As a just cause for dismissal of an employee under Article 282 of the Labor Code, willful disobedience of

the employers lawful orders requires the concurrence of two elements: (1) the employees assailed
conduct must have been willful, i.e., characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the
order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to
the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Both requisites are present in the instant case. It is
noteworthy that upon receipt of the notice of suspension, petitioner did not question such order at the
first instance. He immediately defied the order by reporting on the first day of his suspension. Deliberate
disregard or disobedience of rules by the employee cannot be countenanced. It may encourage him to
do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to
observe. (JIMMY ARENO, JR., v. SKYCABLE PCC-BAGUIO, G.R. No. 180302, February 5, 2010)

5.

ROGELIO BARONDA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AND HIDECO SUGAR MILLING CO., INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 161006, October 14, 2015
(FIRST DIVISION)

FACTS:Respondent Hideco Sugar Milling Co., Inc. employed the petitioner as a mud press truck driver.
He hit HIDECO's transmission lines while operating a dump truck, causing a total factory blackout. Power
was eventually restored but the restoration cost HIDECO. Following the incident, HIDECO served a
notice of offense requiring him to explain the incident within three days from notice. He complied.
Thereafter, the management conducted its investigation, and, finding him guilty of negligence,
recommended his dismissal. The resident manager served a termination letter and informed him of the
decision to terminate his employment effective at the close of office hours of that day. Hence, HIDECO
no longer allowed him to report to work on the next day. The petitioner, along with another employee
also dismissed by HIDECO, filed in the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board in Tacloban City a complaint for illegal dismissal against HIDECO.

Voluntary Arbitrator Antonio C. Lopez, Jr. handled the case and eventually rendered his decision by
finding the petitioner's dismissal illegal, and ordering his reinstatement. Voluntary Arbitrator Lopez, Jr.
deemed the petitioner's separation from the service as a suspension from work without pay, and
commanded him to pay on installment basis the damages sustained by HIDECO incident he had caused.
HIDECO filed a motion for reconsideration but the Voluntary Arbitrator denied the motion. Accepting
the outcome, HIDECO subsequently reinstated the petitioner. The petitioner filed his manifestation with
motion for the issuance of the writ of execution in the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator praying for the
execution of the decision, and insisting on being entitled to backwages and other benefits. HIDECO
opposed the petitioner's motion for execution and simultaneously presented its own motion for
execution to enforce the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator directing the petitioner to pay the actual
damages. The Voluntary Arbitrator denied the petitioner's motion for execution on the ground that the
decision did not award any backwages and granted HIDECO's motion for execution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reinstatement aspect of the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision was executory
pending appeal.

HELD: YES
The timely filing of a motion for reconsideration or of an appeal forestalls the finality of the decision or
award of the Voluntary Arbitrator the reinstatement aspect of the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision or
award remains executory regardless of the filing of such motion for reconsideration or appeal.The
immediate reinstatement of the employee pending the appeal has been introduced by Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 6715, which amended Article 223 of the Labor Code. The duties and responsibilities of
the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and
meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force, which the Constitution also
expressly affirms with equal intensity. Labor is an indispensable partner for the nation's progress and
stability.

We see no reason to obstruct the reinstatement decreed by the Voluntary Arbitrator, or to treat it any
less than the reinstatement that is ordered by the Labor Arbiter. Voluntary arbitration really takes
precedence over other dispute settlement devices. Such primacy of voluntary arbitration is mandated by
no less than the Philippine Constitution and is ingrained as a policy objective of our labor relations
law.The reinstatement order by the Voluntary Arbitrator should have the same authority, force and
effect as that of the reinstatement order by the Labor Arbiter not only to encourage parties to settle
their disputes through this mode, but also, and more importantly, to enforce the constitutional mandate
to protect labor, to provide security of tenure, and to enhance social justice.

6.

G.R. No. 172642 : June 13, 2012

ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife MERRIDY JANE P. DULAY, Petitioner, v. ABOITIZ
JEBSEN MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC., Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

Since 1986, Nelson Dulay was employed as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun on contractual basis
by General Charters, Inc,, a subsidiary of Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime. From September 3, 1999 up to July
19, 2000, Nelson was detailed in petitionersvessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle.

At the time of his death on August 13, 2000, he was a bona fide member of the AMOSUP, GCI collective
bargaining agent. Nelson widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the
grievance procedure of the CBA between AMOSUP and GCI. However, on January 29, 2001, the
grievance procedure was "declared deadlocked" as petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by
the widow.

On March 5, 2001, Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC against GCI for death and medical
benefits and damages. Merridy Jane claimed $90,000.00 however, CGI awarded P20,000.00 to Nelson
brother. Merridy Jane is now claiming the $90,000.00 less the P20,000.00 that Nelson brother received.

Respondents asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the action on account of the absence of
employer-employee relationship between GCI and Nelson at the time of the latter death. Nelson also
had no claims against petitioners for sick leave allowance/medical benefit by reason of the completion
of his contract with GCI.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered respondents to pay P4,621,300.00, the
equivalent of US$90,000.00 less P20,000.00, at the time of judgment. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that
the proximate cause of Nelson death was not work-related.

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter decision as to the grant of death benefits under the CBA
but reversed the latter ruling as to the proximate cause of Nelson death.

A special civil action for certiorari was filed with the CA. The appellate court granted the petition and
referred the case to the NCMB for the appropriate resolution of the issue on the matter of the
applicable CBA provision.

