Luca Nogler, Udo Reifner Life Time Contracts

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Life Time Contracts
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Life Time Contracts
Social Long-term Contracts in Labour, Tenancy

and Consumer Credit Law
Luca Nogler & Udo Reifner (Eds.)
Social long-term contracts - soziale Dauerschuldverhltnisse - relational contracts

-
labour, tenancy and consumer credit contracts/relations - contrat de longue
dure - consumer loans - location - Mietverhltnisse - locatio conductio - housing
-
contratti di durata per lesistenza della persona - services of first necessity -
soziale
Dauernutzungsverhltnisse - contrato social a largo plazo . . .
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Table of Contents
Preface
xiii
Principles of Life Time Contracts (de/en/fr/it/es)

xvii
EuSoCo Declaration (de/en/fr/it/es)

xxxi
1 Introduction: The New Dimension of Life Time in the Law

of Contracts and Obligations
1
Luca Nogler and Udo Reifner
1.1 Life Time Contracts

1
1.2 The New Class of Life Time Contracts: Key Features and
Historical Development
5
1.3 Removal of Long-Term Relationships in the 19th-Century
Legal System, Which Centred upon Property and Contracts of
Purchase and Sale
8
1.4 The Rise of Contracts for Work and Rental of Property for
Personal Use in the Production Age
10
1.5 Life Time Contracts in the Credit Society
14
1.6 The Main Contracts that Make Up the New Category
22
1.7 Moving Life Time Contracts into the Heart of the Contract System
26
1.8 Life Time Contracts and European Contract Law
37
1.9 Principles of Justice and Life Time Contracts
41
1.10 Principles of Life Time Contracts
47
Part I: Life Time in Contract Law

73
2 The Evolution of European Contract Law: A Brand New Code,

a Handy Toolbox or a Jack-in-the-Box?
75
Luisa Antoniolli
2.1 Introduction
76
2.2 The Role of Legal Doctrine in the Harmonisation of European Private
Law: The Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), the Work of the
Study Group on a European Civil Code and Other Scholarly Enterprises
78
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Table of Contents
2.3 The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)

81
2.4 The Optional Instrument on European Sales Law
90
2.5 The New Directive on Consumer Rights
96
2.6 European Contract Law: Where Do We Stand and Where
Do We Go from Here?
101
3 Etica del contratto e contratti di durata per lesistenza della persona

123
Andrea Nicolussi
3.1 Contratto, etica e contratti di durata per lesistenza della

persona. Un argine allimperialismo dello spot contract?
128
3.2 Solo una dimensione sociale autoritaria o anche una etico-giuridica
per il contratto? Autonomia relazionale e solidale vs. autonomia
in senso individualistico
134
3.3 Una troppo rigida separazione tra mercato e contratto, da una parte,
e etica e gratuit, dallaltra
140
3.4 Etica dello scambio e Freiheitsethik
142
3.5 Il riduzionismo antropologico del modello che pretende
di assolutizzare la logica dei rapporti di scambio
147
3.6 Contratto e durata. Obblighi di protezione, recesso, sopravvenienze
e inesigibilit
151
3.7 Contratto di scambio, collegamenti tra rapporti di durata,
famiglia e impresa. Fernbereichsmoral e Nahbereichsmoral
157
4 Lebenszeitvertrge und Teilhabe der zivilrechtliche Anschlussverlust

als Versto gegen die Verfassung
169
Peter Derleder
4.1 Die Dimensionen des Anschlussverlustes

170
4.2 Die Formen der Sozialstaatlichkeit
172
4.3 Die anderen Formen der Staatlichkeit
180
5 Lebenszeitvertrge Natur und Ethik

189
Helena Klinger
5.1 Charakteristika von Dauerschuldverhltnissen in der Form des

Lebenszeitvertrages
191
5.2 Begriff des ethischen Standards
195
vi
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Table of Contents
5.3 Ethische Standards von Lebenszeitvertrgen als soziale

Dauerschuldverhltnisse
197
5.4 Schlussfolgerungen fr Lebenszeitvertrge
214
6 Le social et la dfaisance - introduction au problme de la critique

en droit europen des contrats
221
Vincent Forray
6.1 Premiers sentiments

222
6.2 Premire intuition: dfaire
224
6.3 Le social
226
6.4 Lintgration du social dans les projets acadmiques de droit europen des
contrats
231
6.5 Le problme du projet critique du droit europen
234
6.6 Le motif critique du social
236
6.7 Rengager la critique sociale?
242
7 Life Time et contrat - Ronald Coase (1910 - 2013) et le dtournement de

linterdisciplinarit du droit
255
Maurice Tancelin
7.1 Le ddoublement du texte dorigine

257
7.2 Lobjet des coupures
258
7.3 La porte des coupures sur la Toile
259
7.4 Les ractions doctrinales larticle de 1960
265
7.5 Les devanciers oublis de Coase
269
7.6 Conclusion: remplacer lAED par une analyse sociale du droit
270
Part II: Labour Contracts

277
8 The Historical Contribution of Employment Law to General Civil Law:

A Lost Dimension?
279
Luca Nogler
8.1 Employment Relationships before the Market Economy

279
8.2 The Implementation of the Market Economy and the 19th-Century
Civil Codes
281
8.3 Lotmars View of Modern Labour Contracts
283
8.4 Gierkes View of Long-Term Obligations
285
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Table of Contents
8.5 The Full Contractualisation of the Employment Relationship

288
8.6 Historical Contributions to the General Civil Law of Employment
Law, Characterised by a Full Contract View
292
8.7 Work Relationships and Life Time Contracts
297
8.8 A Lost Dimension?
303
9 The End of Mandatory Rules in the Employment Contract Law:

On Ready-Made Suits, Goods Made to Measure and Fashion Trends
321
Ruben Houweling and Lisette Langedijk
9.1 Introduction
322
9.2 The Ratio of Mandatory Law in Labour Law
323
9.3 Degrees of Mandatory Law: From Ready-Made Suits to Goods
Made to Measure
326
9.4 The Labour Law Wardrobe Anno 2013: A Survey on
Mandatory Provisions
329
9.5 Developments and Critique of Mandatory Labour Law: Goods
Made to Measure and Fashion Trends
338
9.6 Conclusion
345
10 Schutz und kollektive Privatautonomie das Arbeitsverhltnis

in seiner Besonderheit
351
Eva Kocher
10.1 Arbeitsrecht: Rechtsfolgen

353
10.2 Der Rechtsbegriff des Arbeitnehmers
358
10.3 Schutzbedrftigkeit in der Beschftigung? Arbeitsrechtliche
Vorbilder fr das allgemeine Zivilrecht
362
10.4 Zusammenfassung und Ausblick
374
11 Self-Employment and Economic Dependency in the Light of the

Social Contract Law
387
Orsola Razzolini
11.1 The Link Between Economic Dependency and Social Contractual Rights
387
11.2 From Inequality of Bargaining Powers to Long-Term Life Time Contracts
390
11.3 Long-Term Work Relationships in the Light of European
Social Contract Law
392
viii
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Table of Contents
12 Tarifautonomie und Vertragsgerechtigkeit: der Beitrag des kollektiven

Arbeitsrechts zur Vertragstheorie
397
Florian Rdl
12.1 Existentielle Vertrge ber fiktive Waren

398
12.2 Zum Sinn von Tarifvertrag und Tarifautonomie
401
12.3 Vertragsgerechtigkeit und gerechter Preis im allgemeinen Vertragsrecht
404
12.4 Vertragsgerechtigkeit fr existentielle Vertrge
410
Part III: Consumer Credit Contracts
417
13 Darlehensvertrag als Kapitalmiete (locatio conductio specialis)

419
Udo Reifner
13.1 Darlehen und Kredit

422
13.2 Schuld: Kredit und creditum
426
13.3 Produktivitt: Darlehen und mutuum
429
13.4 Zinsen: Geldmiete und locatio conductio
434
13.5 Wucher: Verbraucherkreditrecht und Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag
436
13.6 Neuere Entwicklungen
438
14 Change of Circumstances in Consumer Credit Contracts The United

Kingdom Experience and a Call for the Maintenance of Sector Specific Rules
451
Geraint Howells
14.1 Consumers and Vulnerability

451
14.2 Consumer Protection and Life Time Consumer Credit Contracts
452
14.3 Credit, Other Life Time Contracts and General Contract Law
453
14.4 Continuing Information Duties
454
14.5 Variations Particularly of Interest Rates
456
14.6 Change of Circumstances
460
14.7 Conclusions
463
15 The EU Consumer Credit Directive 2008 in the Light of the EuSoCo Principles
467
Elena F. Prez Carrillo and Fernando Gallardo Olmedo
15.1 The Historical Environment of the Consumer Credit Directive

467
15.2 The Directive in the Light of the Principles of Life Time Contracts
473
15.3 Conclusions
490
ix
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Table of Contents
16 Access to Long-Term Banking Services in the Nordic States

495
Frey Nybergh
16.1 Introduction
496
16.2 The Development of Marketisation and the Emergence of E-Commerce
498
16.3 Regulation of Access to Basic Banking
504
16.4 Concluding Remarks
520
17 A Contractual Approach to Over-Indebtedness: Rebus Sic Stantibus

Instead of Bankruptcy
531
Juana Pulgar
17.1 The Rebus Sic Stantibus Clause in the Economic Crisis

533
17.2 Superseding the Principle of Privity of Contract: Hold-Outs and
Information Asymmetry
535
17.3 The Principle of Universal Liability and Its Exception in Responsible
Credit 536
17.4 Mediation, Responsible Credit and Amicable Composition of Creditors
in Individual Insolvency
540
17.5 The Adoption of Contractual Solutions to Individual Insolvency
of Individuals Within the European Legal System
541
18 Responsible Bankruptcy
551
Udo Reifner
18.1 Insolvency in a Credit Society

551
18.2 Bankruptcy of Bankruptcy
555
18.3 From Bankruptcy Law to Debt Reorganisation
562
18.4 Responsible Lending A New Insolvency Principle
568
18.5 Conclusion
570
Part IV: Residential Tenancy Contracts

579
19 Das Recht auf Wohnraum und der Wohnraummietvertrag

581
Peter Derleder
19.1 Zur verfassungsrechtlichen Verankerung eines Grundrechts auf Wohnung
583
19.2 Recht auf Wohnung
586
19.3 Die historische Entwicklung des Wohnraummietrechts seit dem
Zweiten Weltkrieg
588
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Table
of Contents
19.4 Der Beitrag des sozialen Mietrechts fr die Sozialstaatlichkeit

und seine modernen Schwerpunkte
593
19.5 Fazit
601
20 Towards a Common Core of Residential Tenancy Law in Europe?

The Impact of the European Court of Human Rights on Tenancy Law
605
Christoph Schmid and Jason Dinse
20.1 Introduction
605
20.2 Important Judgments of the ECtHR Affecting Tenancy Law
610
20.3 Some Provisional Conclusions: Towards a Principle of
Socio-Economic Balance?
621
21 Exploring Interfaces Between Social Long-Term Contracts and

European Law Through Tenancy Law
627
Elena Bargelli
21.1 European Contract Law Ignores Residential Tenancy Law

627
21.2 Vertical Harmonisation of Residential Tenancy Law Falls outside
EU Jurisdiction
629
21.3 Interfaces Between European Law and Residential Tenancy Law
Nevertheless Exist
630
21.4 Beyond Vertical Harmonisation: Soft Law
635
22 Das koreanische Wohnungsmietschutzgesetz und die Notwendigkeit

der Kontrolle des Mietwuchers
641
Shin-Uk Park
22.1 Wohnung als Lebensgut oder als Ware: zur Entwicklung des
koreanischen Wohnungsmarktes
643
22.2 Miete zwischen Miete und Kreditkauf
646
22.3 Anstze von Lebenszeitvertrgen im koreanischen Mieterschutzrecht
648
Authors
661
xi
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Preface
Since 2005 we have been convinced of the necessity of a research programme to

highlight
the fact that the existing work on European Contract Law Study Groups and their
prin-
ciples has to a large extent neglected life time contracts concerning labour,
housing and
consumer credit. To this end, on 4 April 2005, we made the first European Social
Contract
(EuSoCo) Declaration and presented a research project called Towards a General Part
of
a European Code on long-term contracts and obligations in the fields of consumer
credit,
labour and tenancies to the Ministry of Education, the University of Trento and
Italian
researchers (MIUR-Interlink 2005). Thus, funding was obtained to organise a meeting
for
scholars well placed to launch the ambitious project of contributing to a body of
life time
contracts law. In addition, our initiative, from its outset, linked in with the
internation-
ally known programme being developed by the Coalition for Responsible Credit (ECRC/
NCRC), which in its turn had likewise reached the view that the deficit of social
compe-
tence in the monetary context was creating unresolved legal issues.
The first EuSoCo meeting, organised with the help of Sebastien Clerc-Renaud
and
Carla Boninsegna, took place in the Legal Sciences Department of the
University of
Trento on 25 September 2009. With the aim of launching a discussion on the subject
of
EuSoCo Law, we invited the following scholars to Trento: Geraint Howells, Eva
Kocher,
Emmanuel Docks, Elena Prez-Carrillo, Nick Huls, Frey Nybergh, Andrea
Nicolussi,
Marcus Pilgerstorfer, Luisa Antoniolli and Katsutoshi Kezuka. We reached the
conviction
at that time that, to produce a positive outcome, we would need to differentiate
our group
from others working in the field of European Contract Law and, more specifically,
we ad-
opted a multicultural approach in the complete certainty that Europes strength
lies in its
cultural pluralism. The fact is that the absence of the theme of life time
contracts from the
European debate was due precisely to the failure to adopt a multicultural approach,
a fea-
ture of the present book, representing the outcome of our research project. In fact
it is a
multilingual book, with some basic chapters written in those original European
languages
of the partners, which we expect a more than sufficient number of our readers to be
able
to understand. More detailed English summaries accompany these texts. However, most
of the contributions have had to be translated into English by the authors, with
the help
of Rosemary Conaty-Fogitt (English - German) and Lesley Orme (English - Italian).
The
original language is able to fully impart the richness of the individual national
legal sys-
tem, as is shown in the contributions by Derleder, Forray, Nicolussi and Howells,
among
others.
The meeting saw the publication of the first EuSoCo paper, where we used the
notion
of life time contracts as a working definition for social long-term contracts such
as labour,
xiii
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Preface
tenancy and consumer credit contracts, to which we refer our readers in the
introduction
to the present volume. We were also aware of the fact that other socially
meaningful long-
term contracts do exist in the area of goods of first necessity, associations and
company
law, but we assumed that the idea of a life time has nowhere emerged so clearly as
in these
three areas. The paper expressly set out that our initiative was not intended as a
simple
critique, from an outside perspective, of the social deficit in the existing
projects in Euro-
pean contract law, but we intended to make a positive contribution to the
development of
a body of European social law. For these purposes we adopted a methodology that
started
out, as it were, from within the various national bodies of contract law, favouring
the three
sectors we had identified as being the most important from a historical
perspective. In this
way our project was freed from an approach too heavily weighted towards existing
laws,
as, for example, some Community initiatives are, such as the Study Group on Social
Jus-
tice in European Law (Manifesto Group) or the Study Group on European Contract Law
(SECOLA) where some of our members are also engaged while maintaining the objec-
tive of engaging in debate with and influencing such initiatives. In particular,
inspired by
the plurality of national traditions, we nurtured the ambition of launching a
transnational
legal approach and, to that end, one Korean and two Canadian scholars were
subsequently
involved in the project, as well as Katsutoshi Kezuka, the Japanese scholar who had
taken
part in the first meeting.
The papers and the short presentations given at the Trento meeting were then
made
available on an appropriate webpage [http://eusoco.eu], which meant that the group
could
expand to include scholars with an interest in the subject matter to continue the
debate.
Meanwhile, the Hans-Bckler Foundation of the German Trade Union Association con-
tributed to the funding of our research project, adding to the funding made
available by
the University of Trentos Legal Sciences Department, which financed a study into
over-
indebtedness, and by the private non profit research association, the Institute for
Financial
Services (iff e.V.) in Hamburg.
This Institute also organised the second EuSoCo meeting, which took place in
the
Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences of the University of Hamburg on July 1,
2010,
at which the following people took part: Geraint Howells, Eva Kocher, Nick Huls,
Frey
Nybergh, Andrea Nicolussi, Luisa Antoniolli, Katsutoshi Kezuka, Kai-Oliver Knops,
Claes
Martinson, Iain Ramsay, Toni Williams and Anne-Sofie Henrikson. In the course of
this
seminar, seven individual themes were identified, which formed the basis for our
later
work: 1. Regulation of price; 2. Regulation of market power (rebalancing
relationships);
3. Considering the specificities of the real persons (emergencies/desperate
situations);
4. Access; 5. Termination; 6. Risk allocation (economic risk); 7. Variety of
sources of law
(most favoured principle (Gnstigkeitsprinzip)), coordination, collective
bargaining law,
EU law etc.) 8. Participation procedures (strike and boycott; legal process;
insolvency pro-
cedures) and institutions. The following day, also in Hamburg, the European
Coalition for
xiv
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Preface
Responsible Credit Conference took place, in the course of which we held a workshop
on
European Social Contract Law.
The day 21 January 2011 was a decisive moment for our project, when we were
able
to organise, again at the same Faculty at Hamburg University, a seminar with
Christoph
Schmid, Professor at the ZERP of the University of Bremen, who agreed
to act as our
groups expert on tenancy law. The iff then, in the same year, organised the third
EuSoCo
meeting, which took place in May, at the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
of
the University of Hamburg. On that occasion the following were present: Elena
Bargelli,
Helena Klinger, Candida Leone, Andrea Nicolussi, Frey Nybergh, Fabio Pantano, Elena
Prez-Carrillo, Iain Ramsay, Orsola Razzolini, Christoph Schmid, Bob Schmitz,

Maurice
Tancelin e Toni Williams. From then on the project steadily took shape, to the
point that,
finally, the 4th EuSoCo meeting could be organised, which took place once more at
the
Legal Sciences Department of the University of Trento on 28 and 29
September 2012.
Some of the authors of the book took part, specifically Luisa Antoniolli, Elena
Bargelli,
Geraint Howells, Andrea Nicolussi, Frey Nybergh, Juana Pulgar, Orsola Razzolini,
Chris-
toph Schmid, Toni Williams and Helena Klinger, who also took on the role of
supervising
the organisation of the project. The objective of the last EuSoCo meeting was to
present
the current state of our book project, through the contributions. In Trento we
discussed the
final version of our principles, which have been translated into the different
languages by
Rosemary Conatty-Foggitt (English), Udo Reifner (German), Andrea Nicolussi and Luca
Nogler (Italian), Vincent Forray (French) and Elena Prez-Carrillo (Spanish).

Literature
and footnotes have been treated by Kerstin Jrgenhake and Frank Osterloh.
This publication aims to be only a first contribution to the themes raised by
EuSoCo,
and for this reason, after publication, we shall be using our webpage (eusoco.eu)
to enlarge
and finalise the discussion of a topic that is of crucial importance to our
immediate future.
We will post reactions, reviews and new contributions, as well as translations or
original
versions of those presented in the book. Lastly, we would like to emphasise that
with-
out the means, premises and financial engagement of the institute for financial
services
(Hamburg) and the Faculty of Law of the University of Trento and the enormous
volun-
tary contributions of all participants who paid for their travel expenses, this
long-term
project would not have come this far.
xv
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Prinzipien sozialer Principles of Social Long-

Term
Dauerschuldverhltnisse Contracts
1. Lebenszeitvertrge: Lebenszeitvertrge 1. Life time contracts:

Life time contracts
sind soziale Dauerschuldverhltnisse, die are long-term social
relationships provid-
mit Bezug zu einem Teil der Lebenszeit ing goods, services and
opportunities for
natrlicher Personen lebenswichtige Gter, work and income creation.
They are essen-
Dienstleistungen, Arbeit und Einkom- tial for the self-
realisation of individuals
mensmglichkeiten zur Selbstverwirkli- and their participation in
society at various
chung und sozialen Teilhabe bereitstellen. stages in their life.
2. Humanitt: Lebenszeitvertrge stellen 2. Human Dimension: The

subject matter
den Menschen in seiner Wirklichkeit und of life time contracts
is real-life circum-
humanen Ausbildung in den Mittelpunkt. stances. The role of the law
governing them
Es ist daher nicht nur der Vertragsab- is to frame the power
relationships of those
schluss, sondern vor allem die dauerhafte contracts in terms of human
development,
Kooperation unter Bercksichtigung der so that on-going co-
operation rather than
Machtverhltnisse, die es im Recht zu steu- the formation of the
contract lies at the
ern gilt. Persnliche Verhltnisse zu Drit- heart of the contractual
relationship. Per-
ten (insbesondere in der Familie) mssen sonal relations (such as the
family) have to
Bercksichtigung finden. be taken into account.
3. Langfristigkeit: Das Vertrauen beider 3. Long-term

relationship: Mutual trust
Vertragspartner in den Bestand des between the parties as to
the durability of
langfristigen Lebenszeitvertrages wird the long-term relationship
must be pro-
geschtzt (z.B. Kndigungsschutz), so dass tected, and early
termination must have
Vertragsauflsungen nur mit der Wirkung only future effect, having
no bearing on the
ex nunc erfolgen. Eine Eingrenzung contract prior to that
point. Early termina-
erfhrt dieser Vertrauensschutz durch die tion must be restricted to
circumstances in
Privatautonomie insoweit, als ein Min- which the freedom and
the autonomy of
destma an Entscheidungs- und Hand- the individual is at issue
and makes early
lungsfreiheit eine vorzeitige Aufkndigung termination necessary.
erforderlich machen. 4. Linked contracts: Life
time contracts are
4. Verbundene Vertrge: Die Einbettung embedded in a network of

linked contracts
der jeweiligen Vertragsverhltnisse in ein to which the law must
have regard when
Netzwerk von Vertrgen erfordert deren legal questions fall to be
decided.
xvii
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Einbeziehung und Beachtung bei der 5. Basic needs: The

provision of essential
Lsung rechtlicher Fragen. goods and services for
basic needs related
5. Rcksichtnahme: Die Bereitstellung von to consumption and
employment requires
Nutzungsmglichkeiten fr Verbraucher that physical, social and
psychological con-
und Arbeitnehmer erfordert soziale Rck- siderations be taken into
account in order
sichtnahme auf die konkreten krperli- to ensure the protection
of the weaker
chen und seelischen Belange zum Schutz party to the contract.
Stringent regulation
des Schwcheren. Das Gesetz oder andere or other collective
rules will secure the
kollektive Regeln sehen nach Art, Dauer degree of social
protection needed in line
und dem Grad der Bedeutung dieser with the subject matter of
the contract, its
Vertrge fr die Lebensverhltnisse der duration and its
importance in the life of
Betroffenen in zwingender Form verschie- the individuals concerned.
dene Stufen der Rcksichtnahme vor. 6. Productive use: The

provider of essential
6. Produktive Nutzung: Wer im Rahmen goods and services or

income-generating
von Lebenszeitvertrgen Nutzungen und opportunities under a
life time contract
Einkommensmglichkeiten bereitstellt, must avoid taking any
action that will
hat alles zu unterlassen, was deren sozialen jeopardise the social
purpose of the con -
Zweck gefhrdet. tract and the productive
use of the ren-
dered services.
7. Kollektivitt und Ethik: Arbeitnehmer
und Verbraucher knnen vom Staat ver- 7. Collective and
ethical dimensions:
langen, dass kollektive Systeme zu ihrer Employees and consumers
are entitled to
Interessenwahrung ebenso wie kollek- expect that the
collective aspect of their
tive Wertsysteme von Treu und Glauben individual interests is
safeguarded by the
sowie den guten Sitten in den Prozessen state through
collective representation
von Abschluss, Gestaltung und Auflsung mechanisms, together with
the application
sozialer Dauerschuldverhltnisse Eingang of general values of good
morals and good
und Bercksichtigung finden. faith that influence
access, formation, con-
8. Zugang: Wer Lebenszeitvertrge anbie- tents, adaptation and
dissolution of such
tet, muss in Ankndigung, Vorbereitung relationships.
und Abschluss sowohl bei der Definition 8. Access: Providers of

life time contracts
der Gruppe, fr die diese Nutzung bereit- must refrain from
discrimination in terms
gestellt wird, als auch innerhalb der Gruppe of the personal and
social characteristics
jede Diskriminierung nach persnlichen at all stages of the
contract, from access
wie sozialen Merkmalen unterlassen. Die to termination, including
discrimination
Bedeutung der Lebenszeitvertrge fr die in terms of the group of
intended users of
Befriedigung menschlicher Grundbedrf- the contract, or individual
members of that
nisse wie Wohnen, Arbeit, Teilhabe an der group. The importance
of life time con-
Wirtschaft erfordert ein Menschenrecht tracts in meeting the
basic human needs
xviii
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Principles of Life Time Contracts

(de/en/fr/it/es)
auf Zugang zu diesen Gtern und of subsistence, employment and

participa-
Dienstleistungen. tion in economic life gives
access to these
9. Entgelt: Leistung und Gegenleistung der goods, services and income
opportunities
Lebenszeitvertrge drfen nicht in einem the status of fundamental
human right
aufflligen Missverhltnis stehen. Der (distributive justice).
Preis muss nach transparenten und diskri- 9. Remuneration: The mutual
obligations
minierungsfreien Gesichtspunkten bemes- of life time contracts
shall not be grossly
sen sein. disproportionate. Prices must
be transpar-
10. Anpassung: Haben sich die sozialen und ent and non-discriminatory.
wirtschaftlichen Umstnde, die die Grund- 10. Adaptation: If the social

and economic
lage des Lebenszeitvertrags bilden, nach circumstances upon which a life
time con-
Vertragsschluss schwerwiegend verndert tract is based have changed
significantly
oder stellen sich wesentliche Umstnde, since the contract was
entered into, or if
die zur Grundlage des Vertrags geworden material circumstances from
which the
sind, als falsch heraus und htten die Par- parties derived have arisen
that are found to
teien den Vertrag nicht oder mit anderem be at variance with its
original situation to
Inhalt schlieen mssen, wenn sie diese such an extent that the social
nature of the
Vernderung vorausgesehen htten, so contract is jeopardised, and
if the parties
kann Anpassung des Vertrags verlangt would not have entered into
the contract
werden, soweit einem Teil unter Berck- or would have entered into it
on different
sichtigung aller Umstnde des Einzel- terms had they foreseen this
change, adap-
falls, insbesondere der vertraglichen oder tation of the contract may
be required if,
gesetzlichen Risikoverteilung und seines taking into account all the
circumstances
sozialen Zwecks sowie der grundlegen- of the specific case, and
in particular the
den Pflichten der Person, das Festhalten contractual or statutory
allocation of risk
am unvernderten Vertrag nicht zugemu- and the fundamental obligation
of a human
tet werden kann. Kollektive Regelungen being, one of the parties
cannot reasonably
haben den Vorrang. be expected to continue to
comply with
the contract without variation
of its terms.
11. Kndigung: Die Kndigung von
Lebenszeitvertrgen muss transparent, Collective regulation shall
take precedence
nachvollziehbar und sozial vertrglich over individual adaptation.
gestaltet sein. Sie ist ultima ratio. Sie muss 11 Termination: Termination
of life time
die wahren und angemessenen Grnde contracts must be transparent,
accountable
nennen und diskriminierungsfrei erfol- and socially responsible. Early
termination
gen. Sie soll sich nur an Grnden in der against the will of the
consumer, tenant or
Person oder im Verhalten des Nutzenden worker must be a measure of
last resort. Dis-
sowie der Wirtschaftlichkeit der Bereit- closure of true and fair
grounds for termi-
stellung fr den Anbieter orientieren. Bei nation must be non-
discriminatory and be
xix
----------------------- Page 21-----------------------
wirtschaftlichen Grnden sind kollektive provided a reasonable period

before termi-
Mechanismen des Interessenausgleichs nation comes into effect. The
only grounds
zu suchen. Der einzelne und seine Inte- for termination are personal
behaviour of
ressenvertretung sind zu hren. Es ist such significance as to merit
termination, or
Gelegenheit und Zeit fr Vorschlge zur financial circumstances or
interests on the
Vermeidung von Kndigung und/oder part of the provider that
materially affect
Kndigungsfolgen zu schaffen. Soweit die the viability of the subject
matter of the con-
Kndigung im Interesse der Partei liegt, tract. Where the reasons for
termination
die den Vertrag erstellt und die Dienst- are financial in nature, users
are entitled to
leistung organisiert hat, muss sie die have recourse to mechanisms
of collective
Interessen der anderen Partei gebhrend redress, including the right of
the individual
bercksichtigen. to be heard or represented. This
procedure
12. Kommunikation: Vom Beginn der must allow sufficient time for
users to put
Vertragsverhandlungen, whrend der forward measures preventing
termination
Geschftsbeziehungund bis hin zur and/or its consequences. As far
as the termi-
Abwicklung des Lebenszeitvertrages soll nation is in the interest of
that party which
der Dialog zwischen den Vertragspartnern has developed the contract
and organised
the service, it has to consider
the interest of
auf einer gleichrangig, kooperativ an der
Erfllung des Vertragszwecks sachorien- the other party with due
diligence.
tiert sowie einer direkt persnlich gefhr- 12. Communication: Throughout

the con-
ten Kommunikation beruhen. Vor jeder tractual relationship, from the
beginning of
Vertragsgestaltung (Abschluss, Anpas- the process of negotiation of
the contract to
sung, Kndigung etc.) hat eine diesen its termination, a continuing
and co-oper-
Mastben entsprechende Anhrung zu ative dialogue must be
established on an
erfolgen, die dem Grundsatz vertrauensge- equal basis and at a personal
level between
tragener Kommunikation Rechnung trgt. the parties with regard to
fulfilling the pur-
13. Information und Transparenz: Whrend pose of the contract. Such a

discussion must
der Vertragsverhandlungen, der Vertrags- take place before each stage in
the contract
laufzeit sowie nachvertraglich soll eine an (formation, adaptation,
termination), and
den Bedrfnissen des Vertragspartners ori- communications must at all times
be based
entierte hinreichende, wahrheitsgeme, on the principle of trust and
confidence.
vollstndige, rechtzeitige und verstndli- 13. Information and

Transparency: During
che Information erfolgen, die bestehende the negotiation of the contract
and for the
Informationsasymmetrien berwindet. life time of the contract,
accurate, com-
14. Existenzsicherung: Soweit Lebens- plete, timely and

understandable infor-
zeitvertrge regelmige Einkommen mation must be provided that is
adequate
verschaffen, diese zeitlich und rtlich ver- to overcome any information
asymmetry
fgbar machen oder sich auf Zahlungen that arises.
xx
----------------------- Page 22-----------------------

(de/en/fr/it/es)
aus solchem Einkommen beziehen, ist 14. Securing livelihood:

Where life time
zu gewhrleisten, dass das fr die Siche- contracts provide for regular
income, mak-
rung des Existenzminimums notwendige ing it available according to
time and place,
Einkommen durch fortdauernde Zah- or for payments to be drawn
from that
lungen bzw. Schutz vor Pfndungen, income, a minimum level of
income must
Verjhrungsregeln und Ausgleich nicht be guaranteed in the form
of continuing
geschmlert wird. payments sufficient to meet the
consumers
15. Soziale Not: Die sozialen Risiken subsistence needs and, if
applicable, pro-
der Arbeitslosigkeit, Obdachlosigkeit tection must be provided from
attachment
und berschuldung mssen in der indi- of income, seizure and
individual volun-
viduellen wie kollektiven Gestaltung der tary arrangements with
creditors.
Nutzungsvertrge entsprechend ihrer 15. Exclusion: The social

risks of unem-
gesellschaftlichen Verursachung angemes- ployment, homelessness and
over-indebt-
sen bercksichtigt und durch das ffentli- edness must be taken into
account in both
che Recht ergnzt werden the individual and the
collective forms of
16. Vertraulichkeit: Die whrend der the contract with due regard
to its social
Geschftsbeziehung eines Lebenszeit- origin and in line with public
law.
vertrages erlangten persnlichen Daten 16. Confidentiality: Personal

data obtained
und darauf beruhende Bewertungen sind during a life time contractual
relationship
vertraulich zu behandeln und drfen nur and assessments based on such
data must
zur Erfllung des Vertragszwecks benutzt be treated confidentially and
only be used
werden. for the purpose of the contract.
xxi
----------------------- Page 23-----------------------
Principes des contrats temps Principi sui contratti di

durata
essentiels lexistence de la per lesistenza della
personne persona
1. Contrats dexistence: Les contrats 1. Contratti di durata

per lesistenza della
dexistence sont des relations sociales persona: i contratti di
durata per lesistenza
long terme par lesquelles les individus della persona sono
contratti socialmente
se fournissent des biens ou des services, rilevanti i quali hanno per
oggetto la sod-
accdent un travail ou une source de disfazione di esigenze delle
persone relative
revenus. Ces contrats sont essentiels a beni e servizi
primari, al lavoro ed alla
la ralisation et linsertion de lindividu capacit economica
necessaria allo svi-
dans la vie sociale, diffrents stades de luppo della persona come
individuo e nella
celle-ci. sua vita di relazione.
2. Dimension humaine: ce sont les condi- 2. Dimensione umana:

punto di riferi-
tions concrtes de vie qui constituent la mento centrale dei contratti
per lesistenza
matire des contrats dexistence. Le droit della persona la
persona umana colta
qui les rgit a pour fonction de contrler nella sua concreta realt
materiale e cul-
le pouvoir qui sexerce lors de la relation turale. Il diritto non deve,
quindi, preoc-
contractuelle afin de permettre le dve- cuparsi di regolare soltanto
la conclusione
loppement personnel des individus qui del contratto, ma
soprattutto la coopera-
y participent. Cest donc la coopration zione duratura tra le
parti facendo s
continue des parties au cur de la relation che essa non sia compromessa
o distorta
quil sagit de rgler, plutt que le proces- dalla eventuale differenza
di potere (con-
sus de formation du contrat. Les relations trattuale) indotta dai
rapporti di forza
intimes (telles que les relations familiales) che sussistono tra le
parti stesse. Si deve
doivent tre prises en compte. tener conto anche dei
rapporti personali
3. Relation long terme: la confiance mutu- altamente significativi

per la vita delle
elle doit tre protge pendant toute la persone (come ad esempio,
le relazioni
dure de la relation. Toute rupture anticipe familiari).
ne doit produire deffet que pour lavenir 3. Durata: deve essere

tutelato laffidamento
et navoir aucune incidence sur la relation reciproco tra le parti circa
il permanere nel
contractuelle antrieure la rupture. La tempo del contratto per
lesistenza della
rupture anticipe doit tre rserve aux persona (prevedendo, ad
esempio, una
circonstances dans lesquelles la libert et tutela in caso di
recesso), in modo tale
lautonomie de la personne sont en cause et che il recesso o la
risoluzione del contratto
rendent ainsi ncessaire une telle rupture. abbiano effetto solo ex
nunc. Tale regola
4. Contrats connexes: les contrats dexistence pu essere derogata

dallautonomia pri-
sont insrs dans un rseau de contrats vata solo per i casi in cui
lo scioglimento
xxii
----------------------- Page 24-----------------------

(de/en/fr/it/es)
connexes qui doivent tre pris en consi- anticipato del

rapporto risulta necessario
dration lorsque quun problme juridique per non mortificare la
libert di decisione e
doit tre rgl. di azione delle persone.
5. Besoins essentiels: la fourniture de biens 4. Collegamento

contrattuale: il fatto che
et services visant la satisfaction des i contratti per
lesistenza della persona si
besoins essentiels de lindividu, dans le inseriscano in una rete
di contratti impone
contexte dune opration de consomma- di affrontare le
questioni giuridiche che
tion ou dune relation de travail, suppose li riguardano
considerando sistematica-
que soient pris en compte des considra- mente anche il
collegamento negoziale.
tions dordre physique, social et psy- 5. Farsi carico della
situazione della con-
chologique afin dassurer la protection de troparte: la messa a
disposizione di beni
la partie la plus faible au contrat. e di possibilit di
godimento a favore di
6. Clause dutilit: le fournisseur de biens consumatori e

lavoratori presuppone la
ou de services essentiels lexistence, ou disponibilit a farsi
carico in modo soli-
bien celui qui offre laccs une source de dale della tutela della
parte pi debole, con
revenus doit sabstenir de toute action qui riguardo alla sua
integrit fisica e morale.
pourrait compromettre la dimension soci- Tenendo conto del
tipo, della durata e
ale du contrat ou lutilit des prestations dellimportanza di tali
contratti per le con-
contractuelles. dizioni di vita degli
interessati, la legge e
7. Aspects collectifs et thiques: les salaris le discipline collettive
devono prevedere in
et les consommateurs sont fonds atten- modo inderogabile, vari
gradi di rispetto e
dre de lEtat que la dimension collective de protezione della
controparte.
leurs intrts individuels soit sauvegarde 6. Uso produttivo:

chi nellambito di con-
au moyen de mcanismes de reprsenta- tratti per lesistenza
della persona concede
tion collective, ainsi que par lapplication lutilizzazione di beni o
la disponibilit di
des valeurs gnrales dune bonne morale denaro deve astenersi
dal fare tutto ci che
et de la bonne foi, quil sagisse de laccs, la possa compromettere gli
scopi cooperativi
formation, du contenu, de ladaptation et de degli stessi.
la dissolution des relations contractuelles. 7. Dimensione
collettiva e clausole etiche:
8. Accs: ceux qui offrent des contrats i lavoratori

dipendenti ed i consumatori
dexistence doivent sabstenir de toute dis- possono pretendere che
lo Stato predis-
crimination quant aux caractristiques ponga e prenda in
considerazione nelle fasi
personnelles ou sociales des consomma- della conclusione, dello
svolgimento e della
teurs quelque tape du contrat que ce cessazione dei contratti
per lesistenza della
soit, depuis laccs celui-ci jusqu son persona meccanismi
collettivi di tutela dei
terme. Ceci concerne tant la discrimina- loro interessi e che sia
sempre dato rilievo
tion lgard du groupe auquel appartient ai valori richiamati
dalla buona fede e dal
la partie vise que la discrimination buon costume.
xxiii
----------------------- Page 25-----------------------
lgard du membre dun groupe. Du fait de 8. Accesso: chi offre contratti

per lesistenza
limportance des contrats dexistence pour delle persone non deve compiere
nessuna
la satisfaction des besoins humains en discriminazione personale o
sociale. Ci
termes de subsistance, de travail et de par- vale sia nel momento della
predisposizione,
ticipation la vie conomique, il convient sia in quello della pubblicit,
sia nella con-
de donner laccs ces biens et services clusione, inclusa la eventuale
definizione
ainsi qu ces sources de revenus le statut della categoria di destinatari.
La rilevanza
dun droit de la personne humaine. che hanno i contratti per
lesistenza della
9. Prix: les obligations rciproques dans persona, avendo essi ad oggetto
il soddis-
un contrat dexistence ne doivent pas tre facimento di bisogni primari
della persona
grossirement disproportionnes. Les frais quali labitazione, il lavoro e
la partecipazi-
doivent demeurer abordables et aligns sur one alla vita economica,
esige il riconos-
les cots. cimento di un diritto umano
allaccesso
mediante il contratto a tali beni
e servizi.
10. Adaptation: en cas de change-
ment significatif des conditions socia- 9. Corrispettivo: la prestazione
e la contro-
les ou conomiques qui constituent le prestazione relative al
contratto di durata
fondement du contrat dexistence, ou en cas per lesistenza della persona
non possono
daugmentation des contraintes matrielles risultare manifestamente
sproporzionate
envisages par les parties, de telle sorte que tra loro. Il corrispettivo deve
essere deter-
la nature sociale du contrat serait remise en minato secondo criteri
trasparenti.
cause, et de telle sorte que les parties ne se 10. Adeguamento e inesigibilit:

pu essere
seraient pas engages si elles avaient su que chiesto ladeguamento del
contratto se
des modifications de cette ampleur poule circostanze sociali ed
economiche che
vaient survenir, ladaptation du contrat peut oggettivamente rappresentano il
sostrato
tre requise condition que, tenant compte del contratto per lesistenza
della persona
de toutes les spcificits du contrat en cause, si sono notevolmente
modificate dopo la
en particulier de la manire dont le contrat conclusione del contratto
stesso oppure
ou les lois rpartissent la charge des risques se le circostanze che hanno
costituito i
contractuels, et en tenant compte des obli- presupposti fondamentali del
contratto si
gations fondamentales qui psent sur les rivelano diverse da quelle
considerate dalle
personnes, on ne saurait raisonnablement parti tanto da far ritenere
ragionevolmente
attendre dune partie quelle se conforme au che le parti o non avrebbero
concluso il
contrat sans que son contenu ait t modifi. contratto o lavrebbero
concluso a con-
Les rgles collectives dadaptation doivent dizioni significativamente
diverse. La richi-
primer sur les adaptations individuelles. esta pu aver luogo se,
tenendo conto di
11. Rsiliation: la rsiliation des con- tutte le circostanze del caso

concreto ed in
trats dexistence doit tre transparente, particolare della distribuzione
contrattuale
xxiv
----------------------- Page 26-----------------------

(de/en/fr/it/es)
responsable et socialement acceptable. e legale del rischio,

nonch dello scopo
La rupture anticipe contre la volont du cooperativo del contratto
e di eventuali
consommateur, du locataire ou du salari obblighi fondamentali della
persona, non
doit avoir lieu en dernire extrmit. La si pu esigere che una delle
parti rimanga
dclaration des motifs sincres et qui- vincolata al contratto col
contenuto immu-
tables de rupture du contrat doit tre tato. Devono essere
prioritariamente appli-
non-discriminatoire et prvoir un dlai cate eventuali
regolamentazioni collettive.
de pravis raisonnable avant que celle-ci 11. Recesso: il recesso
da un contratto
ne prenne effet. Seuls le comportement per lesistenza della
persona deve essere
dune partie justifiant une rupture de trasparente, controllabile
e socialmente
contrat, les conditions conomiques ou accettabile. Esso deve
rappresentare
latteinte aux intrts du cocontractant lextrema ratio. Il
recesso deve, inoltre,
de telle sorte que la continuit de lobjet indicare i motivi reali
ed adeguati, non-
du contrat se trouve compromise con- ch evitare sempre
discriminazioni. Latto
stituent des motifs de rsiliation. Lorsque di recesso deve essere
giustificato solo da
la rsiliation a lieu pour des raisons ragioni attinenti,
rispettivamente, alle con-
conomiques, lautre partie a un droit de dizioni fisiche del
debitore, al suo com-
recours dans le cadre des procdures col- portamento oppure ad un
eccesso di costo
lectives de rglement, y compris le droit economico della
cooperazione creditoria.
dtre entendue ou reprsente. Le pro- Se il recesso dipende da
motivi economici
cessus doit laisser un temps suffisant devono essere privilegiati
meccanismi col-
lautre partie afin de prendre les mesures lettivi di conciliazione. Il
debitore ed i suoi
propres prparer la rsiliation et / ou ses rappresentanti devono essere
previamente
consquences. Dans la mesure o la rsil- sentiti. Deve essere prevista
la facolt, ed il
iation a lieu dans lintrt de la partie qui tempo necessario per
esercitarla, di avan-
a labor le contrat et organis la fourni- zare proposte per evitare il
recesso o miti-
ture des prestations, les intrts de lautre garne le conseguenze. Quando
il recesso
partie doivent tre pris en considration, nellinteresse della parte
che ha predisposto
avec toute la diligence attendue lors de la il contratto e ha
organizzato il servizio il
rsiliation. suo esercizio fa sempre
sorgere obblighi di
protezione della controparte.

12. Communication: tout au long de la
relation contractuelle, depuis le dbut 12. Comunicazione: il dialogo
e il confronto
des ngociations jusquau terme du contra le parti contrattuali
deve essere impron-
trat, le dialogue et la coopration des tato, gi a partire
dallinizio delle trattative
parties doivent tre tablis sur des bases precontrattuali, nel
corso del rapporto
galitaires, et individuelles, en ce qui contrattuale e fino alla
cessazione degli
concerne laccomplissement des objectifs effetti del contratto per
lesistenza della
xxv
----------------------- Page 27-----------------------
contractuels. La discussion doit tre mise persona, al modello di una

comunicazione
en place chaque tape du contrat (forma- paritaria, orientata in
modo cooperativo
tion, adaptation, rsiliation) et la commu- alla realizzazione degli
scopi contrattuali.
nication doit tre base sur la confiance. Tale comunicazione
devessere condotta
13. Information et transparence: afin de in modo personale e
diretto tra le parti.
remdier aux asymtries de linformation Prima del compimento di
qualsiasi atto
qui pourraient survenir entre les par- unilaterale attinente al
contratto ( adegua-
ties, une information adquate, complte, mento, recesso etc.) deve
essere sentita la
opportune et comprhensible doit tre controparte con modalit
che rispettino i
fournie, au cours de la ngociation et pour canoni enunciati, e in ogni
caso il principio
toute la dure du contrat. di tutela dellaffidamento
reciproco.
14. Garantie des moyens de subsistance: 13. Informazione e

trasparenza: durante le
lorsque le contrat dexistence prvoit le trattative precontrattuali,
lo svolgimento
versement de revenus rguliers, les met- del contratto, cos come
nel periodo suc-
tant disposition un temps et en un lieu cessivo alla cessazione, la
parte che predis-
dtermins, ou prvoit le prlvement pone e organizza il contratto
deve prestare
des paiements sur les revenus dune par- costantemente informazione in
modo veri-
tie, il doit tre garanti que la partie con- tiero, esauriente, puntuale,
comprensibile e
cerne conserve un montant minimum attento ai bisogni della
controparte.
de ressources afin dassurer sa subsis- 14. Garanzia del minimo

vitale: se il con-
tance. Le cas chant, une telle protection tratto per lesistenza della
persona procura
doit stendre aux voies dexcution, aux con regolarit delle somme di
danaro (che
mesures de saisie et aux accords passs ad esempio possono formare un
reddito o
avec les cranciers pour lapurement des una rendita), o le rende
disponibili in un
dettes. determinato tempo e luogo,
oppure fa ri -
15. Exclusion: les risques sociaux du ch- ferimento a prelievi da tali

somme per effet-
mage, du surendettement et de la perte tuare dei pagamenti, deve
essere preservato
de logement doivent tre pris en compte il reddito minimo vitale
escludendo obbli-
dans toutes les formes individuelles ou ghi di pagamento periodico,
pignoramenti,
collectives de contrat, en considrant les forme di prescrizione e
compensazione
origines sociales de la personne, et con- che intacchino tale minimo
vitale.
formment aux dispositions du droit 15. Esclusione sociale:
nella strutturazione
public. individuale e collettiva
dei contratti per
16. Confidentialit: les donnes com- lesistenza della persona

devono trovare
muniques dans le cadre dun contrat adeguata considerazione, in
rapporto alle
dexistence et les estimations faites loro cause socio-economiche,
i rischi di
xxvi
----------------------- Page 28-----------------------

(de/en/fr/it/es)
partir de ces donnes doivent faire lobjet disoccupazione, di

mancanza di alloggio
dun traitement confidentiel et ne doivent e di sovra-indebitamento.
La relativa dis-
tre utiliss que dans le cadre de lobjectif ciplina deve essere
integrata da quella di
contractuel. diritto pubblico.
16. Trattamento
confidenziale dei dati: i
dati personali acquisiti
in occasione del
contratto per
lesistenza della persona,
cos come le valutazioni
inerenti a tali
dati devono essere
trattati in modo riser-
vato e possono essere
utilizzati solo per
lesecuzione del contratto.
xxvii
----------------------- Page 29-----------------------
Principios de los contratos sociales a largo plazo
1. Los contratos para la existencia se la problemtica jurdica

derivada de tales
definen como relaciones jurdicas con- contratos para la
existencia.
tractuales de larga duracin cuyo objeto es 5. Necesidades bsicas.
En los contra-
satisfacer necesidades humanas esenciales tos para la existencia
relativos a bienes y
a travs de bienes y servicios. Facilitan la servicios para satisfacer
las necesidades
integracin y participacin de las personas esenciales de las
personas (consumo,
en la sociedad, a lo largo de su vida. relaciones laborales,
vivienda) deben
2. Dimensin humana. Las circunstancias tomarse en consideracin

las circunstan-
de la vida real de las personas contribuyen cias materiales, sociales y
psicolgicas para
a configurar el contenido de los contratos proteger a la parte
contractual ms dbil.
para la existencia. Corresponde al derecho Corresponde al
derecho garantizar un
establecer el marco para que las relaciones nivel de proteccin
adecuada al objeto
de poder subyacentes en tales contratos se del contrato, a su duracin
y a su importan-
orienten al desarrollo humano, para que la cia para la vida de los
individuos afectados.
cooperacin entre las partes contractuales 6. Clusula de utilidad. Los
proveedores de
ocupe un lugar central en la relacin (ms bienes o de servicios, o de
rentas para satis-
all de las reglas jurdicas sobre conclu- facer necesidades esenciales
de las personas,
sin del contrato); y para que se tenga en deben evitar cualquier
actuacin que com-
cuenta el contexto personal en el que estos prometa la dimensin social
de los contra-
contratos para la existencia se desarrollan tos para la existencia y/o
para favorecer el
(incluidas las relaciones familiares) uso productivo de las
prestaciones.
3. Relaciones duraderas. Debe protegerse 7. Aspectos colectivos y

ticos. Los asala-
la confianza recproca entre las partes en riados y los consumidores
tienen derecho
cuanto a la duracin de los contratos para a la proteccin del
Estado y a que se sal-
la existencia. La rescisin, revocacin vaguarden sus intereses
por medio de
o cancelacin contractual !nicamente mecanismos de
representacin colectiva,
pueden desplegar efectos de cara al futuro, as como de la
aplicacin de los prin-
pero nunca retroactivos. La cancelacin cipios generales de tica
y buena fe a los
slo puede admitirse en circunstancias contratos para la
existencia en todas sus
en las que, de no permitirse, se afectara fases (acceso , formacin,
contenido, adap-
negativamente a la libertad y la autonoma tacin, y resolucin).
de los individuos estn en juego. 8. Acceso. Los proveedores
que ofrecen con-
4. Contratos vinculados. Los contratos para tratos para la existencia

deben abstenerse,
la existencia se desarrollan en el contexto en cualquiera de las fases
del contrato (desde
de redes de relaciones contractuales vincu- el acceso a la relacin
contractual hasta su
ladas, que son relevantes para interpretar trmino) de toda
discriminacin basada en
xxviii
----------------------- Page 30-----------------------

(de/en/fr/it/es)
las caractersticas personales o sociales de 11. Resolucin. La resolucin

de los contra-
los consumidores, es decir, discriminacio- tos para la existencia debe
ser transparente,
nes por motivo del grupo al que pertenez ca responsable y socialmente
aceptable. La
el individuo afectado, o por causa de su rescisin anticipada contra la
voluntad del
posicin dentro del mismo. El acceso a los consumidor, del inquilino o
del asalariado
bienes, servicios y rentas mediante contra- slo ser posible en
situaciones extraor-
tos para la existencia debe gozar del esta- dinarias y excepcionales,
y mediando
tuto de los derechos humanos y de la justicia motivos explcitos y
equitativos. Nunca
distributiva, por su importancia para la sa - ser discriminatoria, su
efectividad ir
tisfaccin de las necesidades humanas, sub- precedida de un plazo de
preaviso razon-
sistencia, empleo y participacin en la vida able. Slo es posible cuando
el comporta-
econmica de las personas. miento de una de las partes
sea tan grave
9. Precio. Las obligaciones recprocas que que lo justifique, o cuando
las circunstan-
tienen su fuente en los contratos para la cias financieras que
afecten al proveedor
existencia deben ser equilibradas y pro- hagan materialmente inviable
el desarrollo
porcionadas. Los precios han de ser trans- del contrato. Cuando la
resolucin se base
parentes y no discriminatorios. en motivos financieros,
el consumidor
contar con procedimientos
colectivos de
10. Adaptacin. Puede exigirse la adap-
defensa en lo que ser
escuchado y repre-
tacin de los contratos para la existen-
sentado. El proceso debe
garantizar que las
cia en caso de cambio significativo de
las condiciones sociales o econmicas partes dispongan de tiempo
suficiente para
adoptar medidas de preparacin
frente a la
que concurren en su desarrollo, cuando
resolucin y / o sus
consecuencias. En tanto
tales modificaciones afecten a la propia
que la resolucin se
efecta en inters de
naturaleza de contratos para la existen-
la parte que redact el
contrato y organiz
cia y cuando, de haberse conocido tales
el abastecimiento de las
prestaciones, sta
modificaciones las partes no se habran
debe respetar los intereses de
la otra parte.
comprometido. Ser una condicin para
la adaptacin el que tenidas en cuenta 12. Comunicacin. A lo largo
de la relacin
las especificidades del contrato y en par- contractual en los contratos
para la exis-
ticular el reparto legal o contractual de tencia, desde el comienzo
de las nego-
los riesgos contractuales, as como las ciaciones hasta su
terminacin, el dilogo
obligaciones contractuales derivadas para y la cooperacin entre las
partes se basarn
las personas, pueda deducirse razonable- en la igualdad en el
cumplimiento de los
mente que el individuo no se hubiera objetivos contractuales, la
comunicacin y
comprometido, sin mediar una modifi- la confianza.
cacin del contrato. Las reglas colecti- 13. Informacin y
transparencia. Para sol-
vas de adaptacin prevalecern sobre las ventar posibles asimetras de
informacin
adaptaciones individuales. entre las partes, en
las negociaciones
xxix
----------------------- Page 31-----------------------
precontractuales y en cada fase de los con- 15. En la interpretacin de

contratos para
tratos para la existencia se facilitar infor- la existencia se tendrn en
cuenta los ries-
macin adecuada, completa, oportuna y gos sociales derivados del
desempleo, del
comprensible. sobreendeudamiento y de la
prdida de
14. Garanta de los medios de subsistencia. vivienda, a la luz de la
perspectiva social
Cuando los contratos para la existencia de la persona, y de las
disposiciones del
den lugar al abono de rentas regulares, en derecho.
tiempo y lugar determinados; o prevn 16. Confidencialidad. Los

datos comunica-
deducciones sobre las rentas disponibles por dos en el marco de los
contratos para la
las personas; la parte afectada conservar existencia as como las
estimaciones real-
siempre un mnimo de recursos con el fin izadas por el proveedor,
deben ser objeto de
de asegurar su subsistencia. Esta proteccin un tratamiento confidencial.
Slo pueden
se mantendr en va de ejecucin, en los utilizarse en el desarrollo
contractual.
embargos, y en los acuerdos con acreedores.
xxx
----------------------- Page 32-----------------------
Erklrung Declaration
1Die Verfasser dieser Erklrung, Verbrau- 1We, a group of academics

knowledgeable
cher- , Miet- und Arbeitsrechtler sowie about consumer, tenancy and

labour law,
Vertreter des allgemeinen Vertragsrechts, are deeply concerned that the
path to a
sind tief besorgt, dass der Weg zu einem harmonised European system of
contract
europischen Vertragsrecht auf einem law as envisaged by the
European Com-
verengten Kaufrechtsmodell aufbaut, mission and the Parliament will
be built on
demzufolge die Vertragspartner allein a reductive model of commercial
and con-
Informationen zum Ausgleich rechtlicher sumer sales, where information is
the only
Benachteiligung erhalten knnen. substantive concession to social
interests.
2konomische und soziale Interessen der 2Economic and social rights
of workers,
Arbeitnehmer, Verbraucher und Mieter consumers and tenants in long-

term rela-
in Langzeitvertrgen haben dagegen tions have got no adequate place.
bisher keine adquate Bercksichtigung 3This is the case for the

Consumer Rights
erfahren. Directive of 2011, which has as
its core ele-
3Das Kaufvertragsmodell ist zur Leitfigur ment the sales law model. Other
instances
in einer Reihe von Richtlinien wie der can be found in the Consumer
Credit
Verbraucherrechtsrichtlinie geworden. Directive of 2008 and in the
Directives
Die Konsumentenkreditrichtlinie schreibt concerning labour, which turn
life time
bindend ein neues punktuelles synallag- contracts into synallagmatic spot
relations.
matisches Vertragsmodell fr das Dar- In the modern service and credit
economy
lehen vor. hnliche Wirkungen haben the new understanding of such
contrac-
Richtlinien im Bereich der Arbeit. In der tual relations at the EU as well
as national
Dienstleistungs- und Kreditgesellschaft level poses a threat to the
achievements in
wird dies neue reduktive Verstndnis von social protection with regard
to life time
Arbeit, Konsum und Wohnen die Errun- contracts.
genschaften bei Lebenszeitvertrgen zum 4The liberal sales model of
information is
Schutz von Arbeitnehmern, Verbrauchern indifferent to life time,
provides no sufficient
und Mietern bedrohen. protection for the weak and has
no regard for
4Das Modell des Zeit indifferenten Kauf- the productivity of those who
work for their
vertrages muss um ein zweites grundle- living. Commercial sales

contracts need to
gendes Modell ergnzt werden, das wir als be completed by a second model
based on
Lebenszeitvertrag bezeichnet haben. what we call life time contracts.
xxxi
----------------------- Page 33-----------------------
5Es soll soziale Gerechtigkeit fr die Men- 5It should provide social
justice related to
schen ausdrcken knnen, fr die kono- human needs and life time, to
which eco-
mische Effizienz im Sinne von Profitabilitt nomic efficiency in the sense
of profitability
nur ein Mittel ist. can only be a means.
6Es sollte Antworten fr Vernderungen 6It should be able to
cope with long-term
in der Lebenssituation bereithalten und relational problems of

changes in human
mehr als eine einfache Tauschgerechtigkeit lives instead of providing
only remedies
bieten. typical of spot contracts.
7Materieller Schutz fr soziale Schwche 7It should provide
substantive protection
neben der Information fr die Auswahl for the weak instead of

information for
auf dem Markt gehrt dazu ebenso wie choice only, it should
acknowledge the col-
eine kollektive und soziale Dimension von lective and social dimension
of labour and
Arbeit und Konsum, wie sie in Tarifvertr- consumption expressed in
collective agree-
gen, aber auch in allgemeinen Prinzipien ments and general principles.
enthalten sind. 8The contractual freedom of

suppliers and
8Die Vertragsfreiheit der Anbieter und employers in the
traditional sales-based
Arbeitgeber sollte um die Anerkennung contract model should be

complemented
sozialer Freiheit der Arbeitnehmer, Mieter with the freedom of
social interests to be
und Verbraucher ergnzt werden, in der sheltered from the three
dangers of our
die drei groen Bedrohungen unserer Zeit time: unemployment,
over-indebtedness
- Arbeitslosigkeit, berschuldung und and homelessness.
Obdachlosigkeit - ernst genommen werden. 9We shall work together
internationally,
9Wir werden international in mehreren make use of different EU
languages in
EU-Sprachen zusammen arbeiten, um den order to incorporate the

wealth of national
Schatz nationaler Kulturen im Arbeits- legal cultures in labour and
private law.
und Privatrecht sichtbar zu machen. 10This will be done in
order to study the
10Dabei werden wir die grundlegenden basic contractual forms,
principles, com-
Vertragsformen, Prinzipien, gemeinsamen mon approaches and

achievements in the
Anstze und rechtlichen Errungenschaften existing as well as the
historical national
im gegenwrtigen wie auch im historischen social contract law.
sozialen Vertragsrecht erforschen. 11We offer our
professional support not
11Wir wollen nicht nur Gewerkschaften, only to trade unions,
consumer organisa-
Verbraucherverbnden und anderen Ver- tions, tenant organisations

and community
tretern der Zivilgesellschaft, sondern auch groups in the civil society,
but also to those
den offiziellen Stellen in der Gesetzge- officials working in the
legislative process
bung und anderswo, die mit der Erarbei- who share our conviction
that the way to
tung betraut sind, unsere Hilfe anbieten, a unified Europe can
compensate the loss
xxxii
----------------------- Page 34-----------------------
EuSoCo Declaration
(de/en/fr/it/es)
wenn sie mit uns der Meinung sind, dass of national autonomy only
through social
die Akzeptanz eines zuknftigen Europas developments that also in
the law are built
nur dann erreicht werden kann, wenn der on social traditions and
experiences of the
Verlust an nationaler Autonomie durch Member States.
ein wirklich soziales Europa kompensiert
wird, das sich auch im Recht auf die sozi-
alen Traditionen und Erfahrungen in den
Mitgliedsstaaten sttzt.
xxxiii
----------------------- Page 35-----------------------
Dclaration Dichiarazione
1Nous, qui constituons un groupe 1Gli autori di questa

dichiarazione, un
duniversitaires spcialiss dans les gruppo di accademici che

si occupano di
domaines du droit de la consommation, diritto dei consumatori,
dei rapporti di
du droit du louage et du droit du travail, locazione e del lavoro cos
come del diritto
affirmons notre profonde proccupation generale dei contratti,
hanno maturato
quant au chemin pris par la Commis- una forte preoccupazione
che il diritto
sion et Parlement europens en matire contrattuale europeo si
sviluppi sul mod-
dharmonisation du droit des contrats. ello semplificante della
disciplina della
Celui-ci semble devoir se rduire un compravendita in virt del
quale le parti
droit des ventes commerciales ou la con- contrattuali possono al pi
ottenere diritti
sommation dans lequel linformation est di informazione finalizzati
a riequlibrare
la seule concession significative faite aux svantaggi giuridici.
intrts sociaux. 2Al momento non sono stati
ancora tenuti
2Les droits conomiques et sociaux des tra- adeguatamente in
considerazione gli
vailleurs, des consommateurs et des loca- interessi economici ed

esistenziali dei
taires dans les relations long terme ny lavoratori, dei consumatori
e dei condut-
occupent aucune place. tori relativi ai contratti di
durata rilevanti
3Il en est ainsi pour la Directive de 2011 per lesistenza delle
persone.
sur les droits des consommateurs dont le 3Il modello del diritto
della compraven-
modle de la vente occupe le cur. Il en dita assurto a figura

guida in una serie
est galement ainsi, par exemple, dans la di direttive sulla tutela
del consumatore.
directive de 2008 sur le crdit la con- Ci avviene nella
direttiva sulla tutela del
sommation, qui transforment les con- consumatore del 2011 che
stata, appunto,
trats du temps dexistence en rapports splasmata sul modello della
compravendita.
sy nallagmatiques ponctuels. Au sein de la Esiti analoghi si registrano
in relazione alla
socit moderne des services et du crdit direttiva sul credito al
consumo del 2008
dans laquelle nous vivons, cette nouvelle cos come in direttive in
materia di diritto
comprhension des relations contrac- del lavoro le quali
trasformano i contratti
tuelles, dploye au niveau europen di durata per lesistenza
della persona in
comme au niveau national, constitue une rapporti (sinallagmatici)
spot. Nella mod-
menace pour les acquis de la protection erna societ dei servizi e
del credito questo
sociale en matire de contrats du temps nuovo modo riduttivo
dintendere tali con-
dexistence. tratti a livello comunitario
e nazionale finir
4Le modle libral de vente bas sur con il rimuovere i progressi
registrati nella
linformation est indiffrent la ques- tutela sociale grazie ai
contratti di durata
tion du temps dexistence, ne protge pas per lesistenza della
persona.
xxxiv
----------------------- Page 36-----------------------
EuSoCo Declaration
(de/en/fr/it/es)
suffisamment la partie faible et ne prend 4Il modello del contratto di

compravendita
pas en considration la productivit de che astrae dallesistenza delle

persone deve
ceux qui travaillent pour gagner leur vie. essere affiancato da un
secondo modello
Le modle contractuel de la vente doit tre basilare, che abbiamo ritenuto
di denomi-
complt par un second modle, bas sur nare: contratto di durata
per lesistenza
ce que nous appelons les contrats pour le della persona.
temps dexistence. 5Esso deve garantire
giustizia sociale ai
5Ce second modle doit promouvoir la jus- bisogni esistenziali delle
persone per le
tice sociale quappellent les besoins humains quali lefficienza economica

finalizzata al
et les ncessits de lexistence, pour lesquels profitto rappresenta solo un
mezzo rispetto
lefficacit conomique, au sens de la rental fine dellesistenza.
abilit, ne saurait tre quun moyen. 6Esso deve mettere, inoltre,
a disposizione
6Un tel modle doit permettre de sur- risposte per modificazioni che
intervengono
monter les problmes relationnels qui nais- nelle situazioni di vita ed

offrire una tutela
sent des changements advenant pendant pi intensa di quella che
consegue alla sem-
lexistence des individus, plutt que de se plice giustizia di scambio.
Appartiene a tale
borner aux remdes typiques des contrats tutela la protezione
sostanziale delle situ-
ponctuels. azioni di debolezza sociale la
quale integra la
7Il doit assurer une protection substanti- garanzia di essere informati
sulle scelte che
elle de la partie faible plutt que de sim- operano nel mercato.
plement lui offrir dinformer ses choix. Il 7Essa comprende pure la
dimensione soci-
doit reconnatre la dimension collective et ale e collettiva del lavoro e
del consumo che
sociale de la consommation et du travail trova espressione nei contratti
collettivi ma
quexpriment les conventions collectives et anche in principi generali.
les principes gnraux. 8La libert contrattuale
dei datori di
8La libert contractuelle des fournisseurs lavoro, dei locatori cos
come e di coloro
et des employeurs que promeut le droit des che offrono beni e servizi
sul mercato,
contrats fond sur la vente doit saccorder dovrebbe essere regolata in
modo tale da
avec la libert de se protger des trois fl- tenere adeguatamente conto di
tre grandi
aux sociaux de notre poque: le chmage, le rischi sociali della nostra
epoca quali la
surendettement et la perte du domicile. disoccupazione, il sovra-
indebitamento e
9Il nous faut travailler ensemble au niveau la mancanza di alloggio.
international, et utiliser les diffren- 9Collaboreremo a livello
internazionale
tes langues de lUnion Europenne, afin utilizzando una pluralit di

lingue in uso
dintgrer la richesse des cultures juridiques nellUnione europea, per
rendere visibile il
nationales au droit du travail et au droit patrimonio culturale del
diritto del lavoro
priv. e del nuovo diritto civile
nazionale.
xxxv
----------------------- Page 37-----------------------
10Lobjectif est dtudier les formes con- 10A tal fine saranno
oggetto della nos-
tractuelles lmentaires, les principes, les tra attivit di ricerca le

principali forme
approches et ralisations communes dans contrattuali, i relativi
principi, approcci
le domaine du droit social, contemporain comuni nonch gli
affinamenti giuridici
et historique, du contrat. del diritto sociale
contrattuale non solo
11Nous proposons notre soutien professi- contemporaneo ma anche
storico.
onnel aux syndicats, associations de con- 11E nostra intenzione
offrire la nostra
sommateurs, associations de locataires collaborazione non solo

alle organizza-
et autres groupes communautaires de la zioni sindacali, di
tutela dei consuma-
socit civile, mais aussi aux fonction- tori e ad altre forme di
rappresentanza
naires et responsables politiques uvrant della societ civile, ma anche
alle autorit
dans le domaine lgislatif ; tous ceux qui competenti a legificare o
comunque sia
partagent notre conviction que le projet incaricate dellelaborazione
delle norma-
dune Europe unifie ne compensera la tive, qualora convengano
con noi che si
perte dautonomie nationale quau trav- potr aspirare a
raggiungere il consenso
ers de progrs sociaux qui, comme le su un futuro modello
europeo solo se la
droit, se construisent sur la base des tradi- perdita dellautonomia
nazionale verr
tions et des expriences sociales des tats adeguatamente compensato da
unEuropa
membres. realmente solidale che
anche in campo
giuridico poggi sulle
tradizioni e conquiste
sviluppate e realizzate negli
Stati membri.
xxxvi
----------------------- Page 38-----------------------
EuSoCo Declaration
(de/en/fr/it/es)
Declaracion
1Los autores de esta declaracin, un grupo cambio de circunstancias,

resultan indife-
de acadmicos que trabajamos en los rente, y no ofrece

suficiente proteccin a
mbitos de derecho de consumo, arren- los ms dbiles. Debe
complementarse con
damientos y derecho laboral, as como en un segundo modelo bsico que
denomina-
derecho general de contratos, hacemos mos aqu de contratos para
la existencia.
pblica nuestra preocupacin porque el 5Este segundo modelo sirve
para garanti-
derecho contractual europeo armonizado zar la justicia social en la
cobertura de las
este enraizndose en el modelo contractual necesidades esenciales de las
personas a lo
de la compraventa, en virtud del cual los largo de su vida, y en ese
contexto, la efi-
derechos de informacin constituyen el ciencia econmica o el fin de
lucro consti-
ncleo para reequilibrar las desventajas de tuyen nicamente medios.
una de las partes.
6Debe dar respuesta a las
consecuencias de
2En dicho modelo no se garantizan debi- las modificaciones de las
circunstancias a
damente los intereses econmicos y socia-

lo largo de la vida de las
personas, y ofrecer
les de los trabajadores, los consumidores y
mayor proteccin que la
derivada de la jus-
los inquilinos que son parte contratante en
ticia de intercambios
comerciales sinalag-
acuerdos de larga duracin para satisfacer mticos de tracto nico.
necesidades bsicas (Principios de los
contratos sociales a largo plazo). 7Debe garantizar una tutela
sustancial para
los ms dbiles frente a las

circunstancias
3As, la Directiva relativa a la proteccin
sociales, y no slo un
derecho a la infor-
de los consumidores de 2011, la Directiva
macin sobre las diversas
opciones del
sobre crdito al consumo del ao 2008 , o
mercado; reconociendo
plenamente la
las Directivas sobre derecho laboral y con-
dimensin colectiva y social
del trabajo y
tratos de arrendamiento para fines residen-
del consumo expresada en
convenios col-
ciales que regulan contratos a largo plazo
ectivos y en principios
generales.
contratos para la existencia, reproducen
el modelo contractual de la compraventa. 8La libertad de
contratacin de los pro-
En la actual sociedad de servicios y crdito, veedores de bienes y

servicios y de los
esta forma de entender tales contratos a empleadores, debe
completarse con la
escala comunitaria y nacional tendr como libertad del inters
social para hacer
resultado eliminar los avances en la protec- frente a los tres principales
riesgos socia-
cin social de los contratos a largo plazo les de nuestro tiempo:
desempleo, endeu-
para la existencia de la persona (contratos damiento excesivo y
indigencia.
para la existencia). 9Cooperamos en el plano

internacional
4En el modelo de contrato de compraventa, mediante una pluralidad de
lenguas de
las consideraciones existenciales como el la Unin Europea, para
aprovechar la
xxxvii
----------------------- Page 39-----------------------
riqueza de las culturas jurdicas europeas a los funcionarios competentes

para legis-
del derecho privado y del trabajo. 10Nuestra lar y regular que compartan
con nosotros
investigacin se centrar en las formas con- el deseo de alcanzar un

consenso sobre un
tractuales bsicas, sus principios , enfoques modelo europeo nico, donde
la prdida
comunes, as como en la legislacin social de autonoma nacional sea
compensada
nacional contempornea e histrica. adecuadamente por una
verdadera pro-
11Ofrecemos apoyo profesional no slo teccin social basada en
las tradiciones
a los sindicatos, organizaciones de con- y logros desarrollados y
aplicados en los
sumidores, asociaciones de inquilinos y ordenamientos de los
distintos Estados
grupos de la sociedad civil, sino tambin miembros.
xxxviii
----------------------- Page 40-----------------------
1 Introduction: The New Dimension
of Life Time in the Law of Contracts
and Obligations
1.1 Life Time Contracts
This book is concerned with life time contracts, the group of contracts that
generally have the
most important role to play in peoples daily lives and existence. These establish
social long-
term relations that, with regard to certain periods of the lifetime of individuals,
provide essen-
tial goods, services, labour and income opportunities for self-realisation and
participation.
Since all denominations such as social contracts, contracts with regard to
social exis-
tence or simply long-term contracts risked confusion we finally had to accept that
our
1
term could be confused with a contract for lifetime . Since such contracts are
not legally
2
accepted we occupy this notion in relation to the existing contract law as a
counterpart
3
to the sales contract model. In our use of the term life time it is life and
time, two dis-
tinct objects of the contractual relationship and not just a denomination of a
period in
which they are in force. We therefore use a spelling in which both words are
separated
4
from each other if it is feasible. If we refer to the period of time only, we will
refer to it
1 This is the use of the word lifetime contract made on the internet, where
people announce that they have
got a contract for the rest of their lives.
2 After the French Revolution, modern contract law sees the core of freedom in
the abolition of slavery and
lifelong contractual relations. See Art. 1780 French code civil: On ne peut
engager ses services qu temps,
ou pour une entreprise dtermine; Art. 1583 span. cdigo civil:
Arrendamiento hecho por toda la vida
(lifetime) es nulo; 724 BGB (society): Ist eine Gesellschaft fr die
Lebenszeit (lifetime) eines Gesellschafters
eingegangen, so kann sie in gleicher Weise gekndigt werden wie eine fr
unbestimmte Zeit eingegangene
Gesellschaft. (If the service relationship is entered into for the lifetime
of a person or for a longer period of
time than 5 years, then it may be terminated by the person obliged at the end
of 5 years.) (= 574 BGB for
rent contracts); 624 BGB (labour contract): Ist das Dienstverhltnis fr
die Lebenszeit einer Person oder fr
lngere Zeit als fnf Jahre eingegangen, so kann es von dem Verpflichteten
nach dem Ablauf von fnf Jahren
gekndigt werden. (If the service relationship is entered into for the
lifetime of a person or for a longer period
of time than 5 years, then it may be terminated by the person obliged at the
end of 5 years.)
3 For the relation between time and law see Engisch, K. (1965). Mengoni, L.
(2011) distinguished between
the temporal dimension of the law, which is the way law exists in its time,
and the way law deals with time.
The first concerns the ontology of law, while the second, to which we refer
in this book, is addressed as part
of the methodology of the law.
4 This is not possible, for example, in German (Leben Zeit instead of
Lebenszeit does not make sense). In
German, we therefore either employ the English words life time or refer to
Lebenszeit. In the Italian and
French language we use a circumscription: contratti di durata per
lesistenza della persona.
1
----------------------- Page 41-----------------------
in a single word as lifetime. But similar to consumer contracts, commercial

contracts and
other economically defined categories of contract law, the term life time
contract serves
as an umbrella for legal terms like social long-term contracts, relational
contracts, soziale
Dauerschuldverhltnisse, contratti di durata per lesistenza della
persona, contrats de
longue dure5 or de dure indertermin, locatio conductio (ad longum tempum), which
are equally used where the place of life time contracts in the legal system is
discussed.
Experience has taught us that in the modern world people share basic needs
that are
more than mere individual preferences and that do not tend to be conditioned by
different
6
cultural requirements . They also share the need for security and the necessity of
a reason-
able expectation of being able to satisfy their basic needs.7
In any event, people are not generally in a position to lead isolated and
independent
8
lives, and no society can provide for people to be good friends/neighbours.
Therefore, in
order to satisfy their basic needs, people have to relate to the other elements of
society. The
fact remains, as outlined in Derleders chapter, that the post-war constitutions
oblige the
State to ensure the minimum conditions for ein menschenwrdiges Dasein seiner
Brger
9
[a dignified existence for its citizens].
Nowadays, entering into a life time contract is the main10 and, for many, the
most
dignified way (see Andrea Nicolussis contribution below) of ensuring long-term

satisfac-
tion of the basic requirements to organise and plan their lives. Such contracts
determine
certain functions for the individual, but this does not hinder the other party from
com-
plying with ethical standards (see Helena Klingers contribution below) and
provisions
11
aimed at safeguarding their personality nor, therefore, the
competent authorities from
setting out the required rules. The principles that such laws must adhere to will
be set out
in the second part of this introduction, after the category of life time contracts
has been
comprehensively described.
Currently there are a number of important scientific studies that
deal with the
definition of long-term contracts12. In civil law systems, life time contracts
mean those
contracts that take effect through the performance of one or more continuous
activities
5 See i.e. Vellas, P. (1957).

6 See on this point Doyal, L./Gough, I. (1991).
7 On the current difficulty for people to think about the future, see Aug, M.
(2008).
8 Heller, . (1987) translated into Italian as Heller, . (1990b) p. 47.
9 BVerfG, 29.05.1990, AppNo. BVerfGE 82, 60 in relation to Art. 20 GG.
10 The main, but not exclusive method of satisfying ones needs. The situation
varies from state to state and
from one type of goods to another. For example, the rate of home ownership
ranges from 43% in Germany
to 54% in France and 80% in Italy, and therefore it is clear that residential
lease contracts play a less impor-
tant role in the latter country.
11 Heller, . (1990a) translated into Italian as Heller, A. (1997) pp. 133 ff.
12 The early scholars of long-term contracts have been Gierke, O. v. (1914) pp.
24 ff; Beitzke, G. (1948). Impor-
tant studies in this field were then undertaken by Italian legal scholars:
Oppo, G. (1943), Oppo, G. (1944);
Devoto, L. (1943). More recently, Larenz, K. (1987) pp. 29-33.
----------------------- Page 42-----------------------

of
Contracts
and Obligations
(that is, which are carried out, uninterrupted, for the time provided for under the
contract
or in any case sufficient to fulfil the creditors requirements) or on a periodic
basis (that is,
which is not continuous in nature but is repeated at intervals). The
differentiation between
obligatory relationships, which are respectively short-term and long-term, relates
to the
different interests that are being satisfied by the obligation itself. In
fact, whereas with
contracts involving continuous or periodic performance, the creditors requirements
are
such that by their nature they cannot be satisfied by a single act but need a
continuous or
periodic performance by the debtor, in spot contracts the creditors interests can
be served
on one occasion. To conclude, a feature of life time contracts is that the
performance in
its entirety depends on the duration (Lnge).13
This insight has been deepened by economists who distinguish between spot
con-
tracts that are typically sales or sales-related contracts and relational long-term
contracts,
where the definitions and rules provided in the initial phase of the
conclusion of the
contract are less important than the institutional arrangements for
unforeseen events
and conflicts during the life time of such long term contracts.14 Similar concerns
may
have motivated Roman law, which was reluctant to apply the existing sales law model
of will-related contracts (stipulatio) to such long-term relations where the use of

capital
was at stake. Still today the French civil code, especially, contains models of
real con-
tracts (contractus realis) such as loan (prt consommation Art. 1874 cc, lat.
mutuum),
mandate (mandat Art. 1984 cc, lat. mandatum), deposit/saving (dept Art. 1915 cc,
lat.
depositum) and borrowing (prt usage Art. 1875 cc, lat. commodatum),
where the
factual provision of goods and services and the relation during the
life time of the
contract are the core elements of the relation instead of the initial will of the
parties.15
This was also true for those relations where the use of foreign capital was
governed by
property-related absolute rights as represented by the usus fructus that could be
provided
unilaterally and that still governs the books on property and possession in the
continen-
tal European civil codes. Although a necessary consensus of the user has meanwhile
been
introduced into the genesis of such rights, the whole relation is primarily
governed by
the law and not by the will of the parties. Tendencies within modern long-term
contrac-
tual relations to reduce the elements of the will where factually such long-term
relations
have persisted should also be noted. Factual contracts have been accepted
especially in
labour, tenancy and company law16 because the idea of voiding retroactively
contracts in
which the parties had performed factually, without the necessary contractual
remedies
provided by the law or collective agreements, would leave such parties, especially
minors
13 Larenz, K. (1987) p. 30; Medicus, D. (2005) p. 5.

14 See Bolton, P./Dewatripont, M. (2005) pp. 3, 489 ff.
15 For this, see below at note 144.
16 See Simitis, S. (1957).
3
----------------------- Page 43-----------------------
or those who were mistaken with regard to the contents of the contract or were
victims of
immoral behaviour, to the law of undue enrichment (see Reifner Kreditvertrag),
depriv-
ing them of all social protection provided by the law for such contractual
relations, but
also leaving third parties without reward for the trust they had invested in
relations that
looked superficially like consensual contracts.
Research that brings together all those pieces of law where the use of
foreign capital
in all its different forms is concerned could probably reveal that there are
fundamental
differences between the idea of the free will and the necessities of a long-term
relation.
Life time contracts have to take these differences into account since inadequate
legal pat-
terns for long-term relations impede the additional task of representing life time
needs
adequately within contractual relationships. The lack of socialist oil referring
to a quite
modern issue of the lack of social justice in civil law17 in the modern civil
codes, already
18 19 20
criticised at the beginning of the 20th century by Anton Menger
Duguit, Sinzheimer
and others, is therefore not so much the effect of a class perspective but more
structur-
ally rooted in a system where the social needs that appear during the use of such
capital
are reduced to the will stated at the signing of such contracts. The most famous
dispute
perhaps on the adequacy of the idea of a spot contract where the initial will of
the parties
dominates the parties and an institutional or relational view on long-term
relations was
held between Immanuel Kant and Georg Friedrich Hegel with regard to the nature of a
marriage. While Kant insisted on a definable synallagmatic relationship governed by

the
will of the spouses, Hegel insisted that marriage could not be understood in this
way.21
When contracts for immediate performance merely follow on from one another,
and
there is no provision linking them together from the outset, they are referred to
as recur-
ring contingent contracts ( Wiederkehrschuldverhltnis); they are not
characterised by
single contractual relationship.
There are basically four issues that have historically justified the
development of life
time contracts: the possibility for the parties to terminate the contractual
relationship ad
nutum22; the possibility of responding to the alteration of what in German legal
language
is known as the economic balance underlying the contract (Geschftsgrundlage,

clausula
17 See Brggemeier, G./Bussani, M. et al. (2004).

18 Menger, A. (1890).
19 His property right I deny, his social duty I confirm (Son droit de
proprit, je le nie, son devoir social, je
l'affirme.) see Duguit, L. (1920) pp. 147 ff (La Proprit fonction
socials).
20 Sinzheimer, H. (1976b).
21 Hegel, G. W. F. (2005). The French Civil Code distinguishes between
the marriage as an institution
(Art. 144 ff cc) and marriage as a contractual relation (Art. 1387 ff cc).
22 The traditional position is that a right to ordinary termination (on notice)
should be recognised with regard
to long-term relationships of indeterminate length, whereas under fixed-term
contracts, only where pro-
vided for under the contract.
----------------------- Page 44-----------------------

of
Contracts and Obligations
rebus sic stantibus); the adaptation of the contract; and finally, the fact that
withdrawal,
termination and the termination clause do not operate with retroactive effect.23
The earliest modern civil code to introduce the category of lifelong

contracts was the
Italian c.c., which, by Art. 1467 (1), governs the alteration of the economic
balance of the
contract, providing that this may justify termination of the contract by a court
if the superven-
ing burden exceeds the normal margin of risk in the contract and if the party
against whom
termination is sought does not offer to adjust the contractual conditions in a
fair way.
The BGB leaving aside the references to dauernde Dienstverhltnisse
accepted,
without defining them, the class of contracts under discussion here only with the
Schul-
drechtsreform, which came into force on 1 January 2002.24 In cases of serious
alteration
(schwerwiegende) in the economic balance of the contract, performance of the

contract
can be sought under 313 if, in all the circumstances of the case, one of the
parties cannot
insist on adhesion to the terms of the contract. Finally, if performance of the
contract is
not possible, the parties can withdraw from it. In the case of all long-term
contracts, 314
of the BGB provides generally for termination of the contract without notice,
conditional
upon the existence of a compelling reason (aus wichtigem Grund).25
1.2 The New Class of Life Time Contracts: Key Features and Historical
Development
The class of long-term contracts corresponds only partially to the life time
contracts cat-
egory, which, compared with the former, are more restrictive from some
perspectives, but
wider from others. The same can be said of the class of contracts,
American in origin,
known as relational contracts.26
Life time contracts are above all those that ensure a place to live
(contracts for rent/
leases), goods and services (contracts for supply) and income (labour contracts and
credit
23 The largest number of academic references relates to the first problem:

Gschnitzer, F. (1926); Mancini, G. F.
(1962); Oetker, H. (1994). With regard to the other issues, readers are
referred to the authors cited by Lar-
enz, K. (1987) pp. 29 ff.
24 In Germany, the Dauerschuldverhltnisse were regulated for the first time in
1976 under 10 n. 3, 11 n. 1
and 12 AGBG ( 308 n. 3, 309 n. 1 e 9 BGB), but this regimen only applied to
certain long-term contracts.
25 (1) Each party may terminate a contract for the performance of a continuing
obligation for a compelling
reason without a notice period. There is a compelling reason if the
terminating party, taking into account
all the circumstances of the specific case and weighing the interests of both
parties, cannot reasonably be
expected to continue the contractual relationship until the agreed end or
until the expiry of a notice period.
(2) If the compelling reason consists in the breach of a duty under the
contract, the contract may be termi-
nated only after the expiry without result of a period specified for relief
or after a warning notice without
result. Section 323 (2) applies with the necessary modifications. (3) The
person entitled may give notice
only within a reasonable period after obtaining knowledge of the reason for
termination. (4) The right to
demand damages is not excluded by the termination.
26 Macneil, I. R. (1978); Goetz, C. J./Scott, R. E. (1981); Macauley, S. (1991);
Macauley, S. (2000).
----------------------- Page 45-----------------------

agreements), the necessities for living. It is worth underlining that credit is the
necessary
complementary contractual relation in which either income is allocated as and when
it is
needed (consumer credit, mortgage loans, private pension schemes,
educational finance;
bank account and payment services) or in which access to certain services like
housing, trans-
portation, water, heat and electricity are provided in the form of deferred
payments or rent.
At the heart of this class of contracts there is an individual human being,
with his or
her physiological and ethical requirements, in terms of security, belonging,
success and
self-fulfillment, in other words, the existential need to be able to enjoy
essential goods
(lebenswichtige Gter), services, labour opportunities and income opportunities.
Satisfac-
tion of such needs is normally an essential pre-condition for the pursuit of a
happy life, or
for self-realisation and participation.27
As such, the contracts that we are categorizing in the new class to which
this book is
dedicated are those that can be considered indispensible to the organization of a
com-
munity.28 In other words, for the purposes of our discussion it is important to
note that,
unlike the case of long-term contracts, it is not the satisfaction of any long-term
interest
that justifies classing a contract within the category of life time contracts. Only
specific
interests qualify for inclusion, in the sense that their purpose is to satisfy
material needs
that permit people to aspire to self-realisation.
Interests to consider may include those of an economic kind, such as the need
to have
an available income. This type of interest should be classified as social, since it
is con-
nected to the existential need for people to have access to certain essential
goods, services
and opportunities that are a prerequisite for aspirations to a happy life. But all
the more
reason to consider other non-economic interests that, in other periods of history,
were sat-
isfied more in terms of family status or citizenship29: people live to achieve
their life-aims
and to take part in social life.

Goods, services and opportunities (of work and having money) can be defined
as
essential when they are a function of the free development of personality, and this
accounts
for their constitutional importance (e.g. the right to housing, to work, access to
credit) or
the fact that they are frequently governed by public administration regimes as well
as pub-
lic policies (welfare).30 But this volume focuses principally on the private law
aspect of the
circulation of these goods, services and opportunities.

The case-law of the Bundesgerichtshof, for example, relates to this private-
law dimen-
sion, which recognises a right to compensatory damages (including contractual
claims)
27 As we can see, life time contracts overlap only partly with those that
Medicus, D. (2005) p. 200 calls der
Existenzsicherung dienenden Dauerschuldverhltnisse.
28 Grossi, P. (1963) p. 26.
29 See Oppo, G. (1943) I, p. 149.
30 Gambino, A. M. (2010).
----------------------- Page 46-----------------------

of
Contracts
and Obligations
for the interruption of enjoyment (Nutzungsentschdigung) of goods or services that

are
of central importance to a self-maintaining lifestyle (eigenwirtschaftliche
Lebenshaltung).
However, it must include other cases where the interruption impacts significantly
on the
material basis of leading ones life.31 The reason for this has to do with both the
principle
of certainty in the law and with the rule that non-economic loss can be compensated
for
only to the extent provided for by law ( 253 BGB).32
There are two other distinctive features of life time contracts.

In order for a contract to be included in the category of life time
contracts, it is not
whether or not the obligation at the centre of the contract requires continuous
perfor-
mance, but the fact that it concerns the duration of satisfaction of at
least one of the
interests included among the specific interests referred to above protected
by the con-
tract and, obviously, that the whole comes about through the recognition of an
enforceable
legal right.
Secondly, contracts that form part of the category of life time contracts
also share the
feature that they influence the future activity of those who, in order to fulfil
the obliga-
tions arising under these contracts, must and here is the economic substrate that
obliges
people to make certain choices at the same time employ their labour according to
market
forces. Under employment contracts this happens directly, in the context of the
contract
itself, which satisfies the workers long-term money needs and professional
achievement,
whereas, with other types of life time contracts, this happens with separate
contracts, but
linked to what satisfies social requirements. In other words, life time contracts
are embed-
ded in a network of linked contracts that require as we shall see
presently regard
(gards, Rcksicht) and attention33 where legal solutions have to be found.
We can therefore say with confidence that life time contracts are conducive
to leading
ones life, but at the same time they consume life time.
Generally speaking, in most national private law systems a special
regime has
developed as we shall see in subsequent paragraphs to govern
individual types
of life time contracts, but no legal system has as yet recognised a common matrix
for
these contracts.
31 It is not the case if the enjoyment involves a private swimming pool, (BGH,
24.01.2013, AppNo. III ZR
98/12), a camper (BGH, 15.12.1982, AppNo. VIII ZR 315/80), a fur coat (BGH,
12.02.1975, AppNo. VIII
ZR 11/73) or a motor boat (BHG, 15.11.1983, AppNo. VI ZR 269/81).
32 BGH, 24.01.2013, AppNo. III ZR 98/12, which recognises a right to damages for
interruption of internet
services required for email services; further examples of compensable
interruption include the use of a
television set, personal computer, including laptops, bicycle, kitchen
furniture and holiday home.
33 In Art. 241 (2) German BGB the official (questionable) translation for
Rcksicht (regard) is attention:
An obligation may also, depending on its contents, oblige each party to take
account of the rights, legal
interests and other interests of the other party. (Das Schuldverhltnis kann
nach seinem Inhalt jeden Teil
zur Rcksicht auf die Rechte, Rechtsgter und Interessen des anderen Teils
verpflichten.)
----------------------- Page 47-----------------------
1.3 Removal of Long-Term Relationships in the 19th-Century

Legal System, Which Centred upon Property and Contracts
of Purchase and Sale
In the medieval period in the context of an agrarian economy, the

institution of
locatio ad longum tempus was developed, thanks to which, for the whole duration of
the contract, which was obviously long, the tenant of the land put down roots
there,
became dominus utilis while his strictly personal relationship was transformed
into a
case of real property.34 This type of relationship was a wholly medieval
anthropology,
in which human will gives way to domination by natural events, primarily time, time
as duration.35
Kant, the 18th-19th Century philosopher, overturned this interpretation, with

his
assertion that space and time are not objective structures but means, belonging to
the
individual, possessed a priori by man in that they are pure palpable intuitions,
that is
universal and necessary.36 Kant held that no one can conceive of a before and
after
unless they accept that time exists as a reality, allowing them to do so. This
highlights,
above all, the fact that the new conception of time, which permitted the individual
to
spend it, on the assumption (itself new) of self-determination,37 led legal
scholars of the
Pandectist persuasion to collocate the contractual effects in a context that

transcended
empirical reality and that referred to the common will of the parties.38 The
latter was
imbued by natural law theorists with a normative force that assumed, contrary to
what
typically occurs in life time contracts (leaving aside, that is, some special
cases), that
the contracting parties had equal bargaining power. In short, the figure of
reference
at the bargaining table was an a priori construction, not an individual
immersed in
social relations that condition his or her actions: a legal abstraction. In brief,
the value
of the persons concerned is treated as absolute, which means that the regime
governing
contracts is determined by iustitia commutativa (. . .) as justice without
regard to
the person.39
34 Grossi, P. (2008) p. 60 summarises the conclusions he reached in his classic

study, Grossi, P. (1963).
35 Grossi, P. (2008), p. 60.
36 Kant treats this profile in the first part of The Critique of Pure Reason
(see Kant, I. (1747a-1804), URL:
http://www.korpora.org/kant/aa03/. Accessed: 15.08.2013) devoted to the
cognitive process and, more spe-
cifically, to transcendental aesthetics.
37 Brandt, R. (2007).
38 This reasoning is all contained in 19 of that part of Die
Metaphysik der Sitten concerning
Rechtslehre, cited here from Kant, I. (1747b-1804) pp. 272-273.
URL://www.korpora.org/kant/aa06/.
Accessed: 15.08.2013. The BGB the Swiss Obligationsrecht, lABGB as
reinterpreted during the 19th
century, and the 1942 Italian Civil Code rests, as has been noted, on the
Kantian notion of the con-
tract as Einigung der Wille (Schmidlin, B. (1999)).
39 Canaris, C.-W. (1997) p. 31. See further on this point Andrea Nicolussis
contribution in this volume.
----------------------- Page 48-----------------------
1 Introduction: The New Dimension of Life Time in the

Law of
Coherently with this new Kantian conceptual frame, the subject-matter of the
con-
tract was no longer identified with the Sache but with a Tat or a deed, a
performance.40
On this premise, the enjoyment was no longer conceivable as a

real situation that
objectively limited ownership, and not by chance, the latter was depicted as the
denial
[of restriction] der Beschrnkung.41 Enjoyment was only possible, therefore,
thanks to a
performance by an individual who, in order to fulfil the contract, put the

subject-matter of
the enjoyment itself at the others disposition.42 In other words, the enjoyment
of a habita-
tion, for example, was only achieved indirectly, through the activity of the
landlord who
quotidie et singulis momentis permitted the fruitio of the rented property.43
It should be understood that social situations, such as the long-term

enjoyment of goods,
obviously did not disappear; they simply lost legal significance, because
nineteenth century
individualism tended to make jurists give prominence to decisions made by market
forces.
Furthermore, in a system in which the person now appeared without an inborn
telos
(purpose), new contractual figures began to be examined, with long-term
obligations of
facere [performance]. Bernhard Windscheid, in particular, drew a
distinction between
contracts that focussed respectively on the obligation to provide ones own
Dienste and,
conversely, to bring about the expected result,44 so prefiguring the solution that
came to
be laid down in the BGB ( 611 e 631), including the third Teilnovelle of the
1916 Allge-
meinen Brgerlichen Gesetzbuch (ABGB).45
The 1804 civil code (Art. 1708) and the 1865 Italian civil code (Art. 1570),
conversely,
make a distinction, first of all, between the louage des chose, de service and, on
the other
hand, douvrage by which a person undertakes an obligation to work for another
indepen-
dently or provide a service under a monetary agreement.
40 Kant, I. (1747b-1804) p. 273: Was ist aber das uere, das ich durch den
Vertrag erwerbe? Das es nur die
Kausalitt der Willkr des Anderen in Ansehung einer mir versprochenen
Leistung ist, so erwerbe ich
dadurch unmittelbar nicht eine uere Sache, sondern eine That desselben,
dadurch eine Sache in meine
Gewalt gebracht wird, damit ich sie zu der meine mache.
41 Windscheid, B./Kipp, T. (1906) 167 (p. 857).
42 Grossi, P. (1963) pp. 24-25.
43 Vangerow, K. A. v. (1865-1876) I, 312 citato da Grossi, P. (1963) p. 28.
44 From locatio conductio unitaria, thanks to Johannes Voet, the tripartite
position of locatio rei- operis-operarum
is reached; with Windscheid, as noted in the text, the latter two figures
were presented as Dienst- und
Werkvertrag (see additionally, for the necessary references, Ranieri, F.
(2010)).
45 Tomandl, T. (1971) p. 20, where the passage from the Lohnvertrag class used
in the original 1811 version of
the ABGB is traced (which foresaw that this comes into existence when a
person binds himself to the per-
formance of work or a service for a sum of money), to the acceptance of the
division between Dienst- und
Werkvertrag: wenn jemand sich auf eine gewisse Zeit zur Dienstleistung fr
einen anderen verpflichtet,
so entsteht ein Dienstvertrag; wenn jemand die Herstellung eines Werkes gegen
Entgelt bernimmt, ein
Werkvertrag. However, as appears from the preparatory work, the clauses of
the ABGB, as amended by
the 1916 reformulation, concerned only the contract of subordinated service
and the work contract, and
not, conversely, the independent contract for services (freier
Dienstvertrag). A legislative regime to govern
the latter is still non-existent, and therefore legal scholars classify such
contracts as innominate contracts
(Lschnigg, G. (2011)).
----------------------- Page 49-----------------------
Some of the first attempts to separate out from these contracts those whose
subject-
matter was performance of subordinated work also belong in this historical time
frame,
which, in some countries, survived into the twentieth century. But this was still
being done
within the typical liberal framework that turned on the notion of an exchange
between
money and things. Lujo Brentano, the guru of the social democratic movement, and,
in
Italy in a rather more sophisticated way Francesco Carnelutti,46 in fact
asserted that
the employment contract does transfer the hire of the workers body to the
employer, an
assertion that actually demotes the intrinsic value of a person.
As Otto von Gierke observed, in his pioneering study of long-term
contracts in
1914, it is beyond doubt that the general doctrine of obligations developed by the
Pan-
dectists rests upon relationships of obligation which are transitory
(vorbergehende)
in nature.47 The latter concept has gradually come to seem natural because the
whole
body of the (general) laws of obligations has undergone a process of de-

historification.
In particular, the awareness of the origins of its derivation from the purchase and
sale
contracts has become lost over time. The introduction of a general part of the
law of
obligations into the civil codes of continental Europe which becomes separated
from
the regime that governed its sources has generated the conviction that,
despite his-
torical awareness and the resulting relativization of legal categories, obligations
or the
relationship of obligation presents itself (. . .) as an a-historical class which
has its own
measure.48
A final observation should be made on the consequences brought about by the

nine-
teenth-century (liberal) legal system based on the ideology of the market and
freedom
to contract. Under such a system there is no place for consumer protection because
the
very system presents itself as oriented towards ensuring consumption; it has been
rightly
said that the liberal system had blind faith in the social consequences of freedom
to con-
tract, which became detached from the concrete act of consumption whose existential
and
social characteristics remained legally irrelevant.49
1.4 The Rise of Contracts for Work and Rental of Property

for Personal Use in the Production Age
The emergence during the twentieth century of a market economy based on industrial
production gave extraordinary social importance to one of the typical life time
contracts:
46 Carnelutti, F. (1913).
47 Gierke, O. v. (1914) pp. 356-357.
48 Giorgianni, M. (1993) p. 141 in relation to the 1942 Italian civil code and
the BGB.
49 Reifner, U. (1988); Nogler, L. (2009) p. 70.
10
----------------------- Page 50-----------------------

of
the contract of subordinated employment.50 At the beginning of the century the

concept
of Arbeitgeber (from which the Italian term datore di lavoro [employer,

literally giver
of work] derives) and Arbeitnehmer originated, and developed in a way that at
first seemed
to be definitive, an overturning that meant that the lack of work was no longer
evaluated in
a positive light, as the opportunity to be free of obligations and to devote
oneself to work
in a higher social sphere, but negatively, as an absence of income.51
The rise of the employment contract has been slow but steady and inexorable.
At the
start of the century fixed-term contracts of subordinated employment still
prevailed, often
on a daily basis and carried out in inhumanely oppressive conditions.52 But by the
mid-
century, and the German law on dismissal (Kndigungsschutzgesetz=KSchG) of 10

August
1951 (which was followed by legislation, or at least collective
regulations, which were
similar in almost all the industrialized countries), the format of a subordinated
employ-
ment contract of indeterminate length emerged, with stability as a feature. The
possibility
for an employer in that particular type of life time contract, the
contract for subordi-
nated employment, to freely terminate (ad nutum) the contractual obligations, was
in fact
overcome, which represented one of the pillars of the traditional regimen for long-
term
contracts (see above, 1.1.). Representative of the difficulty that legal scholars
in the civil
law tradition had, obstinately bound as they were to the principles of purchase and
sale
agreements, in placing this novel situation, is the fact that some legal scholars
depicted it
53
as Verdinglichung [objectification] of obligatory rights (take, for instance,
613a BGB,
Art. 2112 c.c. and also the Community legislation on transfers of business).
But labour law also confronted two other pillars of the long-term contracts
regimen (see
above, 1.1), since the possibility of action in the face of a change to the
underlying economic
conditions of the contract has been overtaken by periodic collective wage-
bargaining agree-
ments that, as collective regulation, are given immediate legal effect which
satisfies the par-
ties interests in the adjustment of the contractual conditions. This argument is
approached
by two of the contributions to this book, one by Ruben Houweling and L.J.M.
Langedijk and
the other, Tarifautonomie, by Florian Rdl. People find self-realisation in the
first instance
in the place where they live, before the workplace, if it is true to say that the
link with place
(Ortsbindung) is one of the main causes of unemployment.54
50 See Nogler, L. (2009) on the fact that the Court of Justice has coined a new
legal term subordination in
the English language to denote what in British labour law is called a
contract of service. For this reason, we
refer in the text to the expression the contract of subordinated
employment, as opposed to the contract
for services or autonomous work contract.
51 Mayer-Maly, T. (2000) p. 50; on the origin of the concept of unemployment,
see Topalov, C. (1994).
52 See further Mayer-Maly, T. (2000) pp. 52-53.
53 Dulckeit, G. (1951); Canaris, C.-W. (1978).
54 Mayer-Maly, T. (2000) p. 51. This link also has legal implications for labour
law, because it limits the employers
right to transfer; likewise, the fact that a worker in receipt of assistance
during a period of unemployment
can only be obliged to accept a new post if it is within a feasible distance
of his/her place of residence.
11
----------------------- Page 51-----------------------
Alongside the work contract, specific legislation has emerged as a further

type of life time
contract, which resolves the long-term social problem of the enjoyment of a
property that
can be put to use for living. Also in regard to such contracts, first of all,
legislation has been
laid down at the national level establishing the length of the contract itself (see
Christoph
Schmidt). This has come about as a result of two strategies: either through a
regimen limiting
the landlords rights of termination (Germany and Denmark) or else through the
guarantee-
ing of the length of a lease which is in any case of a fixed term (Italy and
Ireland, 4 years;
Spain and Portugal, 5 years; Belgium, 3+3 years; Austria, Greece and France, 3
years). Lease
agreements are burdensome, but generally rent increases are either controlled (by
courts or
conciliation organisations) or are directly regulated by law (in Holland, Austria,
Sweden, and
in Italy by Art. 14 of act no. 392 27 July 1978 later repealed by act no. 359 of 8
August 1992).
Thus there is a derogation from the general regimen on contractual balance in long-
term
contracts.55 Finally, it is significant that under the German reform of the law of
obligations of
56
1 January 2002, the right to residential leases was inserted into the BGB ( 535
ff ).
National regimens governing contracts of subordinated employment and
leases
therefore have importance for essential existential and social needs of one of the
parties
to the contract. The pioneering study by Gierke in 1914 had the merit not only of
defin-
ing the new category of long-term contracts, but also (something that was not to be
in
the least taken for granted at the time) of not obliterating the social profile
that justified
the making of these life time contracts. But, in order to resolve these problems,
he opted
decisively for the stark choice of invoking, respectively, the regime governing
property
rights (Sachenrecht) for contracts guaranteeing the right of possession, the use or
usufruct
of goods and, on the other hand, to the regime governing personal rights
(Personenrecht)
for those which he colourfully called the Rechtsgschfte for social
organisation, which
included, for example, employment contracts. In Gierkes view, the specific
problems of
life time contracts had to be resolved in isolation from the law of obligations; by
combin-
ing the latter with the law governing personal rights, a specific discipline could
be created
that would become a part of the immutable general provisions of the BGB.
Contrary to the theory propounded by Gierke, the two special sectors of
labour law
and the law on residential leases have satisfied the (social) needs of (specific)
workers and
tenants in the context of the law on obligations57 and personal rights of
enjoyment.
55 Confortini, M. (1988).
56 (1) A lease agreement imposes on the lessor a duty to grant the lessee use
of the leased property for the
lease period. The lessor must surrender the leased property to the lessee in
a condition suitable for use in
conformity with the contract and maintain it in this condition for the lease
period. He must bear all costs
to which the leased property is subject. (2)The lessee is obliged to pay the
lessor the agreed rent.
57 History, if we limit the discussion to Germany, for a while judged Gierke to
be in the right, but with the
decline of the Ford model, the total contractual view of labour has come to
predominate in Europe. This
view does not have recourse to personal or property rights, but has led to the
innovation (that is, to support
the needs of long-term employment contracts) wholly within and not outside
the context of contractual
relationships (total contract view). Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2011) p. 352.
12
----------------------- Page 52-----------------------

of
Contracts
and Obligations
More generally, we can say that the new legislation with regard to these two
life time
contracts have introduced rules into private law that relate to the principle of
justice with
regard to the person. As Hugo Sinzheimer has stated in relation to labour law, but
with an
assertion that is valid for all life time contracts, the law must not just consider
the freedom
of the citizen as a formality, but project itself into the real essence of freedom
and recog-
nise it in practical terms, when confronting the citizens real relational needs.58
Finally, it is considered that the emergence of a market economy based on

indus-
trial production puts production above consumption. The first is the realm of
collective
interests geared to solidarity, the second of individualism and self-
centeredness.59 Despite
Marx having demonstrated that production is also simultaneously consumption and

that
consumption is also labour,60 in this historical period the accent is all on
productive labour
without concern for the consequences that this brings about in terms of consumption
of
resources and that in the consumption phase too, people work.
Finally, in the historical period under consideration here, contracts whose
subject-
matter is the supply of goods and services (Dauerlieferungsvertrgen) essential for
the
satisfaction of the social needs of the creditor take on a fundamentally important
role.
Italian lawmakers define such contracts as those under which one party undertakes,
for a price, the periodic or continuous performance of things (Art. 1559 ff) A
link is
established between the two, by virtue of which one undertakes to carry
out a con-
tinuous range of distinct and autonomous, albeit related, performances, and the
other
undertakes to pay the money owed at established intervals. This is the pattern in
con-
tracts for telephone connection or the supply of electricity, gas, water or the
supply of
raw materials to factories for processing or again, in the so-called periodic
subscription
contract.
Since the entire range of the performance is not generally fixed at the time
the con-
tract is established, some authors maintain, wrongly, that these contracts are
recurring
contingent contracts (Wiederkehrschuldverhltnis).61 But it is rightly
demonstrated that
the supplier undertakes to produce the goods he supplies and hold them at the
disposal of
clients,62 so we can conclude without hesitation that the contract satisfies the
customers
needs in a continuous way, so that they can rely on the supply of the goods in
question.
Frey Nyberghs contribution in this volume deals with this subject.
59 Reifner, U. (1988) p. 61.
60 Marx, K. (1983), I, 2, a1).
61 Some German legal scholars assert that the new 314 BGB (see above, note 6)
does not apply in such cases,
which are known as spurious contracts for supply (unechte
Sukzessivlieferungsvertrge) precisely because
the quantity of supply is not fixed in advance.
62 Larenz, K. (1987) p. 31, note 45. Also Medicus, D. (2005) p. 6 underlines the
stndige Lieferbereitschaft
(continous ability to provide).
13
----------------------- Page 53-----------------------
1.5 Life Time Contracts in the Credit Society
The enormous rise of consumer credit for individual consumption as well as for
mortgage
loans, which has soared in Germany alone from about 1.5 billion in 1953 to 330
bil-
lion in 2013 following similar developments in the USA, which in June 2013 peaked
at
$ 2,847.9 billion, related to the degree of the capitalisation of consumption in
all other
states, has been attributed to the rise of a consumer society. The origins and
development
of this are linked to various reasons, not the least of which is the political need
to stabilize
the post-war democracies.63 More recent times have seen an economy based on saving,
which accompanied the rise of industrialized society, move on to an everything

now
economy, which encouraged and facilitated the spending of money people did not
have.64
This theory of overconsumption does not match up to the data available for
those who
are most indebted in the dominating area of bank credit.65 Consumption has
increased
only if the money values of consumption goods are taken into account. But consump-
tion has never been a process that happened on the market where money values could
be attributed. Consumption, linked to human needs like eating, drinking, shelter,

com-
munication with regard to family, friends or the rest of society in oral, written,
physical
or virtual, substantive or ideal forms including mass communication, transportation
or
leisure, has always taken place but was provided with new opportunities through
capital-
intensive media and objects of desire. Just as already in the 19th century the
industri-
alisation of labour required credit and the use of other forms of foreign capital
to render
it more productive (shares, participations, commercial papers), consumption
has been
equally industrialised a hundred years later. In modern times the revolution of
individual
transportation by privately owned cars revealed that the new forms of substantive
com-
munication require the advancement of capital that would be unthinkable without
credit.
Still, individual cars today account for 60% of consumer credit. In fact, after the
capitali-
sation of labour, the capitalisation of consumption, including the increased use of
credit
to acquire houses replacing inherited housing and rent of houses by mortgage loans,
has
revealed that both the industrialised society and the consumption society are in
fact credit
societies.
The reasons for consumer credit are manifold (see the essay by Carrillo):
capitalisa-
tion of consumptive processes (i.e. transport, mechanisation of household work,
means
63 Scarpellini, E./Cavazza, S. (2010).

