REGALIAN DOCTRINE

1. Concept

a. Cruz vs. Sec. of DENR

-Native Title is the EXCEPTION of Regalian Doctrine

b. Sec. of DENR vs. YAP

-The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with
the conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has been consistently adopted under
the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitution. Art. 422 of the Civil Code
Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

-All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
domain. Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be
disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed
of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients
of the lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding
the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary
acts of ownership.

-Private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be found on royal
concessions which took various forms, namely: 1) titulo real or royal grant; 2) concension
especial or special grant; 3) composcision con el estado or adjustment title; 4) titulo de
compra or title by purchase; and 5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.

c. Republic vs. CA

-When the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of a decree in 1930, the trial court
had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the disputed portion,
applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land
was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a
certificate of title.

-In 1935, the State recognizes that the lands belong to the public domain is subject to any
existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution.

2. Purpose and Meaning of the Torrens System of Registration

a. Legarda vs. Saleeby

-The real purpose of the torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a
stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted, at
the time of registrations in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That
being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the owner
might rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in
the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his hand. The proceeding for the
registration of land under the torrens system is a judicial proceeding, but it involves more in
its consequences than does an ordinary action.
The registration under the torrens system and the issuance of a certificate of title do not
give the owner any better title than he had. He does not obtain title by virtue of the
certificate. He secures his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title. If he
obtains a certificate of title, by mistake, to more land than he really and in fact owns, the
certificate should be corrected. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not secure
his certificate. Having a fee simple title, and presenting sufficient proof of that fact, he is
entitled to a certificate of registration. The certificate of registration simply accumulates, in
one document, a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee simple title,
which the owner, in fact, has. The certificate, once issued, is the evidence of the title which
the owner has. The certificate should not be altered, changed, modified, enlarged or
diminished, except to correct errors, in some direct proceedings permitted by law. The title
represented by the certificate can not be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished
in a collateral proceeding.
b. Bishop vs. CA

-The Court notes that the private respondents' title is traceable to an Original Certificate of
Title issued way back in 1910 or eighty-two years ago. That certificate is now
incontrovertible and conclusive against the whole world. The presumption of regularity
applies to the issuance of that certificate. This presumption covers the finding that the land
subject of the certificate was private in nature and therefore registrable under the Torrens
system.

-To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for being void ab initio, it must
be shown that the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction over the case and that
there was actual fraud in securing the title. Neither of these requirements has been
established by the petitioners. All they submitted was the certification of the Bureau of
Forestry that the land in question was alienable and disposable public land. The trial court
was correct in ruling that this deserved scant consideration for lack of legal basis. To be
sure, a certification from an administrative body cannot prevail against a court decision
declaring the land to be registrable.

-As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject
any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be
supposed that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and
regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the
return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.

-Registered owner cannot lose the subject property by prescription.

- In light of the observations already made, it is obvious that the petitioners cannot invoke
the status of builders in good faith to preserve their claimed rights to the constructions
they have made on the lots in dispute. A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of
any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on it. This definition cannot apply to
the petitioners because they knew at the very outset that they had no right at all to
occupy the subject lots.
-The petitioners have consistently insisted that the lots were part of the public domain and
even submitted a certification to that effect from the Bureau of Forestry. The land was in
fact registered under the Torrens System and such registration was constructive notice to
the whole world, including the petitioners. Apparently, the petitioners did not take the
trouble of checking such registration. At any rate, the point is that, whether the land be
public or private, the petitioners knew they had no right to occupy it and build on it. The
Court of Appeals was correct in calling them squatters for having entered, without
permission or authority, land that did not belong to them.

c. NGA vs. IAC

-Time and time again, this Court has ruled that the proceedings for the registration of title
to land under the Torrens System is an action in rem, not in personam, hence, personal
notice to all claimants of the res is not necessary in order that the court may have
jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the res. Neither may lack of such personal notice
vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued in a registration proceeding, for the State, as
sovereign over the land situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a
proceeding in rem or one in the nature of or akin a proceeding in rem which shall be
binding upon all persons, known or unknown.

-Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land
taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of the encumbrances which
may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said provision, claims and liens of
whatever character, except those mentioned by law as existing, against the land prior to the
issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon, and the
certificate so issued binds the whole world, including the government.

