ALAWI V. ALAUYA
:
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate
and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District
in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends. Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for
the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was
also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted
to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the
Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC. On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an
administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds was Alauyas usurpation of the title of "attorney," which
only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use. Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the
assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal"
or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the title Attorney may be synonymously used by Sharia lawyers with Counsellors-at-
law.
RULING:
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," the Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law
before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice
in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his
use of the title of attorney.
As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more
stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive,
offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action
against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness,
or undue harm to anyone in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of
Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by
counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by
City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing
the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would
appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive
any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the
counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant
Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law
practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is
a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance
of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as
Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this
limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he
(Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided
by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which
read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the
civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party
had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her
interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an
agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his
appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or
intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna,
because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the
duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor
in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case
had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was
impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the
Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or
a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing
the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1wph1.t
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider
plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127
(now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give
professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was
engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private
practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition
of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel
on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following
observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior,
the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed,
in all respects, with costs against appellant..
In Re: Argosino B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995TOPIC:
FACTS:
This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant.
Argosino was previously involved with hazing that caused the death of Raul Camaligan but was
sentencedwith homicide through reckless imprudence after he pleaded guilty.
He was sentenced with 2 years imprisonment where he applied for a probation thereafter which was
grantedby the court with a 2 yr probation.
He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take oath.
He filed a petition to allow him to take the attorneys oath of office averring that his probation was already
terminated.
The court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was terminated.
ISSUE:
WON Argosino may take oath of office
RULING:
The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar members, keeping in mind that
suchis of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are
concerned,than the possession of legal learning.
Hence he was asked by the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and have
become a responsible member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who have a
good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to
certify heirs morally fit to the admission of the law profession.
The court also ordered that said a copy of the proceeding be furnished to the family/relatives of Raul
Camaligan
FACTS: On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the affliction of severe
physical injuries upon him in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On
February 11, 1993, the accused were consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years. Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues
filed an application for probation with the lower court. The application was granted on June 18 1993. The period of
probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him. Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He was allowed and he passed
the exam, but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office. On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to
allow him to take the attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of law. He averred that his probation period had
been terminated. It is noted that his probation period did not last for more than 10 months.
ISSUE: Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted to the practice of law
HELD: Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those who are seeking admission to the bar. He should show to
the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased
student and to the community at large. In short, he must show evidence that he is a different person now, that he has
become morally fit for admission to the profession of law. He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate
written manifestation, of the names of the parents or brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.
The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar members, keeping in mind that
such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than
the possession of legal learning. Hence he was asked by the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has
reformed and have become a responsible member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who
have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify
he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession. The court also ordered that said a copy of the proceeding be
furnished to the family/relatives of Raul Camaligan.
DOCTRINES
The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special
education qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the general public and proper
administration of justice is concerned.
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission
to the Bar.
Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must
be a necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public.
Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that
the participant was possessed of good moral character.
Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated at the time of the
application for permission to take the bar examinations and more importantly at the time of application for admission
to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101,
charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection
with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity
initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a
result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea
was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused
individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court.
The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge
Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to
the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He
was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He
passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office
and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period
by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10)
months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr.
Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.
Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be
lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having
persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's
right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition
to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a
character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which
the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It
means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or
should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of
least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for
a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its
ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his
life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such,
is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210
NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the
straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of
profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to
possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of the
moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument,
therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to
the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil
must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has
once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far
more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for
disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to
carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to
those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All
may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has
been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only
those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the
standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to
 punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into
learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect
the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet
what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to
be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may
not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible
consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who,
having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the
administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas.
187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the
practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The
possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the
public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning.
Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes
the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that
his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead
of an ornament to his great calling a curse instead of a benefit to his
community a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith
or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for
disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to
practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the
court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been
guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be
sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and
the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects
honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that
might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of
necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a
very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our
people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of
good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical
injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious
character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to
discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the
fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and
kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible
behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must
be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be
now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission
to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the
community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant
period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to
the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased
student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that
he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of
the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the
names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan),
within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and
sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was
admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter
was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and
later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys,
because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not
completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the
Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma
therefrom which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his
application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the
"required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first
charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service
of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him)
is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational
authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit
any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is
unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained
his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an
A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the
Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a
graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1 .t
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of
his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano
University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he
began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in
Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules
provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the
study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal
education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on
"previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his
false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to
the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations
is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal
study in the regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao.
And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
TELESFORO A. DIAO v. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
FACTS: Two years following his admission to the Philippine Bar, lawyer Telesforo A. Diao
was charged by private complainant Severino G. Martinez for allegedly falsifying his
application to take the Bar Examinations specifically his scholastic qualifications. The
Solicitor General, having established in the course of its investigation that at the time Diao
filed his application to take the Bar Examinations did not complete the required pre-legal
education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, recommended the omission
of his name from the roll of attorneys. Diao averred that he had entered military service,
took and passed the General Classification Test which is equivalent to a high school
diploma, and that he completed his Associate in Arts degree at the Arellano University in
1949 and due to confusion, was erroneously certified in his school records as a graduate
of Quisumbing College.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Telesforo A. Diao should be disbarred from the practice of
law.
HELD: Yes, Atty. Telesforo A. Diao should be disbarred from the practice of law. His
application disclosed that he began his law studies six months before he obtained his pre-
law degree thereby disqualifying him from taking the bar tests under the rules, but with the
aid of false pretenses, was allowed to take it, passed it and thereafter admitted to the bar.
The fact that he hurdled the bar examinations is immaterial. The High Tribunal, through
Chief Justice Bengzon, enunciated that passing such examinations is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Taking the prescribed courses of legal
study in the regular manner is equally essential.
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the
legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice
law even if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct,
violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May
2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the
Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that
respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented
himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel
for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being
a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as
counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for
vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant
claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty
candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him
from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court
required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the
law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the
canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney
in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on
11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt
of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims
that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the
losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his
appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May
2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor.
Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the
MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer;
and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative
case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections.
The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC
likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May
2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of
the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to
the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel
for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection
to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that
he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan
himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent
him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same
date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA
LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC
on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao
and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition
filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of
Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of
law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law,incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render
any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and
filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of
law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself
out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer
of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person
who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in
the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath
to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. [9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for
a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor
and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your
acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. [11] Thus, the evidence
does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent
to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation,
respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

AGUIRRE vs. RANA

FACTS: Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among who passed the 200 Bar Examinations. Respondent, while not yet
a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election

AGUIRRE vs. RANA

Canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate and filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection
to the Ibl