Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs Republic of the Philippines First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and
ricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable
April 29, 2009
TINGA, J.:
Topic: Non-Registrable Properties
Digest by Chua, edited by Cucueco
Note: Doctrines as synthesized by the Court was reproduced in toto.
FACTS:
1. On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A Silang (Cavite) Cadastre.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years.
2. Aristedes Velazco, Malabanans witness, testified that the property originally
belonged to a 22 hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
Lino had four sons, among them was EstebanAristedess grandfather. Upon Linos
death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by
1966, Estebans wife, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited
by the Velazco sons from their father. After their death, their son Virgilio succeeded
them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by
Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
3. Among the evidence presented by was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by
the CENRO-DENR, which stated that the subject property was verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land and approved as such on March 15, 1982.
4. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan. The Republic interposed an appeal
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he had not been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law
for confirmation of imperfect title. CA reversed.
ISSUE: WON Malabanan may register land in question under Sec 14 (1) or Sec. 14
(2).
HELD: No to both.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October
2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
May a private person validly seek the registration in his name of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public
lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial legalization.. Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right.
Section 48(b) received its present wording in when the law was amended by P.D. No.
1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073.
lands of the public domain. OSG submits that this imposes a restriction.
Actually, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class
than only agricultural lands.
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for
thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application to
possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This should be understood to mean
persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
With respect to Section 14 (1):
We reiterate that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted
in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto absurdly limits the application of the
provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared
alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to
establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership long before that date. Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more
possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their
imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. Moreover, the passage in
Herbieto, cited in the latter Buenaventura case should be considered as obiter. Thus,
neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental
value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded
in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in
exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945.
With respect to Section 14(2):
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the
possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2).
Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the
application. It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public
domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive
prescription.
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that
persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code
as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing
law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands,
including patrimonial property belonging to the State.
Does Section 14(2) encompass original registration proceedings over
patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has acquired through
prescription?
At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on
prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). Unlike
Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription
under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept
of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section
14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1).
 The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus:
[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription. The identification what consists of
patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421.
Would lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil
Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all,
, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man;
Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that
patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State. It is this provision that controls how public
dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of
the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example. RA
7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into
Other Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly known as the BCDA law.
Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and
portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and
Villamor Air Base.
For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the
President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA) which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer
them.
The President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in
part.
Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands are alienable
and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations
governing sales of government properties.
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have
become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become
patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these
lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
American bases at Clark and Subic. Such purpose can be tied to either public
service or the development of national wealth.
Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of the public dominion,
notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable.
It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or
entity that such lands become private property and cease to be property of the
public dominion.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such
in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, would
the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into
patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the
possessors? No.
Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the
object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration
under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil
Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as
public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive
prescription and justify registration.
Difference between Sec 14 (1) and Sec 14 (2):
Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2)
entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is
extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land
Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property
Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
Difference between the thirty-year periods under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, and Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to
Article 1137 of the Civil Code:
The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the
period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary
prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep.
Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil
Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is
founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
With respect to how our land registration procedures correlate with our law on
prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring
ownership over property:
Whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period
of possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as
patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But
 after the property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription
begins to run in favor of the possessor.
Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the
patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the
person in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires
ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did
not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property
under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the confirmation of
imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of possession
ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No.
1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
This has already been modified with the adoption of the Property Registration
Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original
registration in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil
Code as of now.
Doctrines of the case, as synthesized by the Court:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
a. Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does
not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. [51]
entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
b. There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property
may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under
ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in
good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good
faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
Application of the doctrines to the case at bar:
a. Petitioners failed establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject
property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence
that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back
their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented
in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
b. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While
the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national interest. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of
the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.

b. The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property
not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

a. Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person

acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is