-Under said ruling, if the purchaser is the only party who appears in the deeds and the
registration of titles in the property registry, no one except such purchaser may be deemed
by law to be the owner of the properties in question (Ibid). Moreover, no title to registered
land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.

-The real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any
question as to its legality. 'Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the 'mirador su casa,' to avoid
the possibility of losing his land.'" An indirect or collateral attack on a Torrens Title is not
allowed.

-The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a land
belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true owner. He is then
considered as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to the
defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value.

d. D.B.T. Mar-Bay Construction, Inc. vs. Panes

-While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring title, but merely a system of
registration of titles to lands, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be
made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's agents, in
the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons.
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any
question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the
time of the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the
Torrens system would forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land
registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties.
Thus, where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus
issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard those rights and order
the cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair
public confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be
preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the system will
have to inquire in every instance on whether the title had been regularly or irregularly
issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with the registered
land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law
will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the
property.

LAND REGISTRATION AND ITS REGISTRIES OF DEEDS

2. Office of the Register of Deeds; General Function

a. Baranda vs. Gust

-Duty of Register of Deeds is Ministerial.

-A register of Deeds has no legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration. Opinion of
commissioner must be sought in case of doubt.

b. Balbin vs. Register of Deeds of Ilocus Sur

-Register of Deeds' refusal to annotate donation proper where there were other copies of
title: Where, when the petitioner presented to the register of deeds a duplicate copy of the
registered owner's certificate of title and a deed of donation for annotation, three other
copies of the title were in existence, the register of deeds was correct in denying the
requested annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law." As
correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the
issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being
presumed until otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There being several
copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely
affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not
on the others.

c. Almirol vs. Register of Deeds of Agusan

-The Register of Deeds may not validly refuse to register a deed of sale presented to him
for registration. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the Register of Deeds to
determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. Indeed, a
register of deeds is entirely precluded by Section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his
personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register
a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is
in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument
presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the
question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter
an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.

-Mandamus does not lie to compel the register of deeds to register the deed of sale in
question, because pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act 1151, where any
party in interest does not agree with the register of deeds, the question shall be submitted
to the Commissioner of Land Registration, whose decision on the matter shall be binding
upon all register of deeds. Hence, this administrative remedy must be resorted to, before
there can be recourse to the courts.

ORIGINAL REGISTRATION

1. Application

a. Who may apply: Section 14 of P.d. 1529

Section 14(1): Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier.

i. Ong vs. Republic

-Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must
prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona de claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
-The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show by
clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the
land is of the nature and duration required by law. Unfortunately, petitioner's evidence do
not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary in cases of this nature.

ii. Caete vs. Genuino Ice Company

-One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may
not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial, as
this contravenes the historical fact that friar lands were bought by the Government of the
Philippine Islands, pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United States, approved on July 1,
1902, not from individual persons but from certain companies, a society and a religious
order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only "actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands
are acquired by the Government" were given preference to lease, purchase, or acquire their
holdings, in disregard of the settlement and occupation of persons before the government
acquired the lands.

Section 14(2): Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provision of existing laws.

i. Malabanan vs. Republic

-(1) In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48 (b) of
the Public Land Act recognizes and con rms that "those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona de
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period
of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as
soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section
47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree

-(2) In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code.
And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person's uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

Section 14(3): Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds
by river of accession or accretion under the existing laws.

a. Republic vs. Abrille

- Recourse under Section 44 of Act 496 is good only insofar as it covers previously
registered lands.
- Where parts of the tracts of land has not yet been brought under the operation of the
Torrens System, approval of subdivision plans cannot bring said tracts of land under the
operation and coverage of the Torrens Systems. More so where the approval of the
subdivision plans was without notice to all parties in interest, more particularly the
Director of Lands.

