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Different aspects

of Collective
Bargaining in
Industrial Arena
Ikramul Hasan
This study is prepared for academic exercise. This is
study which cover different aspects of collective
bargaining issue in different industrial arena which
also gives us an opportunity to understand different
activities regarding issue and their gapes based on four
Table of contents
1.0 Introduction 04
2.0 Literature Review Model 1 06
2.1 Methodology 09
2.2 Results & Findings 09
3.0 Literature Review for Model 2 11
3.1 The co-ordination policy 11
3.1.1 Development 11
3.1.2 The institutions: 11
3.1.3 The content 12
3.2 Assessing meeting the guidelines for bargaining claims 13
3.2.1 Inflation 13
3.2.3 National productivity 13
3.2.4 Wages 13
3.2.5 Non-wage aspects 14
3.2.6 Quantitative aspects 2000-2002 14
3.2.7 Qualitative aspects 15
3.2.8 Reductions in working time 15
4.0 Literature Model 3 15
4.1 Degree of trust developed from previous negotiations 16
4.2 Style/level of expertise of the negotiators 16
4.3 Clarity of the bargaining issues 16
4.4 Ability of facilitators to use problem solving-based techniques 17
4.5 Methodology 17
4.6 Findings 17
4.6.1 Degree of trust developed from previous negotiations 17
4.6.2 Style/level of expertise demonstrated by negotiators 18
4.6.3 Clarity of the bargaining issues 19
4.6.4 Ability of facilitators to use problem solving-based techniques 19
5.0 Literature Review Model 4 19
5.1 Methodology 21
5.2 Findings 21
6.0 Gaps in literature 22
7.0 Recommendation 23
8.0 Conclusion 23

9.0 References 23

List of Tables and Figures

Table1: Results of the study 09
Table 2. Literature Gaps 22

1.0 Introduction:
Numerous organizations particularly in manufacturing side have transformed their work systems
in to team-based work system to gain better economic performance with organizational
flexibility and effectiveness (McHugh, 2007; Appelbaum et al. 2000; Batt 1999). Understanding
employee attitudes, socio-technical and job design theories support a positive relationship
between team systems and work-related attitudes (McHugh, 2007; Hackman and Oldham, 1980;
Cumming 1978) though some studies have not found a consistent relationship (McHugh, 2007;
Appelbaum et al. 2000). To understand how alternative work systems affect work-related
attitudes, there is a need to examine the interface between team systems and union-related
institutional arrangements as positional characteristics that are attained by having
organizational membership and may act as cognitive filters for individual perceptions and
attitudinal responses. Employee seniority is relevant to a study of work restructuring because
team systems are often associated with changes to the tenure based privileges of seniority
systems (McHugh, 2007; Hunter et al. 2002). In a joint labor-management initiatives, such as
off-line problem solving, are frequently viewed as a precursor to the adoption of team systems
(McHugh, 2007; CutcherGershenfeld et al. 1987). Employee participation is one potential
avenue for increasing organizational flexibility for more dramatic workplace innovations such as
teams (McHugh, 2007; Katz and Kochan, 2004). Job satisfaction focuses on day-to-day work
experience and is relevant to the debates surrounding the negative repercussions of team systems
on employees (Babson, 1993).

The social partners have also concluded voluntary agreements to be implemented by collective
bargaining in the member states covering telework (2002), work-related stress (2004),
harassment and violence at work (2007), a framework of actions for the lifelong development of
competencies and qualifications (2002) and a framework of actions on gender equality. The
primary focus in the Directive to negotiated arrangements in establishing a European Works
Council prompted European-level bargaining between management and employee
representatives on an unprecedented scale. EWCs, however, are consultation, not negotiating
bodies, and cover the rights of all employees, not just those of trade union employees. At the
European level of analysis, there are three levels at which social dialogue takes place and three
Framework Agreements have been negotiated by the cross-sectoral social partners covering