64 Bauman, Z./Rovirosa-Madrazo, C. (2010).
65 The annual statistics of a representative survey of more than 12,000
overindebted households of the esti-
mated 4.5 million households in a similar situation (see iff-
berschuldungsreports 2009 ff. URL: www.
iffueberschuldungsreport.de/index.php?id=3003, Accessed: 15.08.2013) shows
that only on a marginal
percentage of about 10% debt advisors indicate that overconsumption could have
played a role. Instead, all
relevant empirical data in the industrialised countries show that
unforeseeable lack of income, illness, and
divorce are the main causes for default.
14
----------------------- Page 54-----------------------

of
Contracts
and Obligations
for individual and mass communication), substitution of non-monetary credit

relations
(family, inherited house, low mobility) with the necessity of real investments into
ones
life (home, furniture, electric appliances, education). Further, the increasing
instability of
income necessitates credit to uphold liquidity in a world where, without money,
individu-
als cannot live. In addition, there is another intimidating reason for the spread
of con-
sumer credit: the sham world of alleviating poverty through credit. Unscrupulous
lenders
(payday loans, credit card credit) profit from the fact that poor people will opt
for present
liquidity in exchange for an increased and inescapable fate of
overindebtedness in the
future. The consumer society is in fact the completion of the credit society. The
value of
total life time income, known as LTV, has to be rendered available at those times
when
expenditures are required. Individualisation, rising mobility and unsteady income
flows
increase the necessity for consumer credit or related forms like leasing, renting,
participat-
ing in service circles organised as associations. Household data66 have also shown
that the
distinction between labour and consumption, without regard to those processes where
family and household work are concerned, are artificial and do not mirror the true
situ-
ation of peoples life time, which is increasingly split between two workplaces: at
home
and within collectively organised working conditions even with cross-overs where
labour,
dependent or otherwise, is transferred to the home (computer work), while
consumption
happens within the time spent at the workplace (kindergarten, lunch, leisure).
With the steady fall in income obtainable under subordinated work contracts
and the
time taken to carry them out, besides the emergence of dual-income families that
have
increased the demand for services,67 so-called consumer credit contracts68 have
taken on
a central role in peoples lives.

There is little clarity in economics and law about the nature of
consumer credit.
Economists refer to the law,69 the law refers to the economy when it employs the
notion
credit, which was and is still in many languages the expression of what in Roman
law was
seen as the creditum, describing any obligation from contracts or quasi-contracts
from
undue enrichment to gestione daffari altrui [benevolent intervention in anothers
affairs]
or delictual claims. Il debito in Italian law is still the other end of a claim
also visible in
the denomination of anyone who has a claim against a debtor in Common and the con-
tinental law of the Romanistic countries (creditor, crediteur, creditore). The
Germanistic
tradition has only translated the creditor literally into German as Glubiger. A
lender is as
in all synallagmatic relations a creditor and the debt especially the interest
owed to him
a credito. But this is also true for a sales or a labour contract and does in no
way justify
66 Piorkowsky, M.-B. (2011); Kutsch, T./Piorkowsky, M.-B. et al. (1997).

67 Esping-Andersen, G. (2000) pp. 294-295.
68 Among the first to outline this class of contracts, see Carnelutti, F. (1933).
69 See Wikipedia UK: Credit is the provision of resources (such as granting a

loan).
15
----------------------- Page 55-----------------------
the occupation of this denomination only for the convened use of purchasing power
for
a certain time in return for the payment of interest.70 The uncertainty prevails
if one con-
siders the three (at least) different legal definitions given to consumer credit in
European
law, which may even coexist within the same legal order, such as, for example, in
Italian
legislation.
Consumer credit includes the whole range of providing finance to natural
persons
and families, which is aimed at consumer spending or to postpone payment or arrange
for
this to be done by instalments. A feature of consumer credit is that its purpose is
not to
make investments but just to finance the current spending of the family.
The prototype consumer credit contract is the mortgage agreement.
Except that, in
some civil law systems, such as the Italian one, the result sought by the borrower
consistent
with assuring the immediate and exclusive availability of the thing or the sum of
money is
not achieved through an obligation but rather by means of a device involving the
attribu-
tion of title (Art. 1814 c.c.) of the things consigned, with a duty by the borrower
to make
restitution of the tantundem (Art. 1813 c.c.). This is an archaic arrangement that
obscures
the relational and social aspects of the economic operation pursued by the
contract. It is
not by chance that in the legal system under consideration, there is a possibility
to allow
the borrower to have recourse to the solution offered by Art. 1467 c.c. if the
obligation to
make the interest payments becomes too heavy. The argumentation proceeds by
rectifying
the concept of long-term contracts themselves, so as to include all cases where the
pur-
pose of the contract is carried out on a continuous basis, even if not through
fulfillment
by continuous performance.71 This is a redefinition of the time element that also
fits the
class of life time contracts.

Be that as it may, in other systems, such as the German one, a legal
configuration has
emerged, coinciding with the implementation of the relevant Community law,72 which
is
more congruous with a mortgage agreement, assigning to the borrower a right of

enjoy-
ment of the capital put at his or her disposal by the lender.73 Consumer credit has
entered
the BGB in 488 ff, which provides: (1) The loan contract obliges the lender to
make
available to the borrower a sum of money in the agreed amount. The borrower is
obliged
to pay interest owed and, at the due date, to repay the loan made available. (2)
The agreed
interest, unless otherwise provided, is to be paid at the end of each year and, if
the loan
is to be repaid before the end of 9 year, upon repayment. (3) If a time is not
specified for
70 For a critical review of this etymology see Reifner, U. (16.05.2013).

71 Giampiccolo, G. (1972) p. 69; Luminoso, A. (2010) p. 515.
72 Nicolussi, A. (2003) p. 525 ff.
73 The hypothesis was raised in Germany by Reifner, U. (1979). It was sustained
in Italy by Carnelutti F. (1933)
p. 26, but criticised by Oppo G. (1944) on the ground that it was true from an
economic viewpoint but not
a juridical one. On the interpretation of a mortgage contract, as configured
by the German reform of 2002
as a long-term contract, see Medicus, D. (2005) p. 5.
16
----------------------- Page 56-----------------------

of
Contracts
and Obligations
repayment of the loan, its due date is subject to the lender or the borrower giving
notice
of termination. The notice period is 3 months. If interest is not owed, the
borrower is also
entitled to repay without giving notice of termination.
In relation to consumer credit, the work required to repay the loan takes on
legal
relevance once again, so that the subdivision of peoples lives into two parts
which are
estranged from one another74 is dissolved. In fact, the consumer is required to
have an
income, preferably a permanent job or in the public sector, besides not appearing
in a bad
credit register. But above all in the credit society, work is shifted over from
production to
consumption, as can be appreciated in the new term prosumer.75
At this point of development, the debate is polarized by the opposing

positions taken
by the two differing approaches a legal system may adopt to regulate the consumer
soci-
ety76: the Anglo-American one that centres on consumer choice and is predicated on
full
freedom to contract, and the Continental European one that centres on consumer
dignity,
treated as an existentially and socially conditioned person who, deprived of
protection,
risks expropriation in his or her personal sphere.
Unlike labour and tenancy, the law on consumer credit or consumer debt has
not yet
been understood as directly affecting the dignity and lives of debtors. Already the
denomi-
nation of borrowers as debtors of capital instead of its users even before
default attaches
a pejorative connotation to them. This is because economically, creditors have only
one
option to keep up or even increase the value of their empty money claims with
interest:
lending. But since the 19th century, this kind of investment has seen the emergence
of the
good creditor who invests his trust into the unworthy debtor (see Reifner II).
Through the
sale of securitised claims, debtors are even traded themselves, as occurred during
the era of
slavery. Instead of the bank they trusted when taking out a loan to transform
flexible money
capital into fixed capital in the form of home-ownership, they now get a new
master with
a hedge fund who tries to squeeze out the maximum profit possible from these (so-
called)
useful relations, in which life time income has been made available in advance to
facilitate
the acquisition of the use-value of homes.
When the expectations for future income or rising house prices are
frustrated,
because of general conditions that the borrower is unable to predict or
influence,
repaying a credit is outlawed in default and with one strike of cancellation, the
user
of capital is turned into a mere object of debt collection and
predatory refinancing
mechanisms. This directly affects the dignity and the life time of these persons.
The
databases for payment incidences remove their chances on the labour, credit as well
as
housing market. Wage assignments make them prone to preferred cancellation of their
74 Reifner, U. (2007) p. 3.
75 Dujarier, M.-A. (2008).
76 Whitman, J. Q. (2007).
17
----------------------- Page 57-----------------------
labour contracts, and the seizure of their fortune impedes independent workers as
well
as self-employed persons from paying their taxes, which again makes them
unreliable,
in terms of the law, for admission to such professions.
But this absence of recognition does not take into account the whole of a
consumer
credit legislation, including the enormous spread of personal bankruptcy
schemes.
(Pulgar) Recently, worldwide regulation of consumer credit in response to the
financial
crisis has introduced a concept of responsible lending, which imposes duties on the
lender
to take care of the ability of the borrower to repay. While the Consumer Credit
Directive
2008 abandoned the approach of the 2002 Draft (see Carrillo), its true meaning is
still
hidden in Article 5 (6) of it.77 It requires, as outlined below in depth (see
Reifner II),
that creditors and credit intermediaries . . . place the consumer in a position

enabling
him to assess whether the proposed credit agreement is adapted to his needs and to
his financial situation, where appropriate by explaining . . . the

specific effects they
may have on the consumer, including the consequences of default in payment by the
consumer.
This new approach goes far beyond the principle of safe and sound banking,
which
was understood only as providing a guarantee to savers that their money
was invested
safely. The new responsibility targets the borrower and obliges the lender to warn
him of
the risks he runs of ruining his and his familys life time through over-
indebtedness and its
adverse consequences. Discharge of debts from consumer credit in personal
bankruptcy
procedures78 are also a sanction for lenders who did not succeed in preventing such
effects
for the consumer.79 In consumer credit law, the distinction between the freedom of
the
consumer and his dignity appears in the mirror of fair treatment of consumers,
which tra-
ditionally provides all information necessary for a rational decision on the one
hand and
responsible lending, which looks at the material effects a credit relation has on
the lives
of the consumer and his family. The first, dear to many believers in the economic
theory
of law, is the culture of maximum freedom/control of the consumers economic
interests,
and the second is maximum protection of the consumer as a person and of non-
economic
values. Where the first dominates, no limits can be placed, for example, on
discount poli-
cies, to the establishment and increase of commercial ventures such as access to
credit, to a
range of goods and services, and antitrust laws protect the economic interests of
consum-
ers and not competitors. Such limitations are, conversely, features of the second
model,
which, although it does not reject the utilitarian principle, centres on the real
possibility of
pursuing product liability and of guaranteeing a particular level of quality in the
products,
as well as, above all, protection of the consumer and hence his or her non-
economic, social
77 EU, Directive 2008/48/EC of 22.05.2008.

78 Worldbank/Kilborn, J. et al. (2013).
79 See Reifner II.
18
----------------------- Page 58-----------------------

of
Contracts
and Obligations
sphere.80 The latter objectives ensure that the system remains much more
producerist than
the first model, which shifts the centre of gravity of the system of economic law
from sup-
ply to demand.
The central importance of consumption and accumulation and its
incentivisation,
as Robert Reich has noted, makes labour law one of the key sectors of life time
contracts,
subject to undiluted cost principles and thus deprives it of its historical raison
dtre.81 The
shift in perspective in favour of the consumer, however, can never be taken as

being in
opposition to the new class of consumers: people are still people, they are merely
viewed
on the basis of a different identity.82 No; what we are dealing with here, rather,
is a choice
between several values: can the citizens interests as consumers place limits on
their inter-
ests as producers and, if so, to what extent? But this is not specific
to the relationship
between the role of a consumer and a worker. First, the distinction between
consumption
and labour is to a large extent not reflective of the views of the persons
involved, but the
views of an economic system that seems to be able to deal only with activities that
pro-
vide a possibility for profitable investment, which obviously is only the case for
remuner-
ated labour. Secondly, the assumed contradiction between certain consumers and
certain
workers is equally present among workers from different areas whose products are
part
of a value chain, in which the cost of the one is the profit of the other. But it
occurs also
quite intensively between consumers themselves. Savers for old age pensions would
like
to see their savings stable and growing with high return, but their money has to
find bor-
rowers for whom the interest charged to serve the savers needs may lead to
exploitation.
The zero sum games of a capitalist economy individualise all participants in the
market
and turn them into potential opponents. Consumers against workers, investors
against
borrowers, small business against big business, trade against production, public
services
against private services the list of potential conflicts of interests is
unlimited. But such
conflicts cannot obscure the fact that the majority of individuals in modern
society work
for their living and consume or lodge in order to be able to work for such income
in dig-
nity and health.
Unlike labour and tenancy law, consumer credit law still remains under the
dogmatic
supervision of commercial law, where the core definitions of credit and its
derivatives in the
security markets are treated. Banks, especially, but economists as well, speak of
the sale of
credit, when they refer to life time relations, where the use of money capital
may last years
and even a lifetime if refinancing is taken into account. The international home
mortgage
80 American legal scholars draw a distinction between consumer protection

law (manufacturers liability,
product quality, non-deceptive advertising) and the economic interests
of consumers (low prices, wide
choice, easy access to credit, etc.).
81 Reich, R. B. (2009).
82 Whitman, J. Q. (2007) p. 348.
19
----------------------- Page 59-----------------------
crisis in the US, Ireland, UK and Spain must have made it clear that
consumers do not
buy credit but enter into a life time relationship when they contract for a 35-
year mortgage
that leads to little more than what a tenant gets from the landlord. Eviction of
tenants by
investment funds that acquired their homes and foreclosures initiated by the same
funds
that acquired their mortgages are the same from the perspective of those who live
in these
houses. The Korean system of a tenancy relation, which in fact requires the tenant
to provide
a security close to the real value of the home which then has to be financed, which
Park
describes in this book, shows that both systems, mortgage credit and rent
contracts, can
even merge into one single system obviously to the detriment of those who live in
it.
While in labour and tenancy law special courts or specialised chambers in the
court
system make apparent that social sensitivity, sociological insight and sufficient
knowledge
of the situation and markets is necessary, consumer credit, with the exception of
some
appeal courts in Germany, are treated in the general civil or commercial law courts
often
with incompetence. Although the overindebted household as well as foreclosures and
debt
collection has become a core issue in the debate on poverty and has reached the
level of
concern that unemployment and homelessness achieved in the past, civil as well as
com-
mon law are far from acknowledging that consumer credit is part of what the social
wel-
fare state requires, to be looked at in the light of human dignity and personal
development
(Pulgar, Reifner II).
For our approach on life time contracts, this area seems to be
the litmus test for
whether there is something like a special discipline of long-term contracts that
need their
own legal system and follow their own principles as indicated below.
In fact, the problems of consumer credit were far more adequately dealt with
at the
turn of the century when, with numerous investigations, instalment and
hire purchase
were seen as an imminent threat to the poor. Although sociological research shows
that
83
consumer credit today is one of the accelerators and also reasons for poverty,
consumer
credit contracts are treated like any commercial contract, with the sole exception
that it
would merit consumer protection. Although thousands of years of debtor protection
has
been developed in credit, labour and tenancy relations (see contribution by Rdl)
with legal
forms such as usury, laesio enormis, anatocism, discharge, capped interest and
default rates,
such protection has not found its way into consumer protection. Instead the neo-
liberal
information model assumes that the sole problem of borrowers is the choice of the
wrong
product. This ideology is derived from sales law, where indeed the relationship
between
seller and buyer starts and finishes on the spot, so that the only way of
influencing it must
be the right choice. Instead, this ideology seems unrealistic where people are in
need, are
83 To this question see the work of David Caplovitz: Caplovitz, D. (1969);

Caplovitz, D. (1974). Further
Reifner, U./Ford, J. (eds.) (1992); Ford, J. (1988); Reifner,
U./Niemi-Kiesilinen, J. et al. (2010) with
further references.
20
----------------------- Page 60-----------------------

of
Contracts
and Obligations
excluded from participation in economic life without credit or are already indebted
and
need to adapt their monthly instalment to their changed monthly income. Under these
conditions there is no choice. In any event, the Consumer Credit Directive, as

shown in
the chapter by Carrillo, provides nothing but repeated information while the vast
body of
debtors protection rules remain outside in the general parts of the law of
obligations and
contracts.84 While the CCD 2008 still assumed that regulation of mortgages was less
impor-
tant and could be excluded, now a mortgage directive, expressly dedicated to

responsible
lending, has been developed. European States, but especially the US, have
introduced a
number of regulations on credit card credit, foreclosures, mortgage loans,
refinancing and
payday loans, and there is no question that such rules are seen as necessary, just
as they
have been recognised in labour and tenancy law. A number of artificial distinctions
hinder
a new understanding of the consumer credit contract as a life time contract. The
artificial
distinction between debtor protection and consumer credit protection has already
been
mentioned. Substantive parts of consumer credit protection have been allocated in
the law
of consumer bankruptcy. Pulgar shows in her chapter that this bankruptcy can
already to a
large extent be understood as a state-supervised credit contract that in some way
or another
favours the supervised prolongation of unnecessarily detrimental credit contracts
during
bankruptcy. Also, the idea that consumer protection as a mere informational
approach to
ameliorate the bargaining position of consumers in the market game has lost its
fascina-
tion. The new EU bank supervisory system, together with the G20 principles for
financial
services, reveals that consumer protection is a regulatory system that has to be
designed to
prevent certain social and economic effects and not only the systems how such
products
are sold. A view on consumer credit law using the methodology of sociology of law
as it
has been widely used to develop an autonomous field of labour and tenancy law
following
the turn of the 19th century85 would reveal that consumer credit law has all those
elements
dispersed in different legal fields as valid in labour and tenancy contracts.

Finally, over the last few decades we have been witnessing the steady rise of
individu-
alisation, in habits and consumption,86 as a direct result of social security
policies and new
consumer credit contracts, which have created competition for market share87 and
which
have broadened with the phases of economic development.88 This has generated demand
for differentiated products that diversify and therefore, to cite Robert

Reich again, for
product-services89 that are increasingly personalised, such as to require a high
degree of
84 See Reifner, U./Schrder, M. (2012); Huls, N. J. (1994).

85 See Sinzheimer, H. (1976a).
86 On the process of individualisation mentioned above, see Beck, U. (1986), pp.
121 ff.
87 See Orsini, R. (1997).
88 On the so-called social limits to growth, see Hirsch, F. (1999).
89 As noted, this is the hypothesis that emerges from Reich, R. B. (1991). For an
attempt to identify the effects
that this phenomenon will produce on the world of work, see Boissonnat, J.
(ed.) (1996).
21
----------------------- Page 61-----------------------
specialisation and a capacity for adapting rapidly to the changing needs of the
market. In
particular, the widespread requirement to adapt the product to consumers needs
means
that there is a call for worker (-producers) to deploy increasingly sophisticated
skills, also
because the capacity to manage respectively the flow of information (and
therefore to
become proficient in various languages, including the language of information
technol-
ogy90), as well as managing consumer relations, have become part of the production
pro-
cess. The new perspective of market adaptation in real time determines the
following: the
disappearance of the rigid Taylorist differentiation of project, execution and
management;
a reengineering of job profiles; the requirement of greater flexibility and
therefore the par-
tial sacrifice of the reasonable expectation of income acquisition that underpins
the sat-
isfaction of many essential needs.91 The growth in autonomy demanded of
subordinated
workers is accompanied by a greater dependence on the part of a self-employed

worker on
the organisation and on the information provided by the party contracting out the
work.
All this means that, for all kinds of reasons, the distinction between contracts
for subor-
dinated work and self-employed (contracts for services) is, in the light of the
need for the
protection of life time, now as obsolete92 as the differentiation between housing
finance
and tenancy law, between consumer loans and hire purchase. We shall be returning to
this
professional profile at the end of the next paragraph.
1.6 The Main Contracts that Make Up the New Category
Having clarified the way that various national regimens governing life time
contracts place
central importance on the underlying social conditions inducing people to
enter into
them, we can now consider the basic features that characterise the new group,
observing
that some contracts are included respectively in the class of long-term contracts
because of
the personal interest of one of the contracting parties and, on the other hand,
among life
time contracts because of the personal interest of the other party.
This is the case, for instance, with regard to work contracts,93 where the
long-term
interest involved, of relevance to their inclusion among life time contracts, is

that of the
workers themselves. Modern labour law is predicated upon the awareness that the
subject-
matter of the (subordinated) work contract is the very life time of the individuals
con-
cerned (being is time) and, consequently, their personality. Work does not
represent an
90 On the overlap between production and communication in the new post-Fordist

reality, see Marazzi, C.
(1996).
91 Sennett, R. (1998).
92 See Freedland, M. R./Kountouris, N. (2011).
93 On the impossibility of categorising work contracts as long-term contracts
because of the employers obli-
gation, see Oppo, G. (1943) p. 233.
22
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Law of
object of barter (see above, 1.1), but is the Ausfluss der freien
Persnlichkeit94 (expression
of the free individual), and is therefore linked to a moral value95 of greater
import than
the simple need to possess.96 It is likewise impossible to recognise the employers
right to
enjoyment of the energy applied by the worker to his/her work, because energy
cannot
be enjoyed unless it is consumed.97 The person doing the work does not do so
passively,
simply putting him or herself at the other partys disposal, but actively, since
they aspire to
professional self-realisation in the process.98 It is for this very reason that
workers tend to
have a recognised right to actually do their job. Up to the mid-1980s, German legal
scholars
asserted no longer simply as a duty/role but as an obligation on the employers
part to
exercise directive authority and, more generally, to so arrange the means of
production that
the worker could do his work.99 Analogously in France, lobligation de fournir du
travail was
made part of the subordinated work contract, and the same solution was adopted by
Italian
100
legal scholars. Finally, it goes without saying that under a subordinated
work contract,
the worker also satisfies another long-term social need in addition to the
existential need
for professional self-realisation and likewise taking part in social life: to
generate income
which usually allows him/her to further satisfy a whole range of social needs.
We saw previously (see above, 1.1) how a particular academic persuasion
collocated
leases among long-term contracts, on the basis that the tenants interest in the
enjoyment
of the goods would be satisfied by ascribing to the landlord a continuing
obligation to
101
allow enjoyment of the property, but this construction is not
capable of explaining the
power the tenant directly exercises over the property leased to him/her.
The academic
construction of lease contracts has therefore been rectified by, on the one hand,
recogniz-
102
ing the tenants personal right of enjoyment and, on the other,
assigning a (long-term)
obligation not to interfere with the tenants quiet enjoyment of the
leased property.103
Obviously, this last obligation (duration) is by itself insufficient to

achieve the tenants
objective, and this comment alone could raise a doubt as to whether lease contracts
can be
classified as long-term contracts. To avoid such a paradoxical outcome, the
proposal is to
94 Gierke, O. v. (1914) p. 409.

95 On the importance of the moral debate for the purposes of the new category of
contracts set out in this
volume, see the contribution by Andrea Nicolussi.
96 Lotmar, P. (1902) p. 7: the workers obligation related to his being rather
than to his having.
97 See Luca Noglers contribution below.
98 Mayer-Maly, T. (2000) p. 50.
99 This change arose in BAG Groer Senat, in Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Nr. 14 zu
611 BGB Beschftigungs-
pflicht.
100 For more detail, see Nogler, L. (2007).
101 Oppo, G. (1944) p. 332; Stolfi, M. (1940).
102 On this category see Giorgianni, M. (1940).
103 For Italian legal scholarship, see Mirabelli, G. (1972); Luminoso, A. (1995);
for German scholarship, see
Wolf, E. (1978) pp. 98 ff, who, moreover, maintains that the landlord cannot
interfere in the tenants user,
not on the basis of an extant obligation but rather on the grounds of the
latters right to possess.
23
----------------------- Page 63-----------------------
rectify the concept itself of long-term contracts, no longer emphasizing the

fulfilment of
a continuous performance that activates the function of the contract, but the fact
that the
latter is performed on a continuous basis, on the model of a divisible utility
distributed
over time.104 It has already been noted (see above, 1.1) that this rectification,
together with
the other aspects that have already been considered, connotes the category of life
time
contracts.
The emphasis placed on the time spent by people performing the contract over
a life
time means that independent contracts for services also fall within the scope of
life time
contracts. This is a work profile whose depiction is complicated by the fact that,
whereas
105
the various legal systems govern subordinated work contracts in a fairly uniform
way, the
same cannot be said for non-subordinated (autonomous) work, whose subject-matter is
a
work performance or a service. A unitary regimen governing autonomous work
contracts
has been established in France, where the louage de service is equivalent to a
subordinated
work contract, while the louage douvrage also includes, in fact, contracts
establishing obli-
106
gations de moyens This solution is expressly provided for in the 1942
Italian civil code
under Art. 2222, which defines a single contract for autonomous work (contratto
dopera),
whose subject-matter may be a work performance or a service.
It has already been mentioned that the BGB, on the other hand, is
characterized by
the counter- positioning of the Dienstvertrag, which covers autonomous (frei ) work
and
the Werkvertrag, and therefore it has been inspired by Pandectist legal
scholarship, raised
to a criterion of differentiation of type between the two different kinds of
autonomous
work, the distinction between obligation as to the means and as to the result.107
The posi-
tion is the same in Austria, where, however, the freier Dienstvertrag is not
regulated by
statute but by case-law, which for that purpose makes reference to some provisions
of the
ABGB concerning subordinated employment contracts, such as, for example,
termination
for good cause from the contract by the committing party (employer).108 This is the
reason
why autonomous work contracts that have been subsumed under the Dienstvertrag have
traditionally been classed as long-term contracts, while the same thing does not
occur in
relation to the Werkvertrag.109
104 Luminoso, A. (2010) p. 515 on the basis of Giampiccolo, G. (1972) pp. 68 ff.
105 Nogler, L. (2009b).
106 Wendehorst, C. (2006) p. 218. It is worth noting that in Germany, for the
first time in July 2013, the metal
workers union has concluded a collective agreement integrating contracts for
services (Werkvertrge) of
such labour that performed similar or the same tasks as dependent workers in
order to disincentivise the
circumvention of labour protection law and collective agreements through
independent labour.
107 Ranieri, F. (2010) pp. 16 ff; Wendehorst, C. (2006) p. 219, which refers to
the fact that the same thing is to
be found in the Spanish civil code and in the old Swiss Law of Obligations of
1881.
108 Lschnigg, G. (2011) pp. 163-165.
109 Gierke, O. v. (1914) p. 395; for Austrian scholarship, see Lschnigg, G.
(2011) p. 163.
24
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Law of
But in point of fact it is now time to accept that the aptness of the
distinction drawn
between obligations as to means and result110 is decisively in question, in so far
as it operates
as a criterion for differentiating contractual profiles. This also emerges from the
critiques
of Gierkes position, which hold that the Dienstvertrag, as well as all the other
long-term
contracts, are not extinguished by performance but rather by the simple passage of
time.
Conversely, it is the case that in relation to both hypotheses, it is the
performance111 that
is important, including, and this is the point, the achievement of a particular

result, even
though, as Larenz observes, the relationship is not extinguished by a single
performance
because new obligations of performance continue to arise.112
To conclude, the Dienstvertrag and the Werkvertrag are not to be

differentiated from
one another on the basis of the importance or otherwise of the Erfolg and, with
increasing
regularity, legal scholars tend to refer to a single institution113: the autonomous
work contract.
But the question is whether or not autonomous work contracts are classifiable
as life
time contracts. The oldest scholarship on the matter tended to exclude the
possibility of
their inclusion in the category of long-term contracts, since performance
by the inde-
pendent contractor would in this case be instantaneous, from a legal viewpoint,
since the
creditors interest consists in the mere completion of the work [opus] or the
service.114
Since the act of performance is not completed in the course of a moment, but the
fulfil-
ment continues, the obligation is not fulfilled until the final moment of the
contract.115
However, without doubt, in real life the performance of the work or service
in any
case calls for the performance of some future activity on the part of the
independent con-
tractor, and that is also the case when the work relationship between the parties
involves
a single piece work or service as subject-matter of the contract. This
explains why the
debtor has an interest in assigning legal relevance to the time spent carrying out
the work
or service and to consider it deducted under the contract116 in that it is a factor
connoting
the means of performance.117
110 Fundamental in relation to this topic, Mengoni, L. (1954) in the footsteps of

Lotmar, P. (1902); as affirmed in
Cass. s.u. 11 gennaio 2008 no. 577 In every obligation the practical result
to be achieved assumes importance
through binding terms, such as the commitment the debtor must engage to
obtain it; see also on the point
likewise adhering to this interpretation, Ranieri, F. (2010) p. 34.
Nicolussi, A. (2008).
111 Oppo, G. (1944) p. 236, according to whom it is not the passage of time
which brings about the extinction;
likewise Wiese, G. (1965).
112 Larenz, K. (1970) p. 31.
113 Wendehorst, C. (2006) p. 245, where he concludes that now [scholars] refer to
a more or less uniform con-
cept of a service contract.
114 Autonomous work contracts may be considered long-term where a repetition of
individual performances
has been agreed (periodic execution). But even in such a case, time is
considered as an indication of the
plurality of executory acts, to express a chronological series. Time is not a
measure of the performance.
115 Oppo, G. (1944) p. 166, who comments in addition this is not a case of time-
related activity as such, which
may satisfy the requirement.
116 As Oppo, G. (1944) p. 166 in effect maintains.
117 Oppo, G. (1944) p. 155.
25
----------------------- Page 65-----------------------

Gierke depicted a vorbereitendes Schuldverhltnis.118 More recently, a
configura-
tion of long-running contracts (contratti ad esecuzione prolungata) has been

mooted, as
an intermediate category between obligations for immediate execution and long-term
obligations.
The prolongation of performance also takes on importance with regard to other
exis-
tential obligations beyond those linked to performance, including the income
necessary
to live.
For these purposes a contract-type exists in the Italian legal system known
as autono-
mous coordinated and continuative collaboration [collaborazioni autonome coordinate
e
continuative], which in some circumstances must be part of a project. The
definition of
this contractual figure is not directly centred upon financial independence, as
happens
in fact in Germany (as well as in Holland and Austria119), where it has arisen in
response
to a fundamental need for an appropriate prototype of autonomous activity. (The law

on
employment litigation, the federal law on holiday provision, the law on collective
agree-
120
ments, etc. refer to wirschaftliche Abhngigkeit.) In many Community
planning docu-
ments, the figure of economically independent work/self-employed worker is
evoked,
without however defining it any further.121 The subject is explored in this book by
Orsola
Razzolini.
But above all, the growing tendency to query the distinction itself between
autono-
mous and subordinated work contracts should emphatically be borne in mind,
principally
because new technology and the increasing importance of the workers contribution
are
making the factor (in the sense of personal dependence) distinguishing
employee and
employer more problematic.122 Eva Kocher explores this theme in this book.
1.7 Moving Life Time Contracts into the Heart of the Contract System
All the signs are that the lack of integration of life time contracts into the
codification
of modern private law has a much deeper doctrinal dimension than the criticism of
the
social content of contract law would suggest (see Forrays contribution), or indeed
the crit-
icism of the inability of contract law to regulate long-term relationships in a
meaningful
118 Gierke, O. v. (1914) p. 396.
119 Lschnigg, G. (2011) pp. 196 ff.
120 In fact, moving on from the level of declamation to an analysis of the
operational rules adopted in the two
systems, it emerges that in the German legal system the requirements for
economic dependence turn out
to be defined by technical parameters, quite comparable to those in the
Italian system see Borzaga, M.
(2012).
121 See for example, finally, Commission of the European Communities COM(2005) 33
final (09.02.2005) p. 7.
122 See Zeitschrift fr Arbeitsrecht und Sozialrecht (05.2008).
26
----------------------- Page 66-----------------------

of
way, the criticism of the spin-off of social considerations into public law, such
as personal
bankruptcy into consumer credit law (see Pulgar), work relationships into
employment
law or tenancy disputes into landlord and tenant law (see Derleders contribution
on the
significance of the welfare state principle in contract law).
The law as it stands reveals the systematic construction of concepts which
draw a clear
distinction between the thinking around sales contracts and that of long-term
relation-
ships (Verhltnisse) in the law of obligations. In distinguishing between
relational and
spot contracts, economic contractual theory has, like the theory of the law of
long-term
relationships of obligation, overlooked the fact that the substance of the
difference does
not lie between spot, or one-off , and long-term or durable. The real
difference is that
between contract and relationship. In this context, the question is not of what
alternative
123
forms of regulation might be devised, as the legal concept of contractual
relationships
makes clear by its name. However, the concept of relationship is used by the law
precisely
in relation to long-term relationships of obligation, in order for the law to focus
on the
crucial role that the dimension of time has in a relationship. The fact that
statute constantly
refers to the employment,124 tenancy125 and loan126 relationship alongside the
employment,
tenancy and loan contract when the dimension of time arises, while failing to
recognise
the purchase or services relationship itself, references the fact that a connection
over time
in a transaction formed within the concept of a contract under sale of goods law
cannot
adequately be taken into account. The law applicable to the sale of goods funnels
all legal
questions into the logical second of the conclusion of the contract. Certainly,
that does
not mean that the achievements of the freedom to contract, or that its culmination
in life
time contracts should be abandoned, as happened, for example, in Nazi employment
law.
Nazi theory of the incorporation of workers into industry (see the contributions by
Nogler
and Kocher) and its concepts of the incorporation of farm-workers into the farm
house-
hold under landlord and tenant law, removed individual freedom to contract. The
French
Revolution saw precisely the setting of intentional time limits and the
terminability of
employment relationships as decisive in the emancipation from slavery.127
123 See, for example, 309 no. 2 b); 314 sub-para. 1 BGB: the continuation of
the contractual relationship until
it is ended by agreement or until expiry of a notice period cannot be a
requirement.
124 E.g. 113 BGB entering into or ending a service or employment relationship.
125 Universal designation in 536 f BGB on leasing law, e.g. 536 sub-para. 4
BGB a tenancy relationship
concerns living space.
126 493 sub-para. 2 BGB prepared to continue the loan relationship.
127 Cf. Art. 1780 Code Civil (fr): On ne peut engager ses services qu temps,
ou pour une entreprise dtermi-
ne; Art. 1583 span. cdigo civil : arrendamiento hecho por toda la vida es
nulo. The fact that the BGB
prefers the concept of relationship over that of contract in the Law of
obligatory relationships (Schuldver-
hltnisse) 241 BGB) has in fact less to do with the fact that the sales
contract is also seen as a relationship
as that, unlike in Common Law, statutory quasi-contracts such as unjust
enrichment need to be integrated.
In this sense, the French term quasi-contrat is preferable.
27
----------------------- Page 67-----------------------
The life time contracts that these considerations bring into the
spotlight therefore
constitute a specific category of legal doctrine because they add relationship to
contract,
and connection to intention. They form a dialectical unity of free will and social
depen-
dence through long-term contact, and the law offers the foundations of a doctrine
of con-
tract law for the services and credit society that goes beyond the sales contract.
However, life, not merely the element of time, has acquired its
own dimension in
private law. With time and duration, a further element characteristic of all three
disci-
plines has, over time, found its place in the thinking around contracts, which the
law had,
by the end of the 19th century, characterised as the use relationship. This use
(usus) can
operate capitalistically to increase capital. It can also, however, operate
directly to satisfy
human needs for a good life. Consumption, shelter and work as the defining
objective
of long-term contractual relationships make clear that this objective goes far
beyond the
capitalist perspective. Use and usefulness can, in general terms, be classified
within this
real-life objective and juxtaposed to profit realisation as the aim of the
contract. Achiev-
ing usefulness in the life of people thus becomes what represents the life time of
these
contracts. Even this element is, in the market economy, not an alternative, but
merely a
competing point of view in synallagmatic contracts, and both have the same goal,
namely
profit realisation and the maximisation of use. Life time thus expresses both human
ele-
ments of work, tenancy and consumer credit contracts, use (use value) and
relationship
(time). A glance into history leads to the astonishing conclusion that this
dialectic within
the contractual thinking of Roman law was still present in the early 19th century.
It was
only sacrificed, apparently irrevocably, with the advent of the economic needs of
the trad-
ing and industrial society of the 19th century, characterised by private property
and the
sales contract. The magnificent study by Paolo Grossi on the long-term use
contracts of
the Middle Ages suggests at the same time that there is a need for substantial
research in
this area, preferably with the active participation of Romanists, to examine the
proposi-
tions set out in this contribution (see Reifner I).
This desire for systematic contractual alternatives to the sales model of the
bourgeois
market society has, as stated above, been present for some time. While in this
context Otto
von Gierke juxtaposed his long-term relationship of obligation as a private-law
community
relationship in the German legal tradition to Roman law, which in his opinion bore
hardly
128
any trace at all of this way of thinking, Italian legal-historical
research has shown that
Roman contractual law featured a distinction between the sales contract (emptio
venditio)
and the use contract (locatio conductio) and that the triumph of the sales contract
in the
general law of obligations is not the legacy of Roman law but of its absorption by
the Pan-
dectists at the time of the ascendancy of capitalism in 19th century Germany and
France.129
128 Gierke, O. v. (1914) p. 411.

129 Ranieri, F. (2010) p. 3; Grossi, P. (1963) p. 25.
28
----------------------- Page 68-----------------------

of
The general definition is, however, correct. According to Dernburg,130 the

locatio con-
ductio is a type of contract, which we encounter at the beginning of the classical

period
in Roman sources of law. They obliged a person (locator) to make available to
another
(conductor) something in some circumstances even himself of his labour power
(operas
suas) for a specific period at a specific price (merces), so that the use or work
that had
been promised contractually, and its product (opus), could be taken (uti frui).
The rental
contract makes things or labour power available for a period in return for a money
equiv-
alent.131 But here, Dernberg already substitutes labour power
(Arbeitskraft) for labour
(operarum).132
This development has, however, been impeded today by the fact that only the
domi-
nant applications of the locatio conductio are under discussion, and in particular
by the
dominance of the view that this legal construct was identical to the locatio
conductio rei, in
other words, the rental of goods. This gave rise to the misunderstanding about the
rental of
slaves, which was shoved into the category of locatio conductio operarum along with
the
absence of rental of money, which at that time could only be contemplated as
mutuum. l.c.
was thus reduced to l.c. rei. The human dimension of l.c. appears to have been
lost. For this
reason, the leading opinion even today considers that it is unsuitable for
regulating social
long-term use relationships that are essentially determined through human activity.
According to Grossi,133 the Pandectists were guilty of falsified reception,

which sup-
pressed the alternatives to the sales contract. The historical legal school, he
said, projected
its 19th century proprietorial individualism into the Dominum of Roman law. Any
quali-
fied application of use-value was seen in a negative light. Actual use
relationships thus
slipped from view. . . . It was a distorting filter which linked a libertarian
dogma of absolute
freedom to Roman property without the slightest regard for social considerations as
the
expression of unlimited individual freedom. For them (the Pandectists), the
development
of law relating to long-term use in the locatio conductio was a nonsensical
creation, even
absurd.134 Grossi considered that, historically, property always had two elements.
Its use
(dominum utile (Baldus)) was seen as separate from the rights of

dominium over it
130 Ranieri, F. (2010) pp. 3, 305; Pugliese, G. (1994) p. 600; Garsonnet, E.

(1879); Fiori, R. (1999) p. 305 and
with the quote in the glossary p. 306: Locat quis quandoque res, quandoque
operas, quandoque rem et
operam; Vigneron, R. (1993); Bassanelli, G. (2010); Mayer-Maly, T. (1956);
Pugliese, G. (1994); Pothier,
R. J. (1806); Dankwardt, H. (1874) 2; Wesel, U. (2010) pp. 79 f; Olivier-
Martin, F. (1936); Dernburg, H.
(1897) II8, 780 367; Hajje, A. (1926); Garsonnet, E. (1879); Gurlitt, C. et
al. (1889) pp. 26-33.
131 Dernburg, H. (1897) II p. 780 ( 367); on the concepts and the various
translations in detail cf. Mayer-Maly,
T. (1956) pp. 16 ff. with reference to the works of Degenkolb, Kniep and
Mommsen. Locare means adjust
in the sense of place. This only presents two households. The origin in the
Roman market is shown in its
mention in the Twelve Tablets Law, in which locare becomes putting into
service. Conducere is bringing
together and taking with (p. 17).
132 Similarly Honsell, H. (2010) pp. 145 ff.
133 Honsell, H. (2010).
134 Honsell, H. (2010) p. 24.
29
----------------------- Page 69-----------------------
(dominum directum).135 The modern debate about the division of the locatio
conduc-
tio into the three elements of the services contract, the employment contract, and
the
tenancy contract, in which the existence of a unified contractual form comparable
to the
sales contract was in part denied, belongs to that process.
Grossi sees this generalisation of the particular as suppression. The locatio
conductio,
he says, is a rent to regulate real use relationships.136 He thus determines the
elements
that we have also recognised as the fundamental elements of life time contracts.
The fact
that today we have not fully appreciated them in research into the law of ancient
Rome is
attributed by Grossi to the fact that the unrestricted ownership of the dominium
directum
was, in the 19th century, given ideological pre-eminence over all other legal
relationships,
so that the important social functions of the l.c. in the organisation of
agriculture in the
Middle Ages were forgotten.137 Grossis study shows that essentially rent, like
purchase, left
the rights of the owner intact.138 The dominance of a hierarchical society
characterised by
slavery then strengthened the dominium in such a way that in the shadow of an
absorb-
ing individualism use rights in the Roman concept of property could develop only
slowly
and to a limited extent as a function of that property.139 As the slave economy
disinte-
grated, however, economic pressure for the development of use relationships

increased to
the point at which we experience it today in the services and credit society. When
labour
was reduced by the end of the supply of slaves from 800 and through the freeing of
slaves
in the 11th century, existing legal forms impeded economic development. Under the
old
law, the Colonus (tenant farmer) was indeed no slave, but he had only a factual,
not a legal
relationship, to what was rented. Just as in modern employment law, in which 855
BGB
in principle provides a functional and more modern definition of the employee,
because it
limits his right of possession of the means of production to the objectively
necessary,140
the Colonus was denied rights of ownership.141 The weakness of the leaseholders
position
prevented him from developing the land, over which he possessed no rights. The
conse-
quence was lack of work and an abundance of fallow land, a situation we are
experiencing
today in the form of the colossal level of unemployment of young people in the EU
(aver-
age 25%), the coexistence of housing need with large quantities of
overpriced housing
only available for purchase, and the vast amount of fallow monetary capital, which
cannot
135 Honsell, H. (2010) p. 11.

136 Grossi, P. (1963) sub-title.
137 Grossi, P. (1963) p. 26.
138 Non solet locatio dominum mutare D. 19, 2, 39; Grossi, P. (1963) p. 46.
139 Grossi, P. (1963) p. 48.
140 If a person exercises actual power over an object on behalf of another in
their household or business or in
a similar relationship, by virtue of which he is obliged to follow the
instructions of the other in relation to
that object, then only the other is the owner.
141 Grossi, P. (1963) pp. 46 ff.
30
----------------------- Page 70-----------------------

of
be used in purposeful investments for the benefit of society because this real
economy
(unlike that of the capital market, which circulates capital within
itself) can no longer
meet the high level of interest charged on capital.
In addition to agricultural problems, there was the problem of organising the
cultiva-
tion of land at a time of population growth.142 Between 848 and 1000 AD, these
problems
had led to a depression in levels of rent through gifting on condition of

cultivation. Sales
contract thinking, by excluding use and use-value as principles from the
contractual syn-
allagma, and consequently the perspective in society as a whole, led to the
consequences
we are now struggling with, using numerous legal constructs in the areas of
unemploy-
ment, homelessness and over-indebtedness in the long-term relationships of
obligation we
have described. The rental contract, on the other hand, created a place for all
this within
the contractual synallagma itself. It revealed the strengthening of the rights of
the lessee
as employee (with regard to the means of production), tenant (with regard to the
house)
and borrower (with regard to money capital) as the expression of the need of the
lessor to
preserve the value of the capital being used. Significant community functions for
public
benefit were thus achieved by strengthening the role of the tenant. This was lost
again
in the 19th century in the thinking of the Pandectists and resurrected the positive
roles
the lessor got in the word investor, while the lessee turned into a questionable
debtor
(see Reifner I).
This loss in historical understanding within the historical school of law
occurred, as
143
Hofer has shown, in the debate between Savignys Theory of Will and the
Trust Theory,
which was once the foundation of the Obligation in Roman law.144
Romanists such as
Girtanner145 and Schlomann146 saw the foundation of the obligation in the contract
of
Roman law not as Will, but as Trust, which was the basis of the debt. The
relationship in
this context was conceived of as an alternative to the contract.
Like sale, synallagmatic rent is an all-embracing form of contract in which
the use
of capital is released from the rights of dominion over a thing, a person or an
animal.
Certainly, its influence has dwindled significantly, especially in the
19th century. In
employment law and in relation to loans, it has been seen as more of a nightmare
figure
142 Grossi, P. (1963) p. 51.

143 Hofer, S. (2001) pp. 240 ff.
144 Burdese, A. (1993) p. 418 points to the fact that even in the case of the
twelve tablets the obligation has
a purely personal source. The obligation is intended to enable cooperation
between creditor and debtor.
The obligation has thus formed a bond between two people, which will be
released when the obligation
has been fulfilled [. . .] Delivery means to be a guarantor for the creditor
[. . .] Claims are accordingly made
against the person (actio in persona). Hold, compel, determine, intend are
at the root of the obligation.
That is how Friedrich Schiller describes the guarantee in his poem, as
vouching for the loyalty of a person,
the archetypical obligation, which does not generate a call upon assets until
later.
145 Girtanner, W. (1859).
146 Schlossmann, S. (1980).
31
----------------------- Page 71-----------------------
than a source of assistance in the socialisation of these relationships for the use
of capital
with reference to the personal life time.
It has wrongly been asserted that the locatio conductio only existed in its
concrete form
of rental agreement in relation to employment, work and materials. These
distinctions in the
19th century were alien to the Middle Ages and earlier times, in which there was an
institu-
tion of locatio conductio, whose many adjuncts in the form of rei, operarum,
operis, irregula-
ris, specialis primarily only transmitted what we, in sales law, denote through the
conceptual
link of the sales contract with the object purchased, such as legal or material
goods or parcels
of land, without calling into question the unity of the sales contract model
itself. The unity
theory still holds today for Romanists, according to which the trichotomy
of the three
forms of the l.c. in Roman law has significance only in terms of its legal
consequences, not the
nature of the contractual relationship. This applies in particular to the
distinction in employ-
ment law of the civil law countries, of such great significance today, between the
contract for
services and the contract for works, which demarcates between employee and employer
and
constantly threatens the existence of employment protection law in practice. At
this point
legal history is co-opted by the needs of the industrial market economy.147
This is how the legal form of all service or credit relationships in the
market economy
has come to be the same as that of the sales contract, which denotes what remains
when
work and services are removed from the employment contract, when money and con-
sumption are removed from the loan agreement, and when property and habitation are
removed from the tenancy agreement. This form denoted Roman law as locatio
conductio,
whose logic was transferred to labour (operarum, operis), goods, land and slaves
(rei) and
money-like goods (specialis).
In German law, this corresponded to rent.148 In the French Code Civil, this
general
construct is still apparent; Art. 1709 cc defines rent as to faire jouir lautre
dune chose
pendant un certain temps (allow another the enjoyment of something for
a specific
period). 535 BGB and Art. 1572 ital. cc adopted this word for word, namely use
of the
rented item is to be assured for the duration of the rental period or far godere
allaltra
una cosa mobile o immobile per un dato tempo. Use and time are thus the central
ele-
ments of this most general legal form for allocating work and cooperation, which
extends
from the item concerned to all objects of legal relationships, including human (=
slave),
material, money and organisational capital.
The Code Civil develops in Art. 1708 the idea that material objects are not
the only
things that can be used. Il y a deux sortes de contrats de louage: Celui des
choses, et celui
d'ouvrage. (There are two types of rental contract: those which govern material
objects
147 In detail and with evidence of opinion among Romanists Mayer-Maly, T. (1956)
pp. 17 ff and Brasiello, U.
(1927). On the unity principle see also Olivier-Martin, F. (1936) pp. 419 f;
against only Arangio-Ruiz and
Niedermeyer (cit. Mayer-Maly, T. (1956)).
148 Brckner, H. (1877); Niendorff, O. (1896).
32
----------------------- Page 72-----------------------

of
Contracts and
Obligations
and those which govern the products of labour/works). The contrat de louage de
service
personnel (rental of services) applies under Art. 1667 cc to domestic staff,
servants and
maids, as did the Gesindemiehte of the 19th century.149 It in fact perpetuates the
idea of
renting a slave. The l.c. operis as the form of rental that could be seen closest
to the general
principle of l.c. and also help to understand the idea of a l.c. operarum of free
labour was
focussed on the result of the labour (contrat de resultat, performance
agreement)
This historical reorganisation of types of legal contract into only two
categories of
sales contract (+ works contract) and rental contract (all forms of rental of
capital) comes
up against the fact that in the law governing the rental of material objects, at
least, the
locatio conductio is still conceptually taken into account in the Synallagma.
In employment law in particular, emancipation from the thoughts of the rental
of
labour of which Roman law had been accused was understood to be virtually the
corner-
stone of a move towards the human personality of the working person. Lotmar first
and
then, from the second edition, Barassi too, and in their wake the entirety of
humanistic-
orientated employment law, indignantly rejected the proposition that it was
possible to
rent labour power. Yet there remain signs that this should be completely
reconsidered,
because the pre-eminent employment law solution is far more to be feared, making
the
slave relationship with its subjugation and its authoritarian nature even
conceptually
(Dienstvertrag, Service contract) capable of forming a contract model for modern
times in
the sense of the pathos of the liberal contractual thinking of the French
Revolution.
The fact is that in the Roman world there was never a rental of labour
between free
citizens. People who rented out their labour had to offer their labour force, which
is insep-
arable from the person. They thus rented out themselves as human beings. That
should be
uncontroversial, and this is in fact the distinction between the modern employment
law of
the Pandectists, who saw in this a possibility legally to cement and legitimise the
modern
slavery of industrial labour of the late 19th century. Roman law thus only
recognised the
rental of slaves, but dealt with this not as the rental of labour, but that of
goods. The use of
a slave seemed just as possible to them as it did to Napoleon, who, in 1803,
reintroduced
the old slave law of the French colonies into the Code Civil. In fact, the Roman
labour
contract was made between free men, and it mainly governed what we would see today
as the skilled services of doctors, tax advisers and lawyers, more a

services agreement
of performance, including duties owed to the buyer of the services with reference
to the
subject matter, not the person of the supplier. The agreement involved no
subjugation of
the person. There were no industrial workers. Low-status work was carried out by
slaves,
members of the family and peasants, who did not have the status of free men.
Today in order to adequately express the position of an employee endowed with
full
human rights, the works contract would emerge as the form closest to achieving that
in
149 Windscheid, B./Kipp, T. (1906) 399.
33
----------------------- Page 73-----------------------
the form of the purchase of the products of labour, which the buyer may wish to
influence.
The l.c. operarum therefore comes back predominantly into the area of the
l.c.operis. The
employment relationship in Roman law would therefore have fallen outside life time
con-
tracts, because it refers to products, and is only marginally concerned with the
relation-
ship between mandate and accomplishment of the task by the mandatory.150 In Roman
law, long-term relationships between people were determined by status law, not
contract.
A special law for farm hands and peasants endured into the 19th century.
The special nature of the free wage labourer as he appeared first in French
manufactur-
ing and then in the English factory system is not that his labour power was being
used.151
The worker must use the employers capital in a mechanised world organised
according to
a division of labour. Without the availability of such an Arbeitsplatz
(workplace), which
in turn justified the name Arbeit(splatz)geber (work(place) provider,
i.e. employer) the
worker could not usefully deploy his own labour power in an industrialised
production pro-
cess. He is therefore the employee, the Arbeitnehmer who rents the machines,
the factory
organisation, the management function of the owner and everything that the
equipped and
operational commercial enterprise implies, thereby also implicitly submitting to
the practi-
cal rules and directions of a functional command structure, which are necessary for
the
interplay between his labour and this environment to function. The employment
contract
is thus a complex juridical instrument, which extends the traditional labour
contract in the
synallagmatic production of services around an element of a rental contract. This
explains
why the reference to the enterprise and its demands, which Kochers contribution
examines,
prompted many to recognise the integration into the factory and the factual use of
the means
of production as a further element of the contract over and above statements of the
will of
the parties. The employment contract thus joins the ranks of the consumer credit
contract
and the tenancy agreement as a life time contract. In all such contracts, the
counterparty to
the owner of capital would be the user (of means of production, dwelling, money),
and use
would occur wherever there are activities bearing on the necessities of life (work,
home, con-
sumption). A relationship would always be encountered, which would require
cooperation
in relation precisely to the opposing interests of profit-realisation and
achievement of use-
value that the law, in the sense of justice, has a duty to organise in a sensible
manner. These
will only be outlined here as ideas. So far they have been anything but consensual
among
the authors of this book, but they should make clear that cooperation beyond the
traditional
limits of employment law along with tenancy and credit law can certainly be
creative.
What is less problematical, on the other hand, is the classification of
lending in the
locatio conductio, which is exactly what the modern reform of credit law in Europe
has
150 It is interesting to note that dictionaries translate this word derived from
the contract for service with pur-
chaser, buyer, customer.
151 Mengoni made the apposite remark in this context that even the employee was
obliged to succeed, as oth-
erwise his effort had no meaning.
34
----------------------- Page 74-----------------------

of
Contracts
and Obligations
demonstrated. Renting money was in fact not envisaged in Roman law. This, however,
as
Reifners contribution on the Darlehnsvertrag (Reifner I) will show, had nothing to
do
with the fact that rent was not thought of as legally relevant to the use of
capital at all. It
was more to do with a general attitude that money in its modern expression was
merely a
means of payment and had no function as capital. The idea that using money had
value
in itself was offensive to a feudal agricultural society. Money could not bear
fruit. Interest
was therefore not fruit but robbery of the fruit of the labour of the borrower. The
canonical
prohibition against interest expressed this in the 1745 Encylical Vix Pervenit: On
Usury
and Other Dishonest Profit. Aristotle considered that a lender was a robber. A
locatio con-
ductio pecuniae (rental of money) did not therefore exist. People used, and still
use today
in Roman countries, the legal form of the real contract for loans of
money and other
means of exchange, in principle free of charge, the mutuum.
That was not completely misguided. Money does not in fact bear fruit. In that
it is dif-
ferent from other forms of capital, such as land, on which plants grow, or trees,
which bear
fruit, or animals, which produce young, or slaves, who produce work or children,
and it is
therefore different from goods, people and housing.
Like all pre-capitalist systems, ancient Roman law understood productivity
mainly
as usus fructus, the cultivation of fruits. Interest and profit were therefore
understood as
bearing fruit. Anything that was not the fruit of the object of use, resembled
theft. Aris-
toteles therefore condemned not only interest but the return on capital realised by
com-
merce, because the origin of the profit was obscure. Use rights enabled
participation in the
fruits and otherwise initially as explained in the Encyclical only in damages for
lost gains
(lucrum cessans) or for losses caused by delay (damnum emergens).
It was not until the emergence of a developed market economy that
people could
understand why interest, irrespective of whether it took the form of
rental interest for
goods, for the use of slave labour, or of the fee for a loan, did not represent
participation
in the fruits of the use of these things, but capital growth. That growth had
arisen through
the opportunities to make labour more productive through the use of capital. The
reward
for the use of capital is therefore not the harvesting of fruit, but the difference
between the
value of the capital before and after its use. A glance at financial mathematics
confirms
this. A calculation using the profitability method,152 which merely presents a
calculation of
the proportion of costs incurred, is incorrect. Interest can only be mathematically
correct
if it is measured as a growth differential in capital values.153
152 Eg. kg wheat per year; y eggs per hen per year, etc.
153 The formula for extracting fruit in interest calculations [cost/(capital
time)] is mathematically incorrect.
Instead, the growth formula [(1 interest rate)time capital ] is used
for the calculation. (cf. 6 PreisAngVO
and European Union (22.05.2008) Annex I).
35
----------------------- Page 75-----------------------
That does not apply only to the rent of money; it is relevant to all rental.
The question
of which fruits a parcel of land produces is at best a motive, not a yardstick, for
rent. The
same applies to the contract of slave labour, in which the employee is paid, not
according
to the individual output from his labour, but according to an average productivity
drawn
from the increase in value of the capital deployed by the slave owner (Mehrwert
surplus
value). In the case of rent of a dwelling, this is not the fruit harvested by the
tenant from
the dwelling, but a part of the earnings from labour that is set aside for the
home. Lastly, in
the case of consumer credit, the connection with monthly income and instalments on
the
loan154 shows that it is merely the productivity of labour that provides the
monetary value
to ensure repayment of the loan with interest. Investment loans are different.
Conceptu-
ally, the pre-requisite for the payment of interest on investment loans is the
differential in
the value of capital before and after use of the finance, if not, as in securitised
loans such
as shares and bonds, the dividends or the yield from appreciation in value already
legally
restricted to what the capital invested could generate.
Because, as Polanyi aptly describes it, thinking in categories of capital
only became
necessary when the markets extended to land, and in the 19th century, and the
capitalist
economy was already needed for things like trade between localities, the economy of
the
Middle Ages could function only with the help of auxiliary legal structures.
Roman law made concessions to this pressure from trading capitalism in a
constant
toing and froing, and allowed the construction of money loans for no return
(mutuum) in
combination with a separate and solemnised agreement (stipulatio) as to interest,
thereby
partially achieving the outcome of money-rental.155 It was not only the rental of
things and
services that enabled an early version of synallagmatic thinking. The principle of

exchange
(synallagma) developed with the sales of goods also entered the use of capital
against a
deposit (depositum) ( 688 BGB, Art. 1915 cc), the order (mandatum) ( 662 BGB,
Art.
1986 cc) where today it appears in the form of synallagmatic savings contracts and
agency
agreements.
Yet even Roman l.c. law had moved closer to money rental. Loans defined in
German
and French law today acknowledge the locatio conductio specialis or the operis
irregularis156
recognised in Roman law in the form of an agreement for the loan of goods ( 607
BGB),
for example a haulage agreement, in which delivery is required of any kind of
grain. This
form was occasionally related in ancient Rome with the construction of the mutuum
with
stipulatio. In French law (Du prt usage, ou commodat Art. 1875 cc), this figure
is pre-
sented as the basis of money rental, because it is only in the third paragraph
after loan
of goods, in which the use of exchangeable goods under loan is allowed, that the
loan of
154 Dealt with in detail in Reifner, U. (1979) pp. 305 ff.

155 Maschi, C. A. (1973) p. 104.
156 Hausmaninger, H./Selb, W. (2001) p. 252. Also on the actio certae creditae
pecuniae and interest as pay-
ment of damages.
36
----------------------- Page 76-----------------------

of
Contracts
and Obligations
money in return for payment arises (Du prt de consommation, ou simple prt Art.
1892 cc)
(Du prt intrt. (Art. 1905 cc). In Germany, this is completed in the reform of
the BGB in
2002, the conversion required by EU Consumer Credit Directives of the
prestitum/mutuum
in a locatio conductio specialis. The definitions, according to which it is not
time but the
giving and receipt of money that appear to be decisive elements of the loan
agreement, and
157
in which it is not intention but factual giving (real) that determines the
contract, have
become the credit agreement of common law in 488 BGB and now in Art. 3 Directive
2008/48/EU, which define consideration as the payment of interest in the words

makes
available and thereby the use of capital in time. It states: The lender is
obliged under the
loan agreement to make available to the borrower a sum of money in an agreed
amount. The
borrower must pay the interest due.
1.8 Life Time Contracts and European Contract Law
Neither national law, nor European law, and still less Community law, have
established a
regimen for governing life time contracts. The four main sectors considered in
previous
paragraphs have been regulated in national law, but a general discipline for the
type of
life time contracts does not in fact exist, as happens on the other hand for long-
term con-
tracts (see above, 1.1). Legal scholars in continental Europe, it is true to say,
have recently
endeavoured to set out the need for a sort of allgemeiner Teil des Rechts des
schwcheren
Partners.158 But to base a new general contract-type on the weakness of one of the
parties
simply favours formal equality, or in other words provisions that compensate for
the infor-
mation asymmetry between the contracting parties, mainly generalising the current
legal
setting of Community consumer protection law. Neither does the proposed criterion
seem
to be particularly selective, when one takes on board the fact affirmed by Andrea
Nicolussi
in his contribution to this book, that in contracts, there is always, or almost
always, one
party which is weaker than the other.
For that matter, even under the economic contract theory the category of
relational
contracts is only recognised as one aspect of the problem, namely the continuous
highly
interactive contact between the contracting parties, without placing importance on
the
existential needs of the people involved.
Here we are dealing rather with reinforcing the need to ensure some degree of
sub-
stantive equality, or, in other words, to guarantee a minimum of social dignity for
those
157 Art. 1905 cc: livre une chose lautre pour sen servir, la charge par le
preneur de la rendre or 607
BGB old version: A person who has received money or other exchangeable goods
as a loan must repay the
lender what he has received in the form of goods of a similar nature, quality
and amount.
158 Gamillscheg, F. (1976) and in Gamillscheg, F. (2006) pp. 124 ff;
Derleder, P. (1996); Hnn, G. (1982);
Roppo, V. (2007); Gitti, G./Villa, G. (2008).
37
----------------------- Page 77-----------------------
who, for reasons that usually go beyond the will of individual people, have to make
provi-
sion for living their lives by entering into contractual relations. Therefore, the
question
that poses itself is as follows: does the European legal system include the pursuit
of these
moral values by transforming them into legally binding terms, or not?
In the debate on European contract law, the merit for calling general
attention to lop-
sided European contract law, which has emerged from the debate over recent years,
must go
159
to the manifesto of the Study Group on Social Justice in European Law (Manifesto
Group)
160
of 2004. In fact the practically unique aim pursued by European law in this
regard consists
in preventing distortion of competition, whereas in reality the regulation of
markets is not
only significant for its contribution to material wealth, but also it helps to
structure access to
basic needs of citizens and supplies them with essential protection of their
interests.
For these purposes, according to the Manifesto, the Charter of fundamental
rights of
the European Union161 should be considered above all, which sets out a range of
values that
should be balanced with freedom to contract (at the time the Manifesto was
published, the
Charter was yet to be integrated into the Treaties). Values that should be included
together
with dignity (human dignity, the right to life, the right to the integrity of the
person, pro-
hibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, prohibition
of
slavery and forced labour), all freedoms (the right to liberty and security,
protection of
personal data, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression
and
information, freedom of assembly and association, freedom to choose an occupation
and
the right to engage in work), all equality (equality before the law,
non-discrimination,
cultural, religious and linguistic diversity, equality between men and women, the
rights
of the child, the rights of the elderly, integration of persons with disabilities)
and finally
solidarity (the right of access to placement services, protection in the event of
unjustified
dismissal, fair and just working conditions, prohibition of child labour and
protection of
young people at work, family and professional life, access to services of general
economic
interest, environmental protection, consumer protection).162 Any of the
rights derived
from the common constitutional traditions of EU countries must be interpreted in

accor-
dance with those traditions.
159 Brggemeier, G./Bussani, M. et al. (2004).

160 See Caruso, D. (2014).
161 The charter was drawn up by a convention that was formally proclaimed in Nice
in December 2000 by the
European Parliament, Council and Commission. In December 2009, with the entry
into force of the Lisbon
Treaty, the charter was given binding legal effect equal to the Treaties. To
this end, the charter was amended
and proclaimed a second time in December 2007. Protocol (No) 30 to the
Treaties on the application of the
charter to Poland and the United Kingdom restricts the interpretation of the
charter by the Court of Justice
and the national courts of these two countries, in particular regarding
rights relating to solidarity (chapter IV).
162 See for an overview on critical voices Hesselink, M. W. (2008). See further
Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2011).
38
----------------------- Page 78-----------------------

of
The Manifesto also raises the possibility of generalising rules contained in

the Com-
163
munity discipline governing individual contract types, among which commercial
agency
is referred to, above all. Some individual life time contracts are in fact
regulated by Com-
munity law, in a more or less fragmentary way. The most extensive regimen and
here are
two further sectors recalled in the Manifesto concerns consumer credit, whereas
sub-
ordinated employment contracts are regulated only minimally,164 although some
profiles
such as health and safety at work165 and gender equality, one of the fundamental
principles
of Community law (Art. 8, ex Art. 3(2) TEC),166 are very important here. Finally,
contracts
for supply and residential tenancy law are, however, not the subject-matter of
Community
legislation (Elena Bargelli in this book in fact considers this, from a Community
law per-
spective). Similar to the present efforts for the legal acknowledgement of life
time contrats
in the law of contracts and obligations, the Manifesto Group has itself started to
rethink
the rather vague concept of social justice in European Contract law. This new
start of the
group initiated by Hugh Collins and Martijn Hesselink, where also three members of
the
EuSoCo group attended, reacts to the own analysis that the Manifesto had little
effects
on European legislation and that legal scholars from outside the EU found this
concept
too vague. The fairly recent idea of vulnerable consumers167 should lead to a
competence
creep of the EU, where the traditional density of regulations in employment,

housing,
and access to credit are essential aspects of social justice insofar as they are
necessary to
secure a set of basic entitlements. . . . Social Justice in Contract Law must now
look at
much more than consumer protection. Its agenda must embrace contracts
that secure
housing, employment and access to credit.168
The Draft Common Frame of Reference itself (see Antoniolli and Forray) only
referred
to the leasing of movable property and states that the rules are not intended to
be used,
163 See European Council (31.12.1986).

164 The European Union has minimum requirements in the field of labour rights and
work organisation. These
requirements concern collective redundancies, insolvency and the transfer of
undertakings, the consulta-
tion and information of workers, working hours, equal treatment and pay, and
posted workers. They have
been supplemented by framework agreements between the European social
partners. This has led to the
introduction throughout the EU of the right to parental leave and leave for
family reasons, and has facili-
tated part-time work and limited the use of successive fixed-term contracts
(see Barnard, C. (2006)).
165 European Council (29.06.1989) and European Union (28.02.2003) See Barnard, C.
(2006) pp. 539 ff.
166 The European Unions objectives on gender equality are to ensure equal
opportunities and equal treatment
for men and women and to combat any form of discrimination on the grounds of
gender. The EU has
adopted a two-pronged approach to this issue, combining specific measures
with gender mainstreaming.
See Barnard, C. (2006) pp. 297 ff.
167 See i.e. Europische Union (20.12.2012); European Consumer
Consultative Group (ECCG): European
Consumer Consultative Group Opinion on consumers and vulnerability
Adopted on 7 February 2013
by ECCG Plenary (2013) URL:
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/empowerment/docs/eccg_opinion_
consumers_vulnerability_022013_en.pdf. Accessed: 01.02.2013.
168 See Caruso, D. (2014), p. 9.
39
----------------------- Page 79-----------------------
or used without modification or supplementation, in relation to rights and

obligations of a
169
public law nature, or in relation to, among other things, the employment
relationship.
Art. 1:101 of the underlying Acquis principles adds that they are not formulated
to apply
in the areas of labour law. Business-to-business and business-to-consumer
contracts were
at the heart of the recent debate on European contract law. Luisa Antoniolli
reconstructs
the debate in detail, whose conclusion was the implicit gliding from general
contract law
to sales law.170
In fact, it is worth recalling again the general principles common to the

laws of the
Member States invoked by Art. 340 of the consolidated version of the Treaty on EU
(ex-
Art. 288 TEC) in relation to non-contractual liability, but that is now applied in
every
field where the European dimension of the relationship being governed is not
flanked by
a regimen which governs it directly.171 For instance, Art. 6.3 of the consolidated
version
of the Treaty on EU that states that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the

European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall
constitute
general principles of the Unions law. Both the Convention and constitutional
traditions,
as Elena Bargelli reminds us in her contribution, recognise a right to housing.
In a system where production depends on consumption (see above,
1.4), and in
which globalisation intrudes into the phases of economic recovery to produce
increased
productivity rather than increases in salary, there is now a pressing need to avoid
encour-
aging the dominance of consumption at the expense of the chance to maintain the
right
to life time contracts, and this book aims to make a contribution to identifying a
range
of specific principles that could serve as guidance towards this ambitious, but
inevitable,
objective.
It is therefore time to move on from general assertions to concrete, working
direc-
tions. This is why we have decided to favour what could be called the bottom-up
approach,
that is, which starts out from the historical evolution of (national) regimens
governing
individual life time contracts, to arrive at the description of a specific set of
principles that
will be illustrated in the following paragraph.
169 Such a clarification is necessary because the rules are intended to be used
in relation to service contracts
(Barendrecht, M./Jansen, C. et al. (2007); Jansen, C. (2010)). The DCFR
itself does not define what is meant
by service. It is made up of a general and a specific part. The
distinguishing criterion within the latter part
is not centred on the classification of the provider (and therefore, on the
differentiation between a work
contract and a tendering contract), but, in an innovative way, on the type of
service: construction, process-
ing, storage, design, information or advice and treatment. On the whole,
analysing the individual norms on
service contracts, the conclusion is easily reached that regulation of
contracts that involve the sale of goods
has been accorded special status (see Wendehorst, C. (2006)).
170 See European Law Institute: Statement of the European Law Institute:
COM(2011) 635 final (11.10.2011);
Schmidt-Kessel, M. (ed.) (2013).
171 Castronovo, C./Mazzamuto, S. (2007) p. 9.
40
----------------------- Page 80-----------------------

of
Contracts and
Obligations
1.9 Principles of Justice and Life Time Contracts
In this joint research project, diverse critical approaches to the dominating

system of con-
tract law based on the 19th century sales law model have been outlined. On the
European
level, the only fully harmonising Directives on sales law and consumer law,
together with
its duplication in the draft common frame of reference (DCFR), have explicitly
excluded
life time contracts (see Antoniolli and Forray). While tenancy and labour contracts
are
totally excluded, the abundant regulation of financial services in the
Consumer Credit
Directive (Carrillo), the Mortgage Directive, the different insurance directives,
the pay-
ment services directive, distant marketing of Financial Services Directive, MIFID I
and II
as well as IMD I and II have focussed on the marketing and sale of such services
provid-
ing cooling-off periods, extensive pre-contractual information and a technical
harmoni-
sation of products and supervision. Questions concerning the life time of those who
use
these services (access, exploitation, cancellation, usury, debt enforcement,
adaptation,
continuity) have expressly been left to the National Legislator, which in fact was
based on
the neo-liberal assumption that functioning markets would render protective
regulation
superfluous (Tancelin). On the EU level, which, especially for some new accession
states
as well as countries with less-developed consumer law, has created the impression
that the
core elements of life time contracts for consumers is the information provided at
the time
when the contract is signed. This assumption (see, for its roots in the economic
analysis of
law developed by the Chicago School, the contribution by Tancelin) is erroneous,
empiri-
cally unfounded, and denies especially vulnerable consumers (Howells and
Nybergh)
justice and security. The wealth of national rules, as for example on debtor
protection,
gambling and usury, have not even been touched by this legislation, not to mention
the
vast achievements of labour and tenancy law, as described in this book by Nogler,
Houwel-
ing, Kocher, Razzolini and Rdl for labour and employment law.
Also, consumer law concerning long-term relations and the life time of human
beings
had been more developed in the ius communis and ancient laws, as, for example, in
the
locatio conductio, than in what is called Consumer Law in the Consumer Directives.
This
is why what is called consumer law in EU-Law is basically market law, following the
infor-
mational model of consumer protection, while market compensatory law in the model
of
social consumer protection is omitted,172 as shown in the contributions to the
consumer
credit part of this book (Howells, Prez-Carrillo/Gallardo, Reifner I and II,

Pulgar). Ten-
ancy law, which protects the roof over ones head and thus concerns a special, and
his-
torically basic, purpose of consumption, is, as Derleder, Bargelli, Schmid and Park
reveal,
also torn into these two pieces of the market fixes everything and a substantive
social
tenant protection law. But here the EU did not dare to intervene and
opt for a purely
172 See for this distinction Reich, N. (1977) pp. 198 ff.
41
----------------------- Page 81-----------------------
market-driven sales law model. Just as in labour law, it would be too obvious to
tell the
homeless and unemployed that they need more information instead of workplaces and
a
place to hide away. Thus, their mere exclusion from what the EU has defined as
European
Contract law justifies the assumption that life time contracts, where the use of
foreign
capital is forced onto those who have social needs, are the other category that has
to be
developed in order to cover the rich diversity of national contract law.
This approach is not identical with the newly emerging concept of the
vulnerable con-
sumer,173 which can even be misused to neglect the general situation of
consumption in
a market society and blame social diversity for problems of life time in an
environment
174
where relations are replaced by spot contacts. Consumption or
housing in a market-
driven provision of goods, services and homes as well as labour in a market-driven
provi-
sion of workplaces is structurally weak. For those in society who have sufficient
assets, there
are a number of possibilities to compensate for such weaknesses. Vulnerable
consumers are
therefore only those who have no financial opportunities to compensate for this
structural
weakness. To turn this lack of compensation into the reason for structural
weaknesses in
the market economy follows the neo-liberal concept according to which the person of
the
consumer, and not the market ignorance of needs untempered by the law, is the
problem.
This confoundation is visible in social conservative concepts of social
justice as well as
in paternalistic approaches to consumer protection of ignorant, unskilled,
inexperienced
and irrational individuals who are personally unable to enjoy the blessings of
markets that
offer workplaces, housing and consumption opportunities to those who can exercise
the
adequate demand.
The negative reasons why Europe needs a concept of life time contracts are
therefore
not even the strongest arguments for its development (see Forray). A concept of
life time
contracts is just more suited to what is happening in the modern credit and service
society,
with its increasingly dense relations that also need to be unified under a concept
that does
not resemble the Procrustes bed175 of the sales ideology for long-term relations.
173 Van Gerven, W. (2002) p. 43; Lurger, B. (2007) pp. 273 ff; Lurger, B. (1998).
174 Irigoyen Prez, M. (2012) p. 1. notes that the diversity of vulnerable

situations, both when consumers are
placed under statutory protection and when they are in a specific situation
of sectoral or temporary vulner-
ability, hinders a uniform approach and the adoption of a comprehensive
legislative instrument, which has
thus led the existing legislation and policies in place to address the
problem of vulnerability on a case-by-
case basis, stresses, therefore, that European legislation must address the
problem of vulnerability among
consumers as a horizontal task, taking into account consumers various needs,
abilities and circumstances.
175 Procrustes () or the stretcher [who hammers out the metal],
also known as Prokoptas or
Damastes () subduer, was a rogue smith and bandit from Attica who
physically attacked people
by stretching them or cutting off their legs, so as to force them to fit the
size of an iron bed. In general,
when something is Procrustean, different lengths or sizes or properties are
fitted to an arbitrary standard.
(Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia. URL:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Procrustes. Accessed: 01.02.1013).
42
----------------------- Page 82-----------------------
1 Introduction: The New Dimension of Life Time in the Law of
Contracts and
Obligations
Life time contracts share the problems on similar time scales concerning the
contrac-
tual relationship. Starting with the provision of services and its marketing
efficient access
to houses (Derleder II), credit (Reifner I, Nybergh) and work (Nogler) are of legal
concern.
The three modern threats of poverty and exclusion are homelessness, unemployment
and
overindebtedness. The bargaining power and consequently the ability to exercise
rational
choice are reduced or excluded, limiting the value of information and reflection.
An arti-
ficial or objective lack of affordable offers exists in all three markets for
housing, labour or
consumer credit. They all show usurious prices and bad conditions for the use of
foreign
capital: exorbitant rents for dwellings provided in lamentable conditions in the
big cities,
usuriously low wages for unskilled workers who have to work under inhuman
conditions
and usuriously high interest rates in overdraft, payday loans and credit card
credit for those
who are already indebted or poor and at the mercy of their lenders in a captive
refinanc-
ing situation. All three areas are exposed to the same threats of income
fluctuations where
wages are lowered, instalments and rent cannot be paid and the use of the necessary
goods
like workplaces, homes and money capital is permanently, and unpredictably
threatened
in an interconnected way. Adaptation of the contractual relations is a core
necessity with
regard to the conditions under which modern individualised life time is spent,
especially
with regard to illness, divorce, accidents, crime and loss of income. While a large
number of
scattered rules apply, providing at least some collective rights to get at least
recognition for
these problems, no general principle applies. All three contractual relations also
suffer from
the isolation the sales contract model imposes onto social family and other
relations (see
Nicolussi), when only those two who signed the contracts can be taken into account
when
drastic changes have to be made. Children are the first and most important victims
of the
evils their parents have to endure and, with the exception of vague clauses in
early termina-
tion of labour and tenancy contracts, no concern has been shown to them. While in
the
sales-law model, the freedom of leaving the contractual partner in order to choose
a better
offer on the market is a core element of contract law, life time contracts have the
opposite
concern: cancellation of labour, tenancy and consumer credit contracts deprive the
users
of working opportunities, houses and money of a core chance to develop themselves
and
their families. This is why, other than the French revolutionary thinking that
introduced
the concept of the freedom to leave when abolishing slavery, today the freedom to
stay and
to be allowed to continue using the rented capital is a crucial element of the law
protecting
against early cancellation, which, although the core element in labour and tenancy
law, is
still seen as an exception to the principle of contractual freedom.
Consequently, all three forms of life time contracts do not end when the
contrac-
tual relationship is formally terminated. The ongoing relationship between employer
and
worker is apparent not only in the duties to pay indemnities but also in collective
arrange-
ments in which continuous pay, reduced work, alternative occupation is imposed on
the
employers by law or collective bargaining. In tenancy and especially in
credit law, the
43
----------------------- Page 83-----------------------

relation continues eternally in the form of a creditordebtor relation where all
rights are
allocated to the creditor, while the former borrower or tenant who
valued the foreign
capital by his or her interest and rent payments is left to the mercy of a debt-
enforcement
machinery. The introduction of consumer bankruptcy has been inevitable all
over the
world to cope with the shortcomings of contract law, which artificially assumes the
rela-
tionship has stopped, while the underlying relation continues, rather one-sidedly.
Since
the end of the19th century, debtor protection as well as unemployment benefits and
social
welfare are allocated outside contractual relations in administrative
procedures in the
form of alimony and social care, although they have been erected to shelter markets
and
capital accumulation from carrying the cost of their social consequences.
These similarities are not only socially typical for the economics and social
effects and
conditions of life time contracts; they are of immediate legal relevance and have
created
their own body of scattered exemptive rules.
We can illustrate this with the legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, which
is cited as the
basis of thou shalt pay thy debts. The devastating activities in debt collection
and foreclosure
destroying the future of whole families are justified with this principle that
seems to justify
the punishment of debtors in default. In his book on Consumers in Trouble Debtors
in
176
Default sociologist David Caplovitz has already juxtaposed visions of the same
problem a
sociological view and a legal view that implicitly start from opposite assumptions.
The same
occurs when one reads the recent sociological evaluation of the American Subprime
crisis
by Dan Immerglueck.177 The legal answer to the description of how people have been
made
homeless through irresponsible lending practices178 is based on the creditors view
that the
debtor is in default irrespective of his or her fault.179 But in fact, pacta sunt
servanda never
had such a meaning before 1800. Already the Codex Hammurabi as well as the Bible
held that
it was illegal to claim repayment for used capital in case a borrower or tenant had
had a bad
180
harvest on account of circumstances he could not influence. Life
time contracts have never
been totally subsumed under the sales law idea of an instant Synallagma. Lawyers
before
the 19th century held that the relational aspect of long-term dependencies did not
allow an
understanding under which the user of capital is only a debtor of the owner of the
capital.
The principle of pacta sunt servanda in long-term relations translated into
the obliga-
tion to cooperate and to care for the productive use of the means of production,
things,
176 Kranig, A. (1983).

177 Kahn-Freund, O. (1931).
178 This was the judgment even of the Federal Reserve Boards president Bernanke.
(See Speech Chairman
Ben S. Bernanke At the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicagos 43rd Annual
Conference on Bank Structure and
Competition, Chicago, Illinois May 17, 2007 The Subprime Mortgage Market:
http://www.federalreserve.
gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070517a.htm. Accessed: 15.01.2014).
179 See Reifner, U. (2003); Reifner, U. (1997).
180 Art. 48 of the Codex Hammurabi: If any one owe a debt for a loan, and a
storm prostrates the grain, or the
harvest fail, or the grain does not grow for lack of water; in that year he
need not give his creditor any grain,
he washes his debt-tablet in water and pays no rent for this year (Hammurabi
(2004)).
44
----------------------- Page 84-----------------------

of
Contracts
and Obligations
land or money. It is especially a users right that the provider of the capital
acts responsibly
and is liable for the outcome of the lending process. He should not be allowed, in
the mere
interest of profit, to assign his claims to third parties when they are exonerated
from these
duties. Also the limitations for early termination can be explained by pacta sunt
servanda
since the reasonable expectation of the user is that he will get at least such a
long-term
perspective as is present when the contract is signed.
Similar adaptations can be made to other principles such as the clausula
rebus sic
stantibus, which has primarily been used to uphold the market value of a sellers
claim.
The idea that this principle is inherent in all life time contracts requesting the
parties to
adapt these relations to changing social circumstances has led to only a few
exceptional
cases in which, for example, the divorce of a wife who guaranteed the credit of her
hus-
band was taken into account to reduce the debt to that part which would have been
appro-
priate for her to guarantee.181 That illness is a reason for adapting a labour
contract to the
new circumstances is already widely acknowledged in labour law, but not
sufficiently seen
as the expression of a much broader principle of adaptation and care with regard to
the
rebus sic stantibus rules. In tenancy law, the death of the tenant even adapts the
contrac-
tual relation in so far as his or her family members can enter into the contractual
relation
without the landlords consent.182
The interdiction of usura, as explained above, as the duty to keep renting

produc-
tive for the user if remunerations have to be paid lost its legal meaning during
the 19th
century, when it was assumed that instead of banning interest it would now forbid
exag-
gerated prices in all contracts. In fact, this had not been its purpose. This was
instead the
purpose of another truly general rule from sales law, the laesio enormis, which
held that
more than double the market price was supposed to be the fruit of illegal
exploitation.183
This principle of laesio enormis can of course be applied also to life time
contracts to the
extent that the initial synallagama of the contract was flawed, owing to a lack of
competi-
tion and freedom to decide as the basis for freedom of contract.
But it had nothing to do with the principle of usury. This principle forbade
all interest
that was more than a participation in the gains of the use of capital or did not
correspond
to damages the owner of the capital had incurred.184 While laesio enormis is a
relatively
market-driven principle, usura is a fundamental principle of productivity in any

form of
economy. While laesio looked at the offer, usura looked at the demand side, and
while
laesio referred to competition, usura referred to life time. It allowed
participation in the
gains, but carried the insight that where the use of capital does not help to
increase its size,
181 See BVerfG, 19.10.2013, AppNo. 89, 214, 1 BvR 567, 1044/89.
182 See 563 BGB for the right of a family member to continue the rent contract.
183 See Art. 138 BGB. For an overview of European law see Reifner, U./Schrder, M.
(2012).
184 For an explanation of usury see Pope Benedict XIV (01.11.1745) (URL:
http://www.ewtn.com/library/
ENCYC/B14VIXPE.HTM. Accessed: 01.02.2013).
45
----------------------- Page 85-----------------------

interest would deprive users of their means to satisfy their basic needs. Usura
means that
the collectivity of owners of the capital is already rewarded by the fact that
their capital is
maintained by others for the future.
Nobody should pay for the increase of the borrowed capital with funds
necessary to
uphold his or her own family and which were not derived from the gains provided by
the
lender, employer or landowner. In legal terms, this principle of usury has more
correctly
turned into the principle of responsible behaviour with regard to the productivity
of those
who make use of their capital. Responsible lending has emerged as a new
principle in
credit law and explains the number of responsibilities for employers in labour law
as well
as the responsibility a landlord has to take for the decent lives of his tenants in
tenancy law.
The 19th century market principle of fairness has only temporarily been able to
push aside
the thousands of years of the principle of responsibility in law that had since
Aristotle
been linked to human values such as dignity, virtues and decent behaviour or
returned as
the ehrbare Kaufmann (honourable merchant). Industrial capitalism has too long
thought
that the provision of procedural justice (fair treatment, information, chances)
providing
opportunities to others would suffice to excuse where inhuman and asocial outcomes
were
the normal consequences of economic behaviour.
Also, those rules concerning bona fide can be seen as principles of life time
contracts.
According to this, somebody has the right to find responsible behaviour where he
invested
his trust previously instead of an employer he never wanted to work for, an
investor he
never would have chosen as his lender or a landlord he never would have selected
for pass-
ing his life time in his houses.
Also, the ancient bans on gambling and betting can be applied to the shift of
risks to
those who live in life time contractual relations. The neo-liberal deregulation of
financial
markets (see Tancelin) has torn down the walls against gambling and betting,
opening the
door to derivatives and futures that create devastating effects for the solvency of
whole
states, consumers, small businesses and the ability to find decent and affordable
houses.
Much is known about those legal principles in contract law that have been
developed
for the upcoming capitalist sales society in the 19th century, especially by the
French and
the German Pandectistic fathers of the civil codes. These principles have
been further
developed to pave the way for globalisation through the CISG, Unidroit and the
recent
proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law185 (see Antoniolli,
Forray).
The contract law reforms in Italy 1942, the Netherlands 1970-1992, the
German 2002
185 European Law Institute: Statement of the European Law Institute: COM(2011) 635
final (11.10.2011) p. 2,
which seems to justify this first attempt towards a strict and unified
European sales contract law only with
the cost of the industry when it cites (p 2) the need for traders to adapt to
the different national contract
laws that may apply in cross-border dealings makes cross-border trade more
complex and costly compared
to domestic trade, both for business-to-consumer and for business-to-business
transactions.
46
----------------------- Page 86-----------------------

of
Contracts
and Obligations
reform, the continuous restatements of contract law in the US (1962-1979) as well

as the
DCFR have brought these principles to a level of abstraction that facilitate their
global
application. In addition, the large projects on the Principles of European Civil
Law like
PECL (see Antoniolli) have evaluated these developments since 1800 in Europe. But
little
has been accomplished with regard to those areas of the law that we address as life
time
contracts (see Schmid/Dinse and Bargelli). Its enormous number of rules and
jurispru-
dence is seen as piecemeal and impossible to assemble into a system that could
match the
expectations the enormous dogmatic efforts have reached with regard to
the sales law
concept. Case law in systematic disorder has opened this vast area of legal
application
to politics and arms-length concepts hostile to a system that could not only
legally but
also philosophically respond to the basic topic of all law: justice. Strangely
enough, the
quest for social justice partly continues this abdication of concepts in favour of
day-to-
day responses to urgent needs of the public. Assuming that justice can be split
into justice
as such and social justice nourishes the impression that those who ask for more
justice
for human needs in a capitalist society are more or less situated outside the
secure and
abstract notions of the law. Instead, one should return to the historical insight
that there is
only one justice in society that can lead the law and that we have to develop a
legal theory
in which the justice underlying the regulation of life time contracts becomes part
of the
unified concept of justice that all law has to obey. To that extent this project
contributes to
what is commonly addressed as social justice in the law (see Forray).
1.10 Principles of Life Time Contracts
The study group on European social contract law (EuSoCo) has tried to extract
principles
from the three areas of life time contracts that have been in the focus of this
research and
seem to be common to all three areas. Its preliminary formulation should
serve as an
incentive for all contributors to find common ground for a general concept of life
time
contracts.186 They could also guide currently politicised regulations of life time
contracts
into a future where the principle of justice can play a more important role for
more ade-
quate regulations with regard to the human dimension of life time contracts. The
articles
evaluating the joint legal questions in labour, consumer credit and
tenancy law in the
three special parts are accompanied by articles reflecting consumer law as such
(Howells),
ethical considerations for a human dimension (Nicolussi and Klinger) and the
obstacles
186 Similar attempts on a more general socio-economic basis have been made with
the seven principles of
responsible credit created by the International Coalition for Responsible
Credit. (See in eight languages
at European Coalition for Responsible Credit (ECRC). URL:
http://www.responsible-credit.net/index.
php?id=2516.); also Reifner, U./Niemi-Kiesilinen, J. et al. (2010);
Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2010). For a
discussion of the impact, suitability and legal consequences of such
principles see Reifner, U. (2003a).
47
----------------------- Page 87-----------------------
neo-liberal legal thinking has erected for the development of a more adequate
contract law
in the credit and service society (Tancelin).
The reader will find reference to these principles in the
contributions to this book,
especially in the contributions of Klinger and Prez-Carrillo/Gallardo. The
principles are avail-
able in the four languages used in this book. The principles are neither
hierarchically ordered
nor grouped according to more general principles of justice. This work has still to
be accom-
plished in the future. We want to provide incentives for legal and socio-economic
research and
discussion in this long-term research by volunteers of different legal cultures,
ideas and even
contradictions and profound differences as to how such principles can be
implemented.
1.10.1 Life Time Contracts
Life time contracts are long-term social relationships providing goods,

services and
opportunities for work and income creation. They are essential for the self-
realisation of
individuals and their participation in society at various stages in their life.
In the civil law systems, so far as the law of contracts is concerned, labour
law has
already widely contributed to the distinction between Abschlussfreiheit and
Gestaltungs-
freiheit, between the formal regulation and the content of the agreement, between
inten-
tion and judicial control, between initial regulation and mechanisms for
adaptation of
the individual contract. Human beings do not work or consume or live alone. Every
life
time contract affects these social circumstances. The family, especially, is a core
element of
concern that cannot be ignored in an individualised view of contractors isolated
from the
rest of the world. Especially between the three main categories of life time
contracts close
relations and interdependencies exist. Losing ones job jeopardises the ability to
repay the
loan or keep up with monthly rent payments. On the contrary, drastic changes in
hous-
ing conditions may jeopardise the ability to work according to the conditions
previously
fixed in the labour contract. Being pursued by debt collectors and exploited by
loan sharks
have direct effects on housing and labour. Besides, in all three areas the social
purpose and
the underlying need create social links between, for example, the financing
contract and
the contractual relationship through which the goods and services are provided
(Nogler/
Reifner; Nicolussi; Nogler; Schmid/Dinse; Bargelli; Nybergh; Razzolini; Kocher;
Rdl).
1.10.2 Human Dimension
The subject matter of life time contracts is real-life circumstances. The

role of the law
governing them is to frame the power relationships of those contracts in terms of
human
development, so that ongoing cooperation rather than the formation of the contract
lies
at the heart of the contractual relationship. Personal relations (such as the
family) have
48
----------------------- Page 88-----------------------
Contracts and
Obligations
to be taken into account (Nicolussi; Forray; Derleder I; Razzolini; Nybergh;

Antoniolli;
Kocher).
1.10.3 Long-Term Relationship
Mutual trust between the parties as to the durability of the long-term relationship
must
be protected, and early termination must have only future effect, having no bearing
on
the contract prior to that point. Early termination must be restricted to
circumstances in
which the freedom and the autonomy of the individual is at issue and makes early
termi-
nation necessary (Nogler/Reifner; Razzolini; Kocher).
1.10.4 Linked Contracts
Life time contracts are embedded in a network of linked contracts to which the law
must
have regard when legal questions fall to be decided (Prez Carrillo, Kocher).
1.10.5 Basic Needs and Access
The provision of essential goods and services for basic needs related to
consumption and
employment requires that physical, social and psychological considerations be taken
into
account in order to ensure the protection of the weaker party to the contract.
Stringent
regulation or other collective rules will secure the degree of social protection
needed in
line with the subject matter of the contract, its duration and its importance in
the life of
the individuals concerned (Forray, Nybergh, Antoniolli).
1.10.6 Productive Use
The provider of essential goods and services or income-generating opportunities

under a
life time contract must avoid taking any action that will jeopardise the social
purpose of
the contract and the productive use of the rendered services.
Whereas under commercial law, use-value acquires significance only to the
extent
that it falls mainly by chance into the hands of the consumer, as part of
proprietorship, in
continuous social obligations, precisely the fact that this use-value is guaranteed
is central.
Thus, a landlord is increasingly held responsible for the effective and humane
utilisation
of the dwelling by the tenant ( 535 Abs. 1 S. 2 BGB). Similarly, a lender has a
duty to
ensure that the loan can be applied effectively in the purchase of the item for
which it was
taken out, by ensuring that the item is free from defects (defence
against enforcement
49
----------------------- Page 89-----------------------
under 359 BGB), which is comparable to the duty of employers to ensure that the
place
of employment is humane and that wages are paid consistently (Reifner I+II; Park).
1.10.7 Collective and Ethical Dimensions
Employees and consumers are entitled to expect that the collective aspect of their
indi-
vidual interests is safeguarded by the state through collective representation
mechanisms,
together with the application of general values of good morals and good faith that
influence
access, formation, contents, adaptation and dissolution of such relationships
(Nicolussi;
Klinger; Nogler; Forray; Antoniolli; Roedl).
1.10.8 Access
Providers of life time contracts must refrain from discrimination in terms of the
personal
and social characteristics of consumers at all stages of the contract, from access
to termi-
nation, including discrimination in terms of the group of intended users of the
contract,
or individual members of that group. The importance of life time contracts in
meeting
the basic human needs of subsistence, employment and participation in
economic life
gives access to these goods, services and income opportunities the status of
fundamental
human right (distributive justice) (Nybergh, Klinger, Derleder I; Antoniolli;
Kocher).
1.10.9 Price
The mutual obligations of life time contracts shall not be grossly

disproportionate. Prices
must be transparent and non-discriminatory, and the charges must be affordable and
in
line with the costs.
All continuous social obligations share a distrust of pure market pricing,
which is
the cornerstone of the ideology of commerce. In the case of services of general
economic
interest even in the wake of neo-liberal deregulation and privatisation, the State
has estab-
lished public commissions equipped with extensive mechanisms for price control in
the
areas of, for example, radio, television, gas, water, electricity and the
railways.187 What the
minimum wage achieves in terms of obligations in the context of employment, whether
directly or indirectly through pay agreements under individual employment

contracts,
legislation on rents achieved through regulations relating to local
comparable rents
187 Also Canaris, C.-W. (1997) p. 50 concedes that the problem must be
confronted beyond the market
principle and according to the tenets of distributive justice.
50
----------------------- Page 90-----------------------

of
Contracts
and Obligations
under 558 ff BGB. While consumer credit in France, the Benelux countries, Italy
and
Poland is regulated through statutory restrictions on usury, in Germany the public
policy
requirement under 138 Abs.1 BGB extends the principle of double the
average local
comparable rent to interest rates as well. Finally, it is interesting to recall
Dublers pro-
posal, which canvassed the idea of resurrecting of one of the provisions of the BGB
( 612)
laid down for contracts of service.188 This rule states that where payment is not
specified,
this should be determined on the basis of tariffs or, in the absence of a pre-
determined
tariff, on the basis of the usual rate for the work. The author suggests the
setting up of
state committees to fix surplus payments known as Risikozuschlag (risk premium) for
the
various types of work relationship to be found in the new autonomy, so that
workers can
provide independently for insurance against risks (sickness, accidents, old-age
pensions,
etc.) arising from their work (Nogler/Reifner; Reifner I; Derleder II; Kocher;
Roedl).
1.10.10 Adaptation
If the social and economic circumstances upon which a life time contract is based
have
changed significantly since the contract was entered into, or if material
circumstances
from which the parties derived have arisen that are found to be at variance with
its original
situation to such an extent that the social nature of the contract is jeopardised,
and if the
parties would not have entered into the contract or would have entered into it on
different
terms had they foreseen this change, adaptation of the contract may be required if,
taking
into account all the circumstances of the specific case, and, in particular, the
contractual
or statutory allocation of risk and the fundamental obligation of a human being,
one of
the parties cannot reasonably be expected to continue to comply with the contract
without
variation of its terms. Collective regulation shall take precedence over individual
adapta-
tion (Howells; Pulgar; Reifner II; Antoniolli).
1.10.11 Termination
Termination of life time contracts imposed on workers and consumers must

be trans-
parent, accountable and socially responsible. Early termination against the
will of the
consumer, tenant or worker must be a measure of last resort. Disclosure
of true and
fair grounds for termination must be non-discriminatory and be provided a
reasonable
period before termination comes into effect. The only grounds for termination are
per-
sonal behaviour of such significance as to merit termination, or financial
circumstances
188 Dubler, W. (1998) p. 1069.
51
----------------------- Page 91-----------------------
or interests on the part of the provider that materially affect the viability of
the subject
matter of the contract. Where the reasons for termination are financial in nature,
users are
entitled to have recourse to mechanisms of collective redress, including the right
of the
individual to be heard or represented. This procedure must allow sufficient time
for users
to put forward measures preventing termination and/or its consequences. As far as
the
termination is in the interest of that party which has developed the contract and
organised
the service it has to consider the interest of the other party with due diligence.
We have already seen that the regimen governing subordinated employment
contracts
and residential leases generally provide for limitation on the possibilities for
termination
by employers and landlords. All continuous social obligations are subject to
protection
from termination, going beyond contractual arrangements, to introduce certain forms
and
fees and, at the same time, under credit legislation, an attempt at amicable
continuation of
the relationship is required ( 498 Abs.2 BGB). Moreover, under landlord and tenant
legis-
lation and employment legislation, termination is restricted structurally, and in
both cases
social justification is required, arising from the conduct, the person of the
employee or
the tenant (ILO Convention No. 158 of 1982189), or from overriding economic consid-
erations (business necessity, prevented by reasonable business operations), in

which
account must be taken of social considerations ( 574 BGB, ILO Convention No. 158
of
1982; 1 KschG; Art. 1 Law No. 604 of 1966 in Italy). The breach of contract
required to
terminate a contract is also made relative, and must attain a certain level of
gravity in all
continuous social obligations, such as the continuation of conduct in breach of
contract
despite a warning under employment or tenancy law, or arrears of two payments of
rent
or credit instalments. The limitations described thus far have substantially been
made part
of general civil law by the judgment of 17.1.1998190 of the German Constitutional
Court,
which has made judicial review available to ensure dismissal is not

arbitrary; likewise
judicial appeal to determine whether or not the dismissal is attributable to
factors outside
the specific case, or whether or not in selecting the worker the social
consequences of his/
her dismissal have been taken into account, or, finally, whether consideration of a
workers
expectations of a continuing work relationship, after years of constant
collaboration with
an employer, has been totally omitted. A negative outcome of such a review means
the
dismissal is nullified, also giving rise to the possibility of a claim for
compensatory dam-
ages; the burden of proof is on the worker.191 In Italian case-law, too, the
(ordinary) rule on
termination ad nutum of long-term contracts has been superseded by the Court of

Cassa-
tion since it ruled in the case of Renault Italia, which communicated the
termination of
about 200 dealership contracts, on the basis (legal in itself) of wanting to
restructure the
189 For comparative references on dismissals see Hepple, B. (1997).

190 NZA, 1998, 470; the judgment centres on 242 BGB.
191 Wank, R. (2000).
52
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of
Contracts and
Obligations
dealership network of its products in Italy. However, there was another factor in
play at
the same time: the company had terminated a number of its own directors contracts
by
consent, on the basis of transforming the work relationship into dealerships,
replacing the
dealers whose concessions had been revoked.192 The Court of Cassation affirmed
that the
judge hearing the case on the merits should have evaluated whether the termination
was
ineffective because it was illegal, but, beyond the label given to it and
invoking the rule
about fairness and good faith in contractual relations the Court reasoned in
terms of
fraud in the face of the law: the court hearing the case must consider the
objective func-
tion of the act, to decide whether the act itself was put in place adopting ways
and means
to pursue different, ulterior objectives to those stated. The judgment, finally,
in confirma-
tion of this premise, defines this limit as external (Nogler; Kocher).
1.10.12 Communication
Throughout the contractual relationship, from the beginning of the process of

negotiation
of the contract to its termination, a continuing and co-operative dialogue must be
estab-
lished on an equal basis and at a personal level between the parties with regard to
fulfilling
the purpose of the contract. Such a discussion must take place before each stage in
the
contract (formation, adaptation, termination) and communications must at all times
be
based on the principle of trust and confidence (Nicolussi).
1.10.13 Information and Transparency
During the negotiation of the contract and for the life time of the contract
accurate, com-
plete, timely and understandable information must be provided that is adequate to
over-
come any information asymmetry that arises (Prez-Carrillo/Gallardo; Tancelin).
1.10.14 Securing Livelihood
Where life time contracts provide for regular income, making it available
according
to time and place, or for payments to be drawn from that income, a minimum level of
income must be guaranteed in the form of continuing payments sufficient to meet the
consumers subsistence needs and, if applicable, protection must be
provided from
attachment of income, seizure and individual voluntary arrangements with
creditors
(Pulgar, Reifner II, Nicolussi).
192 Galgano, F. (2011).
53
----------------------- Page 93-----------------------
1.10.15 Exclusion
The social risks of unemployment, homelessness and over-indebtedness must be taken
into account in both the individual and the collective forms of the
contract with due
regard to its social origin and in line with public law.
Justice with regard to the person (and not without regard to the person): the
regi-
men for employees contracts governs the parties reciprocal obligations on the
basis that
this contract, so far as the worker is concerned, performs a pre-eminently social
func-
tion of support and affirmation of his/her personality. For this reason, the risk
of non-
performance based on impossibility, linked to specific events of the kind that may
befall
(illness, accident, pregnancy, conscription, performance of public duties, etc )
relating to
the debtor, is transferred from the latter to the creditor who, contrary to the
synallagmatic
principle (no work, no pay), is required to pay remuneration for a certain
period.193 It is
interesting to note that the recent financial crisis has brought about a situation
in which
the principle of justice with regard to the person has been affirmed in the context
of other
long-term relationships (other than those of work). For example, one of the most
impor-
tant commitments that Italian credit institutions have taken on in order to have
access
to the Tremonti bond (bank bonds) underwritten by the State to inject liquidity
into the
troubled banking sector, which provide a yield of between 7.5% and 8.5% (and which
are
governed by legislative decree no. 185 of 29 November 2008, converted with
amendments
into Act no.2 of 28 January 2009): the banks are committed to suspending, for at
least
12 months, the mortgage payments of employees who have lost their jobs (see the
memo-
randum of understanding signed by Abi and the Treasury Minister). As can be seen,
there
has been an enlargement of the typical labour-law principle of the transfer of risk
of super-
vening impossibility linked to specific personal events (illness, unemployment)
from the
customer to the bank. The litmus test of private law thinking is the interaction
with human
need.194 The return of homeless soldiers; sickness, accident, family circumstances,
child-
care, matters affecting contractual duties long-recognised in employment law have

not
made much progress in relation to other continuous social obligations, where the
prin-
ciple that you have to have money overshadows everything. For that reason, the
German
Civil Code avoids any echo of financial liability in the context of potential
indeterminate
obligations limited by labour capacity, instead inserting termination for
compelling rea-
sons in the General Part, thereby enabling employers, landlords and lenders to
further
their interests through termination of the contract, without explicit reference to
the social
needs generated for employees, tenants and borrowers.
193 For the German context, cf. Hoyningen-Huene, G. v. (2008) and Canaris, C.-W.
(1997) pp. 81 ff.
194 See Reifner, U. (2000) URL: http://www.money-advice.net/index.php?
id=4&searchid=1&offset=6.
Accessed: 01.02.2013.
54
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of
Contracts
and Obligations
Yet what appears logical within commercial ideology seems illogical when
examined
in the light of the sociology of law, not only in France, Norway or Finland, where
social
force majeure195 has found its legal expression. With the right to pay arrears of
rent until
the first hearing date in the eviction proceedings, the German Civil
Code created the
opportunity in practice for the social welfare office to intervene with a payment
and make
termination of the tenancy for arrears of payment ineffective. Nor do borrowers
face lia-
bility forever when they are in hardship. If they run out of money, consumer
bankruptcy
comes to the rescue under 286 ff InsO. That law provides for release from debts
after 9
years ( 301 InsO), irrespective of the contract, while in France and the USA
immediate
release is possible where borrowers have no assets, and in the Netherlands and
Belgium a
period of 3 to 4 years applies. Contrary to all exchange principles, the hard-
hearted credi-
tor discovers that his claim is worthless, while the debtor lives on, unlike an
insolvent
company. The debt dies, instead of the person of the debtor196 (Nybergh; Derleder I
u. II;
Forray).
1.10.16 Confidentiality
Personal data obtained during a life time contractual relationship and assessments
based
on such data must be treated confidentially and be used only for the
purpose of the
contract.
195 Wilhelmsson, T. (1992) pp. 180 ff.