- For an applicant to have this imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be

originally registered under Act 496, the several requisites should all be satisfied; (1) Survey
of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor; (2) Filing an
application for registration by the applicant; (3) Setting of the date for the initial hearing
of the application by the Court; (4) Transmittal of the application and the date of the
initial hearing together with all the documents or other evidences attached thereto by the
Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission; (5) Publication of a notice of the
filing of the application and the date and place of the hearing in the Official Gazette; (6)
Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to have interests
in the property by the sheriff; (7) Filing of answer to the application by any person
whether named in the notice or not; (8) Hearing of the case by the Court; (9)
Promulgation of judgment by the Court; (10) Issuance of the decree by the Court
declaring the decision final and instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a
decree of confirmation and registration; (11) Entry of the decree of registration in the
Land Registration Commission; (12) Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the
corresponding Register of Deeds; and (13) Transcription of the decree of registration in
the registration book and the issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate of title
to the applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.

2. Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete Titles

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, C.A. 141

a. Susi vs. Razon

-An open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain from
time immemorial by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an
effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be public, to become private,
property.

-To acquire a right to a certificate of title over a land of the public domain, under the
provisions of Chapter VI of Act No. 926, as amended by Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, an
open, adverse, public and continuous possession from July 26,1894, is sifficient, provided the
possessor makes application therefor under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874.
The possessor under such circumstances acquires by operation of law, not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the government, and the actual issuance of a title is not necessary in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts.

-As the possessor of a public land under the circumstances mentioned in the preceding
paragraphs acquires the land by operation of law as a grant from the State, the land ceasing
to be of public domain, to become private property, at least by presumption, it follows that
it can no longer be sold by the Director of Lands to another person, and if he does, the sale
is void, and the said possessor may recover the land from any person holding it against his
will.

-from that grant, the judicial confirmation of imperfect titles becomes a mere formality.

b. Republic vs. IAC and ACME Plywood and Veneer

-Alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-

interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years
under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse
or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the
undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it
was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there
being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land.
The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial
confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than
substantial.

c. Rep. vs. CA and Naguit

-Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made,
has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence,
the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part
of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

-A different rule obtains for forest lands, such as those which form part of a reservation for
provincial park purposes the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership. 20 It is
elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals, forestland is not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless
such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. In the case at bar, the
property in question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the
ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.

-Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public
Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public domain," while the Property
Registration Decree uses the term "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It
must be noted though that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands." Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land.

d. Republic vs. Herbieto

-A land registration case is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired
unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.
-Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of
the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2)
mailing; and (3) posting.

-Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property Registration
Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands
v. Court of Appeals 30 that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory
for the land registration court to validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or
applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree enumerated and described
in detail the requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial
Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of
general circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the
same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the
Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.

-As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is indispensable that the
person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or
any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. The Public Land Act, as amended, governs
lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-
owned lands which reverted to the State. It explicitly enumerates the means by which public
lands may be disposed, as follows:

1. For homestead settlement;

2. By sale;
3. By lease;
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
a. By judicial legalization; or
b. By administrative legalization (free patent)

-Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding

144 hectares may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land
Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073.
-Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to
judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse
possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots
became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to
the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession;
such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as
alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.
It is very apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the period of
possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire
imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or
legalized.

e. Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic

-that the 30- year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code.

-What the system accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought about by
the completion of a period of possession ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30
years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).

f. Diaz vs. Republic

-We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases led under the provisions of
the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an
order dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part of the public
domain constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also against all
persons.

-it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been reclassified as alienable
by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon the recommendation of the proper
department head who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands) 34 coupled with possession by the
claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was
not able to produce such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her
predecessors-in-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is
because prior to the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or
possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year
possession requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act. The
rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified
as forest land is released through an official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then
will it form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. Therefore, even if
possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen to ownership.

g. Sps. Fortuna vs. Republic

-it is essential for any applicant for registration of title to land derived through a public
grant to establish foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the land.

-As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and disposition of alienable
agricultural lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands of the public domain may be
disposed of, among others, by judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title.

-Under Section 6 of the PLA, the classification and the reclassification of public lands are the
prerogative of the Executive Department. The President, through a presidential proclamation
or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the
public domain. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is
likewise empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as
alienable and disposable. Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for
registration of title acquired through a public land grant must present incontrovertible
evidence that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing
the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
-Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties'
alienable and disposable character. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of the
original classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the
DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.

-applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona de
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947 if prior
to P.D. No. 1073. (now, June 12, 1945, P.D. No. 1073 (Jan. 25, 1977)). IOW, they must prove
the 30 years or at least since May 8, 1947 prior to P.D. No. 1073.

4. Forms and Contents

d. Amendments of boundaries or area

ii. Benin vs. Tuazon

-Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment of
the application for registration when it appears to the court that the amendment is
necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time order an
application to be amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the
application. The amendment may be made in the application or in the survey plan, or in
both, since the application and the survey plan go together. If the amendment consists in
the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously
included in the original application, as published, a new publication of the amended
application must be made. The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all
persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the
registration court can not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added
to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration court
would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land. The reason is
because without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is
required in registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to
present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice. But if the
amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original
application and the original plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary.
In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not affected by the
failure of a new publication.

-It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the original survey plan is
amended during the registration proceedings by the addition of lands not previously
included in the original plan should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on
the court to order the registration of the area that was added after the publication of the
original plan.

iii. Dream Village vs. Bases Development Authority

-The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross Swo-00-0001302 was abandoned
by deviating it northward to traverse the southern part of Libingan ng mga Bayani does not
signify abandonment by the government of the bypassed lots, nor that these lots would
then become alienable and disposable. They remain under the title of the BCDA, even as it
is significant that under Section 8 (d) of R.A. No. 7227, a relocation site of 30.5 has. was to
be reserved for families affected by the construction of C-5 Road. It is nowhere claimed that
Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are part of the said relocation site. These lots border
C-5 Road in the south, 56 making them commercially valuable to BCDA, a farther argument
against a claim that the government has abandoned them to Dream Village.

-While property of the State or any of its subdivisions patrimonial in character may be the
object of prescription, those intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth are considered property of public dominion and therefore not
susceptible to acquisition by prescription.

e. Survey of the Land

i. Republic vs. Sarmiento

-It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from the government, and it is indispensable that the person claiming
title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode
of acquisition recognized by law.

-In any event, an examination of what purports to be the technical survey data of the LLDA
shows that it is not a certified original copy but a mere photocopy, the veracity and
genuineness of which cannot be ascertained by this Court.

ii. Carpo vs. Ayala Land

-It is mandatory that the application in original land registration cases, should be
accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved by the
director of the Bureau of Lands.

-A survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has a character
of being a dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence.

-That unless a survey plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands the same is of dubious
value and is not acceptable as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its
alleged results are not entitled to credit and should be rejected.

- The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless
the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the
same are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it was
ruled that the Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey
plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177).

5. Publication, Opposition of and Default (Section 23)

a. Notice of Initial Hearing

i. Director of Lands vs. CA and Abistado

- The law (Section 23 of P.D. 1529) used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done
by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order
setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus
indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While concededly such literal mandate is
not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its
context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be
understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, the Court
through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide. Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1599 requires notice
of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which
must be complied with. "If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not
have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the
petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and
occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of
reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since
the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.

b. Proof Required in Registration Proceedings

i. Republic vs. Dela Paz

-From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona de claim of ownership from
June 12, 1945 or earlier. These the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive
and convincing evidence.

-To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau
of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In
the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands
Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness
of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and
character of the property surveyed.

ii. Republic vs. CA and Lapina

-The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable
public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v Buyco,
216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of
the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As
such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of
the Director of Lands to dispose of.

c. Issuance of Decree

i. Republic vs. Nillas

-Neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case.

-The provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action
must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes
the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings, the purpose is
to establish a status, condition or fact; In land registration proceedings, the ownership by a
person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved
and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and
the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

-There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue
a decree. The reason is that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not
need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a
decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission;
failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion
therefore has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is
ordered to be registered.

ii. Ting vs. Heirs of Lirio

-In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without
opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as
the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res
judicata against the whole world. It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary
period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.

-if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the
decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials
of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings.

-This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action
must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes
the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to
establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a
person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved
and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and
the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

-Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the
winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration
case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further
action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.

d. When OCT takes effect

i. Manotok Realty vs. CLT Realty

-The date of receipt by the Register of Deeds of the decree is the date which should be
reckoned as the date of registration of title. The date of the issuance of the decree of
registration is not the date when the title took effect.

ii. Angeles vs. Sec. of Justice

-there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received
for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date
which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also be
acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the
decree of registration on [19] April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the
date of the title or the date when the title took effect.
6. Classification of Public Lands

a. Director of Lands vs. CA

-In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, w e ruled: "As
provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act 2874,
the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not
the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the
court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government, through the Office of the
President.