parental leave (1996), part-time work (1997) and fixed-term employment contracts (1999)
(Gennard, 2009). In the year1999, the European Graphical Federation passed a resolution
entitled Developing a European Industrial Relations System in the Graphical Sector which
contained an agreed for national level collective bargaining within a European context in Annual
General Meeting (AGM) for different European countries. UEG has been influenced by that of
the European Metalworkers Federation (EMF) which has been a leader in developing a European
co-ordination of collective bargaining strategy in developing this policy (Gennard, 2004;
Schulten, 2000, 2001a, b). The UEG co-ordinated collective bargaining approach is multifaceted
that it aims to prevent graphical employers from gaining a competitive advantage by applying
downward pressure on employment conditions. The policy also seeks to stimulate economic
growth in the European graphical industry by maintaining and increasing the real purchasing
power of graphical workers, and/or their employment security by negotiating the implementation
of employment creation measures such as reductions in working time (Gennard, J. 2004).
Many conflicts in labour relations and community settings illustrate a range of difficulties, many
of which involve people taking positions that evoke resistance from others (Caverley,
Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005, Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). Whether it is a conflict over
pay and benefits or the scheduling of work, people often engage in positional-based bargaining
(Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005, Fisherand Ury, 1991) where parties take a position,
argue for it, and then agree to make concessions in reaching an agreement. Alternative dispute
resolution strategies are often based on the assumption that it is possible to be more integrative,
win-win, and cooperative (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005; Kochan and Osterman,
1995; Fisher and Ury, 1991; Walton and McKersie, 1965). They are based on the belief that both
parties can be winners with complementary and non-competing interests. Such strategies
encourage people to go beyond their positions, focus on the problem rather than the personalities,
and seek to satisfy each partys interests or real needs (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell,
2005; Wisher and Ury, 1991). This usage appears to stem from the inherent perception of power
that people associate with this style of conflict resolution. Even though 70 percent utilized a
positional-based negotiation style, 60 percent of the litigators surveyed thought that problem-
solving negotiation is a preferred method that needs to be more readily used within conflict
resolution processes (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005). In this literature study we try
find gaps between articles to draw a conclusion for a perfect combination collective bargaining

process in the company operation for effective performance and article are consider 4 model to
define the fact base on industrial system, European collective bargaining process, case study and
also view point.

2.0 Literature Review Model 1:

In traditional work systems are based on hierarchical control focuses on management desires to
establish order, exercise control, and achieve efficiency by: (a) limiting worker attention to a
single job; (b) deskilling jobs with accountability focused on individuals; (c) layering the
organizational structure with an emphasis on positional authority, managerial prerogatives, and
hierarchical status symbols; and (d) restricting employee voice and limiting sharing of business
information. This mass production approach is associated with individualized, repetitive, and
scripted work (McHugh, 2007; Batt 1999). Seniority is an enduring principle in employment
relations arising out of the desire to curb managerial favoritism because seniority gives
employees preferential treatment based on either job or organizational tenure (McHugh, 2007;
Rees 1962). Gordon and Johnson (1982) distinguish to pattern between noncompetitive and
competitive status seniority. Noncompetitive status seniority includes benefits that accrue with
seniority without depriving fellow workers of benefits (e.g., insurance coverage, sick days, and
pensions). These benefits are more distal-based and more clearly linked to continuance
organizational commitment through side-bet theory (McHugh, 2007; Allen and Meyer 1990).
Where competitive status seniority determines work preferences that accrue with seniority that
may deny fellow workers preferences, for example, job assignments, shift preferences, overtime
options, vacation scheduling, and job security. These preferences are more proximal to the
employees work experience and have a closer connection to job satisfaction and affective
organizational commitment. Traditional work systems emphasize using seniority principles to
allocate competitive status seniority opportunities. In particular, under traditional systems,
seniority creates vested rights in jobs that are reinforced by the formal and informal adoption of
various work rules (McHugh, 2007; Rees 1962). Thus, the following hypotheses are suggested:

Hypothesis 1a Seniority will moderate the relationship between work system and job
satisfaction such that job satisfaction will he higher when employees work in a traditional system
and have high seniority

Hypothesis 1b Seniority will moderate the relationship between work system and organizational
commitment such that organizational commitment wills him higher when employees work in a
traditional system and have high seniority.

Off-line problem-solving is a form of employee involvement in which a groups of employees

who may or may not be from the same work unit work voluntarily meet to engage in problem-
solving activities called parallel teams because they have a structure that is parallel to the
organization of work, they tend to complement rather than substitute for existing structures
(Batt 2004: 188)by assuring that off-line problem-solving groups do not challenge the extant
organizational hierarchy with limited discretion and recommend to management (McHugh,
2007; Batt 1999; Cohen and Bailey 1997; Lawler et al. 1995). Empirical research has not found a
consistent, long-term, positive relationship between employee involvement in off-line problem-
solving and work-related attitudes (McHugh, 2007; Cohen and Bailey 1997). Batt (2004: 189)
asserts that the most plausible interpretation of these results is that parallel structures do not
sufficiently influence the organization of work and daily routines of employees to dramatically
affect their attitudes and self-interests. The work-related attitudes of team members with
experience in off-line problem- solving groups are likely to differ from other employees. Team-
based work systems require substantive employee participation because teams are charged with
responsibility for determining how to achieve team objectives. However, with continued
participation (i.e., exposure to off-line groups and teams) an employee has a broader exposure to
various decision-making activities and, therefore, a greater likelihood of a positive relationship
between participation activities and general work-related attitudes. In short, a stronger
relationship between team membership and work-related attitudes would be expected for
employees who had off- line problem-solving experience because those employees would have a
more exposure to participation systems (McHugh, 2007). Therefore, the following hypotheses
are proposed:

Hypothesis 2a Off- line problem-solving experience will moderate the relationship between
work system and job satisfaction, such that job satisfaction will he higher when employees work
in teams and have experience in the off line problemsolving process.