196 For the Death of Debt Doctrine see Reifner, U. (2003c).
55
----------------------- Page 95-----------------------
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Part I
Life Time in Contract Law
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----------------------- Page 114-----------------------

2 The Evolution of European
Contract Law: A Brand New Code,
a Handy Toolbox or a Jack-in-the-Box?
Luisa Antoniolli
Summary
The chapter analyses the main developments in European contract and private law in
recent
decades, focusing on the interplay between European institutions, the courts and
legal schol-
ars, as well as the relationship between legal, political and economic factors.
The first relevant instrument is the PECL (Principles of European contract
law), drafted
by the Lando Commission in the 1980s and 1990s, which for the first
time attempted to
state in a clear and comprehensive manner the main rules of general
European contract
law, derived from a comparative analysis of national rules. The PECL are a soft law
instru-
ment (principles) that can serve a variety of purposes, including offering a
benchmark for
European and national legislation, a source of persuasive rules for judges,
arbitrators and
contractual parties, and a basis for a future common European code.
The success of the PECL has subsequently inspired a similar initiative in the
form of the
Study Group on a European Civil Code, which has worked since 1998 on drafting soft
law
covering most of private patrimonial law, that is, contracts, tort, benevolent
intervention in
anothers affairs, unjustified enrichment, and certain property law matters, such
as acquisi-
tion and loss of ownership of goods, proprietary security rights in movable assets
over mov-
able property and trusts.
Other academic groups, such as the Common Core of European Private Law, the
Society
on European Contract Law (SECOLA) and the Ius Commune project, have focused on a
cultural perspective, emphasising the need to study through comparison the
differences and
commonalities among national legal systems, before any attempt to draft black-
letter rules.
European Community/Union law focused initially only on specific issues of
contract law,
particularly consumer contract law, and was therefore fragmented in character and
in its
impact on national law. Later it started work on initiatives with a wider scope. In
2001 the
Commission launched a debate on the perspectives of European contract law, which
also en-
visaged the possibility of a comprehensive binding legal instrument. In 2003 it
conceived the
idea of a Common Frame of Reference (CFR) containing common concepts and rules,
whose
drafting was entrusted to a large network of scholars, combining the members of the
Study
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Luisa Antoniolli
Group, the Acquis Group and others. In 2009 the network completed the Draft Common
Frame of Reference (DCFR), a comprehensive instrument of soft law model rules,

definitions
and principles covering most areas of private patrimonial law. The final Common
Frame of
Reference is likely to be selected from this material by the EU institutions, but
the final out-
come of this process remains unclear.
Meanwhile, starting from a feasibility study drafted by an Expert Group of
scholars,
in October 2011 the Commission presented a proposal for a Regulation establishing
an Op-
tional Instrument on European Sales Law, which was inspired by the DCFR but focuses
on a
much narrower topic, and aims at introducing a body of rules that can be freely
adopted by
parties to cross-border contracts, both B2B and B2C.
In the same period, the EU institutions have adopted a comprehensive
directive on con-
sumer rights. Directive 2011/83 originally aimed at establishing fully harmonised
rules in a
number of crucial areas of consumer contract law, but finally reached only
selective maxi-
mum harmonisation in distance and off-premises contracts. A striking feature of
this instru-
ment is the fact that it did not take into account the results contained in the
DCFR, which
should have been a natural reference source.
The chapter concludes by analysing the future perspectives of European
contract law.
While it is extremely difficult to foresee the results, a crucial issue will be
how to balance the
increasing scope of European contract (and more generally private) law with the
require-
ments and characteristics of national laws, which are based not only on technical
but also
on social justice considerations. While EU law has gradually enlarged its scope of
action, it
still remains fundamentally market oriented, and the development of an autonomous
social
model is only embryonic. The multi-level character of European contract law will
therefore
remain, and will require new and adequate mechanisms in order to regulate the
interplay
between EU and national laws.
2.1 Introduction
The building of European private law is among the most important phenomena that Eu-
ropean legal systems have experienced in the last decades.1 The engine
of this process
is gradually increasing its speed through the interplay, intense but far
from coherent,
between many actors: besides the long-established players on the stage of European
le-
2
gal evolution, namely judges, legislators and professors, new ones are emerging,
among
which the technocratic apparatus governing the EU legal process is particularly
relevant.
1 The literature on this subject is increasingly vast. Among it, to

mention but a few, see Brownsword, R./
Niglia, L. et al. (eds.) (2011); Schulze, R./Schulte-Nlke, H. (eds.) (2011);
Twigg-Flesner, C. (2010); Cafaggi,
F./Muir-Wood, H. M. (2010); Bussani, M./Werro, F. (2009).
2 Van Caenegem, R. C. (1987).
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2 The Evolution of European Contract Law: A Brand New Code, a Handy

Toolbox or
a Jack-in-the-Box?
Over the last decades, the increase of EU law-making activity through

regulations and
Directives in the core fields of private law, such as contract and tort law as
well as labour
and company law has promoted an approximation of national legal systems that,
although
far from being complete and systematic, could not have been anticipated at the time
when
the European Communities were established.3 Yet, the making of European private law
suf-
fers from well-known limits that may impair its performance. Not only is EC/EU
legisla-
tion sectoral and fragmented in content and form, and limited by the narrow
institutional
boundaries of the subsidiarity principle and the lack of a general competence for
the approxi-
mations of laws (Art. 5 TEU), but it is also superimposed on and often overlaps
with a
mosaic of national and local legislation related to local social patterns.
Moreover, case law is
also fragmented, since the European Court of Justice is far from being a Supreme
Court of
the European Union. Its intervention is only interstitial in guaranteeing the
application of EU
law, and its activity is consequently inadequate to produce uniformity in all
relevant areas. In
addition to that, legal doctrine in Europe is still largely limited to traditional
municipal law,
and legal education and legal literature are still mainly concerned with national
law.4
These limits have not stopped the progress of Europeanisation of the law and
the aca-
5
demic debate on European private law. The achievements of comparative legal
research
and legal history in the twentieth century have revealed similarities and
diversities among
legal traditions and demonstrated that different legal systems often tend to
provide com-
mon solutions to common problems, despite the multiplicity of cultures, languages,
legis-
6
lation, styles and taxonomies that lawyers use in reaching particular outcomes.
This basic
cultural equipment has been fundamental in handling the many problems arising from
7
European legal integration. Moreover, the integration process has gradually
fostered the
creation of a true and growing European network of scholars and the flourishing of
legal
literature on European law.8
From a structural point of view, lurking behind the debate on the development
of
European private law is a fundamental issue of policy, that is, determining who
should
be in charge of defining the content and the contours of this emerging
common law.
Formally, it is the European Union institutions that have the task of
establishing new
binding rules, a process that is dialectically linked to the definition of the
scope of EU
3 Schulze, R. (2011a); Joerges, C. (2003).

4 Eidenmller, H./Faust, F. et al. (2008), p. 660.
5 For a comparative analysis of the structure of European private law see
Gordley, J. (2007).
6 On the plurality of European legal traditions, each of which has a national
and a common (i.e. European)
dimension, in a mixture of iura propria and ius commune, see Glenn, H. P.
(2005). On the results of com-
parative legal research see Sacco, R. (1991).
7 On the variety of meanings connected to that expression in the context of the
advancement of the European
project, including sociolegal processes, language and culture, see the essays
collected in Petersen, H./Kjr,
A. L. et al. (eds.) (2008).
8 Schulze, R. (2011a).
77
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Luisa Antoniolli
competencies in relation to the Member States, which retain residual competencies

out-
side the areas devolved to the EU. Yet the substance of European private law,
particularly
in the last decade, has been deeply influenced by the academic debate developed by
Eu-
ropean scholars, who in recent times have directly drafted the materials from which
the
EU institutions have derived new legal instruments. This process has contributed to
the
strengthening of a class of scholars that had gradually lost its social prestige
and technical
relevance everywhere in Europe with the beginning of the age of national
codification of
the law. Yet its relationship with the bureaucratic technocracy of the EU legal
process is
complex and far from linear. In this situation, legal doctrine is clearly a very
important
player, but its role in the creation of legal rules is unsettled and sometimes
fuzzy.9
Contract law has been the legal area in which this development has been the
most in-
tense and controversial, owing to the fact that it is central to the development
and working
of the internal market, and at the same time the density of rules and principles in
this field,
as defined by all actors (i.e. legislators, judges and academics), requires intense
analysis
and coordination.
The aim of this chapter is to briefly review the main developments in
European con-
tract law that have taken place in the last two decades and describe the
relationship be-
tween them, showing common trends as well as overlaps and frictions.10 It will
cover, in
particular, the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), the Draft Common Frame
of
Reference (DCFR), the proposal for an Optional Instrument on European Sales Law and
the recently enacted Directive on Consumer Rights. The chapter will conclude by
discuss-
ing some of the critical issues determined by the development of European contract
law
and sketching some possible future scenarios.
2.2 The Role of Legal Doctrine in the Harmonisation of European Private

Law: The Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), the Work of the
Study Group on a European Civil Code and Other Scholarly Enterprises
In the 1980s, scholars from a number of European countries embarked on the study of
national private law within Europe, with the aim of fostering legal harmonisation.
They
gathered initially in research groups formed on the private initiative of
academics, deploy-
ing different working methods and each attempting to give substance to its own idea
of
harmonisation. What they shared, however, was the opinion that harmonisation had to
be
carried out through the creation of a set of European black letter rules.
9 Bussani, M. (2003): On the fate of legal scholarship as a source of law in the

European civil law tradition see
also Bussani, M. (2007).
10 The analysis is developed on the basis of a previous work done with F.
Fiorentini (University of Trieste)
concerning the evaluation of the DCFR: see Antoniolli, L./Fiorentini, F.
(2011).
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Toolbox or
a Jack-in-the-Box?
The first enterprise of this kind was the Lando Commission, set up in 1982
under
the direction of Prof. Ole Lando of the University of Copenhagen to prepare a body
of
rules on general contract law and, partially, the general law of obligations: the
Principles
of European Contract Law (PECL).11 These Principles, being the result of years of
com-
parative research and international cooperation among leading European scholars,

have
achieved a remarkable degree of success as an authoritative reference for the
development
of national legal systems in Europe. In the mind of their authors, the PECL were
deemed to
serve a variety of goals, such as being the initial basis for a European Civil
Code, or a model
law to be referred to by national legislators aiming to modernise their law; they
could also
be used as a model for both future EU legislation and for judges and arbitrators in
the ad-
judication of legal disputes, or as the governing law that could be chosen by the
parties in
private agreements, according to the applicable rules of international private
law.12
Later, the Study Group on a European Civil Code was established in 1998 as
the suc-
cessor to the Lando Commission, under the leadership of Prof. Christian von Bar of
the
University of Osnabrck. The very name of this Group shows that its initial goal
was to
develop the idea, expressed also by the European Parliament, of fostering the
creation of
a European Civil Code. The comprehensiveness of the codification scheme led this
un-
dertaking to enlarge the scope of the research from the general law of obligations
and
contracts to most of private patrimonial law.13 The work (still in progress) of the
Study
Group therefore includes not only specific contracts, but also benevolent
intervention in
anothers affairs, unjustified enrichment, tort law14 and some matters relating to
property
law, such as the transfer of movable property, security rights over movable
property and
trusts.15 The overall aim is to draft a basic set of rules for Europe, composed of
principles
11 Lando, O./Beale, H. (eds.) (2000); Lando, O./Clive, E. et al. (eds.)

(2003). For the story of the Lando
Commission see Lando, O. (2005); Lando, O. (2002).
12 Lando, O./Beale, H. (1995) p. XVII.
13 To date, a First Book on general contract law and a Second Book on Sale
Contracts have been published: see
Accademia de Giusprivatisti Europei. URL:
http://www.accademiagiusprivatistieuropei.it/. See Gandolfi, G.
(2005); Gandolfi, G. (1989) p. 339.
14 In the sector of tort law a specific research group, the European Centre of
Tort and Insurance Law (ECTIL)
was set up in Vienna in 1999 as the institutional basis for the work of the
European Group on Tort Law. Start-
ing from 1992 under the leadership of J. Spier, this group has produced the
Principles of European Tort Law
(PETL) in 2005, which has been translated into 10 languages. See European
Group on Tort Law (ed.) (2005).
The results of the comparative analysis that constituted the basis for the
drafting of the PETL have been pub-
lished by Kluwer Law International (The Hague, London, New York) in the series
European Group on Tort
Law (ed.) (1995-2006). For comparative observations on these Principles see
Koch, B. A. (2005).
15 The results of the research of the Study Group on a European Civil Code are
published by Sellier (Munich) in
the series Principles of European Law (PEL); see sellier european law
publishers GmbH. URL: http://www
.sellier.de/pages/en/home/index.welcome_to_the_sellier_homepage.htm.
Accessed: 01.02.2013. They cover
tort law, sales, leases, services, commercial agency, franchise and
distribution, personal security contracts,
benevolent intervention in anothers affairs, unjustified enrichment law,
mandate contracts, loan contracts,
donations, acquisition and loss of ownership of goods, proprietary security in
movable assets, trust.
79
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Luisa Antoniolli
deriving from comparative research and distillation of the best rules by way of
scholarly
analysis. At the root of the project is the belief that European law can emerge
only as Pro-
fessorenrecht , a belief that is reflected in the method of the Study Groups work
on how to
develop a shared legal culture in Europe.16
The codification idea has also been adopted by another academic

group, the
Acadmie des Privatistes Europens . Since 1992 this Group is working
on a Code
Europen des Contrats, under the coordination of Prof. Giuseppe Gandolfi
of the
University of Pavia. The Acadmie chooses the traditional concept of codification
used
in continental Europe, as a set of specific rules, intended to guide
interpretative activity.
The Code Europen des Contrats takes as a starting point the Italian Civil Code,
but is
sometimes open to solutions from other civil law systems and the common law tradi-
tion. The official language of the text is French, rather than the more usual
choice of
English as a global language.
Besides these major enterprises targeted at legislation, another aspect of
the academic
debate and activity around European private law has grown significantly, focussing
on the
broader cultural aspects of this process. The starting point for many European
scholars
is that there is not yet adequate comparative knowledge of legal systems to form a
suf-
ficiently solid ground for a legislative endeavour, particularly if intended as
codification
in the continental sense. In this vein, the primacy of legal research (at least in
terms of
timing) over legislative drafting should be acknowledged, as the development of a
Euro-
pean legal culture is a prerequisite for a European legislation that aspires to be
uniformly
applied. Without a truly shared common culture, no black letter rule approach
could re-
ally serve the purpose of a convergence of legal systems. Moreover, a significant
number
of scholars consider that not only is a Civil Code not feasible at present, it is
not desirable,
because legal pluralism enriches, rather than limits, European law. This cultural
perspec-
tive is advocated by several leading projects, albeit with different nuances among
the vari-
ous groups. The Common Core of European Private Law17 is a project that was
launched
in Trento in 1995 under the direction of Prof. Bussani (University of Trieste) and
Mattei
16 Bar, C. v. (1999) p. 156; Bar, C. v. (1999).

17 The project was initially based at the University of Trento (Italy), and since
2007 has moved to the University
College of Torino (Italy), where annual general meetings are held.
See The International University Col-
lege of Turin. URL: http://www.common-core.org/. The methodology of
the comparative research, based
on the analysis of legal formats as developed by Rodolfo Sacco and on the
common core method developed
by R. Schlesinger, is described in Bussani, M./Mattei, U. (Fall 1997). See
also Bussani, M./Mattei, U. (eds.)
(2000); Bussani, M./Mattei, U. (eds.) (2002); Bussani, M./Mattei, U. (eds.)
(2007) The results of the research
are published by Cambridge University Press (Zimmermann, R./Whittaker, S. et
al. (eds.) (2000-2010), see
http://www.cambridge.org/it/knowledge/series/series_display/item3936915/?
site_locale=it_IT. Accessed:
14.08.2013, as well as by Staempfli, Berne. They cover a vast number of issues
related to the core fields of
contract, tort and property (a full list of the completed work and the work in
progress can be found on the
website of the project).
80
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Toolbox or a
Jack-in-the-Box?
(University of Torino and Hastings, USA), bringing together nearly two hundred
scholars
from all EU Member States, from Eastern European and Mediterranean countries, and
from the US and Canada. It seeks to unearth the common core of European private
law,
that is, what is already common among the different legal systems of Europe,
subdividing
the research into the general categories of contract, tort and property.
The Society on European Contract Law (SECOLA)18 was founded in 2001 by Prof.
Bianca (University of Rome), Collins (London School of Economics) and Grundmann

(Humboldt University of Berlin) to foster research and academic debate in the area
of
contract law; for this purpose it has also set up a journal, the European Review of
Contract
Law.
The Social Justice Group19 is a looser group of European scholars, whose work
is of-
ten connected to some of the European comparative law projects. They advocate a
more
socially oriented development of European law.
Finally, the Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe,20 whose
proj-
ect leader is Prof. van Gerven (University of Leuven), assembles a network of

scholars
working on a series of textbooks devoted to specific areas of European
law, which are
intended to be used in University teaching and as reference materials, thus
fostering the
development of a common European legal culture.
2.3 The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)
At the same time as the developments in legal doctrine were emerging,

the European
Community institutions also started from the end of the 1980s to express an
interest in
the harmonisation of private law as a means to achieve a single market among Member
States. The institutional inputs into the process have been very influential in the
evolu-
tion of European private law to its present stage and deserve special attention.
Initially,
at the end of the 1980s, the driving force was the European Parliament, which voted
a
number of Resolutions (which are politically, not legally, binding) advocating the
start
18 Information on SECOLA is available at Society of European Contract Law (SECOLA)

e. V. URL: http://www.
secola.org/about.htm. SECOLA has also set up a journal, The European Review of
Contract Law, which is
an important forum of academic debate on European contract law. See Grundmann,
S. (2001); Grundmann,
S./Kerber, W. (2006).
19 See Brggemeier, G./Bussani, M. et al. (2004). Among the numerous contributions
see Hesselink, M. W.
(2007); Lurger, B. (2007); Mattei, U./Nicola, F. (2006).
20 See Van Gerven, W. (1996) and the web site of the project Van
Gerven, W. (2012). URL: http://www.
casebooks.eu/welcome/. The volumes published cover contract law, tort
law, unjustified enrichment,
non- discrimination law, consumer law. Future volumes will relate to
civil procedure, conflict of laws,
constitutional law, horizontal effects of EU law, judicial review of
administrative action, labour law, law and
art, legal history, property law.
81
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Luisa Antoniolli
of a process that could lead to a codification of European private law.21 The

Commission
first joined with Parliament initiatives in the 2001 Communication on European

Contract
Law,22 a document that initiated wide consultation among EU institutions and
stakehold-
ers (enterprises, consumer organisations, legal professions, scholars) on the

obstacles to
the single market in the form of divergences in contract law regimes in the Member
States,
and the way to overcome them. The Commission aimed at gathering information on the
need to go beyond the traditional selective approach of EC legislation
through Direc-
tives on specific contracts or marketing techniques. The Communication suggested a
list
of possible solutions: (i) leaving the market free to regulate divergences in
cross-border
contract law; (ii) promoting the elaboration of non-binding principles; (iii)
reviewing and
improving existing EC legislation; (iv) adopting a new European instrument
(Directive,
regulation or recommendation) covering general contract law and specific contracts
that
could replace or coexist with national laws.
The results of this consultation led to the adoption of the 2003
Action Plan on
European Contract Law by the EU Commission.23 It confirmed the outcome of the con-
sultation process launched by the 2001 Communication, that is, that there is no
need to
abandon the use of Directives, but there is a need for a uniform application of EC
contract
law to guarantee the smooth functioning of the internal market. With this aim, a
review
of the existing European contract law acquis should identify and remedy
inconsistencies,
increase the quality of drafting, simplify and clarify existing
provisions, adapt existing
legislation to economic and commercial developments that were not foreseen at the
time
of adoption and fill gaps in EC legislation that have led to problems in its
application. The
Action Plan suggested increasing the coherence of EC acquis in the field of
contract law
and promoting the elaboration of EU-wide general contract terms. The question
whether
a non-sector-specific instrument (also called Optional Instrument) had to
be elabo-
rated was considered as deserving further examination. In this document the project
of
a Common Frame of Reference (CFR) was first announced. The Commission expressed
the intention to develop the acquis communautaire through this tool,
which was to be
elaborated by European scholars in cooperation with stakeholders (European consumer
21 Starting in 1989, the European Parliament has adopted a series of Resolutions

expressing the need to begin
to explore the feasibility of a European Civil Code as a politically charged
and sensitive issue, and to react
to the steps undertaken by the Commission. The justification for this choice
has been the need for more
harmonisation to foster a working and integrated common market. Harmonisation
supported by the EU
Parliament has always been a wide-ranging idea, covering not only contract law,
but also matters related
to tort, restitution and property. See European Parliament (1989); European
Parliament (1994); European
Parliament (2002); Commission of the European Communities, COM(2003) 284 final
(12.02.2003); Com-
mission of the European Communities, COM(2003) 284 final (12.02.2003); European
Parliament (2006);
European Parliament (2008a); European Parliament (2009).
22 Commission of the European Communities, COM(2001) 398 final (11.07.2001).
82
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Toolbox
or a Jack-in-the-Box?
associations, businesses, practitioners, etc.). The CFR had to provide for best
solutions in
terms of common terminology and rules, establishing coherent core definitions of
legal
concepts and rules. The second objective of the Common Frame of Reference was to
build
a starting point for an Optional Instrument in the area of European contract law.
In 2004 the Commission published a Communication on European Contract Law
and the revision of the acquis: the way forward,24 in which it decided to finance
research
activities for the elaboration of the Common Frame of Reference within the Sixth
Frame-
work Programme for Research and Technological Development. Under that call, the
Joint
Network on European Private Law - Network of Excellence (CoPECL)25 started work in
2005, the widest research network ever created in Europe. This group was led by
Prof.
Schulte-Noelke of the University of Bielefeld and brought together two of the most
pres-
tigious academic research groups in Europe, the Study Group on a European Civil
Code
and the Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (Acquis Group),26 together
with
the Project Group on a Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law27
and some
other supporting groups.28

25 See Common Principles of European Contract Law (CoPECL) (23.01.2012). URL:
http://www.copecl.org/.
26 This group was set up under the sponsorship of the EU Commission
and is directed by Prof. G. Ajani
(University of Turin) and H. Schulte-Noelke (University of Bielefeld). See
European Research Group on
Existing EC Private Law (Acquis Group) (2011). URL: http://www.acquis-
group.org/. Unlike the other aca-
demic groups, this team has focussed on existing EC law, in order to produce
the Principles of Existing EC
Contract Law (Acquis Principles), i.e. principles aiming to systematise EC
contract law and help national
legislators in the implementation of EC law. The volumes of the Acquis
Principles have been published by
Sellier: Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (Acquis Group) (ed.)
(2007); Research Group on the
Existing EC Private Law (Acquis Group) (ed.) (2009).
27 Since 2004, the Group has been directed by Prof. Helmut Heiss. It focusses on
general standard terms in in-
surance contracts of the European countries, especially on mandatory rules
that are regarded as an obstacle
to a single market in the insurance sector. The Group has recently published a
set of minimal rules that could
uniformly govern insurance contracts in Europe: Basedow, J. (ed.) (2009).
28 In the network, Supportive Groups are added to these Drafting Groups, with
the aim of completing the leg-
islative activities with critical assessments. These evaluation groups are:
1. the Association Henri Capitant,
together with the Socit de Lgislation Compare. This group published its
results in early 2008: Fauvarque-
Cosson, B./Mazeaud, D. (2008); Fauvarque-Cosson, B./Mazeaud, D. (eds.) (2008).
These studies have also
been published in English: Fauvarque-Cosson, B./Mazeaud, D. et al. (2008). 2.
The Academy of European
Law ERA; within the network, ERA has the task of organising conferences on
the topics covered by the
CFR in order to encourage a debate and promote the spreading of knowledge on
these issues; see Academy
of European Law (ERA). URL: www.era.int. 3. The Economic Impact Group, set up
by the Research Group
on the Economic Assessment of Contract Law Rules (TILEC - Tilburg Law and
Economics Center), in order
to assess the economic impact of the DCFR; see Tilburg University. URL:
http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/
research/institutes-and-research-groups/tilec/. See Chirico, F./Larouche, P.
(2010) and De Geest, G./Kovac,
M. (2009). 4. The Common Core project on European private law, with the task
to carry out a case-based
assessment, focuses on the applicability and practicability of the DCFR rules.
For a synthesis of the common
core working method see The International University College of Turin. URL:
http://www.common-core
.org/. The results of the DCFR assessment can be found in Antoniolli,
L./Fiorentini, F. (eds.) (2011); see also
Antoniolli, L./Fiorentini, F. et al. (2010).
83
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Luisa Antoniolli
The task of the Network was to deliver to the EU Commission the

Common
Principles of European Contract Law (CoPECL) to constitute the possible
basis for a
future Common Frame of Reference of European Community law, as firstly required
by
the EU Commission in the 2003 Action Plan.
A first Draft of these Principles was delivered to the EU Commission in
December
2007 and made public in February 2008; a second enlarged and reviewed edition
followed
and was published by Sellier in February 2009; the final full edition with comments
and
comparative notes was published in October 2009.29 The drafters of these principles
called
it the Academic Draft (i.e. not final) Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), to
distinguish
the results from what was termed the political (and final) Common Frame of
Reference
(CFR), that is, the tool whatever its form, scope and purpose that the EU
institutions
would be willing to adopt in the future, as a consequence of a political decision.
In accordance with the scheme set out in the Commissions Communication of
2004,
The Way Forward, the DCFR contains principles, definitions and model
rules. The
meaning of these words has not been made clear by the Commission and
is therefore
subject to a variety of interpretations.
The drafters of the DCFR intend principles as a synonym of rules that do
not have
a binding character.30 The word principles, however, can also mean rules of a
general na-
ture, with which all Member States are more or less familiar, such as freedom of
contract
or good faith. Moreover, a third meaning of principles has also been employed by
the
DCFR, that is, the meaning that the EU Commission has sometimes used in connection
with the adjective fundamental. Fundamental principles reflect abstract

basic values
that underlie the rules, whether they are expressly stated or referred to, or not.
These basic
values were included in Outline Edition II of the DCFR and in the final Full
Edition, as
a consequence of the suggestions coming from the Principes directeurs du droit
europen
du contrat elaborated by the Supportive Group composed of the Association Henri
Capi-
tant and the Societ de lgislation compare31 They were grouped under the headings
of
freedom, security, justice and efficiency.32 In addition, the DCFR recognises
overriding
29 Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et al. (2009): The Drafts are available at sellier

european law publishers GmbH. URL:
http://www.sellier.de/pages/en/home/index.welcome_to_the_sellier_homepage.htm,
see Sagaert, V. (2012);
Micklitz, H.-W./Cafaggi, F. (2010); Schulze, R./Schulte-Nlke, H. (eds.)
(2011).
30 Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et al. (2009), p. 4. This is also the meaning adopted by
the Lando Commission, as made clear
in Art. 1:101 of PECL, as well as by the UNIDROIT Instituto Internacional para
la Unificacin del Derecho
Privado (2004) URL:
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm. Accessed:
14.08.2013.
All these instruments have been modelled on the idea first developed (starting
in the 1930s) in the American
Restatements on the law: for a comparison between Europe and the US see
Schulte-Nlke, H. (2011).
31 The suggestions from this Group have not resulted in full acceptance of what
was elaborated in the Principles
directeurs, but have led to a consultation among the Drafting Groups, from
which a different conception of
those fundamental principles underlying the Model Rules has emerged.
32 Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et al. (2009), pp. 8, 37 ff.
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Toolbox or a
Jack-in-the-Box?
principles, that is, principles of high political relevance, such as protection of

human
rights, promotion of solidarity and social responsibility, preservation of cultural
and
linguistic diversity, protection and promotion of welfare and promotion of the
internal
market.33 Although the addition of this catalogue of general and
fundamental prin-
ciples clearly inserts a further important element into the application of the
rules of the
DCFR, it does not clearly spell out the policy options.34 The drafters themselves
stress
that the two categories may overlap, since the underlying principles may also play
a
role as overriding principles.35 The possibility of conflict between the two
categories
of principles, as well as between principles within the same category,

are envisaged
by the drafters, but the DCFR leaves the complex task of balancing those principles
and values to the judges of the European countries. This is a problematic issue,
given
the differences existing among the European legal systems in terms of legal
cultures
and the routines employed by lawyers, which implies a threat to legal certainty and
is
likely to lead to new differences in European private law. But without an explicit
and
reasoned political choice at the European level, which at the moment is clearly
miss-
ing, it is impossible to make a balanced decision on the selection of principles,
their
ranking and relations.
Definitions also play a crucial role in the context of the DCFR. They serve
the pur-
pose of building a common European terminology that will be essential for the sake
of a
uniform interpretation of the model rules. The definitions have been distilled in
part from
existing EC law, in part from the model rules themselves. This explains why the
model
rules cannot work without the definitions and vice versa.36
Finally, model rules are black letter rules that are not meant to have the
force of law,
but are rather soft law, in the same vein as the Lando Principles,37 and in this
sense they
overlap with one of the meanings of principles.

The coverage of the DCFR is directly linked to the sources it draws from.
Since the
CoPECL Network builds on the work of the Lando Commission and its successor, that
is, the Study Group, the DCFR incorporates the PECL with some changes, as well as
the
results of the books of the PEL series. The work of the Acquis Group is added to
these ele-
ments. The DCFR structures all these materials in 10 Books.
Book I is intended by the authors as a general guide for the reader that
deals with
the field of application of the text, the rules on its interpretation and
development, some
fundamental definitions and the rules on computation of time.38
33 Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et al. (2009), p. 8.

34 For a critical discussion of the principles and values embodied in the DCFR see
Hesselink, M. W. (2011).
35 Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et al. (2009), pp. 8 ff.
85
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Luisa Antoniolli
Books II and III have been the subject of considerable debate. They were
deemed to
incorporate the Lando Principles, covering general rules on contract and other
juridical
acts, as well as general rules on contractual and non-contractual obligations. The
draft-
ers have chosen to divide these materials into two parts: Book II, devoted to
contracts
and other juridical acts (formation, interpretation, cases of invalidity,
determination of
content, etc.) and Book III, dealing with contractual and non-contractual
obligations and
the rights and duties arising from them. The very title of these Books makes clear
how the
concepts of contract and obligation have been intended by the drafters: while
contract
is a type of juridical act (the most important one), obligation is what arises
from a legal
relationship, which can result from a contract. Moreover, as far as possible, Book
III treats
contractual and non-contractual obligations uniformly; when a rule applies only to
the
former, this is explicitly spelt out.39
Book IV contains the rules on specific contracts and the rights and
obligations aris-
ing from them. It is divided into Parts, each devoted to a contractual type (Part
A, Sales;
Part B, Lease of goods; Part C, Services; Part D, Mandate contracts; Part E,
Commercial
agency, franchise and distributorship; Part F, Loan contracts; Part G, Personal
Security;
Part H, Donation). If the logic underlying the distinction between contract and
obliga-
tion is more or less shared by both common law and civil law traditions, the
structure
and content of Book IV cannot always claim to represent the common core of
European
law. Sometimes the text shows a stronger influence by some national laws or
traditions of
the Member States (for example, English law does not classify the lease of goods as
a con-
tract). In other cases, the approach chosen is new compared with that of national
laws. For
instance, the systematisation effort of the DCFR treats as typical contracts
relationships
that, under many domestic laws, are not regulated by the codes and other statutes,
particu-
larly in the part on services, where specific rules are set out for processing,
storage, design,
information and advice, medical treatment.40 Also, the structure and terminology of
the
Part dealing with personal security is relatively new in comparison with the
traditional
European civil codes.41 The novelty (or oddity) of many solutions probably depends
on
the fact that, for special contracts, the path of harmonisation has been much less
trodden
than for general contract law. Of course, the major exception to this is
represented by sales
contracts. Here, well-established scholarship42 has prepared some of the most
successful
39 Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et al. (2009), pp. 13-14.

40 For critical remarks see Eidenmller, H./Faust, F. et al. (2008), pp. 662 ff. A
severe criticism is also expressed
by Unberath, H. (2008) p. 764; a more positive view can be found in Wendehorst,
C. (2006).
41 The subject is subdivided into dependent and independent security
contracts, abandoning the traditional
terminology shared by most Member States of accessory and non-accessory
security.
42 Going back at least to Rabel, E. (1936-1957). See Huber, P. (2006).
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Toolbox or
a Jack-in-the-Box?
examples of legal harmonisation, such as the United Nations Convention on

International
Sale of Goods of 1980 and the Consumer Sales Guarantees Directive (1999/44/EC). Not
surprisingly, Part A of Book IV is largely based on these models. Nevertheless, the

DCFR
sale regime departs from them to some notable extent, for example when it extends
some
consumer protection rules to business-to-business contracts, such as the good
faith and
fair dealing test of Art. III. 3:105 (2).43
Non-contractual obligations are dealt with in the following three books. Book
V reg-
ulates benevolent intervention in anothers affairs; Book VI is devoted to non-
contractual
liability arising from damage caused to another, and Book VII disciplines
unjustified en-
richment. From a general point of view, the domain of non-contractual obligations
is even
more dependent on the specificities of national laws than is contractual
obligations. This
is especially true of benevolent intervention in anothers affairs and unjustified
enrich-
ment, for which comprehensive comparative work is still lacking.44 The scholarly
debate
on (European) tort law is much more long-standing and mature.45 Yet the strong
differ-
ences among legal systems as to the form and general structure of tort law (e.g.
general
clauses, as opposed to specific torts; relevance of unlawfulness; differences in
the notion
of fault in the legal systems), as well as the treatment of some fundamental
issues, such as,
for instance, strict liability and pure economic loss,46 have made the
harmonisation efforts
of the DCFR more difficult. The drafters have carved out models for European rules
whose
suitability for playing a common role in all Member States is highly
questionable.47
To books I to VII, which were already included in Outline Edition

I, others have
been added in Outline Edition II: Book VIII on Acquisition and loss of
ownership of
goods; Book IX on Proprietary security in movable assets, whose most important
feature
43 European harmonisation in the field of (consumer) sales law might be undermined

by the recent adoption
of the Consumer Rights Directive, which does not take over, nor make reference
to, the rules of the DCFR,
on which see infra par. 5. See Zimmermann, R. (2009), p. 502; Hesselink, M. W.
(2009); Hall, E./Howells, G.
et al. (2012).
44 Zimmermann, R. (ed.) (2005); Jansen, N. (2007).
45 See, in chronological order, Van Gerven, W. (1998); Van Gerven,
W./Lever, J. et al. (2000); Bar, C. v.
(1998-2000); Magnus, U./Spier, J. (eds.) (2000); Zimmermann, R. (ed.)
(2003); van Dam, C. (2006);
Bussani, M. (ed.) (2007); Infantino, M. (2010) URL:
http://works.bepress.com/marta_infantino/8.
Accessed: 14.08.2013.
46 Werro, F./Palmer, V. V. (eds.) (2003); Bussani, M./Palmer, V. V. (eds.) (2003);
Palmer, V. V./Bussani, M. (eds.)
(2009).
47 For details on the merits and defects of the DCFR regimes in these
fields see Zimmermann, R. (2009),
pp. 499-500; Jansen, N. (2007), p. 960. Criticism of the opportunity to
codify unjustified enrichment law
can be found in the paper by Smits, J./Mak, V. (2011). Doubts on the need for
European harmonisation in
these areas as a means to foster the internal market are expressed by
Zimmermann, R. (2009), p. 499 and
Basedow, J. (2008).
87
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Luisa Antoniolli
is probably the European registration system, set up to guarantee the

effectiveness of
security rights as against third parties 48; and finally Book X on Trusts.
Comments and comparative national notes, which accompany the black letter
rules
in the books in the PEL series, have been omitted in the first two Outline
Editions. This
was due to the choice of simplification and accessibility of the draft model rules
for Eu-
ropean readers, who were called on to contribute to the debate in the ongoing
process of
elaboration of the rules.49
The acquis communautaire has been partly incorporated into these ten books.
In par-
ticular, the results of the work of the Acquis Group, published in a separate
series,50 have
been taken into account as a source of existing EC law. According to the DCFR,
Within
the process of elaborating the DCFR, the Acquis Group and its output contribute to
the
tasks of ensuring that the existing EC law is appropriately reflected. The ACQP are
conse-
51
quently one of the sources from which the Compilation and Redaction Team has
drawn.
Yet the method and scope of the merger between the results of the Study Group on
European
Private Law and those of the Acquis Group concerning the EC acquis on contract law
have
not been defined ex ante, but rather have been left to a subsequent unilateral
decision of
the Compilation and Redaction Team.52 The methods employed by the two working
groups
48 The Book envisages a general regime for non-possessory security rights for
Europe that is extremely mod-
ern and challenging and is another illustration of an academic approach by the
drafters producing new
theoretical categories and rules for Europe, which has prevailed over a
detailed distillation of a true com-
mon core of European legal solutions. In the DCFR the novelty of the regime
elaborated for Proprietary
Security is very clear and the drafters have gone far beyond the present state
of European law in this field.
Along the lines of the models of North-American Art. 9 U.C.C. and the United
Nations Commission on
International Trade Law: UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions:
E.09.V.12 (2007/2010),
without merely copying them, they have created a functional system, which
subjects all legal devices that
fulfil the purpose of security to the same legal regime. Traditional pledges
are included in a single notion
of security right, together with transfers of ownership or trusts for
security purposes, security assignments
of claims, sale and lease-back and sale and resale agreements (Art. IX.
1:102). Furthermore, a new notion
of retention of ownership devices has been created (Art. IX. 1:103), to
which the general regime of the
rules is only partially applicable (Art. IX. 1:104). For a first assessment
of Book IX see Macdonald, R. A.
(2009).
49 These omissions have sometimes been an obstacle to the full
understanding and appropriate evaluation
of the rules, for both academics and other citizens and stakeholders, with
regard to the first phase of their
publication. See Whittaker, S. (2008).
50 Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (Acquis Group) (ed.) (2007);
Research Group on the Exist-
ing EC Private Law (Acquis Group) (ed.) (2009): Further volumes are in
preparation. See also Schulze, R.
(2005).
51 Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et al. (2009), pp. 18-19.
52 The ties between the two groups were also of a personal nature. For instance,
Prof. Hans Schulte-Noelke of
the University of Osnabrueck (Germany) was both co-ordinator of the Network of
Excellence on European
Private Law (CoPECL), co-ordinator of the Acquis Group and member of the
Compilation and Redaction
Team of the network.
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Toolbox or a Jack-in-the-Box?
have been independent and significantly different.53 Both relied on the tools of
comparative
law, but their approach diverged in fundamental respects. While the Acquis Group
was aim-
ing at restating existing EC law without changing it (even though it admittedly
generalised
some partial results), the Study Group was striving not only for shared solutions
among
European legal systems, but also for best solutions, implying the possibility of
drafting rules
that do not correspond to any existing national system.54 Clearly, this is a major
difference
in the drafting approach, yet little systematic attention was given to the way in
which these
two different bodies of law had to be connected from the beginning and finally
merged, and
consequently suitable specific mechanisms were not created.55 This fundamental
difference
is also mirrored in the scope of the work of the two groups: the Study Group
emphasised the
need to cover not only contractual but also non-contractual obligations and some
matters of
movable property56; on the contrary, the Acquis Group stuck to the idea that only
contract
law is a suitable area for further harmonisation within the European Union.57
In spite of the difficulty in linking the two bodies, the influence of the
acquis commu-
nautaire is important and can be detected in several parts of the DCFR. Book II
contains
rules on non-discrimination, information duties, unsolicited goods or services,
right of
withdrawal; the rules on consumer goods guarantees and consumer protection in the
Part
53 See Ajani, G./Ferreri, S. et al. (2009), according to whom il lavoro del

Gruppo Acquis ha una propria au-
tonomia e un proprio obiettivo, che non si confonde con quello di altri
gruppi. (. . .) Lautonomia (. . .) non
incrinata dal fatto che il quadro comune di riferimento accademico preparato
dallo Study Group abbia
attinto da essi (. . .). As a consequence stato ben chiaro a tutti i
partecipanti al Gruppo Acquis che il lavoro
dedicato allelaborazione dei Principi Acquis non implicava affatto ladesione
al disegno pi ampio coltivato
dallo Study Group, proprio perch i due progetti avevano natura e scopi
diversi (p. 274).
54 See Schulze, R. (2011a), pp. 5-8. See also Schulze, R. (2008), pp. 4, 9-10,
according to whom there are two
methodological weaknesses in terms of the overall structure: only particular
parts of the DCFR are based
upon the link between comparative law and Community law, whilst in the
majority of parts the reference
to Community law is missing. The structure of the draft (for example the
central role of the General Law of
Obligations) is largely neither derived from existing Community law nor from a
convincing basis in compara-
tive law (p. 10). In fact, this is related to a wider problem, namely
defining the scope of the DCFR and CFR
respectively: Whilst the Common Frame of Reference should serve a coherent
European contract law follow-
ing the European Commissions Action Plan (. . .), the academic DCFR thus goes
far beyond this objective and
subject matter. (. . .) With this expansion the DCFR stretches across areas
for which the principles of the acquis
communautaire still have to be researched in more detail, and moreover more
extensively in matters for which
no acquis communautaire exists (and in part where there is no recognisable
interest in rules on the part of the
European Community). This leads to a methodological break within the draft
(. . .) (p. 11).
55 For a specific example of the difficulty of matching the rules of the DCFR
with those of the Acquis Principles
owing to the different method of selection (best solution v. restatement) in
the area of pre-contractual duties
see Twigg-Flesner, C. (2008), particularly pp. 125-126.
56 Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et al. (2009), pp. 10-12. The underlying
fundamental idea is that it is for the EU
institutions to define the desired scope of the political CFR, either
contract law or a broader area, on
the basis of the wider DCFR: Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et al. (2009), pp. 3-4, 19-
23. See also Schulte-Nlke, H.
(2008), who describes the DCFR as a menu offering choice, from which
politicians can and should
cherry-pick (p. 54).
57 Schulze, R. (2008), pp. 17 f, 22 f.
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Luisa Antoniolli
on Sale Contracts; a specific chapter on consumer protection in the Part on

Personal Se-
curity, containing rules sometimes going even beyond the ones existing in the
acquis or in
the Member States (e.g. IV.G. 4:107, Limiting security with time limit).58
The subject matters that are excluded from the DCFR are listed in Book I.
1:101(2).
These are the status and legal capacity of natural persons, wills and
succession, family
relationships, negotiable instruments, employment relationships, immovable
property,
company law, the law of civil procedure and enforcement of claims.59
The academic DCFR has a much broader coverage than the political CFR that
could
finally be envisaged by the EU Commission. This is because the drafters have built
a text
deemed to be an independent body of law. From the structure they have
given to the
materials, the result looks much more like a continental Civil Code, rather than an
ac-
cessible tool-box.60 In particular, it seems that the model is borrowed from the
German
way of thinking and of organising private law rules in a code.61 The insertion of
contract
and contractual obligations in an hierarchical system of concepts, moving from the

more
general juridical act to the more specific contract and the obligations
arising from it, is
closer to the analytical structure of the German BGB than to other civil law
systems and
the common law approach to the topic.62
According to the intention of the drafters, the EU institutions should be

able to choose
from the text of the DCFR the parts to be included in the more focussed political
CFR.63
Yet, given the logical connection between all topics regulated in this highly
systematic
work, this cherry-picking is not an easy task,64 as subsequent developments have
shown.
2.4 The Optional Instrument on European Sales Law
Following completion of the Draft Common Frame of Reference in December

2009,
the Commission decided to take a further step by appointing in April
2010 an Expert
Group with the task of drafting a Feasibility Study concerning a future European
contract
58 Also the Acquis Principles do not merely restate existing EC contract

law, and in a number of cases go
beyond it: see Jansen, N./Zimmermann, R. (2008).
59 The text of the DCFR does not include the results of the Project Group on the
Restatement of European In-
surance Contract Law (Insurance Group), which is also part of the CoPECL
Network. This working group has
delivered to the Commission the final version of its Principles separately
in 2009, and has published them as
Basedow, J. (ed.) (2009).
60 On the idea of a European Civil code see Hartkamp, A. S./Hesselink, M. W. et
al. (eds.) (2011); Collins, H. (2008).
61 Common lawyers, indeed, are not familiar with the concept of juridical act,
whose inclusion in the archi-
tecture of a European restatement of contract law is not felt as
indispensable across the Channel. Strong
criticism of the structure, especially of Book II and Book III of the DCFR, is
expressed by Schulze, R./Wil-
helmsson, T. (2008) and in Grundmann, S. (2008).
62 Whittaker, S. (2008), pp. 78 ff.
63 Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et al. (2009), pp. 11, 23.
64 Whittaker, S. (2008), p. 83.
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Toolbox or a
Jack-in-the-Box?
law instrument.65 This was a much smaller group66 than the one that drafted the
DCFR,
comprising 17 experts, mainly scholars but also some practitioners, who had a very
tight
schedule of 1 year for selecting the parts of DCFR that were of direct relevance to
contract
law and simplifying, restructuring, updating and supplementing its content. The
Group
was also required to take into consideration the U.N. Convention on the
International
Sales Of Goods (CISG) of 1980, the Unidroit Principles, the PECL and the Principes
Con-
tractuels Communs of the Association Capitant and the Socit de Legislation
Compare.
In its mandate, the Commission asked the Expert Group to work without making
clear what the final form of the instrument would be, that is, whether it would be
a tool-
box (i.e. guidelines to be employed by the European institutions), a
Recommendation, an
Optional Instrument to be introduced into national law through a Regulation, or a
Direc-
tive on contract law replacing national laws. In fact, the members informally knew
that
the most likely outcome was an Optional Instrument, yet the vagueness of the
mandate is
a very important structural element: the Commission wanted to keep as much room for
manoeuvre as possible, and thereby gave a hard time to the drafters, since the
content of a
legal instrument cannot be kept fully separate from its form, particularly because
the vari-
ous options implied very different models of interaction with national laws.
During the work of the Expert Group, in July 2010, the Commission
decided to
launch a consultation on this topic, publishing a Green Paper on policy options
for prog-
ress towards a European contract law for consumers and businesses,67 in which it
asked
stakeholders to evaluate several options: (i) publication of the Expert Group

Report; (ii)
adoption of a toolbox; (iii) publication of Commission Recommendation on European
contract law; (iv) enactment of an Optional Instrument on European contract law;
(v)
enactment of a Directive on a mandatory Common European Sales Law (with a mini-
mum or maximum harmonisation standard); (vi) enactment of a Regulation establishing
a European contract law replacing national laws; (vii) enactment of a Regulation
establish-
ing a European Civil Code. The consultation closed in January 2011, receiving over
300
replies.68
65 European Parliament (2010a).

66 See European Commission (2010). URL:
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/expert-group_en.pdf.
67 European Commission, COM(2010) 348 final (01.07.2010) At the same time, the
Commission also estab-
lished a Sounding Board composed of stakeholder experts, representing
different categories, with the task
of providing advice and input to the Expert Group.
68 It is interesting to note that the results of the consultation (which received
320 responses) showed wide
support for the option of a toolbox, but diverging positions
concerning an Optional Instrument. More-
over, of the respondents favoring an Optional Instrument, a majority considered
that it should only cover
B2C contracts. See Expert Group on a Common Frame of Reference:
Expert Group Feasibility Study:
A European Contract Law for consumers and businesses (April 2011) p.
3; the replies can be found at
European Commission (01.07.2010-31.01.2011). URL:
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/contract/
opinion/100701_en.htm.
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Luisa Antoniolli
According to the mandate of the Commission to the Expert Group, the structure
of
the instrument should be free-standing, that is, a comprehensive text that would
contain
a full range of rules concerning the topic of sales (rather than all contracts, as
we will see
later), and be user-friendly and clear in form, with simple language and
explanatory head-
ings. Yet, it must be remembered that the instrument does not cover all contractual
issues
(for example, issues concerning legal capacity, representation, illegality, etc.),
and all these
aspects are left to the national law that governs the contract according to the
applicable
rules of private international law, which is harmonised at the EU level by the so-
called
Rome I Regulation of 2007 on the law applicable to contractual obligations.69 The
guiding
principle of the Rome I Regulation is that the law can be freely chosen by the
parties
(Art. 3(1))70 but, as we will see later, there are some kinds of mandatory rules
that cannot
be evaded by the parties choice of law.

As for scope, several significant features can be highlighted. From the point
of view
of personal scope, the Commission considered from the beginning that the contract
law instrument should cover both business-to-business (B2B) contracts and business-
to-consumer (B2C) contracts, and inserted this requirement in the Expert

Groups
mandate.71 Yet, in spite of the unification of the two kinds of contracts, the
standards
are different: in B2C contracts the need to guarantee a high level of consumer
protec-
tion implies that many rules should have a mandatory character; on the other hand,
B2B contracts are inspired by freedom of contract, and therefore default rules
prevail.
Moreover, in this case there is an important difference between the
Expert Groups
Feasibility Study and the following Commission proposal for an Optional Instrument:
in the former the personal scope of application covers all contracts, B2C and
B2B,72
whereas the proposal limits the application of the Optional Instrument to B2B con-
tracts only where at least one party is a small or medium-sized enterprise (Art.
7).73
With regard to the scope of the material, despite the fact that the
Commission re-
ferred to an instrument covering contract law, the mandate to the Expert Group only
cov-
ered sales contracts and service contracts associated with sales, that is, a very
specific area
69 European Parliament (2008b) The regulation only allows for the choice of a
State law, not of soft law instru-
ments, which can nevertheless be incorporated as terms of the contract: see
Recitals 13-14 Reg. 593/2008.
70 If the parties do not chose any law, the Regulation provides for alternative
criteria, such as the habitual resi-
dence of one of the parties or the country where immovable property is located
(Art. 4).
71 The choice of regulating both consumer and business contracts is criticised by
Brownsword, according to
whom consumer contract rules are a form of public ordering, whereas business
contract rules aim at struc-
turing private self-regulation, and consequently an Optional Instrument can
work only in the latter field.
Brownsword, R. (2011).
72 Expert Group on a Common Frame of Reference (2011).
73 The restriction for B2B contracts to those in which one party is a small-medium
enterprise has also been
criticised by the European Law Institute, because it is too complex and reduces
the usefulness of the instru-
ment. See European Law Institute, COM(2011) 635 final (11.10.2011).
92
----------------------- Page 132-----------------------

Toolbox
of general contract law, albeit a very important one.74 This issue is now made
clear in the pro-
posed Regulation, which refers in its title to a Common European Sales Law.75
This implicit
sliding from general contract law to sales law is remarkable, and deserves critical
scrutiny.
The Feasibility Study published by the Expert Group strongly emphasises the
need
for a common European contract law in view of the obstacles to the internal market
stem-
ming from differences in national contract laws, which limit cross-border trade,
particu-
larly for small businesses and consumers, an element that has often been claimed by
the
Commission as the main ground for legislative action in this field.
The Feasibility Study was subject to further consultation, which ended in
July 2011,
concerning several aspects of the proposal, in terms of both general structure and
specific
aspects. After this second round of consultation, the Commission decided
to act, and
in October 2011 it published a proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales
Law.76 The explanatory memorandum to the proposal emphasises that its aim is to
elimi-
nate obstacles to cross-border trade that derive from the differences among
national con-
tract laws of the Member States, by providing a single legal regime that reduces
transaction
costs for both businesses, particularly small and medium enterprises,77 and
consumers.78
The memorandum even offers an estimate of the costs of this situation: The value
of the
trade foregone each year between the Member States due to the differences in
contract law
alone amounts to tens of billions of Euros.79 The positive effects of the
instrument and its
74 The need to have a focus on specific contracts is underlined by Schulte-Nlke,

H. (2011), who proposes to
apply the European regime, especially in the area of e-commerce contracts,
where it can have significant
beneficial effects. See Schulte-Nlke, H. (2007).
75 In the explanatory memorandum to the proposal, the Commission states that The
Green Paper responses
also expressed preferences for the material scope of the instrument. As a
result, the proposal focusses on con-
tracts for the sale of goods (p. 7). Yet already the mandate to the Expert
Group referred to sales contracts and
associated service contracts, so the choice seems really to have been made by
the Commission, and merely
confirmed by stakeholders.
76 European Law Institute, COM(2011) 635 final (11.10.2011); the text of the
Optional Instrument is contained
in Annex I. The proposal is based on an Impact Assessment (IA), whose content
is not publicly available, ac-
cording to which the policy objectives could be reached by three of the
options set by the Green Paper of July
2010: an optional uniform contract law, a full harmonisation Directive and a
regulation establishing a man-
datory uniform contract law. The choice of the Optional Instrument is due to
the fact that the other options
would create a considerable burden for traders as those who only traded
domestically and consequently the
former was therefore reasoned to be the most proportionate action (European
Commission, COM(2010)
348 final (01.07.2010) p. 8).
77 Small and medium enterprises are defined for the purposes of the Regulation as
traders having less than
250 employees and an annual turnover below EUR 50 million or an annual balance
sheet not exceeding
43 million. This definition relates to the general formula by the Commission
defined in European Parliament
(2003) p. 36: medium-sized enterprises have between 50 and 250 employees,
small enterprises have between
10 and 50 employees, micro enterprises have less than 10 employees. The
Recommendation also applies
criteria related to the turnover and total balance sheet of enterprises.
78 Because of the link with the internal market, the legal basis for the proposal
is European Parliament: Treaty
on the Function of the European Union - Art. 114: 12008E114 (05.09.2008).
79 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 3.
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Luisa Antoniolli
usefulness for the internal market would derive from the elimination of the costs
related
to finding out about the content of 27 national contract laws and by the
harmonisation of
mandatory consumer protection rules.80
The text is divided into six parts: part I contains the introductory
provisions, with
definitions of concepts and general principles; part II covers the formation of
contract
and the rights to withdraw or avoid (covering also pre-contractual information);
part III
concerns the content of the contract, interpretation and unfair terms; part IV
regulates
obligations and remedies in sales contracts; part V refers to obligations and
remedies for
related services contracts (such as installation, repair and maintenance); part VI
concerns
damages, interest, restitution and prescription.81
The insistence on a single legal regime as a tool for fostering the internal
market is based
on several surveys that have been conducted at the European level, in particular a
survey com-
missioned to Clifford Chance in 200582 on businesses attitude towards an EU
contract law, and
two Eurobarometer surveys of 2011, one on business-to-business transactions and

another on
business-to-consumer transactions. While these surveys show that stakeholders are
concerned
by the differences in national rules on contract, it does not seem that there is
compelling evi-
dence that harmonisation is going to solve all evils. While around 70% of business
respondents
both in B2B and B2C are in favour of a common European contract law, around half of
them
consider that a European contract law would not increase their cross-border
activity, while a
lower percentage considers that it would increase it slightly or significantly.83
80 The structure of the CESL has been thoroughly analysed by the European Law
Institute, which has proposed
a number of revisions, divided into three categories, that is essential,
highly desirable and desirable. The list
comprises the elimination of the SME restriction in the subjective scope of
application (essential), the abandon-
ment of the cross-border requirement for B2B contracts (highly desirable), the
simplification of the B2C opt-in
(essential), the revision of the use of vague general clauses for consumer
rights (essential), in particular of the
good faith provision, by making clear that a breach of the duty to act in good
faith does not give rise directly to
remedies for non-performance. See European Law Institute, COM(2011) 635 final
(11.10.2011).
81 The proposal also envisages the creation of a database concerning the final
judgments on the Common Eu-
ropean Sales Law both of the Court of Justice and national courts of last
instance, as well as training sessions for
legal practitioners.
82 The Clifford Chance Survey (2005); the survey is no longer available on the
website of the EU and that of
Clifford Chance, but a summary of the findings can be found on James,
S./Plattern, H. (2005). URL: http://
www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=32445.
83 Flash Eurobarometer; The Gallup Organization: European contract-law in
business-to-business transac-
tions: Flash EB Series No. 320 (2011) URL:
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_320_en.pdf. Ac-
cessed: 20.06.2012; Flash Eurobarometer; The Gallup Organization:
European contract law in consumer
transactions: Flash EB Series No. 321 (2011). URL:
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_321_en.pdf.
Accessed: 20.06.2012. Recent data on consumer attitudes can be found in Flash
Eurobarometer; The Gallup
Organization: Consumer attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer
protection: Flash EB Series No.
299 (2011) URL:
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/consumer_eurobarometer_2011_en.pdf.
Accessed: 20.06.2011. This survey does not concern specifically the attitude
of consumers towards the pros-
pect of harmonised contract rules, but rather focusses on specific trans-
border contracts (such as distance
contracts), problems and consumer protection issues.
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The aim of the Optional Instrument is to offer a second contract regime

within the
national law of each Member State, which covers cross-border contracts and should
be
freely adopted by the contracting parties. The optional regime would not derive
from a
direct choice of law according to private international law, but would be made
within the
national law applicable under private international law. This means that there
would be a
double track between internal and cross-border contracts, which would be regulated
by
a different set of rules, but there would be homogeneous treatment of cross-border
con-
tracts, although only for the aspects regulated by the Optional Instrument. The
feasibility
of this kind of solution for B2C contracts is linked to the fact that consumer
protection
rules contained in the Optional Instrument are maximum harmonisation
rules, which
would consequently pre-empt the application of national rules. Yet, this
position does
not fully square with the provisions of the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable
to
contractual obligations, which contains important rules protecting principles other
than
contractual freedom: according to Art. 6 the choice of law cannot deprive the
consumer of
the protection granted by national provisions of the consumers habitual residence,
which
cannot be derogated from by agreement. Moreover, according to Art. 3, if all the
elements
of the contract are located in a country that is different from the country whose
law is
chosen by the parties, the provisions of that law that cannot be derogated from by
agree-
ment (i.e. mandatory provisions) shall apply. Finally, according to Art. 9 the
choice of law
cannot restrict the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the law
of the
forum. The combination of these provisions implies that a significant part of
protective
rules cannot be derogated from by the parties. The idea of the Optional Instrument
is to
bypass the application of private international law rules by defining the choice as
internal
to a national legal system. Yet, in so far as not all elements of the contract are
regulated by
the Optional Instrument, the applicability of different national rules is still
regulated by
private international law rules, and as a consequence the application of different
protective
rules has again to be assessed.84
The mechanism envisaged by the proposal is in line with the Commissions most
re-
cent approach, which strongly favours maximum harmonisation,85 a result that was
only
partially achieved in the Directive on consumer rights of October 2011, where for
lack
of agreement among the institutions, only some areas are regulated by targeted full
har-
monisation. According to the Commission, the Optional Instrument represents the
best
balance between uniformity and legal certainty that can be achieved in the field,
and it is
also in line with the principle of subsidiarity, since it only covers cross-border
contracts,
84 For a comprehensive analysis of the interaction and friction of

private international law rules with the
Optional Instrument see Whittaker, S. (2011).
85 According to the Commission, minimum harmonisation has led to
divergent solutions in the Member
States even in areas which were harmonised at Union level: Explanatory
Memorandum, p. 5.
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Luisa Antoniolli
where it can be proved that differences among national contract laws and the
obstacles
stemming from them cannot be solved by the States themselves.86 Moreover, it
regulates
only aspects considered crucial for cross-border trade (i.e. most aspects of sales
and re-
lated services). Finally, the application of this body of rules is subject to the
agreement of
the parties, which can decide to stick to national law if they prefer, and this is
considered
to be in line not only with the autonomy of national legal systems, which can
maintain
different national rules, but also with party autonomy, who can opt between the
European
and the national regime that would be applicable otherwise. The mechanism does,
how-
ever, cover a paradoxical situation in B2C contracts. Why should a consumer opt for
the
European regime if this implies a lower level of protection? And, conversely, why
should
a trader accept national contract law if this can disrupt its strategy of applying
a common
regime to all trans-border contracts? Contracts are based on the premise of the
meeting
of the mind, but what if the minds do not meet? If the Optional Instrument will
ultimately
be enacted, practice will show whether these doubts are well founded or not. If the
par-
ties choose the European regime, it will mean that it has advantages for both
traders and
consumers, but this will require awareness on the part of consumers of the
differences
between the European and the national regime, which in its turn implies
a process of
complex technical evaluation.87
2.5 The New Directive on Consumer Rights
In the field of consumer contracts, the Commission proposed in 2008 an

important
Directive that would merge and reform the most important Directives concerning
con-
sumer contracts,88 namely Dir. 85/577/EEC on contracts negotiated away from
business
premises,89 Dir. 97/7/EC on distance contracts,90 Dir. 93/13/EEC on unfair contract
terms
in consumer contracts91 and Dir. 1999/44/EC on consumer sales and guarantees.92 The
aim of the proposed Directive was to eliminate some discrepancies and gaps in
existing
Directives and to update them, but the most significant feature was that, in line
with the
86 The Member States can decide to expand the scope of the instrument in order to
cover also purely national
contracts, but this is merely a possibility. The choice of limiting the
European regime to cross-border con-
sumer contracts is positively evaluated by Twigg-Flesner, C. (2011).
87 The Optional Instrument has a standard information notice (Annex II) that aims
at informing consumers of
the implications of opting for the European regime and the main rights that
they have under it.
88 Commission of the European Communities, COM(2008) 614 final (08.10.2008). See
Micklitz, H.-W. (2009a);
Rott, P./Terryn, E. (2009); Twigg-Flesner, C./Metcalfe, D. (2009);
Hesselink, M. W. (2009); Howells, G./
Schulze, R. (eds.) (2009); Schulte-Nlke, H./Tich, L. (eds.) (2010).
89 European Parliament (1985).
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most recent position of the Commission, the proposal was based on a maximum harmon-
isation model, which was considered necessary in order to make the internal market
work.
This choice was criticised in many quarters, and the discussion among the
stakeholders,
the Member States and the institutions lasted for several years.93
Finally, a compromise solution was found in October 2011, when Directive

2011/83/
EU was approved94 on the basis of a proposal based on the Green Paper on the Review
of
the Consumer Acquis of 2006.95 The Directive, which must be transposed by December
2013 (but the new rules will apply from June 2014), employs an approach of
selective max-
imum harmonisation, which means that some elements are now fully harmonised, while
for others Member States can still keep more protective national rules. Yet, in
spite of the
compromise choice for selective (targeted) full harmonisation, the
fundamental struc-
ture is still formulated according to full harmonisation. Art. 4 states that
Member States
shall not maintain or introduce, in their national law, provisions
diverging from those
laid down in this Directive, including more or less stringent provisions to ensure
a dif-
ferent level of consumer protection, unless otherwise provided for in this
Directive. Full
harmonisation concerns consumer information and the right of withdrawal in distance
and off-premises contracts. These are clearly very important issues, yet
the final result
is far from the comprehensive application of maximum harmonisation that was
initially
envisaged by the Commission. In the Commissions view, full harmonisation
increases
legal certainty, because both consumers and traders can rely on a single unified
regula-
tory framework, thereby eliminating the barriers to the working of the internal
market
stemming from the fragmentation of legal rules.96 Yet it must be remembered that
all as-
pects that are not specifically addressed by the Directive remains under national
law, so
harmonised rules, even those that are fully harmonised, must still be inserted into
a legal
framework concerning the rules applicable to contracts and obligations (such as
validity,
conclusion, remedies, representation, etc.) which is fragmented along national
lines.
From a structural point of view, due to the final compromise, the
new Directive
only partially substitutes for existing Directives. Only Dir. 85/577 and
Dir. 97/7 are
replaced completely, while Dir. 93/13 and Dir. 1999/44 are merely modified, and
only
to a marginal extent. The Member States can still keep or introduce
more protective
national measures; they are merely compelled to inform the EU and the other States
that
they have done so.
93 The debate took place not only between the EU institutions and the other
players, but also among the EU
institutions themselves; in particular, the Parliament opposed the
general application of the maximum
harmonisation model, considering that this would have clashed with
relevant national mechanisms of
protection.
94 European Parliament (2011). See Hall, E./Howells, G. et al. (2012).
96 Recital no. 7 dir. 2011/83.
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Luisa Antoniolli
The personal scope of the Directive covers any consumer contract, including
those
covering utilities, such as the supply of water, gas, electricity and
district heating, and
those where the trader is a public provider. At the same time, several important
kinds of
contracts are excluded by Art. 3(3).97 The new Directive stresses the importance of
also
covering contracts concerning digital content, that is, data produced and supplied
in digi-
tal form, irrespective of the means through which they are accessed, tangible or
not.
Consumer contracts are those concluded between a consumer and a trader,
the lat-
ter concept substituting for the pre-existing one of professional. The consumer
is defined,
in line with all other Directives on consumer contracts, as a natural person acting
outside
his business or profession.98 The trader is defined in terms that are similar to
the previ-
ous concept of professional, but with a wider scope. A trader is a natural or

legal person,
privately or publicly owned, and acting for purposes relating to his trade,
business, craft
or profession (Art. 2).
The new Directive emphasises the crucial role of information, particularly at
the pre-
contractual stage, which is defined by maximum harmonisation rules (i.e. rules that
can-
not be derogated from by means of national legislation) for distance and
off-premises
contracts (Art. 6).99 This information covers several elements: the main
characteristics
of the goods or services; the identity of the trader; the total price; the
arrangements for
payment, delivery and performance; the conditions for exercising the right of
withdrawal,
if existing; after-sale services and commercial guarantees, if existing; the
duration of the
contract; the availability of out-of-court complaint mechanisms, etc. All this
information
must be provided by the trader in a clear and comprehensible manner before the con-
clusion of the contract,100 and it forms an integral part of the contract.101

Moreover, the
pre-contractual information and thereafter the text of the contract must be

provided to
97 The following contracts are explicitly excluded from the application

of the Directive: contracts related to
employment, succession rights, family law and incorporation and organisation
of companies or partnerships;
contracts for the transfer of immovable property and the construction or the
substantial conversion of new
buildings (but not partial repair or renovation) and contracts for rental of
accommodation for residential
purposes; contracts for the transport of passengers; social services, such as
those for children, families and
older persons; healthcare services; gambling contracts; contracts concluded
by means of automatic vending
machines; financial services, package travel and timeshare. Finally, the
Directive allows States not to apply the
rules to off-premises contracts with a low value, that is, less than 50
Euros.
98 Art. 2. The new Directive widens the coverage of this notion however, since
in cases of dual purposes con-
tracts, that is, contracts concluded for purposes partly related to the trade
or profession, the person can still
be considered a consumer if the trade purpose is not predominant in the
context of the contract; see recital
no. 17.
99 The role of information, also in relation to the impact of behavioural
economics, is analysed by Hall, E./
Howells, G. et al. (2012), pp. 142-154.
100 Moreover, the burden of proof that the information requirements have
been fulfilled is on the trader
(art. 6(9)).
101 While the list of information requirements cannot be changed by Member
States, Art. 6(5) allows the parties
to the contract to alter them, although only by express agreement.
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the consumer on paper or, if the consumer agrees, on another durable medium (Art.
7),
with special rules applying to distance contracts (Art. 8), where specific
requirements are
established in relation to the various means of communication. For all contracts
other
than distance and off-premises contracts, on the other hand, Member States can
establish
or maintain additional information requirements.
In cases of distance and off-premises contracts the consumer has a
right of with-
drawal (Art. 9); in the first type of contract, this is linked to the fact that the
consumer will
see the goods only after the conclusion of the contract; for the second type, the
reason is
that there may be an element of surprise or psychological pressure involved in the
conclu-
sion of the contract. If the right of withdrawal is exercised, all obligations of
the parties are
terminated (Art. 12).102 The periods for exercising the right of withdrawal are now
unified
for these contracts, with a deadline of 14 days from the conclusion of the
contract.103 An
important novelty concerns the legal consequences if the trader does not inform, or
in-
adequately informs, the consumer of his right of withdrawal (Art. 10). In such
cases, the
withdrawal period is extended, but not indefinitely until the information is given;
rather,
the right must be exercised within 12 months.104 These rules are subject to full
harmoni-
sation, and consequently Member States cannot vary the periods. Harmonisation is
also
achieved through the introduction of a standard model for withdrawal, which cannot
be
changed by national rules.105 If the consumer withdraws from the contract, he must
return
the goods within 14 days, otherwise a penalty applies (Art. 14).106 The trader in
turn must
reimburse all payments made by the consumer, including those related to delivery of
the
goods (Art. 13). However, if the consumer has used the goods more than simply than
for
handling and inspecting them in order to establish their characteristics and/or
function-
ing, he is liable for the diminution of value of the goods (Art. 14(2)).
The Directive also contains rules on the delivery of goods (Art. 18): the
parties can
agree on a date, which cannot in any event be longer than 30 days after the
conclusion
of the contract. If the trader does not deliver the goods within the
time specified, the
consumer must ask the trader to do so within a reasonable period of time, after
which,
102 Moreover, withdrawal also affects contracts ancillary to the main contract,
which are automatically termi-
nated without any cost to the consumer (Art. 15).
103 In sale contracts, the period expires 14 days after the consumer acquires
physical possession of the goods.
The 14-day period is calculated in accordance with Reg. 1182/71 of 1971
determining the rules applicable
to periods, dates and time limits (European Parliament (1971)), establishing
that all periods are expressed
in calendar days and the day in which the event occurs is not taken into
account.
104 In previous consumer Directives the periods for withdrawal varied; moreover,
it was a minimum harmoni-
sation requirement, so Member States could extend them.
105 The Directive, however, allows consumers not only to withdraw by using the
model form (whose content
is established in Annex I(B)), but also by any other unequivocal statement
(Art. 11(1)), in which case the
burden of proof is on the consumer.
106 The cost of returning the goods must be borne by the consumer.
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Luisa Antoniolli
if delivery has not been performed, the consumer may terminate the contract.
Further
remedies, such as withholding performance, damages etc., are not harmonised and
con-
tinue to be regulated by national rules.
The Directive does not establish rules on the transfer of ownership of goods,
but it
does introduce some rules on the transfer of risk (Art. 20). It provides protection
for con-
sumers against the risk of loss or damage to the goods before he has acquired
physical
possession of them, which also covers the transport arranged or carried out by the
trader.
Finally, building on Dir. 2005/29 on unfair commercial practices, which
prohibits the
so-called inertia selling, that is, the supply of unsolicited goods or services,
the new Direc-
tive provides for a contractual remedy, exempting the consumer of any obligation to
pay
for unsolicited goods or services (Art. 27).
The Directive also extends the right of organisations protecting consumers
rights
to bring a judicial or administrative action on the issues covered by it,
recognising the
importance of the collective protection of consumers rights (Art. 23). It also
imposes on
States a duty to take measures to inform consumers and traders of the rules of the
Direc-
tive, and to encourage the dissemination of information on existing codes of
conduct
(Art. 26).
In line with the existing consumer acquis, the rules of the Directive have a
manda-
tory character, which implies that consumers cannot waive the rights conferred on
them
(Art. 25).107
While the regime of distance and off-premises contracts has been

significantly
amended, this is not the case for the other two Directives involved. The impact of
the new
Directive on the legal regime governing unfair contract terms (Dir. 93/13) and
consumer
sales guarantees (Dir. 1999/44) is indeed very marginal. Arts 32 and 33 merely
require
Member States to inform the Commission of the adoption of national
provisions that
extend the protection of consumers,108 and to make the information also accessible
to con-
sumers and traders through websites. The model of minimum harmonisation therefore
remains in place in these two very important pieces of EU legislation, despite the
strong
approach formulated in general terms in the Directive and its recitals.
The structure of the new Directive reveals a lack of coordination with the
work of the
DCFR, which is not even mentioned in the document, and whose solutions have not
been
employed in the new rules. Because the establishment of the CoPECL network and the
107 According to Art. 25, contractual terms that waive or restrict

consumer rights are not binding on the
consumer.
108 For unfair terms, States must inform the Commission of the extension of the
control to individually negoti-
ated terms or the adequacy of the price or remuneration, or the extension of
the list of terms considered
unfair. For sales guarantees, States must inform the Commission on rules that
provide for more stringent
consumer protection.
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drafting of the DCFR was officially motivated by the need to provide EU

institutions with
a set of principles, definitions and solutions (the frame of reference), a task
that involved
considerable work and money, this result is hard to explain and indeed puzzling.109
In relation to the proposal on an Optional Instrument for European sales law,

there
is a significant difference. The Directive achieves maximum harmonisation only for
some
aspects, namely pre-contractual information and the right of withdrawal, while
major ele-
ments of consumer protection remain under a minimum harmonisation standard, which
means that Member States can retain more protective rules. The idea behind the
Optional
Instrument is that the choice is left to the contractual parties alone, and once
they have
opted for the European regime, the level of consumer protection is uniform and
cannot
be derogated from by national law. This implies a sort of optional
full harmonisation
decision.110 As a consequence, guaranteeing that the consumer makes an informed
choice
in opting for the European sales law becomes crucial, since it may imply giving up
the
higher level of protection guaranteed by national law, which would otherwise have
been
applicable.
2.6 European Contract Law: Where Do We Stand and Where Do We Go

from Here?
Development of European contract law has increased in intensity and speed,

particularly
in the last decade, leading to achievements that could have hardly been anticipated
at the
time the European Communities were established. Yet it is very difficult to foresee
which
end-results will be reached, because the driving forces are moving in different
directions
and are not synchronised, so it is most likely that the current situation of
fragmentation
and tension will continue in the near future.
An important issue concerns the impact of fundamental rights on European
contract
law.111 The relevance of fundamental rights in the realm of private law was
initially fostered
by the Court of Justice through reference to common constitutional traditions and

the
European Convention on Human Rights, later introduced in EU primary law by incor-
poration in the Treaties. After the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental
Rights has
become binding law, and it establishes a number of principles that are relevant to
contract
law, such as consumer protection (Art. 36), non-discrimination (Art. 21), judicial
protec-
tion (Art. 47), access to services of general economic interest (Art. 34). While it
is not yet
109 See Hesselink, M. W. (2009); Hall, E./Howells, G. et al. (2012), p. 166.

110 See Howells, G. (2011), according to whom the Optional Instrument should be
agreed upon a social dia-
logue between traders and consumers associations, and should focus on two
crucial issues: guaranteeing a
high level of consumer protection and swift and effective dispute resolution
(also online).
111 See Brggemeier, G./Colombi Ciacchi, A. et al. (eds.) (2010); Kosta,
V. (2010); Cherednychenko, O. O.
(2010); Mak, C. (2008); Meli, M. (2006).
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Luisa Antoniolli
clear how far these principles are sufficiently specific to have direct effect, in
the future
they are clearly going to be very relevant in determining the interpretation and
application
of EU secondary law, and will also influence the policy choices of the EU
legislator.
On a different level, the idea lurking behind the DCFR of a Civil Code
modelled on
national codes (no matter which one) is unlikely to be successful, at least in the
short run.
Not only is it hardly feasible from a political or indeed a technical point of
view, but it
also seems a conservative model, albeit a highly symbolic one, dictated more by a
path-
dependent sense of security derived working with familiar tools (at least for
Continental
lawyers!) than by the conviction that this is the most suitable instrument for
consolidating
and developing European private law.112
If one looks at the existing EU acquis in the field of contract law, however,
there are a
number of areas in which rules and principles have been developed, such as pre-
contractual
duties and duties of information, formation of contracts, right of withdrawal, non-
negotiated
and unfair terms, performance and remedies. These elements involve consumer, civil
and
commercial law and thus cut across the traditional branches of private law. Other
important
issues of contract law, on the other hand, are not covered by EU law, such as
mistake and
contract invalidity, multiple creditors and debtors, etc. In spite of the fact that
contract law
is clearly the field of private law in which the largest amount of European law has
emerged,
there is therefore still a large number of aspects that require further work in
order to reach
a possible synthesis.
One such is the heavy reliance by EU law on information duties113 as a way to
protect
consumers (as e.g. in the new Directive on consumer rights), and whether this is
compat-
ible with the conception embodied in some European national laws of the consumer as
the weaker party. What is the role of the principle of non-discrimination in EU

law, par-
ticularly in the aspects related to its use as a means of guaranteeing access by
consumers
to goods and services? What is the role of remedies in this field? Traditionally,
EC law has
left to Member States the task of defining remedies suitable for guaranteeing
effective and
equivalent protection, in accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy
of
national law, yet it is increasingly true that EU law (either through secondary
legislative
rules or case law interpretation) is imposing specific standards as a basis for
remedies, as
in the case of the many consumer contracts Directives providing for
collective redress
mechanisms and rules requiring specific remedies, such as compensation.114
Beyond the technical issue of defining the content of the existing European
acquis in
the area of contract law, an even more important problem concerns the inherent
tension
112 For critical remarks on the use of the national Civil Code models in
developing European private law see
Schulze, R. (2011a), pp. 6-8, who emphasises the role of legal doctrine in
guaranteeing coherence.
113 See Grundmann, S./Kerber, W. (2001).
114 See Reich, N. (2007).
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between national private law, which aims at being systematic and comprehensive, and
EU law, which is fragmented but whose structure is increasingly

interfering with the
structure of national private law and causing friction. This tension has both
technical
and policy roots and implications,115 and it is evident in everyday routine
concerning the
application of specific EU rules in relation to national rules. The underlying

impact is in
fact even more extensive, and it goes at the roots of the social and cultural
dimension of
private law.116
While the most significant elements of social justice, which are related to
the idea of
redistribution of wealth, remain in the hands of Member States, the elements of
justice
underlying EU law are gradually shifting.117 This is taking place over time, and
particularly
since the Single European Act. Increasingly, EC/EU law has increasingly introduced
ele-
ments of regulatory private law aimed at fostering the development of the internal
market,
118
which interfere with national concepts of social justice,
particularly in the area of con-
sumer protection, labour law and anti-discrimination law.119 Micklitz defines the
specific
concept of justice being developed at the EU level as access justice,120 which
does not aim
at social protection through redistributive mechanisms, but rather at

guaranteeing the
right to access to goods and services,121 as well as the right to protection
against discrimi-
nation. This notion is consequently a hybrid between social distributive justice

and liber-
tarian allocative justice, emphasising the importance of the right to market
participation,
as well as the right to access to the benefits generated by the market, through the
removal
of existing barriers.122
There is no doubt that the imprint of EU law is fundamentally

market oriented.
This has been its core from the start of the European Communities and remains even
115 The tension between the instrumentalist/functional nature of EU law in

opposition to the juridical/systematic
nature of national law is emphasised by Michaels, R. (2011).
116 For an illuminating discussion, Reich, N. (2011).
117 For an analysis of the meaning of justice in contract law and labour law, see
also F. Roedl in this book, who
critically analyses the evolution of the relationship between social justice
and market in Europe in relation
to the theories of K. Polanyj about fictitious commodities, developed in
(Polanyi, K. (1944/1957)).
118 Micklitz, H.-W. (2009b) For a historical overview of the evolution of
different conceptions of social justice
in European States see Micklitz, H.-W. (2011).
119 See Schiek, D./Waddington, L. et al. (2007); Basedow, J. (2008a).
120 Micklitz, H.-W. (2011) The relevance of non-discrimination and access is
particularly evident in the area of
services of general economic interest, where Directives concerning
communication, energy and transport
frequently contain a universal service obligation for providers, which
implies that access to the service
must be guaranteed to everybody, often with specific provisions protecting
vulnerable consumers/users
(e.g. avoiding disconnection or guaranteeing reasonable prices). See
Micklitz, H.-W. (2009); Rott, P. (2005);
Reich, N. (2009).
121 See in this book Nybergh.
122 According to Micklitz, H.-W. (2011), p. 42, Social justice is result
oriented. The outcome is what counts
in order to be able to assess whether the result is just or not; on the
other hand,materialised access is less
result oriented. It only establishes fair and non-discriminatory access
conditions.
103
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Luisa Antoniolli
to date, despite the increasing volume of social regulation. What has changed over
time
is the general balance and relationship between EC/EU law and national law.
Originally
the premise was that, by being limited to aspects related to the
internal market, EC/
EU law would not affect the basic structure of national law, but merely supplement
and
amend it. Nowadays, the extent and depth of the inroads of EU law into national law
require comprehensive re-evaluation of the social model embodied in European

private
123
law (i.e. the sum of EU and national laws). Moreover, quite apart from
the debate about
the sheer extent of these inroads, there is also a qualitative issue. EU private
law has a
clearly instrumental function, that is, it is conceived as an instrument for the
creation
and functioning of the internal market. Other aspects of law, related to
its social and
cultural dimension,124 are considered secondary and mostly left to Member States.
This
tension is also evident in the debate about the choice between minimum and maximum
harmonisation, which is at stake in recent consumer protection law. While minimum

harmonisation focusses on the need to respect the diverse interests of Member
States in
regulating and protecting their social structures, maximum harmonisation is based
on
the idea that the core element is the functioning of the internal market, to which
national
specificities must give way.125
The Principles of Life time Contracts developed by the European Social

Contract Law
(EuSoCo) Group have been drafted as a tool to overcome the gaps and flaws of
European
law that are linked to the limited market-oriented conception of justice embedded
in the
European model, and which in its turn is increasingly influencing national social
concep-
tions. They take into consideration a wide spectrum of aspects related to life time
con-
tracts, that is, social long-term relations, such as the collective dimension, the
existence
of networks of linked contracts, the need to guarantee access and to avoid
discrimination,
the need to devise adaptive remedies in case of change of circumstances of the
contract,
and others. They are a useful benchmark for measuring the performance of existing
EU
law and for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of new proposals, as well as for
evalu-
ating the interpretation and application of EU law by the European Court of Justice
and
national courts.
European private law is intrinsically a multi-level legal system, and this
means that
not only different rules in the area of private law coexist and must be connected
and
123 For a discussion of the social justice model in European law see Wilhelmsson,
T. (2004). See also Micklitz,
H.-W. (ed.) (2011).
124 See Wilhelmsson, T./Paunio, E. et al. (eds.) (2007); Lando, O. (2007).
125 Reich, N. (2011), pp. 79-81, proposes a new structure of interplay between
minimum and maximum har-
monisation, which he terms half harmonisation: rules concerning marketing,
quality and information
standards for goods and services should be fully harmonised, while rules on
fairness, remedies and language
should follow a minimum harmonisation model. See also Reich, N. (2010).
104
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Toolbox or a
Jack-in-the-Box?
coordinated, but also that different ideas of social justice and cultural values
are simul-
taneously at play.126 The idea to iron out and force one single notion of justice
to be im-
posed at the European level seems both unfeasible and undesirable: legal pluralism
must
not be conceived as a limit but rather as an asset, a value enshrined in the EU
motto
united in diversity. Moreover, there is currently no specific and widely shared
idea of
social justice at the EU level: the one that is currently developing around the
notion of
the internal market is clearly only partial and embryonic, and it leaves room for
critical
considerations concerning the desirability of a market-driven idea of justice.
Awareness
of this should lead to a reconsideration of the relationship between EU law and
national
law, in which EU law should work as an instrument for compensating for the failings
of
national law that stem from the gradual erosion of its competences due to the
Europe-
anisation and, more generally, globalisation processes, rather than superseding
national
law altogether.127 This also implies a revision of the relationship between law and
politics
in the European integration process. In the past, the political weakness of the
European
Community has been masked by a technocratic use of law, which had two negative ef-
fects: the increase of the democratic deficit at the European level and the
overburdening
of the law as an instrument for solving social problems. The current challenges at
the
European level require that the fundamental choices about the use of resources and
the
attainment of social justice goals be made according to an openly political process
and
not merely a neo-liberal technocratic market approach. As Joerges
emphasises, law
without politics is a fully denuded force.128 The central role of the political
process is
still entrenched at the national level, but the evolution of a post-national

setting cre-
ates gaps and inconsistencies that require complementary European mechanisms, both
political and legal.129
All these considerations also have a profound impact in the area

of contract law.
Consequently, no matter what will be the fate of the European harmonisation
projects
currently in progress, in the future it will still be necessary to confront the
principles and
values developed at the European Union level with those embedded in
national legal
systems.
126 The relationship between EU and national law is critically

reconstructed by C. Joerges. See Joerges, C.
(2006); Joerges, C. (2007).
127 This is the theory of conflicts-law, elaborated by C. Joerges: Everson,
M./Joerges, C. (2012) The analysis of
the recent developments in Europe and the need to recontruct the relationship
between law and politics is
based on the theory of K. Polanyi about the crisis of modern Western societies
related to the development
of markets for fictitious commodities (money, labour and land).
128 Everson, M./Joerges, C. (2012), p. 655.
129 See Habermas, J./Pensky, M. (2001).
105
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3 Etica del contratto e contratti
di durata per lesistenza
della persona
Forgive
me this my virtue,
For in the fatness of
these pursy times
Virtue itself of
vice must pardon beg,
Yea, curb and woo for leave
to do him good.
(Hamlet, 3, 4)
Andrea Nicolussi
Summary
To refer to the social dimension of a contract is to challenge the idea that a

contract is simply
an act of autonomy (self-determination). However, if a certain degree of heteronomy
can
coexist within a contract, the different strands must be identified in order to
render this coex-
istence sustainable. The contract is, in reality, an expression of the autonomy and
individual
responsibility of those, who, in the act of concluding a contract, are consciously
bound by that
act. What is required is a solution that does not distort the essential nature of
the contract,
but instead determines the scope of intervention, conditions and procedures that
are compat-
ible with the concept of the contract that can be integrated in the neo-
institutionalist model
that characterises the law in Europe after the crisis of pure normativism.
From an abstract point of view it is possible to hypothesise two complementary
strands,
which are not necessarily incompatible, in order to fully understand the social
dimension of
contracts. indisputable heteronomy based on the legislative power of the majority.
An addition to the contract by reference to moral values, justified by the
fact that con-
tracts are acts of social relationality and legally binding. Thus, the
moral values that are
considered integral elements of contracts are to be intended as ethicallegal
values, that is,
values of an implicitly dual nature, being both moral and legal.
In the first case, the social dimension could seem to be an authoritarian
intervention in
the contract, resulting in expropriation with a punitive effect on certain
categories of people
to the advantage of others.
In the second case, the intervention is less authoritarian and can be
explained inter-
subjectively. Indeed, autonomy is not purely arbitrary, because contracts operate
within a
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Andrea Nicolussi
social context and consequently must take into account a measure of morality. They
are not
merely private affairs, but also juridical, and so must be applicable to the
general rationality
of the law. The law is tertium related to the parties, and when they seek
enforcement of their
contract they accept this third dimension. This concept is pan-European and
concerns not only
procedural rules but the content of the contract as well. In certain countries it
is more explicit
than in others, such as in England, where the courts work with so-called implied
terms.
With regard to moral values, I wish to emphasise legalised moral values.
Moral values
become legal principles and are therefore subject to the test of reasonableness and
the need to
establish coherence with other principles. There is no place in the law for
fundamentalism of
any sort, ethical, religious or even economic.
Two fundamental issues relating to Reethisierung should be highlighted:
1 justifying duties without compensation, these being generally purposes
based on the prin-
ciples of solidarity (safeguarding good faith and the weak generally). This view
proposes a justifi-
cation closer to the idea of autonomy as a social facet of cooperation. Everybody
relies on a general
principle of ethics when they enter into a relationship with another. From a
general perspective,
the rules derived from moral values are not merely authoritarian decisions, but
products of inter-
subjective research in the field of the social experience of values. In particular,
this should be valid
regarding basic necessity life-time contracts, such as contract of labour, loan
for the purchase of
a house, guarantee in favour of a family member, tenancy for housing, healthcare
contracts, etc.
Those are contracts that usually last for a long time of life and regard basic
needs of people.
2 establishing boundaries demarcating the tendency towards universal
commodification
and an extension of the market into the voluntary sector (so-called third sector).
Creating or
leaving the condition unmodified in order for gratuitous acts to be realised.
Only the first issue will be examined in this abstract.
It is not true that bilateral contracts are ethically indifferent, as Max
Weber and many
others maintain.
Canaris stressed the link between bilateral contracts and what we can call
Freiheitsethik.
Bilateral contracts are an application of the principle of commutative justice in a
formal sense
(sinallagma in a subjective sense), and thus they are tools of self-determination
and plural-
ism. There is also a certain sense of dignity implicit in the meaning expressed in
the famous
quotation from Adam Smith: It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or
the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.
We address
ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of
our own
necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly
upon the
benevolence of his fellow-citizens A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of The
Wealth of Nations, Liberty Press, Indianapolis 1981, 26-27.
Dignity is intended as economic independence and willingness to pay what one
party
requests from another.
The ethics of the contract cannot, however, simply be reduced to this.
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If commutative justice in a formal sense may be considered to be

an instructive aid
in explaining, in part, the fundamental principles pertaining to the
concept of the social
contract, it does not explain everything.
At least two questions remain unanswered:
a. Why at the time of the social contract did the wolves agree to establish a
contract with
the lambs? When the strong man respects the weak man a moral issue is raised;
otherwise
the strong take complete advantage of their strength. In a nutshell, it can be said
that the
metaphor of the social contract is not sufficient to resolve this paradigm.
b. Why does the creditor trust the butcher not to supply him with rotten meat
or the
physician to cure him not only for remuneration (creditor in the literal sense
means he who
trusts, as Glubiger derives from glauben)? Are we sure that all professionals, or
the majority
of them, carry out their work only to receive remuneration and not also because of
the fact
that they have pride in a job well done?
Compensation cannot explain all the rules of obligation. For instance, the
rule that the
creditor may not cancel a debt without the consent of the debtor. Iustitia
commutativa is only
a part of the iustitia involved in contracts.
Ultimately, as a metaphor of civilisation, we should take into consideration
the inherent
ties to the concept of social contract, the dimension of care that Heidegger
proposed as the
basis of humanity. It is not just a question of freedom, but also the idea of
taking care of others.
In other words, there is not just one paradigm, but rather two: one that
refers to the
social contract as a framework for the formal freedom of everybody, and the
paradigm of
the family in the generic (not necessarily traditional) sense of solidarity (there
is now ref-
erence to maternalism, or maternage in French, in order to avoid the ambivalence of
the
concept of paternalism), which means ensuring that the weak are not further
weakened in
a social and economic sense.
This point of view is typical of post-Auschwitz constitutions like the German
and Italian
ones, which provide for formal and substantive equality.
This is undoubtedly a crucial step. Formal equality and substantive
equality must
cohabit, especially when we refer to contracts in the field of autonomy. If we
consider that
cohabitation, that is, the idea of a general protection of the weaker party of a
contract, is
absurd because every contract has a stronger party and a weaker party, the logical
result
would be the elimination of contracts.
It is therefore essential that a formal procedure be established to provide
general rules
applying to contracts in circumstances where a party may be typically in a stronger
position
and to protect typical categories of people such as workers or consumers, who are
formally
(by statutory law or socially) considered the weaker party.
Having once established the limits to the contractual protection of the weak,
we can con-
tinue the discussion on the moral perspective of contracts; the arguments relating
to moral
aspects can be diagnosed in a more rational manner.
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Andrea Nicolussi
According to the continental tradition of law, there remain rules allowing

moral points
of view to filter through into the contract. Leaving aside the protection of gute
Sitten (buoni
costumi), e.g. 138 BGB, good faith is the most essential principle. Fides means
trust, reliance
on the morality of the other party. We assume the existence of an ethical code
that provides
a set of criteria that can be applied to assess the behaviour of both parties. In
the Italian code
as in the German civil code, good faith is already enshrined as a guiding
principle during the
pre-contractual period when both parties are still negotiating.
It should be noted that good faith introduces the fundamental principle of
Diskursethik
in the sense of Habermas and Apel between the parties. Both have to
communicate or
act in good faith, and in good faith they have to understand each other. Usually
we refer to
procedural fairness for these types of rules. Duties of information, of clare loqui
(speaking
clearly), are well established; in English law we should remember the duty of
confidential-
ity (for instance in the Seager vs Copydex case). However, good faith can also
provide sub-
stantive fairness. The development of the Unzumutbarkeit (inesigibilit) is highly
significant,
a limitation on the creditors claim when the performance of an
obligation conflicts with
another duty that is more important from a constitutional perspective. This
perspective is
of particular interest in the context of the duration of contracts that may
infringe upon the
relationships of the debtor, especially in family relationships.
The principle of specific performance (adempimento in natura,
Naturalherstellung) is
also a rule based on ethical values. The duty is a categorical imperative without
the ability
to opt for damages instead of performing the obligation. I wish to emphasise,
obviously, the
efficient breach theory that provides for [t]he view that a party should be
allowed to breach
a contract and pay damages, if doing so would be more economically efficient than
perform-
ing under the contract.
The duration of the contract is the framework in which an ethical approach is
more
appropriate, and we should note three points. One is that when a relationship
lasts for an
extended period it creates reliance and proximity. This is valid, even though one
party is
an enterprise; otherwise we create a moral shield in favour of people who take
advantage
of the enterprise and conceive the enterprise as a machine in which people are
mere cogs
to be exploited. Moreover, regarding Basic Necessity Life-contracts, the
extended period
tends to aggravate the differences between a professional party (an enterprise)
and a person
who contracts for personal purposes (labour, loan for the purchase of a house,
guarantee
in favour of a family member, tenancy for housing), especially in the case of a
change in
circumstances, given that an enterprise is more able to calculate risks and
administer their
costs than are non-professionals. Finally, the different relationships may be
inextricable, and
in certain cases we can speak about contractual links (collegamento negoziale,
Verbundene
Vertrge): for example, labour, tenancy, loans, family relationships. Art. 33
Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union provides for the principle of reconciliation
between
family and professional life.
126
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In this perspective, the contract of labour ensures the sanctity of maternity;

evidently
the duty to the family (child) is more important than the duty to perform. The law
restricts
the right to withdrawal of a tenancy in order to protect the rights to housing not
only of the
tenant but also of family or cohabitants with children. We can imagine a right to
suspend
payment of instalments on a loan in cases of redundancy through no fault of the
debtor when
the worker has to provide for a member of the family (to pay school fees, to pay
medical bills
for themselves or for a member of the family). In cases of a guarantee by a non-
professional
person in favour of a member of the family, the bank has at least a duty to keep
the guaran -
tor regularly updated as to the financial circumstances of the debtor and the
consequences
the guarantee would have to share in order to allow the guarantor to terminate the
contract
before default proceedings have been initiated, when circumstances have varied too
greatly
from the initial contractual obligations.
Scholars tend to be too rigid in their distinction between the purposes of
private law
and those of public law. The first must provide rules in order to
promote commutative
justice and Freiheitsethik, while only public law has the obligation to apply
distributive
justice. This distinction appears to me to be too rigid, and I would prefer a more
systemic
view, stressing that the relationship between the two distinctive
components of the law
should be more coherent.
Private law is able to pursue some distributive justice under certain
conditions.
A clear definition is needed of the subjects (weak parties) who are protected
and the
subjects who should be protected. Interests or goods to be protected should also be
clearly
defined. There should be goods of recognisable intrinsic value (necessary goods
like water,
schooling, housing, health, etc). Some are referred to as common goods (commons)
because
they relate to the fundamental rights of people and thus should not be subject to
exclusive
possession, but instead be governed according to the law so that everyone can
benefit from
them. Self-determination in a solidaristic system cannot be the unique criterion
for evaluat-
ing the value of goods. In particular, it is essential to specify a number of
constitutional values
related to certain professions. Bankers, for example, must execute due diligence
with respect
to the savings of non-professional people to ensure that those savings are
safeguarded, since
savings are a good protected by the law (an example is the Italian constitution:
see art. 47. La
repubblica incoraggia e tutela il risparmio in tutte le sue forme, disciplina,
coordina e cont-
rolla lesercizio del credito). Thus, certain rules should be taken into
consideration in order to
promote responsible credit as a paradigm for measuring the performance of the
good banker
(as Reifner suggests). This could be considered as an application of good faith
that requires
the professional debtor to perform the specific skills of their particular
profession in order to
pursue the interests of the creditor.
The reference to a moral value provides a justification for duties, whether
or not those
duties are disproportionate to the compensation for them or are imposed without
any com-
pensation at all, simply to protect the weaker party.
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Andrea Nicolussi
However, elements of distributive justice require social recognition of the

fact that pub-
lic law must provide (incentives, benefits, advantages). Otherwise the duties
imposed on a
private individual may be interpreted as expropriation or punishment. Of course,
solidarity
should not become a synallagma, but it still requires a degree of reciprocity,
which is a social
response.
In conclusion, distributive justice remains in general a duty and prerogative
of public
law, and one should not overload contract law, but contract law can be made to
cohere with
it through the provision of rules consistent with this purpose.
3.1 Contratto, etica e contratti di durata per lesistenza della

persona. Un argine allimperialismo dello spot contract?
Gran parte dei bisogni primari delle persone esigono la stipula di

contratti di durata
che impegnano le parti per molto tempo combinandosi con altri
significativi rapporti
della stessa persona1. Si pensi ai rapporti di lavoro, al mutuo per lacquisto di
una casa
dabitazione o per il mantenimento agli studi di un figlio, a una locazione per

esigenze
abitative, a fideiussioni concesse a sostegno dellattivit economica di un
familiare, a con-
tratti di somministrazione di acqua ed energia elettrica, ad assicurazioni per il
caso di
una malattia e ad altri contratti ancora. Tali rapporti insistono nella vita di un
individuo
intrecciandosi anche con relazioni di carattere personale come i rapporti
familiari. Basti
pensare al difficile equilibrio tra lavoro e famiglia o, nella locazione di
abitazioni, alle esi-
genze familiari di cui si deve tenere conto.
Queste figure, che potrebbero denominarsi contratti di durata per
lesistenza della
persona, fanno emergere in modo peculiare, nella disciplina del contratto,
listanza di una
pi articolata dimensione etico-giuridica che invece i contratti istantanei (spot
contracts)
tendono a nascondere per via della forte spersonalizzazione che la riduzione del
rapporto
alla istantaneit porta con s. Si pensi alla compravendita, da sempre lo spot
contract per
antonomasia, che riduce la relazione a quella Fernbereichsmoral, die die
Marktbeziehungen
bestimmt, limitando la collaborazione agli obblighi di informazione, alla consegna
della
cosa e al pagamento del prezzo. Non a caso gi nel diritto romano si
ritenne di attri-
buire, in via eteronoma, al contratto di compravendita un effetto di garanzia per
tutelare
il compratore nel caso di vizi della cosa dei quali, l per l, al momento della
consegna non
era facile rendersi conto. In tal modo, il rapporto viene prolungato se cos si
pu dire
1 Il tema dei contratti o rapporti di durata un tema classico della dottrina

giuridica del secolo scorso tra cui
si ricorda il noto contributo di Gierke, O. v. (1914a) 355 f. Per una
rivisitazione recente del tema in Italia, cfr.
Luminoso, A. (2010) che sottolinea il delinearsi un nuovo concetto pi ampio
di rapporto di durata, diverso
da quello corrispondente ai contratti ad esecuzione continuata o periodica, e
che include anche il mutuo e i
contratti di credito ad esso affini, lassicurazione, la locazione, il
comodato, lanticresi e la societ. Luso delle
virgolette nel testo rivolto proprio a sottolineare la problematicit della
durata nel dibattito dottrinale.
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concedendo un tempo supplementare a chi altrimenti avrebbe dovuto correre per

intero
2
il rischio di non aver potuto accertare lesistenza di vizi della cosa .
3
opportuno chiarire subito che la dimensione etico-giuridica a cui si fa
riferimento
va necessariamente inquadrata in una prospettiva intersoggettiva, lunica che pu
venire in
considerazione in rapporto al diritto e non solo per via del pluralismo che
caratterizza le
societ contemporanee. Infatti il punto di vista giuridico, a differenza di quello
della morale
4
individuale che fa appello alla coscienza dei singoli , un punto di
vista che trascende
quello delle parti in gioco, in quanto le norme dellordinamento giuridico, sia
nella loro
dimensione di proposizioni generali e astratte sia nella concretezza del giudizio
sulla con-
troversia, costituiscono un tertium rispetto ai soggetti destinatari delle norme.
Ed proprio
a questa terza dimensione, non appartenente in via esclusiva n alluna n
allaltra parte e
nemmeno al giudice, che si richiamano le parti di un contratto quando ne pretendono
la
tutela giuridica. Di qui lesigenza di criteri di qualificazione dei comportamenti
che siano
comunicabili, cio riferiti a valori non soggettivi ma riconosciuti
dallordinamento e cos
rivestiti della natura giuridica oltre che morale. Un esempio ben noto sono i
valori che, nel
rispetto del pluralismo, sono istituzionalizzati nellordinamento come accade per
le costi-
tuzioni o le carte internazionali che nel Novecento hanno riconosciuto un
fondamento
etico al diritto, individuandolo nella persona umana con i suoi diritti inviolabili
e i suoi
5
obblighi di solidariet . Non pu bastare invece il puro registrare usi o
consuetudini, quasi
che il giudice si debba limitare a semplici indagini sociologiche, perch, pur
nella storicit
2 Si tratta di una tutela che tradizionalmente consiste nella restituzione del

prezzo e quindi si muove nellambito
di una elementare dinamica contrattuale, cio il sinallagma. Solo di recente
la disciplina della compravendita
con i consumatori ha introdotto una tutela in forma specifica che presuppone
nella fase distributiva una
organizzazione in grado di far fronte allinteresse del compratore alla cosa
in natura e che pertanto, almeno
sul piano del singolo contratto, non interamente riconducibile alla logica
del sinallagma. forse la punta
pi avanzata della protezione che la relazione mercantile sembra tollerare con
riguardo a una compravendita
che per lo pi ormai si stipula nei non luoghi (Aug, M. (2009)) dei centri
commerciali e del commercio
elettronico.
3 Nel testo, anche per semplificare, le parole morale ed etica vengono
utilizzate come sinonimi, pur senza
ignorare che filosofi importanti, come Hegel, Habermas e Ricoer le tengono
distinte. Le utilizza sciente-
mente come sinonimi Da Re, A. (2010) 1f. Mazzamuto, S. (2012) p. 22 parla,
proprio con riguardo al con-
tratto di diritto europeo, di unapproccio valutativo di stampo etico-politico
ancora insufficiente nel diritto
dellUnione europea, salva lassodata e tradizionale eccezione del diritto
del lavoro. Nel testo preferiamo
far riferimento a una dimensione etico-giuridica, perch riteniamo che il
diritto, sia nella sua fonte legale sia
nella sua applicazione giurisprudenziale, pur autonomo e distinto dalla
morale, debba mantenere con questa
uno spazio di comunicazione, senza il quale il diritto rinuncerebbe
fatalisticamente o cinicamente a ogni
aspirazione di giustizia.
4 Ma la radice della parola coscienza (cum-scientia) indica anchessa una
dimensione intersoggettiva, indi-
viduata un tempo in riferimento a un ethos comunitario o al rapporto intimo
con Dio, e ora smarrita nelle
societ fortemente secolarizzate.
5 Come spiega Mengoni, L. (1996) p. 117, il problema della fondazione etica
della legittimit viene convertito
in un problema giuridico mediante listituzionalizzazione dei valori morali,
che ne costituiscono il referente
pregiuridico, in opzioni interne al diritto positivo espresse nella forma di
enunciati normativi di principio
strutturati o come clausole generali o come diritti soggettivi.
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Andrea Nicolussi
inevitabile del modo di manifestarsi dei valori, il riferimento ad essi ha funzione

normativa
e pertanto lindagine nella realt sociale ha senso (in termini valutativi e
selettivi) ai fini
della ricerca di esempi di comportamento corrispondenti al valore.
Daltra parte, negli ordinamenti giuridici costituzionalizzati le clausole
generali come
la buona fede oggettiva hanno offerto ai diritti e ai valori fondamentali un punto
di innesto
nel contratto, secondo una concezione che, specialmente con riferimento alla buona
fede,
pu dirsi inscritta nella tradizione millenaria del diritto civile fin dallepoca
romana. Se
vero infatti che il principio di autonomia contrattuale costituisce un
diaframma nei
confronti dellefficacia immediata o mediata in senso proprio dei principi
costituzionali
nel contratto6, la stessa autonomia contrattuale a non esaurirsi nelle
manifestazioni di
volont delle parti e a lasciarsi integrare da considerazioni morali. E con

riguardo a queste
ultime, i valori costituzionali si pongono in primo piano come principi
oggettivi che
costituiscono parametri valutativi per linterpretazione/concretizzazione
delle clausole
generali nel diritto civile in materia di autonomia negoziale . In altre parole,

se da un lato,
il principio di autonomia deve essere preso sul serio e quindi la scelta di una
regolazione
autonoma degli interessi incompatibile con una equiparazione tra autonomia e
eterono-
mia, dallaltro, lautonomia non esclude la morale (giuridicamente rilevante) e
sebbene la
tutela giuridica delle determinazioni contenute nel contratto relativizzi la tutela
dei diritti
fondamentali, ci non pu significare che una parte possa imporre
allaltra sacrifici di
tali diritti n che questi sacrifici possano derivare da atti di disposizione di
diritti indis-
8
ponibili . Inoltre, come la dottrina dei rapporti tra principi
costituzionali e autonomia
privata insegna, i principi costituzionali valgono pur sempre come criteri o
direttive di
9
interpretazione delle leggi che regolano gli atti di autonomia privata . Ne deriva
che la
6 Mengoni, L. (2011a) p. 111. Ma v. gi Wieacker, F. (1954). In altre, parole,

nel rapporto tra autonomia pri-
vata e costituzione non vi spazio n per una Drittwirkung diretta n per una
Drittwirkung indiretta, cio
mediata in senso proprio dai concetti giuridici e dalle clausole generali.
Come sostiene Nogler, L. (2007), con
rinvio a Mengoni (107) sulla scorta di Canaris, C.-W. (1984) p. 213 i diritti
fondamentali salvo le poche
norme strutturate (anche) in modo regolativo, e cio gli artt. 36, 1 c., 37,
1 e 3 c., 39, 40, 51, 3 c. e 52, 2
c. non possono, in quanto principi, incidere nei rapporti negoziali privati
se non come criteri o direttive
di interpretazione delle leggi che li regolano.
7 Mengoni, L. (2011a) p. 108.
8 Spunti interessanti sul tema dei rapporti fra autonomia contrattuale e diritti
fondamentali si possono rica-
vare anche dal dibattito sorto negli anni cinquanta in Germania a proposito
del rapporto tra obblighi con-
trattuali e conflitti di coscienza: Bosch, F.-W./Habscheid, W. (1954);
Blomeyer, A. (1954) con riferimento
anche a Nipperdey, H. C. (1950); Wieacker, F. (1954); Bosch, F.-W./Habscheid,
W. (1956); Kaufmann, H.
(1962); Brecher, F. (1965) p. 48; Esser, J. (1970) p. 42; Larenz, K. (1970) p.
108. Oggi peraltro la herrschende
Meinung in materia di diritti fondamentali e diritto privato si formata
sulla scia di Canaris, C.-W. (1999)
che a p. 9 la definisce una Jahrhundertproblematik. Una efficace sintesi si
trova in Nogler, L. (2007) che
aderisce allatraduzione mengoniana nellordinamento italiano
dellinsegnamento di Canaris.
9 Mengoni, op. loc. ult. cit. I principi esprimono delle prese di posizione
obiettive di valore (Grundentschei-
dungen) che, oltre ad essere rivolte nei confronti del legislatore, orientano
anche linterpretazione del diritto
positivo perch gli organi giurisdizionali hanno lobbligo di proteggere
(Schutzpflicht) i diritti fondamentali.
Cfr. Nogler, L. (2007) p. 596 in rapporto a Canaris.
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stessa comprensione giuridica dellautonomia contrattuale risulta condizionata dai

prin-
cipi costituzionali proprio nella misura in cui essi a loro volta orientano
linterpretazione
della disciplina del contratto.
Ora, laspetto problematico nella ricerca di un equilibrio in questo ambito
costi-
tuito dalloscillazione che si pu determinare a seconda che lautonomia come
principio
giuridico tenda a essere concepita in senso solidale (ossia in un contesto
solidale), come
peraltro sembra pi coerente col costituzionalismo del secondo novecento in Europa,
oppure tenda a essere colta in una chiave puramente soggettivistico-formale. C

infatti
il rischio che la logica solidale si indebolisca sempre pi sotto la spinta
derivante dalla
rappresentazione del contratto incentrata sullo spot contract, la quale
negli ultimi
decenni sembra sempre pi egemonizzante. Nel nostro tempo, infatti, esigenze di
eticiz-
zazione dei rapporti contrattuali legate soprattutto alla durata devono fare i
conti con
una sorta di imperialismo del modello dello spot contract, che si presenta come
lopzione
pi funzionale alla spersonalizzazione dei rapporti di mercato indotta
specialmente
dalle grandi tecno-organizzazioni imprenditoriali. Queste ultime, per giunta,
operano
spesso su scala multinazionale, sollecitando la competizione tra
ordinamenti giuri-
dici allinsegna di una race to the bottom nella tutela della parte debole10. Anche
le c.d.
liberalizzazioni degli ultimi decenni per lo pi sono avvenute promuovendo il

principio
di libert di recesso dai contratti di durata, anzich privilegiare strumenti di
tutela nel
contratto della parte che contrae per esigenze di base della vita personale o
familiare11.
Si preferisce, ad esempio, favorire luscita dal contratto di mutuo bancario da

parte del
cliente non professionista per affidarlo alla concorrenza tra imprese, anzich
introdurre
alcune regole che, sfruttando la durata del rapporto, impongano alla banca di
organiz-
zare il servizio creditizio in modo da alleggerire il cliente in caso di
sopravvenienze da
lui non facilmente superabili.
Nemmeno gli studi in materia di diritto comune europeo dei contratti e delle
obbli-
gazioni, coltivati autorevolmente da qualche decennio, sono rimasti immuni da
queste
tendenze. Addirittura essi hanno sortito quello che stato definito un esito
minimalista
e consistente nella proposta di regolamento di un diritto comune europeo della
vendita12,
ripiegando quindi di nuovo sullarchetipo degli spot contracts. Sul piano

simbolico, pu
ritenersi esemplare nel senso della deeticizzazione, il fatto che la
Commissione, allo
stato attuale, abbia persino rifiutato di inserire nella proposta il divieto di
contratti con-
tra bonos mores. Cercare una spiegazione di tale diniego nella preoccupazione che
una
10 Mi sia consentito rinviare a Nicolussi, A. (2006) pp. 90 ff.