-I t b e a r s emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land

which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and until the land
classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
151 SCRA 679).

b. Republic vs. CA

c. Leonardo de Castro vs. Mayor Yap, et. Al.

-All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of
the public domain.

-While it is true that the land classifcation map does not categorically state that the islands
are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result.

-Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4 (a) is the
word "reclassification". Where there has been no previous classification of public forest
[referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of
the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest
purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest
uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to
speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).

-Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classi cation of lands from the
facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands. 96 Act No. 2874,
promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive
Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. 96-a Since then, courts no longer had
the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the
public domain.

-Contrary to private claimants' argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to
existing vested rights.

d. Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties

-CENRO (Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices) has the authority to issue
certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority
of the PENRO (Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices) to issue certificates of
land classification status for lands covering over hectares.

e. Republic vs. Santos

-Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for
more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land
by prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land was already
declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land
still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.

-it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable,
and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area
per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.

7. Non-registrable properties

a. Santolan vs. Executive Secretary

-Preference of Riparian Owner: The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy
lands, or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or
rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not
be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this
nature, provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a
communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.

-It is true that applicant Lusin introduced improvements on the land in question, but that
fact does not give him preferential right thereto, not only because he had not acquired any
permit from the Bureau of Lands before doing so, but also because his entry on the
premises was duly protested by Santolan.

-The word "riparian" in paragraphs 32 and 4 of the departmental regulations is used in a

broad sense as referring to any property having a water frontage. Strictly speaking,
"riparian" refers to rivers. A riparian owner is a person who owns land situated on the bank
of a river. But in paragraphs 32 and 4, the term "riparian owner" embraces not only the
owners of lands on the banks of rivers but also the littoral owners, meaning the owners of
lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The littoral is the coastal
region including both the land along the coast and the water near the coast or the shore
zone between the high and low watermarks.

b. Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Lastimado

-the land is inside the military reservation.

-Public forest.

c. Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority

-Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also
to property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property
constituted property of public dominion although employed for some economic or
commercial activity to increase the national wealth.
d. Chavez vs. NHA and Regis Romero

-The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing,
and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. All
reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA,
and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any
person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation projects of any national government agency or
entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon
approval of the President.

-Three requisites for a legal and valid reclamation project: 1) approval by the President; 2)
favorable recommendation of PEA; and 3) undertaken by any of the following: a) by PEA; b)
by any person or entity pursuant to a contract it executed with PEA; c) by the National
Government agency or entity authorized under its charter to reclaim lands subject to
consultation with PEA.

8. Remedies

Remedies under the Property Registration Decree, incases of fraudulent registration

a. Petition for review of decree

i. Republic vs. CA

- The one- year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition
for review and is reckoned from the entry of the decree.

-There are other remedies available to an aggrieved party after the said one-year period,
e.g., reconveyance, covered by Section 65 of Act No. 496 which, inter alia, provides that "in
all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any
innocent holder for value of a certificate of title." Likewise, an action for damages is
sanctioned in cases where the property has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for
value, which may be filed within four years from discovery of the fraud. Recourse may also
be had against the Assurance Fund.

-alienable lands of public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to

government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become
private or patrimonial lands

ii. Eland Philippines, Inc. vs. Garcia

-To avail of a petition for review, the following requisites must be satisfied: a) the petitioner
must be satisfied: a) the petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land; b) He must
show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration; c) The petition must be
filed within one year from the issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Authority;
and d) The property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.

-A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained under the
Torrens system. An important feature of a certificate of title is its finality. The proceedings
whereby such a title is obtained are directed against all persons, known or unknown,
whether actually served with notice or not, and includes all who have an interest in the land.
If they do not appear and oppose the registration of their own estate or interest in the
property in the name of another, judgment is rendered against them by default, and, in the
absence of fraud, such judgment is conclusive. If an interest in the land will not by itself
operate to vacate a decree of registration, a fortiori, fraud is not alone sufficient to do so.