The CA ruled that while the suit filed by Merridy Jane is a money claim, the same basically involves the
interpretation and application of the provisions in the subject CBA. As such, jurisdiction belongs to the
voluntary arbitrator and not the labor arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed error in ruling that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the
case?

HELD:

Petitioner contends that Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, vests jurisdiction on the appropriate branches of the NLRC
to entertain disputes regarding the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement involving migrant
or overseas Filipino workers. Petitioner argues that the abovementioned Section amended Article 217
(c) of the Labor Code which, in turn, confers jurisdiction upon voluntary arbitrators over interpretation
or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies.

It is true that R.A. 8042 is a special law governing overseas Filipino workers. However, there is no specific
provision thereunder which provides for jurisdiction over disputes or unresolved grievances regarding
the interpretation or implementation of a CBA. Section 10 of R.A. 8042, which is cited by petitioner,
simply speaks, in general, of "claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of damages."

On the other hand, Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code are very specific in stating that voluntary
arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements. Stated differently, the instant case involves a situation where the special statute
(R.A. 8042) refers to a subject in general, which the general statute (Labor Code) treats in particular.

In the present case, the basic issue raised by Merridy Jane in her complaint filed with the NLRC is: which
provision of the subject CBA applies insofar as death benefits due to the heirs of Nelson are concerned.
The Court agrees with the CA in holding that this issue clearly involves the interpretation or
implementation of the said CBA. Thus, the specific or special provisions of the Labor Code govern.
In any case, the Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the CBA is the law or contract between
the parties.

Upon this Court reading of the pertinent provisions of the CBA, it is clear that the parties really intended
to bring to conciliation or voluntary arbitration any dispute or conflict in the interpretation or
application of the provisions of their CBA. It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a
procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure
should be strictly observed.

It may not be amiss to point out that the CBA are in consonance with Rule VII, Section 7 of the present
Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
as amended by Republic Act No. 10022, which states that "[f]or OFWs with collective bargaining
agreements, the case shall be submitted for voluntary arbitration in accordance with Articles 261 and
262 of the Labor Code." The Court notes that the said Omnibus Rules and Regulations were promulgated
by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and
that these departments were mandated to consult with the Senate Committee on Labor and
Employment and the House of Representatives Committee on Overseas Workers Affairs.

In consultation with the counterparts of the DOLE in the respective committees of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, as well as the DFA and the POEA is that with respect to disputes involving
claims of Filipino seafarers wherein the parties are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the
dispute or claim should be submitted to the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.
It is only in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement that parties may opt to submit the dispute
to either the NLRC or to voluntary arbitration. It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by
administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law,
and are entitled to great respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are
just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself.

DENIED
at June 13,

7.
Phil. Journalistic Inc., vs NLRC G.R. 166421 September 5, 2006 Facts: In NLR s Resolution dated May 31,
2001, petitioner Philippine CC Journalists, Inc. (PJI) was adjudged liable in the total amount of
P6,447,008.57 for illegally dismissing 31 complainants-employees and that there was no basis for the
implementation of petitioner's retrenchment program. Thereafter, the parties executed a Compromise
Agreement dated July 9, 2001, where PJI undertook to reinstate the 31 complainant-employees
effective July 1, 2001 without loss of seniority rights and benefits; 17 of them who were previously
retrenched were agreed to be given full and complete payment of their respective monetary claims,
while 14 others would be paid their monetary claims minus what they received by way of separation
pay. The compromise agreement was submitted to the NLRC for approval. All the employees mentioned
in the agreement and in the NLRC Resolution affixed their signatures thereon. They likewise signed the
Joint Manifesto and Declaration of Mutual Support and Cooperation which had also been submitted for
the consideration of the labor tribunal. The NLRC forthwith issued another Resolution on July 25, 2002,
which among others declared that the compromise agreement was approved and NCMB-NCR-NS-03-
087-00 was deemed closed and terminated. In the meantime, however, the Union filed another Notice
of Strike on July 1, 2002. In an Order dated September 16, 2002, the DOLE Secretary certified the case to
the Commission for compulsory arbitration. The case was docketed as NCMB-NCR- NS-07-251-02. In its
Resolution dated July 31, 2003, the NLRC ruled that the complainants were not illegally dismissed. The
May 31, 2001 Resolution declaring the retrenchment program illegal did not attain finality as "it had
been academically mooted by the compromise agreement entered into between both parties on July 9,
2001." The Union assailed the ruling of the NLRC before the CA via petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In its Decision dated August 17, 2004, the appellate court held that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in ruling for PJI. The compromise agreement referred only to the award given by the NLRC to
the complainants in the said case, that is, the obligation of the employer to the complainants. Issue:
WON the petitione s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the rC Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is a
proper remedy in this case. Ruling: At the outset, we note that this case was brought before us via
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The proper remedy,
however, was to file a petition under Rule 45. It must be stressed that certiorari under Rule 65 is "a
remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop."
Moreover, the special civil action for certiorari will lie only when a court has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Be that as it may, a petition for certiorari may be
treated as a petition for review under Rule 45. Such move is in accordance with the liberal spirit
pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice. As the instant petition was filed
within the prescribed fifteen-day period, and in view of the substantial issues raised, the Court resolves
to give due course to the petition and treat the same as a petition for review on certiorari.