11 Cfr. in Italia art. 8, l. 2 aprile 2007, n. 40 "Conversione in legge, con
modificazioni, del decreto-legge 31
gennaio 2007, n. 7, recante misure urgenti per la tutela dei consumatori, la
promozione della concorrenza, lo
sviluppo di attivit economiche e la nascita di nuove imprese".
12 Cfr. Castronovo, C. (2012)
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Andrea Nicolussi
simile regola possa generare una pericolosa omologazione etica nella
giurisprudenza
europea sembra poco plausibile. La contrariet ai bonos mores, invero, non
oggetto di
applicazioni frequenti n tanto meno preoccupanti negli ordinamenti europei, nei
quali
piuttosto sembra diffondersi la tendenza contraria a relegare letica
nella sfera pura-
mente individuale (lamentandosi e indignandosi peraltro per il malcostume in ambito
economico e politico). Mantenere il riferimento ai bonos mores rappresenterebbe

invece
il riconoscimento di un limite pi conforme alla dimensione sociale concreta in cui
il
contratto si inserisce e che la disciplina del contratto deve conservare se non si
vuole
scivolare in una identificazione riduzionistica di illiceit e illegalit.
Infatti, mante-
nendo la distinzione tra illiceit e illegalit, lordinamento giuridico
non rinuncia ad
una integrazione giudiziale dei divieti generali e astratti previsti dalle
fattispecie legali;
e in tal modo si avvale anche di un controllo del contratto in
funzione di parametri
etico-giuridici meno rigidi e pi riflessivi dellesperienza sociale dei valori,
oltre che pi
sensibili alle circostanze del caso concreto. In ogni caso, lesclusione del
riferimento ai
buoni costumi mostra limpoverimento a cui si pu andare incontro, se le regole
comuni
sui contratti finiscono per essere eccessivamente condizionate dal modello
riduttivo
della compravendita, il quale appanna persino la dimensione del rapporto
obbligatorio,
appiattendola sul dare, lasciando senzaltro neglette le istanze di giustizia
emergenti dai
contratti di durata.
Del resto, lo stesso DCFR, a cui la proposta di regolamento sulla
vendita viene
ricondotta come esito minimalista, mostra uninclinazione verso una cultura del
con-
tratto ispirata al primato della freedom of contract e della security che lo porta
a relegare
la justice al terzo posto tra i suoi quattro principi ispiratori e
soggiacenti allintera
sua disciplina13. In tal modo la prospettiva che stiamo seguendo si
conferma in pi
direzioni. Infatti, e in primo luogo, il fatto che il DCFR abbia incluso il

riferimento alla
giustizia, pur facendolo in una maniera discutibile, implica comunque il
riconosci-
mento che essa non estranea al contratto nemmeno quando lo si prende in
considera-
zione in funzione di modelli pi facilmente riconducibili a quelli mercantili, nei
quali
semmai i riferimenti ad essa tendono a sbiadire. Certo, considerare la giustizia
come
un principio tra i principi, anzich lideale generale a cui tende lesperienza
giuridica14,
13 Sostiene Fabre-Magnan, M. (2012) che la scurit juridiquetout

comme lefficacit sont des mots
ftiches, brandis pour mettre fin la discussion, ouplut t pour ne pas avoir
louvrir.
14 Invero, la caratteristica della giustizia quella di eccedere sempre rispetto
al diritto (auctor iuris est homo,
Iustitiae Deus). Sullinappropriatezza di questa operazione che relega la
giustizia a principio tra i principi,
v. gi Castronovo, C. (2011) pp. 850 f. Dei principi, proprio in riferimento
alla vendita, parla anche Fabre-
Magnan, M. (2012) pp. 1430 f. Quanto agli altri principi indicati dal DCFR,
essi possono semmai essere
considerati punti di vista, peraltro piuttosto parziali, integranti della
giustizia. Tra i diversi principi o valori
che integrano la giustizia la funzione pratica del diritto impone di condurre
volta a volta il bilanciamento
secondo le condizioni storicamente determinate del momento in cui si prende la
decisione.
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costituisce una svista sorprendente, rilevare la quale dovrebbe gi bastare a far

riflettere
su quelleclissi del diritto civile che da ultimo stata autorevolmente denunciata
e che
sembra riguardarlo fin nella cultura che lo alimenta15. In ogni caso, il ruolo
subordi-
nato che il DCFR assegna alla justice offre un altro argomento a favore
dellopportunit
di procedere oltre il modello dello spot contract facendo guadagnare una visione
pi
completa del fenomeno contrattuale nella sua interezza. Invero, mentre gli spot
con-
tracts riducono lorizzonte di giustizia al paradigma della
Fernbereichsmoral, se si
allarga la considerazione ai rapporti che durano nel tempo ci si pu chiedere se
questi
ultimi partecipino in qualche modo di una Nahbereichsmoral, la quale implicherebbe,
oltre ai profili del sinallagma, doveri di solidariet (anche in forma di limiti a

una pre-
tesa) non aventi necessariamente una contropartita e nascenti per tutelare diritti
fon-
damentali della persona o per permettere ad essa di adempiere a obblighi
altrettanto
fondamentali. Invero, la durata implica lintrecciarsi della dimensione sincronica
con
quella diacronica: le prestazioni e i singoli momenti di esecuzione del contratto
pos-
sono essere visti sia come unit attuali che in ogni frazione di tempo potrebbero
essere
comparate bilanciando ci che una parte fa rispetto allaltra, sia come elementi
che si
proiettano nella durata complessiva del contratto ricevendo senso anche in funzione
di
questultima. Il godimento o la possibilit di godimento della casa da parte del
condut-
tore trova ogni mese un corrispettivo nel canone di locazione, ma il valore del
godi-
mento mensile si determina anche in funzione della durata complessiva del rapporto
di
locazione, onde il calcolo del dare e dellavere di per s potrebbe essere svolto
solo alla
fine del rapporto. Cos il mutuatario, che riceve una somma di denaro da restituire
in
rate comprendenti gli interessi da pagare per un certo periodo di tempo, potr
valutare
solo al termine, conosciuti gli andamenti del valore del denaro, se il valore
restituito
sar ragionevolmente comparabile al capitale ricevuto. Inoltre, durante
questo lasso
di tempo le vicende che possono accompagnare lo svolgimento del rapporto si riflet-
tono sulle parti in un modo che si rivela tanto pi squilibrato quanto pi ampio
il
divario della loro rispettiva organizzazione economica e della loro
rispettiva capac-
it di previsione, nonch del grado di coinvolgimento personale sia sotto
il profilo
delladempimento sia riguardo allinteresse da soddisfare mediante il
contratto. Ad
esempio, in relazione alladempimento, lobbligazione pecuniaria del mutuatario,
per la
quale il limite dellimpossibilit sopravvenuta in quanto tale inapplicabile,
potrebbe
andare incontro a una difficultas praestandi che in certi casi potrebbe configurare
una
causa di inesigibilit o di sospensione della esigibilit.
15 Ha parlato di un eclissi del diritto civile Carlo Castronovo nelle Lezioni

pisane di diritto civile di questanno.
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Andrea Nicolussi
3.2 Solo una dimensione sociale autoritaria o anche una etico-giuridica

per il contratto? Autonomia relazionale e solidale vs. autonomia in
senso individualistico
Forse questa stessa problematicit pu offrire una (parziale) spiegazione anche del
fatto
che le formulazione di principi e regole europei comuni sui contratti tendano a
trascurare
i contratti di durata, e quelli per lesistenza delle persone in particolare.
Sicuramente trat-
tare questi contratti implicava lo scioglimento di una serie di nodi legati anche
ai principi
di fondo cui si ispira un ordinamento giuridico (solidariet, diritti
inviolabili). In altri
termini, lintroduzione di doveri di solidariet sembra implicare una prospettiva
pi schi-
ettamente valutativa o propriamente politica che poteva apparire fuori portata
rispetto
alla funzione che a tali formulazioni era stata assegnata, limitatamente alla
comprensione
tecnico-giuridica del fenomeno contrattuale e alla sua ricomposizione sintetica in
chiave
di principi comuni16. Daltra parte, una diversa sensibilit si manifestata
invocando una
dimensione sociale del contratto che lo vuole caricare di funzioni di integrazione

della c.d.
social justice17. Certo, lintegrazione del contratto con regole eteronome
unesperienza
consolidata nel diritto vivente europeo, e sicuramente non pu essere messa in

discus-
sione rispolverando formalisticamente un anacronistico e rigido dogma della
volont.
Inoltre, ormai acquisita lidea che il mercato debba essere conformato dal
diritto alla
stregua di unistituzione pubblica e quindi munito di regole che lo
strutturino, pro-
teggendo lindividuo e la sua libert nei confronti delle grandi organizzazioni
economiche,
le quali sono in grado, proprio sfruttando il tradizionale ma formale ossequio al
principio
di libert contrattuale, di mortificarla nei fatti18. Tuttavia, le modalit e la
misura degli
interventi legali al riguardo sembrano ancora attenere a quel margine di

apprezzamento
che gli stati e in generale la politica tende a riservarsi.
Inoltre, occorre che lautonomia rimanga preservata nel suo significato di
fondo quale
espressione della dimensione personale e quindi libera dei soggetti di entrare in
rapporto
fra di loro per le esigenze cooperative della vita di relazione. Se si segue solo
la via di una
socializzazione per legge del contratto, esso rischia di risultare incapsulato in
una pros-
pettiva meramente funzionalistica in cui una superiore esigenza di conformazione
strut-
turale del mercato, magari per eterogenesi dei fini o per la sua stessa neutrit
assiologica,
16 Lesperienza dei PECL, rivolti esplicitamente a una formulazione

moderna della lex mercatoria e quindi
soprattutto a contraenti internazionali (cfr. Castronovo, C. (2001) p. 14) e
degli altri tentativi di formulare
principi e regole comuni si caratterizzata infatti allinsegna di unidea di
elaborazione tecnica e tendenzial-
mente scevra da valutazione etico-politiche: cfr. Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et al.
(2009) pp. 9 ff.
17 Ad esempio, Eichenhofer, E. (1997) (citato anche da Bargelli, E. (2007))
considera la disciplina delle loca-
zioni abitative e il diritto dei consumatori come momenti
dellutilizzazione del diritto privato a scopi di
politica sociale.
18 Cfr. gi Raiser, L. (1957) p. 7.
134
----------------------- Page 174-----------------------
riduce le parti contrattuali a ingranaggi di un meccanismo19. Infatti, una

concezione ridut-
tiva del contratto e neutra moralmente riguardo agli interventi eteronomi su di

esso pu
persino apparire incerta, se non ambigua, circa la sua stessa ratio. Da un lato,
tali inter-
venti eteronomi, spuri rispetto alla logica sinallagmatica cui comunque viene
ricondotto
il contratto, assumono una funzione prettamente espropriativa nei confronti della
parte
onerata, alla quale viene imposto di dare senza contropartita. Cos , ad
esempio, con
riguardo a certe rappresentazioni proprietarie del posto di lavoro. Persino la
tutela della
maternit che impone al datore di lavoro il pagamento di una retribuzione in
mancanza
di controprestazione della lavoratrice potrebbe essere vista in modo deformato. In
altre
parole, una concezione puramente avversariale del rapporto contrattuale fa velo ai
profili
di rilievo personale insiti nel rapporto di lavoro e impedisce di cogliere nella
relazione con-
trattuale lobbligo di solidariet nei confronti della donna e del nascituro sia
come valore
interinviduale sia come valore sociale e quindi elemento di connessione nel
contratto con
una pi generale organizzazione giuridica della tutela della maternit che potrebbe
non
esaurirsi nel rapporto contrattuale20. Daltra parte, dal punto di vista della
tutela del con-
sumatore, il fatto che la riduzione funzionalistica di essa tenda a generare

incertezza circa
la sua stessa ratio ha reso possibili interpretazioni efficientistiche fino a
configurare questa
tutela come favorevole alle imprese o a certe imprese piuttosto che al
consumatore21.
Se invece si coglie in ogni contratto una dimensione morale

che si innesta
nellautonomia relazionale di cui il contratto applicazione, gli scopi di tutela
degli obbli-
ghi che eventualmente trascendono il sinallagma conservano una dimensione personale
che permette di distinguere il bene tutelato e impedisce di legittimare

interpretazioni
funzionalistiche che nellottica del consumatore favorirebbero addirittura
leterogenesi dei
fini22. Cos, la garanzia in forma specifica che il consumatore pu far valere in
base alla
disciplina europea della vendita di beni di consumo non pu essere concepita come
uno
strumento per vincolarlo al contratto, impedendogli di tornare sul mercato, ma la
misura
pi adeguata affinch il venditore si faccia carico dello specifico interesse del
consumatore
al bene. Perci, qualora il venditore non sia in grado di soddisfare adeguatamente
questo
interesse, il consumatore dovr essere rimesso nella condizione di ritornare sul
mercato.
Daltra parte, per quanto concerne la tutela della maternit che grava sul datore
di lavoro
senza contropartita allinterno del contratto, il diritto della madre dovrebbe
essere coer-
ente con la fiducia che connota il rapporto di lavoro. Conseguentemente, un datore
di
lavoro non rimproverabile di comportamenti discriminatori, che offra un posto di
lavoro
19 Si parla anche di abgegrenzte Rollen und Funktionen secondo quanto gi

denunciato da Freyer, H. (1956)
pp. 79 ff, citato anche da Bckenfrde, E.-W. (1991) 65 testo e nota 4.
20 Si pensi a misure pubblicistiche a tutela della maternit e ad incentivi per il
datore di lavoro.
21 Mi sia consentito rinviare a Nicolussi, A. (2006) pp. 95 ff; Nicolussi, A.
(2007) pp. 928 ff.
22 Per un esempio, cfr. Alessi, R. (2000) pp. 984 f. Diversamente, Albanese, A.
(2008) pp. 134 ff.
135
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Andrea Nicolussi
esplicitamente per far fronte a un interesse immediato di incremento della

produzione,
dovrebbe poter far valere il comportamento sleale della donna che abbia mentito sul
pro-
prio stato di gravidanza al momento della conclusione del contratto. Laffidamento,
del
resto, mette capo a unesigenza di giustizia che nel diritto tedesco ha ispirato
lidea della
Verwirkung e del venir meno della base negoziale, istituti con i quali -
evidentemente - si
superano le esigenze di certezza formale riconducibili alla security e al pacta
sunt servanda .
Pi in generale, il diffondersi di codici etici, talora previsti anche da
leggi, conferma
listanza di eticizzazione o, se si vuole, di un fondamento metalegale, e quindi
non auto-
ritario, di obblighi di protezione nellambito di attivit private, anche se lo
strumento del
codice etico, rimanendo ancora sul piano dellautonomia, si rivela per lo pi
insufficiente
se non inadeguato. Certo, il richiamo della morale sul piano del diritto
questione pro-
blematica, specialmente se si tiene conto, da un lato, del principio pluralistico
degli ordina-
menti contemporanei e, dallaltro, dei rapporti tra potere legislativo e potere
giudiziario.
Occorre quindi chiarirne ulteriormente il senso e la portata.
Il punto di innesto pi evidente della morale nel contratto pu essere colto
sul riflesso
che il principio dellautonomia contrattuale non espressione della semplice
autodetermin-
azione individuale delle parti, perch il contratto rimane pur sempre un atto
relazionale, onde
lautodeterminazione di un contraente deve quantomeno conciliarsi con
quella dellaltro.
Lautonomia contrattuale , in altri termini, unautonomia relazionale e ci
dovrebbe essere
sufficiente per riconoscere in apicibus la plausibilit di una dimensione morale
intersogget-
tiva, non semplicemente individuale, del contratto. Ma guadagnata questa
prospettiva, si pone
altres la questione se le relazioni giuridiche di diritto privato patrimoniale
siano riducibili
a ununica dimensione, la sinallagmaticit (il do ut des), o se pure nellorbita
dellautonomia
contrattuale vi sia spazio anche per il principio di solidariet come fonte di
obblighi senza
contropartita, cio funzionali alla realizzazione di un valore e indipendenti dalla
volont
delle parti. In altri termini, la domanda se la morale del contratto si riduca al
principio del
pacta sunt servanda, che pure il valore proprio dellautonomia quale fondamento
di un rap-
porto giuridico23, o se con essa sia compatibile una certa misura di
Verantwortungsethik che
porterebbe il contratto oltre i confini della Freiheitsethik, la quale ispira

tradizionalmentee
23 Sostiene Atiyah, P. S. (1995) p. 2: Although English lawyers and Theorists

are traditionally wont to insist that
law and morality are distinct, it is none the less true that the law reflects
to a considerable extent the moral
standards and ideals of the community in which operates. It is therefore non
surprising to find that, behind a
great deal of the law of contract, there lies the simple moral principle that
a person should fulfil his promises
and abide by his agrrements. Una dimensione morale del contratto
riconosciuta espressamente da Fabre-
Magnan, M. (2012) secondo la quale contrairement au leitmotiv lassant rabch
par les projets europens,
le droit des contrats na pas pour seul objectif de faciliter le commerce
transfrontalire et de diminuer les
cots de transaction (affirmation au demeurant jamais dmontre). Dautres
valeur bien plus importantes
sont vhicules par le droit des contrats: la loyaut, la justice commutative
et distributive, la confiance, ou
encore le respect de la parole donne.
136
----------------------- Page 176-----------------------
in generale il diritto privato24. Non a caso, del resto, si parla di principio del
contratto (Ver-
tragsprinzip) per riferirsi allidea che di regola fonte dellobbligazione

soltanto la volont
bilaterale, mentre la solidariet normalmente opera come fonte di obblighi
extracontrat-
tuali o eventualmente per estendere obblighi delle parti a favore di terzi (Vertrag
mit Schutz-
wirkungen zugunsten Dritter)25. Tuttavia oggi il contratto non concepito n
regolato come
norma di un rapporto che si risolve unicamente nella volont delle parti

(rectius: mani-
festazione di volont delle parti), ma aperto a una integrazione. Perci
legittimo chiedersi
se esso - con le parole della filosofia illuministica- sia solo ed esclusivamente
strumento della
felicit individuale, per cui ciascuna parte persegue unicamente il proprio
interesse, cos
come lo ha autodeterminato e (ovviamente) nella misura in cui ottiene laccordo
della con-
troparte26, oppure se anche nella disciplina del contratto possa giocare un ruolo,
pur limitato,
unidea diversa di felicit che non sia indifferente alla persona dellaltra parte
contrattuale
27
(una felicit solidale) . Non necessario dimostrare che le discipline
europee del contratto
tendono a considerare come paradigma dominante la prospettiva della felicit
individuale,
ma al tempo stesso non difficile sostenere che il principio della libert di
contratto a sua
volta disciplinato in un contesto normativo dal quale risultano dei limiti che
talora sono
proprio di natura morale.
Questi limiti sono richiamati, come si gi sottolineato, dalle clausole
generali del
buon costume (ad es., 138 BGB) e della buona fede (art. 1366-1375 c.c.) che
rinviano a
valori metapositivi suscettibili di una Konkretisierung ad opera del giudice28. Il
sintagma
buona fede (fides bona , good faith ), in particolare, costituisce un richiamo

diretto a valu-
tazioni morali: la stessa fides rinvia allaffidamento in una correttezza di
comportamento o
in una lealt (Treu und Glauben) che a sua volta non possono non rimandare a un
codice
etico di comportamento al quale commisurare la correttezza (o la lealt); e la
qualifica-
zione buona attribuita alla fede non fa che rimarcare questa prospettiva etica29.
Anche
le recenti proposte di disciplina europea del contratto (Pecl, DCFR30) non si sono
potute
24 Solitamente la dimensione di libert a cui il diritto privato viene ricondotto

e ridotto colta in funzione di
contrappeso a tendenze centralistiche a sovraccaricare lintervento pubblico.
In tal senso, cfr. Schmid, C. U.
(2010) p. 13: Danach gebhrt autonomen privatrechtlichen Regelungen in einem
freiheitlichen Gemeinwe-
sen nach der Maxime in dubio pro libertate ein grundstzlicher Vorrang vor
hoheitlicher Intervention.
25 Cfr. Castronovo, C. (1976) p. 175 ff. Tale figura non prevista peraltro dai
Principi di diritto europeo dei
contratti (Principles of European Contract Law).
26 V. gi Raiser, L. (1960) p. 104.
27 Questa concezione della felicit in senso solidale non estranea nemmeno alla
prospettiva utilitaristica: cfr.
Mill, J. S. (1974)
28 Significativamente Nivarra, L. (2012) mette in esergo la frase di H. Stoll:
Jedes Schuldverhltnis ist heute ein
bonae fidei iudicium (Stoll, H. (1932))
29 Sulla buona fede cfr. Mengoni, L. (2011a) p. 165 f. Riguardo al concetto di
lealt e di fedelt, si legge una presa
di distanza anche linguistica in Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2011) p. 348, che
per lo riportano a contesti storici
ormai superati.
30 Castronovo, C. (2001); Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et al. (2009)
137
----------------------- Page 177-----------------------
Andrea Nicolussi
esimere dal prevedere la clausola generale della buona fede, alla quale anzi hanno
fatto
ampiamente ricorso31. Del resto, trattandosi di proposte prive di una
legittimazione stat-
uale, erano quasi costrette se volevano indicare dei limiti a riferirsi a quel
minimo
di etica che si coagula intorno al principio dellaffidamento: poich
infatti la fiducia
requisito indispensabile del rapporto32, questultimo senza una tutela
dellaffidamento
destinato a dissolversi33. In fin dei conti, se si avvalora il principio di
autonomia contrat-
tuale, il rinvio alletica potrebbe essere visto come una sorta di coerente
declinazione del
principio di sussidiariet accolto dal Trattato europeo, dal momento che i doveri
che da
essa si ricavano non sono puramente e semplicemente frutto di esercizio
dellauctoritas
politica, ma di una ricerca che il giudice deve effettuare, negli ambiti concreti
coinvolti
dallesercizio dellautonomia, dei modelli esemplari di comportamento buono. Del
resto, i
processi di globalizzazione, con il conseguente ridimensionamento della formazione
stat-
uale del diritto, e in generale il superamento del normativismo puro sembrano aver
aperto
il campo a una concezione neo-istituzionale (o Reflexives Recht secondo
lespressione ted-
esca)34, secondo la quale la formazione del diritto si articolerebbe in modo pi
complesso:
rispetto alla legge, cresce il ruolo del diritto di formazione giudiziale e di

quello derivante
dallesercizio dellautonomia di singoli o collettiva. Perci leteronomia
che mediante la
buona fede il giudice finisce per esercitare sul contratto - o dovrebbe essere -
una etero-
nomia non autoritaria, come lo quella puramente e semplicemente imposta da una
mag-
gioranza legislativa, ma, per cos dire, responsabile, e proprio in quanto tale pi
conforme
ai dati della realt fattuale in cui si forma il giudizio e alle concezioni etiche
che in un certo
31 Una critica singolare a tale riferimento alla buona fede si legge in

Brggemeier, G./Bussani, M. et al. (2004)
32 Cfr. Luhmann, N. (2002) p. 53 f, dove per qualche fraintendimento del
fenomeno giuridico relativo alla
tutela della buona fede.
33 La buona fede non coincide col principio di solidariet sebbene in una certa
misura lo presupponga.
Essa radica una eticizzazione dei rapporti nella persona dei soggetti
coinvolti facendo appello alla
buona fede di ciascuno, ossia alla possibilit per ciascuno di avere coscienza
degli affidamenti che crea
nellaltro e quindi nella responsabilit cui tenuto. Sotto questo profilo,
perci, una distinzione tra con-
cezioni liberali e concezioni solidali della buona fede si rivela
semplicistica. Una radicalizzazione della
concezione liberale potrebbe dissolvere la buona fede cos come la
radicalizzazione di quella solidar-
istica, dal momento che la buona fede non una goccia di olio socialista, un
pretesto per introdurre
politiche di tipo socialista nella disciplina del mercato. Ogni intervento
eteronomo sul contratto, se vuol
essere rispettoso della verit della forma giuridica, deve essere compatibile
collautonomia contrattuale.
La buona fede compatibile collautonomia proprio per il suo riferirsi, in
ultima analisi, al principio
dellaffidamento.
34 Cfr. Mengoni, L. (2011a) il quale (67) distingue il neo-istituzionalismo dal
neoliberismo precisando che
il primo mira a una integrazione della societ mediante processi di autonomia
sociale istituzionalizzati
e disciplinati dal diritto dello stato e che (71) il modello neo-
istituzionalista alleggerisce il problema
della fondazione del diritto dello Stato in quanto sostituisce
parzialmente le funzioni di normazione
materiale della legge con funzioni organizzative di procedure di
formazione discorsiva del consenso
sociale in corrispondenza a determinate esigenze etiche. Reflexives Recht
anche il titolo di un saggio
di Teubner, G. (1982).
138
----------------------- Page 178-----------------------
contesto sociale si possono autonomamente formare35. In altre parole, lidea qui

evocata
di intervento giudiziale corrisponde alla formula bona fides quae in contractibus

exigitur
aequitatem summam desiderat36: il giudice chiamato a un esercizio di grande
equilibrio in
un giudizio che nei rapporti tra privati esige sempre la risoluzione di collisioni
(reali) di val-
ori, salvo naturalmente il previo riconoscimento dal carattere apparente della
collisione37.
Si tratta di un equilibrio non facile, ma la cui difficolt pu essere

ridotta nella misura
in cui una efficace interazione fra giurisprudenza e dottrina giuridica operi il
vaglio dei
precedenti ed elabori criticamente una tipizzazione che orienti la valutazione nel
caso sin-
golo38. Il superamento del monopolio legalista nella formazione del diritto
significa, infatti,
la crescita di ruolo del diritto colto e la partecipazione responsabile della

dottrina, sul piano
delle proposte interpretative, alla Fortbildung dellordinamento39. La
sollecitazione verso
una ripresa del discorso sui valori nel diritto dei contratti ha anche la forma di
una presa di
consapevolezza del ruolo del diritto vivente e dellinterpretazione in questa
materia.
La prospettiva che si va descrivendo, in definitiva, tenta di integrare il
problema di trovare
una giustificazione ad obblighi di solidariet, e quindi senza contropartita,
compatibili con una
nuova dogmatica dellautonomia privata, senza rassegnarsi a delegare il compito
interamente a
una eventuale, ipotetica riforma legale, pi o meno orientata alla c.d. social
justice of contracts.
Infatti, lapertura dellautonomia privata a profili di solidariet, nella misura
in cui pu tro-
vare una base etica - fosse pure istituzionalizzata costituzionalmente o ricavata
da una clausola
generale come la buona fede40 -, perde quella allure autoritaria che altrimenti
promanerebbe
35 Sostiene infatti Castronovo, C. (1987) che la buona fede n si colloca sul

crinale che corre tra autonomia e etero-
nomia, e individua per linee sinuose e talora difficili da cogliere e da
percorrere quella che potremmo chiamare
eteronomia non autoritaria, indicativa di un intervento anche incisivo sul
contratto, intervento che, pur condotto
da un potere alieno alle parti, tuttavia non autoritario perch si limita a
filtrare valori sociali entro la forma
giuridica. E i valori sociali, una volta divenuti tali, prescindono per
definizione dalla dimensione impositiva.
36 D. 16, 3, 31 pr., Tryph. 9 disp. citato da Castronovo, C. (1987) per mostrare
come fin dai tempi dei romani
fosse chiaro che la buona fede esige un particolare equilibrio nellopera del
giudice.
37 Cfr. Mller, F. (1990) pp. 95 ff. Del resto, a parte la distinzione previa tra
collisioni reali e collisioni apparenti,
la logica del bilanciamento rappresenta una conseguenza della raggiunta
consapevolezza che nei rapporti tra
privati le parti che possono invocare diritti fondamentali sono sempre
(almeno) due: Nogler, L. (2007) p. 596.
38 Cfr. Mengoni, L. (2011c)
39 Sul rapporto tra legge, autonomia privata e giudice, segnala un certo
discontrollato sconfinare della giuris-
prudenza, Mazzamuto, S. (2012) pp. 250 ff. Alcune critiche di questo autore
sono condivisibili, ma in una
societ complessa e caratterizzata da una generale crisi dello strumento
legislativo la crescita di ruolo del
giudice sembra inevitabile. I confini, allora, si dovrebbero collocare
soprattutto sul piano della cultura
giuridica e della capacit di questa di svolgere due funzioni fondamentali.
Una quella relativa allanalisi
critico-dogmatica e alla tipizzazione del materiale giurisprudenziale, anche
in prospettiva di proposte di
criteri di decisione di tipologie di casi. Laltra quella di dogmatizzare,
in modo autorevole, il discorso sui
valori cui inevitabilmente il giudice attinge, anche (ma non solo) per via
delle carenze sempre maggiori
nella tecnica legislativa. Purtroppo una cultura giuridica prigioniera dei
tab veteropositivistici in materia
di etica giuridica tende a chiudere gli occhi o a distrarsi rispetto a questo
problema, lasciando degenerare il
fenomeno, in s fisiologico, nella patologia del giustizialismo, ossia in
applicazioni unilaterali di valori che
sfuggono alla tecnica del bilanciamento e alla distinzione delle collisioni
reali da quelle apparenti.
40 Per un collegamento tra buona fede e solidariet, Castronovo, C. (2005b) p.
601.
139
----------------------- Page 179-----------------------
Andrea Nicolussi
dalla mera imposizione legale e che potrebbe apparire come leffetto del prevalere
nel conflitto
sociale di una categoria a scapito di unaltra, una mera applicazione del principio
sola aucto-
ritas facit legem con i suoi riflessi espropriativo-punitivi a carico di chi
subisce le decisioni
dellautorit di altri. La ricerca di un fondamento morale degli obblighi che
vengono imposti
a una parte offre insomma una spiegazione di quegli stessi obblighi che una rigida
separaz-
ione della disciplina del contratto dalla morale lascerebbe irrisolta. E una
spiegazione degli
obblighi che ne sappia cogliere il fondamento permetterebbe anche di estenderli, in
via ana-
logica e in quanto compatibili, ad altri tipi contrattuali riconoscibili come
contratti di durata
per lesistenza della persona: si pensi, ad esempio, a obblighi di protezione in
caso di recesso
della parte forte che si potrebbero estendere, mutatis mutandis, oltre il
contratto di lavoro.
Non si tratta quindi di una opinabile ragione moralistica da applicare ai
contratti, bens di una
ragione morale filtrata attraverso il diritto. Infatti, il riferimento a un valore
morale nel discorso
giuridico comporta che questultimo venga rivestito della natura giuridica, e
quindi partecipi
alla logica della ragionevolezza e del bilanciamento con gli altri valori in gioco
senza dar adito
a fondamentalismi e assolutizzazioni41. In definitiva, quando si parla di morale si
allude a una
morale giuridicamente rilevante e sostenibile, che prescinde dalle

valutazioni soggettive, e
qualifica i comportamenti secondo una misura compatibile con lautonomia.
3.3 Una troppo rigida separazione tra mercato e contratto, da una

parte, e etica e gratuit, dallaltra
ricorrente il rilievo che il diritto e leconomia moderna tendono a separare

rigidamente la
dimensione delle relazioni connotate da atteggiamenti di gratuit da quelle fondate
su uno
scambio. molto citata la frase di Adam Smith secondo cui non dalla benevolenza
del
41 In questo senso, sembra riduttiva laffermazione di Reuter, D. (1994), secondo

cui una rieticizzazione del
diritto privato (Reethisierung des Privatrechts) potrebbe portare con
s dei fondamentalismi. Anzitutto,
pure lidea che il diritto privato sia il terreno della Freiheitsethik pu
determinare simili conseguenze. Inol-
tre, la morale quando si fa diritto deve necessariamente passare attraverso i
filtri del discorso giuridico e
aprirsi ai bilanciamenti di valori. Laltro piano inerisce alla questione se
il diritto abbia il compito di difen-
dere la possibilit di uno spazio etico ulteriore sia rispetto alla
sinallagmaticit sia rispetto allimposizione
di obblighi senza contropartita. Tale spazio costituisce unestensione del
principio di autonomia e si pu
indicare genericamente prendendo a prestito la parola dono, molto diffusa nei
discorsi di filosofia morale e
che sembra ancora dover caratterizzare larea dei rapporti che hanno ad
oggetto elementi personali. Si pensi
ad esempio al settore della circolazione di parti del corpo umano o al c.d.
terzo settore (o volontariato).
Peraltro, lesigenza di rimanere anche qui nellambito di una dimensione
intersoggettiva impone di precisare
subito che il modo in cui certe prospettive della filosofia morale
contrappongono il dono allo scambio costi-
tuisce uno spunto, ma non pu rappresentare integralmente il punto di vista
dellordinamento giuridico,
perch il diritto non in grado n di interamente conoscere n quindi di
tutelare lautenticit dei compor-
tamenti e delle intenzioni di chi li pone in essere. Ad esempio, pur
accogliendone la provocazione culturale,
il giurista non pu fare uso dello stesso concetto di dono oggetto delle
aporie decostruttive di filosofi come
Derrida secondo cui il dono avrebbe bisogno di una purezza radicale che lo
avvolge addirittura di mistero,
tanto che la stessa accettazione di esso e prima ancora la percezione come
dono lo annullerebbe.Il semplice
fenomeno del dono, - dice infatti Derrida, J. (1996) p. 16- lo annulla come
dono.
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macellaio, del birraio o del panettiere che noi ci aspettiamo il nostro pane
quotidiano, ma
dalla soddisfazione del loro interesse. Noi non ci rivolgiamo alla loro umanit, ma
al loro
amor proprio, e mai ci riferiamo alle nostre necessit, ma ai loro vantaggi.
Nessuno tranne
42
il mendicante sceglie di vivere dipendendo dalla benevolenza dei suoi concittadini
.
Il pensiero economico moderno abbastanza univoco in tal senso. Sia i
teorici del
liberalismo sia quelli del collettivismo reputano che sotto il profilo della
gratuit il mer-
cato sia di per s irredimibile. Gli uni lo concepiscono come una dimensione
necessaria
ai fini della liberazione dalle strutture autoritarie dellepoca premoderna per
rendere pos-
sibile, ma fuori dal mercato, una vita buona e quindi eticamente improntata. Il
gratuito,
insomma, si svolgerebbe necessariamente altrove: nelle relazioni damicizia, nel
matrimo-
nio e nei rapporti damore, nellarte, nella cultura, nella religione. Gli altri, i
collettivisti,
giudicano il mercato una fonte di rapporti alienati e quindi causa di ingiustizie,
e perci da
sopprimere. Questa rappresentazione delleconomia stata dominante nella
modernit,
mettendo a tacere voci diverse come, ad esempio, lidea delleconomia civile
proposta da
Genovesi e dalla scuola napoletana del Settecento che concepiva la socialit umana
come
una realt unitaria nellambito della quale le relazioni economiche non sono
soltanto di
mutuo vantaggio, ma anche di mutua assistenza43 .
Inoltre, nellottica moderna il mercato pensato come caratterizzato da due
protago-
nisti in una certa misura contraddittori. Da un lato, le relazioni esterne
allimpresa rap-
porti b to b e rapporti b to c improntate alla logica esclusiva del contratto
di scambio,
concepito come accordo retto da una causa sinallagmatica e, dallaltro,
limpresa come
organizzazione gerarchica e quindi chiusa, internamente, al principio
delleguaglianza
formale e degli accordi di scambio. Gli unici contratti gratuiti, il comodato e il
deposito,
sono piuttosto marginali nelle attivit di mercato e quando vengono impiegati per
lo pi
non regolano rapporti isolati, ma profili collegati a pi complesse operazioni
economiche.
Inoltre, la realit che li caratterizza li accosta alla tutela restitutoria, che ha
come fonda-
mento proprio lidea della giusta causa dellattribuzione.
Max Weber parla addirittura di una comunit di contratto, affermando che
dal punto
di vista giuridico la situazione economica legittima, cio la somma dei diritti
legittimamente
acquisiti in senso giuridico e delle obbligazioni legittime dellindividuo, oggi
determinata
da un lato da acquisti ereditari che gli spettano in virt di relazioni giuridiche
familiari, e
dallaltro lato direttamente o indirettamente da contratti conclusi da lui o in
suo nome44.
42 It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that
we espect our dinner, but from
their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity
but to their self-love, and
never talk to them of our own necessities but of thei advantages. Nobody but a
beggar chooses to depend
chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens Smith, A. (1776) pp. 26 f.
Secondo Sen, A. K. (2002) p.
37, per questo passo citatissimo dovrebbe essere letto alla stregua dellopera
complessiva di Smith, autore
anche della Theory of Moral Sentiments, e quindi senza inferirne una dottrina
economica sostenitrice di una
separazione radicale delleconomia dalletica.
43 Lo rileva Bruni, L. (2006) p. 36.
44 Weber, M. (1995) p. 20.
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Andrea Nicolussi
3.4 Etica dello scambio e Freiheitsethik
La contrapposizione tra gratuit e scambio potrebbe veicolare un messaggio

superfi-
ciale che occulta una certa dimensione etica pur presente negli stessi rapporti
contrat-
tuali sinallagmatici. In realt, lo scambio improntato a quella
giustizia che Aristotele
chiamava commutativa e la citazione smithiana, riferendosi soltanto agli interessi
indi-
viduali, nasconde lelemento etico e relazionale: ciascuno chiede al macellaio al
birraio
e al panettiere una prestazione essendo disponibile a sua volta a una
controprestazione.
Perci la commutativit si mostra funzionale a un principio di esistenza dignitosa
legato
alla corrispettivit dello scambio stesso che, posto su basi di libert
contrattuale, rinvia
alla disponibilit a pagare un prezzo per le prestazioni richieste ad altri.
Evidentemente il
concetto di esistenza dignitosa che in questo contesto viene mutuato implica lidea
di una
autonomia economica, di una non dipendenza dellindividuo per soddisfare bisogni
mate-
riali, particolarmente avvertita in un tempo storico caratterizzato da notevoli
differenze
sociali e di status, compresa la condizione di schiavit.
In tale ottica, una concezione formale della giustizia commutativa -
orientata quindi
non al giusto prezzo, ma al prezzo fissato dalle parti - ha costituito
il fondamento del
mo dello di legittimazione delle teorie del contratto sociale (Staatsvertrag),
teorie che hanno
avuto una reviviscenza anche nella seconda met del 900. Il do ut des infatti
alla base di
quel mitico contratto originale per il quale ciascuno accetta di essere considerato
formal -
mente eguale agli altri e di scambiare con gli altri una uguale quota della propria
libert
in funzione di una ordinata convivenza civile45 . Questi aspetti
istituzionali sono messi
bene in evidenza da Canaris, il quale tra laltro critica la celebre affermazione

di Radbruch
secondo cui la giustizia commutativa sarebbe ein Zweckmssigkeitsverfahren im
Dienste
hchstmglicher gleichzeitiger Erfllung zweier Egoismen. Canaris obietta che
corrisponde
al precetto del rispetto di s ed condizione della dignit delluomo poter
soddisfare i pro-
pri bisogni mediante una controprestazione a favore di chi ci fornisce ci di cui
abbiamo
bisogno. Del resto, ancora oggi la disoccupazione considerata degradante e vi
sono molte
persone che, pur essendo legittimate ai sussidi previsti per tale condizione, per
vergogna
non vi fanno ricorso46 .
Si tratta per inevitabilmente di una giustizia commutativa in senso

puramente for-
male, che egli descrive come giustizia senza riguardo della persona . Cos intesa,
essa svolge
anche una funzione istituzionale contro le discriminazioni fondate sulle condizioni
parti-
colari della persona (la razza, il sesso, la religione, gli orientamenti politici)
e soprattutto a
favore del pluralismo, perch rispetta la diversit delle opzioni valoriali dei
singoli. Infatti,
una giustizia non in riguardo della persona , essendo slegata dalla
considerazione delle
45 Canaris, C.-W. (1997) pp. 27 f, con citazioni.

46 Canaris, C.-W. (1997) p. 30.
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----------------------- Page 182-----------------------
particolarit della singola persona e dalle sue opinioni sul modo di realizzarsi,
implica
fondamentalmente anche una indifferenza o tolleranza verso i valori personali e gli
obiet-
tivi individuali della controparte contrattuale47 . In altre parole, nella misura
in cui beni e
servizi sono strumentali alla realizzazione dellautodeterminazione dellindividuo

coer-
ente che il sinallagma sia liberamente fissato dalle parti (soggettivazione del
sinallagma):
chi meglio del soggetto interessato pu stabilire a quale costo disposto a
procurarsi un
bene o un servizio48 ?
In effetti, la diffusione dei contratti commutativi ha svolto una funzione

importante
per eliminare le strutture autoritarie dellantico regime. Non pi dalla graziosa
benevo-
lenza di un superiore, un feudatario o un pater familias , che ci
dobbiamo attendere la
soddisfazione di bisogni materiali. La libert di contratto e la possibilit di
comprare i
beni di cui abbiamo bisogno certamente un fattore che restituisce una certa
dignit agli
individui: il cash nexus, sebbene sia meno ricco delle relazioni damore,
ritenuto pi
civile del rapporto asimmetrico delle comunit feudali49 . La giustizia commutativa
con-
cepita in senso formale, in cui il sinallagma soggettivo, insomma alla base

dello stato
di diritto e della metafora del contratto sociale50. Anche il contratto contiene un
elemento
cooperativo e quindi una reciprocit, sebbene puramente condizionale: un bilateral

back-
scratching, come lo definisce Ken Binmore51.
Questo profilo colto anche da Weber che contrappone i c.d.

contratti di status
(o di affratellamento) ai contratti di scopo, sottolineando come questi
ultimi abbiano
soppiantato i primi grazie alla diffusione del danaro quale puro mezzo di
pagamento con
cui le parti si possono liberamente scambiare le pi diverse prestazioni. Secondo
Weber,
47 Canaris, C.-W. (1997) pp. 31 f.

48 La disciplina della rescissione contenuta nel codice civile italiano mostra
che di per s liniquit dello scam-
bio, anche quando grave, non sufficiente per attivare una tutela a favore
della parte pregiudicata, per la
quale devono concorrere altri requisiti. Tuttavia, probabilmente sulla scorta
di suggestioni francesi, nella
giurisprudenza italiana si sono registrate delle aperture, non univoche
peraltro, verso lidea che il sinallagma
possa venire concettualmente meno allorch il corrispettivo risulti
propriamente irrisorio: cfr. Di Marzio,
F. (2008) pp. 122 ff. Sul piano formale sembra pi aperto il 138 BGB che al
secondo comma esemplifica il
contratto immorale proprio come quello in cui una parte ottiene una
prestazione sproporzionata rispetto
alla propria, sfruttando un potere coercitivo oppure la condizione di
inesperienza, di mancanza di giudizio
o di significativa debolezza della volont della controparte. Allo stesso
138, secondo comma, BGB sem-
bra ispirato lart. 4:109 dei Pecl, ma con delle particolarit significative:
il requisito della conoscibilit della
condizione di debolezza della controparte, la qualificazione di annullabilit
del contratto e la possibilit di
manutenzione di esso. In merito proprio la Nota a art. 4:109, Principi di
diritto europeo dei contratti, cit.,
293 informa che la giurisprudenza tedesca tende ad applicare il 138, co. 2,
BGB in casi come il credito al
consumo e le vendite con patto di riservato dominio incentrando il giudizio
pi sullo squilibrio fra prestazi-
oni che sulla debolezza. Tali contratti sono ritenuti nulli se linteresse da
pagare giudicato eccessivo. In
Italia, peraltro, con riguardo al mutuo la clausola che prevede interessi
usurari nulla senza che la nullit
travolga il contratto il quale si converte in un contratto a titolo gratuito
(art. 1815, ult. co., c.c.).
49 Bruni, L. (2006) p. 31.
50 Canaris, C.-W. (1997) p. 28.
51 Binmore, K. G. (1994) pp. 114 f.
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Andrea Nicolussi
a misura che si risale indietro nel passato, diminuisce limportanza del

contratto per
lacquisizione di beni economici da fonti diverse da quella familiare ed
ereditaria, mentre
il rilievo che oggi ha il contratto in questo campo in prima linea il prodotto
dellintenso
sviluppo delleconomia di mercato e dellimpiego del denaro52. Quindi non
soltanto il
crescere dellimportanza del contratto di diritto privato in generale rappresenta

il riflesso
giuridico della comunit di mercato; ma il contratto propagato dalla comunit di
mer-
cato , anche nella sua essenza intima, differente da quel contratto originario che
ebbe un
tempo unimportanza tanto maggiore di oggi nel campo del diritto pubblico e del
diritto
familiare. In corrispondenza con questa profonda trasformazione del carattere
generale
della libera stipulazione, quei tipi contrattuali primitivi saranno definiti come
contratti
di status, e quelli specifici del traffico economico, cio della comunit di
mercato, come
contratti di scopo53. Ai contratti di affratellamento e agli altri contratti di
status, sempre
orientati in base a qualit universali dello status sociale della persona, e del
suo inquadra-
mento in un gruppo sociale abbracciante lintera personalit con i loro diritti e
doveri
universali, in quanto fondamento di specifiche qualit soggettive si contrappone
dunque
il contratto monetario che rappresenta larchetipo del contratto di scopo, quale
stipulazi-
one specifica nella sua essenza e funzione, determinata e delimitata
quantitativamente
indipendentemente da caratteristiche qualitative, astratta, e normalmente
condizionata
soltanto da motivi economici. Come contratto di scopo eticamente indifferente, il
con-
tratto monetario era adatto ad eliminare il carattere magico o sacramentale degli
atti giuri-
dici, e quindi valeva come mezzo di secolarizzazione del diritto54.
Tuttavia - come si avuto modo di notare -, nemmeno il contratto di scopo

in senso
stretto eticamente indifferente55. Non lo neppure come paradigma del contratto
sociale,
perch quella finzione non riesce a spiegare, per se stessa, per quale motivo i
forti che si
sono seduti al tavolo con i pi deboli per stipulare il contratto sociale, anzich
accettare
il do ut des, non ne abbiano approfittato per rendersi ancora pi forti e abbiano
invece
accettato di dar vita a una civitas in cui ogni cittadino non sarebbe pi stato
homo homini
lupus. Un lupo che non approfitti di tutta la sua forza nei confronti di un agnello
rivela
52 Weber, M. (1995) p. 23.

53 Weber, M. (1995) p. 23, dove prosegue: I contratti di status avevano per
contenuto una modificazione della
qualit giuridica complessiva, della posizione universale e dellhabitus
sociale delle persone. Per produrre
questo effetto tali contratti sono allorigine, senza eccezione, atti
direttamente magici o comunque forniti di
qualche significato magico, e nel loro simbolismo conservano a lungo dei resti
di questo carattere. La mag-
gioranza di essi rappresenta dei contratti di affratellamento.
54 Weber, M. (1995) p. 26, secondo il quale una vera e propria costruzione
tecnico-giuridica di carattere for-
malistico comincia a delinearsi, a proposito dello scambio, soltanto con lo
sviluppo della funzione monetaria
di determinati beni, specialmente dei metalli, e quindi con il sorgere della
compravendita.
55 Proprio il contratto di lavoro, secondo quanto mi suggerisce Luca Nogler,
mette in crisi la dicotomia di
Weber; prima della modernit, infatti, il lavoratore era tale per lo pi in
quanto appartenente ad una certa
categoria di persone e quindi caratterizzato da un certo status.
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----------------------- Page 184-----------------------
in qualche modo una tensione morale56, e, daltra parte, il diritto che non
permette al pi
forte di esercitare tutta intera la sua forza a scapito del pi debole,

evidentemente, riflette
a sua volta una qualche ispirazione morale. Prima della volont e presupposto di
essa,
ricorda Heidegger ispirandosi a un racconto mitologico, c la Cura, la dimensione
fonda-
mentale autentica dellessere umano che tra le sue manifestazioni e significati
contempla
senzaltro laver cura degli altri57. Il limite, in altri termini, costituisce
lesperienza origi-
naria delluomo, in funzione della quale si determina quella che in psicoanalisi

viene detta
la legge della parola e che implica una presa di coscienza dellesigenza di un
rapporto con
laltro58. Di recente, questa prospettiva della cura viene proposta con formule
come mater-
nage, ad evocare una solidariet che ha il suo archetipo nella sollecitudine

familiare, ma
che viene accuratamente distinta dallantimito del paternalismo, ormai in disarmo
dopo
59
levaporazione del padre nella cultura occidentale .
Questo aspetto di natura costituzionale, in quanto costitutiva della stessa
esperienza
giuridica, si reso chiaro quando il principio ottocentesco delleguaglianza
formale stato
integrato nel novecento con un principio di eguaglianza in senso sostanziale. Nella
costi-
tuzione italiana, ad esempio, lart. 3 si compone di due commi che corrispondono ai
due
modi di intendere leguaglianza: il primo accoglie il principio di eguaglianza in
senso for-
male mentre il secondo aggiunge unistanza sostanzialistica affinch leguaglianza
in senso
formale non si faccia essa stessa discriminatoria60. Il contratto come atto di
autonomia
sembrerebbe figlio semplicemente delleguaglianza in senso formale, ma nel

novecento il
diritto ha individuato categorie di soggetti, come i lavoratori e i consumatori,
meritevoli
di una disciplina di sostegno anche come parti di un contratto predisposto e
organizzato
56 Rowlands, M. (2009) pp. 116 ff. E, come noto, secondo Alexy, R. (1992) pp.
130 ff, appartiene intimamente
al concetto di diritto lidea della protezione del pi debole.
57 Heidegger, M./Chiodi, P. (1976) pp. 228 ff, 246 f, dove anche il
racconto preontologico della creazione
delluomo ad opera di Cura che persuade poi Giove a infondere in esso lo
spirito. Certo, evocare la Cura come
dimensione ontologica implica una necessit, anzich una scelta. Ma anzitutto
si tratta di una descrizione
riferita allumanit in generale cos come allumanit in generale e alla sua
civilizzazione fa riferimento il
contratto sociale. Inoltre, la cura implica una tensione, una dinamica, non
gi un dato di arrivo. Essa viene
qui evocata per integrare la prospettiva del contratto sociale, affiancando
alle ragioni della libert individuale
le ragioni della solidariet umana.
58 Cfr. Recalcati, M. (2013)
59 Cfr. Huls, N. (2010) p. 18.
60 In proposito Vettori, G. (2011) afferma che tutti i diritti e libert tendono
ad avere un risvolto sociale se
si vuole superare il limite della eguaglianza formale e ci esige che si
incrocino libert ed eguaglianza sos-
tanziale senza la quale ogni posizione giuridica perde di effettivit. Si
tratta tuttavia di precisare i modi e le
procedure mediante le quali tale promozione sociale dei diritti e delle
libert non vada a scapito dello stato
di diritto. Mentre infatti leguaglianza formale implica il valore
dellautonomia e la fiducia delle istituzioni
nella capacit dei soggetti di accordarsi per regolare i loro interessi, il
riferimento alleguaglianza sostanziale
potrebbe legittimare lintroduzione di controlli eccessivi circa luso
dellautonomia fino a vanificarla. Ne
deriva che la combinazione di eguaglianza formale ed eguaglianza sostanziale
deve realizzarsi su un piano di
ragionevolezza al fine di impedire che una dimensione delleguaglianza
soppianti laltra.
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Andrea Nicolussi
spesso da una grande tecnostruttura imprenditoriale61. In tal modo, penetrata

anche nella
disciplina del contratto lidea delleguaglianza in senso sostanziale almeno come

limite alla
possibilit di abuso del potere contrattuale da parte di soggetti appartenenti a
certe cat-
egorie62. Si parla in proposito anche di una Materialisierung del diritto
contrattuale, ossia
di un approccio che adegua la forma giuridica a condizioni materiali (socio-

economiche)
che il diritto contrattuale per lo stesso svolgimento della sua funzione non pu
ignorare63.
Del resto, non si deve dimenticare che se il contratto espressione di autonomia,

si tratta
pur sempre di autonomia che chiede una tutela giuridica e quindi si rende
disponibile a un
controllo secondo la razionalit generale dellordinamento giuridico (terziet del
diritto)64.
Ma mentre la fissazione di limiti di carattere astratto e generale non incide

sul prin-
cipio di fungibilit delle posizioni contrattuali, che caratteristico
dellautonomia con-
trattuale, linnesto di elementi di eguaglianza sostanziale fa sorgere il problema
giuridico
di individuare i limiti di sostenibilit, per la stessa idea di contratto, di tale
innovazione.
In realt, nei contratti c sempre o quasi sempre una parte pi debole dellaltra,
e perci
la semplice debolezza non pu rilevare come tale, salvo mettere in discussione la
stessa
autonomia contrattuale; tanto vero che gli incapaci legali o di fatto
sono emarginati
dalle attivit contrattuali. Perci il diritto ha il compito di stabilire
criteri selettivi per
offrire sostegno nel contratto a categorie determinate di soggetti deboli,
raggiungendo
cos un punto di equilibrio tra stato di diritto e stato sociale65. E sempre in
questottica,
listanza sostanzialistica impone di leggere secondo ragionevolezza anche il

principio di
autodeterminazione, individuando alcuni beni o servizi di carattere necessario che
non
possono essere puramente e semplicemente rimessi allarbitrio del mercato.
Naturalmente
la sensibilit verso questo profilo della problematica varia a seconda che il
principio di
autodeterminazione sia colto in senso solidaristico oppure in senso
individualistico, cio
relativizzato nel contesto dei valori dellordinamento giuridico ovvero
assolutizzato sec-
ondo lidea delleguaglianza in senso formale66. In effetti solo una concezione
astratta e
formalistica dellautodeterminazione pu ignorare la necessit di condizioni

sostanziali
minime che assicurino sufficienti informazioni, la capacit di valutarle
adeguatamente
61 In Germania la tutela del consumatore stata elevata al rango di principio

costituzionale. Secondo Schmid,
C. U. (2010) p. 29, il concetto di consumatore sarebbe troppo generico, in
quanto ad esso potrebbero venire
ricondotte molte persone che in realt non sarebbero bisognose di un sostegno.
62 Sul punto v. Raiser, L. (1960) p. 106.

63 Cfr. Canaris, C.-W. (2000).
64 Il che pu anche significare ammettere degli spazi di indisponibilit nella
stessa disciplina del contratto: cfr.
Albanese, A. (2008) pp. 82 ff.
65 Cfr. Nicolussi, A. (2008b) pp. 423 f. In un certo senso si registra un ritorno
agli status, anche se ovviamente
per ragioni e funzioni diverse rispetto allantico regime: cfr. Castronovo, C.
(1983) p. 196.
66 Sostiene Wieacker, F. (1967) p. 547: Die vertragsfreiheit ist in der
Wirtschaftsverfassung der sozialen Mark-
twirtschaft . . . im Prinzip aufrechterhalten, aber anders als in der
liberalen Wirtschaftsverfassung als Funk-
tionsprinzip der gesellschaftlichen Gesamtordnung erkannt citato anche da
Castronovo, C. (2005a) p. 40.
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----------------------- Page 186-----------------------
e una non dipendenza dal bisogno67. Non a caso alcuni beni e servizi, come la
scuola, i
trattamenti sanitari, lacqua, lelettricit, labitazione68 sono tradizionalmente
assoggettati a
certi vincoli pubblicistici e non interamente rimessi al mercato69. Di recente,
questo tema
si presenta anche sotto linsegna della questione dei beni comuni (common goods,
com-
mons) che dovrebbe richiamare listanza della formazione di un pensiero comune
sulle
necessit fondamentali delluomo e sulla correlativa esigenza di vincolare quelli
che risul-
tano beni comuni secondo criteri giuridici, ma non necessariamente legati alla
dicoto-
mia formale pubblico-privato, in modo che siano resi fruibili a tutti o almeno al
maggior
numero possibile di persone70.
3.5 Il riduzionismo antropologico del modello che pretende di

assolutizzare la logica dei rapporti di scambio
Il diritto come ordinamento della convivenza uno strumento orientato al principio

di
ragionevolezza, la quale dovrebbe costituire quel filtro che impedisce lingresso
di ogni
fondamentalismo: e i fondamentalismi non sono solo quelli che provengono dalletica
o
dalla religione, ma anche dalleconomia71. Si parlato in proposito di economismo,
allu-
dendo a una concezione dei rapporti economici interamente assorbita in una prospet-
tiva puramente utilitaristico-individualista connotata da una pretesa di

indifferenza etica.
Si segnalato altres un imperialismo del metodo economico allineato sulle
posizioni
dellindividualismo metodologico allinsegna di una tirannia
delleconomically correct72.
Lindividualismo metodologico, che ne alla base inteso per in un senso diverso

da
quello veicolato dalla critica sociologica al collettivismo metodologico73-,
da qualche
tempo contestato anche da diversi economisti che reputano riduttivo o

inadeguato il
67 Addirittura vi chi ritiene che lidea di autodeterminazione come tale non

possa mai divenire principio
di un ordinamento giuridico, perch essa porterebbe al dominio
dellarbitrio: v. Schmidt-Rimpler, W.
(1974) p. 22, l. Ma tale scenario non sarebbe che un esempio di ordinamento
sbilanciato, in cui un valore
viene assolutizzato e reso tiranno su tutti gli altri. Negare tout court che il
contratto sia manifestazione di
autonomia sarebbe un modo per negare lidea stessa di contratto. Si pu invece
concedere che, quando il
concetto di autonomia viene espresso col termine autodeterminazione, si rischia
di sminuire lidea che il
contratto necessita di un accordo, laddove esso proprio come tale non per
definizione un fatto puramente
individualistico.
68 La Corte costituzionale italiana (7.04.1988, n. 404) considera il
diritto sociale allabitazione come bene
primario che deve essere adeguatamente e concretamente tutelato dalla legge.
69 Negli ultimi tempi, come emerso in modo eclatante in alcuni paesi
e in modo pi subdolo, ma forse
non meno pericoloso in altri, un bene che necessiterebbe di una adeguata tutela
la libert di formarsi
unopinione meno condizionata dai mezzi di comunicazione di massa.
70 Il tema importante, ma andrebbe preservato da certe strumentalizzazioni
ideologiche.
71 Mengoni, L. (1996) p. 120.
72 Crivelli, L. (2002)
73 Cfr. Menger, C. (1996) p. 79. Per il diritto del lavoro, riferisce Nogler, L.
(1997) p. 35.
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Andrea Nicolussi
modello antropologico soggiacente alla cosiddetta teoria delle scelte razionali, a

sua volta
74
orientata in funzione della c.d razionalit strumentale interessata .
Lidea che tutto abbia un prezzo e che ogni comportamento o prestazione sia
sem-
pre strumentale, ossia spiegabile in funzione di altro da s (allottenimento del
pi alto
corrispettivo) non priva di risvolti aporetici. Anzitutto in molti casi
il prezzo non
spiega integralmente perch una persona svolga una certa professione o un mestiere.
Non sarebbe molto rassicurante pensarsi sotto i ferri di un medico che opera solo
in
vista di una mercede, o mangiare un piatto cucinato da un cuoco che mira solo al
mag-
gior guadagno o affidare i propri figli a un insegnante che abbia in mente solo la
paga
di fine mese. In un modo o nellaltro il creditore crede (o spera) che il
debitore sap-
pia far bene quello che fa e si impegner a farlo non solo perch
pagato, ma per-
ch facendolo soddisfa la sua vocazione personale. Lidea che il macellaio il
birraio o
il panettiere smithiani debbano essere sempre e necessariamente individui in grado
di
spacciarci qualunque cosa - della carne guasta, della birra adulterata o del pane
ava-
riato - pur di guadagnare di pi, lascia perplessi. Del resto, la regola
civilistica secondo
la quale il debitore pu rifiutare la remissione (art. 1236 c.c. italiano) non
spiegabile
sul piano puramente sinallagmatico. Addirittura in psicologia si parla del
c.d. crowd
out, leffetto di spiazzamento che pu provocare in una persona il ricevere un
prezzo per
una prestazione che avrebbe deciso di effettuare gratuitamente. Insomma, per coloro
che sono disposti alla prestazione gratuita ci sarebbe una ricompensa intrinseca
che
corrisponde alla soddisfazione che lagente ottiene dallazione stessa, prima e
indipen-
dentemente dalle conseguenze economiche che essa in grado di determinare75.
Inoltre,
lestensione del paradigma del mercato ai rapporti giuridici non patrimoniali,

quali i
rapporti di famiglia e i rapporti penali, mediante i concetti di mercato implicito
o di
mercato ipotetico, mette in causa pericolosamente la distinzione, basilare della
nostra
civilt, tra la persona umana e le cose76.
In definitiva, dato a Cesare quel che di Cesare, e cio riconosciute le

ragioni prop-
rie della giustizia commutativa, c qualcosa che la trascende: ci sono ragioni che
la pura
ragione sinallagmatica non in grado di comprendere. Non solo quando la persona
dis-
posta a fare gratuitamente, ma anche nei rapporti di scambio, specialmente quando
una
delle parti opera professionalmente - e quindi nella durata, se non del singolo
contratto,
almeno dal punto di vista della continuit dellattivit professionale -, si pu
cogliere una
dimensione di gratuit ineliminabile (ars gratia artis) che non si contrappone
necessaria-
mente alla giustizia commutativa, ma la integra restituendo a questi rapporti una
dimen-
sione pi completa sul piano umano. In un certo senso, si potrebbe dire che la
giustizia
74 Dal punto di vista giuridico la critica si diffusa soprattutto in Germania:

v. ad esempio, Eidenmller, H.
(1995) pp. 39, 74.
75 Spunti in Bruni, Il prezzo, p. 114.
76 Mengoni, L. (2011e) p. 265.
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----------------------- Page 188-----------------------
commutativa declina un punto di vista puramente sociale77, senza riguardo alla

persona in
quanto tale, ma il rapporto tra persone pu, anche dal punto di vista giuridico,
non igno-
rare profili pi profondi che invece hanno riguardo alla persona.
In questottica, anche la disciplina tradizionale dei contratti mostra degli
elementi che
si sottraggono alla pura sinallagmaticit: il principio della buona fede oggettiva,
il prin-
cipio delladempimento in natura dal quale si ricava lestraneit alla tradizione
europeo-
continentale dei c.d. inadempimenti efficienti (theory of efficient breach)78, la
disciplina dei
limiti di esigibilit della prestazione dovuta dal debitore, i contratti di durata.
Della buona fede si gi detto. La sua rilevanza nel diritto dei contratti e
delle obbli-
gazioni mostra che nemmeno tale branca del diritto pu dirsi fondata sic et
simpliciter
sulla concezione riduttiva dellindividualismo metodologico. E nel diritto
continentale
che estende la buona fede alla fase precontrattuale non si pu ripetere ci che la
House of
Lords sostenne nel 199279: che ogni parte che si accinge a stipulare il contratto
legittimata
a fare di tutto, tranne commettere reati, per realizzare per s il miglior affare.
La buona
fede oggettiva, si potrebbe dire, impedisce di considerare laltro solo come mezzo
fin dal
momento in cui due soggetti si accingono a divenire parti di un contratto e
comunicano
fra di loro per raggiunge la conclusione di un accordo80. Lobbligo di
comportarsi sec-
ondo buona fede nelle trattative precontrattuali e nella formazione del contratto,
nonch
lobbligo di interpretare secondo buona fede il contratto stesso, portano a
ritenere che il
diritto accolga, in qualche modo, unetica del discorso o discorsiva
(Diskursethik)81 fra le
parti: lo confermano gli obblighi di informazione che gi tradizionalmente, ma

soprat-
tutto nellepoca contemporanea, si fanno derivare dalla buona fede82. Ma se gli
obblighi
77 Sociale nel significato che richiama linsieme delle relazioni impersonali

(esteriori), le quali alimentano la
convivenza civile e si differenziano quindi dalle relazioni connotate da un
certo coinvolgimento personale.
In tal senso, si pu fare riferimento sul piano etico allidea kantiana del
dovere di rispettare la dignit di ogni
uomo nel senso di non trattare nessuno solo come mezzo.
78 In tema, cfr. Schwarz, A. (1996) p. 443; Atiyah, P. S. (1995) pp. 428, 454;
Castronovo, C. (1997a) pp. 285 ff;
Mengoni, L. (2011e) p. 267.
79 Walford v. Miles [1992] A.C. 128, H.L.
80 Nel diritto inglese tradizionale si nega lesistenza di un generale obbligo di
buona fede anche dopo la stipula
del contratto. Tuttavia - nota Atiyah, P. S. (1995) p. 213 the broader
concept of good faith was probably
thougt (anyhow by nineteenth century judges) to be equivalent to a general
recognition of ideas of moral
right and equity in the law which was inconsistent with stict commercial
dealings. Modern judges would
probably not be nearly so unhappy if the law recognized a general duty of good
faith.
81 Si allude qui alla formula proposta da filosofi come K.-O. Apel e J. Habermas
che nel testo viene ripresa nei
limiti in cui fruibile come etica della comunicazione fra le parti nelle
trattative precontrattuali, e non certo
come insieme di regole discorsive per la individuazione intersoggettiva di
norme morali. V. per questi autori
Apel, K.-O./Marzocchi, V. (1997).
82 Tali obblighi di informazione costituiscono una specificazione del genus
obblighi di protezione discendenti
dalla buona fede. Un esempio di violazione potrebbe essere il caso delle
fideiussioni prestate a favore di un
familiare di cui il fideiussore ignora le gravi implicazioni e la banca
creditrice abbia trascurato di informare
precisamente il fideiussore dei gravi pericoli economici ai quali egli si
esponeva oppure successivamente
alla stipula della fideiussione abbia omesso di informare il fideiussore di
mutamenti delle condizioni pat-
rimoniali del garantito. In Germania nota la discussione sorta in seguito a
pronunce giurisprudenziali in
materia: cfr. BGH, NJW 1991, 2015 ff; BGH, NJW 1992, 896 ff.
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Andrea Nicolussi
di informazione in applicazione di unetica del discorso possono definire solo

delle regole
procedurali (procedural fairness ), la disciplina delle obbligazioni conosce anche
profili di
83
rilevanza sostanziale della buona fede .
La clausola della buona fede oggettiva, oltre a prevedere obblighi
di protezione, d
ingresso a una valutazione di inesigibilit di obblighi che, sebbene giustificati
dal sinallagma,
a causa di circostanze sopravvenute potrebbero rivelarsi incompatibili con
diritti o altri
obblighi di superiore rango costituzionale. Basta ricordare il notissimo caso della
cantante
che viene ritenuta giustificata per il fatto di non essersi recata al teatro in
conseguenza della
sopravvenuta grave malattia del figlio e dellesigenza di assisterlo al suo
capezzale: lobbligo
di adempiere la prestazione dovuta ex contractu quindi ritenuto subordinato
rispetto al
dovere di assistenza ai familiari. Ma sul piano della inesigibilit della
prestazione si potrebbe
collocare anche il diritto allobiezione di coscienza la cui rilevanza si d
solitamente nei con-
tratti di durata o quantomeno a tratto successivo. Si pensi ad esempio al medico a
servizio di
una clinica nella quale da un certo momento in poi si iniziasse a svolgere
trattamenti sani-
tari eticamente problematici (aborti, eutanasie, selezioni di embrioni, ecc.) o al
giornalista
costretto a un certo punto ad essere fedele alla nuova linea editoriale di un
giornale oppure
alloperaio o al ricercatore in una impresa, la quale successivamente
allassunzione converta
la produzione verso prodotti eticamente problematici (ad es., armi)84.
Anche il principio del primato delladempimento in natura - sancito dalle

codifica-
zioni novecentesche come il BGB e il c.c. italiano85 - costituisce una forma di
eticizzazione
del rapporto che impedisce di ridurlo al puro sinallagma. Lidea - tipicamente

formulata in
contesti di analisi economica del diritto - che ciascuna parte contrattuale,
anzich obbli-
gata alla propria prestazione, sia in realt facoltizzata a scegliere tra adempiere
e risarcire
il danno (teoria dei c.d. inadempimenti efficienti), non rende ragione della regola
per cui
lobbligazione prima di tutto funzionale a soddisfare linteresse del creditore
in vista del
quale sorta e pertanto il suo oggetto non puramente interscambiabile con un
surrogato
monetario. E ci a maggior ragione quando tale interesse sia non patrimoniale.
Invero, la qualit della prestazione, specialmente se connotata da un alto
contenuto
professionale, non sembra potersi rimettere alle sole forze del mercato. Mentre
infatti il
mercato in generale considerato efficiente sul piano della concorrenza di prezzo,
con i
suoi soli meccanismi non ritenuto uno strumento decisivo relativamente alla
concor-
renza di qualit86. Dal punto di vista delle attivit professionali il controllo
della qualit,
83 Occorre peraltro sempre tenere presente che la riduzione proceduralistica del

diritto (prozedurales Recht)
non mai puramente neutra sul piano delle premesse valoriali. Lo rileva anche
Schmid, C. U. (2010) p. 50.
84 Sul punto, per linteressante dibattito che si aperto in Germania
negli anni cinquanta in collegamento
anche con lemergere della questione dei rapporti tra diritti fondamentali e
diritto privato.
85 Mentre per lart. 1142 del Code toute obligation de faire ou de pas faire se
rsout en dommages et intrts
en cas dinexcution de la part du dbiteur.
86 Bruni, L. (2006) p. 144.
150
----------------------- Page 190-----------------------
se lo si vuole estendere oltre la prestazione dovuta nel singolo contratto e quindi

osser-
varlo nella durata, deve essere commesso a istituti che trascendono la dimensione
pura-
mente contrattuale. Una disciplina generale che promuovesse in tal senso il ruolo
degli
ordini professionali potrebbe giovarsi di un contesto in grado di
valorizzare la qualit
delle prestazioni ed eventualmente sanzionare le condotte gravemente inappropriate
sul
piano tecnico o scorrette deontologicamente. Oggi questo potrebbe avvenire anche
sulla
scorta di un interesse generale degli stessi professionisti a ridurre i costi delle
assicura-
zioni collettive per la responsabilit professionale. Naturalmente si tratta di
fornire una
cornice giuridica che scoraggi le degenerazioni corporativistiche e incoraggi
piuttosto gli
aspetti positivi della comunanza di interessi e dellesperienza di coloro che
esercitano una
medesima professione. I contratti con i professionisti potrebbero insomma aprirsi a
una
giustizia, non necessariamente sostitutiva di quella ordinaria, in grado di
controllare con
competenza la qualit dei servizi.
3.6 Contratto e durata. Obblighi di protezione, recesso, sopravvenienze

e inesigibilit
La durata senzaltro la dimensione delle relazioni pi propria ai fini di una

valutazione
87
morale ed anche il campo in cui si parla pi frequentemente di social contracts
; essa
sembra altres sottrarre le regole contrattuali a una integrale riduzione al
principio del
sinallagma. Si tratta di un ambito contrattuale rilevante, perch nonostante la
tendenza
delleconomia capitalistica ad appiattire i contratti sul modello dello spot
contract il cui
archetipo la compravendita di cose mobili, sono ancora molto frequenti nella
pratica i
contratti di durata, nei quali la prestazione non si esaurisce in un unico tratto,
ma si dis-
tende nel tempo e spesso per una porzione significativa della vita delle persone
coinvolte
(si pensi a un mutuo, a un contratto di lavoro, alla locazione di una casa
dabitazione, alla
fideiussione concessa per garantire obbligazioni derivanti dallattivit
economica di un
familiare). E la durata la dimensione che tipicamente fa sorgere affidamenti. Del
resto,
anche istituti come lusucapione, la prescrizione o la Verwirkung sono
strettamente legati
allidea di un fare affidamento che sorge in seguito al durare nel tempo di una
certa situ-
azione. Si comprende agevolmente, pertanto, che la durata, gi di per s in
contraddizione
con la spinta spersonalizzante dei rapporti istantanei, possa far emergere
nei contratti
dei residui comunitaristici88: il tempo avvicina ulteriormente le parti e
pu giustificare
elementi di Nahbereichsmoral a complemento della Fernbereichsmoral che le relazioni

di
mercato tipicamente originano. Una relazione che dura nel tempo moltiplica le
occasioni
87 Cfr. Collins, H. (29.10.2008).

88 Cfr. Nogler-Reifner, e autori ivi citati.
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Andrea Nicolussi
di interferenza tra le parti con possibili maggiori obblighi di protezione

(informazione,
riservatezza, ecc.). La logica del puro scambio e nulla pi si rivela incapiente
quando
due soggetti si vincolano per un certo tempo e lincompletezza del contratto
destinata
ad allargarsi molto, affratellando inevitabilmente le parti nellincontro
con la soprav-
venienza. Di qui la possibilit del c.d. supererogatorio, di fare qualcosa di pi
di ci che
dovuto in termini di puro scambio, quantomeno nel momento in cui si realizza la
soprav-
venienza, dato che come si rilevato in precedenza la logica della
durata permette di
calcolare il dare e lavere effettivi solo al termine del rapporto.
Inoltre, la durata tende
ad approfondire il divario tra le parti aumentando la debolezza delluna verso
laltra nei
confronti di possibili sopravvenienze. Purtroppo questo aspetto ha spesso ricevuto
rilievo
soprattutto a favore della parte forte. Ad esempio nel contratto di assicurazione
si pre-
vedono obblighi di informazione a carico dellassicurato in caso di sopravvenienze
che
possano aggravare il rischio, e ci in funzione di un diritto di
recesso o di variazione
in aumento del premio a favore dellassicuratore; a questultimo, peraltro,
attribuito il
diritto di recesso, in alternativa a una riduzione dei premi, pure nel caso di una
diminu-
zione del rischio. Analogamente nei contratti bancari solo alle banche concesso
uno
ius variandi che permette loro di fronteggiare le sopravvenienze.
Un aspetto rimarchevole dal punto di vista della parte debole emerge in
relazione
alla tutela di diritti fondamentali della persona e alla dignit umana che li fonda
e li rias-
sume89: si pensi al lavoro, allabitazione, ai mutui per lacquisto o per la
locazione di una
casa dabitazione o per mantenere un figlio agli studi90. Tali esigenze di tutela
della persona
sul piano del contratto trovano poi un ulteriore argomento quando una delle parti
un
soggetto organizzato in forma di impresa e quindi meglio in grado di prevedere
rischi
e amministrare costi legati alla sopravvenienza. Certo, il soggetto impresa una
figura
impersonale e quindi come tale sottratta a valutazioni etiche; tuttavia proprio
nella misura
in cui si vuole evitare di ridurre allorganizzazione le persone operanti in essa,
quasi si trat-
tasse di parti di una macchina, oppure di intendere la forma imprenditoriale come
uno
schermo etico a vantaggio di chi trae profitto dallimpresa, si rende necessario
declinare
in modo adeguato la valutazione etica dei comportamenti e degli atti che vengono
svolti
nellambito di unorganizzazione imprenditoriale.
In questi casi il diritto privato europeo ammette che il contratto
possa accogliere
anche dei profili di disciplina che - come sostiene Canaris - traducono una
giustizia che ha
riguardo alla persona. Si pensi alla protezione della maternit e allobbligo di
continuare
a retribuire il lavoratore durante la malattia, ma anche allart. 2087 c.c.
italiano, risalente
89 Una distinzione sembrano postulare Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2011) p.

359, ma probabilmente riferendola
allatteggiamento liberista che imputano al DCFR: solo unastratta distinzione
tra libert e solidariet pu
spiegare, anche se forse non giustificare, la separazione tra diritti umani e
dignit umana.
90 I Life time Contracts sono presi ad oggetto del saggio di Nogler, L./Reifner,
U. (2009).
152
----------------------- Page 192-----------------------
al 1942, che gi prevedeva in capo allimprenditore lobbligo di

adottare nellesercizio
dellimpresa le misure che, secondo la particolarit del lavoro, lesperienza e la
tecnica,
sono necessarie a tutelare lintegrit fisica e la personalit morale dei
prestatori di lavoro.
Un altro esempio sono le tutele del conduttore in caso di recesso del locatore dal
contratto,
ma anche lestensione degli obblighi di protezione a favore dei familiari
conviventi. I rap-
porti di durata pongono in generale il problema di eventuali obblighi di protezione
nella
fase del recesso. Se infatti il recesso indispensabile nel contratto di durata
per scongiu-
rare vincoli perpetui, ci non toglie che esso pu essere esercitato in modo
brutale in certe
situazioni, onde la buona fede potrebbe fondare obblighi generali di protezione a
carico
della parte recedente nel proprio interesse (senza giusta causa).
Nellambito del mutuo
bancario si potrebbe immaginare una tutela della persona del mutuatario per il caso
di
sopravvenuta difficolt di restituzione delle rate qualora la difficolt
consegua a eventi
come il licenziamento incolpevole o lesigenza di fronteggiare spese mediche per
una grave
malattia propria o dei propri familiari. In queste ipotesi non si pu parlare di
impossibil-
it sopravvenuta, che un concetto unitario e non pu essere snaturata
nellimprobabile
categoria della forza maggiore di carattere sociale (social force
majeure91). Potrebbe
piuttosto venire in considerazione una causa di estinzione o pi precisamente di

sospen-
sione dellobbligazione riconducibile alla categoria dellinesigibilit92: in altre
parole, non
un modo diretto di estinzione dellobbligazione in senso proprio (ineseguibilit),

ma un
limite della pretesa creditoria in funzione della buona fede oggettiva e di una
valutazione
sistematica dellobbligo in rapporto alla eventuale collisione con altri obblighi
della stessa
persona. Ex fide bona infatti la pretesa del creditore dovrebbe cedere di fronte a
un obbligo
costituzionalmente sovraordinato come i doveri familiari di assistenza. Tanto pi
che il
soggetto creditore, la banca, un operatore professionale, mentre il debitore un
soggetto
(consumatore) mosso dal bisogno personale e non dotato di una struttura
organizzativa.
Poich la banca soggetto professionale, essa la parte meglio in grado di
prevedere e
amministrare questi rischi nellambito del contratto di durata, e ci pu
giustificare una
sospensione dellobbligo a tutela della parte debole, nonch talora eventualmente
anche
laccollo alla banca del costo di tale sospensione. La regola non costituisce,
evidentemente,
applicazione del principio di giustizia commutativa, ma di una giustizia
distributiva che
si attua mediante un soggetto privato con cui la persona intreccia una parte della
propria
vita93.
Probabilmente la difficolt di accogliere questa prospettiva deriva da una

serie di
fattori. Anzitutto, vi una tendenza ad annacquare il significato di soggetto
professionale,
91 Wilhelmsson, T. (1992) pp. 43, 185 ff.

92 Cfr. Nicolussi, A. (2008b) p. 439.
93 Una trattazione pi ampia nellottica dal confronto critico tra i principi del
credito responsabile e la disciplina
del DCFR si trova in Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2011) pp. 373 f.
153
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Andrea Nicolussi
trascurando che specialmente quando sono coinvolti beni di grande rilievo sociale
tale
qualifica potrebbe essere caratterizzata da una funzione sociale. Ad esempio,
relativa-
mente alla banca, la funzione sociale potrebbe essere vista come il fondamento di
un
principio di esercizio del credito responsabile, dal quale ricavare una serie di
obblighi
(professionali) di protezione della parte debole94. Naturalmente tali obblighi di
protezio ne
avrebbero bisogno di un contesto sistematico diverso da quello che favorisce le

incon-
trollate concentrazioni bancarie che hanno caratterizzato la recente crisi
finanziaria95.
Inoltre, e pi in generale, la disciplina dei contratti non pu essere n

sovraccaricata n
dissociata dal sistema giuridico generale come pretendono coloro che distinguono
rigi-
damente gli ambiti della giustizia commutativa da quelli (pubblicistici) della
giustizia
distributiva. C un sovraccarico, ad esempio, finch il sacrificio della
parte forte del
contratto non risulta ottenere un riconoscimento sociale, e viene presentato come
un
obbligo che sembra alterare la logica dello scambio. Il datore di lavoro
che sconta la
tutela della maternit e la banca cui viene accollata la sopravvenienza o a cui
fosse accol-
lata la garanzia della sicurezza di certi prodotti finanziari che vende ai
risparmiatori
non professionali96 sono soggetti privati, che non operano perseguendo
direttamente
linteresse generale come un ente pubblico, e pertanto lo sbilanciamento

sinallagmatico
che tali tutele generano a favore della parte debole deve trovare un riscontro
almeno
fuori dalla disciplina dei contratti. Ogni volta che si impone a un soggetto un
sacrificio
che sia completamente estraneo al sinallagma occorre interrogarsi sullopportunit
di un
riconoscimento sociale (in forma di provvidenze, incentivi pubblici o altro) che
contri-
buisca a conferire effettivit allobbligo superandone la riduttiva visione
espropriativa-
punitiva. Del resto, nella migliore delle ipotesi un aggravio di oneri su una parte
pu
infatti determinare aumenti dei prezzi ed emarginazione di categorie deboli di
utenti.
proprio la presa datto di questi elementi che spesso porta a ripiegare su una
rigida sepa-
razione tra la forma di giustizia propria delle norme privatistiche che si
ridurrebbe a
quella commutativa e alla Freiheitsethik e la forma di giustizia commessa alle
norme
pubblicistiche che sarebbero rivolte alla giustizia distributiva. Ma si tratta di
una sepa-
razione semplicistica, perch trascura i nessi sistematici fra disciplina dei
rapporti tra
privati e disciplina pubblicistica97. Provvidenze, incentivi e altri vantaggi che
possono
essere previsti sul versante pubblicistico trovano una migliore collocazione se sul
ver-
sante privatistico vi sia una disciplina coerente e magari meglio in grado di
individuare
il soggetto pi idoneo ad amministrare direttamente certi costi. Inoltre, non
sempre gli
94 V. nota precedente.
95 Sul tema, v. le interessanti e talora provocatorie osservazioni di Reifner, U.
(2010).
96 Il principio di tutela della sicurezza dei prodotti si dovrebbe poter
estendere, sia pure con i dovuti adegua-
menti, ai prodotti finanziari.
97 Cfr. Nogler, L. (1997) XV-XVI.
154
----------------------- Page 194-----------------------
incentivi sono sufficienti da soli per orientare la parte pi forte e pertanto,

accanto alla
figura giuridica dellonere (cui lincentivazione metterebbe capo), opportuno
integrare
lo strumentario giuridico con la figura dellobbligo o di un limite a una pretesa a
carico
della parte forte.
Come si desume dagli esempi appena illustrati la durata del contratto,
proprio per-
ch insiste sul life time della persona coinvolta e sui suoi bisogni primari, ha
significa-
tive implicazioni personali, le quali mettono in collegamento diversi rapporti di
durata
di cui la persona parte. Reifner insiste sul collegamento (negoziale?) tra, ad
esempio, un
contratto di locazione di una casa dabitazione e il contratto di lavoro che il
conduttore
richiesto di esibire al momento della stipula del contratto per assicurare la
controparte
circa le proprie aspettative di reddito e quindi riguardo alla capacit nel tempo
di pagare
il canone. In un certo senso, il conduttore finisce per obbligarsi alle prestazioni
lavorative
non solo verso il proprio datore di lavoro, ma anche nei confronti del proprio
locatore.
Le implicazioni giuridiche di questo collegamento non sono per chiarite
dallautore. Da
un lato, si potrebbe immaginare che il conduttore, rendendo palese quale sia la sua
fonte
di reddito, definisca in tal modo anche loggetto della sua obbligazione. Ad
esempio, un
licenziamento a lui non imputabile potrebbe introdurre una causa di
sospensione - di
durata non irragionevole - dellobbligo di corrispondere il canone essendo
temporanea-
mente venuto meno il mezzo per procurarsi la disponibilit economica. Dallaltro
lato,
per, occorrerebbe chiarire quali effetti sul contratto di lavoro potrebbe
dispiegare il colle-
gamento, dal momento che cos si introduce un secondo centro di interesse al
pagamento
della retribuzione.
Un collegamento si pu rilevare senzaltro fra obbligazione in
generale e obblighi
familiari del debitore. Un esempio potrebbero essere le fideiussioni che un
familiare presta
a una banca a favore del debitore, il familiare non essendo n un non
professionista n
spesso un soggetto adeguatamente informato circa le implicazioni giuridiche della
fide-
iussione e in generale riguardo alla sostanza degli affari del debitore
beneficiario della
garanzia. In ogni caso, chiaro che la ragione soggettiva per cui concessa la
fideiussione
fondata soprattutto sul legame familiare che peraltro normalmente la banca
conosce o
in grado di conoscere. In questottica, eventuali sopravvenienze di
carattere familiare
(matrimonio del figlio, filiazione di questultimo, separazione dal
coniuge) potrebbero
essere valutate come una causa di sospensione dellobbligo del fideiussore o
quantomeno
come causa di un onere o obbligo ex fide bona della banca di interpellare il
fideiussore in
ordine alla intenzione di continuare nella fideiussione98. Tradizionalmente stato
soprat-
tutto il rapporto di lavoro a mettere in evidenza questo intreccio che una certa
precariz-
zazione diffusasi negli ultimi tempi tende invece ad occultare. Lattenzione per la
persona
98 Cfr. Nicolussi, A. (2008b) p. 424, con riferimenti alla giurisprudenza della

Corte costituzionale tedesca.
155
----------------------- Page 195-----------------------
Andrea Nicolussi
con le sue implicazioni di solidariet ha bisogno infatti di strutture che

facilitino una certa
durata dei rapporti, perch nelle relazioni brevi, negli spot contracts, riesce ad
affermarsi
soltanto una commutativit che a sua volta rischia di non essere suscettibile di
controllo.
Sotto questo profilo lascia perplessi la logica delle c.d. liberalizzazioni con cui
ad esempio
si impone la c.d. trasportabilit del mutuo da una banca allaltra99. In tal modo,
la banca
tender a concepire il contratto come di breve durata e sar pi

difficile imporle degli
obblighi o delle tutele a favore del cliente giustificabili solo in funzione di una
stabilit del
rapporto.
Relativamente al lavoro, quale esempio tradizionale di intreccio tra
rapporti di
durata significativi nella vita delle persone, lart. 37 della Costituzione
italiana ne ha ben
intuito la relazione con la famiglia e lesigenza di tenerne conto, anticipando
cos lart.
33 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dellUE che prevede espressamente il
principio
di conciliazione tra famiglia e lavoro. La formula del testo dellart. 37
certamente un
po antiquata, perch prevede che le condizioni di lavoro devono consentire alla
donna
ladempimento della sua essenziale funzione familiare e assicurare alla madre e al
bam-
bino una speciale adeguata protezione. Oggi i ruoli domestici non corrispondono pi
a
quelli tradizionali cui il testo dellart. 37 sembra ispirato, anche se la
maternit rimane
una condizione distinta e irriducibile a quella della paternit. Ma il senso della
norma
costituzionale, aperta a una lettura evolutiva, conserva senza dubbio una
rilevanza
attuale nel fissare la necessit che la disciplina del contratto di lavoro e delle
condizioni di
lavoro non sia indifferente agli obblighi familiari. La persona del lavoratore non
doctor
Jekyll mentre dedica buona parte della giornata al lavoro e Mr. Hyde quando ritorna
a
casa. Nel lavoro e soprattutto nella famiglia la durata la dimensione nella quale
si pos-
sono aprire spazi fondamentali per la gratuit. Ma la precarizzazione dei rapporti
famil-
iari impedisce di cogliere i profili istituzionali della famiglia e quindi di
valorizzarne le
esigenze allinterno del contratto di lavoro100. E la precarizzazione dei rapporti
di lavoro
offre un ulteriore pretesto per eludere questo problema. Uno dei fenomeni pi
preoccu-
panti della nostra epoca, del resto, la trasformazione del ruolo genitoriale,
che, spesso
per linconciliabilit del lavoro con la famiglia e lo screditamento sociale delle
funzioni
interne a questultima, tende a rendere i genitori dei meri procreatori e i figli
dei soggetti
con riguardo ai quali i compiti dellallevamento delleducazione e dellistruzione,
fin dai
primissimi tempi dopo la nascita, sono commessi a persone stipendiate. Ma un
rapporto
gratuito come quello tra genitore e figlio come pu essere surrogato quasi
interamente da
professionisti retribuiti?
99 Cfr. D.l. 31 gennaio 2007, n. 7 convertito con modificazione dalla l. 2 aprile

2007, 40.
100 Sul problema di una ricostruzione in chiave neo-istituzionale della famiglia,
cfr. Nicolussi, A. (2012).
156
----------------------- Page 196-----------------------
3.7 Contratto di scambio, collegamenti tra rapporti di durata, famiglia

e impresa. Fernbereichsmoral e Nahbereichsmoral
Secondo Mill, che guardava con favore allimpresa in forma

cooperativistica (school of
sympathy)101, la modernit avrebbe conservato due residui feudali: uno era la
famiglia in
senso patriarcale e laltro limpresa strutturata gerarchicamente.

Ora, la concezione gerarchica della famiglia stata da tempo superata
sebbene la c.d.
crisi della famiglia, anzich avviare un processo di conformazione solidale
dellistituzione
familiare, tende a decostruire la famiglia allinsegna di un individualismo che
rischia di
andare a scapito soprattutto dei soggetti deboli e incrementare la solitudine.
Declinazione
giuridica di questa tendenza linvasione del contratto di scambio nel campo
della fami-
glia: quelli che Weber chiama contratti di scopo non solo hanno largamente
occupato il
terreno delle relazioni economiche, ma sono penetrati anche allinterno
delle relazioni
domestiche soppiantando pure in questambito i contratti di affratellamento o di
status.
Si pensi che una recente risoluzione del parlamento europeo del 13 marzo 2012
invita
gli Stati membri a garantire che le loro leggi in materia di matrimonio, divorzio
e regime
patrimoniale tra coniugi non costituiscano direttamente o indirettamente, una
trappola
finanziaria per i coniugi (. . .). E in fin dei conti il concetto di trappola
sembra presup-
posto anche dal regolamento (Ue) n. 1259/2010 che in materia di separazione e
divorzio
contiene un 15 considerando in cui si legge che per aumentare la mobilit dei
cittadini
necessario rafforzare la flessibilit (. . .) e potenziare lautonomia delle parti
in materia di
divorzio.
Concepire la famiglia come una trappola e in generale come puro oggetto di
autono-
mia contrattuale significa privarla di valore sociale, destrutturare quella
Nahbereichsmoral
familiarer Beziehungen e quindi assoggettare anche i rapporti domestici
alla Fernbe-
reichsmoral, die die Marktbeziehungen bestimmt che in tal modo verrebbe
assolutizzata
e universalizzata102. Viene meno la caratteristica del matrimonio di generare
degli status
e quindi unappartenenza identitaria al gruppo familiare riconosciuta

socialmente. Ma
senza status familiari sui quali fondare gli obblighi di assistenza morale e
materiale, tali
obblighi possono rimanere solo come elementi di uno scambio contrattuale
socialmente
indifferente. Alla famiglia quale struttura aperta a una dimensione solidale della
felicit
si sostituisce lidea della famiglia come affare privato in cui viene
assolutizzata la felicit
individuale a scapito dei familiari. Intesa come affare privato la famiglia non
pu essere
pi, per definizione, un valore con cui misurare lesigibilit di obblighi
contrattuali n una
101 Mill, J. S. (1953) pp. 739 ff. (Mill, J. S. (1970) p. 133).