The petition for review must be led within one year from entry of the decree of registration.

iii. Serna vs. CA

-At the time material hereto, registration of untitled land was pursuant to Act No. 496, as
amended. Later, Presidential Decree 1529, the Property Registration Decree, amended and
codified laws relative to registration of property. "Adjudication of land in a registration (or
cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one (1)
year after the entry of the final decree." After the lapse of said period, the decree becomes
incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening or review. However, the right of a
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation
of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law as a valid and legal basis for
reopening and revising a decree of registration. The fraud contemplated by the law is actual
and extrinsic fraud, which includes an intentional omission of a fact required by law. For
fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon
which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their
opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree
of registration.

b. Action for Reconveyance

ii. Cases:

a. Roque vs. Aguada

-The essence of an action for reconveyance is to seek the transfer of the property which was
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name to its rightful owner or to
one with a better right. Thus, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that he has
a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner and that the property
has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

b. Emma Ver Reyes vs. Montemayor

-It has long been established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action
in an ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. "It is one thing to protect an innocent third
party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if deceit would be
rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious deed".
Reconveyance is all about the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereto, which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful and
legal owner, or to one with a better right. Evidently, petitioners, being the rightful owners of
the subject property, are entitled to the reconveyance of the title over the same.
-This having been said, an action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a
person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in
another's name. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to
an innocent person for value.

c. Gasataya vs. Mabasa

-Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also to the person
with a better right than the person under whose name said property was erroneously
registered. 8While respondent is not the legal owner of the disputed lots, she has a better
right than petitioner to the contested lots on the following grounds: first, the deed of
conditional sale executed by DBP vested on her the right to repurchase the lots and second,
her right to repurchase them would have subsisted had they (the Gasatayas) not defrauded
her.

-Fraud is a ground for reconveyance.

d. Re: 4-year period and 10-year period to file action.

d.i. Amerol vs. Bagumbayan

-An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce
prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very
recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action
for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin
vs. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years.
However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de
Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of
Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil Code not coming into effect until August 30, 1950
as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that Article 1144 and Article 1456,
are new provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of
Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive
period for an action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false
pretenses.

d.ii. Sanjorjo vs. Quijano

-an aggrieved party may still file an action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust, which prescribes in ten years from the date of the issuance of the
Certificate of Title over the property provided that the property has not been acquired by an
innocent purchaser for value.

d. Recovery from the Assurance Fund

i. Recovery could be had from the Assurance Fund only upon a showing that there be no
negligence on the part of the party sustaining any loss or damage or being deprived of
any land or interest therein by the operation of the Land Registration Act.

3. Other Remedies Available

Other Remedies Available

a. Action for cancellation or reversion (Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act)

i. Cawis vs. Cerilles

-The objective of an action for reversion of public land is the cancellation of the certi cate of
title and the resulting reversion of the land covered by the title to the State. This is why an
action for reversion is oftentimes designated as an annulment suit or a cancellation suit.

ii. Republic vs. CA and Alpuerto

-Under these circumstances, the certificate of title may be ordered cancelled (Republic vs.
Animas, et al., supra), and the cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary action
therefor. This action cannot be barred by the prior judgment of the land registration court,
since the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. And if there was no such
jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply.

-Consequently, the State may still seek the cancellation of the title issued to Perpetuo
Alpuerto and his successors-in-interest pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Such
title has not become indefeasible, for prescription cannot be invoked against the State
(Republic vs. Animas, supra).

b. Annulment of Judgments, Final Orders or Resolutions (Rule 47, Rules of Court)

i. Yujuico vs. Republic

-
It may be stated at the outset that a petition for annulment of certificate of title or
reconveyance of land may be based on fraud which attended the issuance of the decree of
registration and the corresponding certificate of title.

- The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence,

minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any
person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual
fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of
the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of
such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court
where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose
rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrances for value. (Emphasis supplied.)
-
-More on the issue of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned or
declined to assert it.