Hypothesis 2b Off- line problem-solving experience will moderate the relationship between
work system and organizational commitment, such that organizational commitment will he
higher when employees work in teams and have experience in the off line problem-solving

Several empirical studies showed that no significant relationship between union participation and
organizational commitment while others have suggested that these results may be partly due to
an inappropriate specification of the union participation construct (McHugh, 2007; Kelloway and
Barling 1993; Leicht 1989; Martin et al. 1986). Using a conceptualization of union participation
that accounts for the cumulative and nonindependent aspects of union participation, Fullager and
Barling (1991) found a positive relationship between union participation and organizational
commitment. This suggests that individuals who participate in union activities have higher
commitment because they have greater interest in the long-term nature of their employment
relationship. According to the voice hypothesis workers become primed to detect dissatisfying
conditions in the workplace as members participate in union activities, such as attending union
meetings and reading union literature become more aware of the dissatisfying aspects of their
jobs (McHugh, 2007; Freeman and Medoff 1984). However, Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1990:
261) contend that drawing attention to the negative aspects of work may actually diminish
employee perceptions of the union since calling attention to negative aspects of the work
reminds workers not only of problems created by the employer but of the failure of the union to
remedy these problems. The interaction between teams and union participation is best
understood after considering issues of worker influence. Team systems require a higher level of
employee involvement than more traditional work arrangements ((McHugh, 2007; Cohen and
Bailey 1997). Workers reporting higher job satisfaction and affective commitment also report
greater influence in their work situation (Campion et a!. 1996). Worker desire for influence
pervades multiple spheres of the employment relationship. Thus, one could argue that greater
employee influence arising from both team membership and union participation will be
positively related to work-related attitudes. Thus, the following hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis 3a Union participation will moderate the relationship between work system and job
satisfaction, such that job satisfaction will he higher when employees both work in teams and are
more active in their union.

Hypothesis 3b Union participation will moderate the relationship between work system and
organizational commitment, such that organizational commitment will he higher when
employees both work in teams and are more active in their union.

2.1 Methodology:
A field study was conducted at a unionized manufacturing facility that employed 1,676 hourly
employees. Interviews with labor and management officials, as well as information garnered
from focus groups. A voluntary survey, endorsed by labor and management, was administered at
the plant. A total of 743 individuals provided completed surveys (44% response rate). The
demographic composition of the respondents closely matched the composition of the entire
hourly workforce. The respondents were 86% male, 76% white, average age 47 years (s.d. 9.7),
and average seniority 20 years (s.d. 11.4); while the entire hourly workforce was 87% male, 79%
white, average age 48 years (s.d. 10), and average seniority 21 years (s.d.= 11.3).

2.2 Results & Findings:

Table1: Results of the study
Hypothesis Findings

Seniority will moderate the relationship between work system and job satisfaction
such that job satisfaction will he higher when employees work in a traditional
system and have high seniority

Seniority will moderate the relationship between work system and organizational
commitment such that organizational commitment wills him higher when
employees work in a traditional system and have high seniority

Off- line problem-solving experience will moderate the relationship between work
system and job satisfaction, such that job satisfaction will he higher when Insignificant
employees work in teams and have experience in the off line problemsolving

Off- line problem-solving experience will moderate the relationship between work
system and organizational commitment, such that organizational commitment will
he higher when employees work in teams and have experience in the off line

problem-solving process.

Union participation will moderate the relationship between work system and job
satisfaction, such that job satisfaction will he higher when employees both work in
teams and are more active in their union.

Union participation will moderate the relationship between work system and
organizational commitment, such that organizational commitment will he higher
when employees both work in teams and are more active in their union

The significant interaction found between union participation and teams. Alternatively, the
unions stance toward a work restructuring initiative may be an important influence on the
impact of union participation on work-related attitudes. If the union opposes a team-based work
system, then union participation could be a school for individual opposition. Alternatively, where
a union is supportive, union participation provides a means for communicating the desirability of
the new work system to employees, as well as a vehicle for employee voice in the design of the
work system. Moreover, under the team-based system, union representatives and management
counterparts co-facilitated team meetings, jointly provided process assistance to teams, and
delivered team-related training. For non-team employees, union-management interactions tend to
focus on grievance handling and contract administration. In short, union participation differed
under each work system. However, the difference is likely linked to differences in employee
influence. The results associated with off-line employee involvement are informative. Off-line
problem- solving experience moderated the relationship between work system and organizational
commitment, but not job satisfaction. Individuals who work in teams and have participated in the
off-line program report higher organizational commitment than those who have participated in
the employee involvement program and are working under a traditional system. Perhaps, worker
commitment increases as employee expectations arising from off-line program participation are
met under the auspices of a team-based work. The results also reaffirm the observation that first
generation work organization innovations, such as off-line employee involvement programs, are
a useful starting point for participation in higher-level innovations, such as teams (Lawler et al.
1995). The inability to find a significant interaction between work system and off-line employee
involvement experience for job satisfaction, yet finding a significant interaction for

organizational commitment may be attributed to differences in these two constructs, as well as
the characteristics of the off-line employee involvement process.