102 Espressioni che si leggono in Reuter, D. (1994).
157
----------------------- Page 197-----------------------
Andrea Nicolussi
ragione per inserire nella disciplina del contratto di lavoro elementi che
permettano di
conciliare lavoro e famiglia. Nella misura in cui i rapporti familiari diventano
leffetto di un
contratto si riducono a puri e semplici obblighi contrattuali e come tali perdono
la mer-
itevolezza di tutela prioritaria rispetto a obblighi contrattuali nascenti da altri
contratti;
ad esempio, lobbligo di assistere un familiare malato non potr essere giudicato
superiore
costituzionalmente a un obbligo derivante da un altro contratto col quale venisse
in colli-
sione. E un ragionamento analogo si pu fare per la filiazione che si tende a
rappresentare
sempre pi, anzich come un rapporto e una responsabilit, come un diritto del
singolo di
carattere privato. Soprattutto negli ultimi due secoli si messo in discussione
nel mondo
occidentale il matrimonio, i suoi requisiti e le sue regole, ma, almeno quando vi
siano dei
figli, sembra contraddittorio ricondurre la famiglia puramente e semplicemente al
valore
della privacy che implica lindifferenza sociale relativamente a ci che avviene
nel privato,
mentre la cura della prole implica strutture giuridiche che la riconoscano come
valore
sociale o, se si vuole, come un bene comune. Del resto, lo stesso gi ricordato
art. 33
Carta dei diritti fondamentali dellUe, collocato sotto il titolo Solidariet, a
riconoscere
il valore della conciliazione tra vita familiare e vita professionale dopo aver
previsto la
103
protezione della famiglia sul piano giuridico, economico e sociale
.
Quanto allimpresa, non detto che debba continuare a essere una struttura
solo ed
esclusivamente gerarchica in cui la legittimazione a prendere decisioni
dipende preva-
lentemente dallautorit pi che dallautorevolezza. Come noto, secondo il
teorema di
Coase, essa una struttura necessaria per evitare linefficienza e il sovraccarico
di costi
transattivi, in quanto il mercato un meccanismo costoso (costi di transazione) e
non
sempre efficiente per gestire rapporti complessi e soprattutto durevoli nel
tempo104. Ma
una democratizzazione dei processi decisionali o dellattribuzione delle

responsabilit
postula luscita da un certo paternalismo sindacale e dalla logica puramente
avversariale
dei rapporti di lavoro. Affinch limpresa possa essere disciplinata come
unorganizzazione
di persone con pari dignit sociale occorrerebbe, da un lato, che una
volta raggiunto
un accordo contrattuale individuale o collettivo la c.d. pace sindacale sia
riconosciuta e
tutelata almeno alla stregua di un obbligo secondo buona fede, mentre
dallaltra che i
lavoratori possano concorrere almeno in certe decisioni vitali per limpresa (in
Germania
prevista, come noto, la Mitbestimmung mentre in Italia ancora inattuato
lart. 46 Cost.
103 Questa disposizione della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dellUe sembra
piuttosto trascurata, mentre viene
sovraccaricato di applicazioni, talora molto discutibili, lart. 8 Cedu che
prevede la tutela della vita privata e
familiare, in un modo che sembra eversivo rispetto alla tutela dei valori
familiari delle tradizioni costituzi-
onali europee. Il tratto eversivo, peraltro, non certamente rappresentato da
una lettura evolutiva di quelle
tradizioni, ma nella riduzione della famiglia a diritto soggettivo del singolo
fino al punto di rappresentare
la filiazione come diritto allautodeterminazione riproduttiva del soggetto
adulto e cos cancellare la dimen-
sione relazionale propria di ogni rapporto fra persone.
104 Bruni, L. (2006) p. 60.
158
----------------------- Page 198-----------------------
secondo cui ai fini della elevazione economica e sociale del lavoro e in armonia
con le
esigenze della produzione, la Repubblica riconosce il diritto dei lavoratori a
collaborare,
nei modi e nei limiti stabiliti dalle leggi, alla gestione delle aziende)105. Si
tratta, in altre
parole, di ricostruire un diritto del lavoro che sappia riconoscere il lavoro non
come merce
che il lavoratore scambia col suo datore, ma come un rapporto caratterizzato anche
dal
coinvolgimento personale dei lavoratori (il grosso problema che da qui non nasca
lidea
che il lavoratore condivide lo scopo e quindi i rischi dellimpresa come sostiene
la teoria
comunitaria). Il recesso del datore di lavoro dal contratto andrebbe
costruito in modo
compatibile con i doveri di fedelt che pure sono imposti al lavoratore, ma che
paiono
poco plausibili in un contesto di estrema precarizzazione: come possibile,
infatti, preten-
dere fedelt se il recesso del datore di lavoro viene disciplinato in modo tale da
non dare
rilievo, nemmeno quando indipendente da ragioni soggettive inerenti al
lavoratore, alle
esigenze di riqualificazione del lavoratore ai fini di un suo reinserimento in
tempi ragio-
nevoli nel mondo del lavoro106?
In fondo, alla luce dellattuale vicenda socio-economica

laccostamento di Mill fra
impresa e famiglia pu essere rovesciato: in entrambe queste dimensioni della
durata, la
precariet si ampiamente rivelata un problema che non affligge solo gli individui
come
singoli, ma lintera societ, con conseguenze negative soprattutto per i pi
deboli107.
105 La partecipazione, mediante Mitbestimmung, peraltro non significa

necessariamente affermare che i
lavoratori condividano tout court lo scopo e quindi i rischi dellimpresa,
ossia che li condividano ben oltre
quanto avvenga comunque per via del fatto che il contratto di lavoro non pu
creare un argine assoluto risp-
etto alle vicende dellimpresa. In questa sede, non necessario richiamare le
differenze tra la partecipazione,
mediante Mitbestimmung, dei lavoratori e quella dei soci capitalisti.
sufficiente piuttosto sottolineare
che la Mitbestimmung pu favorire, da un lato, ladozione di decisioni pi
attente ai profili strutturali e,
dallaltro, forme solidali di adeguamento dei rapporti di lavoro al mutamento
delle circostanze economiche
in modo da superare momenti di crisi senza ricorso alla pura e semplice logica
del conflitto.
106 Cfr. Nogler, L. (2007) su questo esito. La tutela del lavoratore nellambito
del recesso in funzione di una
sua riqualificazione, peraltro, potrebbe costituire un momento di
bilanciamento sensibile alle esigenze di
mobilit sociale, oltre che geografica del nostro tempo in cui le persone
tendono a spostarsi pi facilmente
di una volta: si spostano cio anche senza che lo spostamento sia determinato
da gravi condizioni di bisogno
come nella migrazione in senso tradizionale.
107 Sostiene Reuter, D. (1994) che in einem Recht, das die Kndigung der Ehe
fast schon an geringere Anfor-
derungen knpft als die Arbeitgeberkndingung des Arbeits- und die Vermietung
des Mietverhltnisses, ist
die Werthierarchie ganz offenbar nicht mehr in Ordnung. Si potrebbe pensare
che i vuoti che si aprono da
una parte vengano in qualche modo compensati da unaltra parte, ma forse pi
probabile che il valore della
stabilit delle relazioni significative possa pi facilmente trasferirsi anche
a quelle extrafamiliari di grande
rilievo come le relazioni di lavoro o quelle inerenti allabitazione.
159
----------------------- Page 199-----------------------
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----------------------- Page 208-----------------------
4 Lebenszeitvertrge und Teilhabe
der zivilrechtliche Anschlussverlust
als Versto gegen die Verfassung
Peter Derleder
Summary
In the wake of industrial development in Germany in the 19th century, it became

impossible
for the social system of the time, which consisted mainly of the family, and
farming and vil -
lage communities, to absorb the risks of life. The imperial court of 1881
recognised the fact
that a prerequisite for any aspiration to the foundation of a civilised state was
the assumption
of responsibility by the community for its weaker members. However, access to the
necessities
of life and the durability of the contractual relationships providing for work,
housing and con-
sumption were not part of the thinking behind the idea of freedom of contract.
Worklessness,
family break-up, homelessness is the standardised sequence of the consequences of
exclusion,
which is often discussed in the Anglo-Saxon tradition in terms of access to the
market, and
abbreviated to the word access. This is the missing dimension of the sales
contract approach
based on exchange, in which freedom appears precisely as the freedom of the
participant and
for which public law provides the compensation. The principles of the welfare
state, on the
one hand, with state subsidies that create dependency, attempt to fill the gaps
and routinely
introduce ambivalence between freedom and coercion into the public debate in this
area,
which, in turn, again raises the question of access. This is the context of the
defamation of the
welfare state as a money-guzzling monster and a kleptocracy, which lead to
exploitation of
the productive by the unproductive.
This contradiction has sharpened yet further with European integration.
Without any
readiness to take responsibility for weaker regions and groups or any impetus
towards their
integration, it offers no guarantee of minimum living standards or
legitimation. More-
over, the consumption of ecological resources and the freeing of developing
countries from
economic dependency have reduced the volume of resources available for
distribution in
the form of social benefits. As the willingness of the public and legal sphere to
redistribute
wealth dwindles, the imperative of democracy, culture and integration to ensure
access to
the long-term contracts required for the necessities of life grows. Access by all
to housing,
work and credit is central to this process. The juridical interpretation of the
welfare state
169
----------------------- Page 209-----------------------
Peter Derleder
principle is inadequate in the face of these developments. The question of access

cannot be
left to the state alone. It must be integrated into the civil law relationships
discussed in this
book. Attempts to do this take the form of numerous contributions on the right to
work, the
right to housing, the right to access to essential long-term services and the
right, free from
discrimination, to a current account and credit. This element, captured in the
eighth of the
EuSoCo principles of life time contracts, points to the direction in which the
welfare state
principle should be taken.
4.1 Die Dimensionen des Anschlussverlustes
Arbeitslos, familienlos, wohnungslos: das ist die

standardisierte Stufenfolge des
Anschlussverlustes, der in der angelschsischen Tradition hufig auf
Marktzugang
verkrzt als access to diskutiert wird. Die soziologische Armutsforschung hat
dagegen
mit ihrem relativen Armutsbegriff erkannt, dass der Ausschluss von der Teilhabe
nicht
ber den Marktzugang behoben werden kann, weil es sich beim Monopolstreben gera-
dezu um eine Marktfunktion selber handelt. Vielmehr geht es darum, die
Objekte des
Bedrfnisses - Arbeitsstelle, Wohnung und Kreditwrdigkeit - unmittelbar sicher zu
stellen
und dabei die soziale Bedeutung dieser Teilhabe in den Mittelpunkt zu stellen.
Zentrale
Kategorie der gesellschaftlichen Integration ist dabei weiterhin die Arbeit1. Sie
vermittelt
dem Arbeitenden, dass er zu etwas ntze ist, dass ihm Anerkennung zuteil wird, dass
seine
Arbeit notwendig ist, nicht nur fr die eigene Reproduktion, sondern auch fr die
anderen.
Das gilt sowohl fr industrielle als auch fr soziale Arbeit. Die
Arbeitslosenforschung
belegt dies seit den ersten empirischen Untersuchungen ber die Auswirkungen
langdau-
2
ernder Arbeitslosigkeit nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg , die erst eine passive und
resignative
Haltung erzeugt. Innerlich Ungebrochene, Resignierte, Verzweifelte und Apathische
wur-
den schon damals unterschieden. Wer arbeitslos ist, kann auch leicht seinen
familiren
Kontext verlieren, was durch die Entwicklung des Familienrechts, insbesondere des
Schei-
dungsrechts in den Industrienationen begnstigt worden ist, wo jede(r) unter der
ideellen
Herrschaft der Liebesehe ein Recht auf Scheidung hat. Trennung und Scheidung sowie
der
damit oft verbundene Verlust der Kinder sind fr denjenigen leichter durchzustehen,
der
seine Arbeit behalten hat. Aber auch der Familienverlust kann Arbeitsverlust nach
sich
ziehen, soweit etwa die Disziplin fr schwere Arbeit nachlsst, wenn keine
Angehrigen
sie mehr durch Wertschtzung honorieren.
1 In der Debatte um ein bedingungsloses Grundeinkommen jedes Brgers ist diese

Kategorie zwar in Frage
gestellt worden. Die berforderung des ohnehin hoch verschuldeten
Nationalstaats in der Finanz- und
Wirtschaftskrise macht jedoch neue Akzente in dieser Debatte erforderlich.
2 Jahoda, M./Lazarsfeld, P. F. et al. (1933).
170
----------------------- Page 210-----------------------
4 Lebenszeitvertrge und Teilhabe der

zivilrechtliche
Anschlussverlust als Versto gegen die
Verfassung
Der Wohnungsverlust3 ist dann die Pointe des sozialen Abstiegs, weitgehend
zunchst
durch das Unterkommen bei Freunden oder in Heimen kaschiert, aber doch
beim
kleineren Teil der auf Platte Lebenden fr die ffentlichkeit unmittelbar
greifbar. Er
kann das Resultat vorausgegangener Arbeits- oder Familienlosigkeit sein, oft
verbunden
mit Krankheiten und schweren Schicksalsschlgen. Meist verbindet er sich auch noch
mit
dem Verlust von Legitimationspapieren und Konten. Es existiert zwar ein Netz von
nor-
4
5
mativen Auffangtatbestnden, vom Mieterschutz bis zum Vollstreckungsschutz und
zur
(allerdings inzwischen nach dem Subsidiarittsgrundsatz eingeschrnkten)
Obdachlosen-
6
einweisung . Dennoch fallen auch in Deutschland Hunderttausende durch dieses Netz,
weil sie nicht mehr ber die Fhigkeit zur Wahrnehmung ihrer Rechte verfgen.
Obwohl in der Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ungeachtet aller
indi-
vidualistischen Hypertrophien immer noch ein Rest von karitativer Zuwendung sprbar
ist, sind es doch vorwiegend die staatlichen Konzepte, die die

Solidarittsressourcen der
Gesellschaft bestimmen. Sie stellen, wie das Bundesverfassungsgericht bereits in
seiner
Brgschaftsentscheidung grundstzlich betont hat, eine zu beachtende Anforderung
der
Verfassung an die Vertragsrechtler dar die nicht nur ber die Generalklauseln ganz
gener-
ell fr den Schutz der Lebenszeit in Dauerschuldverhltnissen zu sorgen hat,
sondern die
die weit im zivil- und ffentlichen Recht verstreuten Grenzen ausufernder
kapitalistischer
Gewinnerzielungsinteressen als prinzipiellen Ausdruck eines sozialstaatlich zu
interpre-
tierenden Dauerschuldverhltnisses zu sehen und zu systematisieren hat. Der
vorliegende
Beitrag widmet sich dabei der Grundvoraussetzung dieser Verhltnisse: dem Recht auf
Anschluss, Zugang oder Teilhabe an dem, was in diesem Projekt als verausgabte
Lebenszeit
innerhalb von rechtlichen Dauerschuldverhltnissen angesprochen wird. Dabei geht
es,
wie die folgenden Ausfhrungen erkennbar machen, nicht um eine einfache Anwendung
geltenden Sozialstaatsdenkens. Vielmehr mssen zunchst aus der in den letzten
Jahren
gefhrten Sozialstaatsdebatte die Versuche herausgelst werden, die Verfassung mit
neo-
liberalen Interpretationsmustern dem herrschenden Kaufvertragsmodell des
allgemeinen
Schuldrechts anzupassen statt sie in einem eigenstndigen System von
schuldrechtlichen
Prinzipien fr die sozialen Dauerschuldverhltnisse und Lebenszeitvertrge
fruchtbar
3 Laut Schtzung der Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Wohnungslosenhilfe lebten 2010

rund 354.000 Wohnungs-
lose in Deutschland. Davon gehrten ca. 248.000 zu den Wohnungslosen
und ca. 106.000 zu den von
Wohnungslosigkeit bedrohten Menschen. Davon seien 152.000 Allienstehende (62%).
Ca. 22.000 Menschen
lebten 2010 ohne jede Unterkunft auf der Strae, mit einem Anstieg von 10% seit
2008 (Bundesarbeitsge-
meinschaft Wohnungslosenhilfe e.V. (2011). URL:
http://www.bagw.de/fakten/1.phtml.).
4 Neben den Mieterschutz nach 573 BGB treten der Hrteschutz nach 574 ff.
BGB und der Rumungs-
schutz nach 721, 794 a ZPO.
5 Nach 765 a ZPO.
6 S. dazu OVG Mnster, OVGE 35, 303, 304; WuM 1992, 273; VGH Baden-Wrttemberg,
VBlBW 1993, 146;
ZMR 1997, 206; s. ferner di Fabio, VA 86 (1995), 214; Ewer/von Detten, NJW
1995, 358. Diese Verffent-
lichungen stammen aus der Zeit der Verarbeitung der Migrationswelle Anfang der
90er Jahre.
171
----------------------- Page 211-----------------------
Peter Derleder
werden zu lassen. Wir werden uns zunchst mit dieser

Sozialstaatsdiskussion befassen
und sie dann mit den anderen Staatsformierungen vom Steuerstaat bis zum Rechtsstaat
kontrastieren, um eine verfassungsrechtliche Untermauerung dessen sichtbar werden

zu
lassen, was mit den hier eingangs abgedruckten Prinzipien von Lebenszeitvertrgen
ver-
sucht wurde, was Zivilrechtler, deren dogmatischer Horizont auf eine auf
Tauschzwecke
reduzierten formalisierten Gerechtigkeit reduziert ist, als Verirrung und
Zumutung
begreifen werden.
4.2 Die Formen der Sozialstaatlichkeit
Der Sozialstaat ist im Grundgesetz in Art. 20 I und 28 I 1 GG fest verankert, auch

wenn diese
Normen fr die Herleitung konkreter Ansprche bislang wenig genutzt worden sind,
auch
nicht fr das Wohnungswesen. Das BVerfG hat die Betrge der Grundsicherung nach der
Hartz IV-Gesetzgebung, also nach dem SGB II, ausschlielich am Menschenwrdeprinzip
gemessen, obwohl diese doch das Herz des Sozialstaats betreffen, und damit dem
Sozial-
staatsprinzip keine eigenstndige Wertigkeit zuerkannt.7 Von den Soziologen und im
interna-
8
tionalen Diskurs wird der Sozialstaat gern als Wohlfahrtsstaat , welfare state,
bezeichnet, mit
einem Begriff, der also nicht auf die Solidaritt mit den Schwcheren, sondern auf
die Teil-
9
nahme am Wohlstand abstellt. Sobald der volle Einsatz der Arbeitskraft nicht mehr
fr das
Existenzminimum ausreicht und auch keine hinreichenden kompensatorischen
staatlichen
Zuschsse mehr gewhrt werden, ist der Sozialstaat allerdings kein Wohlfahrtsstaat
mehr.
Im Zuge der Entwicklung des Industrialismus im Deutschland des 19.
Jahrhunderts
erwiesen sich die vorhandenen Sozialsysteme, insbesondere die Familie, die
Hofgemein-
schaften und die Gemeinden, zunehmend als nicht mehr zum Auffangen der
Lebensrisiken
geeignet. Schon vor den Bismarckschen Reformen gem der Kaiserlichen Botschaft
von
10
1881, war in der ffentlichen Diskussion vom Kultur- und Wohlfahrtsstaat
die Rede,
also in einem Sinne, dass nur das Einstehen der Gemeinschaft fr die Schwcheren
einen
Anspruch auf Anerkennung als Kulturstaat begrnden kann. Dass Bismarck mit
der
Sozialversicherung die politischen Wogen der Klassenauseinandersetzung gltten und
der
Sozialdemokratie das Wasser abgraben wollte, ist heute weitgehend unstrittig.11 Ob
von
Anfang an auch die Dimension gesehen wurde, dass ein Sozialversicherungssystem

Bezie-
hungen des Individuums zum Staat und der Individuen untereinander, ja
Abhngigkeiten
7 BVerfG, NJW 2010, 505.

8 Zur Begriffsgeschichte s. Kaufmann, F.-X. (2003) p. 7.
9 Zugespitzt im Motto von Erhard, L. (1957) p. 248.
10 Wagner, A. (1876) p. 257; s. vor allem die kompakte bersicht ber die
sozialwissenschaftlichen Theoriebe-
stnde zur Entwicklung des Sozialstaats bei Lessenich, S. (2009) pp. 21 ff.
11 S. dazu insbesondere Achinger, H. (1958).
172
----------------------- Page 212-----------------------

zivilrechtliche
Verfassung
begrndet und jeder Empfnger ein Teil des kollektiven Systems wird, ist dagegen
eher zu
bezweifeln. Die Erkenntnis des durch den Sozialstaat geschaffenen sozialen Bandes
ist erst
12
nach und nach entstanden .
Der Sozialstaat gewhrt zunchst einmal eine begrenzte Handlungsfreiheit13
auch fr
diejenigen, die sich nicht selbst auf den Mrkten, insbesondere auch dem
Wohnungs-
markt, versorgen knnen. Dieses Freiheitselement wird in den Debatten um die
Flexibil-
isierung des Kapitalismus zunehmend ignoriert. Mit der durch Geld- und
Sachleistungen
eingerumten Freiheit ist allerdings zwangslufig auch Abhngigkeit
verbunden, die
entsprechende soziale Haltungen erzeugen kann, von der kontinuierlichen
Anspruchs-
erwartung bis zum Verlust des Anschlusses an Arbeit. Diese Ambivalenz von
Freiheit
und Zwang kehrt in den ffentlichen Debatten regelmig unter Pointierung des einen
oder des anderen Pols bei den verschiedenen politischen Parteien und ihren
jeweiligen
rechtlichen Konzepten wieder. Weithin ausgeklammert wird zudem, dass der
Sozialstaat
auch denen Freiheiten gewhrt, die gar keine Geld- oder Sachleistungen von ihm
erhalten,
sondern die in sozialem Frieden ihre Produktivitt entfalten knnen oder auch nur
ihre
bescheidenen Arbeitseinkommen beziehen.
Historisch herausgebildet hat sich der Sozialstaat in Deutschland14 bei der
Kranken-,
Unfall- und Rentenversicherung seit dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts, whrend die
Sozial-
versicherung fr Arbeitslosigkeit eine Errungenschaft der Weimarer Republik
war15.
Dabei knpfte die Sozialversicherung streng an die Arbeitsleistung des Berechtigten

an,
wie dies auch den theoretischen Vorstellungen der Sozialdemokratie ber die
Fortschritts-
trgerschaft des Proletariats entsprach. Das von Marx so genannte
Lumpenproletariat16
war ausgegrenzt. Dieser Anschluss an Arbeit ist in den wirtschaftlichen

Entwicklungen
der letzten Jahrzehnte prekr17 geworden, sowohl nach den gesellschaftlichen Fakten
wie
nach den ideologischen Bewertungsgrundlagen.
12 Zum Verhltnis von Individuum und sozialstaatlicher Institutionenwelt s. etwa

Leisering, L. (1997).
13 Vobruba, G. (2003); s. ferner das Grundsatzprogramm des DGB von 1996 mit der
Forderung, den Sozial-
staat durch Reformen zu sichern, mit dem Ziel, die materiellen Grundlagen fr
Freiheit und Selbstverant-
wortung zu erhalten (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund Bundesvorstand:
Grundsatzprogramm des Deutschen
Gewerkschaftsbundes (1996) pp. 23 ff).
14 Zur Gegenberstellung der utilitaristisch inspirierten Sozialreform der
Liberalen in England, der paternal-
istischen Version in Frankreich und der konservativen Doktrin Bismarcks Nida-
Rmelin, J. (2000).
15 Durch das Gesetz ber Arbeitslosenvermittlung und
Arbeitslosenversicherung (AVAVG) vom 16.7.1927
(RGBl. I, 187).
16 Das Lumpenproletariat wurde von Karl Marx als passive Verfaulung der
untersten Schichten der alten
Gesellschaft bezeichnet (Marx, K./Engels, F. (1972) 472). Fr dessen
Bereitwilligkeit, sich zur reaktionren
Umtrieben kaufen zu lassen, benannte er den prfaschistischen Staatsstreich
Napoleons III. gegen die Repu-
blik von 1848. Mit dem Begriff war jedoch nicht nur die schmale Schicht
Krimineller und Halbkrimineller
gemeint, sondern auch die sozialen Absteiger bis zu Lasttrgern, Lumpensammlern
und Literaten (Marx, K.
(1972) 160 f).
17 Zum soziologischen Neologismus des Prekariats und der damit verbundenen
Entwicklung der gesell-
schaftlichen Verhltnisse s. Altenhain, C. (2008).
173
----------------------- Page 213-----------------------
Peter Derleder
Der Sozialstaat ist eine besondere Form der politischen, konomischen und
sozialen
Verfasstheit der westlichen Industriegesellschaften und verbindet die demokratische
Staats-
form, kapitalistisches Wirtschaften und die zentralistische Regulierung sozialer
Leistungen
18
und der Ansprche auf diese. Alte haben Rentenansprche, Kranke Ansprche
auf Gesund-
heitsversorgung, Arbeitslose knnen eine Grundsicherung von der Agentur fr Arbeit
ver-
langen, Arme Sozialhilfeansprche geltend machen. Kinder haben den Anspruch
auf ein
kindheitsspezifisches Existenzminimum, Frauen knnen sich auf die
Gleichberechtigung bei
allen sozialen Ansprchen berufen. Minoritten aller Art knnen existentielle
Bedrfnisse in
die Waagschale werfen, von den Behinderten ber die Kriegsopfer und die
Asylsuchenden
bis zu den unbegleiteten auslndischen Kindern19. Das Sozialrecht ist zu einer
Groenzy-
klopdie in zwlf Gesetzesbnden und Zehntausenden von Kommentarseiten geworden.

Der analytische Blick gilt zunchst dem Verhltnis von Wirtschaft und
Sozialstaat.
Ursprnglich war dieser darauf angelegt, den konomischen Prozessen
Ungestrtheit
zu gewhren. Das grundlegende Profitmotiv des Wirtschaftens konnte sich umso mehr
entfalten, je mehr es von sozialen Rcksichtnahmen frei war. Darauf baute
nicht nur
der Frhliberalimus20, der noch der Kodifikation des BGB zugrunde lag, sondern auch
der wirtschaftliche Aufschwung nach den beiden Weltkriegen. Auch diese beiden
histo-
rischen Grokatastrophen hat der Sozialstaatsgedanke problemlos berlebt, ja
es wur-
den sogar in den Kriegen eingefhrte soziale Einrichtungen, auch wesentliche
Elemente
des sozialen Mietrechts in die Friedenszeiten bernommen.21 Die Expansion
der kapi-
talistischen Wirtschaft bis hin zur informationstechnologischen Revolution beruhte

auf
der ungebrochenen Tendenz zur optimalen Rendite nach betriebswirtschaftlicher Rech-
nung. Der Rcken wurde ihr freigehalten durch die weitgehende bernahme der
sozialen
Funktionen durch den Staat. Privatkapitalismus und Sozialstaat waren also
miteinander
verschrnkte, komplementre Organisationssysteme. Es war ihr Vorzug, dass in diesem
Rahmen die Profitmaximierung nicht eingeschrnkt, ja das allein

erfolgversprechende
Handlungsmotiv war, altruistische und karitative Haltungen also keine magebliche
Rolle
spielten, noch nicht einmal auf der Ebene der individuellen Sozialisation. Vielmehr
war
der Sozialstaat fr die Bestimmung der Solidarittsdimensionen zustndig, die von
der
karitativen Haltung der Steuerzahler ganz unabhngig war. Diese Verlagerung der
Ein-
standsbereitschaft vom Individuum auf das Kollektiv entlastete also auch jeden
einzelnen
von einer individuellen ethischen Anstrengung. Je mehr Reichtum die Wirtschaft
schuf,
desto mehr konnte man ihr fr die Solidarressourcen abzweigen.
18 Kaufmann, F.-X. (1989) p. 94.

19 S. zu Letzteren Peter, E. (2001), sowie Peter, E. (2003).
20 Dessen knappste Botschaft Enrichissez vous stammt von dem Minister
Guizot aus der Regierung des
Brgerknigs Louis Philippe.
21 So gehen Kndigungsschutz und Miethhebegrenzung auf die
Mieterschutzverordnung vom 26.7.1917
zurck.
174
----------------------- Page 214-----------------------

zivilrechtliche
Anschlussverlust als Versto gegen
die Verfassung
Die Krisen des kapitalistischen Wirtschaftens wurden im 20. Jahrhundert

weitgehend
mit keynesianischen Konzepten bekmpft, wie sie seit dem Schwarzen Freitag in den
USA
und der Entstehung des New Deal entwickelt worden sind. Der Staat bernahm Krisen-
bewltigungsaufgaben, indem er Investitionen zur berbrckung schwerwiegender
struk-
tureller Einbrche ttigte. Selbst die Reagonomics22 waren noch eine Art
Keynesianismus,
allerdings mit militrischer Zielrichtung, bis zum virtuell gebliebenen Krieg der
Sterne. Erst
der Thatcherismus mit seinen rabiaten deregulatorischen Einschrnkungen von
Staatlich-
keit und traditioneller englischer Kultur gab eine neue Bhne frei, auf der die
gesellschaftlich
notwendigen Infrastrukturen23 zusammenbrachen und ein vllig
berdimensionierter
Finanzkomplex aufgebaut wurde, durch den jede Woche ein neues hochriskantes Finanz-
produkt angeboten werden konnte und die parasitren Strategien des

Finanzkapitals die
britische Wirtschaft noch auf Jahrzehnte in besonderem Mae belasten werden.
Zunehmend wurde jedoch auch in den anderen europischen Lndern die
staatliche
Brokratie in Frage gestellt, auch gerade die sozialstaatliche. Mit dieser
Brokratiekritik
verband sich eine Politik der Privatisierung vorher ffentlicher Sektoren, um
privatkapi-
talistische Effizienzsteigerung zu erzielen. Weithin ungeklrt blieb, in welchem
Umfang
der staatliche Verwaltungsmechanismus durch privatwirtschaftliche Organisation
ersetzt
werden konnte und welche Nachteile damit verbunden waren.
Sozialstaat und Demokratie sind keine Zwillinge. Der autoritr
errichtete Sozial-
staat hat viele historische Belege und wird auch in der Gegenwart bei der Bildung
der
chinesischen Weltwirtschaftsmacht praktiziert. Der Sozialstaat ist aber
geschichtlich
weitgehend nicht ohne entsprechende soziale Bewegungen entstanden, wie es
fr die
Sozialdemokratie und die Gewerkschaften in Deutschland der Fall war. Die Annahme,
dass nach Einrichtung demokratischer Verhltnisse die Schwcheren in der
Gesellschaft
in Mehrheitsentscheidungen immer mehr soziale Ansprche realisieren, auch ber die
Wahlkmpfe, ist jedoch zu eindimensional.

Schon als das Industrieproletariat in Massenbewegungen mit einigermaen
homo-
genen Theorieanstzen agierte, gab es Ausgrenzungen. Nachdem in den
westlichen
Industriestaaten die Industriearbeitspltze drastisch geschwunden sind und
seit auch
die Dienstleistungen vielfach in Billiglohnlnder verlagert werden, ist ein
so einheitli-
cher Motor der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung wie das Industrieproletariat
nicht mehr
vorhanden. Die Mittelschicht ist zum Hauptakteur des politischen Prozesses
geworden.
Zu ihr rechnen sich in Deutschland auch viele, die nicht annhend zu den 10% der
Erwach-
senen gehren, denen 2007 schon 61,1% des individuellen Nettovermgens gehrten24.
22 Zu den Reaganomics mit der grundlegenden Reduzierung von Steuern, der

Abwicklung sozialstaatlicher
Institutionen und der Auseinanderentwicklung von Arm und Reich s. Crouch, C.
(2008).
23 S. Wolmar, C. (2005).
24 Die Verteilung des individuellen Nettovermgens in Deutschland hat
sich in den Jahren 2002 bis 2007
weiterhin auseinanderentwickelt. 50% besaen 2002 1,3% des
individuellen Nettovermgens und 2007
1,2%, die reichsten 10% besaen 2002 57,9% und 2007 61,1% (Quelle:
Berechnungen des DIW Berlin).
175
----------------------- Page 215-----------------------
Peter Derleder
Die Mittelschicht frchtet sich aber nicht ohne Grund vor dem Abstieg infolge der
Glo-
balisierung der Weltwirtschaft25. Sie wird in allen Wahlkmpfen umworben. Die
deutsche
Mittelschicht, die im Vergleich zu den USA und anderen westlichen Lndern immer
noch
relativ gut dasteht, hat bei der Wahl 2009 offenbar zum Ausdruck gebracht, dass ihr
die
sozialen Lasten zu gro geworden sind. Sie pldierte offenbar fr eine Reduzierung
des
Sozialstaats, was durch die Abwahl der Wirtschaftsliberalen aus dem Parlament im
Jahre
2013 auf Umdenkungsprozesse hindeuten knnte.
Da der Abschied vom Sozialstaat von Politikern nicht als Wahlbotschaft
verkndet
werden kann, wird dafr die Kritik des Steuerstaats instrumentalisiert.
Steuersenkungen
wurden der Mittelschicht versprochen, von brgerlichen Koalitionen. Im hoch
verschul-
deten Nationalstaat26 bedeutete das nichts anderes, als dass smtliche
Steuerreduzierun-
gen auf die sozialen Ausgaben und ihr jeweiliges Deputat verteilt werden mssten.
Hinzu
kommt, dass die zur Stabilisierung der finanzkapitalistischen Institutionen
eingesetzten
zwlfstelligen Betrge den Handlungsrahmen des Nationalstaats ohnehin sprengen. Die
Demokratie mit der Mittelschicht als Hauptakteur luft also keineswegs auf eine
stndige
Erweiterung des Sozialstaats hinaus.
In den 50er Jahren stand im Mittelpunkt der staatsrechtlichen Debatten wie in
der
Weimarer Zeit das Verhltnis von Staat und Gesellschaft. Postuliert wurde eine
Dichoto-
mie von Staat und Gesellschaft, bei der dem Staat eine freie brgerliche
Gesellschaft
vorgegeben war. Auch Juristen, die dem nationalsozialistischen Staat gedient
hatten, wie
Ernst Forsthoff27, Jahrgang 1902, waren nun Liberale in der Weise, dass sie den
Rechtsstaat
als bloen Rahmen einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaft ansahen, wo jeder staatliche

Ein griff
einer besonderen gesetzlichen Legitimation bedurfte. Der Sozialstaat wurde
dagegen
prinzipiell als illegitimes Mittel der Wohlstandsverteilung begriffen. Ihm
wurde weit-
gehend die verfassungsrechtliche Qualitt, zumindest aber die
verfassungsrechtsdog-
matische Kontur abgesprochen. Wer den Brger vor der Umverteilung seines Wohlstands
auf nicht Leistungswillige, schtze war somit die Kernfrage28. Bei Sloterdijk ist
nur der
Sprachgebrauch ein bisschen anders geworden, wenn von der Umverteilung auf
die
Unproduktiven die Rede ist29.
Ernst Forsthoff verlangte nach seiner liberalen Luterung in den

50er Jahren den
starken Rechtsstaat, der alle gleich behandelt, zur Abwehr sozialer
Umverteilung. Die
durch Sozialleistungsgesetze nach und nach immer strker ausgebaute
Sozialstaatlichkeit
25 S. insbesondere Bologna, S. (2006).

26 Mit fast 1,5 Billionen Euro, also 20 000 Euro pro Kopf hat die
Staatsverschuldung in Deutschland das
kontrollierbare Ma ungeachtet der verfassungsrechtlichen Schuldenbremse
berschritten.
27 Forsthoff, E. (1933).
28 Forsthoff, E.; Bachof, O. et al. (eds.) (1954) pp. 8 ff.
29 Sloterdijk, P. (13.06.2009).
176
----------------------- Page 216-----------------------

zivilrechtliche
Verfassung
provozierte bei ihm 197030 die These, die Bundesrepublik Deutschland erfahre als
para-
digmatischer Staat der Industriegesellschaft nur noch durch die Verteilung

des Sozi-
alprodukts ihren Zusammenhalt, nicht aber in Werten, die ber die
Rationalitt der
Eigeninteressen hinausgingen. Wrdigt man dies heute nach der
Zurckdrngung des
westlichen Industriekapitalismus und der informationsgesellschaftlichen Wende, dann
ist zwar zu konstatieren, dass es im Mainstream nicht mehr um die Aufgabe einer
ber
das konomische hinausgehenden nationalstaatlichen Werteordnung geht, aber
doch
praktisch in nur leicht modernisierter Ideologie um die Delegitimierung der
staatlichen
Verteilungsaufgaben zugunsten einer brgerlichen Mitte. Dabei hat die
Marktwirtschaft
der letzten drei Jahrzehnte fr eine immer weitergehende Spreizung der Einkommen,
also
Umverteilung von unten nach oben gesorgt.
Demgegenber ist nach dem Wandel der wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen und
der Ausweitung der Migrationsprozesse31 darauf zu insistieren, dass allein
Einstandsbe-
reitschaft und Integrationskraft dem europischen Mitgliedstaat hinreichende

Bestands-
gewhr und Legitimation bieten. Die schwieriger gewordene kulturelle Verflechtung
lst
dabei mehr Diskussion aus als das (in Deutschland vergleichsweise immer noch hohe)
Niveau der sozialstaatlichen Leistungen. Nur der Sozialstaat bietet also Gewhr fr
das
demokratische Mindestniveau.
Die Verlagerung von Produktion und Dienstleistungen aus den
Industriestaaten
in Billiglohnlnder, innerhalb und auerhalb Europas, macht allerdings
nicht nur das
Arbeitsplatzangebot, sondern auch das bisherige Niveau der sozialstaatlichen
Leistun-
gen prekr. Auf beides bezieht sich die neu proklamierte Flexibilisierung der
Berufs- und
Lebenswelt. Schon in der Ausbildung wird der lernende Unternehmer seiner selbst32
aus-
gerufen. Anstelle der Lohnabhngigkeit wird neue Selbstndigkeit propagiert,

so dass
von ihrem Arbeitgeber wegen Leistungsdefiziten Entlassene sich oft als
Existenzgrnder
versuchen, meist mit wenig tragfhigen unternehmerischen Ideen. Aktivierung
ist die
neue gesellschaftliche Botschaft.33 Die Aktivierung des Alters wird mit der
Entstehung der
umgekehrten Alterspyramide begrndet. Jede Aktivierung hat vielfach eine positive

sub-
jektive Wahrnehmungsseite, auch wenn sie objektiv nachlassenden Sozialleistungen
und
drohenden Anschlussverlusten geschuldet ist. Allgemein wird der flexible Mensch34
postu-
liert, der sich nicht mehr auf ein kontinuierliches Berufsleben einstellen darf,
sondern mit
vielen berraschenden Berufswechseln und Intervallen rechnen muss. Damit ist auch
die
bisherige Wohnungskontinuitt nicht mehr zu erwarten. Ein Arbeitskraftunternehmer
ist
30 Forsthoff, E. (1971).
31 Bundeszentrale fr Politische Bildung (bpb) (ed.) (2008).
32 Siehe allgemein Brckling, U. (2007).
33 Siehe nur Mezger, E.; West, K. W. (eds.) (2000).
34 Sennett, R. (1998).
177
----------------------- Page 217-----------------------
Peter Derleder
gefragt35. Das Scheitern mit unternehmerischen Initiativen ist zwar weithin

vorprogram-
miert, fr die Insolventen wird aber der Comeback-Kid als Spezialfigur des durch
keine
Katastrophe Entmutigten entworfen. Du musst Dein Leben ndern, ist die Botschaft
des
sich selbst so nennenden Anthropotechnikers Sloterdijk36, der damit ideologisches
Mus
auf das karge sozialstaatliche Brot der Zukunft streicht.

Die Gesamtplanung der Sozialversicherungssysteme luft schon seit lngerem
darauf
hinaus, dass ein Arbeitnehmer, der in einem Durchschnittsberuf ber mehr als 30
oder 40
Jahre Sozialversicherungsbeitrge bezahlt hat, am Ende auch nur eine Rente in der
Hhe
der Sozialhilfestze zu gewrtigen hat, jedenfalls wenn man die gegenwrtigen
Hochrech-
nungen zugrunde legt.37 Damit scheint das gesamte Sozialversicherungssystem, auf
das
Deutschland immer noch stolz ist, zu einer Art Selbstbetrug zu werden. Wer am Ende
so dasteht, als ob er keine Beitrge geleistet htte, wird deren Sinn nicht mehr
verstehen.
Die Sozialpolitiker und die Rentenfachleute pflegen an dieser Stelle als Trost
anzufhren,
es sei damit zu rechnen, dass die Sozialhilfestze dann gesenkt wrden und das
Lohnab-
standsgebot38 eingehalten werde. Das Leistungsniveau des zuknftigen Sozialstaats
lohnt
dann aber womglich den ganzen Brokratieaufwand nicht mehr.

Die objektivierende Analyse der Sozialstaatsentwicklung steht also zu
der bisher
guten gesellschaftlichen Resonanz fr die Aktivierung der Bedrftigen und der
Flexibi-
lisierung des Berufslebens in Kontrast. Sie scheint das Paradox in sich zu bergen,
dass die
Chancen zur Erhaltung des Sozialstaats geringer werden, diese aber entschieden
genutzt
werden sollen. Auch die sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung lebt in dieser
Ambivalenz:
ihre Analysen ergeben Rcklufigkeiten, ihre Gutachten ermutigen die Regierungen
zum
aktivierenden Sozialstaat.
Die dieses Jahrhundert beherrschende kologische Krise macht
Einstandsverpflich-
tungen zudem auch zugunsten der knftigen Generationen erforderlich. Die nationalen
Sozialstaatskonzepte sind darauf bisher nur unzureichend eingerichtet. Das

Feuerwerk
an Ressourcen, das Europa seit Beginn der Industrialisierung (in England
ab 1750)
abgebrannt hat, ist nicht wiederholbar.39 Der fortgesetzte Verbrauch der
fossilen Roh-
stoffe fhrt zu einer Erderwrmung mit unberschaubaren Katastrophenszenarien. Die
nachholende Entwicklung insbesondere in den Schwellenlndern muss auf ganz andere
35 Dieser Begriff stammt von den Soziologen Gnter Vo und Hans

Pongratz, s. Vo, G./Pongratz, H. G.
(1998).
36 Sloterdijk, P. (2008).
37 Die realen Rentenkrzungen in Deutschland ergeben sich aus den aperiodischen
prozentualen Rentenerh-
hungen, die deutlich hinter dem Anstieg der Verbraucherpreise zurckbleiben (s.
Kortmann, K.; Halbherr,
V.: (2009); zur Kritik an den amtlichen Rentenberechnungen und -prognosen
Riedmller, B.; Willert,
M. (2008).
38 Die gesetzliche Verankerung des Lohnabstandsgebots findet sich in 28 IV SGB
XII.
39 Sachs, W./Santarius, T. (2005) p. 157, auf den sich auch die folgenden
Ausfhrungen sttzen.
178
----------------------- Page 218-----------------------

zivilrechtliche
Verfassung
Produktions- und Konsummuster als das 19. und das 20. Jahrhundert setzen,
da die
Absorptions- und Regenerationsfhigkeit der Biosphre dies erfordert.
Fr die westlichen Industrielnder, aber auch die Schwellenlnder, steht der
Rckbau
des historisch singulren Hochverbrauchs an, auf allen Sektoren, vom
Fleischverbrauch
ber den Automobilismus bis zum stndig ausgeweiteten Energiekonsum in den Haus-
halten und den Gewerbeimmobilien. Dafr kommen nach der sozialwissenschaftlichen
Literatur40 praktisch drei methodische Anstze in Betracht, die Steigerung von
Effizienz
und von Konsistenz sowie die Wahrung der Suffizienz. Die Effizienzstrategie wird
den
Material- und Energieaufwand vermindern mssen, was freilich nicht ohne
Wider-
sprche in einem marktwirtschaftlichen System realisierbar ist. Bei der
Konsistenzstra-
tegie ist die Vereinbarkeit von Technik und Natur mageblich, mit der Zielsetzung,
dass
die industriellen Stoffwechselprozesse die natrlichen mglichst nicht stren
sollen. Das
Optimum wre es, dass aus den Abfllen der einen Nutzungsstufe Rohmaterial fr die
nchste wird.41 Die Suffizienzprfung wird bestimmen mssen, was der Gesellschaft
der
Zukunft berhaupt (noch) wohl tut, welches Ma an Konsum berhaupt noch eingerumt
werden kann.
Dass die kologisch notwendigen Einschrnkungen berwiegend
marktwirtschaftlich
organisiert werden knnen, ist kaum vorstellbar. Die notwendigen Kontingentierungen
werden an weltweite vlkerrechtliche Konsensfindungsprozesse anknpfen mssen. Was
in Kyoto42 begonnen hat, wird langfristig nicht an den Konfusionen der

Nachfolgekon-
ferenzen scheitern, sondern weitergehend konkretisiert werden. Entscheidend wird

aber
die Umsetzung der Kontingentierungen sein, fr die weitgehend die Nationalstaaten
und
die Europische Union zustndig bleiben werden. Natrlich knnen Subventionen und
andere marktkonforme Steuerungsmittel, etwa auch ein Wohnungsmodernisierungsrecht
innerhalb eines Vertragsverhltnisses, zielfhrend sein. Kontingentierungen
werden
jedoch grundstzlich nicht aus Individualinteressen heraus realisierbar
sein, sondern
bedrfen ffentlich-rechtlicher Vorgaben zugunsten einer die knftigen
Generationen
umfassenden Allgemeinheit. Die damit verbundenen Verteilungsprozesse werden we
sentlich
schwieriger sein als in der Vergangenheit, wo man sich auf den bequemen
Modus der
Verteilung des Wachstums beschrnkt hat. Insofern ist ein
Regierungsprogramm, das in
einer Gesellschaft mit hohem Konsumsttigungsgrad verteilungspolitisch auf
Wachs-
tumsbeschleunigung setzt, ein Zeichen historischer Hilflosigkeit.
Deutschland hat sich bisher als weltkologischer Motor gegeben. Das ist mit
Rck-
sicht auf die zgige Entwicklung umweltbezogener Industrie und ihrer
Produkte und
40 S. etwa Drre, K./Lessenich, S. et al. (2009).

41 Siehe dazu Pauli, G. (1999).
42 Das Kyoto-Protokoll vom 11.12.1997, ein Zusatzprotokoll zur
Klimarahmenkonvention der UN (UNFCCC)
ist das einzige substantielle Umweltabkommen, das aber erst 2005 in Kraft
getreten ist und im Jahre 2012
ausluft.
179
----------------------- Page 219-----------------------
Peter Derleder
der von ihr betriebenen Exporte auch nicht ganz falsch. Die sprunghafte
Entwicklung
energiesparender Heizkessel etwa ist eine fr den Wohnungssektor greifbare
Effizienzstei-
gerung43 . Der Hauptbeitrag der Bundesrepublik zu den Energiesparzielen von Kyoto
war
allerdings die Brachlegung praktisch der gesamten DDR-Industrie, von der

rckstndi-
gen, aber hochkomplexen chemischen Industrie (Leuna), bis zur Produktion
einfachster
Waren (Gummistiefel). Die westdeutschen Lieferanten verstanden den deutschen Osten
als neuen Markt, der notfalls mit Konsumsubventionen zu erobern war. Insoweit
knnen
die erreichten Spareffekte also keineswegs hochgerechnet werden, stellt sich der
deutsche
Sparimpetus also mehr als das Nebenprodukt einer singulren historischen
Konstellation
bei der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands dar. Dementsprechend bleibt es ein
dringendes
Gebot der globalen kologischen Entwicklung, einer knftige Generationen
einschlieen-
den Sozialstaatlichkeit, dass auf dem Immobiliarsektor grundlegende
energiepolitische
Weichen gestellt werden, insbesondere zugunsten erneuerbarer Energien.
4.3 Die anderen Formen der Staatlichkeit
Der Sozialstaat ist nur mglich aufgrund eines funktionierenden Steuerstaats. Im

inter-
nationalen Wettbewerb wurden von den westlichen Industriestaaten seit den 80er
Jahren
immer mehr Spitzensteuerstze gesenkt. Die Staatsverschuldung ber Kredite
wurde
stndig weitergetrieben, bis auch die neu verfassungsrechtlich verankerten
Schulden-
bremsen44 kaum mehr einzuhalten scheinen. Die Grundberlegungen dazu sind in einem
Steuerstaats- und Sozialstaatsdiskurs greifbar, der auch fr den
Wohnungssektor nicht
folgenlos bleiben wird.
Die Steuerstaatskritik begleitet die Bundesrepublik seit Jahrzehnten. Schon
der Finanz-
minister Franz Josef Strau hat eine groe Steuer(rechts)reform
versprochen45 . Von
Juristen wird die Debatte mehr in Richtung auf die Vereinfachung des Steuerrechts
und
die Beseitigung des Dschungels an Paragraphen und Vergnstigungen gefhrt,
erhlt
aber zunehmend philosophische Unterstrmungen. Die Bierdeckel-Ideologie46 war
der
Hhepunkt einer allenfalls fr bindungslose Lohn- und Gehaltsempfnger

denkbaren
Simplizissimus-Steuererhebung und hatte keinerlei Realittsgehalt fr
Selbstndige aller
43 S. etwa die laufenden Forschungsberichte des Bremer Energieinstituts

ber Energieeffizienz und rege-
nerative Energie (Bremer Energie Institut (1992-2013). URL:
http://www.bremer-energie-institut.de/de/
publications/reports).
44 Nach der Verkndung im BGBl. 2009 I, S. 2248 ist das die Schuldenbremse
enthaltende Gesetz zur nderung
des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 91c, 91d, 104b, 109, 109a, 115, 143d) am 1. August
2009 in Kraft getreten.
45 Zu Beginn der ersten Groen Koalition in Jahre 1966.
46 Der frhere Fraktionschef der CDU/CSU im Bundestag Friedrich Merz erregte 2003
Aufsehen, als er medi-
enwirksam ein dreistufiges Steuerkonzept verkndete, dessen drei Eckpunkte auf
einen einzigen Bierdeckel
gehen wrden.
180
----------------------- Page 220-----------------------

zivilrechtliche
Verfassung
Art und Unternehmen. In Paul Kirchhofs zeitweilig sogar vom BVerfG bernommenem
Halbteilungsgrundssatz47 sollte sich eine angeblich am heiligen St. Martin
orientierte ethi-
sche Verbrmung der Steuerstaatsbegrenzung niederschlagen, deretwegen auch der

reichste
Brger trotz aller groben Verteilungsdysfunktionen nie mehr als die Hlfte seines
finanziel-
len Mantels, seines Einkommens, insgesamt fr alle Steuern sollte abgeben mssen.
In dieser Rechenbilanz tauchten weder die immer weitergehende Spreizung der
Ein-
kommen noch die Vorteile auf, die jeder einzelne durch die staatliche
Gewhrleistung eines
weitgehend friedlichen und sicheren Alltags, die Absicherung von Lebensrisiken,
soziale
und kulturelle Integration hat. Um den Vergnstigungen fr die Begterten
(symbolisch
etwa an den von der Allgemeinheit besonders hoch subventionierten Karten fr Opern-
besuche festzumachen) ihren Argumentationsgehalt zu nehmen, wurde sogar

ber die
Streichung smtlicher staatlichen Subventionen gesprochen, als ob eine derartige
Radi-
kalkur nicht die Auslschung aller indirekten staatlichen Steuerungsmittel
zur Folge
gehabt htte. Man denke nur an die von Whrungsgefllen,
Wanderungsbewegungen
und internationaler Arbeitsteilung verursachte Sttzung von Mrkten und Branchen,
von
Unternehmen und Arbeitspltzen sowie notleidender gesellschaftlicher Felder (von
der
Familie bis zur Bildung). Insofern war der Halbteilungsgrundsatz eine negative
Utopie,
die in vorzivilisatorische Verhltnisse htte fhren mssen.
Der Philosoph Sloterdijk48 hat vor kurzem noch darber hinaus den
zeitgens-
sischen Staat als geldsaugendes Ungeheuer bezeichnet. Dieser reklamiere

jedes Jahr
die Hlfte aller Wirtschaftserfolge der produktiven Schichten, bei
unbegreiflicher
Duldsamkeit der Wohlhabenden, er veranstalte eine Kleptokratie mit dem
offiziellen
Titel einer sozialen Marktwirtschaft, als Sisyphos sozialer
Gerechtigkeit, und fhre
zu einer Ausbeutung der Produktiven durch die Unproduktiven, wie sie bei modernen
Nationen inzwischen blich sei, die meist zur Hlfte aus Beziehern von Null-
Einkommen
und niedrigen abgabenfreien Einknften bestnden. Der keynesianisch vergiftete
Staat
steuere auf die Enteignung der Glubiger durch die Schuldner mittels
Whrungsreformen
zu, bei pantagruelischer Dimension der ffentlichen Schulden. Damit werde der einst
von
den Frhsozialisten deklarierte Raub in Form der Eigentumsbildung49
vermittels einer
Politik der nehmenden steuerstaatlichen Hand gercht. Stattdessen sei eine

Revolution
der gebenden Hand durch Abschaffung der Zwangssteuern und Umwandlung in Gaben
an die Allgemeinheit notwendig.
Damit wird eine moralische Umrstung aus dem Wertekanon der sozialen Markt-
wirtschaft hinaus angepeilt. In der Nachfolge Friedrich Nietzsches50 wird die Ethik
des
47 BVerfGE 93, 121, 136 ff; aufgegeben von BVerfGE 115, 97.
48 Sloterdijk, P. (13.06.2009).
49 S. Proudhon, P.-J. (1841), mit der These Eigentum ist Diebstahl.
50 Nietzsche, F. (1967) pp. 207 ff.
181
----------------------- Page 221-----------------------

Peter Derleder
Sozialstaats als Ressentiment der Unproduktiven (bei Nietzsche des

gemeinen
Mannes, der Schwachen) verstanden. Im Topf der Unproduktiven landen dabei unun-
terschieden die Jungen (whrend der immer lnger dauernden Ausbildung) wie die
Alten
(bei immer lngerem Durchschnittslebensalter), die Arbeitslosen, die
Wohnungslosen,
die Behinderten und die Knstler. Der Stolz der Produktiven, der sich Nietzsches
Her-
renmoral nhert, wird durch poujadistische51 Steuerboykottimpulse gekitzelt. Dass
die
Produktiven mehr Vorteile vom Staat haben knnten als die

Einkommensschwachen,
dass sie sich das Eigentum aus vieler Hnde Arbeit zuschreiben knnen,
wird durch
die Fokussierung des Blicks auf Sozialtransferleistungen schon als
Fragestellung elimi-
niert. Der Rechtsstaat jedenfalls bietet vorwiegend den Produktiven Markt-
und Kon-
sumordnung, Kapitalverwertungs- und Rechtssicherheit. Der ungedeckte Wechsel auf
die
Zukunft durch die zunehmende Staatsverschuldung sprengt alle Grenzen erst
seit den
staatlichen Einstandsleistungen fr Grobanken, die unberschaubare Risiken bei
immer
unglaublicheren Geschften eingegangen sind und deren Insolvenz dessen ungeachtet
das
Finanzsystem und die Realwirtschaft in den Abgrund strzen wrde.
Ein Gegenkonzept der freiwilligen Gabe, wie es vielleicht im sozialen Kontext
der
Urhorde geeignet war oder (nach Marcel Mauss ethnographischen Studien52)
dem
Geschenkaustausch als Vorgnger von Tausch und Kauf entspricht, wrde bei
jedem
Geber der modernen Gesellschaft die vollstndige, seine Eigeninteressen
transzendierende
Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit gemeinschaftlicher Aufgaben erfordern und
stellt damit
trotz des begrifflichen Glanzes einer Gabenwelt noch eine pointiertere terrible
simplifica-
tion als die Steuererklrung auf dem Bierdeckel dar. Die Hilflosigkeit der
staatlichen und
politischen Akteure, die einerseits eine Schuldenbremse verfassungsrechtlich
verankern,
andererseits weitere Verschuldung programmieren, ist trotz allem nicht
annhernd so
ausgeprgt wie die philosophische Hilflosigkeit, die fr Staat und Gesellschaft
einer ent-
wickelten europischen Nation die Ersetzung der ffentlichen Verantwortung durch
ein
privates karitatives Spenderwesen propagiert.
Die ffentliche Debatte um die uerungen des ehemaligen Berliner
Finanzsena-
tors Sarrazin53, dessen ungebremste Mglichkeiten zur Vertretung
auslnderfeindlicher
Thesen im April 2013 auch zu einer Rge Deutschlands durch den UN-Anti-Rassismus-
Ausschu fhrte, betrifft dagegen vor allem die sozialstaatlichen Strukturen in
einer Stadt
wie Berlin, aber auch die allgemeinen wirtschaftlichen und interkulturellen
Verhltnisse
in Deutschland. Sarrazin argumentierte, Berlin habe einen Anteil von 20% der
aktiven
51 Der franzsische Steuerrebell Pierre Poujade grndete 1955 eine

spezielle Partei zur Reduzierung der
Steuern, die Union de dfense des commerants et artisans (UDCA), und zog damit
ein erhebliches Whler-
potential an.
52 Mauss, M./Ritter, H. (1990 (zuerst 1923/24)).
53 Vor allem in dem Buch Sarrazin, T. (2010).
182
----------------------- Page 222-----------------------
4 Lebenszeitvertrge und Teilhabe der zivilrechtliche

Verfassung
Bevlkerung, der nicht gebraucht werde, also doppelt so viel wie im Rest der
Republik.
Die einfachen und mittleren Arbeitspltze wrden ins Ausland
verlagert, da der
Ar beitslohn der vielen fleiigen asiatischen Arbeiter der globale Mastab sei. Die
Berliner
Unterschicht nehme am normalen Wirtschaftskreislauf ebenso wenig teil wie ein
Gro-
teil der Trken und Araber, der integrationsunwillig und geburtenfreudig sei. Die
bri-
gen Migranten seien wesentlich aufgeschlossener und lernten die deutsche Sprache
ganz
berwiegend wenigstens in der zweiten Generation. Machten die Kinder
Abitur, finde
die Integration von alleine statt. Whrend in Chicago der Druck des Arbeitsmarkts,
der
Zwang des Broterwerbs die Integration besorge, sei dies in Berlin mit seinen
Sozialtrans-
fers anders. Stndig komme es seinetwegen auch zum Zuzug nicht
integrationsfhiger
trkischer und arabischer Partner. Integration sei aber eine Bringschuld.
Seit den Nachkriegsjahren ist die Bereitschaft zur Integration von Immigranten
in
Deutschland grundstzlich in spektakulrer Weise gewachsen. Dies beruht nicht nur
auf
einer (dringend ntigen) ethischen Nachsozialisation nach dem
Nationalsozialismus,
sondern auch auf sozialkonomischer Notwendigkeit im Hinblick auf die
kontinuierlich,
auch noch in den 80er Jahren vorausgesagte demografische Katastrophe. Die
Mittel-
schicht beklagt jedoch jetzt wieder eine berlastung durch die Unterschicht und
die
integrationsunwilligen Auslnder aus islamischen Lndern. Der Sozialstaatsabbau
wird
als Mittel zur Integrationserzwingung erwogen. Dies alles wird an Berlin pointiert,
das
whrend des Kalten Krieges eine hochsubventionierte Insellage hatte, dessen
Industrie
aus historischen Grnden langfristig weggebrochen und dessen Hauptstadtfunktion im
Lnderfinanzausgleich noch nicht hinreichend bercksichtigt ist. Dafr sind weder

die
Unterschicht noch die Muslime oder gar die 68er-Generation verantwortlich. Das
Flair
dieser Stadt, mit seiner Attraktivitt fr Besucher und Knstler, ist in den
gesellschaftli-
chen Konflikten aber noch keineswegs erstickt.
Die Verlagerung einfacher und mittlerer Ttigkeiten ins Ausland
betrifft dagegen
die deutsche Bevlkerung eher noch strker als die Immigranten, da es fr sie um
den
gesellschaftlichen Abstieg aus der Mittelschicht geht. Ein Groteil der
Arbeitslosen und
Einkommensschwachen ist nmlich ohne eigene Schuld in die Lage gekommen, keinen
Anschluss mehr an den Arbeitsmarkt zu haben oder ein kaum das
Existenzminimum
deckendes Arbeitseinkommen zu erzielen, selbst bei voller
Ausschpfung der
Ar beitskraft. ber die erheblichen Kompetenzen der 40- bis 50- jhrigen etwa, die
nach
einer Kndigung keine oder keine vergleichbare Arbeit mehr finden, wird
bei einer
Ausgrenzungsdebatte selten gesprochen.
Die Teilnahme am Wirtschaftskreislauf ist auch durch die weitreichende
Verlage-
rung von Produktion ins Ausland keineswegs automatisch abgeschnitten.
Sicher ist es
einfacher, mit Hochqualifizierten Innovationen und Ertrge zu realisieren,
sozusagen
im Land der Ideen. Ein westlicher Industriestaat muss aber auch ein Land der
ehrlichen
Arbeit bleiben, der einfachen und mittleren, insbesondere im
Dienstleistungsbereich.
183
----------------------- Page 223-----------------------
Peter Derleder
Die marktmige Anerkennung sozialer Arbeit vollzieht sich dabei

unregelmig und
oft sprunghaft, wie die Tariferfolge fr den Erzieherberuf deutlich gemacht
haben54. Vor
allem hat der Staat dafr zu sorgen, dass hier die wirtschaftlichen Ertrge der
Produktion
steuerstaatlich abgeschpft werden, um die Reserven fr zivilisatorisch notwendige
soziale
Arbeit bereitzustellen. Dass eine derartige steuer- und sozialstaatliche
Umverteilung unter
dem Vorbehalt des Wirtschaftswachstums steht, darf aus der Prioritt des Wachstums
im
regierungsamtlichen Motto55 nicht herausgelesen werden. Dass hohe Wachstumsraten in
den entwickelten westlichen Industrielndern mit ihrem durchschnittlich

hohen Grad
von Sttigung der Konsumbedrfnisse, wie schon dargelegt, in Zukunft nicht mehr den
Verteilungsrahmen abgeben, ist unbestreitbar. Die Festschreibung des

Anschlussverlustes
fr immer breitere Schichten wrde den demokratischen und sozialen Aufbau nach dem
Zweiten Weltkrieg grundlegend in Frage stellen.

Unter den Anschlussverlusten ist der Wohnungsverlust regelmig der
tiefgreifend-
ste, in den Biographien meist der absolute Tiefpunkt56. Der Wohnungslose
hat keinen
Standort mehr, von dem aus er eine Reintegration ins Berufsleben und in einen Fami-
lienzusammenhang in Angriff nehmen kann. Dennoch gibt es fr dieses Feld bislang

kein
Grundrecht, das wenigstens einen minimalen Leistungsanspruch tragen wrde. Vielmehr
wird heute die Wohnungsversorgung ber einen Markt gesteuert, der grundstzlich in
der
Preisbildung und Qualittsgestaltung frei ist.
54 Die bundesweit rund 220 000 Erzieher und Sozialarbeiter im ffentlichen Dienst
erhielten zum Ende des
ersten Jahrzehnts des 21. Jahrhunderts deutlich mehr Geld. Auch der
Gesundheitsschutz der Angestellten
wurde verbessert. Das ergab sich aus den Tarifvereinbarungen zwischen den
Gewerkschaften des ffentli-
chen Dienstes und den kommunalen Arbeitgebern.
55 S. das Motto des Koalitionsvertrags 2009 Wachstum, Bildung, Zusammenhalt
(CDU; CSU et al.: Wachstum.
Bildung. Zusammenhalt (2009)).
56 S. Panier-Richter, K. (2006).
184
----------------------- Page 224-----------------------
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----------------------- Page 228-----------------------
5 Lebenszeitvertrge Natur und Ethik
Helena Klinger
Summary
Ethical arguments have increasingly led to long-term thinking, which is now

becoming preva-
lent, especially in the management sector. The social aspect of this development
is absent
from legal discourse, despite the fact that the areas in which long-term
relationships arise
are growing in number1. Regulation should base its objectives on ethical
principles, and this
contribution examines the nature of long-term thinking and the ethical aspects of
long-term
contracts. The aim of this abstract is to support the development of a harmonised
European
Law of Contract that includes provision for long-term contracts.
The abstract first investigates the characteristics of life time
contracts under German
Civil Law and goes on to summarise the ethical standards it incorporates.
From a moral and economic point of view, it is assumed that long-term
contracts could
be an ideal form of contractual relationship. Long-term contracts have the
advantage of re-
2
duced ex-ante transaction costs . The parties get to know each other well and have
an interest
in establishing a cooperative relationship that is based on trust and is fruitful
in the long
term. Long-term contracts are also likely to offer less incentive for
opportunistic conduct, be-
cause there are more long-term advantages in having a satisfied contractual
partner. Ideally,
the conflicting interests of the parties will fade away in a long-term contract as
each party
adopts the interests of the other in order to achieve an extended and satisfactory
relationship.
This abstract examines how the specific rules and legal requirements governing
long-term
contracts are based on ethical principles and aim to secure this high
level of cooperation
between the contracting parties.
The contribution concludes that the effect of this shift in time horizon away
from the
one-off spot contract is transformative in its ethical scale, moving from
procedural justice
to the more material justice demanded by the nature of long-term
contracts. This mate-
rial justice focuses, in particular, on the legal and economic consequences of the
contract
and attempts to maintain a just contractual relationship. Ethical
criteria onto which the
1 New contractual forms such as leasing, factoring, internet access or the use
of internet domains, mobile
phones, pay-TV and mobile phone ringtones add to the more traditional long-
term contracts in the areas of
tenancy, employment, loan or insurance agreements.
2 Having a long-term contracting party does away with the cost of
finding new contractual partners, of
investigating their credibility and negotiating the subject matter of the
contract, and the general cost of
concluding a new agreement.
189
----------------------- Page 229-----------------------
Helena Klinger
regulation of long-term contracts is built are the willingness to cooperate based

on trustwor-
thy communication that observes the principles of discourse ethics3, mutual loyalty
as well
as consideration.4
Derzeit sind politische Argumentationen sehr populr, die sich auf

ethische Standards
5
beziehen und langfristiges - nachhaltiges - Denken in der Wirtschaftswelt
einfordern.
Die juristische Diskussion im Zivilrecht ist davon bislang noch nicht eingeholt und
wird
erfahrungsgem erst mit einiger Verzgerung diese Fragestellung aufnehmen. Mit der
Figur der Lebenszeitvertrge wird an die Ethik- und

Gerechtigkeitsdiskussion des al-
ten Rechts angeknpft und im Folgenden auf der Grundlage des deutschen Rechts ver-
sucht aufzuzeigen, wie das langfristige Denken in das auf europischer Ebene
bislang
vorherrschende und durch die kurzfristigen Kaufvertragskontakte geprgte
Rechtsdenken
eingefhrt werden kann. Der Beitrag fgt sich dabei ein in die Erluterung der
Natur
von Lebenszeitvertrgen fr das italienische Recht durch die Einleitung von Nogler
und
Reifner sowie die Darstellung der ethischen Anforderungen an das
Vertragsrecht von
Nicolussi.
Zunchst sollen die Charakteristika von Dauerschuldverhltnissen in der Form
des
Lebenszeitvertrages anhand ihres Vertragsgegenstandes sowie der typischen
Interessen
der Vertragspartner dargelegt werden, um darauf aufbauend ihre ethischen
Standards
darstellen zu knnen.
3 Because of the likelihood that unexpected events will occur at some point in a
long-term contractual relation-
ship, the incompleteness of contract terms (in particular, the typically open
clauses of long-term contracts)
and the impossibility of providing for every eventuality, there is a need for
greater willingness on the part of
the contracting parties to find positive solutions and to adapt the contract
terms to changed circumstances.
These adaptations ensure a continuing relationship and require cooperation
between the contracting parties,
as well as, ideally, communication based on a fair and equal dialogue that
fulfills the criteria of timely, ade-
quate, true, transparent and comprehensible information and does not take
advantage of the effect of surprise.
In these post-contractual situations, both the legal requirements and the
business policy of the contractual
partner play a significant role, so that long-term contracts are based on a
special relationship of confidence.
As a result, the replacement of a contracting or a creditor party is often
subject to stipulations that take into
account the personal impact of these long-term contracts and also personal
communication based on trust.
4 Furthermore and due to the extended lifetime of long-term contracts, a higher
level of loyalty is demanded
and granted. According to the formal stability of the legal principle of
pacta sunt servanda, the trust of both
parties in the duration and fulfilment of the long-term contract needs special
protection. For this reason, for
example, the right to terminate a long-term relationship might be restricted
under the principle of mutual
consideration. This ethical principle is crystallised in sweeping clauses that
explicitly refer to the ethical or
moral aspects (e.g.good faith of Section 242 BGB, ordre public of Section
138 BGB) and apply these more
strictly to long-term contracts. Furthermore, sector-specific rules that apply
to long-term relationships add
their own intensive duties of consideration and care for the contracting party
who invests a high level of trust
in the relationship (e.g. Section 618 BGB for employment law and Section 554a
BGB for tenancy law).
5 Vgl. Rat fr nachhaltige Entwicklung. URL:
http://www.nachhaltigkeitsrat.de/presseinformationen/
pressemitteilungen/nachh-wirtschaften-21-11-2012/.
190
----------------------- Page 230-----------------------
5 Lebenszeitvertrge
Natur und Ethik
5.1 Charakteristika von Dauerschuldverhltnissen in der Form des

Lebenszeitvertrages
Der Begriff Dauerschuldverhltnis wird im deutschen Recht ausdrcklich in

den
Vorschriften der 314, 313 Abs. 3, 308 Nr. 3, 309 Nr. 1 und Nr. 9
BGB erwhnt.
Gleichwohl enthlt keine der genannten Vorschriften eine Legaldefinition, um knf-
tige Entwicklungen nicht zu behindern6. Bereits dieses in der Gesetzesbegrndung

ange-
legte und prophezeite Entwicklungspotential verdeutlicht die rechtspolitische

Intention
einer fortwhrend steigenden Bedeutsamkeit jener Vertragsform. Demgem wird
die
herausgehobene Stellung anhand einer Vielzahl der klassischen und
gesetzlich gere-
7 8 9
10 11
gelten Dauerschuldverhltnisse (Miet- , Pacht- , Arbeits- , Darlehens-
, Brgschafts- ,
Versicherungs-12, Renten-13, Gesellschafts-, Makler- oder Schiedsvertrge14)
sowie der
stetig wachsenden Anzahl neuer und berwiegend nicht ausdrcklich gesetzlich

geregel-
ter Vertragstypen besttigt, die gleichfalls als Dauerschuldverhltnisse
einzustufen sind
und auf die berwiegend die Vorschriften der klassischen Dauerschuldverhltnisse
An-
wendung finden (u.a. Factoring-15, Leasing-16, Pflege-17, Mobilfunk-18, Handy-
Klingelton-
Abonnement-19, Pay-TV-20, Internetzugang-21 und
Internetplattformnutzungsvertrge22).
Allen den genannten Vertragsarten ist gemeinsam, dass sie auf eine langfristige
Vertrags-
laufzeit angelegt sind. Daher weisen smtliche Vorschriften des Brgerlichen
Gesetzbu-
ches, die explizit das Dauerschuldverhltnis zum Regelungsgegenstand haben,
einerseits
einen Bezug zum langfristigen Zeithorizont23 und sind andererseits dem Vertrauen
der
Vertragspartner in die Aufrechterhaltung der Vertragsbeziehung sowie dem daraus

her-
vorgegangenen Leistungsaustausch geschuldet. Da zur Bestimmung der
vertragstypischen
6 Begr. RegE zu 314 Abs. 1 S. 1, Deutscher Bundestag 14. Wahlperiode: Entwurf

eines Gesetzes zur Mo-
dernisierung des Schuldrechts: Drucksache 14/6040 (14.05.2001) p. 177.
7 MKo-Gaier, 314, Rn. 6.
10 BGH NJW 2001, 1136 f; 2010, 602 f.
11 BGH NJW 1985, 3007 f; 1986, 252 f.
12 BGH NJW 1991, 1828 f.
14 BGH NJW 1964, 1129 f.
15 BGH NJW 1980, 44.
16 BGH NJW 1988, 204 ff.
18 BGH CR 2011, 506, 510.
20 AG Bremen NJW-RR 2009, 713 f.
21 BGH NJW-RR 2011, 916, Tz. 8.
22 KG NJW-RR 2005, 1630 f.
23 Michalski, L. (1979).
191
----------------------- Page 231-----------------------

Helena Klinger
Hauptleistung von Dauerschuldverhltnissen vorrangig das Zeitkriterium

heranzuziehen
ist24, steigt mit dem langfristigen Zeithorizont der Umfang dieser vertraglichen
Pflichten.
Infolgedessen sind Dauerschuldverhltnisse regelmig durch erhebliche

Vertragssummen
gekennzeichnet.
Rechtstechnisch sind Dauerschuldverhltnisse berwiegend durch einen
grundle -
genden Rahmenvertrag ausgestaltet, auf dessen Basis Einzelanweisungen und
-auftrge
innerhalb der Vertragslaufzeit gegeben werden25. Dieser Vertrag bildet den
zentralen Aus-
gangspunkt und Regelungsort ethischer Standards in Dauerschuldverhltnissen.

Ferner zeichnet sich der Lebenszeitvertrag durch einen
Vertragsgegenstand aus,
welcher dem Verbraucher einen elementaren Bestandteil zur Lebensfhrung
gewhrt.
Beispiele hierfr sind das Dach ber dem Kopf auf der Grundlage eines Wohnungs-
raummietvertrages, das geregelte monatliche Einkommen auf der Basis des Arbeitsver-
trages, Kranken-, Arbeitslosigkeit-, Renten- oder sonstige

Versicherungsvertrge zur
Daseinsvorsorge sowie Bezugsvertrge zur Bedarfsdeckung der
Grundbedrfnisse26 in
Form von Wrmeversorgung, Wasser und leitungsgebundener Energie27 (insofern auch
sog. Grundversorgungsvertrge28) oder eines Girokontos29. Weitere
Anwendungsbeispiele
fr Lebenszeitvertrge in der gegenwrtigen, modernen Gesellschafts- und

Wirtschafts-
welt sind Vertrge ber Kommunikations- und Informationsmedien sowie Vertrge, die
den Zugang zur Transport- und Verkehrsinfrastruktur (ffentlicher

Personennahverkehr,
Postzustellung) und damit die Teilhabe am sozialen Leben gewhrleisten.
Aufgrund des Abdeckens dieser zentralen Bedrfnisse durch den
Lebenszeitvertrag
fhrt der Verbraucher hchst selten mehrere Dauerschuldverhltnisse ber gleiche
Gter
oder Dienstleistungen zu unterschiedlichen Anbietern. Dies fhrt wiederum zu einer
von
Loyalitt und Einzigartigkeit (Exklusivitt) geprgten Geschfts- und
Kommunikations-
beziehung, die sich auch in rechtlichen Eigenheiten niederschlgt. Offenbar
wird dies
insbesondere durch Spezialregelungen, die auf Lebenszeitvertrge fr den Fall eines
Ver-
tragspartnerwechsels Anwendung finden (z.B. fr das Kreditrecht vgl. 496 Abs. 2
BGB,
fr das Mietrecht vgl. 563 f. BGB), die Abtretung von vertraglichen Ansprchen,
die
vielfach hchstpersnlich ausgestaltet sind (z.B. 613 BGB, Dispositionskredit30)
oder ein
25 Z.B. allgemeiner Bankvertrag (wenn auch vom BGH verworfen: WM 2002, 2281 ff,
hlt die Literatur daran
fest; vgl. u.a. Schimansky, H.; Bunte, H.-J. et al. (eds.) (2011) 1, Rn. 28;
2, Rn. 20); MKo-Gaier, 314,
Rn. 6.
26 Michalski, L. (1979) p. 403.
27 BGH NJW 1975, 1268.
28 Vgl. hierzu Aufsatz von Gro, Die neuen Netzanschluss- und
Grundversorgungsverordnungen im Strom-
und Gasbereich, NJW 2007, 1030-1034.
29 Vgl. Aufsatz von Geschwandtner, M./Bornemann, R. (2007).
30 OLG Schleswig NJW 1992, 579.
192
----------------------- Page 232-----------------------
5 Lebenszeitvertrge Natur
und Ethik
Wettbewerbsverbot beinhalten (vgl. 60 HGB, welcher auch im Arbeitsrecht gilt31

oder
110 GewO i.V.m. 74 bis 75 f HGB). Diesen Bestimmungen fr Lebenszeitvertrge

ist gemein, dass sie die persnliche Exklusivitt und Loyalitt der Vertragspartner
ein-
fordern oder Hrden einem Vertragspartnerwechsel entgegenstellen, um die
persnliche
Vertrauensbeziehung der bisherigen Parteien zu schtzen. Diese Regelungsintention
un-
terstreicht, welche Bedeutsamkeit der Person des Vertragspartners im Hinblick auf
das
Vertrauen in eine ordnungsgeme Erfllung des Lebenszeitvertrages beigemessen
wird.
Bereits anhand dieser Charakteristika sozialer Lebenszeitvertrge ist
ihre Bedeu-
tung sowohl gesamtwirtschaftlich aufgrund der stetigen Verbreitung dieses
Vertragstyps
als auch interpersonal zwischen den Vertragspartnern deutlich. Vertrge,
deren Ver-
tragszweck darin besteht, zentrale Gter und Dienstleistungen zur Lebensfhrung
ber
einen langfristigen Zeithorizont sicherzustellen, fhren einerseits zu einer
erheblichen
Angewiesenheit des Nutzers auf den Zugang und Fortbestand des Vertrages.
Andererseits
im Vertrauen auf den Bestand des langfristigen Vertrages und auf Grundlage der
besonderen -
vielfach exklusiven - Loyalittsbeziehung rechnen wiederum beide
Vertragsparteien
mit einen bestimmten Gewinn oder Ertrag aus dem Vertragsverhltnis,
erwarten eine
diesbezgliche Planungssicherheit und ttigen zudem erhebliche Investitionen
in die
Geschftsbeziehung. Deutlich werden diese Investitionen z.B. anhand der
Offenlegung
persnlicher und vertraulicher Daten, des Verzichtes auf Beziehungen zu anderen
Wett-
bewerbern, einer treuhnderischen und vertrauensvollen Gewhrung von
Vertragssi-
cherheiten oder der Ingebrauchnahme des Vertragsgegenstands bzw. einer
diesbezglich
festen Einplanung (z.B. auch gegenber Dritten), noch bevor die gegenseitigen
Leistungen
erfllt wurden. Zudem steigen regelmig mit der Dauer der Vertragsbeziehung die im
Vertrauen auf den Vertragsfortbestand gettigten Investitionen und eventuelle

Verluste
in Form von Transaktionskosten im Falle einer vorzeitigen Vertragsauflsung (bspw.
die
Kosten32 zum Ttigen eines Deckungsgeschfts, welches ggf. schlechtere
Konditionen
aufweist). Darber hinaus trgt zur Loyalittsbeziehung eines

Lebenszeitvertrages bei,
dass die Transaktionskosten und -risiken eines Vertragspartnerwechsels
denjenigen
Vertragsgegenstand betreffen, der elementare Bedrfnisse der Lebensfhrung deckt.
So
treffen zum Beispiel die Risiken des Auseinanderfallens von Vertragsende und
Neubeginn
bei einer vorzeitigen Vertragsauflsung oder einem Vertragspartnerwechsel den
Nutzer
nicht nur konomisch, sondern auch persnlich und qualitativ in empfindlicher
Weise
31 Mller-Glge, R./Preis, U. et al. (2013) 60 HGB, Rn 2.

32 Bei einer vorzeitigen Vertragsauflsung fallen nach der
Transaktionskostenanalyse sowohl fr die Been-
digung als auch fr den Neuabschluss eines Deckungsgeschfts Such- Anbahnungs-,
Informations-, Ver-
handlungs-, Entscheidungs- und Neuvereinbarungskosten an (Laimer, S.
(2009) p. 92). Sofern das neu
abgeschlossene Geschft nicht deutlich gnstigere Konditionen beinhaltet (z.B.
Umschuldung gem. 495
Abs. 3 BGB), ist eine vorzeitige Vertragsauflsung vielfach unwirtschaftlich.
193
----------------------- Page 233-----------------------
Helena Klinger
(z.B. anlsslich eines Bankverbindungs-, Wohnungs-, Arbeitgeber- oder

Telefonnummer-
wechsels) und verstrken mithin die Loyalittsbeziehung.
Die herausgehobene Vertrauensbeziehung eines Lebenszeitvertrages ist
durch die
Eigenschaft des Dauerschuldverhltnisses als eines offenen Vertragstyps geprgt.
Dau-
erschuldverhltnisse mit einem langen Zeithorizont zeichnen sich durch ein hohes
Ma
33 aus, weil knftige Begebenheiten, Vernderungen
und Unwg-
der Unvollstndigkeit
barkeiten vielfach weder im Vorfeld vorherseh- noch regelbar sind. Vielmehr steigt
mit der
Dauer der Vertragslaufzeit die Anflligkeit fr - allen voran nachteilige -
nderungen der
Gegebenheiten, die eine Grundlage zum Vertragsschluss oder fr seinen Inhalt
bildeten
(bspw. steigende Refinanzierungskosten, Einkommens- und Arbeitskrafteinbue infolge
von Krankheit, Notwendigkeit der Einbeziehung von Dritten in den Vertrag

z.B. auf-
grund von Eheschlieung oder Geburt). Daher besteht regelmig ein erheblicher
Anpas-
sungsbedarf34 der Vertragskonditionen, weshalb 309 Nr. 1 S. 2 BGB dem Verwender
von
Allgemeinen Geschftsbedingungen die Preisanpassung im Dauerschuldverhltnis stan-

dardisiert ermglicht. Fr andere der genannten unvorhersehbar eintretenden
Ereignisse
verbleibt hingegen i. d. R. die Notwendigkeit der fortbestehenden Kommunikations-
und
Kooperationsbereitschaft beider Vertragspartner, um einen Erfolg der
Nachverhandlun-
gen durch positive und fr Parteien interessengerechte Lsungen sowie das
Aufrechter-
halten der vertrauensvollen Zusammenarbeit zu gewhrleisten. Auch diese
Zuversicht
beider Vertragspartner in die selbst in schwierigen Zeiten fortbestehende
Kooperations-
bereitschaft des Gegenbers zeichnet die persnliche Vertrauensbeziehung eines
Lebens-
zeitvertrages aus. Mit dem erhhten Anpassungsbedarf der Vertragsbedingungen an die
sich whrend eines langfristigen Dauerschuldverhltnisses genderten

vertragsrelevanten
Umstnde steigt wiederum die Bedeutung des persnlichen Dialogs. Deshalb
steht die
Kommunikationsbeziehung zwischen den Vertragspartnern eines
Lebenszeitvertrages
unter einem besonderen Schutz: diverse Regelungen frdern die den Vertrag
aufrechter-
haltenden Nachverhandlungen ber die Anpassung oder Vertragsverlngerung (fr das
Kreditrecht vgl. 493 Abs. 1 bis 3, 498 S. 2 BGB, fr das Mietrecht vgl. 558a
f. BGB)
und tragen dem persnlichen Vertrauensverhltnis der Kommunikationspartner - gerade
im Falle des Vertragspartner- oder Glubigerwechsels Rechnung, indem ein notwen-

diges Mindestma an Verantwortung des bisherigen neben dem neuen Vertrags-
und
Gesprchspartners fortbesteht (fr das Kreditrecht vgl. 493 Abs. 4, 496 Abs. 2
BGB,
fr das Mietrecht vgl. 566 Abs. 2 S. 1 BGB, fr das Arbeitsrecht vgl. 613a Abs.
2 BGB).
Zuletzt sei im Hinblick auf die Charakteristika von Lebenszeitvertrgen als
soziale Dau-
erschuldverhltnisse auf die beteiligten Vertragspersonen eingegangen.
Lebenszeitvertrge
33 Dies bspw. fr das Arbeitsverhltnis darlegend: Rolfs, C.; Giesen, R. et al.

URL: http://mobile-beck-online.
beck.de/Document?vpath=bibdata\komm\beckok_arbr_27\agg\cont\beckok.agg.p27.htm.
611, Rn. 295.
34 Vgl. Nr. 10 der Prinzipien von Lebenszeitvertrgen.
194
----------------------- Page 234-----------------------
und Ethik
gewhren natrlichen Personen den Bezug von lebenswichtigen Gtern,

Dienstleistungen,
Arbeit und Einkommensmglichkeiten35. Es handelt sich mithin regelmig um
Vertrge
zwischen Unternehmern ( 14 BGB) und Verbrauchern ( 13 BGB) oder letzteren zumin-

dest im Kreditrecht gleichgestellten Existenzgrndern ( 512 BGB)36. Ver
brauchervertrge
weisen regelmig eine vertragstypische Disparitt in der Verhandlungsstrke

beider
Beteiligten auf, welche aus der Informationsunterlegenheit sowie
Geschftsunerfah renheit
des Verbrauchers resultiert37. Zudem verfolgen beide Vertragsparteien
regelmig un-
terschiedliche Interessen mit dem Geschft, welches sich auch im Vertragsabschluss

und
-inhalt niederschlagen kann: Der Verbraucher als socio-oeconomicus38 will mit dem
Lebens-
zeitvertrag seine menschlichen Grundbedrfnisse zur Selbstverwirklichung und

sozialen
Teilhabe decken und ist aus dieser Einbettung des Vertragsgegenstand als zentralem
Be-
standteil in seine Lebensfhrung ggf. bereit, auch einen fr ihn wirtschaftlich
nachteiligen
oder unkonomischen Vertrag einzugehen. Demgegenber wird der Lebenszeitvertrag von
unternehmerischer Anbieterseite grundstzlich mit einem streng konomisch-

rationalen
Gewinnstreben eines homo oeconomicus abgeschlossen, dessen Grenzen die
wirtschaftli-
chen Marktverhltnisse sowie die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen bilden, soweit sich
nicht
Anbieter darber hinausgehende unternehmensethische Standards freiwillig
auferlegen.
Unter Bercksichtigung dieser Charakteristika von Lebenszeitvertrgen sollen
nach-
folgend die ethischen Standards von Lebenszeitvertrgen einer darstellenden
Analyse
unterzogen werden. Hierfr wird zunchst der Begriff des ethischen Standards in
seiner
Definition abgegrenzt, bevor im Anschluss ein direkter Bezug zu den
sozialen Dauer-
schuldverhltnissen hergestellt wird.
5.2 Begriff des ethischen Standards
Der Begriff Standard umfasst die in einer gegebenen Gesellschaft bestehenden, aus
der Erfahrung, Vereinheitlichung und Abstraktion entstandenen Regeln, seien es Nor-
men verortet in den gesellschaftlichen Moralvorstellungen39 oder

Rechtsregeln einer
Rechtsordnung, die legislativ verabschiedet wurden und sich durch eine

inhaltlich
bestimmte Fixierung auszeichnen40 . Der Begriff Moral (mos, mores [lat.]: die
[guten]
35 Vgl. Nr. 1 der Prinzipien von Lebenszeitvertrgen.

36 Obgleich bei Existenzgrndern dem Kreditgeschft ein rational-konomisches
Gewinnstreben zugrunde
liegt, verbleibt eine Schutzbedrftigkeit aus Grnden einer mangelnden
Geschftserfahrung und einem In-
formationsdefizit, insbesondere ber die Spezifika und den ihnen beizumessenden
Risiken des Geschfts-
kredits (Reifner, U. (2003b) pp. 26 f).
37 Staudinger, J. v. (ed.) (2004) 13 BGB, Rn 2-9.
38 Piorkowsky, M.-B. (2012).
39 Rthers, B./Birk, A. (2008) pp. 66 f.
40 Unger, S. (2008) p. 101 unter Bezugnahme auf Alexy.
195
----------------------- Page 235-----------------------
Helena Klinger
Sitten) bezeichnet die Gesamtheit der faktisch geltenden sozialen Normen,

die das
zwischenmenschliche Verhalten in einer Gesellschaft betreffen, das Handeln
leiten,
berwiegend als verbindlich anerkannt und zugleich als gesellschaftlich
besonders
wichtig eingestuft werden41 . Ethische Standards sind ein essentieller
Bestandteil sol-
cher sozialen Normen, denen ein besonderer sittlicher Wert zugesprochen wird. Dabei
verkrpern Rechtsnormen das sittliche Minimum der in einer Gesellschaft

vorhan-
denen ethischen Standards42 . Rechtliche Normen beziehen sich in materieller
Hinsicht
auf ethische Standards, weil das positive Recht und die Moral sich
gleichursprnglich
aus traditionaler Sittlichkeit differenzieren43 : Jeder Rechtsnorm liegt
daher eine Ge-
rechtigkeitserwgung als Rechtsprinzip zugrunde (z.B. die Grundrechte, der

Schwche-
renschutz oder die ausgleichende und Verteilungsgerechtigkeit)44 . Als Ausfluss
dieser
Rechtsprinzipien bauen zivilrechtliche Regelungen z.B. auf den Rechtsmotiven

des
Schuldner-, Verbraucher- oder Vertrauensschutzes oder des Diskriminierungsverbots
auf45 . Da diese rechtsethischen Prinzipien - ebenso wie die in diesem Projekt
entwick-
elten Prinzipien von Lebenszeitvertrgen - einen offenen sowie unbestimmten

Inhalt
aufweisen46 und dadurch im Kollisionsfall gegeneinander abzuwgen sind47, finden
sie
nicht unmittelbar Anwendung auf einen Sachverhalt. Dafr sind diese Prinzipien aber
als Optimierungsgebote heranzuziehen, um bestehende Rechtsnormen - insbesondere

Generalklauseln, die ausdrcklich Bezug auf normative ethische Gesichtspunkte neh-
men - nach dem Telos auszulegen48 und dienen im Rechtsetzungsprozess als Leitstern
der Rechtsmotive.
Um in diesem Sinne die europischen wie nationalen Legislativorgane
auf ihrem
Weg der Entwicklung eines europischen Vertragsrechts in ihren Motiven
hilfreich zu
begleiten, sollen im Folgenden die ethischen Standards sozialer
anhand der Bestimmungen des deutschen Zivilrechts erlutert werden, in denen sich
wie-
derum die Prinzipien von Lebenszeitvertrgen widerspiegeln.
41 Rthers, B./Birk, A. (2008) pp. 66 f.

42 Dies z.B. darlegend fr 138 BGB: Beck'scher Online-Kommentar BGB-Wendtland,
Stand: 01.02.2013 Edi-
tion: 26, 138 BGB, Rn. 2.1.
43 Habermas, J. (1992) pp. 111, 135.
44 Auch Hof sieht in der Freiheit, der Menschenwrde u. der Gerechtigkeit
elementare Werte, die der Rechts-
ordnung als Gestaltungsprinzip zugrunde liegen: Hof, H. (1996) p. 99; vgl.
Behrends, O. (1994) pp. 4 ff;
Bydlinski, F. (1995) p. 12.
45 Hof, H. (1996).
46 Vogel, J. (1998) p. 67.
47 Joerden, J. C. (2005) p. 347; Vogel, J. (1998) p. 67.
48 Bydlinski, F. (1988) pp. 122, 125.
196
----------------------- Page 236-----------------------
und Ethik
5.3 Ethische Standards von Lebenszeitvertrgen als soziale

5.3.1 Loyalitt und Vertragstreue (pacta sunt servanda)
Das Vertrauen beider Vertragspartner in den Bestand des langfristigen

Lebenszeitver-
trages wird geschtzt (Prinzip Nr. 3 der Lebenszeitvertrge).
Der Vertrauensschutz im Hinblick auf den langfristigen Bestand des
Vertragsverhlt-
nisses ist Ausdruck des rechtsethischen Prinzips der formalen Rechtssicherheit,
welches
sich im Vertragsrecht als loyale Vertragstreue zum Vertragspartner und im
Grundsatz
pacta sunt servanda widerspiegelt. Diese Vertragstreue findet ihren
Ursprung in der
privatautonom eingegangenen Vertragsverpflichtung, fr welche die
Richtigkeitsvermu-
tung spricht49, nmlich dass mit Unterzeichnung der Vertragsschluss und -inhalt
dem
subjektiven Parteiwillen beider zu diesem Zeitpunkt entsprach. Das Prinzip der

Vertrags-
treue erhlt in Lebenszeitvertrgen hingegen eine neue Bedeutung und zeigt
besondere
Ausformungen: Unter Rekurs auf die rechtspolitisch gefrderte Vertragsform des Dau-
erschuldverhltnisses und gleichzeitig dem Bedrfnis der Vertragsparteien

nach einer
langfristigen Planungssicherheit Rechnung tragend, ermglicht 309 Nr. 9
BGB dem
Anbieter im Wege allgemeiner Vertragsbedingungen jene auf langfristige
Vertragstreue
angelegte Vertragslaufzeit und Kndigungsfrist - in Abwgung mit einer
aufrechtzuerhal-
tenden Entscheidungsfreiheit - maximal auszudehnen oder den Vertrag erneut und un-
brokratisch zu verlngern.
Unter dem Vorzeichen einer rechtspolitisch gefrderten Vertragstreue
im Dauer-
schuldverhltnis korrespondiert die den Parteien ermglichte maximale Ausweitung
der
Vertragslaufzeit als Spiegelbild mit besonderen Restriktionen hinsichtlich einer
vorzeiti-
gen Aufkndigung des Lebenszeitvertrages. Diese Restriktionen schtzen das
Vertrauen
der Parteien in den langfristigen Bestand, die Erfllung des
Lebenszeitvertrages sowie
die daraus hervorgegangenen Dispositionen. Demgem ist den Parteien die einseitige
und vorzeitige Auflsung eines Dauerschuldverhltnisses nur auf der Basis einer
Kndi-
gung ( 314 BGB) statt eines Rcktritts und mit den Rechtswirkungen von ex nunc
statt
ex tunc mglich, wodurch das Vertrauen der Parteien in den Fortbestand der
bisheri-
gen wirtschaftlichen und rechtlichen Folgen des Leistungsaustauschs einen
besonderen
Schutz erfhrt.
Als Ausdruck der Vertragstreue und auf der Grundlage des rechtsethischen
Prinzips
pacta sunt servanda unterliegt die Aufkndigung der auf Langfristigkeit angelegten
Ver-
tragsbeziehung ferner engen Voraussetzungen eines Kndigungsschutzes. Dieser
geht
49 Dies z.B. fr das Arbeitsrecht darlegend: Zllner, W. (2006) pp. 102 f.
197
----------------------- Page 237-----------------------

Helena Klinger
beispielsweise im Immobiliarkreditrecht derart weit, dass eine ordentliche

Kndigung des
Anbieters ausgeschlossen ist, weil dies die Rcksicht auf die Angewiesenheit und
das Ver-
trauen des Kreditnehmers in seine Dispositionsbefugnis ber die Kreditvaluta
whrend
des Vertragsverhltnisses gebietet. Des Weiteren spiegelt sich der Kndigungsschutz
an-
hand des in Lebenszeitvertrgen vorrangigen Grundes fr eine
Vertragsaufkndigung
wider, welcher ein Fehlverhalten des Nutzenden voraussetzt (demgem Prinzip Nr. 11
der Lebenszeitvertrge fr die Kndigung: sie soll sich nur an Grnden

in der Person
oder im Verhalten des Nutzenden . . . orientieren.). Beispiel hierfr ist allen
voran der
Zahlungsverzug des Nutzenden oder ein sonstiges vertragswidriges Verhalten ( 498
BGB
im Kreditrecht, 543 Abs. 2 BGB im Mietrecht, die personen- oder
verhaltensbedingte
Kndigung im Arbeitsrecht gem. 1 Abs. 2 Alt. 1 und 2 KSchG, fr die
Grundversorgung
mit Energie und Gas 19, 21 StromGVV/GasGVV und ehemals whrend der Mono-
polstellung der Telekom 16 TKV50). Soweit der zur Kndigung berechtigende Grund
in
der Sphre des Anbieters liegt, sind die Voraussetzungen der Wirksamkeit mit
Rcksicht
auf die Angewiesenheit des Verbrauchers auf den Lebenszeitvertrag als wesentlicher
Be-
standteil seiner Lebensfhrung sowie in Ermangelung seines vorwerfbaren
Fehlverhaltens
und Anlasssetzens sehr hoch und restriktiv (vgl. betriebsbedingte Kndigung
des Ar-
beitsverhltnisses mit dem Erfordernis der Sozialauswahl des 1 Abs. 3 KSchG,
Eigenbe-
darfskndigung des Vermieters gem. 573 Abs. 2 Nr. 2 und 3 BGB,
darlehensgeberseitige
Kndigung lediglich fr unbefristete Verbraucherkredite, bei welchen kein
Vertrauenstat-
bestand in die Darlehensgewhrung durch eine Vertragslaufzeit gesetzt wurde, vgl.
499
Abs. 1 BGB, fr Bezugsvertrge der ffentlichen Daseinsvorsorge mit Wasser, Strom
oder
Gas besteht in der Rechtspraxis lediglich ein Anpassungsrecht hinsichtlich der
Vertrags-
konditionen auf der Basis von 309 Nr. 1 BGB).
Des Weiteren korrespondiert das mit der Vertragslnge entstehende Vertrauen
in den
langfristigen Fortbestand des sozialen Dauerschuldverhltnisses mit jenen
regelmig
von der Vertragslaufzeit abhngigen Kndigungsfristen (vgl. 573c Abs. 1 S. 2 BGB
fr
das Mietrecht sowie 622 Abs. 2 S. 1 BGB im Arbeitsrecht).
Ferner verlangt die zivilrechtliche Vertragstreue von den
Vertragsparteien eines
Lebenszeitvertrages Loyalitt und verbietet, den auf Langfristigkeit geschlossen
Vertrag
im Wege eines opportunistischen Verhaltens zu defektieren, auch wenn dies
vielleicht fr
eine Partei wirtschaftlich profitabler wre, als an dem Vertrag festzuhalten
(konomischer
51
Vertragsbruch ). Gleichermaen wie konomisch motivierte Gesetzesbertretungen
ein
rechtsethisch fragwrdiges Verhalten darstellen, ist im auf langjhrige Kontinuitt
ausge-
richteten Lebenszeitvertrag ein die Vertragstreue verletzendes Verhalten aus
Grnden eines
50 Telekommunikationsverordnung.
51 Schfer, H.-B./Ott, C. (2007) pp. 455 ff.
198
----------------------- Page 238-----------------------
und Ethik
allein konomisch-rational motivierten Gewinnstrebens beiden Vertragspartnern

ver-
wehrt. Deshalb muss die vorfristige Aufkndigung des sozialen
Dauerschuldverhltnisses
allein in der Person, dem vertragswidrigen Verhalten des Gegenbers oder besonderen
sozialen Bedrngnissen, die eine vorfristige Vertragsauflsung dem Nutzenden

erfor-
derlichen machen, begrndet liegen. Auf dieser Wertungsgrundlage bleibt dem
Kreditneh-
mer das Recht zur auerordentlichen Kndigung eines grundpfandrechtlich besicherten
Immobiliarkredits gem. 490 Abs. 2 S. 1 BGB versagt, falls die Vertragsauflsung

ledig-
lich seinem wirtschaftlichen Interesse an einer konditionsoptimierenden Umschuldung
in Niedrigzinsphasen dient. Macht hingegen eine finanzielle Notlage oder ein

beruflich
oder familir bedingter Verkauf des finanzierten Eigenheimes die vorfristige
Aufkndi-
gung eines langfristigen Immobiliarkreditvertrags mit einem regelmig 25 bis 30-
jhrigen
Finanzierungshorizont erforderlich52, wird ausnahmsweise das berechtigte
Interesse an
einer auerordentlichen Kndigung bejaht53. Diese eine vorzeitige
Vertragskndigung
unter engen Voraussetzungen ermglichende Wertung zeigt, dass die

Vertragstreue als
Hauptprinzip fr langfristige Lebenszeitvertrge dennoch nicht absolut gilt.
Sie ist mit
divergierenden Prinzipien in Konkordanz zu bringen54. Deshalb erfhrt der
Vertrauens-
schutz hinsichtlich des Bestandes und der Erfllung des langfristigen
Lebenszeitvertrages
eine Einschrnkung insoweit, als eine vorzeitige Aufkndigung zum Schutz eines Min-
destmaes an Entscheidungs- und Handlungsfreiheit (Prinzip Nr. 3 der

Lebenszeitvertrge,
2. Halbsatz) whrend der langjhrigen Vertragslaufzeit erforderlich ist.
Weiterhin muss unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Vertragstreue, des Vertrauens der
Par-
teien in den langfristigen Bestand des Lebenszeitvertrages sowie der gegenseitigen
Rck -
sichtnahme55 die Kndigung des Lebenszeitvertrages verhltnismig56 sein
und sollte
erst nach Ausnutzeng milderer Mittel erfolgen. Deshalb ist der Vertragspartner vor
einer
Kndigung zu hren und es ist Gelegenheit und Zeit fr Vorschlge zur
Vermeidung
von Kndigung und/oder Kndigungsfolgen zu schaffen (Prinzip Nr. 11 der
Lebenszeitver-
trge). Die warnende Anmahnung eines vertragsgerechten Verhaltens und die Anhrung
im Wege des persnlichen Gesprchs (Diskurses57) erfolgt daher auf der

Suche nach
einem die Kndigung vermeidenden und das Vertragsverhltnis

aufrechterhaltenden
Anpassung der Vertragsbedingungen oder -konditionen, welches sich z.B. im
Kreditrecht
52 Dem Darlehensnehmer ist die Kndigung eines Immobiliarkredits grundstzlich nur

zum Ende der Zins-
bindung (i.d.R. fnf- bis zehnjhrige Zinsbindung, vgl. Knops, K.-O.;
Knobloch, M. et al.: Erwerb von
Kreditforderungen durch Private Equity-Unternehmen (12.10.2007) p. 70 mwN.)
oder nach zehnjhriger
Laufzeit gestattet ( 489 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 und Nr. 2 BGB n.F.).
53 AG Naumburg NJW-RR 2007, 1278; MKo-Berger, 490, Rn. 26.
54 Vgl. hierzu Ausfhrungen zuvor unter B.
55 Vgl. hierzu Ausfhrungen unter C.II.
56 Vgl. hierzu Ausfhrungen unter C.VI.
57 Vgl. zur Verhltnismigkeit in Bezug auf das Preis-Leistungsverhltnis
Ausfhrungen unter C.IV.
199
----------------------- Page 239-----------------------
Helena Klinger
ausdrcklich in 498 Abs. 1 S. 2 BGB niederschlgt (Der Darlehensgeber soll dem

Dar-
lehensnehmer sptestens mit der Fristsetzung ein Gesprch ber die
Mglichkeiten einer
einverstndlichen Regelung anbieten.). Schlussendlich und nach einem Scheitern
smtli-
cher Versuche der Rettung erfolgt eine Kndigung der langfristigen
Vertragsbeziehung als
ultima ratio (Prinzip Nr. 11 der Lebenszeitvertrge), die auf Basis der
Ergebnisse jener
persnlichen Aussprache mit einer interessengerecht geordneten und
rcksichtsvollen
Abwicklung der Geschftsbeziehung einhergeht (z.B. Einrumung einer
angemessenen
Zeit fr die Rckzahlung der Kreditvaluta58, Gewhren von Freizeit zur
Stellungssuche
nach der Kndigung eines dauernden Dienstverhltnisses gem. 629 BGB).

Unter dem Aspekt der Vertragstreue ist neben der zuvor erluterten
qualitativen Aus-
prgung zuletzt auch auf deren Umfang einzugehen, nmlich wenn soziale Dauerschuld-
verhltnisse durch verschiedene, aneinander gekoppelte Einzelvertrge

gekennzeichnet
sind und dies eine Erstreckung des Vertrauensschutzes im Hinblick auf den Bestand
und die
ordnungsgeme Erfllung auf smtliche Vertrge erfordert. Demgem verlangt
Prinzip
Nr. 4 der Lebenszeitvertrge bei einer Einbettung der jeweiligen
Vertragsverhltnisse
in ein Netzwerk von Vertrgen die Einbeziehung und Beachtung (dieser Konstruktion)
bei der Lsung rechtlicher Fragen. Mit den Vorschriften ber verbundene Vertrge
gem.
358 ff. BGB bestehen fr die Kopplung von Verbraucherdarlehensvertrgen mit den
hierdurch finanzierten Verwendungsgeschften detaillierte Vorschriften, die im

Rahmen
eines Einwendungs- und Widerrufsdurchgriffs vor einem wirtschaftlichen
Auseinander-
fallen der Vertrge und das Vertrauen auf eine einheitliche Abwicklung beider
Geschfte
- und dies auch in Haftungsfragen - ggf. trotz unterschiedlicher Vertragspartner
schtzen.
Die atypischen Formen von Kopplungsvertrgen nehmen in der Rechtspraxis von
Lebens-
zeitvertrgen zu und befinden sich aufgrund ihrer komplexen Struktur vielfach
auerhalb
des klassischen Normgefges. Beispiele hierfr sind Mobilfunkvertrge, die
zugleich den
Handykauf oder eine entsprechende Versicherung gegen Verlust, Diebstahl
und Ver-
schlei einschlieen sowie Darlehensvertrge, die zugleich einen
Versicherungs- oder
Kontofhrungsvertrag umfassen (vgl. Art. 247 8 EGBGB). Zunchst ist
wnschenswert,
dass ein Verlangen des Anbieters hinsichtlich der zwingenden
Kopplung beider
Geschfte auch als solches transparent (vgl. Prinzip Nr. 13 der
Lebenszeitvertrge) - ins-
besondere bezglich der Gesamtbelastung59 - ausgewiesen wird. Auf dieser
Grundlage
wiederum sind dann entsprechende Vorkehrungen zu treffen, die das Vertrauen auf den
Bestand wie auch die einheitliche Abwicklung dieser Kopplungsvertrge schtzen.
58 Demgem verlangt Nr. 19 Abs. 5 AGB-Banken, dass dem Kunden fr die

Rckzahlung des Kredits eine
angemessene Frist einzurumen ist.
59 Vgl. fr den Kredit, welcher mit einer Restschuldversicherung verbunden ist:
Art. 247 3 Abs. 1 Nr. 3, Abs.
2 S. 3 EGBGB i.V. mit 6 Abs. 3 Nr. 4 PAngV.
200
----------------------- Page 240-----------------------
und Ethik
5.3.2 Schwcherenschutz und Rcksichtnahme
Die Bereitstellung von Nutzungsmglichkeiten fr Verbraucher und Arbeitnehmer

erfordert
soziale Rcksichtnahme auf die konkreten krperlichen und seelischen Belange zum
Schutz
des Schwcheren. Das Gesetz oder andere kollektive Regeln sehen nach Art, Dauer und
dem
Grad der Bedeutung dieser Vertrge fr die Lebensverhltnisse der Betroffenen in
zwingender
Form verschiedene Stufen der Rcksichtnahme vor. (Prinzip Nr. 5 der
Lebenszeitvertrge.)
Das rechtsethische Prinzip des Schwcherenschutzes, welches sich u.a. im
Verbrau-
cherrecht widerspiegelt, entstand als Ausfluss des Sozialstaatsprinzips (Art. 20
Abs. 1 sowie
Art. 28 Abs. 1 S. 1 GG) einer sozialen Marktwirtschaft60. Dabei
verlangen die Charak-
teristika von sozialen Dauerschuldverhltnissen in der Form des Lebenszeitvertrages

eine
herausgehobene Rcksichtnahme auf die schwchere Vertragspartei. Denn der Nutzer
von
Lebenszeitvertrgen ist in Anbetracht des Vertragsgegenstandes, welcher ihm
regelmig
einen elementaren Bestandteil zur Lebensfhrung gewhrt, seiner langfristigen
Bindung in-
nerhalb der Vertragslaufzeit, damit blicherweise verbunden erheblichen
Vertragssummen
und seiner strukturellen Unterlegenheit in der Verhandlungsstrke61 hinsichtlich
Informa-
tionssymmetrie und Geschftserfahrung als Verbraucher ( 13 BGB) gegenber dem

Anbie-
ter als Unternehmer ( 14 BGB) regelmig in der schwcheren Position62.
Disparitten
in der Verhandlungsstrke zwischen den Vertragsparteien knnen sich im

Vertragsergebnis
durch das Fehlen einer materiellen Vertragsgerechtigkeit manifestieren. Demgem
bedarf
es der ausgleichenden Rechtsinstitute im Zivilrecht, die jene Disparitten
kompensieren.
Eines dieser Rechtsinstrumente und ein klassisches Einfallstor fr den
Schwcherenschutz
ist die Generalklausel der Sittenwidrigkeit gem. 138 BGB. Die Regelbeispiele des
Wu-
chers gem. 138 Abs. 2 BGB und ihre Charakteristik einer wirtschaftlichen,
intellektuellen
oder psychologischen Verhandlungsschwche - allen voran des Verbrauchers - bilden
das
Element einer prozessualen Abschlusskontrolle, die zugleich eine Herstellung der
mate-
riellen Vertragsgerechtigkeit bezweckt. Dabei verweist diese - ebenso wie
andere Gene-
ralklauseln - unter Einstrahlung der Grundrechte in das Zivilrecht explizit auf
ethische oder
moralische Aspekte (z.B. die guten Sitten des 138 BGB oder Treu und Glauben
des
242 BGB). Beispiele fr die Anwendung jener Generalklauseln, die unter Rckgriff
auf
ethische Standards den Versuch unternehmen, die materielle Gerechtigkeit
insbesondere
von langfristigen Vertrgen wiederherzustellen, sind die hchstrichterliche
Rechtsprechung
zu sittenwidrigen Knebelungsvertrgen63 oder auch die Fallgruppe des
Wuchergeschfts64.
60 Fastrich, L. (1992) pp. 5 f; so beruft sich insbesondere die Rechtsprechung

darauf: BGH NJW 1994, 2749 f.
61 Habermas, J. (1992) pp. 395, 482, 485, 487.
62 Lieb, M. (1983) p. 362; auch in der europischen Verbraucherrechtsprechung auf
dieses strukturelle Infor-
mationsdefizit Bezug nehmend: EuGH Rs. C-240/98 bis Rs. C-244/98, Slg. 2002, I-
4941 ff. RdNr. 25.
63 Fr das Kredit- bzw. das entsprechende Sicherungsgeschft: BGH NJW 1953, 57.
64 Zu dem Wucherkredit ausfhrlich: Staudinger, J. v. (ed.) (2004) 138 BGB, Rn
142.
201
----------------------- Page 241-----------------------
Helena Klinger
Whrend die Herstellung der materiellen Tauschgerechtigkeit eines

der Haupt-
kriterien der Vertragsgerechtigkeit fr die kaufvertraglichen spot-Vertrge
bildet, ver-
langen langfristige Lebenszeitvertrge ein darber hinausgehendes Ma an
gegenseitiger
Rcksichtnahme und Frsorge zugunsten einer fortwhrenden Kooperation innerhalb der
Vertragslaufzeit. Insofern erweisen Lebenszeitvertrge und die ihnen

zugrundeliegenden
bereichsspezifischen Rechtsvorschriften, dass Gerechtigkeit nicht nur aus der
reinen Propor-
tionalitt eines Leistungsaustausches im Sinne von do ut des erwchst, sondern
darber
hinaus aus jenen der konomischen Effizienz unzugnglichen Werten der
Humanitt,
Rcksichtnahme und Frsorge fr die schwchere und einem anvertraute
Vertragspartei.
So statuiert 618 Abs. 1 BGB die Frsorgepflicht des Arbeitgebers zur
Gewhrleistung der
Betriebssicherheit und -gesundheit zugunsten seiner Arbeitnehmer (Der
Dienstberechtigte
hat Rume, Vorrichtungen oder Gertschaften . . . so einzurichten und zu
unterhalten . . .,
dass der Verpflichtete gegen Gefahr fr Leben und Gesundheit . . . geschtzt ist. .
.). Ebenso
verlangt 554a Abs. 1 BGB die Zustimmung des Vermieters zu baulichen
Vernderungen,
die fr eine behindertengerechte Nutzung der Mietsache erforderlich sind.
Diese Pflichten zur sozialen Rcksichtnahme bestehen hingegen nicht nur fr
die Ko-
operation innerhalb der laufenden Vertragsbeziehung eines Lebenszeitvertrages,
sondern
auch die Beendigung unterliegt entsprechenden Verantwortlichkeiten. Weil mit der
Lang-
fristigkeit der Vertragsbeziehung das Vertrauen in den Bestand und in die
fortwhrende
Gewhrung des essentiellen Vertragsgegenstandes steigt, knnen sich im Einzelfall
und
aus der Anwendung der Generalklauseln ( 138, 242 BGB z.B. fr das
Arbeits- und
Kreditrecht im Wege der Rechtsfigur der Kndigung zur Unzeit65) Restriktionen der
anbieterseitigen Kndigung eines Lebenszeitvertrages ergeben. Darber hinaus sehen

be-
reichsspezifische Regelungen einen Kndigungsschutz zugunsten des betroffenen
Nutzers
eines Lebenszeitvertrages vor. So kann im Arbeitsrecht das Erfordernis der
Sozialauswahl
gem. 1 Abs. 3 KSchG der Kndigung des Arbeitgebers Beschrnkungen
auferlegen.
Aber auch die Kndigungsvoraussetzungen, welche einen Mindestrckstand der Kredit-
rate oder des Mietzinses verlangen (vgl. 498 S. 1, 543 Abs. 2 Nr. 3 BGB), sind
Aus-
druck einer an ethischen Standards orientierten sozialen Rcksichtnahme zugunsten
der
schwcheren Vertragspartei von Lebenszeitvertrgen.
5.3.3 Soziale Teilhabe und Nichtdiskriminierung
Wer Lebenszeitvertrge anbietet muss . . . jede Diskriminierung nach

persnlichen
wie sozialen Merkmalen unterlassen. Die Bedeutung der Lebenszeitvertrge
fr die
65 Kndigung zur Unzeit bzw. rechtmissbruchliche Kndigung. Beispiel fr

das Arbeitsrecht: BAG, Urteil
vom 5. April 2001 - 4 AZR 185/00 242, 138 BGB; fr das Kreditrecht: OLG Hamm
NJW-RR 1991, 242 ff;
BGH JW 2003, 2674 ff.
202
----------------------- Page 242-----------------------
5 Lebenszeitvertrge
Natur und Ethik
Befriedigung menschlicher Grundbedrfnisse . . . erfordert ein
Menschenrecht auf
Zugang zu diesen Gtern und Dienstleistungen. (Prinzip Nr. 8 der
Lebenszeitvertrge).
Lebenszeitvertrge gewhren einen elementaren Bestandteil zur Lebensfhrung:
Sei
es Arbeit, Obdach, eine Grundversorgung mit Wrme, Wasser oder Energie, die
Notfall- und
Altersvorsorge durch Kranken-, Arbeitslosigkeit-, Renten- oder sonstige
Versicherungs-
vertrge sowie das Nutzen einer Infrastruktur, die eine soziale Teilhabe an dem
modernen
Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsleben ermglicht (Girokonto, Festnetz-,
Mobilfunk- und
sonstige Kommunikations- oder Informationsmedien sowie Vertrge, die den
Zugang
zur Transport- und Verkehrsinfrastruktur gewhren, wie der ffentlicher
Personennah-
verkehr oder die Postzustellung).
Mit einer zunehmenden Privatisierung66 und dem Abbau staatlicher
Leistungen67
der iustitia distributiva68 stellt sich automatisch die Frage nach einer
Verantwortungs-
bernahme privater Institutionen, die ber eine bloe Tauschgerechtigkeit

der iustitia
commutativa69 hinausgeht. Einerseits als Ausfluss des Sozialstaatsprinzips
der sozialen
Marktwirtschaft (Art. 20 Abs. 1, 28 Abs. 1 GG), andererseits der Menschenrechte,

die den
Anspruch auf ein lebensnotwendiges Existenzminimum begrnden, strahlen
Grund-
rechte auch in das Privatrecht ein70. Beispiele dieser Einflussnahme der
Grundrechte
auf das Zivilrecht sind zum einen die Generalklauseln, die im Wege des
Kontrahierungs-
zwangs (aufgrund einer marktbeherrschenden Monopolstellung gem. 19, 20 GWB71 i.
V. m. 826, 249 BGB) und des Willkrverbots ( 242 BGB i. V. m. dem

Gleichbehand-
lungsgebot gem. Art. 3 Abs. 1 GG) sowie auf der Grundlage einer
Gemeinwohlverpflichtung
des Eigentums (Art. 14 Abs. 2 GG)72 eine Pflicht zum Abschluss neutraler
Bankge-
schfte73 begrnden knnen (Girokonto fr Jedermann auf Guthabenbasis,
Erffnung
eines Sparbuchs, Besorgung von Wertpapiergeschften)74. Der Grundrechtsbindung von
66 Angesichts einer Privatisierung der ffentlichen Daseinsvorsorge

obliegt dem Staat nur noch eine
Gewhrleistungsverantwortung (Tamm, M./Tonner, K. (2012) 21 Rn 12).
67 Einhergehend mit einer stetig gestiegenen Verschuldung der Staatshaushalte
erfolgt unweigerlich ein Abbau
staatlicher Leistungen und nimmt die Privatisierung - insbesondere der
Aufgaben einer ffentlichen Da-
seinsvorsorge - zu (vgl. hierzu Pttner, G./Mann, T. et al. (2007) p. 102).
68 Aristoteles/Gigon, O. (2002) V 5, 1130 b.
69 Aristoteles/Gigon, O. (2002) V 5, 1130 b.
70 Vgl. hierzu ausfhrlich: Hager, J. (1994).
71 Frher 26 GWB; bezglich der Einstrahlung von Grundrechten in das
Privatrecht, welche die Vertragsab-
schlussfreiheit im Wege des Kontrahierungszwangs begrenzen: Hager, J. (1994).
72 Deutscher Bundestag 14. Wahlperiode: Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des
Finanzausschusses (7. Aus-
schuss) zu der Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung: Drucksache 14/5216
(05.02.2001) p. 2 zum Giro-
konto fr Jedermann.
73 Claussen, C. P. (2001) pp. 61 f, 64.
74 BGH NJW 2003, 1658 f; Schimansky, H.; Bunte, H.-J. et al. (eds.) (2011) 2,
Rn 20; denn diese neutralen
Bankgeschfte zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass eine geringe Bonitt des
Schuldners und ein daraus resultie-
rendes hheres Ausfallrisiko vom Kreditinstitut nicht als rechtfertigender
Grund fr eine Ungleichbehand-
lung eingewandt werden kann.
203
----------------------- Page 243-----------------------
Helena Klinger
ffentlich-rechtlichen Kreditinstituten (Art. 1 Abs. 3 GG)75 Rechnung tragend

begrnden
einzelne Sparkassengesetzes bereits das subjektive Recht auf den Abschluss des
Girokon-
tos fr Jedermann (u.a. 8 SpKVO NRW). Daneben hat sich der Zentrale
Kreditaus-
schuss einer freiwilligen Selbstverpflichtung unterworfen, die sich als Empfehlung
an die
ihm angeschlossenen Banken und Verbnde richtet, aber keinen unmittelbaren Anspruch
gegenber Bankkunden begrndet76. Des Weiteren existieren zahlreiche einfach- bzw.

spe-
zialgesetzliche Anspruchsgrundlagen, die im Wege des Kontrahierungszwangs

die nega-
tive Vertragsabschlussfreiheit im Privatrecht mit Rcksicht auf das
Sozialstaatsprinzip
begrenzen. Dies sind fr Krankenhausleistungen 109 Abs. 4 SGB V, die Kfz-
Haftpflicht-
versicherung 5 PflVG77, die gesetzliche Krankenversicherung 5 SGB V, den
ffentli-
chen Bahnverkehr 10 AEG78, die Personenbefrderung 22 PBefG, die Postzustellung
3 PDLV i. v. m. 13, 14, 56 PostG79 sowie die Grundversorgung mit Strom und Gas
36 EnWG oder fr den Anschlusszwang bezglich der kommunalen Wasserversorgung

die kommunalen Satzungen80. Diese Rechtsbeispiele verdeutlichen, dass trotz einer
ber-
tragung der ehemals ffentlich-rechtlichen Daseinsvorsorge auf private

Institutionen, die
soziale Teilhabe der Kunden mittels eines ausdrcklichen Rechtsanspruchs auf Zugang
gesichert bleibt81. Ungeachtet dieser spezialgesetzlichen Anspruchsgrundlagen

gewhrt
das allgemeine Rechtsinstitut des Kontrahierungszwangs zugleich einen

Rechtsanspruch
auf Zugang, wobei dessen Voraussetzungen eine Monopolstellung des
Anbieters, ein
lebenswichtiges Gut als Vertragsgegenstand, keine Ausweichalternativen des
Anspruch-
stellers und das Fehlen berechtigter Verweigerungsgrnde82 verlangen. Dabei
liegt das
Schwergewicht fr die Begrndung des Kontrahierungszwangs auf der Bedeutung

des
Vertragsgegenstandes fr die Lebensfhrung und dies gilt grundstzlich unabhngig
da-
von, ob Konkurrenzanbieter mit gleichen Angeboten zur Verfgung stehen83. Umgekehrt
muss zum Schutz des hohen Guts der Privatautonomie dem Anbieter stets der Rckzug
auf berechtigte Verweigerungsgrnde verbleiben, die eine - dann nicht
diskriminierende -
Ungleichbehandlung im Hinblick auf die Gewhrung des Zugangs rechtfertigen knnen
(z.B. Grnde in der Person und ihres Verhaltens, die sich insbesondere fr den
Anbieter
75 BGH NJW 2003, 1658.

