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14.3 Moral Hazard Effects of Social Insurance Programs . . . . . .

398
Moral Hazard Effects of Unemployment Insurance 398
Empirical Evidence: Moral Hazard Effects of Unemployment Insurance 400
Evidence for Moral Hazard in DI 402
Evidence for Moral Hazard in WC 403
Empirical Evidence: Moral Hazard Effects of DI 404
Empirical Evidence: Kruegers Study of Workers Compensation 405

14.4 The Costs and Benefits of Social Insurance to Firms . . . . . 406


The Effects of Partial Experience Rating in UI on Layoffs 406
The Benefits of Partial Experience Rating 408
Application: The Cash Cow of Partial Experience Rating 408
Workers Compensation and Firms 409

14.5 Implications for Program Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410


Benefits Generosity 410
Targeting 410
Experience Rating 411
Worker Self-Insurance? 411
Application: Reforming UI 412

14.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413

Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413

Questions and Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414

Advanced Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 14 Advanced Quasi-Experimental Analysis . . 416

CHAPTER 15 Health Insurance I: Health Economics


and Private Health Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
15.1 An Overview of Health Care in the United States . . . . . . . 421
How Health Insurance Works: The Basics 422
Private Insurance 423
Medicare 427
Medicaid 427
TRICARE/CHAMPVA 428
The Uninsured 428
Empirical Evidence: Health Insurance and Mobility 430

15.2 How Generous Should Insurance Be to Patients? . . . . . . . 432


Consumption-Smoothing Benefits of Health Insurance for Patients 432
Moral Hazard Costs of Health Insurance for Patients 433
Application: The Problem with McAllen, Texas 436

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