3.0 Literature Review for Model 2:

Excessive wage increases can result in the European Central Bank (ECB) raising the interest
rates. This macroeconomic environment also increases the probability of employers and national
government favoring what Schulten (2000, 2001a) N calls competition oriented collective
bargaining policies. These seek to achieve, in one country, at the expense of competitor
countries, collective bargaining outcomes compatible with improved national, sector and
corporate competitiveness. The productivity oriented collective bargaining thesis. Wage
bargaining centers on the distribution of productivity gains between the interests of workers and
employers. Increases in wages resulting from enhancements in productivity plus inflation are
known as the quantitative aspects of the collective agreement. The productivity oriented
approach to the co-ordination of collective bargaining aims to achieve for any collective
agreement a total value equal to the sum of the annual average increase in inflation plus the
annual average increase in national productivity. Under this approach, however, the bargained
nominal wage increase can be lower than this sum (Gennard, 2004).
3.1 The co-ordination policy
3.1.1 Development
It also agreed to continue to encourage bi-lateral and multi-lateral transnational collective
bargaining co-operation initiatives between its affiliates (European Graphical Federation, 1994).
The major step forward, however, in the development of a productivity oriented collective
bargaining policy occurred when the 1999 EGF Annual General Meeting (European Graphical
Federation, 1999a) adopted a Declaration on the Co-ordination of Collective Bargaining
(European Graphical Federation, 1999a).

3.1.2 The institutions:

The major institutions developed by UEG to develop, and monitor, transnational co-operation
amongst affiliates are its Collective Bargaining Committee and its Annual Collective Bargaining
Conference of the chief negotiators of affiliated unions. This conference is attended by the chief
negotiators of affiliates and they debate, and approve or reject, the guidelines suggested for the

co-ordination of collective bargaining for the following years annual collective bargaining
round (UNI Europa Graphical 2000a).

3.1.3 The content

The content of the UEG Guidelines on the European co-ordination of collective bargaining with
national graphical employers organizations rests on seven pillars the provision of information,
online network, social dialogue, and regional collective bargaining, guidelines for bargaining
claims, transnational companies and transnational solidarity. It provides information on a regular
basis on the duration and termination dates of agreements, the bargained changes to the
quantitative and qualitative aspects of agreements and on progress to meet, at a point in time and
over time, the common collective bargaining objectives and trends on meeting these objectives.
The survey is the basis upon which the Collective Bargaining Committee and the Collective
Bargaining Conference establish the key priorities for the next collective bargaining round with
the national graphical employers organizations. In 2002, UEG entered the results of its
Collective Bargaining Survey for the years 2000, Future collective bargaining survey reports will
be added to this database thus providing affiliates with a quick access to up-to-date information.
In the same year, UEG established an online network providing affiliates with a forum for quick
and easy exchange of information on collective bargaining activities including industrial
disputes, in affiliates countries. Its animators collate the data and produce general or specific,
analysis of trends in collective bargaining issues. This component of the guidelines encourages
affiliates on a regional basis to exchange information on their collective bargaining agendas and
outcomes, on the industrial relations policies and practices of particular graphical and packaging
multinational companies and to provide solidarity action in industrial dispute situations
(European Graphical Federatio 1999, UNI Europa Graphical 2001, 2002, 2003). The rationale
behind such moves is that linguistic and cultural similarities in some regions, such as the Nordic
countries or the German speaking countries, might make co-ordination easier. The central pillar
of the guidelines is that bargained wage increases plus bargained increases in the qualitative
aspects of employment conditions be at least equal to the annual increase in inflation plus the
average annual increase in national productivity. The guidelines for bargaining claims link wage
negotiations with other elements of collective bargaining. As well as the different collective
priorities of each national graphical trade union, the UEG co-ordinate collective bargaining

policy takes account of the different levels (e.g. confederal, sector, etc.) and stages of
development of collective bargaining in each country and the macroeconomic priorities of
European governments. The onus falls on UEG affiliates to ensure that the national agreements
they negotiate meet (or move towards) the minimum standards and wage goals outlined in the
guidelines. If in attempting to do this an affiliate finds itself in industrial dispute with employers
then affiliates in other countries are committed to provide solidarity action, which includes
refusing to handle work transferred from the country in which the dispute is taking place. This
clause can also be invoked when a dispute occurs in the country of an UEG affiliated union. For
example, in 2003 notice of its dispute with the German national graphical employers
organization went out from the German affiliate Verdi (Medien). In the previous year, the
Norwegian affiliate had issued a similar notice with respect to its dispute with its national
graphical employers organizations (Gennard, 2004).