76 OLG Bremen BKR 2006, 294 ff.
77 Pflichtversicherungsgesetz.
78 Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz.
79 Sich hierauf zuletzt berufend: BGH, Urt. v. 20.09.2012 - Az. I ZR 116/11.
80 OVG Frankfurt (Oder), LKV 2004, 277.
81 Beispiele gebend fr den Kontrahierungszwang: Busche, J. (1999) pp. 603 ff.
82 BGH NJW 1990, 761 ff.
83 Da anderenfalls unter Verweis auf die vorhandene Anbieterkonkurrenz, sich jedes
einzelne Unternehmen
seiner Verantwortung entzieht (LG Berlin, Urt. v. 08.05.2008, Az.: 21 S 1/08;
BGH NJW 1990, 761, 763;
Busche in: Staudinger, J. v. (2005) p. 227).
204
----------------------- Page 244-----------------------
5 Lebenszeitvertrge
Natur und Ethik
wirtschaftlich auswirken, d.h. allein vertragszweckbezogene Aspekte)84. Damit

drfte sich
zur Begrndung der sozialen Teilhabe der Grundsatz ableiten: Je zentraler der
Vertrags-
gegenstand fr die Lebensfhrung des Nutzenden ist und je ungewichtiger dagegen die
Ablehnungsgrnde des Anbieters erscheinen, die eine Ungleichbehandlung

rechtfertigen
knnten, desto leichter lsst sich ein Anspruch auf Gewhrung ableiten. Damit der
An-
spruch auf soziale Teilhabe und Zugang zu lebenswichtigen
Dauerschuldverhltnissen
nicht ber die Preisgestaltung umgangen wird, ist des Weiteren fr
Lebenszeitvertrge
eine Nichtdiskriminierung auf der Grundlage einer Preisgerechtigkeit erforderlich.
In einer
sozialen Marktwirtschaft sind Preisdifferenzierungen erwnscht, die mit den
rechtlichen
Vorschriften des Diskriminierungsverbots in bereinstimmung stehen. Whrend Art. 3
Abs. 3 S. 1 und 2 GG grundstzlich eine Ungleichbehandlung aufgrund des Geschlech-

tes, der Herkunft, der Rasse oder Sprache, des Glaubens, der religisen oder
politischen
Anschauungen sowie der Behinderung verbieten, erweitert das AGG jenes Diskriminie-
rungsverbot, welches auch einen Kontrahierungszwang ( 19, 21 AGG85) beinhalten
kann,
um die Kriterien des Alters sowie der sexuellen Identitt86. Unter bestimmten
Vorausset-
zungen dennoch gerechtfertigt bleibt gem 20 AGG eine Ungleichbehandlung, die

sich
sowohl in einer Zugangsverweigerung als auch in differenzierenden
Vertragskonditionen
uern kann, wenn dies ein sachlicher Grund verlangt, der einem berechtigten
Interesse
dient. Soweit eine Ungleichbehandlung bei Zugang oder Vertragskonditionen nach
jenen
Mastben zu rechtfertigen ist, verbleiben bezglich dieses
Unterscheidungskriteriums
der Gerechtigkeitsmastab einer formalen Gleichheit sowie eine anlassbezogene
relative
Gleichheit wnschenswert. Ein diese Maximen bercksichtigendes Beispiel der hchst-
richterlichen Rechtsprechung sind Zinsanpassungen. Hierzu stellt der BGH in

seiner
Grundsatzentscheidung vom 6. Mrz 1986 fest, dass fr Zinsanpassungen von Kapital-
marktdarlehen der von der Bank allgemein verlangte Normalzinssatz einzuhalten
ist87.
Wo eine Kontrahierungspflicht fr einen Lebenszeitvertrag keinen Sinn

machen
wrde, weil z.B. die vorangegangene Diskriminierung keine Aussicht auf eine
erfolgreiche
84 Als rechtfertigender Sachgrund fr eine Ablehnung der Erffnung oder

Fortfhrung des Girokontos fr
Jedermann benennt die Empfehlung des ZKA, dass der Kunde (i) die Leistungen
des Kreditinstitutes miss-
braucht, insbesondere fr gesetzwidrige Transaktionen, (ii) Falschangaben
macht, (iii) die bezweckte Nutzung
des Kontos zur Teilnahme am bargeldlosen Zahlungsverkehr nicht gegeben ist,
weil z.B. das Konto durch
Handlungen vollstreckender Glubiger blockiert ist oder ein Jahr lang umsatzlos
gefhrt wird, (iv) nicht si-
chergestellt ist, dass das Institut die fr die Kontofhrung und -nutzung
vereinbarten blichen Entgelte erhlt.
85 Die Voraussetzungen erluternd: Thsing/von Hoff, NJW 2007, pp. 21-26.
86 Ein Gesetzesentwurf scheiterte, welcher die Einfgung des Kriteriums der
sexuellen Identitt in Art. 3 Abs.
3 S. 1 GG bezweckt (BT-Drs. 17/254). Ungeachtet dessen besteht eine
entsprechende Bindung durch das
Gemeinschaftsrecht und Art. 5b der Vertrag von Lissabon, welcher ber das
Zustimmungs- und Umset-
zungsgesetz gem. Art. 23 Abs. 1 GG als Bundesrecht gilt.
87 Die Bank ist verpflichtet, bei zulssigen oder gebotenen Zinsnderungen den
Kunden, soweit nicht besondere
Sachgrnde vorliegen, nicht schlechter zu behandeln als andere Kreditnehmer,
denen sie Kredite dieser Art und
Grenordnung gewhrt (vgl. BGH NJW 1986, 1803, 1805); ebenso: Derleder, P.
(2001); Wimmer, K. (2008).
205
----------------------- Page 245-----------------------
Helena Klinger
Kooperation whrend der Vertragslaufzeit bietet, bleibt eine

Entschdigungsmglichkeit
(vgl. 15 AGG im Arbeitsrecht bzw. 611a Abs. 2 BGB a.F.).
5.3.4 Gegenseitige Kooperationsbereitschaft auf der Basis von

diskursethische
Mastbe bercksichtigender Kommunikation
Vom Beginn der Vertragsverhandlungen, whrend der Geschftsbeziehung und bis hin
zur Abwicklung des Lebenszeitvertrages soll der Dialog zwischen den Vertragspartner
auf
einer gleichrangig, kooperativ an der Erfllung des Vertragszwecks sachorientiert
sowie
einer direkt persnlich gefhrten Kommunikation beruhen. Vor jeder
Vertragsgestaltung
(Abschluss, Anpassung, Kndigung etc.) hat eine diesen Mastben entsprechende An-
hrung zu erfolgen, die dem Grundsatz vertrauensgetragener Kommunikation Rechnung
trgt. (Prinzip Nr. 12 der Lebenszeitvertrge).
5.3.4.1 Reziprozitt, Synallagma und Universalisierbarkeit

Zweiseitige und synallagmatische Vertragsverhltnisse knnen nach Aristoteles auf
dem
Prinzip der Reziprozitt oder dem synallagmatischen Prinzip des do ut des
beruhen.
Das synallagmatische Prinzip erfasst diesen positiven, gegenseitigen
Leistungsanspruch.
Das Reziprozittsprinzip ist dagegen weiter und umgefasst auch die einseitig
verpflichten-
den Dauerschuldverhltnisse, wie sie in den Realvertrgen aber auch der Brgschaft
vor
allem heute noch im Code Civil beschrieben sind. Diese Unterscheidung wird heute so
jedoch nicht mehr getroffen. Vielmehr wird das Prinzip der Reziprozitt vorrangig
unter
dem Aspekt des synallagmatischen Tauschdenkens gesehen88.
Auf der geistigen Fhigkeit des Menschen, sich im Rahmen eines Rollentauschs
in
das Gegenber versetzen zu knnen, basiert fr Ulrich, dass der legitime Anspruch
auf
Anerkennung und Achtung der Subjektivitt reziprok auch dem Gegenber zu
zollen
ist89. Auch Habermas sieht in der menschlichen Fhigkeit zum Rollentausch und einer
darauf aufbauenden Kommunikationsfhigkeit die Grundlage fr eine moralischen Grn-
den entspringende Kooperationsbereitschaft erfolgsorientierter Egoisten90. Ferner

ist aus
diesem Reziprozittsprinzips jene Goldene Regel abzuleiten, die gegenseitigen

Respekt
gegenber dem anderen Vertragsteil, Humanitt, Schwcherenschutz und
Rcksicht-
nahme auf der folgenden Basis einfordert: Behandle andere so, wie Du selbst
behandelt
werden mchtest oder negativ formuliert: Was Du nicht willst, das man Dir tu, das
fg
88 Vgl. dieses Prinzip in Bezug setzend zur Vertragsfreiheit: Oetker, H./Scker,

F. J. et al. (2012) Vorbemerkung
zu 320 ff. BGB, 6. Auflage, 2012, Rn 13.
89 Thielemann, U./Ulrich, P. (2003) p. 46; ebenso Piaget, J./Goldmann, L. et al.
(1990) pp. 450 ff; Habermas, J.
(1992) pp. 120 f, 140, 436.
90 Habermas, J. (1992) pp. 120 f, 140, 436.
206
----------------------- Page 246-----------------------
und Ethik
auch keinem anderen zu91. Das synallagmatische Reziprozittsprinzip beinhaltet

mithin
eine Form der Pflicht zur Gleichbehandlung - nur eben reflexiv unter den
Vertragspar-
teien. Ausdruck findet dieses Reziprozittsprinzip auch im Recht der
Lebenszeitvertrge.
So berechtigen im Kreditrecht vernderte Refinanzierungsmglichkeiten die
Bank zu
einem Anheben, aber verpflichten auch zugleich zu einem Herabsenken des Zinssatzes
gegenber dem Kunden92. Im Arbeitsrecht wiederum wird zur Wirksamkeit von arbeits-
vertraglichen Klauseln, die einen Ausschluss fr die Geltendmachung von Ansprchen
aus dem Arbeitsverhltnis vorsehen, verlangt, dass sich die Frist sowohl auf
Ansprche
des Arbeitsnehmers als auch des Arbeitsgebers gleichermaen bezieht93.
ber die zur Begrndung der synallagmatischen Tauschgerechtigkeit

herangezogene
goldene Regel hinausgehend verlangt der kategorische Imperativ von Kant: Handle
so,
dass du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person als auch in der Person eines jeden
anderen,
jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals blo als Mittel brauchst 94 sowie
Handle so, dass
die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen
Gesetzgebung
gelten knne 95. Die Fortentwicklung des kategorischen Imperativs beruht nach
Hruschka
auf einer Erweiterung der goldenen Regel insbesondere um das Prinzip der
Universa-
lisierbarkeit96. Auch der kologische Imperativ von Hans Jonas geht ber das mit
einer
synallagmatischen Reziprozitt verfolgte Eigeninteresse hinaus, indem dem

Schutz der
natrlichen Ressourcen sowie der Existenzgrundlage des menschlichen Lebens
- auch
fr die Nachfolgegenerationen - ein Selbstzweck zugemessen wird: Handle so, dass
die
Wirkungen deiner Handlungen vertrglich sind mit der Permanenz echten
menschlichen
97
Lebens auf Erden .
Diese universell verstandene Reziprozitt erklrt dagegen eine einseitige
Rcksicht-
nahme nicht mehr damit, dass sich der einzelne Nutzen von dem, dem er die Wohltat
erwiesen hat, sondern die Aufrechterhaltung und Strkung ethischer Prinzipien in
einer
gesellschaftlich gelebten Moral wnscht und mit seiner Handlung zu frdern
bezweckt.
Mithin ist neben der synallagmatischen Tauschgerechtigkeit auch Altruismus
Bestandteil
eines universell verstandenen Reziprozittsprinzips. Die Langfristigkeit von
Lebenszeit-
vertrgen und ihre beschriebene Exklusivitt legen es nahe, in diesem Bereich der
Ver-
hltnisse universelle Reziprozitt als ethische Grundlagen des entsprechenden
Rechts wie
auch freiwilligen unternehmensethischen Engagements anzuerkennen.
91 Kant, I. (1788) 7, p. 54; Hruschka, J. (1987).

92 BGH NJW 1986, 1803; BGH NJW 1992, 1751 f.
93 BAG NZA 2006, 324, 326.
94 Kant, I. (1797) p. 66.
95 Kant, I. (1788) 7, p. 54.
96 Hruschka, J. (1987); In diesem Sinn orientieren sich moralische Regeln an dem,
was im gleichmigen
Interesse aller und von jedermann rationalerweise akzeptiert werden knnte;
moralische Regeln drcken
daher einen schlechthin allgemeinen Willen aus (Habermas, J. (1992) p. 188).
97 Jonas, H. (1979) p. 36.
207
----------------------- Page 247-----------------------

Helena Klinger
5.3.4.2 Kooperations- und Dialogbereitschaft

Da mit der Langfristigkeit von Lebenszeitvertrgen als Dauerschuldverhltnis das
Risiko
fr pltzlich eintretende Unwgbarkeiten steigt, denen eine vertragliche
Regelung in
Vorhersehung knftiger komplexer Begebenheiten kaum zugnglich ist, bergen
sie ein
hohes Ma an Unsicherheit98. Mit der Unvollstndigkeit vertraglicher Absprachen
sind
implizite Erwartungen verknpft, die rechtlich hingegen nur bedingt

einklagbar sind.
Vielmehr besteht das Erfordernis, die vertraglichen Verhltnisse an die sich
verndernden
Umstnde anzupassen und auf der Grundlage einer fortbestehenden Kooperations- und
Dialogbereitschaft der Vertragspartner eine fr beide Parteien annehmbare neue
Verein-
barung ber diese Punkte zu erzielen. Weil sich in diesen
nachvertraglichen Verhand-
lungssituationen die auerhalb rechtlicher Anforderungen liegende Geschftspolitik
des
Vertragspartners anhand des Vorhandenseins oder Fehlens der fortbestehenden Koope-
rations- und Dialogbereitschaft uert, ist das Eingehen eines
Dauerschuldverhltnisses
eine besondere Vertrauensentscheidung.
Welche entscheidende Bedeutung in einem Lebenszeitvertrag die
Dialogbereitschaft
einnimmt, verdeutlichen exemplarisch die zahlreichen Vorschriften des Kreditrechts,
die
whrend der Vertragslaufzeit eine Kommunikation unter den Vertragspartnern
anstoen,
um eine Vertragsfortfhrung zu untersttzen (vgl. fr das Auslaufen einer echten
oder
unechten Abschnittsfinanzierung 493 Abs. 1 und 2, fr das Gesamtflligstellen
eines
Kredits 498 S. 2 BGB).
5.3.4.3 Inhaltliche Anforderungen an die Kommunikation

Whrend der Vertragsverhandlungen, der Vertragslaufzeit sowie nachvertraglich soll
eine
an den Bedrfnissen des Vertragspartners orientierte hinreichende,
wahrheitsgeme,
vollstndige, rechtzeitige und verstndliche Information erfolgen, die bestehende
Infor-
mationsasymmetrien berwindet. (Prinzip Nr. 13 der Lebenszeitvertrge).
Das Diskusprinzip, welches die inhaltlichen Anforderungen an die
Kommunikation
zwischen den Vertragspartnern konkretisiert, durchzieht den gesamten Zeithorizont
eines
Lebenszeitvertrages. Beginnend mit der Vertragsanbahnung erwnscht die
Vertrags-
paritt das gleichrangige Fhren von Vertragsverhandlungen im Dialog durch die Ver-
tragsparteien und das Einbringen ihrer verschiedenartigen wirtschaftlichen oder

ideellen
Interessen in die privatautonome Rechtsgestaltung99. Sowohl das Diskursprinzip als
Aus-
druck der prozeduralen Vertragsgerechtigkeit wie auch das liberale
Rechtsverstndnis auf
98 Fr den Lebenszeitvertrag des Kredits gehren zu diesen Unwgbarkeiten

sich dynamisch verndernde
Marktkonditionen des Kreditzinses, aber auch ein berraschend aufgrund eines
Arbeitsortwechsels erfor-
derlicher Verkauf des kreditfinanzierten Eigenheims oder der Ausfall eines zur
Kredittilgung vorgesehenen
Tilgungsersatzmittels.
99 Wolf, M. (1970) pp. 69 ff; Hnn, G. (1982) pp. 9 ff.
208
----------------------- Page 248-----------------------
und Ethik
Grundlage der Privatautonomie schreiben dem daraufhin ergehenden Vertrag und seinen
Rechts- sowie wirtschaftlichen Folgen eine materielle Vertragsgerechtigkeit, das

Erzielen
einer Win-Win-Situation zwischen den Handels- und Vertragspartnern oder zumindest
eine bereinstimmung mit dem rechtsgeschftlich Gewollten i.S. der
Richtigkeitsver-
mutung100 zu. Insoweit korrespondiert die Idee eines idealen,
selbstregulierten, freien
Marktes, dessen eigene Gesetzmigkeit zu einer gesamtwirtschaftlich effizienten

Gter-
allokation fhrt101, mit dem Postulat der Vertragsfreiheit. Soweit eine
strukturelle Unter-
legenheit in der Geschftserfahrung oder dem Informationsniveau des Nutzers

gegenber
dem Anbieter von Lebenszeitvertrgen besteht (vgl. Ausfhrungen zum
Schwcheren-
schutz zuvor unter III.2), berbrcken sowohl vorvertragliche102 als auch
whrend der
Laufzeit bestehende103 Aufklrungs-, Informations- und
Erluterungspflichten104 diese
Informations- oder Kompetenzvorsprnge.

Smtliche dieser Pflichten, die auf eine Informationssymmetrie zwischen den
Ver-
tragsparteien gerichtet sind, gehen auf diskursethische Mastbe zurck. Sie
bezwecken
zugunsten eines fairen, vernunftbasierten sowie eines kooperativ an der
gemeinsamen
Erfllung des Vertragszwecks sachorientierten Dialogs zwischen zwei annhernd
gleich-
starken Beteiligten eine wahrheitsgeme, verstndliche sowie rechtzeitige
Information
der schwcheren Vertragspartei, damit diese eine eigenstndige fundierte Bewertung
des
Vertragsgegenstands und seiner Chancen sowie Risiken vornehmen kann105.
Grundstzlich gilt, dass je umfassender und risikoreicher die
rechts- sowie
wirtschaftlichen Folgen eines Vertrages und je geringer das Informations- und
Kompetenz-
niveau einer Vertragspartei sind, desto hhere Anforderungen sind an diese
Pflichten zu
stellen. Als Konsequenz drfte mithin fr Lebenszeitvertrge als
gelten, dass die sich aus ihnen ergebenden langfristigen und mithin umfangreichen
Pflich-
ten grundstzlich intensivierte vorvertragliche Informationspflichten erfordern.
Darber
hinaus streben fr die nachvertraglichen Verhandlungssituationen des
Lebenszeitver-
trages - im Gegensatz zur Konzentration auf den Vertragsschluss bei sog. spot
Vertrgen
- fortwhrende Informationspflichten whrend der langfristigen
Vertragslaufzeit (vgl.
493 BGB fr das Kreditgeschft als Lebenszeitvertrag) eine Vertragsparitt an.
Um dennoch einen information overload des Nutzers als auch immense Kosten
des
brokratischen Verwaltungsaufwands fr Anbieter von Lebenszeitvertrgen zu
vermeiden,
erweist sich eine am Einzelfall orientierte, bedarfs- und risikobasierte
Justierung dieser
100 MKo-Busche, Vorb 145 BGB, Rn. 6.

101 Bechtold, S. (2010) p. 28.
102 Vgl. insoweit die Generalklausel der culpa in contrahendo 280 Abs. 1, 311
Abs. 2, 241 Abs. 2 BGB sowie
auch bereichsspezifisch fr das Kreditgeschft als Lebenszeitvertrag 491a
Abs. 1 BGB.
103 Vgl. fr das Kreditgeschft als Lebenszeitvertrag 493 BGB.
104 Vgl. 491a Abs. 3 BGB.
105 LG Karlsruhe BeckRS 2010, 17902.
209
----------------------- Page 249-----------------------
Helena Klinger
Informationspflichten als sinnvoll. Zudem sind Unternehmen bereits in der

Umsetzung
106
klassischer Compliance-Vorschriften mit diesem Bedarfs- und
Risikoansatz vertraut.
Angelehnt an die zunchst zur Begrndung von vorvertraglichen
Aufklrungspflichten
herangezogene und am Einzelfall orientierte Generalklausel von Treu und Glauben
( 242
107
BGB) werden vorvertragliche Informations- als Loyalitts- und
Rcksichtnahmepflicht
nunmehr aus 280 Abs. 1, 311 Abs. 2, 241 Abs. 2 BGB begrndet, wenn das
Verschwei-
gen von Tatsachen gegen den Grundsatz von Treu und Glauben verstoen wrde und der
Erklrungsgegner die Mitteilung der verschwiegenen Tatsache nach der
Verkehrsauffassung
erwarten durfte, weil sie fr die Entschlieung des anderen Teils erkennbar von
Bedeu-
tung sein knnen108. Ein weiteres Beispiel sind die vorvertraglichen
Erluterungspflichten
im Kreditgeschft gem. 491a Abs. 3 BGB, die dem Einzelfall gerecht werden und
sowohl
im Hinblick auf das Ob als auch das Wie angemessen sein mssen. Dieser
bedarfs- und
risikoorientierte Reglungsmodus fr Informationspflichten bietet sowohl den
Vorteil, dem
Anbieter von Lebenszeitvertrgen nicht mehr an Organisationsaufwand zuzumuten, als
es
der Einzelfall bedarf, andererseits aus rechtspolitischer Sicht keinen status quo
zu schaffen,
dessen Einhaltung per se exkulpiert. Stattdessen wird eine fortwhrende Achtsamkeit
fr
die Umstnde des Einzelfalls abverlangt und damit i.S. des Subsidiarittsprinzips
der sozialen
Marktwirtschaft109 eine eigenverantwortliche Selbstregulierung untersttzt.
5.3.5 Vertrauen
Neben diesen auf diskursethische Mastbe zurckzufhrenden Anforderungen an eine

informationssymmetrische Kommunikation zwischen den Vertragspartnern ist
ferner
die von besonderem Vertrauen und Vertrautheit getragene Geschftsbeziehung fr
einen
Lebenszeitvertrag charakteristisch. Das Vertrauen des Nutzers in seinen
Vertragspart-
ner grndet neben der regelmigen Informations- oder Kompetenzasymmetrie, einer
oftmals bei Abschluss eines Dauerschuldverhltnisses sensiblen Offenlegung
persnli-
cher und wirtschaftlicher Verhltnisse (z.B. Mieterselbstauskunft, Schufa-
Anfrage bei
Abschluss eines Kredits oder Handyvertrages)110, den in Anbetracht der
langjhrigen
106 Vgl. u.a. 31 Abs. 4 WpHG fr die Anlageberatung, 33 Abs. 1 WpHG fr eine
den Compliancevorschriften
angemessene Organisation, in der Geldwscheprvention 2 Abs. 1 Nr. 1, 3
Abs. 4 GwG.
107 OLG Nrnberg NJW-RR 1989, 815; LG Kln NJW-RR 1989, 816.
108 BGH NJW 1973, 752 f; BGH NJW 1983, 2493, 2494.
109 Nothelle-Wildfeuer und Ockenfels in: Goldschmidt, N.; Wohlgemuth, M. (eds.)
(2004) pp. 48 ff und pp.
154 ff; Steinmann, H. (2005) p. 89; Albach, H. (ed.) (2005) p. 42; Maring, M.
(2001) pp. 346 f; das Subsi-
diarittsprinzip geht insbesondere auf die christliche Sozialethik und
deren Vertreter (u.a. v. Nell
Breuning, O. (1992), S. 79) zurck. Die von dem Subsidiarittsprinzip
gewnschte Selbstverantwortung der
Akteure korrespondiert mit einer von Habermas geforderten Selbststeuerung der
Rechtsunterworfenen im
rationalen Diskurs (Habermas, J. (1992) pp. 494, 497).
110 Vgl. Prinzip Nr. 16 der Lebenszeitvertrge Vertraulichkeit.
210
----------------------- Page 250-----------------------
und Ethik
Vertragslaufzeit vielfach erheblichen Vertragssummen, zugleich in der Zuversicht,

auch
nachvertraglich einvernehmliche Lsung mit dem Vertragspartner zugunsten von Ver-
tragsanpassungen zu finden. Die Vertrauensbeziehung in einem Lebenszeitvertrag wird
zudem nochmals dadurch gestrkt, dass Vertragsinhalt die langfristige zur

Verfgung
Stellung eines zur Lebensfhrung essentiellen Gutes ist, wodurch zahlreiche Hrden
im
Falle eines Anbieterwechsels und entsprechende Transaktionskosten zu einer
verstrkten
Loyalittsbeziehung beitragen.
Auf der Basis dieser Besonderheiten von Lebenszeitvertrgen geniet die
persnliche
Vertrauensbeziehung zwischen den Vertragspartner auch einen besonderen rechtlichen
Schutz. Offenbar wird dies anhand von Spezialregelungen, die fr

Lebenszeitvertrge
im Falle eines Vertragspartnerwechsels (vgl. fr den Betriebsbergang im
Arbeitsrecht
613a BGB) und eines Glubigerwechsels durch Forderungsabtretung (z.B. fr das
Kre-
ditrecht vgl. 496 Abs. 2 BGB oder 493 Abs. 4 BGB) erhhte
Zulssigkeitsanforde-
rungen vorsehen, die bertragbarkeit aufgrund eines hchstpersnlichen
Charakters
ausschlieen (z.B. 613 BGB, Dispositionskredit111) oder ein die Loyalitt und
Exklusivi-
tt der vertrauensvollen Geschftsbeziehung unterstreichendes Wettbewerbsverbot

bein-
halten (vgl. 60 HGB oder 110 GewO i.V.m. 74 bis 75 f HGB).
Zugleich gelten fr Dauerschuldverhltnisse erhhte Mastbe aus der
Zentralnorm
fr das Begrnden von Loyalittspflichten und einem rechtsethischen
Vertrauensschutz,
dem Tatbestand von Treu und Glauben ( 242 BGB). Denn der jeweilige aus 242 BGB
abzuleitende Umfang der Treuepflicht sowie des Vertrauensschutzes in die

Vertragstreue
und Loyalitt des anderes Vertragspartners steigt einhergehend mit der Fachkenntnis
des
einen Vertragsteils, dem ihm entgegengebrachten Vertrauen und den Besonderheiten
des
Vertragsgegenstandes wie auch der Vertragsbeziehung112. Demgem kann ein erhebli-
ches Vertragsrisiko, die Langjhrigkeit des Vertragsverhltnisses - insbesondere in

der
113
Form einer auf einen einzigen Geschftspartner konzentrierten
Vertragsbeziehung -
114
zu erhhten Anforderungen an die Zulssigkeit einer Kndigung aus 242 BGB fhren
oder zugleich als Ausdruck des Verhltnismigkeitsgrundsatz (hierzu im

Folgenden
unter III.6.) das Ergreifen weniger einschneidender Manahmen auferlegen
(z.B. die
Tilgungsaussetzung, Zinsstreckung)115.
111 OLG Schleswig NJW 1992, 579.

112 MKo-Roth, 5. Auflage, 2007, 242 BGB, Rn. 173 ff.
113 Innerhalb der Interessenabwgung einer auerordentlichen Kndigung gem. 490
Abs. 1 BGB gelten im
Falle einer Hausbankbeziehung verstrkte Treuepflichten des Kreditgebers,
wodurch hhere Anforderungen
an die Wirksamkeit gestellt werden (BGH WM 84, 586).
114 BGH WM 84, 586; BGH NJW-RR 1987, 1184.
115 OLG Schleswig BKR 2006, 253 f.
211
----------------------- Page 251-----------------------
Helena Klinger
5.3.6 Verhltnismigkeit
Leistung und Gegenleistung der Lebenszeitvertrge drfen nicht in einem

aufflligen
Missverhltnis stehen. Der Preis muss nach transparenten und
diskriminierungsfreien
Gesichtspunkten so bemessen sein, dass die Belastung tragbar und den Kosten
angemes-
sen ist. (Prinzip Nr. 9 der Lebenszeitvertrge).
Das rechtsethische Prinzip der Verhltnismigkeit116 besitzt fr
Lebenszeitvertrge
verschiedene Ausprgungen117, wobei das Prinzip Nr. 9 der Lebenszeitvertrge auf
die ma-
terielle Vertragsgerechtigkeit gerichtet ist. Diese verlangt im Rahmen der

ausgleichenden
Gerechtigkeit des privaten Wirtschaftsverkehrs eine Gleichwertigkeit zwischen
Leistung
und Gegenleistung innerhalb synallagmatischer Austauschvertrge, so auch im
Dauer-
schuldverhltnis. Zur Wiederherstellung der materiellen Vertragsgerechtigkeit
unterliegen
Lebenszeitvertrge der Preis- und Wucherkontrolle gem. 138 BGB und sind
nichtig,
wenn das Geschft gegen den ethischen Standard der guten Sitten verstt118. Da
die Wie-
derherstellung einer materiellen Vertragsgerechtigkeit im Wege der Inhaltskontrolle

einen
starken Eingriff in die Privatautonomie darstellt, ist sie nur unter engen
Voraussetzungen
mglich. Vielmehr spricht fr jeden Vertrag grundstzlich die
Richtigkeitsvermutung119,
nmlich dass der Vertragsinhalt dem subjektiven Parteiwillen und mithin ihrem
subjek-
tiven quivalenzbegriff zu diesem Zeitpunkt entsprach. Ausschlielich in eng
begrenz-
ten Ausnahmefllen einer Verhandlungsschwche i.S. des 138 Abs. 2 BGB findet eine
gerichtliche und mithin objektive Fremdkontrolle des quivalenzverhltnisses in

berein-
stimmung mit dem Subsidiarittsprinzip der sozialen Marktwirtschaft ex post statt.
Dies
korrespondiert mit den Prinzipien der Selbstbestimmung und Selbstverantwortung, die
der
Privatautonomie als Ausfluss der Menschenwrde zugrunde liegen und verlangen, dass
nicht jegliches vom subjektiven quivalenzbegriff zum Zeitpunkt des

Vertragsschlusses
abweichende objektive Missverhltnis zu einer Sittenwidrigkeit nach 138
BGB fhrt.
Vielmehr muss dieses besonders grob oder zumindest auffllig sein. Neben 138
BGB
existieren strafrechtliche Spezialvorschriften, die dem Miet- sowie Kreditwucher
gelten
( 291 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 und Nr. 2 StGB, 5 WStG), und diverse weitere Mechanismen, die
eine Preiskontrolle von Lebenszeitvertrgen zugunsten der iustitia commutativa als

Tausch-
gerechtigkeit vornehmen. Grundlage und Mastab dieser Vorschriften einer
gerechten
Preisfindung ist dabei stets und zu recht die Marktblichkeit (z.B. im
Arbeitsrecht
116 ffentlich-rechtliche Kreditinstitute unterliegen dem bermaverbot als

Ausdruck des Verhltnismig-
keitsgrundsatzes im Rahmen ihrer Grundrechtsbindung (vgl. BGH KR 2003, 346 f;
BGH BKR 2003, 664 f.
117 Z.B. im Rahmen des Verhltnismigkeitsmastabs, welcher an die Wirksamkeit
einer Kndigung zu stel-
len ist, so dass diese eine ultima ratio - nach Ausschpfung anderweitiger
Mglichkeiten - bilden sollte (z.B.
der Vertragsanpassung hinsichtlich der Konditionen), vgl. hierzu Prinzip Nr.
11 von Lebenszeitvertrgen.
118 Fr das Arbeitsrecht: BAG, Urt. v. 22. April 2009 Az. 5 AZR 436/08, BAG, BB
2012, 237; fr den Kredit-
wucher: BGH NJW 1990, 1597; BGH NJW 1991, 1810; BGH NJW 1995, 1019, 1022.
119 MKo-Busche, Vorb 145 BGB, Rn. 6.
212
----------------------- Page 252-----------------------
und Ethik
612 Abs. 2 BGB oder im Mietrecht 558 BGB fr den Mastab der ortsblichen Ver-
gleichsmiete). Diese Bestimmung der materiellen Vertragsgerechtigkeit i.S.
einer Tausch-
gerechtigkeit werden flankiert durch Vorschriften, die zugleich Elemente
der iustitia
distributiva, d.h. politische und soziale Zielsetzungen einer
Verteilungsgerechtigkeit
bercksichtigen (z.B. Mindestlhne, welche durch allgemeinverbindlich
erklrte Tarif-
vertrge Geltung erlangen bzw. gem. 3, 7 AentG120, Zinssubvention im
Kreditgeschft
entsprechend 491 Abs. 2 Nr. 5 BGB oder Lohnkostenzuschsse fr Schwerbeschdigte
gem. 104 Abs. 3 SGB IX i.V.m. 16 SchwbAV).

Neben diesen Leitplanken, die fr eine Bestimmung der Verhltnismigkeit
zwischen
Leistung und Gegenleistung in Bezug auf den Anfangspreis eines sozialen
Dauerschuld-
verhltnisses gelten, unterliegen des Weiteren die Preisanpassungen besonderen
Rechts-
mastben, die gleichfalls das quivalenzverhltnis betreffen. Soweit der Verwender
von
Allgemeinen Geschftsbedingungen fr ein Dauerschuldverhltnis die
Preisanpassung
gem. 309 Nr. 1 S. 2 BGB standardisiert und mit einem einseitigen
Leistungsbestimmungs-
rechts, das ihm i.d.R. mit einem Ermessenspielraum eingerumt wird, kombiniert,
bildet
die Billigkeit gem. 315 Abs. 1 und 3 BGB den ethischen
Rechtmigkeitsmastab121.
Die Billigkeit der Ausbung des Preisanpassungsrechts - sei es im Kredit- oder im

Ener-
gierecht - orientiert sich wiederum am ursprnglichen quivalenzverhltnis, welches
i.S.
des Grundsatzes pacta sunt servanda auch bei einer Anpassung beizubehalten ist122.
Ferner soll als Kriterium der materiellen Vertragsgerechtigkeit auch auf die
finan zielle
Belastbarkeit eingegangen werden. Da sich im Dauerschuldverhltnissen der
Umfang
der Leistung aus der anteiligen Vertragslaufzeit ergibt123, bemisst sich danach
auch der
Preis. Angesichts der Langfristigkeit der Vertrge bei Dauerschuldverhltnissen ist

hu-
fig die Verhltnismigkeit grerer Vertragssummen zu begutachten124. Dennoch
bleibt
auch fr Verbindlichkeiten, die hhere Vertragssummen darstellen, zu Recht die

Belast-
barkeit grundstzlich kein Kriterium der Verhltnismigkeitsprfung und
materieller
Vertragsgerechtigkeit125. Vielmehr verlangt die Rechtsordnung einen mglichst
hohen
Grad an Selbstverantwortung, weshalb z.B. die bloe Vorhersehbarkeit einer

berfor-
derten finanziellen Leistungsfhigkeit des Kreditnehmers bei Vertragsschluss anders
als
120 Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz.
121 Fr das ursprngliche quivalenzverhltnis hingegen spricht die
Richtigkeitsvermutung einer materiellen
Vertragsgerechtigkeit, so dass dieser anfngliche Preissockel - in
Absehung von einer berprfung auf
wucherische Mastbe gem. 138 BGB innerhalb der Billigkeitsprfung des
315 BGB unangetastet
bleibt (vgl. BGH NJW-RR 1991, 565).
122 Fr Zinsanpassungsklauseln im Kreditrecht: BGH NJW 1986, 1803; Bruchner,
H./Metz, R. (2001) Rn 118 f.
123 MKo-Gaier, 314, Rn. 5.
124 Vgl. hierzu Ausfhrungen unter A.
125 Fr das Kreditgeschft: BGH NJW 1994, 1726 f, BGH NJW 1989, 1665 f; OLG
Brandenburg, NJW-RR
2002, 578 f; vielmehr gewhrt den Schutz vor einer wirtschaftlichen
berforderung die InsO (vgl. Medicus,
D. (1999) p. 839; Aden, M. (1999)).
213
----------------------- Page 253-----------------------
Helena Klinger
beim altruistischen Brgen zu recht keine Sittenwidrigkeit begrndet126. Allerdings

findet
- zumindest im Kreditrecht - unterhalb der Sittenwidrigkeitsgrenze eine Prfung der

fi-
nanziellen Belastung im subjektiven Interesse des Verbrauchers statt, indem eine
entspre-
chende Erluterungspflicht gem 491a Abs. 3 S. 1 BGB (ob der
Vertrag . . . seinen
Vermgensverhltnissen gerecht wird) oder explizit eine Pflicht zur
Bonittsprfung fr
Finanzierungshilfen gem. 509 BGB bzw. 18 Abs. 2 KWG besteht. Das vorrangige Re-
gelungskonzept bleibt mithin, die wohlerwogene Entscheidung des Nutzers von Lebens-
zeitvertrgen zu frdern, und das daraus resultierende Vertragsergebnis als

grundstzlich
gewnscht und dem subjektiven quivalenzverhltnis der Parteien entsprechend in der
Rechtswirksamkeit anzuerkennen.
5.4 Schlussfolgerungen fr Lebenszeitvertrge
Auf der Grundlage einer zunehmenden Bedeutsamkeit von Lebenszeitvertrgen

sowie
der vorgenannten ethischen Standards, die fr langfristige
Vertragsverhltnisse bereits
anhand der rechtlichen Ausgestaltungen tragend sind, zeigt sich deutlich
der Vorbild-
charakter dieser Dauerschuldverhltnisse. Im Gegensatz zu sog. spot-
Vertrgen sind
Lebenszeitvertrge von einer auf Langfristigkeit abzielenden Motivation der
Vertrags-
partner geprgt, die den fortwhrenden Bestand der Vertragsbeziehung
bezweckt. Das
damit verbundene und eine nachhaltige Perspektive einnehmende Denken der Vertrags-
partner bietet im Gegensatz zu dem mit spot-Vertrgen verbundenem
Interesse an
einer kurzfristigen Gewinnerzielung einen geringen Anreiz fr ein
opportunistisches
Verhalten. Aus moralischer Sicht und unter Zugrundelegung der zuvor erluterten
recht-
lichen Bestimmungen knnen langfristige Vertrge mithin ideale
Vertragsbeziehungen
sein, in denen die Vertragsparteien ein einheitliches Interesse an dem
Fortbestand des
kooperativen Vertragsverhltnisses zur gegenseitigen Zufriedenheit haben. Dies
erweist
sich zugleich als konomisch effizient fr beide Vertragsparteien, denn durch
langfristige
Vertragsbeziehungen kann eine Verbundenheit mit dem Vertragspartner entstehen, die
Transaktionskosten fr den Fall des Wechsels der Geschftsbeziehung vermeidet (z.B.

die
Suche nach einem neuen vertrauenswrdigen Vertragspartner).
Zugleich verndert sich mit dieser Verschiebung des Zeithorizonts der
Fokus
der Vertragsgerechtigkeit von der Situation des Vertragsschlusses auf die
langfristige
Vertragsbeziehung. Dieser entfernt sich von der Situation des einmaligen
und nach
Mastben einer prozedurale Vertragsgerechtigkeit ergangenen
Vertragsabschlusses
126 Nur zustzliche qualifizierende Merkmale (z.B. die Geschftsunerfahrenheit des

Kreditnehmers, eine vom
Kreditinstitut verschuldete Fehlinformation oder Verharmlosung des Risikos)
knnen die Sittenwidrigkeit
begrnden (vgl. BGH NJW 1989, 1665 f; BGH NJW 1990, 1034 f; OLG Brandenburg,
NJW-RR 2002, 578 f).
214
----------------------- Page 254-----------------------
5 Lebenszeitvertrge Natur und

Ethik
hin zur Aufrechterhaltung einer gerechten Vertragsbeziehung i.S. einer materiellen

Ver-
tragsgerechtigkeit. Loyalitt und Vertragstreue zum Vertragspartner sowie eine ber
die
Vertragslaufzeit fortbestehende Kooperations- und Dialogbereitschaft auf der
Grundlage
diskursethischer Kriterien gewinnen an Gewicht.
Vor dem Hintergrund dieser umfassenden ethischen Standards des Lebenszeitver-
trages ist der Vertragsform als Idealtypus einer kooperativen Geschftsbeziehung
eine
herausgehobene Bedeutung beizumessen, die - insbesondere neben der bereits
erfol-
genden Harmonisierung des Kaufrechts - auch in der europischen Rechtsetzung zur
Herstellung eines einheitlichen Vertragsrechts einen entsprechenden Niederschlag
fin-
den sollte.
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in der multinationalen Unternehmung. In: Herrmann, Harald; Voigt, Kai-Ingo
(eds.):
Globalisierung und Ethik. Ludwig-Erhard-Ringvorlesung an der Friedrich-
Alexander-
Universitt Erlangen-Nrnberg. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag pp. 79102.
Tamm, Marina; Tonner, Klaus (2012): Verbraucherrecht. Rechtliches Umfeld,

Vertrags-
typen, Rechtsdurchsetzung; Beratungshandbuch. Baden-Baden1: Nomos.
Thielemann, Ulrich; Ulrich, Peter (2003): Brennpunkt Bankenethik. Der
Finanzplatz
Schweiz in wirtschaftsethischer Perspektive. Bern: P. Haupt.
Thsing, Gregor; Hoff, Konrad, von (2007): Vertragsschluss als

Folgenbeseitigung: Kon-
trahierungszwang im zivilrechtlichen Teil des Allgemeinen
Gleichbehandlungsgesetzes. In:
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 60 (1/2/2007), pp. 2125.
Unger, Sebastian (2008): Das Verfassungsprinzip der Demokratie. Normstruktur

und
Norminhalt des grundgesetzlichen Demokratieprinzips. Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Vogel, Joachim (1998): Juristische Methodik. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Wimmer, Konrad (2008): Zinsanpassung bei variablen Darlehen: Eignung alternativer

Refe-
renzzinsstze. In: Zeitschrift fr Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht, 62 (48/2008), pp.
22372243.
Wolf, Manfred (1970): Rechtsgeschaftliche Entscheidungs-freiheit und vertraglicher

Interes-
senaugleich. Tbungen: Mohr Siebeck.
Zllner, Wolfgang (2006): Vertragskontrolle und Gerechtigkeit. In: Neue Zeitschrift

fr Ar-
beitsrecht, 23 (3/2006), pp. 99106.
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6 Le social et la dfaisance -
introduction au problme de la
critique en droit europen des
*
contrats
Vincent Forray
Summary
This chapter offers a possible avenue for a social critique of European contract
law. Beginning
with the premise that a critique is needed in order to raise the
standard of social justice
in Europe, the problem arises of how to develop a critique of European law that
remains
European. In other words, can the critique adhere to the European legal
idea and, more
importantly, can it be Europe-friendly? In a nutshell, is a European social
critique of European
contract law thinkable?
I argue that an answer lies in what one calls the social, that is to say, a
particular mo-
ment of legal thought. The point is to understand what makes this moment a critical
but
operational one, and then to extract a pattern of contemporary social critique from
it. I will
say that what characterises social critique is what may be called an intellectual
form of defea-
sance: a sort of detachment from a binding thought process about law and legal
scholarship.
I suggest putting the critique in a position in relation to European contract law
similar to that
of an art critic in relation to a work of art.
The chapter has five parts. The first is a summary of the social moment,
the focus of
Duncan Kennedys perspective in Three Globalizations of Law and The Legal
Thought. In the
second part, I argue that one cannot imagine simply transposing what has been done
during
the social moment. This is because this moment has created a consciousness of
social issues
that is still irrigating legal thought, and consequently influences contract law
harmonisation
projects. The third part investigates the social critique project. It attempts to
describe more
accurately what problem this project is faced with. The fourth part develops a
pattern of social
critique. The fith part is an essay on reconstructing a contemporary social
critique within this
pattern: the social critique of European contract law in the manner of the art
critic.
* Professeur lUniversit McGill, vincent.forray@mcgill.ca. Je tiens

remercier Ruth Sefton-Green pour ses
commentaires, ainsi quUdo Reifner pour la trs fine relecture quil a bien
voulu produire de ce texte. Toutes
les erreurs sont les miennes.
221
----------------------- Page 261-----------------------
Vincent Forray
6.1 Premiers sentiments
Lharmonisation europenne du droit des contrats est jubilatoire.

Nous prouvons la joie de la construction juridique1 qui signale la vitalit
du droit
dans laventure humaine. Qui signale aussi limportance des juristes et,
parmi eux, les
universitaires, les scholars; les savants du droit. Nous nous rjouissons encore de
voir la
centralit du contrat raffirme: pas dEurope politico-juridique sans droit
europen du
contrat. Cest une source de satisfaction car, aprs tout, aucun autre concept na
pu, mieux
que le contrat, compromettre entre la libert des individus et la scurit des
oprations
conomiques. Avec le contrat, dailleurs, savancent encore les juristes: aucun
juriste na pu
devenir juriste sans savoir le droit des contrats. Celui-ci fournit les
connaissances lmen-
taires de la science juridique. Enfin, le droit europen donne du travail aux
savants et une
activit tangible la recherche juridique, et cest une source de satisfaction.
En mme temps, lharmonisation du droit des contrats suscite dautres
sentiments.
Parmi eux, celui quon pourrait qualifier d inquitante tranget. Voici le
droit le plus
familier, le droit des contrats, qui, revenant vers lendroit o sont les sujets de
droit -les
systmes tatiques-, est devenu un autre, un tranger dont linsistance
pose problme.
Les Principes de droit europen du contrat ou le Draft for a Common Frame of
Reference,
la directive 2011/83/UE du 25 octobre 2011 sur les droits du consommateur ou la
Proposi-
tion de rglement 2011/0284 relatif un droit commun europen de la vente
contiennent
des objets et des concepts auxquels nous sommes habitus. Mais leur assignation,
depuis
lextrieur des juridictions tatiques, trouble une certaine ide du droit.
Linquitante tranget vient aussi de ce que lharmonisation du droit
europen des
contrats semble devoir remettre en jeu des tats du droit que nous pensions avoir
sur-
monts. Il en est ainsi dune forme dinjustice associe la structure libert-
volont-force
obligatoire. Le modle qui prdomine, lheure actuelle, dans les textes
prparatoires dun
cadre commun de rfrence, dun code europen ou de toute forme dharmonisation ju-
ridique savante mobilise une telle structure. Elle se trouve reconduite dans un
droit pens
partir du contrat consensuel de vente, comme lindique le groupe EuSoCo. Il y a
des
raisons cela. Sans pouvoir ici les dvelopper, disons que ce dernier propose une
transac-
tion entre le concept (philosophique) de contrat promesse et le droit du contrat
comme
droit du march.
Or, sans que la structure en question nait disparu, et sans que le contrat
consensuel
de vente nait cess dinspirer le droit des contrats, la ncessit den conjurer
les effets jugs
les plus nfastes na chapp personne, dans le sein des socits europennes. Il
en est
galement ainsi de certaines manires de faire du droit. Le lgicentrisme, la
nomophilie, le
1 Pierre Schlag a not le plaisir que les juristes peuvent trouver dans la
certitude, Schlag, P. (2002).
222
----------------------- Page 262-----------------------

6 Le social et la dfaisance - introduction au
problme
de la critique en droit europen des
contrats
conceptualisme, le droit dogmatique, sans que les fondements en aient t dissous,

ont t
discuts depuis belle lurette. Les juristes acadmiques sont habitus la dispute
ralisme
contre formalisme, quoique celle-ci ne prsente pas, en Europe, une forme aussi
nette que
cet nonc le suppose. Les juristes ont aussi contribu aux tentatives pour tablir
lquilibre
entre les forces juridiques du commerce, du travail et des droits fondamentaux.
Chacun
peut en apprcier la russite ou lchec. Mais il y a certaines choses quon peut
dire.
On sait lirrductibilit du droit des contrats lunit
conceptuelle quon pouvait
qualifier de thorie gnrale. A savoir un ensemble cohrent de propositions sur
ce qui
arrive en droit des contrats, soutenu par une dfinition consensuelle du contrat:
accord
de volonts duquel procde des obligations reconnues par le droit en vigueur. Les
juristes
nationaux ont pu, un temps, capitaliser leur savoir sur la valeur de cette unit
conceptu-
elle, cest--dire sur la correspondance entre la thorie et les donnes positives.
Une telle
capitalisation serait aujourdhui excessivement risque et elle ne se pratique plus
gure que
dans le cadre de cours prparatoires au droit des contrats.
En dehors de ceux-ci, le droit des contrats peut encore revendiquer
dtre trait
comme un ensemble, mais pas de procder dun concept unique, ni dobir
un seul
modle conomique. Lensemble en question est complexe et ambivalent. Les
effets de
droit varient en fonction de corps de rfrences diversifis (droit de le
consommation, de
la concurrence, du travail, du crdit, droit civil); et les propositions thoriques
concur-
rentes affluent: droit commun / droit spcial; contract as promise / contract as
reliance
relational contract; critical contract law; libert contractuelle / solidarit
contractuelle;
droit du contrat / droits des contractants. . . Cette complexit fait quon ne peut
penser le
regroupement thorique des phnomnes contractuels sans caviarder le droit
des con-
trats. Est-ce que, dans son principe mme, lharmonisation du droit europen des
contrats
nefface pas une partie du droit des contrats en Europe? Leffacement se ferait, si
lon suit
lhypothse du groupe EuSoCo, au profit du modle du droit libral de la vente.
Des inquitudes sexpriment, donc, dans la pense juridique contemporaine. La
cri-
2
tique slve et on comprend quelle veuille emprunter les canaux de la justice
sociale , ou,
plus gnralement, de la socialisation du droit des contrats. On le comprend
dautant plus
que lide sociale a fcond la critique juridique, notamment en droit des
contrats, tout au
long de lpoque moderne.
Le prsent ouvrage adopte un point de vue un peu diffrent; plus concret,
plus urgent
en un sens : il y a un ensemble de relations contractuelles -qui peuvent tre
dsignes par
lexpression life time contracts- qui appellent des principes de rgulation
divergents des
modles sur lesquels se concentrent les entreprises contemporaines dharmonisation
du
droit europen des contrats. Il ne sagit pas dvelopper une branche du droit des
contrats
2 Brggemeier, G./Bussani, M. et al. (2004); Hesselink, M. W. (2008).
223
----------------------- Page 263-----------------------
Vincent Forray
ou un droit spcial tels que les connaissent les systmes civilistes, cest--dire
un rgime
juridique particulier applicable un contrat nomm. Le contrat spcial -vente,
crdit-bail,
time-share- porte alors le nom dune opration conomique qui constitue le point
central
des rgles juridiques en question. Celui partir duquel se dploie une logique
contractu-
elle. A linverse, les life time contracts ne renvoient pas des oprations
conomiques mais
des oprations qui concernent la participation ou lintgration des
individus dans la
socit (comme lindiquent les Principes 1&5 dans le prsent ouvrage). Il sagit de
relations
contractuelles qui, en ce sens, contribuent tablir, prserver ou constituer le
tissu social.
Elles mobilisent une logique fondamentalement diffrente.
Que le droit europen maintienne le silence autour de ces life time contracts
donne
penser quil les ignore. Ceci a de quoi inquiter.
De juristes joyeux lide de contribuer la construction du droit
europen, nous
pourrions redevenir des juristes inquiets 3; et engager un geste critique. Do
lide de
retravailler ici mme une critique sociale du droit des contrats; de

tenter dextirper du
social un motif critique, et mme une activit juridique critique.
La question est de savoir si ce geste critique peut tre europen. Il ne va
pas de soi que
la critique de lharmonisation europenne en matire contractuelle -mme faite au
nom
dune figure sociale du contrat- ne se rduise pas elle-mme une destruction de
lide
juridique europenne. Parce quelle insinue que ce que le droit des contrats a
deuropen
contrevient lide sociale.
Il me semble alors que tout lenjeu -et tout le problme- de la critique
sociale du droit
europen des contrats est de demeurer europenne. De ne pas tre, paradoxalement
pour
une thorie critique, une critique politique du droit europen. Sans quoi elle
risque de
redoubler les reproches adresss au principe de construction dun droit venu
dailleurs.
Le prsent texte tente de dgager un cheminement pour la critique sociale en
droit
europen des contrats au travers du problme que cette critique doit affronter.
6.2 Premire intuition: dfaire
Voil peut-tre en quoi consiste le geste critique qui accompagne la

mobilisation du
social dans la problmatique du contrat. A un moment, il a fallu dfaire le
travailleur de
son statut caractristique des socits prcapitalistes pour rendre possible la
conclusion
du contrat de travail4 . Chez Karl Marx, cet acte de dfaire est suspect de l
accumulation
3 Selon lexpression de Marie-Claire Belleau qui dsigne par l un certain nombre

dauteurs franais crivant
la charnire des 19me et 20me sicles : Franois Gny, Raymond Saleilles,
Ren Demogue, Julien Bon-
necase, Emmanuel Lvy, Lon Duguit, Maurice Hauriou . . ., Belleau, M.-C.
(1999).
4 Kervgan, J.-F. (2009) p. 95.
224
----------------------- Page 264-----------------------

problme
de la critique en droit europen
des contrats
primitive5. Il est cependant lexpression dune critique prliminaire au

contractualisme
social quil me semble ncessaire de rserver.

Ajoutons lusage pronominal du mot: dfaire et se dfaire. De ce qui nous
gne, nous
enserre de trop prs, depuis trop longtemps. Ce qui ne veut pas dire dtruire ou
rendre
inutilisable. Mais laisser de ct pendant un moment, dposer, le temps
de faire autre
chose, dengager des alternatives. Comme on fait dun vtement en fin de
journe. Les
glossateurs y avaient peut-tre song en qualifiant les formes du droit romain de
vtements
(vestimenta) du contrat. Il devenait possible de dshabiller celui-ci pour en
apercevoir le
corps et apprcier ce que pacte nu pouvait vouloir dire. On a pu conclure que la
forme ne
constituait pas lessence du contrat.
Plus tard, un certain nombre de propositions thoriques ont tenu disputer
le mono-
6
pole exerc par le concept de contrat sur la pense des actes juridiques . La
cohrence du
droit contractuel a t mise en cause. On a dout, alors, de pouvoir dduire les
droits con-
tractuels du concept. Plus prcisment, on sest avis de ce que la pertinence du
droit ou
sa justice ne souffriraient pas de prendre leurs distances avec un droit des
contrats centr
sur la protection des volonts contractuelles. On a aussi revu la position du juge
vis--
vis du contrat. La dtection de nouveaux contenus obligationnels (obligation de
scurit,
dinformation, de bonne foi) ou la mise entre parenthses de ceux qui parasitent la
rali-
sation de lopration conomique entreprise (clauses critiquables, quelles soient
injustes,
abusives ou anticoncurrentielles) na pas sembl illgitime. On a, enfin, entrepris
de tirer
des consquences de la rupture de lunit conceptuelle du droit des contrats du
fait des
nouvelles problmatiques7 souvent soutenues ou amplifies par des rgimes
ingalitaires
8
(droit du travail, droit de la consommation, droit de la concurrence . . .) .
En fait, la construction du droit rationnel des contrats na cess dtre
critique depuis
quon a pris conscience de celle-ci, savoir depuis le moment o le phnomne a
t d-
9
sign . Je tcherai de dterminer ce que la critique moderne du droit des contrats
doit au
social. De comprendre dabord ce que signifie le social en droit des contrats.
5 Karl Marx: Quant au travailleur, au producteur immdiat, pour pouvoir

disposer de sa propre personne,
il lui fallait dabord cesser dtre attach la glbe ou dtre infod
une autre personne; il ne pouvait non
plus devenir libre vendeur de travail, apportant sa marchandise partout o
elle trouve un march, sans avoir
chapp au rgime des corporations, avec leurs matrises, leurs jurandes,
leurs lois dapprentissage, etc. Le
mouvement historique qui convertit les producteurs en salaris se prsente
donc comme leur affranchisse-
ment du servage et de la hirarchie industrielle. De lautre ct, ces
affranchis ne deviennent vendeurs deux-
mmes quaprs avoir t dpouills de tous leurs moyens de production et de
toutes les garanties dexistence
offertes par lancien ordre des choses, Marx, K. (1867).
6 Voy. Jamin, C. (2003).
7 Difficile de ne pas rappeler ici les travaux de Macneil, I. R. (1980).
8 Jestaz, P. (2003) p. 243; Collins, H. (2003).
9 A peu prs au moment o les juristes sapproprient des fins
critiques, lautonomie de la volont, voy.
Gounot, E. (1912).
225
----------------------- Page 265-----------------------
Vincent Forray
6.3 Le social
Dans Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-200010, Duncan

Kennedy
introduit the social comme slogan de la priode de globalisation du droit dont

il situe
le commencement aux alentours de 1900. Le social constitue dabord une critique
de
la pense juridique classique, cest--dire une critique du droit mdit depuis
lindividu
(Gounot, par exemple, parlait dindividualisme juridique) - le droit tel que mdit
par
le sujet.
La critique se dploie simultanment au plan substantiel et au plan
mthodologique: les
juristes du social entendent modifier tant le contenu du droit que les mthodes
dinterprtation.
Ils sattaquent notamment la place occupe, dans la thorie juridique, par
la volont
qui prtend fonder la totalit du droit11. Ainsi, le grand livre de Jhering, Zweck
im Recht,
souvre sur la loi de finalit qui soumet la volont: celle-ci ne se dtermine

pas elle-mme
mais en considration de son but. On ne comprend donc pas le droit si lon sen
tient
lindividu, abstraction faite de la socit qui constitue son milieu de vie.
Jhering crit: je
nentends pas, comme le droit naturel, briser arbitrairement le rapport historique
qui unit
lindividu la socit, en lisolant, et en opposant cette existence pour soi,
purement imagi-
naire, lexistence pour autrui, ou la vie relle dans la socit. Je prends
lhomme dans la
position quil occupe de fait dans le monde rel12.
La comprhension du droit ne procde pas dune pense du sujet -cest--dire

des pro-
jections de la raison a priori- comme le rationalisme juridique lavait
prescrit13. Elle doit
prendre en considration le rseau complexe des faits sociaux qui contraignent

lindividu.
Elle doit embrasser les buts, les finalits, les intrts qui faonnent la matire
juridique14.
Ainsi, les principes, les rgles et les solutions juridiques rsultent dune
transaction qui a
lieu entre les acteurs du droit, et non du systme formel qui est hors du monde15.
Le droit
a lieu dans le social.

Planiol crit propos du droit des obligations quelle est la matire la
plus thorique
de toutes les parties du droit et quelle forme le domaine principal
de la logique
juridique. Il crit aussi, et immdiatement aprs:
Cependant, il est bon de se mettre en garde contre cette tendance
raisonner de
manire troitement logique. Elle est contraire au but social de la lgislation,
dont la fin
10 Kennedy, D. (2006) pp 19-73.

11 Voy. Hegel, G. W. F. (1940, 2006) p. 69.
12 Jhering, R., von (1901) p. 39.
13 Balibar, . (2011); Villey, M./Rials, S. et al. (2003) pp 513-558.
14 Il faut, afin de saisir lampleur de la rupture que se propose de conduire
Jhering, se souvenir que la jurispru-
dence des intrts proteste contre la construction kantienne de la loi morale,
voy. Jhering, R., von (1901)
note 19, pp 32-41.
15 On distingue volontiers les sources relles et les sources formelles du droit,
voy. Gny, F. (1954) pp. 33 f.
226
----------------------- Page 266-----------------------

problme
des contrats
dernire, la voix vivante se trouve dans la jurisprudence, cest--dire

dans ladaptation
de la loi aux faits. Sans doute il y faut du raisonnement, mais non
pas dune manire
exclusive, ni mme dune manire prpondrante; linterprte du droit a surtout
desprit
16
dobservation et dquit .
La rupture avec le rationalisme juridique simpose parce que celui-ci
dissimule la fi-
nalit du lgal. La logique gare linterprtation du ct des concepts; elle sen
tient au droit
en soi. Au contraire, le droit est instrumental. Linterprtation doit reconstituer
le rapport
du droit et du social. Ce pourquoi elle acquiert chez quelquun comme
Josserand une
dimension tlologique17.
Dune manire gnrale, il sagit de rendre compte de linstitution
du droit dans le
mouvement permanent de la lgislation la jurisprudence. Au cur de ce mouvement,
le
droit est tel quil est; tendu vers son but. On notera chez les juristes du
social lutilisation
du vocabulaire de lvolution, du dplacement; la mobilisation dune
esthtique de
lnergie18. On sintresse au droit vivant. Penser, penser seulement, ce nest
pas encore
la vie, dit Jhering19. Lorganisme juridique est la socit20. Il sadapte aux
conditions socio-
conomiques de son temps. Une telle ide fournit un ressort de la critique adresse
par le
social au volontarisme. Celui-ci correspondait aux ralits dune poque rvolue.
Kennedy
relve que la critique sociale prsente ici une forme proche de celle de la
critique marxiste:
elle montre le volontarisme comme lhabillage juridique des conditions socio-
conomiques
de la premire moiti du 19me sicle21. Il faut dfaire le droit de cet habillage
qui le travestit.
Une autre manire de parler du droit suit la critique dun tat

du droit fix par le
pass. Les juristes du social nont pas de scrupules passer dans leurs textes du
mode de-
scriptif au mode prescriptif. Les professeurs font du droit (comme aujourdhui les
univer-
sitaires en droit europen). Ils entreprennent, sous la couverture des nouvelles
mthodes
dinterprtation, de rformer celui-ci (rformer veut dire: rendre sa
forme premire;
comprenons alors: rtablir le droit dans ce quil est). Les civilistes franais
retaillent ainsi
au tout dbut du 20me sicle le concept de jurisprudence leur mesure22. Ils
disposent
dsormais dun mdium pour esprer oprer les changements sur la matire du droit.
Ce
nest plus la lgislation quil faut commenter mais la jurisprudence quil faut
influencer23.
Cest la raison pour laquelle le social organise la promotion du travail

judiciaire; redfinit
16 Planiol, M. (1902) Prface au tome 2, p. IX.

17 Josserand, L. (1928. 2006).
18 Schlag, P. (2002).
19 Jhering, R., von (1901) p. 5.
20 On trouve lide du droit-organisme chez Jhering, R., von (1880) pp. 26-58.
21 Belleau, M.-C./Kennedy, D. (2006) p. 38.
22 Javais tent, dans un prcdent travail, de montrer cette formalisation de la
jurisprudence, Forray, V. (2009).
23 Loin donc de dcourager, par des exigences surannes, cette jurisprudence
progressive, la doctrine ne peut
mieux faire que lappuyer, en cherchant clairer ses procds, et
imprgner davantage dun vritable esprit
scientifique ceux qui les mettent en uvre, Gny, F. (1954) Tome 2, p. 229.
227
----------------------- Page 267-----------------------
Vincent Forray
la mission du juge afin quadvienne le droit adapt au but24. En matire

contractuelle, on
sollicite les clauses gnrales afin daugmenter le pouvoir du juge sur le
contrat25; on fab-
rique de nouveaux objets thoriques (le contrat dadhsion, labus de droit) qui
impliquent
la possibilit dintervention du juge.
Les traditions civilistes et le common law convergent dans cette ouverture
judiciaire
du droit. La proximit intellectuelle des juristes continentaux du social et de
ceux qui,
aux USA, sont dsigns comme des ralistes permet de comprendre pourquoi Duncan
Kennedy parle dune deuxime globalisation juridique propos du social. Cette
proximit
intellectuelle tient la posture critique du moment. Comme le dit Kennedy,
Demogue,
Heck, Holmes, Hohfeld et Llewellyn sont anti-formalistes.
Cest de cet anti-formalisme quil faut repartir. En Europe, on
peut prfrer parler
danti-conceptualisme afin de se souvenir de ce que la critique se dveloppe contre
le pan-
dectisme. Nanmoins, cest bien une forme du raisonnement qui est vise: la
dduction,
ou tous les procds logiques qui donnent penser quil y a des conclusions
invitables
en droit. Gny indique que si lon prtend dcouvrir, par la seule logique, la
solution [au
problme dune situation juridique] qui sen dgagerait, en vue dune adaptation
positive
la vie, on est manifestement dupe dune grossire illusion26. Pour Holmes,
lide na-
turelle selon laquelle la logique est la seule force luvre dans la cration du
droit est
fallacieuse. Elle conduit les juristes, et les juges eux-mmes, se mprendre
sur lacte de
juger. En particulier, elle oblitre ce qui a toujours lieu, savoir la pese des
considrations
de lavantage social. Les fondements de la dcision sont alors mis hors de porte,
et sont
mme souvent inconscients. Le discours judiciaire, demeure inarticul27.
Le raisonnement logique se voit reprocher la rduction quil opre du droit.

En cela,
il est formaliste (retenant que formaliser veut dire rduire un systme de
connaissances
ses caractres formels). Holmes crit au tout dbut de The Common Lawla
citation est
archi-connue:
The life of law has not been logic: it has been experience [. . .] The law
embodies the
story of a nations development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with
as if it
contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.
Dans cette rduction formelle, la vie du droit se perd. La forme logique
recouvre la
ralit juridique. Car il y a bien un rel du droit qui est dans la socit. De ce
point de
vue, la critique (sociale) du formalisme implique une posture raliste. Les anti-
formalistes
24 Jhering cit par Demogue, R. (1911) p. 532.

25 Voy. Jamin, C. (1998) p. 48; Jamin, C. (2002).
26 Gny, F. (1954) Tome 1, p. 133.
27 I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their
duty of weighing considerations
of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often
proclaimed judicial aversion to deal
with such considerations is imply to leave the very ground and foundation of
judgments inarticulate, and
often unconscious, as I have said, Holmes, O. W. (2009) p. 15.
228
----------------------- Page 268-----------------------

problme
des contrats
europens sont ralistes comme les anti-formalistes amricains partir du moment

o
les uns et les autres considrent quil y des choses28 en droit, et pas simplement
des ides
ceci contre le droit naturel (comprendre: rationnel) et le conceptualisme. On

saperoit
que chacun est raliste selon les donnes que lui fournit sa propre tradition
juridique.
En common law, le ralisme consiste porter lattention sur la fabrication
de la dci-
sion judiciaire. On en vient penser que les juges dcident souvent sur la base de
con-
victions personnelles ou dides politiques, et quils raisonnent partir de leurs
propres
intuitions. Il nest alors pas possible de comprendre le jugement sans
porter lattention
sur ce genre de faits qui sont constitutifs de la dcision, donc du droit tel quil
est dit29. Le
droit ne rsulte donc pas de procds logiques. La promesse de le connatre en

raisonnant
rigoureusement sur ses lments formels ne peut qutre trahie. Les rgles de droit
sont
30
indissociables des individus qui les interprtent et des institutions qui les
fabriquent .
En droit civil, lgalisme oblige, le ralisme ne peut pas en demeurer la
fabrication de
la dcision. Les juristes du social saccordent sur la ncessit de faire toute sa
place au tra-
vail judiciaire dans la cration du droit, mais ils divergent sur ce qui doit
sensuivre. Faut-il
tcher de contraindre le travail judiciaire par des dispositifs scientifiques
rinvents partir
des donnes relles du droit? Ou faut-il prendre son parti de lultra-subjectivit
et alimenter
le momentan, le contingent et loscillation constitutifs du droit31? Quoiquil en
soit, le social
ne peut ignorer la structure lgaliste du droit civil, sauf adopter une approche
qui serait
proprement irraliste. Ainsi, si le progrs juridique se fait par le conflit
rciproque du lg-
islateur, des juges et des murs, un accord final doit avoir lieu. Une
dmocratie, qui est
un effort conscient pour favoriser la libert et la justice par la lgalit, na
pas le droit de se
tromper sur la valeur exacte de linstrument lgislatif 32. Celui qui crit ainsi,
Jean Cruet, un
avocat qui publie La vie du droit et limpuissance des lois en 1908, rend
parfaitement compte
de la transaction que la critique sociale doit oprer par souci de ralisme33.
Cette ncessit de transiger avec la loi explique la constitution

dun droit doctri-
nal, cest--dire dune masse dcrits universitaires au statut flottant (la
doctrine est une
autorit dit-on parfois en France) susceptible de compromettre entre la
loi, les juges
et les murs; de reprsenter, donc, la ralit du droit en train de se faire. Elle
explique
aussi la valeur accorde aux ides de conciliation des intrts, de solidarit, de
solidar-
isme34. Duncan Kennedy relve ainsi que le social est une idologie de
lharmonie. Il
28 Sur le pragmatisme judiciaire aux USA, en partant de Holmes, on peut lire

Posner, R. A. (2008) pp. 230-265.
29 Bix, B. (2009) pp. 190-191.
30 Llewellyn, K. N./Schauer, F. F. (2011) par ex. pp. 41-43; et lintroduction
Schauer pp. 6-11.
31 Sur ces divergences, voy. Jamin, C. (2010) spc. pp. 147-149.
32 Cruet, J. (1908) pp. 333-336.
33 Andr-Jean Arnaud place le livre de Cruet parmi les travaux indicatifs dune
sociologie juridique naissante
en France, Critique de la raison juridique, 1. Arnaud, A.-J. (1981).
34 L-dessus, Jamin, C. (2009) pp. 175-220.
229
----------------------- Page 269-----------------------
Vincent Forray
faut comprendre une idologie de lharmonie sociale, et non de lharmonie du droit
lui-
mme. Lordre juridique ne se dcrte pas lavance. Il se construit dans des
compromis,
des ententes qui ont lieu au jour le jour. Il se stabilise progressivement sous
linfluence des
juristes et des diverses sources du droit.
La tendance antiformaliste, antirationaliste mme, quexpriment les
juristes du
social nest alors pas contradictoire avec le dveloppement spectaculaire de la
lgislation
et de la rgulation au 20me sicle. Au contraire, le social raffole des gros
objets normatifs qui
dchirent lunit conceptuelle du droit. Les lgislations en matire de travail, de

consomma-
tion, de pratiques anticoncurrentielles, de protection sociale, ainsi que le
dveloppement
du droit public et /ou administratif ont de quoi rjouir le social.
Elles slvent contre
(les abus de) la libert contractuelle et contrebalancent lautonomie de la
volont. Elles les
compromettent dans leur vocation constituer un fondement unique du droit. Le
hros
du social (Kennedy) est bien le lgislateur. Mais un lgislateur affranchi des
reproches qui
pouvaient lui tre adresss par crainte de linterventionnisme tatique.
Dans le social en effet, lEtat ne constitue plus une menace mais un espoir.
En Europe,
le lgislateur, dgag de lambition universaliste et de la codification, peut se
livrer une
balance des intrts abstraits. La loi na plus vhiculer un projet global de
socit. Elle a
corriger, ajuster, installer lquilibre des forces sociales35. Les juristes
tcheront den rendre
en compte en parlant, par exemple, dordre public de protection36. En somme, la loi
est
autorise par la doctrine des sources du droit apparatre parcellaire, partiale,

incomplte
et mme incohrente -tout linverse dun code. Cela importe peu parce que le fait
de la l-
gislation signifie dans son ensemble que lEtat joue son rle. Il tend prserver
lquilibre
dune socit qui est tout instant soumise -du moins dans limaginaire collectif-
un
risque majeur deffritement, de fractionnement, de dlitement, danomie. . .37.
Remarquons que la lgislation projette elle-mme limage de la critique

sociale du
droit. Cest--dire un droit qui rompt avec le projet dunit conceptuelle de son
contenu
et avec la forme rationnelle laquelle il semblait vou. Le droit tire dsormais
sa valeur
de sa flexibilit (dune certaine forme dimprcision), de sa vocation tre
complt par
linterprtation (dune certaine forme dincompltude), de son pluralisme
(dune cer-
taine forme de dsordre). La rorganisation des sources du droit importe moins que
la
conception dun modle juridique capable dvoluer systmatiquement dans
les formes
35 [. . .] le fait majeur en notre matire, cest bien la lgitimit acquise par

celui-ci [lEtat] dans les relations
contractuelles, non pour en garantir la bonne excution, mais pour rtablir un
certain quilibre entre les
intrts respectifs des contractants: ceux du patron et de louvrier, de
lassureur et de lassur, du bailleur et
du preneur, du transporteur et de lusager, Jamin, Chr. (2009) p. 185.
36 Jean Carbonnier, le premier selon Grard Couturier, indiquedeux nappes
successives formant lordre public
conomique, Carbonnier, J. (2004) pp. 2039-2040; les propos de Couturier sont
rapports par Cumyn, M.
(2012) voy. note 31.
37 Jamin, Chr. (2009) p. 185.
230
----------------------- Page 270-----------------------

problme
des contrats
pr-existantes (pas de rvolution de type codification), de se rgnrer avec le

corps social.
Cest pourquoi tout ce qui contrarie louverture du droit, en lgislation, en
jurisprudence,
ou dans la thorie juridique, appelle la critique:
It was not just a matter of reconceptualizing, reformulating, and
then reforming
the maladaptive, ideologically individualist doctrinal substance that had
emerged in the
late-nineteenth century. The antiformalist strand in the social current
emphasized gaps,
conflicts, and ambiguities in the corpus of the positive law, and consequently the
role of the
judge, either as an abuser of deduction or as a rational lawmaker. In the United
States, stare
decisis was discredited as abuse of deduction per excellence, and layers of
socially oriented
early case law were discovered in order to multiply conflicts and open the space
for reform38.
6.4 Lintgration du social dans les projets acadmiques de droit

europen des contrats
Il ne peut pas sagir, maintenant, de prtendre prolonger ou transposer

le moment du
social. De faire comme si, entretemps, rien navait eu lieu dans la pense, lart
et les sciences,
et faire comme si lhorrible 20me sicle39 navait pas branl ce sur quoi le
social pouvait
se tenir: lEtat40, le nationalisme41, le progrs42, la morale43 . Ce serait, je
crois, saccrocher
un historicisme trs naf44 que dimaginer investir le droit europen des
contrats avec le
contenu thorique du social. Je veux dire un contenu thorique labor avec les
donnes
du moment en question. Le droit europen des contrats contient dj du
social. Plus
prcisment, il se trame avec des discours juridiques conscients du social45 .
La question sociale en droit des contrats ne se pose plus de la mme manire

du fait
mme que le social a eu lieu46. Un seul exemple, emblmatique: le pouvoir du juge
sur le
contrat. Il est entendu que la lgitimit du juge accrotre la densit des droits
contrac-
tuels et sa capacit imposer aux contractants des obligations imprvues
(dcouverte des
obligations dinformation47, laboration des obligations lies la norme de bonne
foi48,
38 Belleau, M.-C./Kennedy, D. (2006).

39 Lexpression est de Ricoeur, P. (1995) p. 8.
40 Sassen, S. (2009a) spc. pp. 113-270.
41 Sur les ambiguts du nationalisme du social, Kennedy D. (2006) pp. 47-50.
42 Parmi dinnombrables rfrences, on peut consulter Habermas, J. (1973, 1990);
Jonas, H. (2008); Beck, U. (2008).
43 Arendt, H./Kohn, J. et al. (2009).
44 Sur lequel on peut voir Strauss, L. (1986) spc pp. 21-43.
45 Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et al. (2009) pp. 14 f.
46 Jamin, Chr. (2009) p. 179 lexplique bien: les juristes contemporains, mme
ceux qui se rclament des ides
librales et individualistes en matire contractuelles sont tout de mme un
peu les petits-enfants du social.
47 Fabre-Magnan, M./Ghestin, J. (1992).
48 La bonne foi, Travaux de lAssociation Henri Capitant, tome XLIII, Litec,
1994; Brownsword, R.; Hird, N. J.
et al. (eds.) (1999).
231
----------------------- Page 271-----------------------
Vincent Forray
implied terms49, promissory estoppel 50. . .) ont augment par rapport un rgime
strict de
libert contractuelle. En outre, le contrle judiciaire de la conformit du contrat

aux droits
quun individu prtend tirer des textes internationaux organise la rsistance
certaines
oppressions contractualises. Le droit des droits de lhomme ou des droits
fondamentaux
de la personne est invitable51.
Ainsi, la fabrication du droit europen des contrats sopre au sein dune

mosaque de
rgles / rules inspires des tendances la protection des droits fondamentaux, au
libra-
lisme et au socialisme juridiques. Les politiques du droit des contrats ont dj
tabli des
limites ce que lon peut faire en la matire52. Ces limites demeurent floues,
elles entrent
parfois en contradiction et se dplacent. Leur dessin suppose une interprtation

perma-
nente. Mais elles constituent un fait que le droit qui vient na pas
dautre choix que de
considrer.
Dveloppons un tout petit peu lide. Ce que les droits nationaux nont pu
ignorer, bon
gr, mal gr, se retrouve dans les matriaux du droit europen en construction. Car
nous
parlons bien ici du droit europen du futur, celui dont on peut penser quil vient,
tel que
lindique notamment le groupe EuSoCo53: le droit europen harmonis. Celui qui,
visant
son propre achvement en une forme juridique, quelle quelle puisse tre (un code,
des
principes, un cadre de rfrence, une bote outil ou un dictionnaire), marquera
le dbut
dune nouvelle re du droit europen. Ce droit-l est encore en train de se faire
-quoique
certains crits soient finis et que les collections douvrages aient t cres
dans la mesure
o les textes ne peuvent pas revendiquer la clture du moment prparatoire du droit
qui
vient. Il faudra -il faudrait- un acte fondateur54.
49 Collins, H. (1993) pp. 224-231; Atiyah, P. S. (1995) aux pp. 201-206; voy.
aussi Campbell, D./Collins, H.
(2003).
50 Smith, S. A. (2004); voy. aussi Robert A. Hillman qui montre que la vivacit
de promissory estoppel en droit
amricain doit se comprendre laune de ce quil sagit bien dun mcanisme
dajustement des droits protgs
en droit contractuel et pas un dispositif annonant leffondrement de la
conception dominante du contrat,
Hillman, R. A. (1998).
51 Sur le theme, Mak, C. (2008).
52 Cest pourquoi il est rappel chacun lexistence de principes directeurs:
libert, scurit, loyaut contrac-
tuelles, Fauvarque-Cosson, B./Mazeaud, D. (2008).
53 Dclaration du groupe EuSoCo.
54 Lquivalent de la loi franaise du 21 mars 1804 contenant la runion des
lois civiles en un seul corps de lois,
sous le titre de code civil des Franais et qui disposait dans un article 7:
compter du jour o ces lois sont
excutoires, les lois romaines, les ordonnances, les coutumes gnrales ou
locales, les statuts, les rglements,
cessent davoir force de loi gnrale ou particulire dans les matires qui
sont lobjet desdites lois composant
le prsent code; ou de cet acte par lequel Justinien a donn en 533 force de
loi aux compilations quil avait
ordonnes et quon a ensuite appeles Corpus Juris Civilis.
232
----------------------- Page 272-----------------------

problme
des contrats
Dans le moment de sa composition, ce droit europen a des obligations vis--

vis des
droits nationaux. Je ne songe pas au principe de subsidiarit55. Les savants
engags dans
lbauche (drat ) du droit europen harmonis des contrats ny sont pas astreints.
Je songe
aux obligations quimplique le travail acadmique dcriture56, mme dans sa
dimension
la plus prospective. Un tel travail impose une reprsentation des donnes

positives du
droit57. Llaboration scientifique du droit tel quil devrait tre requiert la
projection du
droit tel quil est. Elle mobilise un effort pralable de description des systmes
positifs qui
est le propre de lactivit doctrinale58. Dans le courant de cet effort, toutes les
tendances du
droit des contrats doivent figurer, sans quoi le travail ne serait pas srieux.
En outre, le seul fait dutiliser les catgories et modes dexpression du
droit familiers
aux juristes emporte rception des ambiguts politiques, conomiques et
philosophiques
sous-jacentes. Le maniement des mots du droit (des contrats) cause un invitable
flotte-
ment du discours juridique59. Les juristes du social avaient su, en leur temps,
utiliser un
tel flottement.
La configuration chelles multiples dun discours juridique
transnational tel que
celui du droit europen accentue trs certainement le phnomne. Par configuration
chelles multiples, je veux dire que le discours dharmonisation du droit europen

des
contrats doit pouvoir fonctionner diffrents niveaux de juridiction ou
diffrents niveaux
normatifs: au niveau des instances infra-tatiques, tatiques, extra-tatiques60.
Dans ce dis-
cours, les mots du droit rfrent un ensemble infini de textes juridiques

pralables; ils
annoncent une pluralit possible deffets de droit propos desquels on spcule en
variant
linteprtation61. Cest ainsi que le sens social du matriau juridique peut
(r)apparatre.
55 Pour mmoire, larticle 5 du Trait sur lUnion Europenne dispose

que: Le principe dattribution rgit
la dlimitation des comptences de lUnion. Les principes de subsidiarit et
de proportionnalit rgissent
lexercice de ces comptences [. . .] 3. En vertu du principe de subsidiarit,
dans les domaines qui ne relvent
pas de sa comptence exclusive, lUnion intervient seulement si, et dans la
mesure o, les objectifs de laction
envisage ne peuvent pas tre atteints de manire suffisante par les tats
membres, tant au niveau central
quau niveau rgional et local, mais peuvent ltre mieux, en raison des
dimensions ou des effets de laction
envisage, au niveau de lUnion. Les institutions de lUnion appliquent le
principe de subsidiarit confor-
mment au protocole sur lapplication des principes de subsidiarit et de
proportionnalit. Les parlements
nationaux veillent au respect du principe de subsidiarit conformment la
procdure prvue dans ce pro-
tocole. 4. En vertu du principe de proportionnalit, le contenu et la forme de
laction de lUnion nexcdent
pas ce qui est ncessaire pour atteindre les objectifs des traits. Les
institutions de lUnion appliquent le
principe de proportionnalit conformment au protocole sur lapplication des
principes de subsidiarit et de
proportionnalit.
56 Je me permets de renvoyer lun de mes textes sur cette question, Forray, V.
(2012).
57 Lexpression est celle de Jacques Ghestin dsignant ce quil appelle les
guides utiles dans la recherche de la
solution juste et, surtout, fruit du travail dit doctrinal, Ghestin, J.
(2002).
58 Voy. ce qucrit Antoine Jeammaud propos de lactivit quil nomme
dogmatico-doctrinale dans
Jeammaud, A. (2010).
59 Atias, C. (2002) pp. 84-86.
60 Largument des chelles multiples est emprunt Sassen, S. (2009b) pp. 17-
47.
61 Hesselink, M. W. (2008) pp. 43-45.
233
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Vincent Forray
Il y a, retenue dans le sein de lentreprise de formalisation du droit

europen des con-
trats, lambivalence du droit. Il faut y insister: lambivalence est plus
remarquable quailleurs
en droit des contrats (des obligations). Parce que ce droit-l est droit en mme
temps quil
est grammaire juridique; quil se prsente comme lieu dexercice de la technique
juridique
et de la science du droit.
En outre, pour que lharmonisation du droit des contrats en Europe soit
simplement
possible, cest une gigantesque transaction quil faut mener son terme. Des
dizaines et
des dizaines de scholars, des groupes et des regroupements de groupes acadmiques,
des
groupes de pression aussi, des milliers de pages de travaux compromettent sur des
disposi-
tifs techniques en usage depuis des dizaines de sicles sur le sol europen. Je ne
crois pas
quune telle entreprise puisse tre vue comme une opration de promotion dune
politique
juridique unique.
En mme temps, le contenu de la transaction se dmarque du contenu des droits
qui
en fournissent la matire. Il faut choisir (cause / consideration / simple
promesse; porte
de lexigence de bonne foi; sanction de la rupture des pourparlers), tablir des
hirarchies
(entre protection de la promesse et de la confiance lgitime, entre rgles et
standards, entre
stabilit et justice contractuelle) et dterminer des modles (contrat-promesse,
contrat-
change, contrat relationnel). A chacune de ces oprations, le droit europen
sloigne ou
se rapproche de telle ou telle tradition nationale. Tout en sachant quil nest pas
vident
dassigner au droit dun pays telle ou telle orientation sans se mprendre sur les
change-
ments qui lagitent. Je prendrai encore lexemple franais. La lgislation
spcifique du
contrat de travail indique, sous un certain angle, la proccupation du droit priv
pour la
question sociale. La rigidit du droit civil des contrats sur la question de la
rvision pour
imprvision montre, quant elle, que persiste lattachement une conception de la
force
obligatoire juge impermable certaines considrations sociales. Selon le point
de vue, le
droit europen prolonge ou limite les traditions nationales qui, selon le point de
vue, sont
plus ou moins sensibles au social. Quoiquil en soit, la construction scientifique
du droit
europen, partir du moment o elle opre des choix, implique de juger les
traditions
nationales. Ainsi, le droit europen des contrats est dj une entreprise
critique. Ce qui
amne poser plus profondment le problme soulev par la construction dune
critique
sociale du droit europen.
6.5 Le problme du projet critique du droit europen
Ce problme tient une double difficult. Premirement, comme nous venons de le

voir,
le droit europen des contrats contient invitablement une dimension sociale. Peut-
tre
juge-t-on quelle nest pas assez marque, ou encore quelle devrait tre annonce
explic -
itement. Cest alors un ajustement de la politique du droit europen des contrats
que lon
234
----------------------- Page 274-----------------------

problme
contrats
rclame. Il sagit de (re)faire la loi. Ou dexprimer une dissidence en empruntant

les termes
et la forme de lobjet en question.
Deuximement, rien ne permet daffirmer que la transaction entre les systmes
na-
tionaux en train soprer par le travail acadmique pourrait tre mieux faite. Ne
serait-ce
que parce quelle a lieu. Peut-tre juge-t-on quelle devrait avoir lieu autrement,
cest--dire,
tout dabord, ne pas avoir lieu. Dans ce cas, le geste mme de construction du
droit euro-
pen des contrats est mis en cause. Une telle attitude sexpose demeurer trs
ambigu.
Critique dans son intention, elle pourrait rejoindre une sorte de consensus
europen anti-
europen: elle entendrait maintenir un certain niveau de social, par rfrence un
systme
idalise depuis une fraction ou une synthse des lgislations nationales.
En somme, le projet de critique sociale se trouverait confront une
alternative. Ou
bien la critique emprunterait une structure identique au droit quelle vise: un
ensemble de
propositions normatives oprant une transaction entre les droits nationaux; une
transac-
tion politiquement oriente et labore par des groupes de scholars sous-
reprsents au
sein des instances en charge du projet scientifique dharmonisation. Ou bien la
critique,
prescrivant un niveau de social au moyen dun ensemble de rfrence qui ne peut
tre que
constitu partir des droits nationaux, ne saurait se maintenir au niveau
europen.
Ceci ne veut pas dire quune telle mise en cause ne devrait pas avoir lieu.
En particu-
lier, la conceptualisation de contre-propositions acadmiques est ncessaire.
Notons sim-
plement que les mthodes et les objectifs des universitaires engags dans une telle
cause
pourraient ne pas diffrer de ceux des universitaires engags dans lharmonisation
scien-
tifique mainstream. Et pourraient encourir des reproches de forme similaire. Je
rpte que
je nentends pas discuter le positionnement politique que les juristes
universitaires peuvent
adopter, explicitement ou non, sur lharmonisation du droit des contrats en Europe.
Il ne
sagit pas dorganiser la police du discours juridique. Mais plutt den saisir les
limites.
A cet gard, les convergences formelles entre la critique et lobjet de la
critique me
semblent parfaitement normales partir du moment o il sagit de peser sur le
proces-
sus dharmonisation du droit des contrats. De formuler donc des contre-
propositions.
Une contre-proposition na de chance demporter ladhsion que si elle est
comparable
la proposition initiale. Quelle rpond et invite son tour au dialogue. Et pour
que celui-
ci ait lieu, les forces en prsence devraient tendre squilibrer. Il y a en jeu
une question
de poids politique avec tout ce que cela comporte en termes de structures, de
lgitimit,
62
dinstitutionnalisation .
Pour le dire plus concrtement, lharmonisation du droit europen
des contrats
ne constitue pas un objet dtude comme les autres. Elle attire celui
qui lobserve dans
62 [. . .] en contrepoint du regret, nous formulons un souhait: la cration dun

Institut du Droit Europen. Un
rve de convergence de matire grise juridique, en bibliothques, en centres de
recherche, Prieto, C. (2003).
235
----------------------- Page 275-----------------------
Vincent Forray
lentreprise dharmonisation. Les textes des Principes Europen de Droit

du Contrat,
lAvant-projet de Code Europen, le DCFR demandent tre jugs. Au plan
acadmique,
ils nont mme pas dautre fonction. Les tudier, cest les apprcier et -que faire
dautre pour
63
un universitaire?- en imagier les modifications, les amendements, les complments
.
Un tel travail men par un juriste isol na gure de chance dinfluencer de
manire spec-
taculaire les textes en question. Et cela quelle que soit la pertinence
scientifique de son propos.
Parce quau bout du compte, sagissant doffrir un patron lgislatif, le choix
politique de tel ou
tel contenu est dterminant. Pour atteindre son objectif de participation
lharmonisation
du droit europen des contrats, le propos scientifique doit tre relay
-transform, en fait- par
une instance dont la voix est susceptible dtre entendue par ceux qui dcident.
Cest pour-
quoi les universitaires, experts du domaine contractuel, sassemblent64, dans des
groupes
susceptibles de peser dans lentreprise65. Il sagit de faire masse pour gagner de
la puissance,
cest--dire un poids politique. Le geste critique se perd dans cette prise de

poids politique.
Or, il na pas, ce moment l, puis toute son utilit. Il faut le
prolonger afin de r-
aliser que la constitution dune dogmatique europenne ou dun no-pandectisme66
nest
pas inluctable et ne constitue pas la seule voie qui soffre pour contribuer
faonner le
matriau juridique europen.
La question est alors de savoir si un motif critique du social peut tre
rserv, isol
de lintention sociale, savoir sa vise politique. Il ne sagit pas de prtendre
que ce motif
critique serait politiquement neutre. Il aura invitablement une dimension
politique La
question porte sur la possibilit de reprer, dans le travail des juristes du
social, un motif
distinct de la politique du moment du social. De dterminer ce qui se laisse
rapproprier.
6.6 Le motif critique du social
Le motif est prendre ici dans la diversit de ses sens. Aussi bien comme
llment qui
pousse agir que comme le sujet dune uvre, y compris dans sa dimension
simplement
formelle.
63 Voy. Schulze, R. (2011b) spec. la p. 8.

64 On trouve une telle ide chez Savigny. Au titre des conditions idales de la
codification, contre laquelle il
prsente alors son dernier argument, Savigny compte la doctrine comme un tout
organique (il voque, un
peu mchamment, la ncessaire fongibilit des juristes), Savigny, F. C. v.
(2006) p. 126.
65 Les textes juridiques qui se discutent en Europe ne sont adopts quau terme
dun long processus consul-
tatif. Les experts, particulirement les universitaires, y sont de plus en plus
parties prenantes. Aux cts des
autres professionnels du droit, beaucoup se mobilisent pour peser sur
llaboration des textes europens [. . .]
en ralit, ce dont souffre lexpertise franaise, ce nest pas dune absence
dexperts mais dune absence de
visibilit. Plus les comptences seront identifiables et mises en commun et
plus elles pourront tre offertes
aux instances europennes, Fauvarque-Cosson, B./Rochfeld, J. (2011).
66 Voy. ce propos Somma, A. (2009) spc. p. 57.
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problme
des contrats
Repartons de ce que les juristes du social se dfient dune certaine manire

de faire
du droit quils vont situer sur le terrain du raisonnement67. Conservons galement
lesprit
quils expriment la ncessit de lvolution du droit. Ils relient la
modification des m-
thodes de travail des juristes aux changements rels du droit. Ils donnent aussi
penser
que les rformes mthodologiques constituent le pendant ou mme
lamplificateur des
rformes lgislatives. La mthode doit tre adapte la complexit du droit; la
forme de
raisonnement des juristes doit suivre les sinuosits de la matire juridique.
La rduction rationaliste pose problme dans la mesure o elle conduit
ignorer ce qui
arrive dans le monde rel. Pour les juristes du social, on se trompe en pensant que
le droit
peut se tenir sur le trait trac depuis le concept jusqu la solution. Ce nest
pas parce quune
ide fait tenir ensemble une gamme de situations juridiques qui ont dj eu lieu
que cette
ide puise le problme du droit venir. La critique sociale sen prend, je crois,
limage rec-
tiligne du droit. Il sagit de cette linarit qui occulte les besoins de la vie
sociale.
La critique consomme ainsi la rupture qui sopre avec lentreprise politique
dunit de
la lgislation incarne par la codification. Notons quune telle entreprise est une
dclinai-
son normative de lidal dunification conceptuelle du droit. Or les lois spciales
dvelop-
pes la fin du 19me sicle et premire moiti du 20me signalent une forme
dadaptation
du droit la ralit et le dcrochent de labstraction du droit civil. La

lgislation en matire
de travail fournit un bon exemple68.
Au plan doctrinal, les juristes du social ont travaill

llaboration dinstruments
thoriques en rupture avec la logique dominante69. Ils ont aussi plaid la
reconfiguration
de linterprtation70. Oprons la transposition lpoque contemporaine.
En lgislation, la rupture avec lidal dunit du droit a perdur. Un seul

exemple: le
droit de la consommation peut jouer le mme rle que celui jou par le droit du
travail
un sicle plus tt. Il constitue un droit spcial, en rupture avec le droit civil
ou commun71.
Il intervient dans un champ conomique crucial pour le fonctionnement de la

socit. Il
vise introduire un quilibre des droits entre les acteurs quil concerne, le plus
souvent au
bnfice de la partie juge la plus faible. Il prsente alors spontanment des
dispositions
67 Voy. encore ce qucrivent Marie-Claire Belleau et Duncan Kennedy propos des

Notions fondamentales du
droit priv de Ren Demogue comme constituant ltude critique la plus
exhaustive de labus de dduction
dans le vaste domaine du droit priv, Belleau, M.-C./Kennedy, D. (2006) p.
171 pour la citation.
68 Quelques exemples en France: en 1884, les associations professionnelles
ouvrires et patronales (les syn-
dicats) sont lgalises -cest la loi Waldeck-Rousseau-; en 1898, la loi sur
les accidents du travail tablit le
principe de la responsabilit patronale; en 1909, une loi garantit le maintient
de leur emploi aux femmes en
couche et une autre garantit aux ouvriers et aux employs le versement du
salaire intervalles rguliers; en
1910, la loi institue un code du travail. . .
69 Sur le dveloppement de labus de droit, notamment chez Josserand, comme
thorie critique des droits
subjectifs et de la lgislation ordinaire, Moyse, P.-E. (2012).
70 Sagissant des juristes allemands, il faut de nouveau mentionner la
jurisprudence des intrts (en particulier
les travaux de Philippe Heck) et lEcole du droit libre; voy. Gogos, D. (1957).
71 Voy. Ayns, L. (impr. 2010); Moore, B. (2007).
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Vincent Forray
pour une pense critique72. Celle-ci contribue discuter le fonctionnement du

droit com-
mun des contrats.

