La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc.

Vs Ramos
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 127882; January 27, 2004

FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942
(The Philippine Mining Act of 1995), its implementing rules and regulations and the Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 by the government with Western Mining
Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is
antithetical(opposition) to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed
foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

ISSUE:
What is the proper interpretation of the phrase Agreements involving Either Technical or Financial
Assistance contained in paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its implementing rules and
regulations insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements as well as the subject Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that the State
retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the
contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a
private corporation, the performance of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other
functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board
retains full residual control of the business.

LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. V. O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of
Environment and Natural Resources; H. RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-
DENR); R. TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that
participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be
construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on
March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with
WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in
South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.

On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23,
which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and
WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like
WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII
Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company sold its whole
stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by
Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in
Sagittarius name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the
Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider
and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or
agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development
and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the
President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of
the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection
of Australian investments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service contract that permits
fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

HELD:

First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that All lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, the exploration
and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the
State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or
utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public
domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of
exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control
by the concessionaire over the countrys natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to
exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other forms of assistance in
the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only technical and financial assistance. The
management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of
the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that
participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such
provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is
invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions
actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign
contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the
mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to
manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial
ownership over the nations mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but
bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally
ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the
exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations,
inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them
as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional
or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely
technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since
the agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore,
exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area.
Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology,
management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial
ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of
its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that
the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from
which they spring must be struck down.
 Grace Poe vs COMELEC
(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and
11 months counted from 24 May 2005.

May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before
that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was
born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in
1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition
declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and
obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of
the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on,
she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly,
among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that
her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy
on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed
material misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.

Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates (Read
Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and
deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.

In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over
the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the
President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of
candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in
determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by
a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds
for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the intent of the
Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of
Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)

Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the
constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.

First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical
of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born
in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents nationality. That
probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the
norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is
based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the
framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings,
the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties
and the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of
these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in
which the foundling is found.

Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in
acquiring a new domicile.

Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her
application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs reliance on cases which decree that an
aliens stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or
reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the circumstances in
this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to
abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her familys actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear
that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.

Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her
citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has
no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering
from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or
cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her qualifications.

In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate
for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her
citizenship and residency. ##
 Saguisag vs Executive Secretary
Case Digest: GR 212426 Jan 12, 2016
Facts:
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the constitutionality
of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive
department with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US
forces the access and use of portions of PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the
right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities
within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities;
humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the
parties.

Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US violated
the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops
and facilities whose entry into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate.
The Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional
ratification.

Issue 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing in assailing the
constitutionality of EDCA
No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens may dodge the
requirement of having to establish a direct and personal interest if they show that the act affects a
public right. But here, aside from general statements that the petitions involve the protection of a
public right, and that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated, the petitioners failed to
make any specific assertion of a particular public right that would be violated by the enforcement of
EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens
suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned requirements.

Issue 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers

No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax measure, nor is it
directed at the disbursement of public funds.

A taxpayers suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Here, those challenging the act must specifically
show that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that
they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle
to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
powers. A reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there has been neither an appropriation nor
an authorization of disbursement.
Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as legislators suit
No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional prerogative
granted by the Constitution to the Senate. In a legislators suit, the injured party would be the Senate as
an institution or any of its incumbent members, as it is the Senates constitutional function that is
allegedly being violated. Here, none of the petitioners, who are former senators, have the legal standing
to maintain the suit.

Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case
Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental importance which
justify setting aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The challenge raised here is rooted in the very
Constitution itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides for a stricter mechanism
required before any foreign military bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in the country. Such is of
paramount public interest that the Court is behooved to determine whether there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Executive Department.

Brion Dissent
Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners satisfied the requirement of legal standing in
asserting that a public right has been violated through the commission of an act with grave abuse of
discretion. The court may exercise its power of judicial review over the act of the Executive Department
in not submitting the EDCA agreement for Senate concurrence not because of the transcendental
importance of the issue, but because the petitioners satisfy the requirements in invoking the courts
expanded jurisdiction.
Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for concurrence by the Senate violates the
Constitution
No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is in the form of a mere
executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the Constitution, the President is empowered to enter into
executive agreements on foreign military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the
instrument that allows the entry of such and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.

EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves adjustments in detail in the
implementation of the MTD and the VFA. These are existing treaties between the Philippines and the
U.S. that have already been concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the
requirements of the Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the status of these prior
agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate.

De Castro Dissent
No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and the MDT. Whether the
stay of the foreign troops in the country is permanent or temporary is immaterial because the
Constitution does not distinguish. The EDCA clearly involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops
or facilities in the country. Hence, the absence of Senate concurrence to the agreement makes it an
invalid treaty.

IBP vs. Zamora

Posted by kaye lee on 11:27 PM
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada,
in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to
these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme
over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake
the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
Bernardino Marcelino vs Fernando Cruz, Jr.

121 SCRA 51 Political Law Constitutional Law Period to Resolve a Case from Date of Submission
Promulgation vs Rendition of Judgment Constitutional Period to Decide not Mandatory
Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On August 4, 1975, the prosecution finished
presenting evidence against Marcelino and rested its case. On the same date, the attorneys of both parties
in the criminal case moved for time within which to submit their respective memoranda. The presiding
judge, Fernando Cruz, Jr., gave them 30 days or until September 4, 1975. Only Marcelino submitted a
memoranda.
On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a copy of his decision, his decision bears
the same date of November 28, 1975. The promulgation of the decisions was scheduled in January 1976.
Marcelino is now contending that the court can no longer promulgate judgment because by January 1976,
the 3-month period (90 day period) within which lower courts must decide on cases had already lapsed,
thus, the lower court lost its jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period.
HELD: Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date of last day of filing of
the memoranda by the respective parties). From that day, the 3-month period begins to run so Judge Cruz
had until December 4, 1975 to rule on the case. Judge Cruz made a rendition of his decision on November
28, 1975. The date of rendition is the date of filing of the decision with the clerk of court. Hence, Judge
Cruz was able to rule on the case within the 3-month period because November 28, 1975 was merely the
85th day from September 4, 1975.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976, could not serve as the
reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date.
Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?
Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that upon the effectivity of this constitution, the
maximum period within which case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission
shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court, 12 months for the inferior courts and 3 months for lower
courts. In practice, the Supreme Court is liberal when it comes to this provision. The provision is
mandatory, its merely directive. Extensions can be granted in meritorious cases. To interpret such
provision as mandatory will only be detrimental to the justice system. Nevertheless, the SC warned lower
court judges to resolve cases within the prescribed period and not take this liberal construction as an
excuse to dispose of cases at later periods.