3.2 Assessing meeting the guidelines for bargaining claims

In assessing the extent to which affiliates have met the UEG guidelines for bargaining claims
there are measurement problems with regard to inflation, productivity and wages.

3.2.1 Inflation
The EU Commission, on the other hand, publishes a harmonised index of consumer prices which
is a pure price index which excludes rents, mortgage and interest payments [6]. This statistic
often varies from that of national based inflation indices. UEG affiliates in completing the
collective bargaining survey questionnaire invariably quoted nationally compiled inflation
statistics, which invariably presents some difficulties concerning comparability.

3.2.3 National productivity

The EU Commission issues productivity per worker statistics. The UEG Annual Collective
Bargaining Survey collects wage information per worker and therefore, the productivity per
worker figure is the most appropriate measure to use. The problem is that many European
countries do not publish productivity per worker data on a sector basis (Gennard, 2004).
3.2.4 Wages
In the UEG guidelines, the wages figure relates to the annual percentage bargained increase at
the sectoral level with national graphical employers organizations (Column (4) of Table I). The

figure for Belgium and Cyprus also includes wage increases resulting automatically from a link
to increases in inflation as well as those resulting from bargaining. Measuring only the bargained
wage understates the actual wage increases (earnings) received by the graphical workers in any
one year. The bargained wage increase shown in Table I is an understatement of the actual
annual wage increases for some countries. This is because in multi-level bargaining systems in,
for example, the UK and the Nordic countries, the actual wage increase received is the sum of
those bargained at the sector and the company/enterprise level. The figure in Column (1) refers
only to the bargained sectoral wage increase. The UEG Collective Bargaining Survey, while
recognizing these important data limitations, confines itself to collecting information on the
percentage wage increase bargained at the sectoral level, on wage increases automatically linked
to inflation increases and on wages bargained for all workers at the multi-sector level (Gennard,
2004; ODonnell and OReardon, 2000).

3.2.5 Non-wage aspects

In calculating, over time or at a point in time, the change in the total value of a collective
agreement, a central problem is assigning a financial cost to the employer of the bargained
increases to the agreements qualitative aspects. This is especially difficult in cases where the
actual cost to the employer of increases in non-wage benefits depends upon the extent of take-up
of the benefit. Examples of this problem are where graphical unions negotiate improved training,
retraining and lifelong learning opportunities and where they negotiate early retirement schemes
designed to increase employment opportunities for other composition such as younger workers
(Gennard, 2004).

3.2.6 Quantitative aspects 2000-2002

Table I provides data for 14 European countries for the collective bargaining rounds of 2000-
2003 inclusive (UNI Europa Graphical, 2000b, 2001, 2002, 2003). Over the period 2000-2002
inclusive, graphical unions across Europe have experienced difficulties in achieving bargained
wage settlements that equal the sum of increases in the annual average rate of inflation plus the
average annual increase in national productivity. Over the three-year period only in Sweden in
2000, in The Netherlands in 2001, in Germany and Norway in 2002 and in Belgium, Norway and
Sweden in 2003 did graphical unions exceed this target? In every bargaining round, graphical
workers in general received a bargained wage increase in excess of the average annual increase

in inflation. The real purchasing power of graphical workers has, on average, been maintained
over the period 2000-2003 inclusive. The obtaining of bargained wage increases at least equal to
the increase in the rate of inflation is a key of absolute floor below which the wage evolution
should not fall.

3.2.7 Qualitative aspects

The four collective bargaining rounds overall, in 12 of the 14 countries; graphical workers
gained some improvements to qualitative aspects of their employment conditions. The
exceptions were Austria and Luxembourg (Gennard, 2004).

3.2.8 Reductions in working time

It understates the actual position as it excludes overtime working. In eight of the countries, the
annual amount of working time, excluding overtime, is below the UEG guideline of 1,750 hours
per year. The guideline is exceeded in Ireland, Portugal, Latvia, Spain (where there was in 2000,
a reduction in annual working time of eight hours) and the Czech Republic. Although not
included in the table, the working hours guideline is also exceeded in Iceland and Croatia.
Overtime working in the graphical industry varies considerably from country to country
(European Graphical Federation, 1998b, 1999b) and from company to company. In some
European countries, the level of paid overtime working in the graphical industry exceeds 20
hours per week. Averaged out across countries, the typical graphical worker is estimated to
work between five and six paid hours of overtime per week [8]. If one assumes that some 50 per
cent of European graphical workers (estimated to be 0.5 million) work five to six paid hours of
overtime per week then a total of 141 million paid overtime hours per year are worked in the
European graphical sector. However, in some European countries, there are restrictions on
overtime working. In Denmark, for example, overtime working is restricted to one hour per day
whilst in Spain the maximum for paid overtime (Gennard, 2004).