Ce dernier est, par ailleurs, questionn. Il apparat que
lalignement du rgime
des obligations contractuelles avec le principe de leur formation par change des
con-
sentements ne garantit pas les individus contre les iniquits. On juge que
lintensit de
lobligation contractuelle ne devrait pas seulement se rgler en fonction de la
constitution
du contrat. Un contrat peut tre constitu conformment aux prescriptions du
concept
et cependant organiser loppression de lindividu73. En ltat actuel, le droit des
contrats
ne peut plus tre considr comme un droit de lengagement contractuel mais aussi
-et
simultanment- comme un droit du dsengagement contractuel74. Il me semble quun
trait caractristique de la critique sociale est son inscription contre-courant

du sens a
priori du droit.
De manire un peu plus labore, je dirais que le motif critique du social
consiste en
un doute lgard de toute entreprise de rduction du droit. Il faut se dfaire
dun rflexe
rductionniste qui pse trop lourdement sur le travail juridique.
Dans la rduction se trouve lide arithmtique de simplification: une
situation ju-
ridique complexe peut tre dcompose en lment simples. Le droit des
contrats est
familier de cette ide depuis quun concept philosophique de contrat
sest impos la
pense juridique: le contrat est un change de promesses. Ainsi, selon les
traditions, il se
dcompose en consentement, objet, cause ou en promesses changes et
consideration.
Bref, de manire gnrale, contrat = lments subjectifs + lments objectifs. Le
droit des
contrats peut partir du concept et slever par constructions juridiques. Il se
compose de
blocs normatifs (formation contenu excution) lis logiquement les uns aux
autres75.
Le concept de contrat -qui est ici le concept de promesse- fournit une ratio au
droit des
contrats: assurer la force obligatoire de ce qui a t promis.
Dans la rduction se trouve aussi lide (chirurgicale) de retour la
situation normale.
On rduit une fracture afin de ramener los sa position anatomique initiale. La
rduction
du droit prsuppose une forme normale du droit, anatomique du droit, cest--dire
une
structure fondamentale du corps juridique. La rduction du droit vise donner au
droit
la forme quil doit avoir.
72 Parmi de nombreux travaux, on peut citer ici ceux de Thierry Bourgoignie qui a
dvelopp assez tt en
Europe une approche critique partir du droit de la consommation. Voy. spc.,
Bourgoignie, T. (1988); voy.
aussi Bourgoignie, T. (2006).
73 La pense juridique peut se nourrir dun courant de pense critique
du contractualisme aliment par
dautres disciplines qui utilisent elles-mmes les solutions en matire de
droit des contrats. Par ex. Pateman,
C./Nordmann, C. et al. (2010).
74 Rappr. Farnsworth, E. A. (2000).
75 Lide selon laquelle loutil de lapprentissage et du traitement du droit du
contrat tait une thorie gnrale
a donc pu perdurer; voy. Savaux, E. (1997); Pimont, S. (2009).
238
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problme
des contrats
Le droit europen des contrats que visent les projets acadmiques sollicite
ces deux aspects
de la rduction76. Il sagit dabord de rationaliser la matire juridique quon
peut extraire des
traditions juridiques europennes. Il sagit ensuite dordonner cette matire dans

un texte pre-
nant une forme canonique du droit crit . Il sagit en somme de normaliser la
matire juridique
lissue de la collecte des matriaux pertinents. Nous sommes au cur dune vaste
opration
dharmonisation. Afin de souligner les traits spcifiques de cette opration,
jutiliserai la com-
paraison opre par Robert Leckey entre harmonisation juridique et harmonisation
musicale77.
Lauteur indique une diffrence importante entre ces deux types

dharmonisation, dans
le contexte du droit canadien. Lharmonisation juridique entre le droit fdral et
le droit
provincial procderait dune approche par le haut. Lharmonisation musicale
procderait
quant elle dune approche par le bas qui mobilise une logique de lintgration
plus que
de la diffrenciation. Selon Robert Leckey, les juristes devraient
profiter de lutilisation
courante de la mtaphore musicale pour rviser leurs pratiques de lharmonisation.
En Europe, lentreprise acadmique de construction du droit des contrats peut
tre
saisie par lharmonisation musicale. Celle-ci regroupe un ensemble de rgles qui
dfinis-
sent la structure des accords en partant du principe de la tonalit et dterminent
leurs
enchanements dans le temps78. Lharmonisation introduit de lordre dans
la matire.
Cest une opration de la raison. Elle est en mme temps une opration cratrice79.
Robert
Leckey insiste sur la contingence de la norme que lon suit pour harmoniser: En
mu-
sique, les rgles ne jouissent daucune force contraignante et aucune instance
nassure leur
mise en uvre. Au contraire, la mthode par laquelle elles sont modifies est la
dsob-
issance soutenue. Que lharmonie soit dfinie comme la conception densemble qui,
une poque ou dans un style donns, conditionne la manire de sexprimer en

musique
affaiblit davantage la connotation de rgle80. Ainsi, lharmonisation est
une technique
dintgration des diffrences et de gestion des dissonances. Il ny a pas de vrit

des rgles
dharmonisation. La manire de faire se tenir ensemble les donnes de
lharmonisation
peut varier. Car lharmonie comprend un mlange de culture et desthtique81. Ce
qui
nous renvoie prcisment au processus dharmonisation du droit europen des

contrats.
76 Le thme de lharmonisation a t beaucoup tudi. Sagissant du droit

europen, voy. par ex. Vogenauer, S.;
Weatherill, S. (eds.) (2006); Jamin, C.; Mazeaud, D. (eds.) (2003); Nadaud, S.
(2008) spc. pp. 52-59.
77 Leckey, R. (2010).
78 Weber, E./Gut, S. et al. (1992), s.v.harmonie, p. 340, cit par Leckey, R.
(2010) p. 15.
79 Lharmonie est venue avec le dveloppement de la civilisation occidentale,
avec le dveloppement de lesprit
humain. Les personnes qui nient le progrs, qui croient la supriorit du
monde antique sur le monde
moderne, peuvent nier limportance de lharmonie dans la musique et sattacher
exclusivement la mlodie.
Les autres, si elles veulent tre logiques, reconnatront quavant la
naissance de lharmonie, la musique
tait en quelque sorte rudimentaire et que ses principaux organes lui
faisaient dfaut. Le dveloppement
de lharmonie marque une nouvelle tape dans la marche de lhumanit
[. . .] Les belles mlodies et les
belles harmonies sont galement le produit de linspiration; mais qui ne voit
quil faut un cerveau bien plus
puissamment organis pour imaginer les belles harmonies?, Saint-Sans, C.
(1885) pp. 14-15.
80 Leckey, R. (2010) p. 17.
81 Leckey, R. (2010) p. 16.
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Vincent Forray
La composition des corpus de droit europen des contrats par des experts et
des sa-
vants comporte, en premier lieu, une dimension culturelle. Il ne sagit pas
uniquement de
noter que les juristes participent la construction dun objet culturel82. Mais
de souligner
leur appartenance une communaut. Une communaut scientifique. Les juristes

parta-
gent une connaissance du phnomne contractuel et des rgles qui sy rapportent.
Ils se
tiennent donc dans une relation vis--vis du droit des contrats en Europe qui les
distingue
du reste du monde. Dans cette distinction est le principe de la culture83.
Cette dimension culturelle de lharmonisation permet de comprendre

pourquoi un
droit commun des contrats est possible penser84. Ceux qui partagent un savoir
ont quelque
chose en commun qui peut tre montr dans un texte. Celui-ci indiquerait ce qui
est dj
l, prsent dans la diversit des droits nationaux: des lments juridiques
transcendants. Ce
quon appelle parfois le droit savant ou le jus commune . Celui-ci dispose dun
potentiel lg-
islatif considrable. Le droit europen des contrats serait la consquence dun
savoir com-
mun aux juristes europens. Il peut revendiquer, alors, dtre le fruit dune
culture -dune
communaut- europenne. Dans cette perspective, lharmonisation du droit des
contrats
ne consiste pas, proprement parler, formuler des propositions de rgles -
faire du droit
prospectif- mais rvler, par lexpertise, les rgles communes telles quelles
existent dj.
Il sagit darranger le droit des contrats comme on arrange un morceau de
musique,
cest--dire de faon le mettre la porte dun instrument pour lequel il na
pas t crit. Le
droit crit pour les systmes nationaux est mis porte de la future lgislation
europenne.
Cest dans la culture commune -le savoir des juristes- quon trouve les moyens de
cette
mise la porte. Les PEDC, lAvant-projet de Code Europen, le DCFR
reprsentent des
systmes de rfrences culturelles.
De cette manire, lharmonisation savante pallie efficacement le problme de
la ca-
pacit et de la lgitimit politiques des instances officielles de lUnion
Europenne. Si on
assume sa dimension culturelle, lharmonisation apparat inexpugnable.
En second lieu, la dimension esthtique de lentreprise dharmonisation est
cruciale
pour comprendre la rduction quelle opre. Lesthtique rfre ici la forme que
prend le
droit europen des contrats dans le travail des juristes universitaires.
Il y a dabord une forme ramasse, compacte, massive du droit en question (le
Drat
for a Common Frame of Reference compte presque 4800 pages). Ce qui procde de la
con-
traction dune norme quantit dinformations collectes dans les
traditions europe-
85
nnes . En considrant un tel travail, le lecteur est saisi par des sentiments
qui augmentent
82 Sur le droit comme phnomne culturel, voy. Carbonnier, J. (2004) pp. 47-52.
83 Sur ce point, Arendt, H. (1992) pp. 271-288.
84 Voy. Prieto, C. (2003).
85 Voy. par exemples les commentaires et les notes sous larticle II.3:301:
Negotiations contrary to good faith
and fair dealing, pp. 271-278.
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problme
des contrats
limportance du travail en question; ladmiration est une motion esthtique. On

pressent
ce quil a fallu faire pour en arriver aux textes: relever les rgularits et les
symtries, dis-
cerner les lois auxquelles se conforment des solutions qui se montrent dans leurs
contra-
dictions et, finalement, tablir lharmonie qui accorde les lments essentiels du
droit des
86
contrats selon leurs diffrences ncessaires .
Il y a ensuite une composition soucieuse dintgrer elle lensemble des
procds de
fixation du droit par lcrit. Les corpus de droit europen des contrats innovent
par leur
dimension et leur amplitude mais demeurent fidles aux traditions juridiques
textuelles
du continent. Ils recourent aux formes canoniques du droit. Pour sen tenir au
DCFR, les
rgles-modles figurent la loi; les dfinitions tiennent du code juridique; les
principes rap-
pellent la fois les dclarations des droits, les textes constitutionnels et la
jurisprudence.
A cela sajoute lutilisation des procds formels de la science du droit: les
commentaires
et les notes. Le tout provoque le sentiment dtre en prsence dun bel ouvrage
juridique.
Irrprochable en la forme.
Il y a enfin lattention porte la construction de louvrage et la forme
de lexpression.
In the preparation of the DCFR every attempt was made not only to achieve a clear
and
coherent structure, but also a plain and clear wording87. Le texte
devrait prsenter cer-
taines qualits formelles qui sont aussi celles quon attend dune bonne
lgislation: clart,
cohrence, prcision du vocabulaire, efficacit du style. Plus le texte doctrinal
ressemble
au droit quil vise, plus il est proche dincarner le droit en question.
Nous avons l un effet dterminant de la construction formelle du droit
europen des
contrats dans les textes acadmiques. Ces derniers jouent une bonne partie de leur
avenir
sur une esthtique de la similarit. Leur composition doit prsenter au lecteur une
image
vraisemblable du droit europen des contrats. Cest--dire une image qui ne devrait
dstabi-
liser ni la connaissance que ce lecteur possde en droit des contrats, ni les
projections quil
peut faire partir de cette connaissance. Cest pourquoi les textes acadmiques
sajustent aux
autres textes acadmiques afin quadvienne cette image stabilise du futur droit
des contrats88.
Cette approche de lopration dharmonisation par le biais de la

mtaphore musi-
cale permet den considrer les effets propres. Et de concevoir que
lharmonisation du
droit europen des contrats relve dune activit crative. Elle consiste rduire
les ques-
tions, les concepts, les rgles et les solutions dans une forme juridique qui peut
tre perue
comme un ouvrage dart89. Parce quelle est lie une culture -le savoir des
juristes qui
86 Le vocabulaire utilis est celui de Hegel, G. W. F./Bnard, C. (1997) pp. 202-

213.
87 DCFR, p. 25.
88 Le DCFR prend en compte un certain nombre de travaux qui visent les textes
acadmiques de lharmonisation
du droit europen des contrats, parfois ceux qui ont servi de base au DCFR, pp.
26-30.
89 On songe encore Hegel:lart, en vertu de son concept mme, na pas dautre
destination que celle de mani-
fester, sous une forme sensible et adquate, le contenu qui constitue le fond
des choses, Hegel, G. W. F./
Bnard, C. (1997) p. 748.
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Vincent Forray
la confectionnent- et dispose de certaines qualits esthtiques. Elle cherche

susciter le
sentiment du droit.
Faire du droit europen des contrats entraine les protagonistes dans une
reprsenta-
tion artistique des savoirs juridiques. La prise de conscience dune telle activit
peut offrir
de renouveler le motif critique du social et, ainsi, dengager une alternative la
formalisa-
tion du droit europen des contrats telle quelle se prsente lheure actuelle.
6.7 Rengager la critique sociale?
Nous avons vu que le problme principal de la critique en droit europen des

contrats con-
sistait, paradoxalement, en sa propre politisation. Ce qui entraine deux risques.
Dabord
celui de dcrocher du plan europen pour se replier vers lintrieur des traditions
natio-
nales. Ensuite de se condamner faire dpendre la pertinence de la critique de son
poids
politique, cest--dire, en fin de compte, de programmer en permanence
ltouffement du
projet critique.
Ce problme me semble insoluble partir du moment o lobjet de la critique
est le
droit europen des contrats lui-mme. Plus exactement tant quil
napparat pas que le
droit europen des contrats signifie deux choses.
Premirement, des orientations quant ce quon peut appeler le contenu
normatif du
droit: des options techniques, des choix de politique lgislative, des solutions.
Tout cela
tabli au moyen de principes, de dfinitions, de rgles-modles; tout ce que
contiennent
les projets consigns dans des livres.
Deuximement, le rsultat dune activit crative appele harmonisation: un
ouvrage
dart. Celui-ci exprime un tat contemporain du droit des contrats au moyen dun
enrich-
issement des concepts et des rgles en vigueur eu Europe. Il constitue
un corps de droit
europen.
Il y a donc le droit europen des contrats et luvre droit europen des
contrats,
simultanment. Le premier se prsente nous comme un ensemble juridique accompli.
A ce titre, il peut revendiquer une certaine force normative. Celle-ci lui vient de
ce quil
a de commun aux juristes -aussi bien de partag que dhabituel-; de coutumier en
un
sens90. En cela, le droit europen des contrats accompli par les savants a quelque
chose
dintouchable. Sauf en recommander la destruction. Et si tel nest pas le cas, il

faut se
rsoudre contribuer son enrichissement.
On en viendra pouser sa rationalit, adopter son langage pour introduire
en son
sein, par exemple, davantage de dispositions socialement orientes. Le droit
europen des
90 Louis Assier-Andrieu relve que la coutume offre ainsi une conceptualisation

de lhabitude, connue des
juristes comme une gense de lobligatoire [citant ici Jean Carbonnier],
Assier-Andrieu, L. (2003).
242
----------------------- Page 282-----------------------

problme
contrats
contrats dont nous parlons est dj fait . Toute intervention critique sur cet
objet-l risque
de se borner le contrefaire.
Louvrage, luvre, droit europen des contrats peut en revanche tre
expose la
critique sans que celle-ci se borne tre un prlude des contre-propositions.
Lobjet de
la critique nest alors plus le droit europen des contrats, mais lharmonisation
du droit
europen des contrats. Non plus ce qui est fait en droit europen des contrats,
mais le fait
de faire du droit europen des contrats.
Cest le geste de composition du droit europen des contrats quil faut
saisir. Pour en
interroger la mthodologie, les prsupposs, les significations implicites et
les contenus
obscurs91. Pour donner voir ce qui se passe rellement en droit europen des
contrats.
Montrer celui-ci dans sa forme initiale, cest--dire, littralement, le dfaire.

Il reste une difficult: si la critique ne vise pas les contenus juridiques,
quel est son
objet?
Luvre, dans sa matrialit, donne un corps lharmonisation du droit des
contrats.
Voil donc ce quil sagit apprhender: le travail juridique en tant quuvre. A
savoir un
texte92 dont lcriture par les scholars constitue lacte le plus concret de
lharmonisation du
droit europen des contrats. Un texte tudier en tant que texte, la manire
dont opre
une critique dart. Cest--dire dans le respect le plus scrupuleux de luvre la
critique
naffecte pas son objet quelle nen finit pas de rvler (il arrive que lauteur
en soit affect;
mais lauteur nest pas luvre93).
En mme temps, la critique travaille de faon dvoiler la composition, les

ressorts,
la gnalogie, les stratgies, les conditions de production de luvre. Elle est
alors sus-
ceptible de causer une dstabilisation, non pas de luvre qui demeure inchange,
mais
de la perception quon a de luvre. Elle produit donc son tour quelque chose -un
texte-
dintimement li luvre et qui sen distingue pourtant radicalement. En effet,
le texte
produit par la critique du texte qui harmonise le droit europen des contrats ne
vise pas
lui-mme lharmonisation du droit europen des contrats. Il vise donner accs
celui-
ci, comme la critique dart fournit un accs luvre. Elle cherche prsenter
luvre au
public; elle linforme (ce qui veut dire: donner une forme). La critique fournit
un sens;
elle interprte. Ce faisant, elle acquiert une trs grande importance et trouve,
dans son
principe, les moyens daction qui lui manqueraient si elle sengageait son tour
dans la
fabrication duvre dart.
Je crois que les juristes du social avaient peru cela. Cela explique
pourquoi ils nont,
le plus souvent, pas entendu plaider la modification des rgles de droit par le
lgislateur
en offrant celui-ci leur concours. Ils ont mme parfois, en France,
rejet lide dune
91 Les deux expressions sont empruntes Foucault, M. (2004).

92 Barthes, R. (1984a).
93 Barthes, R. (1984b).
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Vincent Forray
recodification du droit sont ils auraient pourtant t les artisans94. Ils ont
plutt travaill
le droit de lintrieur au moyen dobjets thoriques alternatifs: labus de

droit, le contrat
dadhsion, le risque, la jurisprudence. . .
Ceci explique aussi pourquoi ils ont tant insist sur la rvision
des mthodes
dinterprtation. Lide tait dintervenir l o les discours acadmiques
alternatifs ont le
plus de chances de produire des effets: dans les lieux de lexpression proprement
thorique
du droit. Ainsi, en France, il sest constitu, au moment du social, un espace
intellectuel
particulier partir du concept de doctrine95. On peut parler, la Bourdieu, de
champ
doctrinal96.
Les juristes universitaires disposaient ainsi dune sorte dantichambre du

droit dans
laquelle celui-ci tait retravaill, mis en forme. De la sorte, lactivit critique
pouvait se d-
ployer, sre de produire des effets rels, sans avoir emprunter une voie
politique, et sans
mme avoir srieusement soutenir que les scholars font du droit. Il sagissait,
en somme,
de produire un dcalage dans lactivit juridique thorique. De se situer entre la
fabrica-
tion officielle du droit et une activit consistant en une lecture servile ou une
paraphrase
du droit en vigueur (ce que les juristes franais ont dsign sous le nom
dexgse97).
Il me semble que chaque fois quun mouvement de la pense juridique comporte

une
dimension critique, cest que cet effort de dcalage a eu lieu. Il faut pour cela
un concept,
une structure thorique, un imaginaire. Cela a pu tre par exemple le pragmatisme
(pour
le ralisme amricain) ou le bricolage (pour les Critical Legal Studies).
Pour la critique sociale de lharmonisation du droit europen des contrats,
ce pour-
rait tre le texte. Les rfrences thoriques seraient puises ce quon a appel
le post-
structuralisme -un mouvement philosophique europen- lhermneutique et certaines
orientations du mouvement droit et littrature98. Lide est de prolonger lanalyse

du corpus
de droit europen des contrats comme uvre dart: dengager les juristes une
critique lit-
traire de lharmonisation. Une telle critique est susceptible de saisir le fait de
faire du droit
europen, cest--dire dcrire un texte. Sagissant du fait du texte, la critique
prend une
impulsion raliste et on tire ici le fil du social. Il nest pas absurde
dopposer un nouveau
type de ralisme un nouveau type de formalisme.
Lemprunt aux thories littraires permet la fois une lecture respectueuse
du texte
et une rappropriation de sa perception. Elle ne vient pas contredire le projet
europen
mais plutt laccompagner et, mme lilluminer en exposant le travail
dharmonisation. Je
94 Au Livre du centenaire du Code civil (franais), Marcel Planiol est contre une
rvision gnrale, comme
Eugne Gaudemet; Gny sexprime pour une volution de la mthode lgislative en
cas de rvision, prsenta-
tion par Halprin, J.-L. (2004).
95 Jestaz, P./Jamin, C. (2004).
96 En ce sens, Jestaz, P. (2005).
97 Bonnecase, J. (1924).
98 Voy. par ex. Binder, G./Weisberg, R. (2000).
244
----------------------- Page 284-----------------------
6 Le social et la dfaisance - introduction au problme

contrats
crois quelle surmonte, dans cet acte, son problme initial qui est son dcrochage
du plan
europen.
Je terminerai en soulignant quun geste critique de ce genre vaut aussi parce
quil ap-
partient tout le monde. Pour en demeurer dans le cadre acadmique, nous savons
que
tous les juristes ne peuvent prtendre occuper une position qui leur permet de
modifier
les textes de droit europen des contrats. En revanche, chacun a vocation la
critique qui
slve depuis un acte fondamental de transmission et dapprofondissement du
savoir. Ceci
se passe dans nos cours, dans nos articles, dans nos livres. Il est de notre
responsabilit
de rendre accessible au public la trame de ce droit europen des contrats. Et il
est alors en
notre pouvoir den organiser la critique. Nous engageons alors un processus de
dmocrati-
sation du droit. Son lieu est constitu des espaces denseignement et dcriture.
Au sein de ces espaces, des structures de dfaisance intellectuelle peuvent
tre crs.
La dfaisance est une opration qui consiste allger le bilan comptable dune
entreprise
en transfrant une partie de ses dettes une entit charge den organiser le
service au
moyen des actifs dont elle dispose. Les dettes nont pas disparu, mais leur poids
ne pse
plus sur lentreprise. Celle-ci espre poursuivre son activit en vitant de prir
touffe
par son passif. La critique sociale fonctionne raison dune dfaisance: elle
promet une
restructuration du travail juridique.
245
----------------------- Page 285-----------------------
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253
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----------------------- Page 294-----------------------
7 Life Time et contrat - Ronald Coase
(1910 - 2013) et le dtournement de
linterdisciplinarit du droit
Maurice Tancelin
Summary
The Economic Analysis of Law approach of the legal branch of the Chicago school1
was devel-
2
oped by reference to an essay written by Ronald H. Coase on The Problem of Social
Cost .
It conquered the legal world and was cited mostly just by its initials (EAL in
English, AED in
French or Italian and AR in German). It developed nearly religious belief that
markets and
profit could be used as a general goal of public interest, artificially disguised
as a quest for
3
efficiency . Efficiency is thus supposed, either to be equal to justice, or even
able to substitute
and explain what has historically been the core element of legal norms. The attempt
to put
together a European civil code on contracts (also known as the Draft Common Frame
of
Reference or DCFR) in a bid to mirror the achievements of European contract law,
has paid
tribute to this idea, putting efficiency at the same level as justice. Indeed, the
Study Group
explains: For the broader purposes of the DCFR we suggest that the underlying
principles
4
should be grouped under the headings of freedom, security, justice and efficiency
.
It is common sense that evil and good can both be done efficiently. The
emptiness of
this principle mirrors the moral indifference of an approach that has inundated
contractual
thinking since the 1960s. But it was not economics that imposed this idea onto the
law. It was
the law itself that opened its doors voluntarily. In this respect, the EAL is
closely related to
the issue of life time contracts. EAL is the legal expression of a sales economy
that since the
late 19th century has reduced the idea of law to an omnipresent sale of commodities
as indi-
vidual property. Human relations were thought of as a number of instant exchanges
on an
omnipresent market. It also tried to conquer the world of long-term relations. The
purchase
of the labour force should explain labour and services, the sale of consumer goods
replaced
1 The Chicago school of economics is a neoclassical school of economics. It was

centred at the faculty of the
University of Chicago and related to Frank Knight, Ronald Coase, George
Stigler, Milton Friedman, Robert
Fogel and Gary Becker.
2 Coase, R. H. (1960).
3 See Tancelin, M. (2013).
4 Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et al. (2009) p. 13 also cited at pp. 14, 17, 60 ff, 94
ff.
255
----------------------- Page 295-----------------------
Maurice Tancelin
consumption, and the acquisition of dwellings should represent the needs for home
and shel-
ter in the law. Labour, housing and consumption resisted owing to a strong social
movement
in the first three decades of the 20th century.
But in the 1960s the idea of a sales economy came back as Reagonomics and
Thatcher-
ism were scientifically expressed by economists of the Chicago School. Human life
time was
turned into a simple commodity. Instead of asking for its price the question was
obscured by
asking if it was efficient (or too costly) to protect pregnant women, prevent
labour accidents
in the metro construction (McKaay) or reserve parking for handicapped persons
(Miller).
Law should no longer regulate human relations but render investments profitable.
Instead,
the idea of contracts in which human relations play the core role would
reintroduce sociologi-
cal and interdisciplinary concepts into legal science as they flourished,
especially in labour
law in the early 20th century. AEL could then be reduced to what it can achieve:
organise
human relations where law and justice explicitly define goals that should be
achieved in the
form of monetary efficiency.
The following chapter sheds some light on the development of the ideas of
AEL. It shows
that it was neither the chapter itself nor the arguments that caught the legal
profession ir-
resistibly. Instead, the temporary victory of these currents, revealing much of
their impact in
the financial crisis, was due to especially non-scientific factors in the
political and economic
developments since the 1960s in the United States and the United Kingdom, which
then in-
fluenced many other countries and still do so today.
Ronald H. Coase est reconnu comme le pionnier de lAnalyse conomique du
droit (ou
AED), de lcole de Chicago. Lexamen de sa carrire apprend que cet conomiste
anglais, im-
migr aux tats Unis au moment de la vogue interdisciplinaire dans luniversit
amricaine,
est entr la Facult de droit de Chicago, trois ans aprs la parution de son
principal article.
Cet article de 1960 a t publi dans la revue dont il deviendra presquaussitt
le directeur,
jusqu sa retraite. Sa renomme acadmique est intervenue trente et un ans plus
tard avec
lattribution du Prix Nobel dconomie. Mais la question est de savoir si la
valeur scienti-
fique de cet article est la hauteur de son succs mdiatique?
La comparaison de larticle de Coase diffus sur la Toile (datant du dbut
des annes
quatre vingt dix) avec la version originale datant de 1960 rvle plusieurs
coupures impor-
tantes dans la premire. Larticle original contient des dveloppements juridiques
qui sont
soustraits la connaissance des lecteurs de la version informatique ouverte au
public sur la
Toile. Les parties supprimes sont certes dune lecture difficile pour le lecteur
non initi au
droit, mais leur soustraction lui enlve un repre essentiel pour juger de la
valeur du contenu
total de larticle.
Quant la version intgrale de larticle fondateur de LAED, il a fait
lobjet dapprciations
opposes de la part de la communaut scientifique. Leur examen amorc ici reste
complter
par les chercheurs. Les jugements ports par la doctrine vont de lacceptation la
plus totale au
rejet le plus complet. Une tude slective de la doctrine a t faite en langue
franaise par des
256
----------------------- Page 296-----------------------
7 Life Time et contrat - Ronald Coase (1910 -

2013) et le
dtournement de linterdisciplinarit
du droit
juristes partisans inconditionnels de lAED. Ltude interdisciplinaire

scientifique comportant
les bases historiques et anthropologiques de la thorie est toujours faire pour
montrer les
deux faces de la mdaille.
La prsente tude est un projet de recherche dont la problmatique est
lexamen critique
dun article considr come fondateur. Il sagit de mettre au jour la substance de
larticle de
Coase pour en examiner le bien fond au point de vue
interdisciplinaire. Coase fait une
dmonstration de linfriorit de lintervention de ltat en matire
conomique laide
darguments juridiques dnus de toute valeur scientifique, comme la
dmontr de faon
magistrale en 1996 le professeur A.W. Brian Simpson de University of Michigan Law
School.
Notre hypothse est que Coase ne dmontre rien. Il fait une lecture au
premier degr
darrts anciens de la jurisprudence anglaise et amricaine. Ces arrts nont
aucune perti-
nence juridique lre post-industrielle.
7.1 Le ddoublement du texte dorigine
Le problme du cot social est le titre de larticle que lconomiste Ronald

Coase a publi en
1960, dans la revue Journal of Law and Economics, dont il deviendra le directeur
quand il en-
trera comme professeur la Facult de droit de lUniversit de Chicago en 1963.
Loriginalit
de cet auteur tient ce ddoublement de fonctions, non prcde dune formation
ncessaire
en droit. Coase est un autodidacte au point de vue juridique. La dimension
normative de
ltude approfondie de son uvre5 reflte la prsence du droit dans les
proccupations de
Coase. Lexamen de lusage quil en fait cependant, nest gure convaincant. Il lui
manque la
vraie dimension interdisciplinaire correspondant lemploi et aux crits de
lauteur. Trente
et un ans sparent cet article du Prix Nobel dconomie qui rcompense lauteur,
en 1991.
Vingt trois ans sparent cet article de 1960 de celui crit en 1937 en
Grande-Bretagne,
6
La firme, le march et le droit dans lequel lauteur tmoigne dune sobrit
inhabituelle.
Pour mesurer le sens de ces diffrentes dates, il faut se souvenir que le
prix Nobel dconomie
a t cr en 1968. Pourquoi larticle de Coase a til t honor 22 ans aprs la
cration du Prix et
31 ans aprs sa publication? Cest peut-tre parce que le Prix a honor dabord des
conomistes
mathmaticiens (Frish, Tinbergen) pour rpondre aux multiples contestations dont
il a fait
lobjet sa cration par la Banque de Sude. Il faut en second lieu se rappeler
que lordinateur
personnel et les moteurs de recherche qui le rendent utile datent des annes 1990.
7
Lhommage que lui a rendu lEconomist loccasion de son centenaire
confirme quil
est unanimement reconnu comme le pionnier de la Nouvelle conomie
institutionnelle.
5 Bertrand, E./Hervier, A. (2003) (2010) p. 991 et s.

6 Coase, R. H. (1937) pp. 389. Article traduit en franais aprs un demi sicle,
par Gillis, X./Bourreau, M.
(1987).
7 The Economist (18.12.2010).
257
----------------------- Page 297-----------------------
Maurice Tancelin
Coase a emprunt la notion de cot de transaction aux crits de John Rogers

Commons
(1862-1945) pour son article de 1960, sans aucune mention de cet auteur, connu
comme
un aptre du capitalisme raisonnable. Lconomiste O. Williamson, qui a
dvelopp la
mme notion de cot de transaction aprs Coase, met dans son Discours de rception
du
prix Nobel en 20098 (avec pour la premire fois une femme, Elinor Ostrom) une
opinion
peu flatteuse sur larticle de 1960.

Lhypothse de recherche pose ici est la suivante: le succs tardif de Coase
est un ph-
nomne de lre informatique. Pour dmontrer son point de vue, Coase a dtourn
de
son but la mthode interdisciplinaire quil fait mine demployer dans son article
de 1960. Il
utilise le droit en faisant une lecture au premier degr dune jurisprudence
ancienne sans
rapport avec les problmes importants de son poque. Ces dveloppements
juridiques
non pertinents de son article original disparaissent presque compltement de la
version
informatique.
7.2 Lobjet des coupures
Larticle publi par le Journal of Law and Economics, en octobre 1960 a 44 pages et
com-
porte les 10 sections suivantes:
I The Problem to be Determined
II The Reciprocal Nature of the Problem
III The Pricing System with Liability for Damage
IV The Pricing System with no Liability for Damage
V The Problem Illustrated Anew (analyse 4 arrts, 5 pages)
VI The Cost of Market Transactions Taken into Account
VII The Legal Delimitation of Rights and the Economic Problem (6 pages)
VIII Pigous Treatment in The Economics of Welfare (7 pages)
IX The Pigouvian Tradition
X A Change of Approach.
En 2009, la version de larticle mise la disposition du public sur la Toile, sans

passer par
JSTOR, comportait 8 (au lieu de 10) sections, les sections V et IX ayant totalement
disparu,
ainsi que 5 pages de la section VII, soit au total une dizaine de pages dun
article 26 pages,
sur deux colonnes, dans la version intgrale originale rimprime, qui a figur
brivement
sur la Toile en 2010. la dernire vrification, le 19 octobre 2011, la version
tronque avait
repris sa place. Ce qui disparat dans la version incomplte, cest la plupart des
analyses
darrts de la jurisprudence tudie par lauteur et la quasi-totalit des notes de
bas de page.
8 Williamson, O. E. (08.12.2009) p. 158, notes 4 et 5.
258
----------------------- Page 298-----------------------

2013) et le
du droit
La rare doctrine juridique cite dans larticle de 1960 subit le mme sort
que la ju-
risprudence. En outre, jusquaux dernires annes, la forme de la
reproduction laissait
beaucoup dsirer, mais la situation a t corrige.
7.3 La porte des coupures sur la Toile
7.3.1 Lobjectif initial de larticle de 1960 tait purement conomique-

1re phase:
1960-1990
Lobjet de larticle est expos dans la section I:
This paper is concerned with those actions of business firms which have
harm-
ful effects on others. The standard example is that of a factory the smoke
from
9
which has harmful effects on those occupying neighboring properties .
La lecture de larticle intgral est difficile pour un conomiste qui

na pas de notions
lmentaires de droit. Coase le sait puisquil le dit:
The reasoning employed by the courts in determining legal rights

will often
seem strange to an economist because manny of the factors on which the
deci-
sion turns are, to an economist, irrelevant. Because of this, situations
which are,
from an economic point of view, identical will be treated quite differently
by the
courts. The economic problem in all cases of harmful effects is how to
maximise
the value of production10.
Or, cette dernire phrase est soustraite au lecteur de la version informatique

tronque, en
dpit de son importance stratgique pour le caractre interdisciplinaire de la
dmarche de
lauteur. Les deux problmes concilier sont:
le problme juridique qui fait lobjet de larticle: This
paper is concerned with those ac-
tions of business firms which have harmful effects on others.
le problme conomique qui fait lobjet de larticle ou
dans les termes de Coase : how to
maximise the value of production.
La conciliation interdisciplinaire des deux problmes consisterait

trouver le moyen
dobtenir lindemnisation des victimes potentielles au cot conomique le
plus bas
9 Coase, R. H. (1960) p. 414. Traduction en Francais: cet article concerne les

actions des entreprises qui ont
des effets nfastes sur autrui. Lexemple type concerne une usine qui met de
la fume qui a un effect nocifs
sur les individus qui occupent des proprits voisines.
10 Coase, R. H. (1960) pp. 422, 423.
259
----------------------- Page 299-----------------------
Maurice Tancelin
possible. Pour y parvenir, toute production conomique devrait tre prcde dune
tude
dimpact comprenant les ventualits susceptibles de causer dommage (au sens
juridique)
autrui et la faon de les minimiser et ventuellement de les rparer. Au lieu de
cela, la
Rvolution industrielle a gnr un droit qui a fait limpasse sur la dimension
socitale de
lconomie pour tenir compte seulement de la vision conomique de la socit. LAED
est
un aboutissement de la logique majoritairement conomique des droits positifs
occiden-
taux. Ce ne sont pas les conomistes qui sont blmer, mais les institutions
politiques,
pouvoirs excutifs, lgislatifs et judiciaires unis dans le mme souffle, en
Occident.
7.3.2 Lobjectif politique des coupures juridiques larticle de 1960 sur la

toile -2e phase:
depuis 1990
Lobjet des dcisions jurisprudentilles analyses par Coase

Les dcisions jurisprudentielles utilises par Coase sont rendues sur des
questions de
res ponsabilit civile en matire de troubles de voisinage. Or, la qualification
juridique de
trouble de voisinage date du droit romain, cest dire de deux mille ans. Il y a
toujours
des querelles de clture aujourdhui. Les dcisions examines par Coase nont donc
aucune
pertinence pour rgler les problmes cologiques actuels. Elles sont trs
majoritairement
conformes la jurisprudence anglo-amricaine qui est tablie dans le sens de
lexonration
de lentrepreneur muni des permis exigs par la loi, pour les inconvnients mineurs
ou
moyens que sont les troubles de voisinage au sens juridique du terme, aux premiers
temps
du capitalisme. Mais les catastrophes cologiques contemporaines ne sont pas
juridique-
ment des troubles de voisinage. Largumentation de Coase senvole en fume.
La solutions et les dates des dcisions

Le choix de dcisions historiques, non contemporaines donne au droit
lallure dune
matire fige, intangible et dconnecte de lvolution de la socit. Des quelques
25 arrts
majoritairement anglais tudis par lauteur, un date du 18e sicle, une douzaine
du 19e et
une dizaine du 20e, dont deux seulement sont rcents. Une argumentation juridique
ne
tenant pas compte des dernires dcisions na aucune valeur. Le message
interdisciplinaire
envoy aux conomistes est trompeur.
La ratio des dcisions

Coase ne sarrte pas au problme de la recherche de la ratio decidenci des
arrts examins:
A thorough examination of the pressupositions of the courts in

trying such
cases would be of great interest but I have not been able to attempt it.11
11 Coase, R. H. (1960) p. 425, 2e colonne.
260
----------------------- Page 300-----------------------

2013) et le
du droit
Ici encore, le caractre interdisciplinaire de ltude est contredit par cet aveu
surprenant de
la part dun membre du corps enseignant dune facult de droit aussi prestigieuse
que celle
de Chicago. La valeur de prcdent dune dcision judiciaire tient sa ratio
decidendi,
cest--dire sa motivation juridique. Coase sen tient au fait divers.
La doctrine cite
Coase12 cite des auteurs juridiques majeurs comme W. Prosser, J. W. Salomond, H.
Street,
Halsbury. Notez que les lecteurs de la version informatique abrge de larticle,

privs de
60 des 64 notes de bas de page de larticle original sont devant des noms, soit
inconnus du
public, soit prsents de faon non-conforme lusage scientifique.
La lgislation cite
La seule lgislation cite vise la lgalisation des nuisances rsultant de
lexercice dune ac-
tivit conomique exerce conformment une habilitation lgale. On apprend ainsi
que
la pollution de lenvironnement est luvre conjointe de la source judiciaire et de
la source
lgislative, donc excutive, des droits anglais et amricain.
Le contexte concret des dcisions

La chronologie des catastrophes industrielles13 indique deux accidents pour la
premire
dcennie, et sept pour la premire moiti du XXe sicle. La premire dcennie du

XXIe
en compte dj vingt-cinq. En 2010, cette liste atteignait le mme nombre
daccidents que
celle du sicle prcdent atteignait en 1979: autant daccidents majeurs en 10 ans
au XXIe
sicle quen 80 ans au XXe.
La cadence des accidents durant la seconde moiti du XXe sicle par rapport
la pre-
mire passe de sept (1906-1948) trente-neuf (1956-2000). Cette augmentation de
crois-
sance tait donc perceptible au dbut de la seconde moiti du XXe sicle, quand
Coase
crivait son article. Par exemple, le premier mouvement attest contre le DDT date
de
1957 aux Etats-Unis. Coase et ses admirateurs font partie des ngationnistes de
lcologie.
7.3.3 Les arguments de Coase pour combattre la position de Pigou
On note une totale absence de commentaires juridiques sur la jurisprudence et la

lgisla-
tion analyses. Coase vient donc dexposer ltat du droit anglo-amricain en
matire de
trouble de voisinage, nuisance, sans en rechercher la motivation et sans mettre la
moindre
12 Coase, R. H. (1960) notes 16, 22, 27, 41.

13 Wikipedia (2013). URL:
http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chronologie_des_catastrophes_industrielles.. Pour le
gaz naturel, The N. Y. Times, 27.2.11, p. 1, Regulation Lax as Gas Wejjs
Tainted Water Hits Rivers. Le
Devoir, 28.2.11, Dossier noir sur le gaz de schiste.
261
----------------------- Page 301-----------------------
Maurice Tancelin
opinion. Lconomiste Pigou, partisan du welfare economics, prconisait une taxe

impo-
se par ltat aux pollueurs industriels. Les dix dernires pages de larticle de
Coase sont
une attaque contre Pigou en trois points disparates et non concluants, le
conservatisme
(7.3.3.1), les chiffres (7.3.3.2) et labstraction chimrique (7.3.3.3):
7.3.3.1 Le conservatisme ractionnaire

La solution de Pigou, une nouvelle taxe, est une nouveaut:
14
[. . .] changes [..] may well produce more harm than the original
deficiency .
Coase conclut cet argument par une citation du pilier de la Facult

dconomie de
lUniversit de Chicago de 1920 1960, Frank H. Knight (1885-1972), qui rsume
bien la
philosophie politique et sociale ambiante dans le berceau de lAED:
As Frank H. Knight has so often emphasized, problems of welfare economics
15
must ultimately dissolve into a study of sthetics and morals
.
7.3.3.2 La mthode des exemples chiffrs

En deuxime lieu, Coase sen prend au manque de rigueur de Pigou, sa
looseness of
thought, propos de son idal de justice sociale (ideal world) et il propose la
place sa
propre mthode des exemples arithmtiques fictifs:
A better approach would seem to be to start our analysis with a situation

ap-
proximating that which actually exists, to examine the effects of a proposed
pol -
icy change and to attempt to decide whether the new situation would be in
total,
better or worse than the original one. In this way, conclusions for policy
would
have some relevance to the actual situation16.
Il est louable de prfrer lvolution la rvolution, condition de

ne pas prsenter
aussitt aprs un argument qui contredit la sagesse de la modration. En effet, le
troisime
argument de Coase est radical.
7.3.3.3 Labstraction ou drification de lconomie

Le troisime et dernier point de largumentation de Coase est le reproche fait
son adver-
saire Pigou dtre incapable de trouver une solution plus dsirable que celle qui
existe :
Pigou a selon Case le tort de sen tenir (traduction)

15 Coase, R. H. (1960) mme page.
262
----------------------- Page 302-----------------------

2013) et le
du droit
une notion fautive de ce quest un facteur de production (..) conu

ordinaire-
ment comme une entit physique (..) au lieu dun droit daccomplir certains
actes
(physiques).
Et de conclure, plus loin:
Si les facteurs de production sont conus comme des droits, il devient

plus fac-
ile de comprendre que le droit de faire quelque chose de dommageable
(fume,
17
bruit, odeur) est aussi un facteur de production .
Voil le coup de gnie de notre auteur: dun trait de plume, il lgalise la

pollution. Cest la
sagesse populaire, le vieux proverbe: on ne fait pas domelette sans casser des
ufs. Mais,
ce nest pas du droit, ni de lconomie, ni de la politique.
Dire quun facteur de production comme une entreprise est un droit, cest
linguistique-
ment, une mtonymie, comme boire un verre. En dautres termes, cest un raccourci
de
langage anodin, qui ressemble un stratagme si on veut y voir une rvolution dans
la pense
conomique, un changement de paradigme, pour parler comme Popper. En droit,
prtendre
quun prjudice rsultant de la pollution industrielle est un droit, cest un
oxymoron; ce nest
plus de linterdisciplinarit. En droit, un prjudice est un dlit civil, un tort,
qui donne ven-
tuellement un droit la victime, le droit des dommages-intrts. Mais, le soi-
disant droit de
causer des prjudices vise uniquement les cas tombant sous la maxime de minimis non
curat
pretor . Il sagit des dommages mineurs, trop peu importants pour que le droit sen
occupe, les
petits inconvnients de la vie en socit, comme par exemple tre oblig de voyager
debout
dans un mode de transport en commun, briser un ressort de voiture automobile dans
un nid
de poule ou supporter le bruit des travaux occasionnels chez un voisin.
Au total, larticle de Coase ayant pour objet la rparation des dommages
causs par
les accidents industriels tire argument dexemples de troubles de
voisinage (nuisance).
Il nest pas possible aujourdhui de dire que la plateforme de forage Deepwater
Horizon a
cr un trouble de voisinage. Ce nest pas plus dfendable que de sopposer aux
mariages
interraciaux ou homosexuels.
Il semble y avoir une confusion majeure de la part de lconomiste Coase
entre deux
niveaux juridiques, celui de la prvention des accidents industriels et celui de la
rpara-
tion, de lindemnisation des victimes de ces accidents. Conceptuellement, utiliser
les m-
canismes de la prvention pour rsoudre les problmes de la rparation, cest
confondre
la thorie, qui permet dviter lavenir, dans labstrait, des accidents
ventuels, et, la pra-
tique, consistant rgler immdiatement, par des solutions concrtes, les
situations re-
lles, irrversibles des victimes daccidents survenus. Le problme du cot de
transaction
est une question totalement dnue de pertinence pour la victime dun accident: il
ny a
17 Coase, R. H. (1960) mme page, 1e et 2e colonnes.
263
----------------------- Page 303-----------------------
Maurice Tancelin
nul besoin dune enqute sociologique ou autre auprs des victimes du Golfe du
Mexique,
en 2010 ou de Lac Mgantic au Qubec, en 2013 pour le vrifier.
Un conomiste ne devrait pas pouvoir enseigner dans une facult de droit sans
une
formation juridique minimale; il y a une recherche faire sur celle de Coase. Il
annonce
le problme juridique de la rparation et il enchaine et conclut son article sur
celui de la
prvention. Il reproche Pigou ce que lui, Coase, considre comme une erreur du
choix de
la politique conomique. Celle nonce dans louvrage de Pigou, The Economics of
Wel-
fare, faisait encore autorit en 1960. En condamnant le choix de Pigou par son
Thorme
conomique, Coase se place sur un terrain extrieur au problme de
droit soi-disant
examin.
Pourtant, Coase ne cite aucun auteur majeur en conomie (von Mises, Hayek,
Keynes
par exemple). Outre ses propres crits, Coase ne cite que trois autres conomistes,
Stigler
18
(cole de Chicago) et deux conomistes anglais obscurs, dont un, E.J. Mishan
deviendra
hrtique pour ses crits ultrieurs. force de refuser aux victimes des accidents
indus-
triels courants la rparation des effets ngatifs mineurs de lactivit
industrielle, le droit
positif a fini par riger en droit le pouvoir de commettre des actes susceptibles
de causer
des inconvnients qui se sont peu peu aggravs et sont devenus des accidents
pouvant
atteindre parfois des proportions catastrophiques. Larticle de Coase est une
justification
au milieu du XXe sicle de cette conception de la common law anglo-amricaine du
XIXe
sicle, maintenue au XXe sicle, du droit des entreprises industrielles
et commerciales
lgalement autorises causer des inconvnients de voisinage, dans un sens
largi, sans
avoir en gnral les rparer. On est en droit de considrer que cette opinion
juridique
reue est fruste et archaque.
En sen prenant la conception socio-conomique connue sous le nom de social
wel-
fare, Coase combattait le courant politique nolibral (au sens propre du terme)
qui a t la
source des premires lois sociales de lextrme fin du XIXe sicle et du dbut du
XXe sicle.
Lhistoire de lcole de Chicago est celle de la lutte finir contre le Sherman
Anti-Trust Act,
1890 et le Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 1914. Elle a un parallle europen dans la
gense extraor-
dinairement lente et pnible des lois sur les accidents du travail, en France par
exemple.
Aujourdhui, lAED est devenue une doxa, une thorie inspire dune forme de
libral-
isme politique amricain, domin par le souci du profit et limit au point de vue
du pro-
ducteur de biens ou de services (Vertical Integration, Takeovers, Leveraged
Buyout). La
distribution et la circulation de la richesse ne les intressent quaccessoirement.
Le sujet de
droit est devenu dans le langage courant des juristes le consommateur, partenaire
con-
tractuel de lentreprise. La personne juridique est qualifie physique, cause
de larrive
rcente de la personne morale.
18 Mishan, E. J. (1967). Cf. Graeber, D. (2011).
264
----------------------- Page 304-----------------------

2013) et le
du droit
Lanalyse de Coase est une varit de ralisme associe une forte pousse
de la tendance
hdoniste au milieu du XXe sicle. Faut-il prciser que cette tendance la
recherche du plaisir-
profit est un sentiment non moins esthtique et moral que la justice sociale ou
le respect du
prochain, rencontr plus haut propos du premier argument de Coase contre Pigou?19
7.4 Les ractions doctrinales larticle de 1960
Larticle de Coase a t dcrit comme une mtamorphose du droit amricain ayant eu

un
retentissement sans prcdent dans ce pays. Les auteurs qui disent cela font
partie de ses
admirateurs inconditionnels qui forment la doctrine majoritaire (7.4.1). Il y a
aussi les
adversaires qui constituent une doctrine dissidente (7.4.2).
7.4.1 La doctrine majoritaire des partisans de Coase
Un ouvrage collectif publi aux tatsUnis en 2003, reprsente la tendance

approbative de
20
Coase. Ladhsion est complte: tous les mots-cls du discours coasien sont l
:
Given individual rationality and self-interest, a system of well

specified and
transferable property rights encourages positive-sum games with mutual
gains
from trade [Traduction] Sont en voie de disparition chez les juristes les
con -
ceptions anciennes selon lesquelles la personne morale (the corporation)
est une
cration de ltat. Il en est de mme chez les conomistes de lide de
base antri-
eurement reue voyant dans lentreprise un instrument de production
caractris
par ses courbes de cots. Juristes et conomistes sont maintenant daccord
pour
voir dans les entreprises le rsultat dun rseau troit
(interconnected web) de
contrats tablissant des droits sur les biens (property rights) entre les
parties con-
tractantes (administrateurs, investisseurs, prteurs, travailleurs, etc.)
La Rvolution managriale prne par Coase est prsente dans les mmes termes
sur
la toile par un conomiste franais, Olivier Weinstein21. Il rsume ainsi, en 2008,
lanalyse
coasienne de lentreprise:
Lanalyse de Coase constitue le point de dpart de la conception

de la firme
aujourdhui dominante chez les conomistes: la vision contractuelle. Dans
cette
perspective, la firme sanalyse comme un systme de relations
contractuelles
19 Supra, note 15.

20 Anderson, T. L./McChesney, F. S. (2003) p. 6.
21 Weinstein, O. (2008) p. 91 : Quelques controverses thoriques Lentreprise
dans la thorie conomique, p. 92.
265
----------------------- Page 305-----------------------
Maurice Tancelin
spcifiques entre agents. [..] La firme tant caractrise comme

un nud de
contrats entre les dtenteurs des diffrents facteurs.
La littrature juridique europenne actuelle en langue franaise sur lAED se

caractrise
par la diversit des rubriques sous lesquelles elle se prsente, telles que
lconomie institu-
tionnelle, historicistes et institutionnalistes, parties prenantes, incompltude du
contrat,
rgulation juridique, responsabilit socitale, gouvernance, etc.
La codition en France et Montral par Dalloz et les ditions thmis, en
2008, de
louvrage des professeurs qubcois, Ejan Mackaay et Stphane Rousseau22
rvle que
lEurope francophone en est encore dcouvrir lexistence de lAED. Les

deux auteurs
notent juste titre quil sagit plutt de plusieurs coles de pense, orbitant
autour du
professeur Richard A. Posner.
Une raction doctrinale franaise, dune rare exactitude sur les fins relles
de lAED,
est dun an antrieure cette dernire publication conjointe franco-qubcoise:
cest celle
de la Professeure Catherine Prieto:
Mal aime parce que mal comprise, la politique de concurrence a assurment
contribu une exacerbation des dbats sur la Constitution

europenne, au
prix de malheureux contresens. Elle a t assimile un ultralibralisme
issu
de lEcole de Chicago. Or, ce courant de pense est bien loin de reflter
ce quest
une politique de concurrence, tant son objectif visait rduire la
substance de
la politique amricaine de lantitrust. Surtout, il importe de saisir
combien les
Europens ont su saffranchir de cette influence, en plaant leur politique
de con-
currence au service dune conomie sociale de march. [. . .]23.
Nous partageons lopinion de Catherine Prieto la fois sur la raison dtre

profonde de
lAED, et, sur la ncessit dinsuffler aux conventions internationales le
caractre social de
lconomie de march, qui leur manque encore en pratique.
En Europe, ce sont les fonctionnaires internationaux europens qui
ont introduit
lAnalyse conomique du droit. Elle est entre dans la politique et dans la
pratique ad-
ministrative europenne comme par effraction. LEurovignette et la taxe
carbonne ont
t les occasions demploi du vocabulaire pigouvien et coasien, dans la discussion
sur
linternalisation des cots externes. Voici un exemple de la lecture, figurant sur
la Toile,
que lon donne aux snateurs franais:
. . . lanalyse conomique propose, ct de la

rglementation, deux ou-
tils conomiques de rgulation : la taxe et les permis
dmission. Ces deux
22 Mackaay, E./Rousseau, S. (2008) no. 23 et s.

23 Prieto, C. (2007) p. 1603.
266
----------------------- Page 306-----------------------

2013) et le
du droit
instruments, (..), ont t mis en vidence ds 1920 sagissant de la taxe

pigouvi-
enne (De lconomiste Arthur Cecil Pigou) et, plus rcemment -les annes
1960-,
sagissant du march dchange de quotas dmission, notamment grce aux
con-
24
tributions des conomistes Ronald Coase et John Dales .
La source o les fonctionnaires europens ont emprunt le langage

caractristique de
lAED est la Toile, o la version tronque de larticle de 1960 de Coase ctoie un
article sur la
Thorie conomique des droits (sic) de proprit, de Wikipdia. Le droit de
polluer qui est au
cur de la doctrine coasienne rpandue par la Toile, se retrouve mme dans
lEncyclopdia
Universalis: marchs de droits polluer, dits aussi marchs de permis ngociables.
Considrer larticle de Coase de 1960 comme le point de dpart

des escapades
dconomistes en terre juridique comme le font Mackaay & Rousseau25,
qualifie bien
labstention de Coase de voir que le problme des nuisances avait chang de nom
dans la
seconde moiti du XXe sicle: il portait dornavant celui de protection de
lenvironnement.
Aprs Minamatta (dbut officiel de la maladie, mai 1956) et la couche
dozone, le dfi
du problme interdisciplinaire pos au droit et lconomie en matire de
pollution de
lenvironnement navait plus grand chose de commun avec les ravages aux rcoltes
causs
par les lapins, ni avec les odeurs de friture de poissons dans les rues de Londres
du XIXe
sicle. Svso, 1976, Bhopal, 1984, Tchernobyl, 1987, Exxon Valdez, 1989 et tous
les autres
dont tout le monde se souvient le confirment sans autre dmonstration.
7.4.2 La doctrine dissidente des adversaires de Coase
Les nombreux successeurs de Coase, Alchian, Demetz, Calabresi ( ses dbuts),

Melamed
ont dvelopp une Nouvelle cole des property rights, faisant de ce vocable
lemblme
(devise) de la property rights society , o lactivit conomique devient une
social tech-
nology tendant linstauration de leconomic efficiency.
Un ouvrage collectif publi aux Etats-Unis et au Royaune-Uni, dit par deux
profes-
seurs italiens26, dnonce lemploi des property rights comme remde tous les
maux du
march. Dans le mme ouvrage de Porrini et Ramello, deux autres professeurs

italiens
eux-aussi27, qualifient Law & Economics
. . .the economists takeover of U.S. legal thought in the second half of

last cen-
tury. [. . .] fundamental paradigmatic shift in legal reasoning,
challenging the
24 Snat. URL: http://www.senat.fr/.

25 Mackaay, E./Rousseau, S. (2008) no 27 30.
26 Porrini, D./Ramello, G. (2007) p. 1.
27 Mattei, Ugo & Pradi, Andrea, A comparative law and economics
perspective in the global era, dans
louvrage prcit, p. 40-53, p. 45. Ces deux professeurs donnent lexemple des
TRIPS (Trade Related aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights).
267
----------------------- Page 307-----------------------
Maurice Tancelin
hierarchical relation between the legal system and the market (Kelsen,
1934) in
favor of an understanding globally much admired by the Washington consen -
sus of the market determining and controlling the law by promoting
efficiency
as a sort of constitutional value.
La dnonciation de la doctrine coasienne par la doctrine juridique rejoint celle

qui en a t
faite par ses pairs, des auteurs considrables ayant reu galement le prix Nobel
dconomie,
comme F. Hayek et M. Allais. Hayek a dnonc les mfaits du scientisme
trs tt et a
28
profit de loccasion de la remise du prix Nobel, en 1974 pour rpter sa
dnonciation :
We [economists] have indeed at the moment little cause for pride: as a

profes-
sion we have made a mess of things. [. . .] If we are to safeguard the
reputation
of science, and to prevent the arrogation of knowledge based on a
superficial
similarity of procedure with that of the physical sciences, much effort
will have to
be directed toward debunking such arrogations, some of which have by now
be-
come the vested interests of established university departments. [. . . .]
Of course,
compared with the precise predictions we have learnt to expect in the
physical
sciences, this sort of mere pattern predictions is a second best with which
one
does not like to have to be content. Yet the danger of which I want to warn
is
precisely the belief that in order to have a claim to be accepted as
scientific it is
necessary to achieve more. This way lies charlatanism and worse.
On peut soutenir que Hayek vise ici lcole de Chicago et lAED, dont Coase est le
pion-
nier reconnu. La sortie de Hayek aurait peut-tre eu plus deffet si elle avait t
faite ailleurs
qu Stockholm, car le prix quil a reu a t dcern plusieurs annes suivantes
dautres
conomistes proches de ceux quil dpeint en termes si svres.
Hayek nest pas le seul dire les choses comme elles sont. Le franais
Maurice Allais
(1909-2010), autre prix Nobel dconomie (1988) crivait aprs sa conversion
radicale:
nous avons t conduits labme par des affirmations conomiques

constam-
ment rptes, mais non prouves. Par un matraquage incessant, nous tions
mis face des vrits tablies, des tabous indiscuts, des prjugs admis
sans
discussion. Cette doctrine affirmait comme une vrit scientifique un lien
en-
tre labsence de rgulation et une allocation optimale des ressources. Au
lieu de
vrit, il y a eu, au contraire, dans tout ceci, une profonde
ignorance et une
29
idologie simplificatrice .
28 Nobelprize.org. URL: http://www.nobelprize.org/.

29 Allais, M. (2010).
268
----------------------- Page 308-----------------------

2013) et le
du droit
La thse de Coase a autant dadversaires que de partisans. Mais ses partisans sont
au pouvoir.
Elle est construite sur le terrain politiquement correct de la simple cohabitation
froide et
inamicale atteinte concrtement dans la vie relle entre les classes sociales. Elle
soppose ainsi
lutopie de la revendication inspire par les ides de justice et de bien public.
Coase et son immense groupe dadmirateurs relvent de ce quAristote

appelait la
chrmatistique ou recherche de la richesse (chrma argent, en grec), le culte de
largent,
par opposition lconomie proprement dite (oikos, maison), lchange pacifique
entre les
tres humains civiliss.
7.5 Les devanciers oublis de Coase
En 1932, Berle, un juriste et Means, un conomiste avaient publi un vritable

ouvrage
interdisciplinaire30 sur un sujet dune grande actualit pratique: le pouvoir
politique des
grandes corporations, plus prcisment la distribution du pouvoir entre

ltat et une
grande varit dinstitutions, parmi lesquelles figurent les grandes corporations.
Avant la Toile, les thses de Berle et Means faisaient lobjet de
discussions. Sur la Toile,
elles ne sont plus tudies pour elles-mmes. Elles sont seulement
prsentes comme
mises en chec par celles de Coase, qui reprsente la pense politiquement
correcte. Les
deux professeurs italiens, Mattei et Pradi, qui soutiennent que la pense juridique
amric-
aine a t lobjet dun vritable enlvement31 par certains conomistes au dbut du
dernier
tiers du XXe sicle, remarquent plus loin:
..the Coasean approach to property rights rapidly became the paradigm of

law
and economics, seizing the tremendous opportunity open to
interdisciplinary
work in US law schools by legal realists32.
Berle et Means ont t parmi les premiers pratiquer

linterdisciplinarit avant mme
que Gilmore en parle. Linterdisciplinarit vise ici est celle entrevue par
Norbert Elias
(1887-1990), Andr Leroi-Gouran (1911-1986) et leurs nombreux continuateurs,
en
France, en Allemagne et partout dans le monde. Linfluence de louvrage de 1932 sur
la
pense de Gilmore est mme un point prcis vrifier par les chercheurs.
La professeure Mitchell33 note que la vision idaliste de Berle et de Means
sest clip-
se dans la seconde moiti du XXe sicle au profit de la vision individualiste

caosienne de
lAnalyse conomique du droit. La thse de Berle et Means a t rduite une tude
de la
30 Berle, A. A./Means, G. C. (1956).

31 Supra p. 267.
32 (Gilmore, G. (1977)).
33 Tsuk, D. (2005).
269
----------------------- Page 309-----------------------
Maurice Tancelin
sparation entre la proprit des actionnaires et le pouvoir des dirigeants des

socits g-
antes (managers). On a fait de Berle un tenant des intrts des actionnaires, dans
un dbat
rest clbre du dbut des annes mille neuf cent trente avec Dodd; ce dernier tenu
pour
tre lorigine de lide de la responsabilit socitale (et non sociale) des
compagnies, ou
en englais la CSR (corporate social responsibility).
Deux autres professeurs amricains, Bratton et Wachter34 ont replac ce dbat
dans
son vritable contexte de recherche dune rponse la crise cause par la Grande
Dpres-
sion de 1929:
Both Berle and Dodd adressed the issue from a corporatist perspective
which
views the corporation as an entity that operates as an organ of the state
and as-
sumes social responsabilities. In so doing Berle took on the fundamental
question
for whom is the corporation managed at the time when the answer had
crucial
implications for social welfare. In answering the question, Berle
articulated a po-
litical economy that integrated a theory of corporate law within a theory
of social
welfare maximization. It was a great accomplishment, but it was in a
context
very different from todays debate about corporate management and
responsabil-
ity. Accordingly, Berle was not advocating shareholder primacy as we
understand
it today. Nor is there a strong claim that Berle was a CSR advocate; he
never did
make the final jump of advocating reorganization of the legal firm as a
social
welfare maximizer. His unqualified statements on the subject all
pressuposed a
strong regulatory state and a public consensus against profit maximisation.
Aprs le triomphe de Coase, le dbat conomique sur ces questions sest teint
laissant
place pour une recherche de sociologie des sciences sur ce phnomne.
7.6 Conclusion: remplacer laed par une analyse sociale du droit
Nous concluons que lopinion de Wikipdia selon laquelle The most prominent
economic
analyst of law is 1991 Nobel Prize winner Ronald Coase repose sur une base qui ne
rsiste
pas lexamen. La notion de thorme dconomie qui sappuie sur des statistiques
est,
selon nous, une autre forme dassouplissement quantitatif (quantitative easing,
QE). Ce
vocable, mis la mode, employ dans lindustrie financire, dsigne une
unconventional monetary policy used by some central banks to stimulate

their
35
economy when conventional monetary policy has become ineffective
.
34 Bratton, W. W./Watcher, M. L. (2003).

35 Wikipedia (2013). URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantitative_easing.
270
----------------------- Page 310-----------------------

2013) et le
du droit
Le magazine The Economist rvlait rcemment que la pratique du QE remonte

lpoque
36
de larticle de Coase tudi ici, et, quelle a des origines gouvernementales
amricaines .
Le Twisted thinking peut sanalyser comme un jeu avec une technique
juridique, le
terme, qui commande une notion au cur du droit des contrats, la dure. Le contrat
long
terme fait lobjet dun abandon pratique, dont la signification est
tudie de faon
approfondie dans la recherche mene par lIFF de Hambourg37.
Les mthodes de Coase sapparentent, notre avis, celles du gouvernement

amric-
ain de lpoque o il publie larticle qui donne le coup denvoi lAED. Aux ides
novatrices
de Pigou sur ce qui deviendra le pollueur payeur, Coase a donc oppos une analyse
fidle de la common law anglo-amricaine sur les rapports de voisinage. Cette

analyse est
reste immuable depuis la fin du XIXe sicle, en dpit du fait quelle tait sans
rapport avec
la ralit du saccage cologique.
En termes thoriques, contrairement ce que professe lAED, cest
lconomie qui
est une des nombreuses parties composantes de lcologie, et non
linverse selon les
ides reues depuis le dbut de la Rvolution industrielle. Le rapport de
lconomie et de
lcologie est une piste de recherche fondamentale38. Lide de
linclusion de lconomie
dans le social avait commenc tre srieusement mise en avant par des auteurs
majeurs
comme Joseph Alois Schumpeter et Karl Polanyi. En 1960, il tait temps de barrer la
route
cette thorie socio-conomique pour ceux qui lavaient mise sur le mme pied que
le fas-
cisme et le communisme, savoir les think-tanks libraux du Colloque Walter
Lippmann
de 1938 et de la Socit du Mont-Plerin, cre par Hayek en 1947. Tel est, selon
notre
hypothse, le but ultime de la mise au pinacle de larticle de 1960 de Coase.
Polanyi39 avait pourtant dmontr de faon convaincante que les ides reues
de la
Rvolution industrielle, toujours en vigueur, sont contredites par les progrs des
sciences
humaines et sociales:
En fait le systme conomique est une simple fonction de lorganisation

sociale.
Dans sa large fresque historique, Polanyi explique lorigine de la mutation

silencieuse de
lconomie politique en science conomique et en science politique.
Le philosophe, docteur en droit et docteur en science politique, Hayek nest
pas as-
sez connu pour avoir dit deux choses qui ne cadrent pas avec sa rputation
rductrice
dconomiste ultra conservateur:
un conomiste qui est seulement un conomiste est susceptible dtre un

flau si
ce nest un rel danger.
36 The Economist, April 2nd-8th 2011, p. 70, Government debt-managers may be

undermining quantitave easing.
37 Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2011).
38 Vivien, F.-D. (1994).
39 Polanyi, K. (1944) traduit: Polanyi, K./Malamoud, C. et al. (1983) p. 79.
271
----------------------- Page 311-----------------------
Maurice Tancelin
Recevant son prix Nobel dconomie en 1974, il
..dclare quil est contre cette institution qui donne aux

conomistes trop
40
dinfluence sur lopinion .
De plus, le sociologue Norbert Elias41 (1897-1990) crit:
jai toujours su que le haut du pav intellectuel tait du toc.
Il veut dire que le rang social nest pas un critre infaillible de la valeur
humaine, comme
chacun sait.
Ces boutades nous invitent ne pas prendre au srieux larticle de Coase.
Et, si ctait
tout simplement un canular (hoax) mont par le haut du pav conomique de
Chicago?
La mystification peut bien tre le rsultat dune joyeuse runion de savants
conomistes
chez Aaron Director. Mackaay et Rousseau42 crivent:
Chicago, Coase fut convi une soire chez Aaron Director

[1901-2004]
pour dfendre ses ides devant des conomistes de la trempe de George
Stigler et
de Milton Friedman. [. . .] La soire donna lieu un mmorable dbat,
comme il
fallait sy attendre avec Milton Friedman. Mais la fin, une nouvelle
unanimit
tait atteinte: 21 voix en faveur de Coase. Coase fut invit fignoler ses
ides et
les publier dans le tout jeune Journal of Law and Economics.
Ainsi, les runions sociales duniversitaires partageant les mmes convictions

ancres trs
profondment ne seraient-elles pas aussi des clubs, en passe de devenir des
institutions
influentes, comme sous la Rvolution franaise?
Maurice Allais43 a le dernier mot contre ces faux prophtes:
Une citation de Wells pourrait suffire : Cette coutume quont les hommes
de se
refuser mettre des jugements critiques sur les points fondamentaux est
un des
plus grands dangers qui menacent, dune faon gnrale, les facults
humaines
de comprhension.
Toute la construction europenne et tous les traits relatifs

lconomie internationale
(lAccord Gnral sur les Tarifs douaniers et le Commerce, la Convention
relative
lOrganisation de Coopration et de Dveloppement Economique, etc.) ont t vicis
40 Colliard, J.-E./Travers, E. (2009) p. 28.

41 La Rpublique des Lettres; Blandin, N. (2013). URL:
http://www.republique-des-lettres.fr/225-norbert-
elias.php.
42 No. 677.
43 Allais (2011).
272
----------------------- Page 312-----------------------
7 Life Time et contrat - Ronald Coase (1910 - 2013)

et le
dtournement de linterdisciplinarit du
droit
leur base par une proposition enseigne et admise sans discussion dans toutes les
univer-
sits amricaines - et leur suite dans toutes les universits du monde entier:
Le fonctionnement libre et spontan des marchs conduit une

allocation
optimale des ressources.
Ceux qui ne sont pas convaincus de la pertinence des propos de Hayek,

de Polanyi et
de Maurice Allais devraient relire lIntroduction du Draft Common Frame of
Reference
(DCFR), Outline Edition pour sattarder sur le third meaning des principes,
annonc
la fin du no 10 du document. Le passage des principes fondamentaux (11, 12) aux
Prin-
cipes directeurs (13, 14) nous conduit vers les Underlying principles (15) et
dbouchent
sur les overriding principles
(16): Overriding principles. Into the category of overriding principles

of a high
political nature we would place the protection of human rights, the promotion
of solidarity and social responsibility, the preservation of cultural and

linguistic
diversity, the protection and promotion of welfare and the promotion of the
in-
ternal market. Freedom, security, justice and efficiency also have a role to
play as
overriding principles. They have a double role: the two categories overlap.
So they
are briefly mentioned here too as well as being discussed at greater length
later.
Les no 17 19 visent les bons sentiments qui ne font pas question. Au no 20, les
auteurs du
rapport annoncent leurs couleurs en mettant sur le mme pied the welfare of the
citizens
and businesses of Europe.
Le welfare of business na pourtant gure besoin dun encadrement en Europe,
pas
plus quailleurs dans le monde. Ce genre damalgame avec le welfare of the citizens
a eu
une application en Amrique du nord avec le remplacement dans la Province de Qubec
de la Loi sur les accidents du travail par une Loi sur la sant et la scurit au
travail, ap-
plicable galement aux employeurs et employs confondus sous le nom de
bnficiaire.
273
----------------------- Page 313-----------------------
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276
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Part II
Labour Contracts
----------------------- Page 317-----------------------
----------------------- Page 318-----------------------
8 The Historical Contribution
of Employment Law to General
Civil Law: A Lost Dimension?
Luca Nogler
Summary
The author begins by demonstrating that the arrival of the modern era changed the
legal
methodologies governing the way people achieve their long-term social needs. With
the com-
ing of the market economy paradigm, people must satisfy the majority of their
long-term
social needs by means of contracts. Among these, subordinated work contracts assume
par-
ticular importance. In civil law systems they have transformed the general law of
obligations
and contracts, which had been developed by pandectist jurists in their
generalisation of the
law into an obligation to give (something).
With the establishment of labour law, the most important obligations as
Philipp Lot-
mar had predicted became the obligations to be performed (or the obligation to
do some-
thing). The general law of obligations was therefore reconstructed on the premise
that the
debtor was the subject and not the object of the obligation itself, and a whole
range of modi-
fications imposed by the existence of subordinated work contracts were developed,
which the
essay reviews in 6.2. As far as the law of contracts is concerned, labour and
employment
law have contributed to a distinction between the freedom of contract and the
freedom to
contract, between formal regulation and the content of the agreement, between
intention and
judicial control, between initial regulation and the mechanisms for adaptation of
the individ -
ual contract. Particular attention is paid in the chapter to the establishment
thanks to Otto
von Gierke of the category of long-term contracts and their later development
within the
context of the general law of obligations. Finally, in the concluding paragraph of
the chapter,
the author considers how the category of life time contracts could benefit from
the patrimony
of labour law and contribute to affirming the latters legitimacy.
8.1 Employment Relationships before the Market Economy
In the family-based farming economy that prevailed during the period of

the Roman
Empire, the problem of labour supply was met chiefly through the law relating to
personal
rights, which meant that those taken prisoner during expansionary wars, and
occasionally
Roman citizens as well, could be relegated to the degraded status of slaves.
Furthermore,
279
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Luca Nogler
the law imposed precise duties on the filii familias , including obligations to
perform work
on behalf of the familia .
In the larger Roman familiae , work to be performed was organised by slaves,
who
managed the so-called servile household. Slaves were not individuals, but chattels,
belong-
ing to the dominus master.1 Finally, the filii familias were subject to a
personal relation-
ship of power with regard to the paterfamilias .

Slavery disappeared in Europe between the fifteenth and the
eighteenth centuries.
The last countries in the West to abolish slavery were the United States, in 1865,
and Spain
in 1870, by which time fossil fuels (coal, followed by oil) had reduced the need
for the
equivalent energy source provided by slaves.
The servile labour of slaves and filii was supplemented by the use of
mercenary labour
(liberi), performing work on the basis of locatio-conductio contracts, a
general type of
contract that covered all types of agreements except contracts of sale. The purely
marginal
importance of this in the hiring of labour (which was short-term, normally 1 day)
is dem-
onstrated by the limited space accorded to it in the sources, which are mainly
concerned
with the right of the labourer to receive remuneration.2
After the fall of the Roman Empire, the hiring of labour

underwent a profound
change: in the first place, the length of the work relationship tended to extend to
an indefi-
nite period (a phenomenon already seen in relation to agricultural tenancies).
Alongside
this can be placed a personal relationship of power, different from that which
bound the
slave to the master, probably nearer to the one which, under Roman law, bound the
free
labourer, who submitted himself, or was using his labour to pay off a debt to his
creditor.
A person who hires out his labour does so for an extended period, which tends to
coincide
with his life time, and he gives himself over to his employer, almost in the form
of personal
3
indenture. Feudal serfs were subject to the jurisdiction of their own lords, who
even de-
cided whether they could marry or not, and a serf could leave the land only if
permitted
to do so by the lord. Those who tried to leave were recaptured and brought back by
force.
It was only when a serf succeeded in reaching the territorial limits of a city and
obtain-
ing a right to reside there that he was able to remove himself from the feudal
landowners
jurisdiction. It was in this context that the German saying Stadtluft macht frei
arose (the
air of the city sets you free).
During the pre-modern period, law which could be classified according to the
prin-
ciple of distributive justice was traditionally justified as being based on
nature as its origi-
nating power, whose legitimacy could be traced in the last analysis to God himself.
This
1 Aristotle himself declared that a slave is a living instrument, although he

added, in contrast to the prevail-
ing opinion in ancient times, that such an instrument should be looked after,
since it is useful for work (see
Aristotle/Jowett, B. (2000) Book I, p. 4). See Knoch, S. (2005).
2 See Fiori, R. (1999) pp. 297-303; Hhnchen, S. (2011).
3 Bassanelli, G. (2010), on agricultural tenancies see Grossi, P. (1963).
280
----------------------- Page 320-----------------------
A Lost Dimension?
conferred a privileged status upon distributive justice as opposed to
commutative jus-
tice. Economic barter has been demonised by canonical doctrine. Society was
dominated
by the principle of hierarchy4 and hence by the obligation of obedience. The
hierarchy was
prescribed by divine distributive justice. It has been rightly said that the law
of master and
servant was a metaphysical structure.5
8.2 The Implementation of the Market Economy and the 19th-Century

Civil Codes
The arrival of the modern era changed the legal methodologies governing the way
people
achieve their long-term social needs.
The market economy is the product of a comparatively recent period of history
in which,
according to Adam Smith, it is taken for granted that the natural propensity of man
is to
barter, truck and exchange.6 The market economy is credited by theorists as being a
wealth-
creating institution that generates positive results for everyone (the trickle-
down effect).
7
Private law accordingly became dominated by the issue of the circulation of
goods in
the great nineteenth century codifications of continental Europe.
Contracts were based on the assumption of individual liberty, which has
predomi-
8
nated since the French Revolution. Under the new order, the legitimation of legal
rules
does not derive (top-down) from natural law but, at least as far as democratic
regimes are
concerned, bottom-up, from the will of the individual.
However, although the freedom of individuals has been formally recognised for
a long
time, only particularly wealthy individuals (such as landowners,
independent workers,
professionals and artisans) had the right to vote and, with it, full citizenship.
As the phi-
losopher Kant affirmed, people working for others were not deemed worthy of civil
inde-
pendence, as was the case for all women and, in general, all those who in the
maintenance
and protection of their existence do not rely on their own impulses, but are
subject to the
commands of others (excluding the commands of the State).9 In fact, even in the
most
progressive States, women were only given the vote from the end of the First World
War.10
4 Mayer-Maly, T. (1985).
5 Orren, K. (1992).
6 Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one for another
with another dog: Smith,
A. (1776) Chapter II, p. 118.
7 See now, with regard to the comments made in the text, Nogler, L./Reifner, U.
(2009) pp. 440 ff.
8 For this reason an influential French jurist has stated that the contract
embodies values linked to human
freedom ( portatore de valeurs lies la libert de lhomme) (Lyon-Caen, G.
(1968)).
9 Kant, I. (1797) now in Kant, I. (1968) p. 143.
10 On the connection between universal suffrage and the birth of employment and
labour law see Mengoni, L.
(1971), now in Mengoni, L. (2004a) p. 10.
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----------------------- Page 321-----------------------
Luca Nogler
Consistent with these premises, the general regime of contracts in the civil
codes of
the nineteenth century and, in a particularly marked way, in the German Civil Code
(the
BGB), the general law of contracts and obligations was drafted from the perspective
of the
circulation of goods, thus, by implication, reaffirming the class divisions within
society.
In fact, the 1804 Code Civil, the Austrian General Civil Code of 1811 (ABGB)
and
the Italian Civil Code of 1865 are all based on Grotius notion of contract,
adopted by
Pothier.11 This centres on the reciprocal alienatio of promissiones 12; from this
arises the
importance of the causa transferendi of the parties act of consent

(causa proxima). In
the French Code, this general law of contracts is contained in the book concerning
the
modalities of the acquisition of property. One example will suffice to illustrate
the preva-
lence of contracts whose subject-matter is an obligation to dare. An important
feature of
the Code Napoleon is that obligations to do something (or refrain from doing it)
become
13
obligations to pay damages, and are not susceptible to orders for specific
performance.
It should be recalled, in any case, that since, under the French system,
lobligation de livrer
la chose est parfaite par le seul consentement des parties contractantes (art. 1138
code civil),
it follows that the French law on obligations is not as broadly developed as German
law.
Conversely, the BGB, the Swiss Obligationsrecht, the ABGB as reinterpreted
in the
course of the nineteenth century and the 1942 Italian Civil Code, all rest on the
Kantian
notion of the contract as Einigung (consent). This Vertragswille is a different
concept from
the Wille of the one of the contracting parties, which in itself represents the
(ultimate)
purpose (causa) of the contract. Precepts of natural law attribute a nominative
force to
this, which presupposes equality of bargaining power, contrary to what typically
happens
(and therefore leaving aside certain special cases) in life time contracts.
In any case, the crucial point is that in a system of private law in which
the law of
contracts is dominated by values bound up with the circulation of goods, the worker
is
likewise considered to be the owner of his own body or his potential for work that
he sells
or, at any event, hires out to his employer. Dienst and Werk are external to the
persona of
the freed wage worker.
In conformity with the premises set out above, the Code Napolon based on
Poth-
iers original scheme provides that the subject-matter of the louage de
services is the
capacity for work itself, considered to be separate from the persona of the
worker.14 It may
be observed at this point that, as later became apparent, it is illogical to

believe that the
11 Pothier, R. J. (1821).
12 Schmidlin, B. (1999).
13 Art. 1142 civil code: toute obligation de faire ou de pas faire se
rsout en dommages et intrts en cas
dinexcution de la part du dbiteur.
14 Article 1779 Code Civil: There are three main categories for the hire of
labour: 1. The hiring of workers who
enter the service of someone; 2. That of carriers, by land as well as by water,
who undertake to carry persons
or goods; 3. (Act n 67-3 of 3 Jan. 1967) That of architects, contractors for
work and technicians following
research, estimates or contracts.
282
----------------------- Page 322-----------------------
A Lost Dimension?
labourer gives the use of his muscle-power (or manpower) because, unlike the water
in a
river it is depleted through use and lasts until it runs out.15
In the ABGB of 1811, the provisions of sections 1151 to 1164 governed

contracts for
wages (Lohnvertrge), once again on the assumption that such contracts were made
by
parties who were on an equal footing so far as contracting power is concerned.
In Germany, the BGB makes a distinction between Dienstvertrag (section 61116)
and
Werkvertrag (section 63117). In the German Civil Code the only Tropfen sozialen ls
(so-
cial oil in private law) is section 618.18 To provide the basis for the employers
power to
give instructions, reference must be made to section 315 BGB.19
The first social laws that were passed for the protection of the worker for
example
the legislation on safety at work, which throughout all European legal systems was
mod-
elled on the Factory Act of 183320 operated outside private law and belonged
wholly to
the sphere of public law.21
8.3 Lotmars View of Modern Labour Contracts
Towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century,
academic
lawyers relabelled22 the louage de services, calling it a contract de travail.
This was not
merely a question of terminology. The contract of employment, in contrast to the

louage
15 Energy cannot be utilised unless it is consumed, Lotmar, P. (1902) p. 49;

Mengoni, L. (1971) p. 11; Fabre-
Magnan, M. (1998) p. 119.
16 Section 611 Typical contractual duties in a service contract (1) By means of a
service contract, a person who
promises a service is obliged to perform the service promised, and the other
party is obliged to grant the
agreed remuneration. (2) Services of any type may be the subject matter of
service contracts.
17 Section 631 Typical contractual duties in a contract to carry out a task (1)
By a contract to produce a work, a
contractor is obliged to produce the promised work and the customer is obliged
to pay the agreed remunera-
tion. (2) The subject matter of a contract to produce a work may be either the
production or alteration of a
thing or another result to be achieved by work or by a service.
18 Which specifies that: (1) The person entitled to services must furnish and
maintain premises, devices and
equipment that he must provide for performance of the services in a particular
way and must arrange ser-
vices that must be undertaken at his direction or under his supervision in
such a way that the person obliged
to perform services is protected against danger to life and limb to the extent
that the nature of the services
permits. (2) If the person obliged has been integrated into the common
household, then the person entitled
to services must provide the installations and make the arrangements, with
regard to living and sleeping
space, the provision of food and work and leisure time, that are required with
a view to the health, morality
and religion of the person obliged. (3) If the person entitled to services
fails to fulfil the duties it has with
regard to the life and the health of the person obliged, then the provisions
of sections 842 to 846 governing
torts apply with the necessary modifications to his duty to provide damages.
19 Section 315 Specification of performance by one party (1) Where performance is
to be specified by one of
the parties to the contract, then in the event of doubt it is to be assumed
that the specification is to be made
at the reasonable discretion of the party making it. (2) The specification is
made by declaration to the other
party. (3) Where the specification is to be made at the reasonably exercised
discretion of a party, the specifi-
cation made is binding on the other party only if it is equitable. If it is
not equitable, the specification is made
by judicial decision; the same applies if the specification is delayed.
20 A basic study in this connection is Mayer-Maly, T. (1980).
21 Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2009) p. 443.
22 Lyon-Caen, G. (1995) p. 22.
283
----------------------- Page 323-----------------------
Luca Nogler
de services, was founded on the concept of subordination. As Gerard Lyon Caen

explains,
French courts began to speak of subordination juridique in relation to the lien de
preposi-
tion, under art. 1384 (5) C. civ.23 The historian Jacques le Goff considers that
the earliest
documents referring to the modern meaning of subordination date from 1868.24
Whatever the truth of the matter, it was Ludovico Barassi who centred work
contracts
on the concept of subordination.25
Finally, Belgium was the first system in continental Europe to introduce in

the legal
formant26 the notion of contract of employment (Law March 10, 1900). Italy, on
the
other hand, was the first system to use the term subordinazione (subordination)
in the
legal formant (Code Civil 1942).27
Philipp Lotmar in contrast to those who characterise the modern contract of

em-
ployment as a sales contract or as a locatio28 was the first to clarify that, in
all types of
work contracts, whether subordinated or as self-employed, the workers obligation

as
distinct both from the locatio conductio operarum and the emptio-venditio related
to his
being rather than to his having.29 Work did not represent an object of barter,
but was the
expression of the free individual30 (Ausfluss der freien Persnlichkeit) and
is therefore
linked to a moral value of greater import than the simple need to possess.
Corresponding to this revised way of looking at the work
relationship, a differing
conception of obligation arose. In contrast to Savignys view, the subjectmatter
of the
credit right is not the person of the debtor.31 The creditor cannot dominate the
actions of
another since every action must be based on the freedom of the individual who
performs
it. The creditor has a right to (auf) performance, but not over (an) it, as happens
in rela-
tion to things.32 As can be seen, legal scholars interested in long-term
relationships began
to take an interest in the moral principles linked to private law, contrary to the
assertion
of Bernhard Windscheid (ethical, political or economic deliberations as such are
not the
business of a lawyer33).
23 Lyon-Caen, G. (1995) p. 22.

24 Le Goff, J. (2004) p. 147.
25 Barassi, L. (1915) p. 622. On Barassi from a comparative labour law view see
Ojeda-Avils, A. (2007) and
La lvarez de Rosa, M. (2011) pp. 75 ff. There are many treatments of the
history of the italian concept of
subordination. Spagnuolo Vigorita (1967) is particularly good.
26 On the concept of formant see Sacco, R. (2001).
27 On the concept of subordination see Countouris, N. (2007) pp. 58 ff; Supiot,
A. (2000).
28 D 19, 2, 60, 7.
29 Lotmar, P. (1902) p. 7; the Lotmars Introduction has recently been translated
into French by the Canadian
scholar in Coutu, M.; Didry, C. et al. (eds.) (2008) See also Lotmar, P.
(1895) now in Lotmar, P./Rckert, J.
(1992) pp. 99 ff.
30 Gierke, O. v. (1914a) p. 409; see also Weber, M. (1902) on Weber as labour
lawyers see Nogler, L. (2012).
31 Savigny, F. C. v. (1851) pp. 4-5.
32 Larenz, K. (1987) p. 17; contra lobbligazione come diritto sopra una cosa
Mengoni, L. (1952) p. 161.
33 Windscheid, B. (1904) p. 112. See Falk, U. (1993).
284
----------------------- Page 324-----------------------
A Lost Dimension?
Lotmars Roman law framework led him to the innovation (that is, to support
the
needs of long-term employment contracts) wholly within the context of contractual
re-
lationships of obligation, not outside them. This innovation was predicated on the
earlier
assumption of the (moral) premise I repeat that the contractual duty which
concerns
a persons being is on a higher moral plane than a proprietary one.34 This was a
real leap up
the scale of values inherited from Roman law, which conversely promulgated the
moral
inferiority of paid work, which was proffered, furthermore, loco servorum.35
8.4 Gierkes View of Long-Term Obligations
Gierke, too, criticised the Justinian maxim locatio et conductio proxima emptioni
et ven-
ditioni, iisdemque regulis consistit.36 In Gierkes view, the specific problems of
long-term
obligations had to be resolved in isolation from the law of obligations; by

combining the
latter with the law governing personal rights, a specific discipline could be
created that
would become part of the immutable general provisions of the BGB. The weak link in
Gierkes construction, however, is to be found in the effects that he attributed to

long-
term contracts (dauernden Schuldvertrge). Leaving aside rescission (already
recognised
at that time by the Reichsgericht) and the inapplicability of the first clause of
362 BGB,37
he opted decisively for the stark choice between invoking either the
regime governing
property rights (Sachenrecht) for contracts guaranteeing the right of possession,
the use or
usufruct of goods, and the regime governing personal rights (Personenrecht) for
what he
colourfully called the Rechtsgschfte for social organisation. These included
employment
contracts. In this context, Gierke was influenced by the Treudienstvertrag, under
which
the Knecht worked under the Bauer.38
Indubitably, German legal scholarship in the inter-war period was operating

in com-
pletely different circumstances from the rest of Europe, given the high level of
industri-
alisation (71% non-agricultural employment in 1931), and hence the decidedly higher
per
capita incomes.39 In particular, the phenomenon of collective bargaining was
already firmly
rooted in German society from the first decade of the twentieth century, that is,
even before
the point at which the state recognised the role of trade-union associations (the
First World
34 Lotmar, P. (1902) p. 8.
35 Robertis, F. M. de (1946).
36 See also Menger, A. (1890) (now Menger, A. (1968)) p. 9: the private law of
the BGB is a law for 10% of the
citizenship.
37 An obligation is extinguished if the performance owed is rendered to
the obligee (Das Schulverhltnis
erlisch, wenn die geschuldete Leistung an den Glubiger bewirkt wird).
38 See Gierke, O. v. (1914b) and the remarks of Adomeit, K. (1996).
39 These statistics are taken from Feinstein, C. H./Temin, P. et al. (1997) pp. 61
ff.
285
----------------------- Page 325-----------------------
Luca Nogler
War). Finally, it has to be borne in mind in this context that, in the German
system, in ad-
dition to the full development of collective forms of participation, the scientific
organisa-
tion of work (also called Taylorism or the Taylor System) was already firmly rooted
in the
mid-twenties. The core ideas of this theory were developed by Frederick Winslow
Taylor in
the 1880s and 1890s, and were first published in his monograph, The Principles of
Scientific
Management of 1911. This book was originally prepared as a paper for presentation
to The
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and, in its introduction, Taylor
explained that
it was written, i.a., to prove that the best management is a true science, resting
upon clearly
defined laws, rules, and principles, as a foundation. And further to show that the
fundamen-
tal principles of scientific management are applicable to all kinds of human
activities, from
our simplest individual acts to the work of our great corporations, which call for
the most
elaborate cooperation. And, briefly, through a series of illustrations, to convince
the reader
that whenever these principles are correctly applied, results must follow, which
are truly as-
tounding. Thus Taylors contribution affirmed a unitary model of contract of
employment.
The first and more traditional, though often neglected function of modern
employ-
ment law consisted in the legal formalisation (and hence legitimisation) of the
power relation-
ships characteristic of the mode of production that emerged with the industrial
revolution.
This imposed the evolution of industrial capitalism and with it, as long ago as the
1920s, the
adoption of legal categories that further broadened the ranks of subordinated
workers in the
firm, to the point of making them jointly responsible for the course of business.
The German system met the requirement of scientific work
organisation which
emerged in Italy, in the armaments industry in particular (if not exclusively)40
by adopt-
ing the communitarian (Gemeinschafts-) idea.

As the German legal system was the first to confront the issues typical of
the indus-
trial sector, the German labour-law mindset also dominated much of the last
century.
National Socialist doctrine (with Carl Schmitt in the forefront) accommodated
com-
munitarian thought within a racist view of law, assigning historical
superiority to the
concreteness of this Germanic thought, as against the abstract notions of Jewish
origin
which had inspired the pandectist method. This doctrine made reference to the
theories
of Eingliederung im Betrieb of Arthur Nikisch41 and of Zugehrigkeit zur
Betriebsgemein-
schaft (membership in the enterprise community) of Wolfgang Siebert,42 although he
was
40 See again Feinstein, C. H./Temin, P. et al. (1997) pp. 196-197.

41 See Nikisch, A. (1941).
42 See Siebert, W. (1935) pp. 60 ff, which dwells on showing that the
individualistic view of the labour contract
had been replaced by membership of the Betriebsgemeinschaft, so that the
discipline of the employment re-
lationship could not be derived from the BGB. On the National Socialist
conception of the employment rela-
tionship, understood as a personal relationship (status) with the worker into
the form of membership in the
community of the firm (Betriebsgemeinschaft), which in turn was part of the
vlkische Gemeinwirtschaft
inspired by the Fhrerprinzip, see also Siebert, W. (1942).
286
----------------------- Page 326-----------------------
A Lost Dimension?
opposed in this by another group of National Socialist legal scholars who regarded
these
theorists as dangerous to the certainty of law.43 Nikisch and Siebert
were appointed in
1938 and 1939 to two professorial chairs in employment law at the Friedrich
Wilhelms
Universitt in Berlin. They denied that a contract had any relevance whatsoever,
not so
much because it had lost its regulatory capacity, but particularly because the
legal category
of the contract was regarded as an individualistic degeneration created by the
Jewish legal
intelligentsia in opposition to the community spirit of the Germanic tradition.
This trend
substantially shifted work relationships back into the field of personal rights.
Also dur-
ing the Nazi era, Alfred Hueck and Hans Carl Nipperdey supported the more
traditional
theory followed by the Reicharbeitsgericht (RAG) in the Weimar Republic (in
particular,
following a decision made in June 192844), according to which the relationship had
a con-
tractual basis, but the content of the relationship also depended on the
Betriebsgemein-
schaft created within the enterprise.45 The Eingliederung im Betrieb was rejected
both in
Germany and in the other states of the European continent. There must be a contract
of
employment, express or implied, for the relationship between employer and employee
to
exist. But from the beginning of the Weimar Republic until the mid-1980s, work
relation-
ships were described as a personenrechtliche Gemeinschaftsverhltnis. 46 The most
impor-
tant strand of case law concerned Betriebsstrungen caused by a strike by the

suppliers
workers, in relation to which the RAG held that the worker could not simply rely on
the
fact that he had continued to make his own labour power available. The opposite was
more
the case. Weimar case law thus developed the rule that the consequences of events
caused
by workers also fell upon individual workers not directly participating in the
events them-
selves, originating in the overall bond between workers.
43 In particular, Sieberts theory was opposed by Werner Mansfeld, director of the

Labour Ministry and sup-
porter of the contractual theory, see the careful reconstruction by Kranig, A.
(1983) p. 114.
44 The dispute originated in refusal by the employer to pay a salary for downtime
at the firm caused by a strike
at a supplier. The BGB (section 323 ff.) restricts itself to laying down the
principle that the consequences of
impossibility of performance should be allocated to the party in whose legal
sphere the relevant risk arises.
To decide the distribution of this risk, accordingly, reference must be made to
section 242 BGB, and in the
case in point this distribution sprang, according to the RAG, from the modern
conception of employment
relationships centring on the idea of the social community of labour and
enterprise (Gedanke der sozialen
Arbeits- und Betriebsgemeinschaft), while the different individualistic
conception of the Dienstverhltnis,
codified in the BGB, had now lost meaning. The new conception changed the
workers role in the firm: he
was no longer regarded as an individual making his own labour power available,
but as a subject setting up
a particular link with a specific enterprise, undertaking to serve its purposes
[RAG 20 June 1928, ER, 2, 74].
On the statement made in the text cf. the fundamental contribution of Kahn-
Freund, O. (1931).
45 Hueck, A./Nipperdey, H. C. et al. (1943).
46 Gierke, O. v. (1914b); on the exploitation of Gierke in the Nazi time see
Dilcher, G. (2013); on the history
of Gierkes theory before its current frame of reference as
Schuldrechtsbeziehung see the outline traced by
Annuss, G. (1994) BAG, Grosser Senat, 27 February 1985, AP, 611 BGB, No. 14,
which marked the now
definitive abandonment of the ideology of the Treuepflicht.
287
----------------------- Page 327-----------------------
Luca Nogler
Finally, again during the Weimar Republic, Hugo Sinzheimer had

already distin-
guished the contractual sphere from the organisational sphere,47 but his approach
did not
conceive of the organisational sphere as a relationship of a community nature.48
That view,
which in Germany was shared by Heinz Potthoff, was adopted in Italy by Paolo
Greco.49
The solution offered by Hueck and Nipperdey also found favour outside
Germany,
because it was supported in Spain,50 in France by the father of modern labour law,
Paul
Durand,51 and in Italy by a faction of academic writers in the early period after
the Sec-
ond World War. This permitted certain rules to be avoided, typical of the general
part of
the Rechtsgeschfte, in particular section 142 BGB, which provides for the nullity
of the
contract to be effective ex tunc. As Siebert remarked, It is impossible to
eliminate a com-
mon relationship between persons from the world.52 Another problem that reliance
on
personal rights resolves is the workers obligation of fidelity.
8.5 The Full Contractualisation of the Employment Relationship
With the decline of Taylorism, the wholly contractual view of Lotmar has come to
pre-
dominate in Europe, thanks to Luigi Mengoni, Gino Giugni,53 Gerard Lyon-Caen 54
and
Franz Gamillscheg.55 This approach does not have recourse to property or personal
rights
and is, if anything, concerned to open up the law of contractual obligations to

distributive
justice. In 1985, the Bundesargeitsgericht marked the now definitive abandonment of
the
ideology of the Treuepflicht.56 As early as 1951, Franz Neumann, rethinking the
position
his school had taken towards employment relationships in the Weimar period,
stressed
47 See Sinzheimer, H. (1927). Sinzheimers treatment of the powers of

the employer was inspired, counter
to totally contractual approaches, by the attempt to create a legal basis for
the asymmetrical positions en-
countered in the organization; the positions necessarily remained outside
the contract, understood in
pandectist terms as the exclusive source of the rights and duties in the
inter-individual relationship between
organiser and organised.
48 See Neumann, F. L. (1951) p. 2, where Sinzheimers pupil highlights extremely
clearly how seeing the em-
ployment relationship as a power relationship excludes the community of
interests required by the logic of
the Gemeinschaft.
49 Greco, P. (1939).
50 For discussion of this reception see Valverde, A. M. (1977).
51 See Durand, P./Jaussaud, R. (1947); whereas for Spain, see Rodrguez Piero,
M. (1967).
52 DAR, 1935, 99; see in a critical sense Simitis, S. (1957).
53 Mengoni, L. (1965) p. 682 and Giugni, G. (1963).
54 Lyon-Caen, G. (1974) pp. 231 ff; C. Rad returns to this point, in Rad, C.
(2001).
55 See Gamillscheg, F. (1998), where the most authoritative contemporary German
labour law scholars take the
opportunity to lament the fact that those abroad are often reluctant to take
note that German legal scholars
have abandoned this for some time now.
56 BAG, Grosser Senat, 27 February 1985, AP, 611 BGB, No. 14.
288
----------------------- Page 328-----------------------
A Lost Dimension?
that there is no doubt that the importance of Arbeitsvertragsrecht was

underestimated
and emphasised that seeing the employment relationship as one that is generated by
an
exchange contract allowed the mutual performance between the parties to be
determined
and rationalised with exactitude.57
In continental civil law systems, employment and labour law is a Janus which
looks
both ways, and mainly in the direction of the basic principles of modern-day
private law,
since individuals in the work relationship are considered to be free and formally
equal.
This is guaranteed by the fact that the relationship itself is held to be based
upon a con-
tract (see above, 8.2).
As Canaris points out: the iustitia commutativa () as justice
without regard to
the person may readily be understood () as meaning that the value of
the persons
concerned is treated as absolute.58 For this reason the leading modern scholar of
French
employment law (Gerard Lyon-Caen) stated that the contract est porteur de valeurs
lies
la libert de lhomme (embodies values linked to human freedom).59 It is only
through this
repositioning of commutative justice that overcoming the class system and social
struc-
tures, such as the medieval guild-system, has been possible.60
However, the rules of labour law do not merely serve, as is generally the
case in private
law, to fulfil the function of facilitating the decision-making process of the
court, namely
to give concrete form to commutative justice, which permeates private law.61 The
rules of
employment law also aim to frame in a declaratory way the content of particular
private
options implied in the performance of the work relationship, on the evident basis
that those
produced by the power relationship between the parties concerned may be
inappropriate
from the point of view of their social consequences or human impact. In this way,
the static
nature of civil society changed, a state of affairs that had lasted for centuries
and had per-
mitted the supporters of natural law, including the pandectists, to affirm the
relationship
between social reality and the rules of natural law, in the sense of disregarding
the develop-
ments in real life, which had been accelerating markedly since the industrial
revolution.
Since the time the work relationship began to be put on a market footing (see
above,
2.1), there has been a risk that employers would operate according to the tenets of
homo
oeconomicus.62 As a result, workers needs are at risk of being met according to
simple cost-
benefit principles. Workers have a double interest: they want to receive wages, but
at the
57 Neumann, F. L. (1951).
58 Canaris, C.-W. (1997) p. 31.
59 Lyon-Caen, G. (1968).
60 Canaris, C.-W. (1997) p. 74.
61 Die iustitia commutativa ist eine Gerechtigkeit ohne Ansehung der Person. In
other words, it is a form of
justice that attributes absolute value to personal value. Distributive justice
to borrow the words of Canaris
is justice in Ansehung der Person.
62 Polanyi, K. (1944) p. 311.
289
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Luca Nogler
same time they spend a considerable part of their life time within the work
organisation.
As in all other human spheres, workers as people tend to ascribe some purpose
(value) to
their work-time. They desire self-realisation and to increase their professional
capacities
in the same way as, more generally, their wealth. In short, in the work
relationship they
want to be the subject and not the object. At the same time, from the workers
personal
perspective, the wage in monetary terms must not be a payment that is divorced from
the
workers normal life needs. The consequence of this is that, on the one hand, the
obligation
to remunerate cannot be strictly correlated with the performance of work63 and, on
the
other, the amount of remuneration must, as far as possible, take into account a
minimum
living wage, apart from the remuneration itself, a problem resolved, at least until
recently,
by collective bargaining.
Then, following the spread of Fordism, an awareness gradually developed that
the im-
balance between the substantive freedom of the parties and the work relationship
was so
unavoidable that it was plainly unfair that the consequences should be borne by the
work-
ers.64 Modern labour law therefore originates in an assumption of values
diametrically
opposed to those upheld by promoters of the economic analysis of law who believe
that
market forces are a priori of any legal solutions in the sense that they must be
taken into
account when selecting the most efficient options. From the perspective of Kaldor
Hickss
criterion, such binding clauses are justifiable only if they contribute to the
improvement
of general living standards.65
The economic analysis of law still starts with the assumption of abstract
legal enti-
ties, whereas in reality, as Hugo Sinzheimer has stated, the law must not just
consider the
freedom of the citizen as a formality, but project itself into the real essence of
freedom
and recognise it in practical terms, when confronting the citizens real relational
needs.66
Sinzheimers reasoning explains why the rules of labour law do not always support
the
natural tendencies involved in the principles of microeconomic behaviours. This is
the
very reason why they have to be obeyed, in the same way that public law must be, by
those
involved in individual work relationships.
European continental employment law is permeated by a natural tendency to
formu-
late and to enforce an ever-growing number of imperative and highly legalistic
norms and
rules for the protection of workers, norms that the parties to the contract cannot
validly set
aside to the detriment of the economically weaker party. If the parties to
individual agree-
ments contract out to the detriment of employees as a group, that agreement is
ineffective
and the relationship is automatically regulated by statutory terms (inability
unilaterally to
63 For the German context, see Hoyningen-Huene, G. v. (2008) and Canaris, C.-W.
(1997) pp. 81 ff and from a
historians point of view Rckert, J. (1984).
64 Gorz, A. (1988) pp. 28-32.
65 See on this point Rawls, J. (1971).
290
----------------------- Page 330-----------------------
A Lost Dimension?
introduce a change for the worse.67 This inderogability governs the relationship
between
the most important sources of employment law, (a) the relationship between
statutory law
and individual contracts of employment, (b) the relationship between statutory law
and
collective contracts, and (c) the relationship between collective contracts and
individual
contracts of employment.
Labour law has transplanted an axiological heart into the body of private
law. The
result of the transplant, the exchange of labour and, more generally, civil
society, so aptly
described by Locke in the 17th century as the guarantee that the property of life,
liberty
and estate is free from every form of external determination,68 has been
definitively un-
derstood to mean something that must be constructed. This is meant in the double
sense
that society and civil relationships are unthinkable outside the state69 and that
human
labour must not be taken as being equivalent to goods. This is therefore the
necessary
corrective mechanism that removes the employment relationship from the sphere of
the
marketplace, namely away from the principle of mere individual interests.70
In contrast to the anthropological framework underpinning labour and

employment
law, however, by analogy with Hayeks position, supporters of the economic analysis
of
law71 find themselves in a unilateral, immanentist position of ontological
individualism.
This position is abstracted from reality and goes over the heads of ordinary human
be-
ings to whom conceiving the future as a function of the present72 they
counterpose
a natural evolutionary order that functions according to the principles of

immanentism,
and that does not lend itself to being governed by externally imposed
requirements.
This school of thought goes back to Hobbes, namely that what, in
classical times, was
67 Legislation laying down minimum standards for conditions of

employment is generally mandatory, jus
cogens. Obviously legislation on maximum hours of work, on severance pay, on
holidays with pay etc., can-
not be contracted out of by an individual contract of employment. Its object
is to protect the employee. If
it were open to him especially in an unfavourable labour market (to him),
to bargain away these rights
as an individual, he would often be unprotected (Kahn-Freund, O. (1969) p.
1030). The substantive legal
protection offered to workers by the inderogability of labor law is
certainly not effective if legislation does
not provide a second general principle. This principle invalidates waivers and
transactions concerning work-
ers rights deriving from imperative norms of statutes or collective
agreements that are decided without the
assistance of the unions or the court.
68 See for a useful re-reading, Mestmcker, E.-J. (1991).
69 Giddens, A. (1994) p. 135. However, it is significant that the modern meaning
of the adjective social has
spread in continental Europe alongside the development of the modern State,
thanks mainly to Rousseau,
J. J. (1762). On the spread of the German adjective sozial in relation to
Rousseaus book, see Geck, L. H. A.
(1963) p. 20.
70 Polanyi, K. (1944) pp. 226-22.
71 In 1961, R. Coase and G. Calabresi independently published two
groundbreaking articles: Coase, R. H.
(1960) and Calabresi, G. (1961) This can be seen as the starting point for the
modern school of law and
economics. But the success of the new paradigm was largely due to Posners
decision theory, which favours
the wealth maximisation principle Posner, R. A. (1977) p. 11. as the
allocation criterion.
72 Mengoni, L. (1985) p. 14.
291
----------------------- Page 331-----------------------
Luca Nogler
considered the good (Agathon), and that approximates roughly to the word
values, de-
pends on the subjective evaluation of each individual. Thus the notion of summum
bo-
num,73 the greatest good, disappears and is replaced by a radical individualism
that, in
Hobbes philosophy, was a function of the aim of theorising about the absolute
nature of
sovereign power. This entailed the inexistence of any rights at all so far as the
sovereigns
subjects were concerned, and the total illegitimacy of any action these subjects
might take
or claim they might take against political power, once established.74 In such a
vision, lib-
erty totally displaces dignity,75 relegating it to the individual moral sphere of
each per-
son. The economic analysis of law presupposes the existence of an

abstract individual
(homo oeconomicus), who is rational and egotistical and who only occasionally bears
some
resemblance to actual people who interact in the marketplace and in the social
sphere.
However, such people are immersed in an inter-personal social tradition and are not
al-
ways guided by rational choices but by a wide variety of motivations religious,
aesthetic,
family-based or merely habit.76 The individual cannot be detached from society.
Society
and the individual are inseparable: they are mutually necessary concepts that
interact in
turn and are not in opposition to one another.77
8.6 Historical Contributions to the General Civil Law of Employment

Law, Characterised by a Full Contract View
With subordination reclassified under contract law or, as the French put it, as a
lien con-
tractual, the following question immediately arises: which part of the law of
contract is
best suited to the contract of employment? Should it be contract law relating to
the cir-
culation of goods, inspired by the principle of commutative justice,78 or contract
law that
originates in the principle of distributive justice? The law with regard to the
person or the
law without regard to the person?
In this regard, it is important to emphasise that Lotmars thinking tended to
the view
that the superiority in values, which came into play in the context of
contracts whose
subject-matter is the performance of work, was a theme taken up by various authors
in the
1950s. Among them was Luigi Mengoni, who highlighted the need to rethink the laws
of
contractual obligations, so that pride of place would no longer be given to the
exchange of
73 See Eckardt, F./Richter, C. (2006).

74 Bobbio, N. (1989) p. 74.
75 Whitman, J. Q. (2007).
76 Polanyi, K. (1944) p. 45.
77 Carr, E. H. (1961).
78 The significant form of justice within existing contract law is indeed,
following Aristotles insight, the iusti-
tia commutativa and not iustitia distributive (Canaris, C.-W. (1997) p. 75).
292
----------------------- Page 332-----------------------
A Lost Dimension?
goods, and should go instead to long-term obligations, whose object is the

performance of
an activity.79 This perspective had already influenced jurisprudence in the Weimar
Repub-
lic in the 1920s and 1930s, when, with reference to 242 of the BGB, the law of
obligations
(Schuldrecht) was redrafted.80
8.6.1 The Law of Contracts
So far as the law of contracts is concerned, labour and employment law have
contributed
to distinguishing between freedom of contract and freedom to contract, between
formal
81
regulation and the content of the agreement, between the intention and judicial
control,
between initial regulation and the mechanisms for adaptation of the individual
contract
(for instance, the direct effects of collective agreements; see principles number 7
and 10).
The term contract of employment (or employment contract) may be used,
collo-
quially but also in the legal sense, to denote alternatively a set of facts (what
the parties,
expressly or implicitly, contracted for) or the whole set of rules that
govern the single
employment relationship.
If the term contract is used for a document that gives effect to a workers
and an em-
ployers own intentions, from which their employment relationship is derived, we
can say
that their obligations (first and foremost the obligation to work and to pay wages
respec-
tively) have a contractual foundation. Today, in European continental systems,
entering
into an employment contract by an act of ones own volition is the only way in
which it is
possible to create an employment relationship.82
Table 1 The differences between contracts of sale and contracts of

subordinated
employment
Contracts of sale Contracts of employment
Concerns the property of both parties Concerns the employers property

and the person
of the employee
Both parties have an equal bargaining One party has a stronger

bargaining position than
position the other
The conclusion of the contract is at the Long-term cooperation between

the parties is at
centre of the contractual relationship the heart of the contractual
79 Mengoni, L. (1952) and Mengoni, L. (1954). See on this point Di Majo, A.

(2012).
80 Wieacker, F. (1995 (reprinted 2003)) pp. 409 ff.
81 See Hnn, G. (1982).
82 Rebhahn, R. (2009) p. 173.
293
----------------------- Page 333-----------------------
Luca Nogler
But if the term contract is used for the whole set of rules that governs
the individual
employment relationship, we cannot say that the contract regulates the employment
re-
lationship (freedom of contract without freedom to contract). The regulation of
employ-
ment relations takes place at multiple external levels (statutes and collective
contracts).
What is the main issue83 differentiating labour law from the law relating to
contracts
of sale? As Sinzheimer states, we deal on a daily basis with real people: workers,
tenants,
borrowers (Kreditnehmer) (see principle number 2). As such, they are subject to the
social
(distributive) power of others, and this applies equally to basic (or vital) needs.
Employers, in the same way as banks and property owners, possess

Verteilungsmacht
distributive power 84 in respect of the narrow commodities of labour and income.
One
issue to be addressed by private law consists in the role of the distributors.