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (Sections 39-50)

1. Key Concepts of the Torrens System

a. Decree Binds the land Sec. 31, PD1529

i. Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City

- Moreover, the petition for reconstitution of title by Lucia dela Cruz which the court held
to be valid was a proceeding in rem. It is well established that in rem proceedings such as
land registration constitutes constructive notice to the whole world. The petitioners
cannot now claim that they were not notified of the reconstitution proceedings over said
lot. Under the facts of the case, the title in the name of Lucia dela Cruz (TCT No. RT 58)
has become indefeasible and incontrovertible.

b. Owners Duplicate Certificate (Section 41)

i. Reyes vs. Raval-Reyes

-The owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name said land is registered and
inscribed in the certificate of title has a more preferential right to the possession of the
owner's duplicate than one whose name does not appear in the certificate and has yet to
establish his right to the possession thereof.

ii. Abrigo vs. De Vera

-More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the
right of a party who had registered the sale of land under the Property Registration Decree,
as opposed to another who had registered a deed of final conveyance under Act 3344. In
that case, the priority in time principle was not applied, because the land was already
covered by the Torrens system at the time the conveyance was registered under Act 3344.
For the same reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera under
the Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over the sale
registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.

-Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo explained the difference in the rules of registration under
Act 3344 and those under the Torrens system in this wise:

Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is without
prejudice to a third party with a better right. The aforequoted phrase has been held by this
Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in ones favor does not give him any
right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously
sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.

The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals is a case in point. It was held therein that Article
1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered under Act No. 496. Like in
the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same unregistered land. The first
sale was made by the original owners and was unrecorded while the second was an
execution sale that resulted from a complaint for a sum of money filed against the said
original owners. Applying [Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court held
that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the
execution sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was
registered. It was explained that this is because the purchaser of unregistered land at a
sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely
acquires the latters interest in the property sold as of the time the property was levied
upon.
Applying this principle, . . . the execution sale of unregistered land in favor of petitioner is
of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of
the said execution sale.

-Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were fraudulently misled into believing that the
property was unregistered. A Torrens title, once registered, serves as a notice to the whole
world. All persons must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.
-We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire the
immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith. Mere registration of title is not
enough; good faith must concur with the registration.

iii. Republic vs. Mendoza

-The Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by
the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal
expropriation proceeding covering such property. Further, as the Court also held in Eusebio
v. Luis, the failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation
proceedings covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his
right to gain back possession. The Mendozas' remedy is an action for the payment of just
compensation, not ejectment.

c. Statement of Personal Circumstances (Section 45)

i. Litam vs. Espiritu

-The evidence shows that the properties in questions were brought by the wife with her
separate and exclusive money, although during her marriage with the decedents; that the
spouse had adopted a system of separation of properties; that the wife had been
administering said properties, to the exclusion of her husband; and that said properties were
registered in her name. Thus, the disputable presumption of law that properties acquired
during marriage are conjugal properties has been overcome.

-The decedent had acknowledged the fact that he had obtained from his wife sums of
money which belongs exclusively to the latter and had not been paid to her up to the
present. He also acknowledged that he had not given any money to his wife and that they
have actually adopted a system of separation of property, each of them not having any
interest or participation whatsoever in the property of the other. These declarations and
admission of fact made by the decedent against his interest are binding upon him, his heirs
and successors in interests and third persons as well.
-Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of
Marcosa Rivera, are the very Torrens Titles covering said properties. All the said properties
are registered in the name of "Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael Litam." This circumstance
indicates that the properties in question belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as
her paraphernal properties, for if they were conjugal, the titles covering the same should
have been issued in the names of Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera. The words "married to
Rafael Litam" written after the name of Marcosa Rivera, in each of the above mentioned
titles are merely descriptive of the civil status of Marcosa Rivera, the registered owner of the
properties covered by said titles.

ii. Parulan vs. Garcia

-Every certificate of title shall set forth the full names of all persons whose interests make up
the full ownership in the whole land, including their civil status, and the names of their
respective spouses, if married, as well as their citizenship, residence and postal address. If
the property covered belongs to the conjugal partnership, it shall be issued in the names of
both spouses.