4.0 Literature Model 3:

The ability to ensure the clarity of the bargaining issues was an important facilitative condition
which describes the degree to which the negotiators and associated parties at the bargaining table
can utilize tactics, strategies and techniques in clarifying the bargaining issues brought forth in
the negotiation process. This cooperative-based collective bargaining framework suggests that a
thorough understanding of ones organizational history and a clearly defined bargaining

approach are pre-conditions for a good dispute resolution process. By understanding the degree
of trust between labor and management and the style of negotiation, parties can clearly establish
and identify the core issues being discussed (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005).

4.1 Degree of trust developed from previous negotiations

We felt that the degree of trust developed from previous negotiations between labor and
management was important in understanding the level of trust, communication, and the nature of
the relationship in the present bargaining process (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005,
Rubin, 1989). Trust is often the process of developing a relationship of trust in collective
bargaining is seen as a legitimate means of endorsing ethically sound values (Caverley,
Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005; Rubin, 1989). A relationship of trust has a greater chance of
coming to fruition if the parties involved in a collective bargaining process have previous
experiences that illustrated honest intentions. By building on the organizational history and its
link to trust between inter-organizational parties (i.e. labor and management), negotiators can
begin the process of mapping out the style of dispute/conflict resolution to utilize within the
bargaining process.

4.2 Style/level of expertise of the negotiators

labor-management cooperation be best achieved within an integrative collective bargaining
process by the style/level of expertise of the negotiators might impact and influence the process
and associated outcomes within collective bargaining. In terms of the style of the negotiators, the
most commonly known cooperative-based negotiating style is illustrated in interest-based
bargaining (in other words, win-win bargaining, problem-solving negotiation and collaborative
bargaining). Mayer (2000) suggested that trustworthiness is primarily rooted in an individuals
competencies, skills, and characteristics such as: problem solving; clarity of language; and
understanding of power imbalances, interests, positions and values which in turn enables
negotiators to influence the other party.
4.3 Clarity of the bargaining issues
Examples of distributive issues include hourly rate of wages, job security agreements, and re-
training costs. Integrative issues, on the other hand, have mutual benefit interests and
opportunities for joint gain for all parties. Achieving greater understanding of the nature of the
basic issues and the strength of each principals interests in these issues is more important for

integrative issues. Effective negotiators may choose to utilize problem-solving tactics on the
issues with integrative potential at the same time that they use either competitive or cooperative
tactics on distributive issues (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005; Chicanot and Sloan,

4.4 Ability of facilitators to use problem solving-based techniques

The facilitator can increase the likelihood of constructive outcomes in conflict situations by:
creating equality in situational powers; synchronizing positive and negative overtures;
providing social support and process expertise to enhance constructive dialogue; and
performing translation functions and adjusting situational tension to optimum levels.
Structured workshops and training programs can help forge more favorable inter-group attitudes
and, as a result, more constructive inter-group behavior. Overall, the conditions within a
cooperative-based integrative collective bargaining process are like dominoes and arranged in a
manner where the major conditions such as the degree of trust developed from previous
negotiations and style/level of expertise of the negotiators commence a chain reaction of events
where the clarity of the bargaining issue and use of third party facilitators/inter-group training are
aspects of bargaining that impact and influence whether the dominoes will move forward to
reach its ultimate goal of cooperative-based integrative collective bargaining (Caverley,
Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005).

4.5 Methodology
To conduct paper researcher use case study method to understand the situation of collective
bargaining and the two companies are BC Cool-Aid Society and British Columbia Systems
4.6 Findings:
4.6.1 Degree of trust developed from previous negotiations
Within both cases, there was evidence of fractious historical relationships between labor and
management. In beginning both collective bargaining experiences, parties felt that the previous
negotiation was fractious, harmful, and unproductive. Parties expressed some interest in
investigating the use of any alternative that might avoid the fractiousness of their previous
experiences. As a result, there was openness to learning about a more integrative process. At
BCSC, labor and management entered the bargaining session under a number of constraints,

including the previous history and damaged relationships that resulted from the previous
bargaining contract, where many members of the Board intervened in the dispute. Like the BC
Cool-Aid Society, representatives of BCSC recognized that there was a need to address the issue
of improving long-term working relationships.Lead facilitators and representatives from the
various labor and management groups in each case study responded by focusing on the
establishment of a better working relationship. At BCSC and the BC Cool-Aid Society,
debriefings were held prior to the collective agreement process. These helped surface
dissatisfactions with the previous negotiation process and clarify perceptions about others
motives and to indicate a willingness to talk about issues. Although a high level of rapport and
trust may not have fully developed, the relationship was much better than in previous
negotiations. The chief spokespersons from management and labor, although they were mindful
of previous years of hard bargaining, were able to sit together and discuss the issues at hand and
propose solutions. There were many false starts in the collective bargaining process that
occurred. In one case, the BCGEU union representatives at Streetlink walked out because of lack
of progress (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005).

