1

Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil 179 The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent behavior
make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet was dead a well-
FACTS: Marciana Escano and Arthur Jones got married in December 1914. On founded one.
January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport. She never heard from him again. In
1919, she filed for a proceeding to judicially declare Arthur missing. On October Bienvenido vs CA
25, 1919, the court declared Arthur as an absentee with the proviso that said
judicial declaration of absence would not take effect until six months after its FACTS:
publication in the official newspapers pursuant to Art. 186 of the Old Civil Code.
In 23 April 1921, the court issued another order for the taking effect of the
On October 3, 1942, Aurelio Camacho married Consejo Velasco. Twenty years
declaration of absence, publication thereof having been made in the Official
after, without his marriage being dissolved, he contracted another marriage with
Gazette and in "El Ideal." On May 6, 1927, Marciana contracted a second
respondent Luisita Camacho. In 1967, Aurelio met petitioner Nenita Bienvenido,
marriage with Felix Hortiguela. When Marciana died intestate, Felix was
who he lived with from 1968 until at the time of his death in 1989. Sometime in
appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. Angelita Jones, Marcianas
1982, Aurelio bought a house and lot which was registered in his name. 2 years
daughter from her first marriage, filed a case and alleged that she is the only heir
after, he executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita, the
of her mother and that her mothers marriage to Felix was null and void on the
TCT was issued in her name. After the death of Aurelio, respondent brought a
ground that from April 23, 1921 (when the court issued an order for the taking
petition before the RTC seeking the annulment of the sale of the property of
effect of declaration of absence & publication thereof) to May 6, 1927 (her mother
petitioner. Petitioner answered and claimed that she and Aurelio purchased the
and Felixs marriage) was below the 7-year prescriptive period. With this, the
property in question using their joint funds and that she was a purchaser in good
marriage would be null and void and would render her as the sole heir.
faith.

ISSUE: W/N the marriage of Marciana and Felix is null and void. W/N Felix is a
legitimate heir of Marciana.
HELD. Yes and Yes. the absence of Marciana Escao's former husband should
be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning
Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than
nine years elapsed. The validity of the marriage makes him a legitimate heir.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Nolasco
FACTS:
Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England. After that,
she lived with him on his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has
expired, he brought her to his hometown in San Jose, Antique. They got married
in January 1982.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita is void.
HELD:
That exception involved by respondent in accordance with Art. 83 of the NCC
refers to the subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the
remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the seven year period has lapsed; That
this exception cannot be invoked because it was Aurelio who had left his first
wife. Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo, his subsequent
marriage to respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous. There is no basis for
holding that the property in question was property of the conjugal partnership of
Luisita and Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first place. Until
otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be
presumed.

After the marriage celebration, he got another employment contract and left the SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON
province. In January 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother that 15 days
after Janet gave birth to their son, she left. He cut short his contract to find Janet.
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption
He returned home in November 1983.
arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the
party attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove that the first marriage
He did so by securing another contract which England is one of its port calls. He had not been dissolved.
wrote several letters to the bar where he and Janet first met, but all were returned
to him. He claimed that he inquired from his friends but they too had no news
Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage. More than 15 years
about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for the
later, a Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death has been filed before the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet.
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, which has been granted. Bailon,
subsequently, contracted marriage with respondent Teresita Jarque and
RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-General, appealed designated her the Social Security System (SSS) beneficiary of the former.
to the CA, contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet presumptively
dead because Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief
SSS cancelled the claim of respondent Teresita Jarque of her monthly pension
for such declaration. CA affirmed the trial court's decision.
for death benefits on the basis of the opinion rendered by its legal department
that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted during the
ISSUE: subsistence of Bailons marriage with Alice.

Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead. Teresita protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits
asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of
RULING: justice as bigamous or unlawful. Hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all
legal intents and purposes.
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement under
the Article 41 of the Family Code, the existence of a "well-founded belief" that ISSUE:
Janet is already dead.
Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been Teresita Jarque may terminate by mere reappearance of the absent spouse of
shortened to 4 years; however, there is a need for judicial declaration of Bailon
presumptive death to enable the spouse present to marry. However, Article 41
imposes a stricter standard before declaring presumptive death of one spouse. It HELD:
requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
The second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures
until annulled. It is only the competent court that can nullify the second marriage
In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing
Janet's whereabouts too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well- spouse, which action for annulment may be filed.
founded belief that she was already dead.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity
Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their
authorities or of the British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
alleged refusal to give any information about her was too convenient an excuse celebration.
to justify his failure to locate her. He did not explain why he took him 9 months to
finally reached San Jose after he asked leave from his captain. He refused to
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by
identify his friends whom he inquired from. When the Court asked Nolasco about
final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who
the returned letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he was in London,
reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
he did not even dare to solicit help of authorities to find his wife.
 2

Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is
necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof provides the subsequent marriage shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio.
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent
marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentees mere
reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage,
will not terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he petition under Rule 45.
or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law.
appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based
on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which
the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
The appellate court granted Yolandas Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon
notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present
ISSUES:

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law,
1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
Bailons and Teresitas marriage prior to the formers death in 1998, Teresita is
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties
rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.

Republic v. Cantor
2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the petition for
declaration of presumptive death based on evidence that respondent had
FACTS: presented.

Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his wife Maria Fe Espinosa HELD:
Cantor after a violent quarrel. After more than four years of not seeing or hearing
from Jerry, Maria Fe filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of
Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is finaland immediately executory.
her husband. She alleged that she conducted a diligent search for her husband
Even if the RTC erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be
and exerted earnest efforts to find him. The RTC granted her petition. Dissatisfied
assailed.
with the ruling, the OSG filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
RATIO:
ISSUE:
1. A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the
Did Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry was dead in pursuant with
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family
Article 41 of the Family Code?
Code is a summary proceeding as provided for under the Family Code. Taken
together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a
HELD: petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the
judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
Whether or not one has a well-founded belief that his or her spouse is dead
depends on the unique circumstance of each case and that there is no set By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
standard or procedure in determining the same. Maria Fes alleged well- shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no
founded belief arose when: 1) Jerrys relatives and friends could not give her any appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the
information on his whereabouts; and 2) she did not find Jerrys name in the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
patients directory whenever she went to a hospital. It appears that Maria Fe did Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a
not actively look for her husband in hospitals and it may be sensed that her petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
search was not intentional or planned. Her search for Jerry was far from diligent. jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance
Were it not for the finality of the RTC ruling, the declaration of presumptive death with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Courts original
should have been recalled and set aside for utter lack of factual basis. jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court
of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
REPUBLIC V. GRANADA freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
DOCTRINE: Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the
court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment
which are the proper subject of an appeal.
Even if the RTC erred in ruling that therespondent was able to prove her well-
founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead, such order already
final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, [n]othing is more settled In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary
in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for
immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial
even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From
conclusion of fact or law. the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
2. Petitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she
Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got
had not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her
married in 1993.
absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the
Family Code.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus
went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
not receive any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail.
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent
presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC
and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead
rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does
not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief is a state of the mind or
condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence
or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or
OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity
Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives
prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. The motion was denied. of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their
The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the ultimate question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse
and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the
spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted,
underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent
husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about
the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives were not
presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. In short, respondent was
allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues
that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese
Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the
Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. constitutes psychological incapacity.
Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
The Republics arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to
deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her well-
founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be
modified or reversed. Indeed, [n]othing is more settled in law than that when a
judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.
SANTOS VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Leouel, a First Lieutenant of the Philippine Army, married Julia in a municipal trial
court and thereafter, in a church. She gave birth to a baby boy and was named
Leouel Jr. Occasionally, the couple quarreled over a lot of things including the
interference of Julia's parents into their family affairs.
Julia went to US to work as a nurse and promised husband that she will return
once her contract will expired. She never did. Leouel tried to find her in the US
but somehow failed to contact her or get in touch with her.
Leouel filed a petition to have their marriage declared null and void, citing Article
36 of the Family Code. He argued that Julia's failure to return home and
communicating with him for more than 5 years constitute psychological
incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
RULING:
No. Julia's failure to return to her husband and communication with him do not
constitute psychological incapacity. The intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) juridical antecedence, (b)
gravity and (c) incurability.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be
dismissed because the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife is not clearly
shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close
to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of
their wedding, they proceed to the house of defendants mother. There was no
sexual intercourse between them during their first night and same thing
happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a
private place, they went to Baguio but Ginas relatives went with them. Again,
3
there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long
walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May
1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of
sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves
for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The
result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the
husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were
allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his
residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi
Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage
annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is
physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young,
they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to
another physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of
impotency and he is capable of erection.
ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife
HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the
Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give
Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
Republic vs. Molina
Panganiban
Facts : On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O Molina married Reynaldo Molina
which union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo show signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and father as he preferred to spend
more time with his friends, depended on his parents for assistance, and was
never honest with his wife in regard to their finances resulting in frequent quarrels
between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage which was affirmed by CA.
Issue : Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personality constitute
psychological incapacity?
Ruling : There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to be more of a difficulty if not outright refusal or
neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.
Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no
wise constitute psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
(not physical) illness.
The evidence merely adduced that Roridel and her husband could not get along
with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem,
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically of clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
 4

Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to Accordingly, We can safely conclude that said deficiency is so grave and so
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. This Court, finding the gravity of
as root causes. the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but to
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71 declare the marriage between the herein petitioner and the respondent herein
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,221 dissolved. While the law provides that the husband and wife are obliged to live
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non- together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Article 68 of the Family
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven be Code), however, what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling
evidence and included in the text of the decision. party to the cohesion and creation of a family as an inviolable social institution. In
fine, Laila Tanyag-San Jose must be allowed to rise from the ashes and begin a
new life freed from a marriage which, to Us, was hopeless from the beginning
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
and where the bonding could not have been possible.
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from the 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied, hence,
which became effective in 1983. petition for review was filed with the SC interposing the following arguments:

The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition.
Judgment reversed and set aside.
Psychological Incapacity
1. That the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant was suffering from
psychological incapacity to perform his marital obligations as she merely relied
upon the doctors report;
2. That even if psychological examination of the defendant is not necessary, the
totality of the evidence does not show the defendants psychological incapacity;
3. That the defects of the defendant did not exist at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, or are incurable.

Once again, the SC in Rep. v. Laila Tanyag-San Jose, et al., G.R. No. 168328, In reversing the CAs decision, the SC
February 28, 2007 had occasion to rule that the mere fact that a spouse is
jobless and cannot support the family is not a ground to declare a marriage void Held: The plaintiff has the burden to show the nullity of the marriage.
on the ground of psychological incapacity. The term refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. Psychological incapacity, as a ground for nullity of marriage, has been
succinctly expounded in the recent case of Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris v. Brix
In this case, the woman filed a complaint to declare her marriage void alleging Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, thus:
that the husband was jobless and hooked to gambling and drugs. She was a fish
vendor. At the trial, she testified that aside from being jobless and hooked to The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
drugs and gambling, there was no other ground. Dr. Nedy Tayag a clinical under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness
psychologist at the National Center for Mental Health declared that from the afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
psychological test and clinical interview she conducted on the woman, she found grave and so permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of the duties and
the husband whom she did not personally examine to perform the duties of a responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people
spouse. In her report, she narrated that respondent refused to get a job. Instead, may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated
he spent most of his available time with his friends drinking intoxicating with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
substances and gambling activities. Furthermore, the doctor reported that the the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
petitioner later discovered that he was into drugs. He described him to be a serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
happy-go-lucky individual spending most of his time hanging out with friends. The insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for
doctor then concluded thus: this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be
Through the evaluation of test data, correlated with clinical interviews and identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
description of their marital plight, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the explained.
disintegration of the marriage between petitioner and respondent was caused
primarily by the latters psychological incapacity to perform the essential roles As earlier-stated, the doctors report showed that her conclusion about the
and obligations of a married man and father. defendants psychological incapacity was based on the information supplied by
the plaintiff which she found to be factual. That the plaintiff supplied the basis of
His behavioral pattern characterized mainly by constant irresponsibility, lack of her conclusion, makes the doctors conclusion hearsay. It is unscientific and
concern for the welfare of others, self-centered orientation, absence of remorse, unreliable, so the Court declared in Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175 (2002), where
violent tendencies and his involvement in activities defying social and moral the assessment of the therein party sought to be declared psychological
ethics; suits under the classification of Anti-Social Personality Disorder. incapacitated was based merely on the information communicated to the doctor
by the plaintiff.
Such disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply immersed within the
system. It continues to influence the individual until the later stage of life. The doctors report did not even show that the alleged anti-social personality
disorder of the defendant was already present at the inception of the marriage or
The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that the portrayal of the defendant as that it is incurable. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged
jobless and irresponsible is not enough. It cited Molina and said that it is not disorder nor identify its root cause. It merely stated that such disorder was
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as considered to be grave and is deeply immersed within the system and continued
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing to influence the individual until the later stage of life.
so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
No need of personal physical examination.
There was no showing that the doctor interviewed the defendant.
There is of course no requirement that the person sought to be declared
Motion for Reconsideration was filed but it was denied. The CA reversed the psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or
decision on appeal and ruled that the defendant was already psychologically psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration. (Marcos v.
incapacitated within the contemplation of the law at the time of the celebration of Marcos, 397 Phil. 840; Antonio v. Reyes, 484 SCRA 353; Rep. v. Iyoy, 470
the marriage. It ruled: SCRA 508). If it can be proven by independent means that one is psychologically
incapacitated, there is no reason why the same should not be credited.
If being jobless (since the commencement of the marriage up to the filing of
the present petition) and worse, a gambler, can hardly qualify as being mentally
or physically ill what then can we describe such acts? Are these normal
manners of a married man? We are not at all swayed that a union affirmed in The defendants alleged psychological incapacity was premised on his being
church rites and subsequently having children, are proofs that either of the jobless and a drug user, as well as his inability to support his family and his
spouses is mature and responsible enough to assume marital responsibilities. refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. His state
or condition or attitude has not been shown, however, to be a malady or disorder
It was further said by the CA, thus: rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition.
 5

