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PCIB V.

ESCOLIN

Short Summary:

Mr. and Mrs Hodges both made in their wills provisions that upon their deaths, their whole estates
should be inherited by the surviving spouse and that spouse could manage and alienate the said lands,
with the exception of the Texas property. Upon death of the latter spouse, the residue of the estate
inherited by the later spouse from the spouse who predeceased him would redound to the brothers
and sisters. Mrs. Hodges died first then Mr. Hodges, but since there was no liquidation of Mrs. Hodges
estate, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges wanted to determine the extent of her estate that they
could inherit. (believe me, this is a short summarycase is long)

Facts

-Charles & Linnie Hodges, both TEXAN nationals, provided in their respective wills that

bequeath remainder of estate to spouseduring lifetime


remainder goes to brothers and sis of surviving spouse
-Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. Hodges appointed as EXECUTOR

in Financial Statements submitted before the court, he made statements that the estate of
Mrs. Hodges is 1/2 of conjugal estate
that he allegedly renounced his inheritance in a tax declaration in US
for 5 years before his death, he failed to make accounting, failed to acquire final adjudication
of wife's estate

-Charles died. Magno, initially administratrix of both spouse's estate, later replaced by PCIB for Charles'
estate

WON Action is prescribed?

NO. 33 appeals were timely made

-Court did not pass upon its timeliness

WON Certiorari and Prohibition is proper?

YES. Appeal insufficient remedy

-many appeals, same facts, same issues = multiplicity of suits

WON THERE IS STILL A RESIDUE FOR MRS. HODGES' HEIRS?

YES.

1. WON SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR SETTLEMENT OF MRS. HODGES ESTATE SHOULD ALREADY BE
CLOSED, BASED ON THE DECEMBER 1957 COURT ORDER ALLEGEDLY ADJUDICATING MR. HODGES AS
SOLE HEIR? NO

.no final distribution to all parties concerned of the estate

2. R90.1 (on RESIDUE):

after residue assigned to parties entitled to it, S.P. deemed ready for FINAL CLOSURE:

1. Order issued for distribution/assignment of estate among those entitled


2. Debts

Funeral expenses
Expenses of administration
Widow allowance
Taxes
Etc.
should be paid already

3. Motion of party requesting the same (not motu proprio) Would include distribution of residue of
estate

-Here:

a. No final distribution of residue of Linney's estate


b. No special application made by charles/PCIB
c. Merely allowed advance or partial payments/implementation of will before final liquidation
d. If charles already deemed sole heir, why PCIB needed to file a motion to declare that Charles is
indeed the sole heir?

3. ON ALLEGED INTENTION OF MR. HODGES

PCIB: He intended to adjudicate whole estate to himself (Thus, no residue left, thus ulit, tapos na
special

proceeding)

BUT SC:

1. Whatever was intended, he can't deprive those who have rights over the estate
2. Order - motion filed merely for exercise of ownership pending proceeding
3. Mr. Hodges was aware that wife's siblings had rights:
In FS, stated that 1/2 of conjugal estate belonged to Estate of Linney
In Petition for will's probate, he listed the bros and sis as heirs
Lawyer of Magno was initially lawyer of Charles when latter was still executor of
Linney's estate so may know what Charles' intended
Charles admitted omitting a bro of Linney
He even allegedly renounced his share of the estate (but was not proven)
Charles had duty, as Surviving spouse, of trustee of wife's estate so had to act in GF
4. ON PROPERTIES FOR SIBLINGS: since there's still a residue, can't close SP yet

>PCIB: NO LIQUIDATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTIES YET, PCIB SHOULD SOLELY ADMINISTER


EVERYTHING TO DETERMINE THE SEPARATE ESTATE OF LINNEY, OVER W/C MAGNO COULD ADMINISTER
H:

NO. both PCIB and Magno should administer

a. It was Charles' fault why no administration of estate yet


b. Admin should both be
impartial
extent of interest
c. Executor (PCIB) of Executor (Charles, over Linney's) Can't administer estate of decedent
(Linney) _ R78.6
d. Liquidation of conjugal partnership may be done in either spouse's probate proceedings -
R73.2
SUCCESSION: WON THERE'S SUBSTITUTION? None

1. No simple or vulgar substitution (A859, NCC)


no provision for:
i. Predecease of T for designated heir
ii. Refusal
iii. Incapacity of designated heir to accept inheritance
2. No fideicomissary substitution
no obligation on Charles to preserve the estate
3. There's simultaneous institution of heirs subject to resolutory condition of Charles' death
Charles was to enjoy the whole estate
but he can't dispose of property mortis causa (because it's already subject to the will
made by his wife, which he agreed in the provision of his will)
4. Charles didn't get mere usufruct: he exercises full ownership

PRIL: WON RP LAW GOVERNS LEGITIME OF CHARLES?

No answer yet. Remanded

Art 16, NCC > applies: law of nationality

If we apply Texas PRIL law:

Personal property: law of domicile


Real property: law of situs (both in RP)

IF Art16 applies, then Texas law should govern; Texas law provides no legitime

So renvoi to RP: RP Law provides that the Surviving Spouse, being the sole heir,

gets 1/2 o the conjugal property, then 1/2 goes to the estate of the spouse. If 1/2 of the estate of the
spouse goes to the surviving spouse which is the sole heir, then Charles gets 1/4 of the whole conjugal
property.

Court said that Texas law may apply, but since not proven as

Courts can't take JN


should show foreign law:
o As certified by person holding/having custody of such law
o Certificate that such officer does have custody over said law
o Aznar can't be used to show what Texas law may contain, as there's a time difference
between this case and that case, thus the Texas law might have changed in between
the rulings

BUT WHATEVER HAPPENS, PCIB can't claim that the estate of Linney is not entitled to at least 1/4 of
conjugal property, they having argued that it is so.

NOTES:

1. will executed in Texas - Oklahoma


2. Charles made executor by Linney, but Charles had no executor - so administrator dapat
3. as regards foreign laws:
Should be proved as a fact
R132 on Public documents
SIR: Dapat use an expert witness
Prove in accordance w/RP law

PCI Bank vs. Escolin

If there is no absolute obligation imposed upon the first heir to preserve the property and transmit it to
a second heir, there is no fideicomisaria. The institution is not necessarily void; it may be valid as some
other disposition, but it is not a fideicomisaria.

PCIB VS. ESCOLIN

56 SCRA 266

FACTS:

Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to her husband. At the time of her death,
she was citizen of Texas but, was, however domiciled in the Philippines. To see whether the
testamentary provisions are valid, it is apparent and necessary to know what law should be applied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable.

RULING:

It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven whether a renvoi will happen
or whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. In line with Texas law, that which
should be proven is the law enforced during the death of Hodges and not in any other time.

The Supreme Court held that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be
more than just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the
principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will
appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that
Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances
presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a
position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We, therefore,
reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court o quo, as
hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand
at this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of
Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to
himself her whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof
during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested
administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of
her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges
in favor of third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under
Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately
applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the
legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.