4.6.2 Style/level of expertise demonstrated by negotiators

The majority of the people at the negotiation table did try to modify their styles and work within
the principles of problem solving. In one case. at Streetlink, a union member, who tried to offer
ideas in a problem-solving style, was ostracized by his colleagues. In the bargaining sessinns,
parties snught to implement a problem-solving approach in defining and understanding the
identified issues after determining each partys needs and interests. Furthermore, the residual
good feelings positively affected the post bargaining relationship as several settlement
implementation issues were resolved easily between union and management. In terms of
applying interest-based negotiation principles from Fisher and Urys (1991) Getting to Yes,
parties within both cases agreed that any of the bargaining committee teams could speak on an
issue, foster candor about issues, and brainstorm for solutions. For BCSC and the BC Cool-Aid
Society, the mutual gains approach had a significant effect on the bargaining process. The lead
negotiators within the BCSC and BC Cool-Aid Society cases utilized their problem-solving skills
and abilities to establish a number of principles for labor and management to work together.
Overall, the negotiation teams were mindful of the previous acrimonious bargaining experiences.

This general discussion may have helped parties better understand the issues from both sides
(Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005).
4.6.3 Clarity of the bargaining issues
In both case studies, some issues were easier to deal with than others. The employees at the BC
Cool-Aid Society commenced bargaining by examining an integrative-based issue pertaining to
occupational health and safety as several concerns related to the safety of the building were
raised by both labor and management at the Society. As part of a mutual gains/interest-based
negotiating process, a joint employer/employee safety committee was formed. The workplace
health and safety philosophy outlined a general procedure to resolve safety problems, including
updating the safety manual, carrying out safety tests, developing relationships with the local fire
department. testing the basic security system. The union brought 42 issues to the bargaining table
from a list of over 300 bargaining demands from its membership, down from over 60 issues
brought forward in the previous negotiations. Management representatives tabled less than a
dozen issues (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005).
4.6.4 Ability of facilitators to use problem solving-based techniques
In both cases, third party facilitators were additional members of the bargaining process, serving
as trainers and troubleshooters in the management/administration ofthe collective bargaining
process. The third party facilitator encouraged the parties for agreement on issues put forth on
the bargaining table. At BCSC, the Fisher and Ury principles were part of a training exercise for
both labour and management representatives prior to commencing the bargaining process. The
opening session featured a mock exercise in which two mixed teams comprised jointly of union
and management representatives bargained over finite natural resources. Successful bargaining
seemed attainable. Within the training session, the third party facilitator structured the workshop
in a manner that participants were able to assess their style in resolving conflict and participate in
role-plays that demonstrated positional and integrative bargaining (Caverley, Cunningham and
Mitchell, 2005).

5.0 Literature Review Model 4:

In the Social Agenda 2006-2010, the European Commission proposed to develop an optional
European Union framework for transnational bargaining. Such a framework, the Commission
argued, would provide for the possibility to conclude transnational collective agreements at
either company level, namely multinational companies with production capacity or service

provision in more than one EU country or at the sector level covering a certain sector such as
shipbuilding, engineering, etc. The European Commission regarded the conclusion of
transnational company agreements as a key factor in the development of the European social
partners future capacity to conduct a dialogue in keeping with the increasingly transnational
nature of company organization and the need to anticipate change and have strategies to deal
with it. The Commission pointed out that the social partners wishing to conclude transnational
agreements at present encountered uncertainties and difficulties that could prevent, or at least
reduce, the impact of such agreements. EU-wide employers organizations remain firmly against
collective bargaining taking place above the national level and have adopted a policy of
opposition to an EU framework for transnational bargaining at the company level. EWCs have
no collective bargaining role. The Modine EWC, for example, has negotiated a pan-European
bonus system for the company, whilst the Novartis EWC has undertaken a survey of pay and
conditions across the companys European plants. They cover the conditions under which
transnational company-wide bargaining can begin, the mandate (claim) and negotiating team, the
approval of the agreement, the implementation of the agreement and the relationship between
transnational agreement and the national agreements. An important factor in this last named
principle is the inclusion of a non-regression clause whereby if the terms of the national
agreement are superior to the transnational agreement, the better conditions in the national
agreement cannot be lowered to the level of the transnational agreement. There are, however,
problems and disagreement that can arise between the affiliates of European industry federations
in the negotiation of transnational company agreements. Multinational companies were unlikely
to be attracted to a transnational collective agreement that is not legally binding/enforceable.
Finally, there is issue of the role of EWC members in transnational negotiations. Since devising
its procedure for the negotiation of company-wide transnational agreements, the EMF has
utilised this in bargaining at this level with at least five multinational companies Areva,
Schneider, Daimler-Chrysler, John Deere and Ancelor Miltal. The company approached the
EMF to see how a transnational agreement on equal opportunities could be achieved. The
agreement was signed in November 2006 and was implemented nationally. The Areva EWC did
influence the employees claim to management, the negotiation of the transnational agreement
and its implementation but above all the conclusion of the Areva transnational agreement
demonstrated clearly that the E1VIF procedure worked. The Schneider-EMF transnational