-A plain reading of the above provision would clearly reveal that the phrase "Pedro
Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]" merely describes the civil status and identifies
the spouse of the registered owner Pedro Calalang. Evidently, this does not mean that the
property is conjugal.

iii. Borromeo vs. Descallar

-It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of
confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are
not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of
the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in
her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on
indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that
the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-
defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did
not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration. This is the situation in the
instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the
properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She
and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.

iv. Ventura vs. Abuda

-The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase
"married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that
Socorro co-owned the property. The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired
ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of
title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title
system merely confirms, and does not vest title.

d. Registered Land Not Subject to Prescription

i. Sugapo vs. De Jesus

-lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

ii. Cabrera vs. CA

-Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.

- The defense of laches is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the character
of the defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of plaintiff's long inaction
or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting his claim at all, because to
allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to defendant. Laches is not
concerned merely with lapse of time, unlike prescription. While the latter deals with the
fact of delay, laches deals with the effect of unreasonable delay. This Court emphasized in
 Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, G.R. No. L-9335, October 31, 1956, 100 Phil 277, the reason
upon which the rule is based is not alone the lapse of time during which the neglect to
enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition which may have arisen during
the period in which there has been neglect. In other words, where a court finds that the
position of the parties has to change, that equitable relief cannot be afforded without
doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or
seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the
consequences of his own neglect. In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a
registered owner of property may be barred from recovering possession of property by
virtue of laches. Under the Land Registration Act (now the Property Registration Decree),
no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession. The same is not true with regard to laches. As we
have stated earlier in Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, while the defendant may not be
considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessor's long continued
possession (37 years) the original owner's right to recover back the possession of the
property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the latter's long period of
possession and by patentee's inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.

iii. Tiongco vs. Tiongco

-The Court agrees with the CA's disquisition that an action for reconveyance can indeed be
barred by prescription. In a long line of cases decided by this Court, we ruled that an action
for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten (10)
years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

-However, there is an exception to this rule. In the case of Heirs of Pomposa Saludares v.
Court of Appeals, the Court reiterating the ruling in Millena v. Court of Appeals, held that
there is but one instance when prescription cannot be invoked in an action for
reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed. In
Heirs of Pomposa Saludares, this Court explained that the Court in a series of cases, has
permitted the ling of an action for reconveyance despite the lapse of more than ten (10)
years from the issuance of title to the land and declared that said action, when based on
fraud, is imprescriptible as long as the land has not passed to an innocent buyer for value.
But in all those cases, the common factual backdrop was that the registered owners were
never in possession of the disputed property. The exception was based on the theory that
registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at
the expense of another.

-prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed land
because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession
gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature
of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. The Court held that where the
plaintiff in an action for reconveyance remains in possession of the subject land, the action
for reconveyance becomes in effect an action to quiet title to property, which is not subject
to prescription.

-wherein we ruled that the imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied
or constructive trust applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not
in possession of the property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is an action to quiet the
property title, which does not prescribe.

-there was no doubt about the fact that an action for reconveyance based on an implied
trust ordinarily prescribes in ten (10) years. This rule assumes, however, that there is an
actual need to initiate that action, for when the right of the true and real owner is
recognized, expressly or implicitly such as when he remains undisturbed in his possession,
the statute of limitation would yet be irrelevant. An action for reconveyance, if nonetheless
brought, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, or its equivalent, an action
that is imprescriptible.

e. Certificate of Title not subject to Collateral Attack (Section 48)

i. Taparuc vs. Vda Mende

-As a final note, we emphasize that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The
question on the validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, can be raised
only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. The title represented by the
certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, diminished, or cancelled in a
collateral proceeding.

ii. Rodriquez vs. Rodriquez

-We agree with the RTC that a certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of ownership of
the land described therein; the validity of which shall not be subject to a collateral attack,
especially in an ejectment case which is summary in nature.

iii. Corpuz vs. Agustin

-It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of
collateral attack. Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. It is a well-
established doctrine that the title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered,
modi ed, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding. Considering that this is an
unlawful detainer case wherein the sole issue to be decided is possession de facto rather
than possession de jure, a collateral attack by herein respondents on petitioner's title is
proscribed.

iv. Tuazon vs. Isagan

-A person who possesses a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the
attributes of ownership including possession. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a
collateral attack in an action for unlawful detainer. A collateral attack is made when, in an
action to obtain a different relief, the validity of a certificate of title is questioned.