In Molina, where the respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends
than with his family, the Court found the same to be more of a difficulty if not
outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.
In Ferraris, it was ruled:
We find respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the leaving-the-
house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic
attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Underscoring
supplied)
wherein the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of
the aforementioned article, examination of the person by a physician in order for
the former to be declared psychologically incapacitated was likewise not
considered a requirement. (Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19,
2000, 343 SCRA 755). What is important, however, as stated in Marcos v.
Marcos, is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
Likewise, Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which
took effect on March 15, 2003, states:

Also in Ferraris, the Court held that habitual alcoholism, just like infidelity or
perversion and abandonment, did not by itself constitute ground for declaring a
marriage void based on psychological incapacity. (Hernandez v. CA, 377 Phil.
919 (1999)). Neither is emotional immaturity and irresponsibility. (Dedel v. CA,
421 SCRA 461 (2004); Pesca v. Pesca, 356 SCRA 588). Or failure or refusal to
meet duties and responsibilities of a married man if it is not shown to be due to
some psychological (not physical) illness. (Rep. v. CA, 335 Phil. 664 (1997)).
Note:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

In Antonio v. Reyes, it was held: The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented,
considered in totality, should be sufficient to convince the court of the
psychological incapacity of the party concerned. Petitioner, however, failed to
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity,
substantiate his allegation that private respondent is psychologically
as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics.
incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to
Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving
bear a child was strongly disputed, as the records undeniably bear out.
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in
Furthermore, the acts and behavior of private respondent that petitioner cited
psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the
occurred during the marriage, and there is no proof that the former exhibited a
auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed
similar predilection even before or at the inception of the marriage. Hence, the
the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has
SC upheld the ruling of the lower courts. (Zamora v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 141917,
proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in
February 7, 2007, Azcuna, J).
adjudicating petitioners for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same
time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent
mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising
from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow
Molina at present There is need though to emphasize other perspective as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36.

No need to present expert opinion in psychological incapacity cases.

The basic question in Bernardino Zamora v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 141917,
February 7, 2007 (Azcuna, J) is whether there is a need for the presentation of
expert opinion of psychologist and psychiatrist in every petition filed under Article
36, Family Code. The RTC and CA dismissed an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The arguments of the
petitioner before the SC are as follows:

1. There is nothing in Santos v. CA, 310 Phil. 21 (1995), upon which private
respondent relies, that requires as a condition sine qua non the presentation of
expert opinion of psychologists and psychiatrists in every petition filed under
Article 36 of the Family Code. This Court merely said in that case that [t]he well-
considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. However, no expert
opinion is helpful or even desirable to determine whether private respondent has
been living abroad and away from her husband for many years; whether she has
a child; and whether she has made her residence abroad permanent by acquiring
U.S. citizenship; and

2. Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any

party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Among the
essential marital obligations embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the same Code is to
procreate children through sexual cooperation which is the basic end of marriage.
To live together under one roof for togetherness spells the unity in marriage. The
marriage had been existing for twenty four years when private respondent filed a
legal separation case against petitioner. Throughout this period, private
respondent deliberately and obstinately refused to comply with the essential
marital obligation to live and cohabit with her husband.

The Supreme Court

Held: It is true that the case of Santos v. CA, 310 Phil. 21 (1995), did not
specifically mention that the presentation of expert opinion is a vital and
mandatory requirement in filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
grounded on psychological incapacity referred to under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Even in the subsequent case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198, (also known as the Molina case),