company agreement was signed in June 2007 covering plants in 27 countries. It was a relatively
precise agreement but, again, demonstrated that the E1VIF procedure for negotiating
transnational company agreements was credible. The EMF-Daimler Chrysler transnational
agreement guaranteed for employees in future in Chrysler garages employment. It was
negotiated by the companys EWC and the EWC co-ordinator. Fewer European countries were
involved than in the agreements outlined above. Negotiations involved the companys EWC and
EWC Co-ordinator. The transnational Arcelor-Mitta)IEMF agreement covered common health
and safety standards to apply in the companys plants throughout the world and not just Europe.
The origin of the agreement was at a global council meeting. There was an extra round of
negotiations and the agreement was approved and signed (Gennard, 2009).

5.1 Methodology:
This is a paper of viewing some point which bargaining takes place in the European Union, the
EU Commission make proposal for a procedure for transnational collective bargaining, the
procedures agreed by the EMF and UNI-Europa Graphical for the negotiation of company-wide
transnational agreements, and the content of some existing transnational company-wide

5.2 Findings:
The continuation of company wide transnational agreements demonstrates that European
industry federations can provide added value to multinational companies by providing effective
procedures within which transnational company agreements can be concluded. They also
demonstrate that the negotiation of such agreements requires substantial resources and cannot be
done without the assistance of the EWC. The existing transnational collective agreements in the
metal trades show that European trade union organizations have to be determined to follow
procedure, provide a trade union answer to EWC bargaining and that national based unions are
unlikely to be able to negotiate with European level corporate management. Lastly existing
transnational company collective agreements certifying that EMF procedure for the negotiation
of such agreements is effective, credible and workable (Gennard, 2004).

6.0 Gaps in literature:

After discussing above literature on collective bargaining some gaps identified which are
discussed in table 2.

Table 2. Literature Gaps
Models Gaps did not address

This study shows us something very important in our company environment

that role of the management that which is perfect for a company either
traditional management or team base system or union participation in the
activity because all of these system ensure workers attitude, work system and
Model 1
organizational commitment to work, any of the system can be play effective
role but the things is where there a dispute in working collective bargaining
activity as well as negotiation process is not clearly define rather than about the

This is paper which give s the idea all about the countries have in Europe and
their industrial practice as well as the macroeconomic environment where if
the wage rate increase with qualitative work on the back ground of increase in
productivity and inflation towards agreement country can ensure the nation
Model 2 level collective bargaining but the information gap start when we see many
country deny this fact and are not interested to do that no even published its
productivity per worker and also there is dispute that though the inflation
increase simultaneously wage is not increase in this process who is the
legitimate authority which ensure the binding agreement in graphical industry
worker a negotiator is not clear.

This is a article all about the negotiation process to ensure collective

bargaining in organizational level. In the negotiation they argued the level of
Model 3 trust required for certain negotiation because it is the ultimate thing which
center in the conflict and negotiator performance depend on this so the gape
how the trust can be build up and up what level it ensure its benchmarks not
clear rather than negotiator role.

This is a view point paper which proposes some ways for the industrial
collective agreement where the two parties have conflict and nothing has
indicated to clear the thing. Another gap in this proposal that who is the
legitimate body that take the ultimate decision for both party because company
Model 4 and union did not want transnational agreement in different location rather than
they want make it with the consultation with union but there is also dispute that
who play the role of negotiator the EWC is neutral party considered by the
employer where the EMF does not right to bind any thing can only give
consultation. So if this comes clearly that we can go for any decision.

7.0 Recommendation:

To have better environment in working place we have satisfy both party on the basis of their job
security, safety, welfare etc. for worker as well as profit for the owner to ensure that we need
perfect team who can run independently to sole their problem means there is some sort of
autonomy their as well we need some traditional approach to in some concern binding. On the
other hand we need union for our collective bargaining process to make our agreement
transparent as well as effective than there is no confusion in our rights. In working environment
we negotiator because everybody think different their must be a conflict so that they have role.
So in final words if we want to have better company environment than we need all of the above
process toward our goal any one system described by the articles can be solution we need all of
the approach combination to supplement each other on to management to have good collective
bargaining process in our working arena.

8.0 Conclusion:
In the end it is clear that how collective bargaining process work in different aspect with dispute
and representing these concepts may be sufficient to understand collective bargaining. So if we
want to comply these concepts in our country we must go through with proper process according
to our working system.

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