Such questions
will be explored at length in the course of our next paragraph about law of
obligations.
8.6.2 The Law of Obligations
As regards the law of obligations, modern employment law has contributed to the
follow-
ing grafts and transformations85:
a) As we have seen previously (see above, 8.3), the pandectist doctrine can be
credited
with having posited that the debtor represents not the object but rather the
subject in
the relationship of obligations.86 To the general system of private law
centred on ob-
ligations to be performed can be added a novel feature, whereby the

obligation of the
debtor, reflected in the content of the law on credit or obligation, assumes
importance
in the field of best endeavours only where it is identified with some conduct
of the
debtor (as occurs in most modern civil law systems on the European
continent87) and
cannot extend to the production of the result, as Windscheid contends.

b) However, the fact remains that the result expected by the creditor is an
integral part
of the relationship onto which the obligation is grafted.88 Any obligation,
in so far as
it is set up to satisfy a creditors interest, tends to be aimed at producing

an outcome,
83 Legal science belongs among the practical disciplines, whose object is not to
explore physical or teleological
phenomena, but human problems arising from social relations, and, in the final
analysis, in the relationships
between people.
84 Canaris, C.-W. (1997) p. 40.
85 See Wieacker, F. (1995 (reprinted 2003)).
86 Goldschmidt, J. (1944) traslation into Italian: Goldschmidt, J. (1950)
p. 92, cit. in Mengoni, L. (1952)
p. 158; Larenz, K. (1987) p. 17.
87 Including the German one, given the first sub-clause of new 280
BGB, introduced by the Gesetz zur
Modernisierung des Schuldsrechts (provisions regarding the modernisation of
the law on obligations) of
26 November 2001.
88 As the United Session of the Corte di Cassazione has stated in case no. 577 11
January 2008, in all obliga-
tions the practical result to be achieved under the binding obligation, as well
as the commitment which the
debtor must demonstrate in order to achieve it, assume importance. See Lotmar,
P. (1908) p. 831; Mengoni,
L. (1952) and Mengoni, L. (1954) pp. 185-209, 280-320, 366-396; Ranieri, F.
(2010).
294
----------------------- Page 334-----------------------

A Lost Dimension?
that is, to procure a result which constitutes the benefit owed to the
creditor,89 which,
in contractual obligations, is set out at the beginning of the contract, as

the object or
reason for the agreement between the parties.
c) In the general system of private law centred on obligations to be performed,
the relation-
ship of obligation arising from the synallagmatic contract may have a complex
structure
and therefore include further obligations, going beyond the exchange
contemplated by
the contract. Consequently, obligations have been introduced into
contemporary civil
codes to have regard for and care for the protection of the debtors person
(see now
section 241.2 BGB and principle number 5), so resolving the problem that the
Gierke
tradition had sought to resolve through the creation of the Frsorgepflicht
(paternalistic
care). Analogous obligations are provided for protecting the legal sphere of
the creditor.90
In cases of infringement of these obligations to protect, priority must be

given to pro-
visions offering specific forms of protection (specific performance) and,
secondly, the
possibility of claiming damages for economic and non-economic loss.
d) Labour and employment law has also opened the way for the use of techniques
that
traditionally were part of public law, such as, for example, the
diffusion of funda-
mental rights in the context of employment relationships, the
prohibition against
discrimination (see principle number 8), abuse of power, unequal treatment
and the
conditioning of the exercise of extra-judicial powers by the existence of a
factual as-
sumption (see principle number 11).
Today, the modern concept of the individual, the recognition of the

independence of
moral choice, the fact that s/he must always be considered in Kantian terms as an
end and
not a means, has definitively opened up the question of the validity of the pre-
established
system of natural law values and of the morality naturally common to the
universality of
humanity.91 But this simply means that the validity of the values themselves can no
lon-
ger be viewed from a transcendental perspective, but must be firmly set in an

historical
context.92 In modern times this has produced a system in which values, including
human
dignity, are the subject matter of constitutional law or integrated legal

systems, which
incorporate the Convention on Human Rights93 into national constitutions by way of
the
Nice Charter (where the issues are linked with the European Union94), re-proclaimed
at
89 Mengoni, L. (1971) p. 33.

90 The fundamental writings of Nipperdey, H. C. (1929). He highlighted the
importance of provisions aimed at the
protection of the workers person as accessory obligations for private law,
too. For Italy see Castronovo, C. (2006).
91 Mengoni, L. (1996) p. 118 nt 9.
92 On the other hand, it is impossible to propose a return to the old natural law
positions, which ascribe the
origin of values to theoretical philosophy.
93 For the social relevance of this, see Airey c. Irlanda, 9 October 1979, 26.
94 Article 51(1) of the Charter also stipulates that the Charter applies to the
Member States only when they are
implementing Union law. The Lisbon Treaty explicitly states that the provisions
of the Charter do not extend
the powers of the Union as defined in the Treaties.
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----------------------- Page 335-----------------------
Luca Nogler
Strasbourg on 12 December 2007 and incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty.

As Bobbio
remarks, the fundamental issue with human rights today is not so much to do with
justi -
fying them, but with protecting them. It is a political problem, rather than a
philosophical
one.95 As the line of thinking reworked by Sen asserts, in order to participate
effectively
in a market order, individuals require more than formal access to the institution
of prop-
erty and contract. They need to be provided with the economic means to
realise their
potential: these include social guarantees of housing, education and training, as
well as
legal institutions.96
Both rules of public law and special laws are needed to guarantee access to
services
(education, health, training and so forth) to those in real need, and/or a
financial contri-
bution, as well as making sure that their state of need, for a reasonable period at
least, does
not impede access to life time contracts that assure them a basic standard of
living.
In the continental European tradition, (public law) norms under social
security law,
which interact with (private law) employment provisions, place much importance upon
the life time problems mentioned above (see principle number 15).
In contemporary reality, from the perspective of justifying the rationale
underlying
the law, this issue emerges more markedly. Thus social principles,97 which are
today called
social rights using this expression with a continental connotation that is

outside the
English legal tradition98 are legitimised. Archaic, traditional codes of law
were codes of
duties (or obligations), not rights. As Bobbio explains, after the reversal of
the relation-
ship between the individual and the State that occurred when the relationship
between
governors and governed was no longer looked at ex parte principis but ex parte
populi,
the traditional relationship between rights and duties has likewise been
reversed. From
now on, as far as individuals are concerned, rights come before duties; as far as
the State is
concerned, duties come before rights.99
Despite this, it is vital to recall that, in relationships between private

individuals, there
are always at least two fundamental principles (rights) vying with one another. In
the case
of work relationships, workers rights are always balanced by the employers right
to orga-
nise their working methods efficiently.
95 Bobbio, N. (1990).
96 Deakin, S. (2005) pp. 6-7. On the capability approach, see Sen, A. (1980) and
Sen, A. (1985).
97 On the differentiation between principles and rules cf Dworkin, R. M.
(1967) and Alexy, R. (1994) pp. 72 ff.
Principles express objective value judgments (Grundentscheidungen) that are
not only aimed at lawmakers,
but also condition the interpretation of positive law because judicial organs
have an obligation to protect
fundamental rights (Schutzpflicht): see Canaris, C.-W. (1984).
98 Scholars have found this differentiation of meaning disorientating: cf M.
Zamboni, M. (2008) (also available
at: http://works.bepress.com/mauro_zamboni/1): in the case of social law, it
actually is very difficult to find
a clear definition of what social law concerns.
99 Bobbio, N. (1999).
296
----------------------- Page 336-----------------------
A Lost Dimension?
The issue of development and economic efficiency is therefore central, both

to labour
law and to social security, at least for those concerned with designing
legal rules in a
responsible way, namely by debating possible solutions, having regard to all the
interests
involved.100 But in evaluating how these interests are involved, reference to
abstract mod-
els is an inadequate approach and there has to be some comparison with empirical
reality.
As an example, the EU Commissions Green Paper on Modernising labour law to
meet the challenges of the 21st century101 asserts, on the basis of reasoning
through ab-
stract models, that the stability of the work relationships of employed people does
not
hinder the social right to work of the unemployed; however, this assertion is
forcefully
negated by the facts.102 Twenty years of the economic analysis of law, and thus of
abstract
reasoning based on theoretical models, have hindered the development of a serious

sci-
ence dedicated to evaluating the social consequences of regulatory
choices, as has the
trend of taking into account the costs, also for future generations, of public
policies.
8.7 Work Relationships and Life Time Contracts
To understand the contribution made by labour law to the evolution of the general
law
of contracts and obligations and, in particular, long-term contracts, the following
tables
should first be considered.
Table 2 Ways in which individuals long-term social and economic needs are
met
Legal instruments that may Characteristics

be long-term (Eigenschaften) Types
(Tatbestand)
Status in the family
Status as citizen Public law instruments Social

assistance Welfare pay-
ments
Healthcare
Absolute rights (Absolute The exercise of the right does

Herrschaftsrechte) not take place at the level of
Personality rights (Persnlich- the relationship with the en-
keitsrechte) tity conferring the right (the
Property rights relationship is immediate) nor
(Dinglichen Sachenrechte) in a relationship with another
Intellectual property rights specific party
(Immaterialgterrechte)
100 So respecting the requirements underpinning the approach of Habermas, J.
(1993) p. 290. and Apel, K.-O.
(1996).
101 See Commission of the European Communities: Green Paper: COM(2006) 708 final
(22.11.2006); for criti-
cal commentary see Barbera, M.; Bronzini, G. et al. URL:
http://www.europeanrights.eu/public/commenti/
giuslavor_libro_verde._pdfit._copy_1.pdf.
102 Nickell, S./Layard, R. (1999) p. 3080; Sadowski, D. (2004 (erschienen 2005)).
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----------------------- Page 337-----------------------
Luca Nogler
Legal instruments that may Characteristics

be long-term (Eigenschaften) Types
(Tatbestand)
Contracts with obligatory ef- The ongoing satisfaction Contract

of employment
fects (obligatory legal relations of the need is part of the Contract
as a self-employed
arising from the contract) relationship and the subject- person
( Werkvertrag und freier
matter of the obligation of the
Dienstvertrag) with repeated
party contracted to perform it,
performance
who is bound by an ongoing
or repeated performance
Contracts conferring personal Lease and

Rental agreements
rights of enjoyment and
contract to guarantee
secured on
real property
(Nutzungspfand)
Contracts conferring legally Company

contracts
recognised positions/interests
in private law (as a state and
type)
Conferral under a contract Mortgage

and other credit
of a divisible benefit that is contracts
divided proportionally over
time
Legitimate interests Insurance

(Anwartschaft) created by the
contract
Contracts conferring legal Social Insurance Contract

of employment
positions/interests under pub- Sickness benefit Contract
as a self-employed
lic law Invalidity benefit person
Unemployment benefit
Sickness and injury at work
Old age pension
Retirement pension
As can be seen from Table 2, long-term needs can be met not only by contracts with
oblig-
atory effects but also by long-term contracts with effects that differ from a
relationship of
obligations. The relationship between time and long-term contracts can be
represented in
the terms set out in Table 3.
In continental Europe, legislation regarding contracts that create long-term
relation-
ships has been introduced within the general law of contracts and obligations with
refer-
ence in particular to two problem areas:
1. Ensuring that the binding nature of the obligation is limited in time,
bearing in mind
the factor of immediate withdrawal, or providing by law for a
fixed term for the
298
----------------------- Page 338-----------------------
A Lost Dimension?
Table 3 Categories of long-term contracts
The significance of time in

contracts Denomination of categories Types of
contracts included
Time spent in preparation for Contracts involving extended Hire of

labour and
performance (performance of performance (Einmalige Leis- services
(Locatio operis;
continuous activity aimed at tungen dessen Erfllung Zeit
Werkvertrag)
permitting the carrying out of kostet)
the activity, but with immedi- The parties themselves bear
ate performance) the cost of the time spent
Contracts with an immediate
result but which assume con-
tinuous input by the debtor
Time as representing the Long-term contracts in the Hire of

services/
length of performance itself strict sense (time is stipulated employment
(Locatio
(repetition of the same per- by the parties) operarum;
Diestvertrag
formance or a continuous Contracts with repeated or
Arbeitsvertrag)
activity performed as such by continuous performance
the debtor). The obligation (auf dauernde oder re-
is not discharged by perfor- gelmig wiederkehrende
mance but only by the passage Durchfhrung gerichteten
of time Vertrge)
Time as a period running Long-term contracts in the Contracts

involving continu-
from the initial conclusion of strict (or traditional) sense ous
performance (locatio op-
the contract to the discharge erarum)
of the relationship Contract
of employment
Contract
as a self-employed
person
(freier Diestvertrag)
Hiring of
chattels
Contracts
of energy supply
Contracts
involving repeated
performance (locatio operis

cum
opera); time as the rep-
etition of
the services
Contract
as a self-employed
person and
Tendering con-
tract
(Werkvertrag)
Supply
contract on demand
Life time
annuity
Contract
of carriage
Fixed-term
mandate
Issue of
mortgage contracts
where the
long-term obliga-
tion is
accessory to the pay-
ment of
interest
299
----------------------- Page 339-----------------------

Luca Nogler
The significance of time in

contracts Denomination of categories Types
of contracts included
Contracts with immediate
discharge but which imply a
continuous performance by
the
debtor (locatio operis
con
opus)
Contract as a self-employed
person and Tendering contracts
Contract of carriage
Mandate for a specific busi-

ness
purpose
Mediation
Time as the duration required Long-term contracts in the

Contracts creating long-term
for satisfaction of the interest broad (or modern) sense
relationships in the strict sense
protected under the contract
Contracts conferring personal
rights of enjoyment
Contracts conferring legal
positions/contracts conferring
a
divisible benefit that is di-
vided
proportionally over time
Contracts creating legitimate
interests
contract. In fact, in some civil codes a general rule is not laid down, but
it may be
reconstructed from the regimes concerning individual contracts.103
2. Ensuring that the effects of termination with immediate effect, or discharge

of the
contract through supervening impossibility, are not retroactive (termination
ex nunc;
Aufhebung des Vertrages; see principle number 3).104
An analogous issue is whether or not the conventional facility of
withdrawal from
the contract can be provided for, in circumstances where performance has started.
Does
withdrawal have effect in relation to performance already carried out, or to
performance
that is still in train? This question is governed, for example, by art. 1373 of the
Italian
Civil Code.
103 Thus, the Italian Civil Code, for example, provides for immediate withdrawal
from a whole range of con-
tracts: Art. 24 (associations); Art. 1569 (contracts for supply); Art. 1616
(rental contracts); Art. 1725-1727
(mandates); Art. 1750 (contracts of agency); Art. 1810 (loan contracts); Art.
1833 (current accounts); Art.
1845 (opening of documentary credit); Art. 1855 (current account banking
transactions; Art. 2118 (man-
agement contract or contract as a home help); Art. 2285 (company contract).
The same is true for the fixed
duration of the contract provided under Arts. 1574 (lease agreement); 1630
(agricultural tenancy); 2143
(sharecropping); 2604 (consortia).
104 In the Italian Civil Code this question is governed by Arts. 1458, 1360, 1373
and 1467.
300
----------------------- Page 340-----------------------
A Lost Dimension?
Contracts concerning obligatory long-term relationships in the broad

sense have
arisen, above all, in relation to the following:
3. Where performance becomes excessively burdensome, before the obligation has
been
completed wholly or in part (dazwischenkommen einer bermige
Belastung der
Leistung). In Germany this is referred to as Wegfall der Geschftsgrundlage
(impos-
sibility). The problem becomes important when the impossibility occurs when
per-
formance is still owing, wholly or in part.
4. Adaptation of the contract.
Are there lasting needs that are met in labour law by solutions that could be
applied to
all long-term contracts? In the final table of this paper I shall try to list a
range of labour-
law solutions. The task of deciding whether or not these can be extended to all
long-term
contracts is therefore left to the work-groups.
Table 4 How labour and employment law deals with long-term needs
Certainty in the satisfaction of basic Payment of wages and salary
at
economic needs regular intervals
Certainty in the satisfaction of basic non- Extent of performance

economic needs Time limitation
Work-time regulation
Breaks and time off
There are national holidays
Personal/self-fulfilment
(through effective
performance of the work)
The regimen for employees contracts governs 616 BGB Temporary

prevention of per-
the parties reciprocal obligations on the ba- formance of services. The
person obliged to
sis that this contract, so far as the worker is perform services is not
deprived of his claim to
concerned, performs a pre-eminently social remuneration by the fact
that he is prevented
function of support and affirmation of his/ from performing services for
a relatively trivial
her social life. For this reason, the risk of non- period of time for a
personal reason without
performance based on impossibility, linked to fault on his part. However,
he must allow the
specific events (illness, accident, pregnancy, amount he receives under a
health or accident
conscription, performance of public duties, insurance policy, provided
pursuant to a statu-
etc.) relating to the debtor, is transferred tory duty for the period
when he is prevented
from the latter to the creditor who, contrary from working, to be credited
against him
to the synallagmatic (reciprocity) principle,
is required to pay remuneration for a certain
period
Overcoming the synallagmatic principle (no pay
without work): 320 BGB Defence of unper-
formed contract (1) A person who is a party to a
reciprocal contract may refuse his part of the per-
formance until the other party renders consider-
ation, unless he is obliged to perform in advance
301
----------------------- Page 341-----------------------
Luca Nogler
Certainty in the satisfaction of basic Payment of wages and

salary at
economic needs regular intervals
Risk of creating a power relationship (of Mandatory

economic dependence) There is freedom to
contract, but not to
regulate the contract
Social participation Rights relating to union

membership and
discipline
The problem of identifying adequate remu- Principles invoked in

determining
neration and adjustment of remuneration remuneration
Collective agreements
apply
Collective agreements
(an/or statutes) produce
legal rules that are
mandatory
Individual contracts can
only apply if their
terms are more
favourable than the collective
agreement (or statutory)
minimum rates of pay
Comment: minimum rates
of pay do not con-
cern either value in use
or market value, but
collective value
Employment law has made it clear that when Respect for workers as
people: form of dis-
the question of having and not being is in- missal and the chance to
present a defence if
volved on the creditors side, the principle the dismissal is for
inadequate performance
of limited duration cannot be invoked with Limitations on
substantive reasons for
regard to relationships of obligation, and dismissal:
consequently a limited dismissal regime is ad- 1. Inadequate
performance
opted (which, in addition, does not recognize 2. Supervening
impossibility of performing the
personal rights of enjoyment, namely the right activity
to a job!) 3. Economic reasons
Right to reselection in
cases 1 and 2
An economic analysis of law of the kind advanced by Posner specifically,

and again
erroneously, assumes that people enter into contracts only to deal with economic
interests.
This view therefore does not embrace interests and needs that people have as social
be-
ings.105 This theory leads to imposition of the rule that only needs which are
affordable
can be satisfied106 and identifies contract law with the law of sales, a choice
that is also
a feature of the Draft Common Frame of Reference.107 If obligation law
is a generalised
105 Mengoni, L. (2004); Kbler, F. (1990), who comes to the conclusion that the
economic analysis of law fails
to point the way to guaranteeing a better society.
106 There are fundamental social needs to satisfy, and we need to acknowledge
the existence of inborn human
rights for no one chooses to come to life (Interview of Paul Ricoeur by
Antonio Gargano in LUnit 17
March 1997).
107 For references to the text of the DCFR and the Acquis see Bar, C. v./Clive,
E. et al. (2009) as available at:
http://www.storme.be/2009_02_DCFR_OutlineEdition.pdf. For the Acquis see
Research Group on the Ex-
isting EC Private Law (Acquis Group) (ed.) (2009) as available at
http://www.acquis-group.org.
302
----------------------- Page 342-----------------------
A Lost Dimension?
representation of the rules governing spot contracts (contracts for sale), there is
no room
for life time problems such as illness, homelessness, age, childbirth and
childcare.108
If we consider social relations as they really are,109 however, we are driven
to the con-
clusion that, in the European context at least, most people fulfil their basic
needs through
contracts that generate long-term legal relations.110 For example, having entered
into the
contract of employment, employees pursue both the economic goal of earning their
wages,
as well as the non-economic one of self-realisation.111
8.8 A Lost Dimension?
In the mid-1950s, among the varied dimensions of mans economic activity

production
(work), consumption and saving the second aspect began to dominate. According to
American theorists, increased consumption would permit economic growth without an

increase in population.
The central position of consumers was achieved through advertising (creating
wants),
credit (self-exploitation), and planned obsolescence (renewal of demand).
In a word:
marketing.
The most important aspect is that two models confront one another
here112: the
Anglo-American one, based on consumer freedom and the assumption of the consumers
complete decision-making power; the other is based on the dignity of consumers, as

exis-
tentially and socially conditioned beings who, without protection, are at risk of
invasion
of their personal sphere.
The former, much loved by the supporters of the economic theory of law,
represents
the culture of maximum consumer sovereignty over economic interests, whereas the
lat-
ter represents maximum protection for consumers as people and of their non-economic
interests. Where the former prevails, there are no limits on discount

policies, business
opening times and a full range of commercial activities, such as access to credit
and the
sale of goods and services, where competition rules/anti-trust law protect the
economic
interests of consumers and not competitors. Conversely, such limitations
are a feature
of the second model, which, while not rejecting the utilitarian principle, centres
on the
effective possibility of pursuing product liability and ensuring a certain degree
of prod-
uct quality, as well as and above all, the protection of consumers as people and
with it
108 Nogler, L. (2011) pp. 365 ff.

109 As invited to do by Sinzheimer, H. (1976b); see Nogler, L. (2011).
110 On the category of life time contracts see L. Nogler, U. Reifner, Introduction
of this book.
111 On the limits encountered by those who prioritise the pursuit of economic
efficiency for all employers see
Veljanoski, C. G. (1981).
112 See Whitman, J. Q. (2007) pp. 365 ff.
303
----------------------- Page 343-----------------------
Luca Nogler
their social, non-economic sphere of activity.113 The latter aims to ensure that
the system
remains much more producerist than the first model, moving the centre of gravity
com-
pletely away from the economic laws of supply and demand. As Robert Reich asserts,
the
centrality and stimulation of consumption and accumulation make labour law subject
to
the pure cost principle and, in so doing, to the demise of its original raison
dtre.
However, the shift in perspective in favour of consumers should never be read
as a
counterposition to workers in the new class of consumers. People are still people,
they are
merely treated on the basis of a different identity.114 It would be more accurate
to say that
we are dealing here with a variation in the hierarchy of values: the interests of
individuals
as consumers limit those of individuals as producers.
These days labour law has come to terms with the principle of intrinsic
limitations on
fundamental rights,115 or rather with limitations deriving not solely from the
dominance
of the efficiency of production, but from the market as well, starting with the
fact that
business itself operates within a context of competition. Protection for workers,
far from
being collocated en bloc within the protective scope of human dignity, must, in a
more
far-reaching way than before, confront the needs of creditors, who in
turn are bearers
of fundamental rights.116 Secondly, employment and labour law as a discipline must
also
remedy the negative externalities generated by workers prerogatives so that, for

example,
the state regulation of strikes affecting essential services is uniformly
approved.117
Rather than denying the centrality of the consumer, the debate should focus
on the
content that results from the new perspective and ask what the interests of
consumers are:
to acquire and accumulate at a lower price, or to seek quality and a profounder
meaning
of life?
From the first viewpoint, people are encouraged to be taken over by
consumerism,
becoming exemplars of homo consumens118: I shop, therefore I am, as the caption
of a
famous photomontage by Barbara Krger asserts. With the reduction of the moral and
material sphere connecting work and the essence of humanity, labour law can only be
113 American legal scholars make a distinction between consumer protection law
(such as product liability,
product quality and non-misleading advertising and consumers economic
interests such as reasonable
pricing, broad range of goods, ease of access to credit etc.).
114 Whitman, J. Q. (2007) p. 348.
115 The Court of Justice now reasons on the basis of this principle too, and in
so doing has produced a small
conceptual revolution, dating from the judgment in case C-112/00 of
12.06.2003 Schmidberger e Interna-
tional Transporte v. Austria, at points 79-80, and later ECJ case C-341/05 of
18.12.2007 (the Laval judg-
ment) at point 94 and C-348/05 of 11.12.2007, (the Viking judgment) at point
46, citing fundamental rights
directly as constituting limiting factors on the fundamental.
116 See Nogler, L. (2007). translation into Spanish Nogler, L. (2010).
117 These transformations lie behind Khan-Freuds last great insight into the new
centrality of the consumer:
Kahn-Freund, O. (1979) pp. 17, 82.
118 See below fn. 124.
304
----------------------- Page 344-----------------------
A Lost Dimension?
destined for deregulation. The Comune of Milan recently decided that shops could
open
on 1 May (Labour Day).
In the context of consumer law, it is only if the legal system too remains
anchored
in the premise that the unitary structure underpinning the law consists of human
beings
that employment and labour-law thinking can (and should aspire to) maintain its
historic
centrality in general private law.
From the second viewpoint, the rise of civil law, as a 2007 Communication of
the
Commission sets out, aimed at empowering consumers, enhancing their welfare,
effectively
protecting them, 119 does not represent a threat to labour law. On the contrary,
consumer
protection law that is elevated to the rights of citizens as such120 brings clear
advantages
to labour law as well, where it concerns contract formation (see principles number
12
and 13), for example,121 or the rationalisation of protection mechanisms. There
is, as it
were, a common interest in re-regulating general private law, in order to affirm

human
dignity.
The category of life time contracts could also assist in regulating the
question of recip-
rocal interdependence, which of necessity intervenes where contracts that are
universally
required by peoples existential needs arise (see principle number 4). Why should
matters
concerning the work relationship (for example, dismissal for an objectively
justified rea-
son) not reflect, in a more incisive way than mere renegotiation, other life time
relation-
ships (for example, in terms of barring termination)? I am aware that this kind of
social
force majeure lays itself open to various types of criticism. The fact
remains, however,
that this concept is linked to real needs that are becoming increasingly intense
and that
express values that should continue to apply, even in the era of super-capitalism,
as they
have always done.
Globalisation means that half a billion workers in the most industrially
developed
countries find themselves competing in the production of goods and services with
more
than a billion and a half workers in the developing world. The latter essentially
work on
fixed-term contracts (in China, 80% of work contracts are fixed term)
with no (or re-
duced) social security provision. Even in the West, new recruitment takes place
through
short-term contracts that do not permit workers to plan for a social life beyond
the self-
fulfilment offered by the job itself.122
119 Commission of the European Communities: Communication from the Commission to

the Council, the
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee: COM(2007)
99 final (13.03.2007).
120 Cian, G. (2003).
121 Cf., also for further reading, Derleder, P. (1996), who foresaw the trend
which now supports the applicabil-
ity of the revised provisions of the BGB on consumer protection to the
subordinated work relationship. See
also Rodrguez Piero, M. (1996).
122 Sennett, R. (1988).
305
----------------------- Page 345-----------------------
Luca Nogler
Unemployment in the more industrialised Western countries is increasing as a

conse-
quence of the decline of the manufacturing sector. For the same reason, the
prospects for
economic betterment and career progress for the workforce are shrinking (the so-
called
decline in value of the labour market).
Following two decades of the hegemony of the abstract models used in the
economic
analysis of law, a return to the Hegelian dominion of the concept or an attempt to
impose
a second great transformation, if the latter is preferred, urges us at this
moment in history
to open up once more to impure human life.123 This is all the more so, in times
when the
winds of change are blowing once again (this time towards the Asian Model) and
globali-
sation has now overtaken production sectors (for example in back-office work or
software
projects), which were once believed to be sheltered from foreign competition.
It is important to take account of the fact that nowadays peoples needs are
met from
funds that do not relate to work already done, but that affect their future life.
On the other
hand, the declining returns from work make it more and more difficult to assure
workers
and a fortiori, their families too, of a free and decent life (regulated by laws
that are con-
scious of social consequences). The most worrying aspect of the decline of work and
with
it the right to work, which is a feature of contemporary life in Europe, is the
increasingly
obvious failure of contracts of subordinated employment, even when supported by the
most far-reaching guarantees of permanence, to maintain the great promise to

workers of
what has been called new property, breaking away from the institution of the
family.
The obverse of this erosion of income, with which, whether we like it or not,
we must
continue to reckon, lies in the steady increase in the existential importance of
phenomena
that in the past were (unlike work) ascribed to hedonistic principles,
individualistic to the
extent of being referred to in ways that betrayed clear ethical-economic
prejudices. I have
in mind here, obviously, consumerism, for example, which is increasing in
existential im-
portance in the form of what is consumed, but also the way consumer goods and
services
are produced and marketed and last but not least how such consumerism is
financed
(through consumer credit). This existential importance124 is also reflected
in European
integration, which is achieved more generally through production factors and the
circula-
tion of consumer goods, rather than through the insignificant degree of free
movement
of workers.
123 Well done France, which, towards the end of the last century, made it
obligatory for students enrolling in
a Law Faculty to follow courses on methodology from the first year, alongside
courses on law, opening up
legal discourse to sociology, economics, anthropology, social sciences, etc.
We shall see three good reasons
for applauding this approach.
124 Underlined several times in Bauman, Z. (2007).
306
----------------------- Page 346-----------------------

A
Lost Dimension?
In this context, the contract of employment ceases to be, if not

the only instance,
then the one that is most often referred to as an example of the backbone of
social life
(Sinzheimer; see principle number 2), as was the case in effect when manufacturing
in-
dustry played the key role in the growth of productivity, shaping social relations
and the
nature of private life itself. Nowadays it is mainly consumerism that erodes time
and en-
ergy by requiring increasing amounts of unpaid work.125
We must create a group of life time contracts. The field should not be
confined to
long-term contractual obligations in the traditional sense. Our category should
include
those which play an essential part in meeting peoples existential needs: see the
Intro-
duction of this book and principle number 1. Whoever holds the future of employment
and labour law close to their heart should not turn down such proposals of alliance
with
other areas of European private law, which should have a decent life as their
common
objective.
125 See Dujarier, M.-A. (2008).
307
----------------------- Page 347-----------------------
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9 The End of Mandatory Rules
in the Employment Contract Law:
On Ready-Made Suits, Goods Made
to Measure and Fashion Trends*
Summary
Labour law is often thought to be the straitjacket of private law. Far-reaching

protection of
employees is seen as placing the autonomy of the parties in a subordinate role in
the reali-
sation, fulfilment and termination of an employment contract. The strong and
mandatory
character of Dutch labour law is accused of having this effect. As a consequence,
labour law,
like a ready-made suit, is seen as failing to allow for the need for a made-to-
measure product,
with the result that there is an insufficient connection with the contemporary
dynamics of
the labour market and the economy. Mandatory law seems to have been out of fashion
for
years now. This chapter examines the extent to which this complaint is justified
and will ad -
dress two main EuSoCo principles, namely principle 5 (Needs and Regard: protection
of the
weaker party and the determination by law of the degree of protection) and
principle 7
(Collective dimension: the employee can reasonably expect that the collective
aspect of their
individual interests be safeguarded by the State through the mechanism of
collective represen-
tation). The complaint that Dutch labour law is too inflexible because of its
mandatory char-
acter attacks principle 5. The degree of mandatory law is strongly influenced by
the degree of
employee representation (principle 7). To this end, is the above complaint
justified? Firstly, we
analyse the rationale behind the granting of mandatory force to a large number of
provisions
in the implementation of the Dutch Employment Contract Act in 1907. We then
consider
the extent to which the labour legislation contained in title 7.10 of the Dutch
Civil Code,
along with certain developments in the field of mandatory and directive law in the
labour
law title of the Civil Code, contain mandatory rules. We concluded that the
drafters of the
Employment Contract Act of 1907 presented a timeless design for mandatory
provisions. The
premise that underlies this design is found in the principle of compensation for
inequality.
* This is an updated version of an article that was previously published as

Houweling, A.R.; Langedijk, L.J.M.
(2011): Dwingend recht in het arbeidsovereenkomstenrecht: van confectie naar
couture. In: Arbeidsrechtelijke
Annotaties (1/2011), pp. 932.
321
----------------------- Page 361-----------------------
The usually weaker employee needs protection against the much more powerful
employer. This
design was later strengthened with the introduction of three-quarters mandatory
(collective
bargaining) and five-eighths mandatory law (working councils), whereby the
starting point for
the compensation for disparity still plays an important role. The design of
various degrees of
compulsion turned out not to be a temporary trend, but is still in fashion today.
We concluded
that the legislator has been very progressive in the design of various degrees of
mandatory law,
but that its implementation in title 7.10 Civil Code has been left behind in a
certain sense. We
noted that the mandatory character of the regulatory provisions does not
necessarily under-
mine the desire for more customisation. Often, the open standards of the mandatory
provisions
simply allow for such customisation. Judges give meaning to these open standards,
and thus
determine the degree of customisation. If judges remove themselves from reality
(ordering a
fixed severance payment that is not related to the circumstances of the case) or
place too high
demands on employers in imposing a specific standard (level of duty of care in
cases of accidents
at work), the customisation of labour law will remain limited. The way mandatory
law has
evolved in the context of Dutch employment law, allowing the rationale of EuSoCo
principle 5
to be extended and safeguarded, while at the same time contributing to a dynamic
and flexible
economic market, could serve as an example for other countries. It underlines the
fact that the
protection of employees does not necessarily mean inefficient and inflexible labour
markets.
Extending three-quarters mandatory law in areas such as dismissal law would
not be wise,
or indeed likely, because of the decreasing level of organisation of employees.
One might argue
that this degree of compulsion is out of fashion. As has been pointed out before,
the current regu-
lation and positioning of trade unions in The Netherlands is contrary to EuSoCo
principle 7.
The Dutch legislator has some serious work to do to address this matter. Expanding
five-eighths
mandatory law and differentiated compulsion, whereby the degree of
compulsion varies ac-
cording to the different categories of employee (based on the extent to which the
employee is
economically dependent on the employer, the level of compulsion in the provisions
may be re-
duced), and focusing on various partial aspects of labour law (labour law that
only guarantees
the fundamental rights for and in the exercise of labour), could on the other hand
become the
new fashion. For this purpose a reconsideration of the overall design is required
to ensure that
the principle of compensation for inequality is not removed from the drawing
board.
9.1 Introduction
Labour law is often thought to be the straitjacket of private law. Far-reaching

protection
of employees is said to have led to the subordination of individual autonomy in
the reali-
sation, fulfilment and termination of an employment contract.1 This is seen as
caused by
1 Verhulp speaks in his inaugural lecture of labour law as a straitjacket, see

Verhulp, E. (2003).
322
----------------------- Page 362-----------------------

the strong mandatory character of Dutch labour law. Labour law, like a ready-made
suit, does
not allow for made-to-measure clothing, and there is insufficient connection with
the contem-
porary dynamics of the labour market and the economy. Mandatory law seems to have
been
out of fashion for years now. This chapter examines the extent to which this
complaint is justi-
fied. It will first analyse the ratio behind the granting of mandatory force to a
large number of
provisions in the implementation of the Dutch Employment Contract Act of 1907. It
will go
on to examine the extent to which labour law as defined in title 7.10 of the Dutch
Civil Code
contains mandatory rules and certain developments in the field of mandatory and
directive
law in the labour law title of the Civil Code. Finally, it will offer a conclusion
as to whether, and
if so how, the current range of mandatory provisions in title 7.10 of the Civil
Code should to be
adjusted. Or, to continue with our metaphor, to what extent the range of mandatory
provisions
in title 7.10 of the Civil Code needs to be dressed in a more modern outfit.
9.2 The Ratio of Mandatory Law in Labour Law
9.2.1 Mandatory Law as Compensation for Inequality
The initial concept of the first draft of the Employment Contract Act
of 1898 was the
general private law principle of freedom of contract: where the law does not
determine
the opposite, the parties are free to set the terms of a contract (as stated in
article 6 of the
Drucker Draft). However, the draft also contained a large number of mandatory
provi-
sions, which were innovative and controversial for that time. According to its
designer,
Drucker,2 the legal regulation of the employment contract had a twofold character.
It was
on the one hand meant to provide legal regulation of a contract that

had great public
value, as it had become one of the most common contracts, because a survey carried
out
by a special State Committee concluded that parties to contracts of employment did
not
regulate their legal relations and that existing regulations, except for a few
provisions con-
cerning the hiring of servants and workmen, provided little guidance.
On the other hand, the proposed regulations recognised the importance of
protecting
employees, who are always in a weaker position than their employer, whereas this
position
varies with regard to the parties to other types of contracts, for instance that of
buyer and
seller.3 With respect to the first target of the draft, regulation of a contract
with great public
value, additional legal provisions were sufficient. According to Drucker, the last
target, the
relatively weak position of employees, also justified mandatory regulation. Drucker
took
2 H.L. Drucker, who wrote the first draft at the request of the Minister for
Justice of that time, Cort van der
Linden.
3 Bles, A. E. (1907) pp. 1-2.
323
----------------------- Page 363-----------------------
the view that both the nature of labour, as a good supplied by the employee, and
the main
purpose of labour, were responsible for the workers weaker position.With
reference to
Oppenheim,4 he considered: The labour, which is supplied by the worker on the
market,
can be called a good, yet a good of a very special nature. Every other good may
be kept in
stock for a longer or a shorter time without loss of quality or quantity. Only with
respect to
labour this is not possible. Labour cannot stay unused for a moment, without being
at the
same time partially wasted. (. . .) Another peculiarity of labour, which makes the
position of
the workers unfavourable compared to the position of the employers, is that one
who has to
sell his manual labour to stay alive, in general does not have anything else but
that labour to
maintain livelihood.5 According to Drucker, discretionary provisions alone would
not ad-
dress this target: Allowing for deviation from a legal regulation will create in
many respects
6
a fixed provision which a worker cannot evade. Nowadays we speak of
compensation for
inequality as fundamental to regulation of the employment contract, which is
needed to
equalise the judicial and economic relations between employee and employer.7
9.2.2 The Effectiveness of Mandatory Law
This new form of governmental interference received considerable criticism in the

parlia-
mentary debate on the draft. In the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer),
comments
mainly related to the effectiveness of mandatory private law provisions for
employee pro-
tection. A number of Members of Parliament did not feel they would provide a real
so-
lution and wanted criminal sanctions. Member of Parliament Tak, for example, was of
the opinion that private law cannot do justice to the inequality of the relative
economic
positions of employer and employee. He pointed to the example of the obligation
placed
on an employee to buy from a certain supplier at higher than average market prices
and
questioned how the mere prohibition or annulment of that kind of term would
operate to
prevent such worryingly bad practice. The obligation to buy from a certain
supplier against
prices higher than average prices on the market is based on a power that the
employer does
not directly indicate, but is indirectly based on the threat of consequences if
his desire is not
fulfilled. This is not written down in the contract, but the employer makes sure
the employees
know of it.8 The response of both Drucker and the Minister of Justice was that
they were
not, by definition, against the use of criminal sanctions to protect the employee,
but they
4 Oppenheim, J. (1889) pp. 10-11.

5 Free translation of a quotation by H.L. Drucker as found in Bles, A. E. (1907)
p. 2.
6 Free translation of a quotation by H.L. Drucker as found in Bles, A. E. (1907)
p. 209.
7 As described in, int. al., Loonstra, C. J./Zondag, W. A. (2011) p. 25; Asser,
C./van Heerma Voss, G. J. J.
(2008); Bakels, H./Asscher-Vonk, I. et al. (2007) pp. 49-50.
8 Free translation of a quotation by Member of Parliament Tak as found in Bles,
A. E. (1907) p. 215.
324
----------------------- Page 364-----------------------

first wanted to see the effect of civil law in the form of the annulment of certain
illegitimate
actions. The Minister strongly hinted that he thought that the enforcement of civil
obliga-
tions through the criminal law was very outdated.
9.2.3 Compensation for Disparity and Mandatory Law: The Fit Between
Instrument
and Objective
While the discussion in the House of Representatives addressed the effectiveness of

civil
protection of the employee by mandatory legal provisions, Members of the Upper
House
(Eerste Kamer) were by no means convinced that governmental interference in civil
legal
relationships was in principle a good thing. A large number of Members of the Upper
House had serious reservations about the principle fundamental to the proposed
Employ-
ment Act, namely that economically weaker individuals need to be protected, because
ec-
onomically stronger individuals would otherwise have the power to make protection
with
an element of discretion illusory. They asked how far governmental interference
would go,
and whether this principle would also give the government the right to intervene in
every
other field of law in which contracting parties were not equally strong. Members of
the
Upper House were definitely not yet convinced that the ground of inequality could
also be
a reason to deviate from the general principles of contract law, of which the
principle of
freedom of contract is among the most prominent.9
In addition, there was criticism of the use of mandatory law as an instrument
by the
legislator. The sanction of annulment in civil law had hitherto been applied only
in cases
of offence against public policy or morality. In this draft, they argued, this
sanction was
assigned to provisions in which even the most sensitive conscience would not find
any of-
fence against public policy or morality. The proposed provisions imposed a certain
moral
standard (namely that of the legislator), which was apparently so far from
prevailing social
norms and present economic needs that there was seen to be a need for legal
compulsion
to enforce them. More benefit was seen to be in moving with the prevailing sense of
justice
instead of trying to improve labour relations and move them in a direction which
only
some people considered to be the right one.10
The government saw off the latter, principal criticism, relatively easily. It
considered
that the inclusion of mandatory law in the regulation of employment contracts was
ab-
solutely necessary and believed that whatever comments were made in the
Preliminary
Report in this regard, they cannot detract from the fact that, in the vast majority
of cases, the
9 As one can see, the protection of the consumer against the powerful seller had
a long way to come in the
early twentieth century.
10 Bles, A. E. (1907) pp. 221-222.
325
----------------------- Page 365-----------------------
individual worker has much more interest in entering into the intended employment
contract
than the employer has in hiring the employee. Subject to rare exceptions, the
employment
contract was, according to the government, a coercive contract, because the
worker, if he
wants to continue to provide the necessary for himself and his family - and, in
view of the
stretch of the term necessary, one might even say that this applies to almost
every worker,
regardless of social position, who does not agree to a service contract merely as a
pastime -
always has to be bound to an employer by an employment contract, whereas the
employer in
general can do without the services of such a worker for any length of time . The
government
thus again emphasised the importance of compensation for disparity, which it deemed
in-
dispensable to the relationship between employer and employee. The imbalance of
power
between the parties and the fact that the employee depends on the employer for the
provi-
sion in his vital needs made this contractual relationship different from any other
known
contractual relationship in the Civil Code.11
The fiercely debated draft became law in 1907,12 and compensation for the
unequal
position of employees through mandatory legal provisions thus became a fact of

life. The
next paragraph discusses the level of mandatory law in labour law at the time of
the intro-
duction of Employment Contract Act in 1907, and to what extent this changed later
on.
9.3 Degrees of Mandatory Law: From Ready-Made Suits to Goods Made

to Measure
9.3.1 The Employment Contract Act of 1907
To use the modern conceptual framework of mandatory and directive law,13 it can be
said
that the legislation of 1907 contained mandatory law, semi-mandatory law and
directive
law.14 The first category was the most common one. The sanction applied in this
category
was clear: contract clauses deviating from mandatory provisions were null and void.
In
most cases this sanction was explicitly stated in the legal provision itself (see
for instance
article 1637v of the Civil Code (old), An employer is not allowed to levy a fine
and also
claim compensation in relation to the same fact. Every contract clause contrary to
this pro-
vision shall be void). In some cases, however, the mandatory character of the
provision
was only evident from the nature of the provision.15 Semi-mandatory provisions
allowed
11 See also: Meijers, E. M. (1924) pp. 1-2.

12 The entry into force was established on February 1, 1909.
13 See among others: Loth, M. A. (2009).
14 Loonstra, C. J./Zondag, W. A. (2011) p. 38 e.v. The term semi-mandatory law
was introduced in 1931 by
Scholten in Asser, C./Scholten, P. (1931) p. 30.
15 See for this categorisation Meijers, E. M. (1924) p. 6, who categorises what we
call semi mandatory law as
partly mandatory, partly directive law. Molenaar describes how to recognise a
mandatory provision that
does not contain an explicit sanction by its ratio in Molenaar, A. N. (1957) p.
29.
326
----------------------- Page 366-----------------------

for deviation, but only if the deviation was in writing. The requirement of writing
was to
ensure that the parties were aware that they were deviating from the legislation,
and would
guarantee a conscious acceptance of the deviation by the employee.16 The difference
be-
tween semi-mandatory and supplementary provisions was that it was possible to

deviate
from supplementary provisions orally, and there was no requirement of writing.17
9.3.2 1954: The Novelty of Three-Quarters Mandatory Law
In 1954, the first major amendment to the Employment Contract Act was made. A new
type of mandatory law was introduced, which had everything to do with the rise of
unions
and collective labour agreements. This new type of mandatory law was
named three-
quarters mandatory law by Levenbach,18 and allowed for deviation from the
legislation
only if the deviation was made through a collective labour agreement or in a

regulation
made by or on behalf of a competent administrative authority. Nowadays, the latter
con-
sists mainly of decrees issued by the Minister of Social Affairs containing an
order extend-
ing the applicability of a collective agreement to an entire industry. In relation
to other
types of mandatory law, three-quarters mandatory law can be situated
between semi-
mandatory law (which is less compulsory) and mandatory law (which is more compul-
sory). This means that deviation by collective labour agreement is also possible if
the law
allows for deviation in writing, while the opposite does not apply: deviation by
collective
labour agreement does not necessarily allow deviation by written agreement.19
By introducing three-quarters mandatory law, the legislator found it

possible suffi-
ciently to protect the interests of employees in cases of deviation from the law in
respect of
certain important areas requiring regulation, while not excluding the possibility
of deviation
altogether.20 As stated in the Explanatory Memorandum to article 1639k Of the Civil
Code
(concerning the length of the period of notice for the termination of a contract):
By written
agreement or regulation, extension [of the period of notice] - within limits - is
possible, but it
seems undesirable to allow for abbreviating it by individual arrangements. On the
other hand,
it is not necessary to prohibit abbreviation, if the interests of those involved
are adequately
safeguarded. If the parties wish to change the terms through a collective
agreement, this provi-
sion makes it possible.21 The assumption here is that the unions can negotiate on
equal terms
with employers or employers organisations. The power imbalance between individual

em-
ployee and individual employer is thus compensated for by employees collectively.
16 See Levenbach, M. G. (1954) pp. 16-17 and Parliament: Parliamentary Papers II:
25426 Nr. 1 (1996/97) p. 6.
17 Loonstra, C. J./Zondag, W. A. (2011) p. 38.
18 Levenbach, M. G. (1954) p. 18.
20 Molenaar, A. N. (1957) p. 30.
21 Parliamentary Papers II 1947/48, 881, nr. 3, p. 8-9.
327
----------------------- Page 367-----------------------
Certain matters are too important to be left by the legislator to negotiation

between
the individual employee and his employer. The interests of the weaker employee are
safe-
guarded if these matters are regulated through collective labour agreements,
because the
union negotiates on behalf of the employee, avoiding the need to incorporate the
relevant
provisions into legislation. For the legislator, this has the advantage of greater
support for
the regulations, because they are drafted in collective labour agreements
by industries
or companies themselves. This form of mandatory law therefore seems partly to
address
the objections raised during the parliamentary debates of 1907. The use of three-
quarters
mandatory law is not achieved through an intention by the legislator (or more
specifi-
cally the person who drafts the government bill), which is then imposed on the
parties.
Instead, the industry itself determines the exact content of the law. This can be
regarded
as a form of customisation (legislation adapted to fit the nature of the industry
concerned)
and moreover makes it easier to change regulations if the need for adjustment
arises.22
Even after 1954, compensation for inequality remained the basis for
legislation in re-
lation to employment contracts, but in response to social developments (the rise of
strong
unions) it was given a more modern jacket. Less absolute mandatory law was used,
and
more room for customisation was created.
9.3.3 Five-Eighths Mandatory Law, a Provisional Final Touch

This development was followed at the end of the twentieth century by a number of
spe-
23
cial labour laws. In 1996, in the Working Hours Act, another new type of
mandatory
law was introduced allowing employers to deviate from legislation when that
deviation
has been agreed with an employee participation body, for instance a
works council.24
This new approach again offered employers and employees the possibility of more
cus-
tomisation, and continued the trend in the field of employment law towards more
joint
responsibility on the part of the parties concerned.25 The fact that
this latter form of
mandatory law cannot be found in title 7.10 of the Civil Code can be explained by
the
legislators choice of matters that are ideally suited to regulation at company
level, such
as working hours and adaptation thereto.26 Again we see that compensation for
inequal-
ity is achieved by employees negotiating collectively (here in the form of the

employee
22 Parliament: Parliamentary Papers II: 25426 Nr. 1 (1996/97) p. 5.

23 i.e. a law regarding maximum working hours.
24 An example of this is provided in art. 5:6 paragraph 2 Working Hours Act: the
employer can agree with an
employee participation body or, in its absence, with the employees concerned,
that it is possible to work on
Sunday in that particular company.
26 This type of mandatory provision can also be found in the Working Hours
Adjustment Act.
328
----------------------- Page 368-----------------------

participation body) on behalf of the individual with the employer, as a result of

which
the employee is better protected than if he would have had to negotiate
himself with
the employer. The ability to deviate from legislation by means of an agreement with
an
employee participation body exists only when the applicable collective labour
agreement
does not regulate for the matter in hand. This of course has to do
with the fact that
an employee participation body is a different, less strong collective than a trade
union.
Because of its more independent position, a trade union is able to negotiate in a
much
tougher way with an employers association than an employee participation body is
able
to do with the company in which it operates (and in which it must continue to func-
tion).27 A higher degree of protection is therefore assigned where there is

deviation from
legislation by collective labour agreement, as opposed to agreement with a

participation
body.28 This form of mandatory law finds itself somewhere between semi-mandatory
and
three-quarters mandatory law: it provides the employee with more protection than an
agreement reached with his employer himself, but less protection than where a
deviation
from legislation is included in a collective labour agreement. It is therefore
called five-
eighths or two-thirds mandatory law.29
Overall, since the introduction of the Employment Contract Act, we

can say that
mandatory law is increasingly being used to enable customisation, both at the level
of the
individual employee and his employer and at the level of the company and the
industry.
The original concept of compensation for inequality has thus survived, but the
legislator
has become convinced that the use of absolute mandatory law is not the only way to
do
justice to that principle. The question is, where have these developments led? How
com -
pulsory is title 7:10 of the Civil Code nowadays?
9.4 The Labour Law Wardrobe Anno 2013: A Survey on Mandatory

Provisions
9.4.1 Mandatory Law
The vast majority of provisions in title 7.10 of the Civil Code is still mandatory
law (all
the provisions of article 7:610 up to and including 7:692 of the Civil Code unless
oth-
erwise stated below). As mentioned briefly above, these provisions can be
identified by
27 Heerma van Voss therefore rightly calls trade unions: the stronger
countervailing power. See van Heerma
Voss, G. J. J. (2005) p. 122.
28 This is one of the many reasons why questions can be raised about the emergence
of so-called company
unions, which are usually initiated by the entrepreneur, established from
within his company, and subse-
quently only negotiate about a collective labour agreement with the
entrepreneur as an employer.
29 Loonstra, C. J./Zondag, W. A. (2011) p. 38-40.
329
----------------------- Page 369-----------------------
the express prohibition of deviation or a mandatory formulation.30 A good example

of a
prohibition against deviation is article 7:617 of the Civil Code. It states that
the established
wage should not be different from the types mentioned in the provision itself.
Examples
of a mandatory formulation are is mandatory (article 7:616 of the Civil Code) or
is
not discharging (article 7:621 paragraph 1 of the Civil Code). Finally, all
provisions are
mandatory if the clause concerned is classified as void (article 7:631 of the Civil
Code)
or if the mandatory characterisation otherwise follows from the nature of the
provision
(article 7:610 of the Civil Code). Sometimes the law determines that a complete
section
within title 7.10 of the Civil Code must be complied with on penalty of being
declared
void, unless deviations are allowed by law (see for example article 7:645 of the
Civil Code).
The legislator has introduced various terms over the years expressing the
mandatory
character of a particular provision. No clear system can be identified for this.
For example,
in title 7.10 of the Civil Code, there are both shall not provisions and should
not provi-
sions. The difference between them can be easily guessed. In the case of shall
not provi-
sions, if the employer acts in contravention of the law, this leads to a nullity.
In cases of
should not provisions, violation leads to another penalty. Unfortunately, this
assessment
is not (entirely) correct. Article 7:672 paragraphs 6 to 8 of the Civil Code, for
example,
contain numerous should not provisions, while case law has established that
violation
of these provisions leads to nullity or avoidance.31 Loonstra and Zondag
accordingly con-
sider that the should not provision of article 7:617 of the Civil Code leads to
nullity.32
The penalty for violation of a mandatory provision varies from case to case.
Violation
of a mandatory provision is sometimes explicitly sanctioned by a declaration of
nullity.
Article 7:652 of the Civil Code, for example, states that any probationary period
that is not
equal for both parties, or is longer than two months, is void. Sometimes a
different sanc-
tion is explicitly included in the law. Article 7:656 of the Civil Code, for
example, states
that if an employer refuses to comply with the obligation to issue a certificate,
he is liable to
employees and third parties for the damage suffered. Often, however, the law is
silent and
article 3:40 of the Civil Code (the general article on nullity in contract law)
should pro-
vide the solution.33 This provision states that violation of a mandatory statutory
provision
leads to the illegality and annulment of the act concerned. If the provision simply
seeks
to protect one of the parties, then violation of a mandatory legal provision leads
to nullity
as avoidance of the law, and the act being void or voidable, provided that it falls
within
the scope of the law. Because many mandatory provisions in labour law are included
spe-
cifically to protect employees, it is argued that unless otherwise stated
violation of

31 See Verhulp, E. (2005).
33 Parliamentary papers II, 1993-1994, 23 438, nr. 3, p. 8.
330
----------------------- Page 370-----------------------
mandatory provisions leads to nullity.34 This must be applied for by the

person whose
interest is protected by the provision. Title 7.10 of the Civil Code also states
explicitly that
only the employee is allowed to invoke grounds for nullity (see for example Article
7:619
paragraph 3 of the Civil Code).35 The main difference between void and voidable
acts is
apart from the time of occurrence that the court tests the matter ex officio
(of its own
motion) where the act is void. With respect to a voidable legal act there must
first be an
application for judgment.
Although the mandatory provisions often imply a direction or
prohibition made
against the employer, the employee may sometimes be ordered by name not to perform
certain actions. Article 7:640 of the Civil Code, for example, states that an
employee can-
not give up his holiday entitlement in return for compensation. Scrutiny of title
7.10 of the
Civil Code reveals that section 4 (equal treatment of employees) and section 8
(transfer
of undertaking) have an exclusively mandatory nature. There is no semi-or three-
quarters
mandatory law in these sections. This can be explained by the fact that both
sections con-
cern implementation of EU Directives.36 The legal protection afforded in those
directives
cannot be ousted by (collective) agreement. Article 7:655 of the Civil

Code is also an
example of implementing legislation with a purely mandatory character.37 In other
words,
these provisions always pursue a minimum level of protection. Deviation from these
pro-
visions is not allowed. So the choice of the legislator for degrees of mandatory
law appears
to have been highly dependent on the spirit in which legislative changes have
occurred. A
clear system cannot be discerned.
9.4.1.1 Unilateral or one-sided mandatory law

A number of mandatory regulations allow for deviation by employees (see
Table 1).
Article 7:625 of the Civil Code, for example, states that no deviation is possible
to the
detriment of the employee with regard to the statutory increase on late payment of
wages.
If there is a deviation from this provision to the advantage of an employee, the
deviation
is not void. If there is a deviation from the provision to the disadvantage of the
employee,
the deviation is voidable.38 This is a nuanced graduation within mandatory law,
known as
unilateral or one-sided mandatory law.39 The possibility of deviating in favour
of the em-
ployee expresses the principle of favourable treatment in title 7.10 of the Civil
Code.40 This
principle is particularly derived from collective bargaining law. Article 12 of the

Collective
34 See E. Verhulp 2004, (T&C Arbeidsrecht) Boek 7, Titel 10, Alg. opm., aant. 7.
35 Certain provisions are also called relatively mandatory. See Asser, C./van
Heerma Voss, G. J. J. (2008) nr. 17.
36 Directive 2001/23/EG (transfer of undertaking)and numerous equal treatment
directives.
37 Directive 1991/533/EEG (Information Directive). See van Arkel (2010).
38 Parliamentary papers II, 1993-1994, 23 438, no. 3, p. 8-9.
39 Asser, C./van Heerma Voss, G. J. J. (2008) no. 17.
331
----------------------- Page 371-----------------------
Agreements Act states that any clause contrary to a collective labour agreement is
void.
The question of whether provisions favourable to an employee, but agreed contrary
to the
collective labour agreement, are also void, is firmly answered in the negative
based on
the principle of favourable treatment.41 Of course the question then arises as to
whether
derogations from all mandatory provisions in title 7.10 of the Civil Code in favour
of an
employee should be declared legal. It follows from the system of the law that in
principle
this question should be answered negatively. If the principle of favourable
treatment ap-
plies as such to title 7.10 of the Civil Code, a stipulated deviation in favour of
an employee
would not be necessary. By stating such provisions explicitly, the legislator has
chosen only
to allow derogations in favour of the employee in the circumstances specifically
identified.
In all other cases, deviation in favour of the employee is also void.42
Table 1 shows that the choice of the legislator of derogations in favour of

the employee
is not linked to a certain category of articles. For example, it is not the case
that the prin-
ciple of favourable treatment only plays a (summary) role with regard to wage
provisions.
Also, in the area of employer liability and dismissal law it is apparent that the
legislator has
permitted derogations. However, it is noticeable that the majority of one-sided
mandatory
provisions is included in the sections on wages and holiday and special leave.
However,
there is no clear system.
Table 1 Overview of unilateral or one-sided mandatory law
Article Subject
7:625 Legal increase for late payment of wages
7:626 Issue payslip in case of a variation
7:628a Entitlement to three hours pay for any call less than
three hours
7:630 Replacement of wages other than by cash
7:634 to 7:643 Vacation and leave
7:656 Certificate
7:658 Employer liability for accidents
7:674 Obligations of the employer in respect of survivors

benefits on death of
employee
7:684 Termination of employment contract with a term longer

than five years,
six months
41 See Fase, W. J. P. M./van Drongelen, J. (2004) p. 89.

42 See also explicitly the legislator: Parliament: Parliamentary Papers II: 25426
Nr. 1 (1996/97) p. 22.
332
----------------------- Page 372-----------------------
9.4.2 Three-Quarters Mandatory Law
Introduction of the so-called three-quarters mandatory law in 1954 had relatively

little
impact on title 7.10 of the Civil Code until 1999. In 1966, the current article
7:634 of the
Civil Code was introduced, and many years later a provision on parental leave
followed,
which is now included in the Work and Care Act. With the introduction of the
Flexibility
and Security Act (1999), three-quarters mandatory law expanded throughout
employ-
ment contract law. The legislator at that time wanted to create more flexibility in
the form
of the ability to customise and differentiate in the employment contract. The
weakening of
mandatory rules to three-quarters mandatory law fitted with the idea of making
employ-
ment relations more flexible.43 The expansion of three-quarters mandatory law
consisted
of payment of wages to employees who did not work after six months (article 7:628
of the
Civil Code), lengthening the maximum probationary period (article 7:652 of
the Civil
Code) and shortening the notice period (article 7:672 of the Civil Code; deviation
in terms
of the provisions on temporary work (Article 7:688a of the Civil Code) and
deviation in
the form of a transfer agreement (article 7:691 of the Civil Code).
Analysis of the current provisions for three-quarters mandatory law
(Table 2) shows
firstly that most provisions are recent (1999). The total number of three-quarters
mandatory
law provisions is somewhat disappointing. One would expect that, given the role and
position
of trade unions as a strong consultative body and years of strong desire by the
government
for more deregulation, title of the 7.10 of the Civil Code would contain more
three-quarters
mandatory law. Does this mean that three-quarters mandatory law hardly exists in
employ-
ment law? We would answer this question in the negative. In the first place, much
three-
quarters mandatory law primarily exists outside employment contract law as such.
Examples
are the Minimum Wage and Minimum Holiday Allowance Act, the Work and Care Act, the
Work Hours Adjustment Act and the Work Hours Act. Besides this, it is arguable that
de-
viating from semi-mandatory law is also possible by means of collective labour
agreements
44
(Table 3). As a result, the possibility of customisation through trade unions
increases further.
The provisions of three-quarters mandatory law in title 7.10 of the Civil Code are
all, with one
exception, contrary to semi-mandatory law (see below), not conditional. Only
article 7:634 of
the Civil Code further qualifies three-quarters mandatory law. A collective labour
agreement
may deviate from the entitlement to holiday for part of a year if a) the employment
contract
has lasted at least one month, and b) leave entitlement is calculated by periods of
one month.
43 Parliamentary Papers II, 1996-1997, 25 263, no. 3, p. 1 and p. 6.

44 This competence is defended on the basis that, if one is entitled
to provide more (surplus), one is also
entitled to do less. Cf. Loonstra, C. J./Zondag, W. A. (2011) p. 40. However,
this position is not completely
unchallenged. It can be argued that for some provisions express agreement with
the individual employee is
required (semi-mandatory). In addition, consistent application of this argument
would mean that where one
can only deviate by five-eighths mandatory law, the unions also play a role.
That is still very questionable.
333
----------------------- Page 373-----------------------
Finally, the legislator has included many provisions involving three-quarters

manda-
tory law in provisions concerning dismissal. When we compare this with semi-
mandatory
law (as described below), we see that this gradation of mandatory law applies
mainly to
holiday and wage provisions and there are hardly any deviations in relation to
dismissal
law. This could be explained by the radical effects of deviation. The weakening of
protec-
tion against dismissal has more drastic consequences for an employee than the
amount
of an advance on his salary. In order to ensure that a worker is still not the
victim of the
unequal relationship between the parties, the legislator sought to compensate for
this in-
equality by granting trade unions the right to grant an exemption.
The option to derogate from mandatory rules through collective labour
agreements
is widely used. The possibility to deviate from the strict rules on temporary
employment
contracts45 is especially popular. Extending the probationary period in temporary
con-
tracts also occurs regularly.46
Table 2 Overview of three-quarters mandatory law
Article Subject
7:628 Contractual risk allocation in wages in cases of more

than six months of
no work
7:629a Appointing expert other than the Dutch Employee Insurance

Agency (UWV)
7:634 Calculating holiday entitlement over part of a year
7:639 Travel vouchers
7:652 Differentiation in term of probation in cases of

temporary contracts for
less than two years or paragraph 5
7:658b Appointing expert other than the UWV
7:664 Deviation from pension agreement in cases of transfer of

undertaking
7:668a para. 5 Deviation from chain arrangement
7:670 para. 13 Prohibition of termination in cases of illness and

military service
7:672 para. 2 Shortening periods of notice for the employer
7:672 para. 4 Shortening remaining notice period of one month for

employer
7:672 para. 6 Shortening legal doubling of notice period by employer in

cases of con-
tractual prolongation of employees notice period
7:691 Deviation from legal periods of temporary contracts in

cases of transfer
agreements
45 Article 7:668a of the Civil Code states that the employer is only entitled to
offer three temporary contracts
over a maximum period of three years. Only by collective employment agreement
can one deviate from this
mandatory rule.
46 See among others Smits, W./van den Abeele, A. (2007) p. 10 e.v.
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----------------------- Page 374-----------------------

9.4.3 Semi-Mandatory Law
Semi-mandatory provisions allow for deviation from mandatory regulation only by

writ-
ten agreement. This deviation by written agreement must be distinguished from the
con-
stitutive requirement of writing by special clauses. The requirement of
writing under
article 7:653 of the Civil Code (non-competition clause) is not a form of semi-
mandatory
law, but a mandatory requirement of law for creating a legal non-
competition clause.
Analysis of the semi-mandatory provisions of title 7.10 of the Civil Code (see
Table 3)
shows the following.
Firstly, it appears that a large number of semi-mandatory provisions (five out
of sev-
enteen) is found in section 3 on holidays and leave. In the revision of this
section in 2000,
the legislator explicitly opted for semi-mandatory law to allow for more
customisation
in the relationship between employer and employee. It is interesting and in line
with
the reasoning based on compensation for inequality described earlier
that the semi-
mandatory law in this section applies solely to giving effect to an entitlement to
vacation
rights. The acquisition of holiday rights as such is a mandatory again. An equal
number of
provisions (five out of seventeen) covers wage provisions. The remaining provisions
relate
to liability for damage caused by the employee, the penalty clause and notice
periods.
It is also striking that virtually all provisions of semi-mandatory law
include further
conditions under which or within which the deviation is permitted by written
agreement.
One could call these stipulated semi-mandatory provisions. In Table 3, these
provisions
are indicated with an *. These conditions are very diverse. Article 7:661 of the
Civil Code
states, for example, that the parties may agree to damage caused by an employee to
the
employer being compensated for by the employee, which is a deviation from the
general
rule, provided that an employee is given an assurance regarding the matter. Article
7:623
of the Civil Code limits advance pay to up to three-quarters of the average wage
over the
previous three months, or the usual wage. Finally, article 7:650 paragraph 6 of the
Civil
Code states that a condition for deviation from the penalty clause is that the
employee
earns more than the minimum wage. This clause shows that the legislator always
wants
to maintain a certain minimum standard of protection of workers in cases of
individual
deviations.
Article 7:628 of the Civil Code is a very interesting provision. The employer
and the
employee can agree upon the following: if no work is available, the employee
receives no
wages even though the cause of the lack of work is down to the employer. Article
7:628
paragraph 5 of the Civil Code stipulates that the parties can use this
semi-mandatory
provision only for a period of six months. After the expiry of that period, it is
only pos-
sible to deviate from the general rule that in principle an employee receives wages
if he or
she does not work for reasons caused by the employer through a collective labour
agree-
ment (three-quarters mandatory law). The possibility of deviation from mandatory
law in
335
----------------------- Page 375-----------------------
article 7:628 of the Civil Code thus changes its hue. At first it has the character
of semi-
mandatory law, but after six months it becomes three-quarters mandatory law.47 The
idea
behind this change in degree of compulsion is that the longer a worker is deprived
of his
primary source of income (wages from labour), the heavier the demands imposed to
allow
deviation from the obligation of the employer to pay wages.
9.4.4 Five-Eighths Mandatory Law and Directive Law
Five-eighths mandatory law cannot be found in title 7.10 of the Civil Code. This
legal
concept can be found in the Work and Care Act and the Work Hours Adjustment Act.
The
missing paragraph (a paragraph that was removed by amendment from the original
draft,
Table 3 Overview of semi-mandatory provisions
Article Subject
7:619 para. 2* Person to whom an employer must produce evidence
7:623* Extension of wage period
7:624* Level advance salary that depends on employer books
7:628* Contractual risk allocation payment of wages in case of no

labour for six
months
7:629 para. 9* Deviation from payment of wages during sickness for two
days
7:637* Considering occupational disability days as vacation days
7:638 para. 2 Determination days off
7:638 para. 7 Deviation from determination period days off
7:640* Redemption of extra-legal days off
7:641 para. 3* Entitlement to remaining days off with respect to new

employer
7:650 para. 6* Deviation from regulation penalty clause
7:661* Deviation from regulation on employees liability
7:667 para. 3 Intermediate termination of a temporary employment contract
7:672 para. 5 Extension notice period employer
7:672 para. 6* Extension notice period employee
7:680 para. 4 Increased fixed compensation for damages
7:688 Deviation to the detriment of the commercial representative
47 Loonstra, C. J.; Zondag, W. A. (eds.) (2010) p. 308.
336
----------------------- Page 376-----------------------

but has since played a significant role in case law) of article 7:613 of the Civil
Code (uni-
lateral adjustment of the employment contract) provided that the employer had
adopted a
serious reason (as referred to in paragraph 1 of the mentioned article) if he had
reached
agreement about the modification of work conditions with, inter alia, the works
council.
The participation body was therefore able to meet one of the constituent
requirements
of the unilateral modification clause, by which the amendment of working
conditions
became de facto five-eighths mandatory law.48 Under pressure from the trade unions
in
particular, this second paragraph was revoked, putting the participation body aside
as a
serious player in title 7.10 of the Civil Code.49
Furthermore, there is hardly any directive law in title 7.10 of the Civil
Code. Some-
times article 7:627 of the Civil Code is referred to as an example of a
supplementary provi-
sion. The article states that no wages need to be paid for the period in which an
employee
does not work. However, this provision is overshadowed by article 7:628 of the
Civil Code
(no work / wages) and article 7:629 of the Civil Code (wages during illness).
9.4.5 Analysis of Mandatory Law in Title 7.10 of the Civil Code
An analysis of the different degrees of mandatory law in title 7.10 of

the Civil Code
shows that there is no discernible system governing the choice of (unilateral)
mandatory
law, semi-mandatory law, three-quarters mandatory law, five-eighths mandatory law
or
directive law. The only tentative conclusion to be drawn is that in cases of
abandonment
or weakening of protection against dismissal (i.e. the regulation of temporary
employ-
ment contracts, the probationary period and the shortening of periods of notice),
the
legislator always chooses three-quarters mandatory law. Semi-mandatory law notably
applies to holiday and wage provisions. There are many more semi-mandatory provi-
sions, while deviations from mandatory law are often limited. Finally, many
provisions
are purely mandatory because they implement EU Directives. In section 3
we noted
that, at the level of legislative technique within employment contract law, a clear
trend
over the years is apparent to create more and more scope for customisation through
the
wide range of degrees of compulsion. It follows that this technique is used in
title 7.10
of the Civil Code only to a limited extent. This title is and will remain
predominantly
mandatory.
48 In fact, because this is an interpretation of the constitutive requirements of

Article 7:613 Civil Code. There
must still be written agreement. Because the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands, however, does not im-
pose onerous requirements on the requirement of a written agreement (see
Supreme Court 19 March 2011,
LJN BO9570), it is arguable that compliance with the participation body can
effect changes in employment
contract.
49 Jellinghaus, S. F. H./Zondag, W. A. (2010) p. 255.
337
----------------------- Page 377-----------------------

9.5 Developments and Critique of Mandatory Labour Law: Goods Made
to Measure and Fashion Trends
Employment contract law still has to a significant extent the same

mandatory charac-
ter as the Employment Contract Act of 1907. Socio-economic conditions since that
time
have, however, changed dramatically. The factory worker of the beginning of
industriali-
sation no longer exists. One may question whether the assumption that a worker is
in an
unequal position in relation to his employer still holds, and whether it still
justifies the
use of mandatory law.50 Furthermore, there is now a wide variety of
workers. Manda-
tory employment contract law applies to all of them when they work under a contract
of
employment. The same mandatory provisions of title 7.10 of the Civil Code apply to
both
the CEO of a multinational and a relatively unskilled worker doing heavy physical
work.
It has been suggested in the literature that workers who earn more than a certain
income
threshold should be dealt with outside employment contract law. It is argued that
they
have no need for compensation for inequality, and that they are quite capable of
taking
care of themselves.51 Developments and discussions like these confirm the need for
more
customisation. This section will focus on whether the current use of mandatory
provisions
in title 7.10 of the Civil Code obstructs this need and whether adjustment of the
relevant
provisions is necessary.
9.5.1 Goods Made to Measure Despite Mandatory Law
Although employment contract law consists mainly of mandatory law, this does not
mean
that there is no room for customisation. On the contrary, analysis of the various
manda-
tory provisions shows that the material standard of the relevant mandatory
provisions is
usually an open standard. For example, parties must behave towards each other as a
good
employer and good employee (article 7:611 of the Civil Code); the employer has a
duty of
care to prevent injury to the employee (article 7:658 of the Civil Code); an
employer may
fire an employee summarily if he has a compelling reason to do so (article 7:677
of the
Civil Code), and the court may, under certain circumstances, grant a
party reasonable
50 Duk, R. A. A. (1996); van der Heijden, P. F. (1997); Rood, M. G. (2000) en

Loonstra, C. J./Westerbeek, M.
(2007).
51 See Jacobs, A. T. J. M. (1994) en in gelijke zin Jacobs, A. T. J. M. (1997) In
legislative proposal 31 862 (Amend-
ment of Book 7, Title 10 of the Civil Code with regard to limiting
the amount of the compensation for
termination of contract under article 7:685 of the Civil Code for persons with
an annual salary of 75,000
or above) the legislator also differentiates on the basis of a level of income.
Employees who earn more than
75,000 can receive a severance payment up to the level of their annual income.
We can also observe dif-
ferentiation in some places in title 7.10 of the Civil Code. See for example
article 7:650 of the Civil Code in
which deviation from the first paragraphs is allowed if the employee earns more
than the minimum wage.
338
----------------------- Page 378-----------------------

compensation in a case of dismissal (article 7:685 paragraph 8 of the Civil Code).

There is
ample scope for customisation in the interpretation of these open standards (by a
judge).
In the interpretation of good employment practice for example, the same cannot be
ex-
pected from a small shopkeeper as a large multinational.52 Similarly, the Supreme
Court
of the Netherlands held in the context of liability for employment accidents that
it is good
employment practice for an employer to ensure proper insurance, and that the
extent of
that obligation should be decided from case to case taking into account all the
circumstances,
with particular reference to the insurance options existing at the time. Whether
insurance is
available at a premium which it is reasonable for the employer to pay is also
relevant, as is
the prevailing social view of what damages (in terms of both their nature and their
amount)
adequate insurance should cover.53
From the phrase at a premium which it is reasonable for the employer to

pay, it fol-
lows that, depending on the type of employer, the amount of insurance increases or
de-
creases.54 Another example is the concept of a compelling reason for summary
dismissal.
Previous decisions have shown that the Supreme Court of the Netherlands tests all
the
circumstances of the case in answering the question of whether there is
a compelling
reason for the dismissal in question.55 This means that the same behaviour by an
employee
might in one case justify instant dismissal but not in another.
The extent to which the court interprets these open standards has
implications for
how employers and employees experience the degree of compulsion of such provisions.
As the jurisprudence poses high(er) and according to some possibly unattainable

de-
mands on the duty of care of an employer, an employer would increasingly experience
the
mandatory provision of article 7:658 of the Civil Code as oppressive. In the same
sense
it can be considered that the extent to which the law covers the liability of an
employer
to reintegrate disabled employees determines the answer to the question of whether
the
mandatory nature of employment contract law leaves enough scope for customisation
and
autonomy of the parties. The most striking example, however, is the frequent
complaint
heard from employers that, whenever an employee is dismissed, a bag of money must
be
handed over. This again is the result of a judge meeting an open standard that
gives him in
certain circumstances the discretion to grant employees fair compensation. For
the sake
of legal uniformity and legal certainty sub-district courts have developed a
formula for
awarding fair compensation, which is known as the sub-district court formula. It
allows
the circumstances of the case to be taken into account by means of a C-factor
applied to
monthly wages and the duration of the employment contract. When judges grant
standard
52 Verhulp, E. (2003) p. 10.

53 HR 1 February 2008, LJN: BB6175, r.o. 4.3.
54 Houwling, A. R. (2009).
55 HR 12 February 1999, JAR 1999/102 (Schrijvers/Van Essen).
339
----------------------- Page 379-----------------------
compensation based on the latest monthly salary multiplied by the number of

weighted
years of service multiplied by a factor 1 (neutral C-factor), this works
against creating
customisation.
All these examples show that it is not the degree of compulsion of many
mandatory
legal provisions of title 7.10 of the Civil Code that obstructs customisation, but
the way
in which judges quantify the relevant material standards. If the courts do justice
to the
circumstances of the case, customisation at the highest level can be delivered,
despite the
mandatory nature of title 7.10 of the Civil Code.56
9.5.2 Goods Made to Measure Through Wider Use of Different Degrees
of Mandatory Law
If the rationale behind many of the provisions of mandatory law is found in

compensa-
tion for inequality, then why is three-quarters mandatory law not used more often?
Does
the collective of workers in the form of a trade union not offer sufficient
compensation?
Heerma van Voss commented on these questions in 2005. First, he found that
deviation
from certain provisions is simply not possible because they are derived from EU
Directives
that impose mandatory application. Furthermore, he found that there is little scope
to ex-
pand the use of this degree of mandatory law beyond the current three-quarters
mandatory
law provisions. The only interesting possibility, according to Heerma van Voss,
exists in dis-
missal law. According to him, both article 6 of the Extraordinary Labour Relations
Decree,
concerning permission for dismissal by the government, and the framework for
testing the
legitimacy of dismissal (found in the Dismissal Decree), could exist under three-
quarters
mandatory law. Employers associations and trade unions would then be able to
establish
discharge criteria themselves, taking into account the specific needs of their
industry.57
Although the idea sounds appealing, some caution is required. The level of
member-
ship of a trade union agreeing a collective labour agreement is generally very low
in the
56 A second refinement that can be placed with respect to the alleged straitjacket
of employment law is that
the parties have a certain freedom to shape their relationship such that no
employment contract exists. It
is settled law of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands relating to the
classification question (article 7:610
Civil Code) that it also determines what the parties in concluding the
agreement had in mind (HR 14 No-
vember 1997, NJ 1998, 149 (Green/Schoevers ) and HR 10 December 2004, NJ 2005,
239 (Diosynth/Large)).
In case law the Supreme Court of the Netherlands has held that the social
position of the parties must also
be taken into account. The social position of course colours the value that one
can and must attach to the
intention of the parties. The intention of an economically dependent worker
will, for example, be given less
weight than the intention of an economically independent worker. Access to
employment law and thus
the applicability of many mandatory regulations already does justice to the
special position of the parties
and therefore also includes a certain degree of customisation. See extensively
on this subject: Jansen, C. J.
H./Loonstra, C. J. (2010).
57 Heerma van Voss, G. J. J. (2005) pp. 126-128.
340
----------------------- Page 380-----------------------
Netherlands and is certainly not representative. In any case, the total number of
workers
organised into trade unions in the Netherlands is low. Many workers are
deliberately not
members of a trade union in order to achieve better working conditions, but only
because
of certain legal services the trade union provides. In many trade unions the
average age of
members is rising rapidly. It is questionable whether and to what extent it would
be wise
to allow a trade union to draw up dismissal criteria that apply to an entire
industry, when
in fact the union represents only a small part of that particular branch, which
moreover
forms a specific cohort of that branch (e.g. employees aged 45 years or older). The
chances
are that no balanced result (for the entire industry) would be achieved. With
respect to
major employment and worker protection such as protection against dismissal and
redun-
dancy selection criteria, this would not be a desirable development.58 In general,
therefore,
whether the role of trade unions as inequality compensatory institutions has now
be-
come obsolete is a matter of debate.59 Partly because of the lack of laws and
regulations in
the field of collective labour agreement law we do not believe that a further
expansion of
three-quarters mandatory law in title 7.10 of the Civil Code is appropriate.60
9.5.3 Differentiated Mandatory Law
The legislator of 1907 deliberately opted for a degree of differentiation in level

of com-
pulsion and not for differentiation in groups of employees. The latter
type of differen-
tiation was suggested during the deliberations on the Employment Contract Act in
the
Upper House. A proposal was made that three distinct categories of employees should
be distinguished, namely the workers in factory and crafts, servants, and others in
paid
employment. Only with respect to the first category was it considered to be fair to
include
mandatory law in the legislation.61 Finally, a uniform system of rules
was introduced,
which applied to everyone who worked under an employment contract. Today, there is
a widespread view that certain types of employees no longer need protection and
should
therefore not fall within the scope of title 7.10 of the Civil Code. This recurring
debate of-
ten resembles a fashion trend. It was, for instance, obviously very trendy in
2008 and 2009
58 See in the same sense Verhulp, E. (2003) pp. 18 e.v.

59 See recently on the legitimacy of the formation of employment conditions by
labour unions the fascinating
article by Beltzer, R. M. (2010). In politics there is concern about these
developments. One finds, for example,
in the Social Note 2002, among others the question of whether central
organisations of employers and em-
ployees still have a grip on their followers. See Parliamentary Papers II,
20012002, 28 001, nos. 12, p. 44.
60 Another development that is increasingly taking place is delegation of
competence in a collective labour
agreement to a local participation body or to individual employers and
employees. In that way more room
for customisation at the company level is offered. At the same time one can
wonder whether such delegation
is allowed. In fact this is a provision of three-quarters mandatory law that
actually becomes of five-eighths
mandatory or even semi-mandatory law.
61 Bles, A. E. (1907) p. 222.
341
----------------------- Page 381-----------------------
to tackle the dismissal payments of top executive employees. This resulted in both
a leg-
islative proposal capping dismissal payments for employees who earn more than
75,000
a year62 and in an even more striking legislative proposal that managers of certain
types
of companies should no longer be entitled to enter into an employment

contract with
the company.63 It is our firm conviction that the legislator should not be seduced
by such
fashion trends, but should focus on the fundamental question of whether

differentiation
in employment contract law is necessary.64
Examination of title 7.10 of the Civil Code reveals that, within this title,
differentia-
tion already occurs to some extent in a number of places. A number of provisions,
for ex-
65
ample, do not apply to workers employed on a temporary employment agency contract.
The section on transfers of undertaking is not applicable to crews on a ship and

bankrupt
employers.66 Outside title 7.10 of the Civil Code, reference may be made to the
exclusion
of the requirement of permission for dismissal under the Extraordinary Labour

Relations
Decree for, inter alia, managing directors.67 These examples involve full exclusion
from
a particular regulation. The question is whether the exclusion of certain

regulations is
also desirable for assertive and socio-economically more independent workers. Duk
com-
ments on this issue, stating that it can hardly be said that one or more provisions
should
not apply to certain categories of workers. He illustrates this with the example of
a non-
competition clause. According to him, socio-economically independent workers
benefit
from a protective clause in the form of the non-competition clause. It cannot be
said with
certainty that such a worker does not need this protection. Duk therefore advocates
an
investigation of which provisions for differentiation in terms of protection are
desirable
and to what extent (what degree of mandatory law), as opposed to differentiation in
pro-
tection as such (some employees are protected, some are not). By that he means that
it
is conceivable that provisions that are now mandatory or three-quarters mandatory
will
apply as semi-mandatory or even supplementary law for certain types of workers.68
As a
legal precedent for such differentiation in degree of compulsion reference may be

made
to article 16 paragraph 5 of the Minimum Wage and Minimum Holiday Allowance Act,
62 Legislative proposal 31 862.

63 Legislative proposal 31 763. The basis of this regulation is that one finds it
unacceptable that a driver on
departure especially if he has failed would get a high severance payment
based on his employment pro-
tection. See for reservations and sharp criticism of this regulation
Parliamentary papers I, 2009-2010, 31 763,
nr. B, p. 6-7.
64 See also Stouthart, G. A. (2010).
65 See article 7:649 Civil Code (equal treatment working time) and
article 7:657 Civil Code (information
requirement outstanding vacancy for temporary labour).
66 See article 7:666 Civil Code.
67 See article 2 en 6 lid 9 BBA.
68 Duk, R. A. A. (1996).
342
----------------------- Page 382-----------------------

which provides that if an employee receives more than three times the minimum wage,
the parties may determine by written agreement (semi-mandatory law) that he or she
is
not entitled to holiday pay.
This approach does of course require an examination of the suitability of the
regula-
tion concerned for a lighter degree of compulsion. Some provisions, such as the
right to
holiday leave, are not suitable because they are mandatory under EU legislation.
Other
provisions are not suitable or are less suitable because they protect certain
fundamental
employment rights (for example the right to free choice of employment under article
19
paragraph 3 of the Dutch Constitution and the non-competition clause of article
7:653
of the Civil Code). The regulation of notice periods would probably be suitable for
dif-
ferentiation in terms of degree of compulsion as would the provisions
concerning the
method of payment of wages. Where the legislator finds that at least a minimum
level of
protection should be provided, there is no room for extensive differentiation in
degree of
compulsion. It is for example hard to imagine that income protection during
occupational
disability (article 7:629 of the Civil Code) would become semi-mandatory or even
merely
directive law. It is only reasonable that, as the need to protect outweighs other
consider-
ations, deviations from the law cannot be made too easy, even in differentiated
degrees
of compulsion. Van Peijpe therefore pleads for differentiation on the basis of
economic
independence for each aspect of employment law. Differentiation in the field of
dismissal
law, for example, is possible (economically independent people do not need
mandatory
legal protection against dismissal), while this does not hold in the field of
exclusion from
social security (this would result in the undermining of the principle of
solidarity).69 The
main objection to this approach is that it is difficult to formulate an objective

criterion
that allows for differentiated degrees of compulsion and does not undermine the
ratio for
mandatory provisions in title 7.10 of the Civil Code, namely compensation for
disparity.
After all, why would an employee who earns at least three times the minimum wage
have
a better negotiating position? Is he not, like other employees, still heavily
economically
dependent on his employer? This is and remains a difficult and rather arbitrary
matter.
However, it remains an issue worthy of further investigation.
9.5.4 The Future of Mandatory Labour Law
What is the consequence of all the above? In our opinion, the future of mandatory
em-
ployment contract law and the necessity for further differentiation of degrees of
com-
pulsion in title 7.10 of the Civil Code depends on a number of developments. First,
one
could argue that the current system requires no adjustment, because the labour
market
69 See van Peijpe, T. (1999).
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----------------------- Page 383-----------------------
regulates itself. Where the parties (both the work provider and the worker)
experience the
protection imposed by title 7.10 of the Civil Code as too restrictive, they find
other ways
to regulate their relationship. In this context, we note the huge increase in the
number of
70
self-employed professionals without employees and directors as principal
shareholders.
Because these parties do not fall within article 7:610 of the Civil Code, title
7.10 of the
Civil Code does not apply to them. This raises the question of whether some aspects
of
work and working relationships require no further protection. However, this
discussion
does not concern differentiation under title 7.10 of the Civil Code, but the
introduction of
more mandatory legal protection outside title 7.10 of the Civil Code.
A second important development is the positioning of the trade unions and
partici-
pation bodies and the willingness of individual workers and employees to join a
trade
union or participation body. In our view, the distinction between trade unions and
par-
ticipation bodies will fade, but employee representatives (collectives) will
continue to exist
and be of added value to enforce collective bargaining agreements. Because of
growing
individualisation, the importance of collective agreements will be under increasing
pres-
sure, and its focus will be on a limited number of subjects. Employees and
employers have
a need for customisation, so that the focus will be more at firm level than
industry level.71
This development will lead to the participation body having a more important
position in
consultation on working conditions. This would mean that more five-eighths
mandatory
law within title 7.10 of the Civil Code is reasonable. We would encourage this
develop-
ment, if at the same time the legal status and quality of participation bodies and
employee
participation law are improved. These bodies should be able to actually negotiate
with the
employer. Otherwise, we might as well just stick with directive law.
The third development to be considered is a reassessment of
compensation for
inequality. The legislator will, because of the wide variety of working
relationships, increas-
ingly face the question of in what areas inequality exists and should be
compensated for
by regulation. That compensation for inequality and employee protection then
focuses
rapidly on equality rights and the protection of risk groups (disabled employees,
ethnic
minorities, etc.). In doing so, the distinction between employees within the
meaning of
article 7:610 of the Civil Code and other workers will fade more, so this question
quickly
leads to the consideration of labour law in general. Should the employment contract
be
mandatorily regulated or should only fundamental rights (such as non-
discrimination,
collective action, free choice of employment, social subsistence) for and in the
exercise
of labour be guaranteed?72 This means that mandatory labour law (in its various
degrees)
70 According to the CBS, the number of self-employed professionals is

approximately 717.000 in 2011. See on
this development among others: Verburg, L. G. (2010) pp. 44-45.
71 See among others Bakas, A./van der Woude, M. et al. (2010) pp. 136 e.v.
72 See Veneziani, B. (2009).
344
----------------------- Page 384-----------------------

will focus on some partial aspects of current labour law. Within this focus,
differentiation
will then take place, depending on what is to be protected. The prohibition on
termination
during pregnancy will remain mandatory, for example, while dismissal criteria in
general
could be three-quarters or even five-eighths mandatory law.
9.6 Conclusion
The drafters of the Employment Contract Act of 1907 presented a timeless

design for
mandatory provisions. The premise that underlies this design is found in the
principle
of compensation for inequality. The employee needed protection against the much
more
powerful employer. This design was later strengthened by the introduction
of three-
quarters mandatory and five-eighths mandatory law, in which the starting point of
com-
pensation for disparity still plays an important role. The design of various
degrees of com-
pulsion turned out not to be a short-lived trend, but remains in fashion today. An
analysis
of the different degrees of compulsion contained in title 7.10 of the Civil Code
reveals
that there is no discernible uniform system that explains the choice of
(unilateral) man-
datory, semi-mandatory, three-quarters mandatory, five-eighths mandatory and
directive
law. The only tentative conclusion that can be drawn is that, in cases of
abandonment or
weakening protection against dismissal (i.e. chain scheme regulation, probationary
period
and shortening of periods of notice), the legislator has always chosen
three-quarters
mandatory law. Semi-mandatory law mainly arises in connection with holiday and wage
provisions. Moreover, many additional mandatory law provisions are stipulated, as a

result
of which deviations from mandatory law are often limited. Finally, many of the
provisions
are purely mandatory because they implement EU Directives.
We concluded that the legislator has been very progressive in the design of
the various
degrees of mandatory law, but that its implementation in title 7.10 of the Civil
Code is left
behind in a certain sense. It has also been noted that the mandatory character of
provi-
sions does not have to undermine the desire for more customisation. Often, the open
stan-
dards of mandatory provisions simply allow for such customisation. Judges give
meaning
to these open standards, and thus determine the degree of customisation. If judges
do not
take reality into account (for example, a fixed severance payment that is not
related to the
circumstances of the case) or impose excessive demands on employers in complying
with
a specific standard (for example, level of duty of care in cases of accidents at
work), the
customisation of labour law will remain limited. Extending three-quarters mandatory
law
in areas such as dismissal law would not be wise, nor is it likely to happen
because of the
decreasing level of organisation of employees. One could argue that this degree of
com-
pulsion seems to be out of fashion. Increased use of five-eighths mandatory law and
dif-
ferentiated degrees of compulsion, whereby the degree of compulsion differs for
different
345
----------------------- Page 385-----------------------
types of employees (where the employee is less economically dependent on the

employer,
the applicable provisions may be subject to a reduced degree of compulsion), and
focus on
various partial aspects of labour law (labour law that only guarantees fundamental
rights
for and in the exercise of labour), could on the other hand become the new fashion.
For
this purpose, reconsideration of the overall design is needed without removing the
prin-
ciple of compensation for inequality from the drawing board.
346
----------------------- Page 386-----------------------
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350
----------------------- Page 390-----------------------
10 Schutz und kollektive Privatautonomie
das Arbeitsverhltnis in seiner
Besonderheit
Eva Kocher
Summary
The idea that employment and labour contracts constitute a very specific kind of
civil con-
tract is very common in Germany, as it is in other legal systems. But in the end,
what does
the specificity amount to? One of the main characteristics of the employment
relationship is
its long-term orientation, which, however, is quite common in a variety of civil
contracts. The
same is true of the dependence of one party on another; economic interdependency
causes
power inequalities in a great variety of economic civil contracts. Nevertheless,
there are two
criteria that can be used to distinguish the employment relationship. One is
subordination,
in the sense of one party (the employee) being integrated into the employers
organisational
division of labour, an aspect of linked contracts in the sense of EuSoCo principle
5. The other
is the fact that employment (for most people) is the basis of livelihood; the life
time contract
not only has a strong human dimension (EuSoCo-principle 2), but it is also
supposed to
provide regular income in the sense of EuSoCo principle 14.
This chapter evaluates how the latter fact, in particular, can be used to
apply some as-
pects of employment and labour law to contracts of employment that have not
belonged to
employment law or labour law in the strict sense. It also points to the
problem of integrat-
ing contracts in three-way-relationships into a system of employment safeguards by
using
the legal concepts of linked contracts (EuSoCo principle 4) in terms of
subordination and
integration in an organisation.
Das Arbeitsrecht ist nicht nur das Dauerschuldverhltnis mit berragender Bedeutung
fr
Leben und Existenzsicherung eines Groteils der Bevlkerung es ist auch ein
Rechts-
bereich, der in den meisten Rechtsordnungen weitgehend auerhalb des
allgemeinen
Zivilrechts geregelt ist. Das BGB wurde mit den Regelungen der 617-619 BGB (die
sogenannte Frsorgepflicht des Arbeitgebers1) zwar mit einem Tropfen sozialen

ls
1 Kritisch zu dieser Begrifflichkeit, die in engem Zusammenhang mit der Idee des
Gemeinschaftsverhlt-
nisses steht, unten bei Fn. 97 ff; zivilrechtlich handelt es sich bei der
Frsorge um nichts anderes als
die Wahrnehmung allgemeiner vertragsrechtlicher Nebenpflichten ( 242
Abs. 2 BGB) (so auch schon
Schwerdtner, P. (1970)).
351
----------------------- Page 391-----------------------

Eva Kocher
gesalbt.2 ber Regelungen zur Kndigungsmglichkeit grundstzlich unbefristeter

Ver-
trge gingen die 611 ff. BGB ansonsten nicht wesentlich hinaus. Es mag in
Deutschland
zwar kein Arbeitsgesetzbuch geben; die Tatsache, dass es eine jahrzehntealte
Diskussion
3
um eine solche Kodifikation gibt, jedoch keine berlegungen einer strkeren
Integration
des Arbeitsrechts ins BGB, zeigt, wie stark das Verstndnis des Arbeitsrechts als
Sonder-
4
privatrecht auch in Deutschland verankert ist.
Ob diese Disparitt nun, wie schon Anton Menger meinte, der Fall war,
obgleich die
ungeheure Mehrheit der Besitzlosen, ja die groe Mehrheit der ganzen Nation darauf
ihre
Existenz grndet oder vielmehr weil dies so ist, soll zunchst offen bleiben.
In den
neueren Diskussionen um den sozialen Schutz in werkvertraglichen Konstellationen
oder
in der Leiharbeit6 wird jedenfalls wieder deutlich, dass diese Trennung zwischen
zivil- und
arbeitsrechtlichen Vertrgen durchaus nicht unproblematisch ist. Erwerbsarbeit wird

in
unterschiedlichen Beschftigungs- und Vertragsformen geleistet, und Arbeit wird
durch
Unternehmen auf unterschiedliche Art und Weise genutzt, ohne dass diese
Unterschiede
sich wesentlich in den Umstnden der Arbeitsleistung widerspiegeln wrden und ohne
dass diese Unterschiede wesentlich etwas am Regulierungsbedarf und den

Interessen
der Beschftigten ndern wrden. Durch die Trennung des Arbeitsrechts vom
Zivilrecht
hat dennoch die Unterscheidung zwischen einem Arbeitsvertrag mit
Arbeitnehmer/in
und Arbeitgeber/in einerseits und einem zivilrechtlichen Werk-, Honorar- oder
anderen
Dienst mit Auftraggeber/in und Auftragnehmer/in andererseits gravierende
Rechtsfol-
gen, die sich mit den sozialen Sachverhalten und Interessenkonstellationen, die
ihnen zu-
grunde liegen, hufig nicht rechtfertigen lassen.
Effektivitt und Wirksamkeit des Arbeitsrechts wird sich in diesen
Brchen nur
gewhrleisten lassen, wenn die tiefe Spaltung zwischen Arbeits- und Zivilrecht
nicht nur
aus zivilrechtlicher Sicht7, sondern auch aus arbeitsrechtlicher Sicht in Frage
gestellt wird.
Statt nach mehr Zivilrecht ins Arbeitsrecht wre zu fragen: Wie kommt mehr
Arbeits-
recht ins Zivilrecht?8
2 Zu dieser Metapher und ihrer damaligen Verwendung (Otto Gierke sprach von
sozialistischem l) Rep-
gen, T. (2000) p. 406.
3 Siehe z.B. Rmer, P. (1970); Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (1977); zu den
Debatten in der Kaiserzeit siehe
Becker, M. (1995) pp. 299 ff; zuletzt die Diskussion um den Entwurf
eines Arbeitsvertragsgesetzes von
Henssler/Preis fr die Bertelsmann-Stiftung, Bertelsmann Stiftung (2012). URL:
http://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/bst/hs.xsl/prj_52988.htm; grundstzlich dagegen:
Weiss, M. (2008) pp. 14 f.
4 Zum Begriff Sonderprivatrecht und seiner Kritik Kocher, E. (2007) pp. 76 f.
5 Menger, A. (1904) pp. 160 ff.; Repgen, T. (2000) zu den damals gegebenen
Grnden fr die Vernachlssi-
gung des Arbeitsvertrags der Industriearbeiter.
6 Siehe z.B. Dubler, W.: Regulierungsmglichkeiten im Zusammenhang mit
Werkvertrgen (2011); zu den
empirischen Fragen siehe auch Otto Brenner Stiftung; Koch, A. et al.:
Werkvertrge in der Arbeitswelt: OBS-
Arbeitspapier Nr. 2 (2012); siehe auch schon die Fragen in Kommission der
Europischen Gemeinschaften:
Grnbuch: KOM(2006) 708 endg. (22.11.2006).
7 Richardi, R. (1974); Lobinger, T. (2011).
8 Dies ist die vierte Perspektive, zu der sich Perulli selbst
bekennt (Perulli, A. (2003). URL: http://www
.metiseurope.eu/content/pdf/n8/7_parasubordination.pdf. pp. 102 f, 105).
352
----------------------- Page 392-----------------------
10 Schutz und kollektive Privatautonomie das Arbeitsverhltnis in seiner
Besonderheit
10.1 Arbeitsrecht: Rechtsfolgen
10.1.1 Humanitt fr Lebenszeitvertrge und Existenzsicherung:

Langfristigkeit9 und Sicherung von Existenzgrundlagen10
Zunchst einmal zu den spezifischen zwingenden Rechten und Ansprchen, die sich im
Zusammenhang mit einem Arbeitsvertrag ergeben. Hier wre zunchst der Schutz von
Gesundheit und Sicherheit am Arbeitsplatz zu nennen. 618 BGB ist insofern die
Grund-
norm im deutschen Recht; ausfhrlich geregelt ist dies jetzt im
Arbeitsschutzgesetz, das bis
heute teil mit ffentlich-rechtlichen Instrumenten agiert.11 Dazu gehrt u. a. das
Arbeits-
zeitgesetz mit der Begrenzung der Hchstarbeitszeit; auch das Urlaubsrecht dient in
erster
Linie dem Schutz der Gesundheit der Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer.12
Dann gibt es eine weitere Gruppe von Normen, die vor allem
Kontinuittsinteres-
sen und die entsprechende soziale Sicherung der Beschftigten regeln. Dazu
gehren
der Kndigungsschutz, aber auch das Recht des Betriebsbergangs (das sogar im BGB
geregelt ist, siehe 613a BGB). Das Befristungsrecht gehrt als Ausnahme vom
grund-
stzlichen Kndigungsschutz und Durchbrechung des Grundsatzes des unbefristeten Ar-
beitsverhltnisses13 ebenfalls in diese Gruppe von Normen.
Wie stark gerade im Arbeitsrecht das gesamte Leben der

Arbeitnehmerinnen und
Arbeitnehmer geregelt und durch Rechte abgesttzt wird, zeigt sich darber hinaus
an
den zahlreichen Regelungen zur Vereinbarkeit von Familie, Privatleben und
Erwerbs-
arbeit: Elternurlaub, Teilzeitansprche, selbst die Regelungen ber die
behinderungs-
gerechte Anpassung von Arbeitspltzen oder ber die gegenseitigen
Verpflichtungen,
Weiterbildung anzubieten und an Weiterbildung teilzunehmen, sind Ausdruck der Lang-
fristigkeit des Arbeitsverhltnisses und der Tatsache, dass auf ihm die gesamte
Existenz
der Mehrzahl der Menschen grndet.14
Neben den arbeitsrechtlichen Normen im engeren Sinn stehen die

sozialrechtlichen
und sozialversicherungsrechtlichen Sicherungen bei den Risiken des Alters, der
Gesund-
heit und der Arbeitslosigkeit. Auch sie knpfen an das Bestehen eines Arbeits- oder
Be-
schftigungsverhltnisses an.
9 Siehe oben Prinzipien sozialer Dauerschuldverhltnisse Prinzip Nr.1

(Lebenszeitvertrge) und 3 (Langfristigkeit).
10 Prinzip Nr. 2 (Humanitt) und 14 (Existenzsicherung).
11 Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2010) p. 54 zur Geschichte.
12 Prinzip Nr. 5 (Rcksichtnahme).
13 Art. 24 der ESC (Europische Sozialcharta) und Art. 30 EU-Grundrechtscharta;
siehe auch schon Erw-
gungsgrund 6 der Rahmenvereinbarung ber befristete Arbeitsvertrge,
Richtlinie 1999/70/EG (Rat der
Europischen Union: Richtlinie 1999/70/EG des Rates vom 28. Juni 1999
zu der EGB-UNICE-CEEP-
Rahmenvereinbarung ber befristete Arbeitsvertrge: L 175 (1999)).
14 Zu diesen Regelungen ausfhrlich Kocher, E./Groskreutz, H. et al. (2013).
353
----------------------- Page 393-----------------------
Eva Kocher
Zur Regelung des unmittelbaren Austauschverhltnisses und damit der

Existenz-
sicherung der Beschftigten gibt es in Deutschland hingegen relativ wenige
staatli-
che Normen wie auch in anderen Rechtsbereichen. Der liberale Grundsatz, dass die
Regelung des Austauschverhltnisses (also des Preises) allein dem Markt

berlassen
bleiben soll, manifestiert sich z.B. darin, dass das AGB-Recht die
Austauschbedin-
gungen und Preise von der AGB-Kontrolle ausnimmt ( 307 Abs. 4 Satz 3 BGB).
Wichtigste
gesetzliche Norm hierzu ist das Wucherverbot, das jedoch als solches
nicht spezifisch
arbeitsrechtlich ist ( 138 BGB). Einen allgemeinen gesetzlichen Mindestlohn gibt
es in
Deutschland (noch) nicht.15
10.1.2 Kollektivitt: Die Bedeutung der Tarifautonomie16
Begrndet wird das Fehlen gesetzlicher Mindestentgelte hufig damit, dass

Mindestent-
gelte im deutschen Recht fast ausschlielich in Anknpfung an tarifliche Normen
fest-
gesetzt und festgestellt werden ( 5 TVG, AEntG, 3a AG).17 Der Anwendungsbereich
des AEntG, das es seit einigen Jahren erleichtert, tarifliche Normen auf alle
Arbeitsver-
hltnisse im Geltungsbereich anzuwenden, wird stetig ausgedehnt,18 whrend das
Gesetz
ber die Festsetzung von Mindestarbeitsbedingungen in Kommissionen (MiArbG) noch

nicht aktiviert wurde.
Auch fr die Feststellung von Lohnwucher nach 138 BGB und 291 Abs. 1 Nr.
3
StGB wird mittlerweile unwidersprochen an tarifliche Normen angeknpft.
Tarifvertrge
gelten in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesarbeitsgerichts zwar nicht als absolute
Grenze
oder magebliche Orientierungsmarke fr die Bestimmung von Lohnwucher. Sie werden
aber als Ausdruck des Marktpreises zugrunde gelegt bzw. in den Worten des Bundes-
arbeitsgerichts als Ausdruck des objektiven Werts der Arbeitsleistung, der sich
nach
dem allgemeinen Lohnniveau im Wirtschaftsgebiet bestimme,19 das nur dann den
Tarif-
entgelten des jeweiligen Wirtschaftszweiges entspreche, wenn diese blich seien

was
angenommen wird, wenn mindestens 50% der Arbeitgeber in dem
Wirtschaftsgebiet
tarifgebunden sind oder wenn mindestens 50% der Beschftigten bei
tarifgebundenen
15 Zur Debatte siehe z.B. Nassibi, G. (2012); Waltermann, R. (2010) sowie die
Beschlussempfehlung 10 des 68.
Deutschen Juristentags 2010.
16 Prinzip Nr. 3 (Langfristigkeit).
17 Prinzip Nr. 9 (Entgelt).
18 Siehe die Ausdehnungen des Anwendungsbereichs in 4 AEntG; vgl. auch die
Diskussion um die Erleich-
terung der Allgemeinverbindlicherklrung nach 5 TVG, z.B. Bispinck, R.
(2012).
19 Zuletzt BAG: Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz, Lohnwucher. AppNo. BAG (5 AZR 527/99),
AuR 2001, 509.
Erfurt: 23.05.2001. m. krit. Anm. Peter.
354
----------------------- Page 394-----------------------
Besonderheit
Arbeitgebern arbeiten.20 Gibt es eine solche tarifliche Regelung, die den Marktwert
der
Arbeit festlegt, so betrachten die Arbeitsgerichte ein Entgelt von 50% des
Tarifentgelts als
Lohnwucher, in Ausnahmefllen auch eine geringere Differenz.21
Die tarifliche Regelung hat jedoch weit ber das Entgelt hinaus Bedeutung fr
das
Arbeitsrecht. Es ist kein Zufall, dass mit Hugo Sinzheimer ein
Rechtswissenschaftler zu den
Begrndern des Sozialen Arbeitsrechts22 wurde, fr den der Tarifvertrag den
Mittelpunkt
des Arbeitsrechts darstellt, das zentrale Instrument zum Schutz der Rechte
der Arbeit-
nehmer.23 Das Urlaubsrecht oder die Entgeltfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall wurden
genauso
wie das gesamte Sozialversicherungsrecht aus kollektivvertraglichen oder

sonstigen
kollektiv gewerkschaftlich organisierten Institutionen entwickelt. Und bis heute
werden
neue Regulierungsfragen wie Weiterbildungsrechte oder Arbeitszeitmodelle zunchst
in
Tarifvertrgen vorgeprgt, bevor an eine etwaige gesetzliche Regelung zu denken
ist.24
Insofern trifft der Satz, die Tarifautonomie sei kollektiv ausgebte

Privatautono-
mie25 einen Kern des deutschen Arbeitsrechts: Arbeitsrecht erwchst zu einem guten
Teil
aus dem kollektiven gewerkschaftlichen Zusammenschluss und damit aus der Selbstor-
ganisation der Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer. Bereits Lotmar und Sinzheimer,
die Begrnder des kollektiven Arbeitsrechts, sahen den Tarifvertrag im Gegensatz
zum
Einzelarbeitsvertrag dadurch als legitimiert an, soweit es sich um
wirkliche Vereinba-
rungen handele.26 Die Bedeutung der Tarifautonomie geht weit darber hinaus, nur
die
unmittelbaren Austauschbedingungen oder den Preis festzulegen. Der kollektive

Zusam-
menschluss war von Anfang an auch ein Instrument der demokratischen
Mitwirkung
an der Gestaltung der Erwerbsarbeit. Die Dynamiken der Solidaritt und Gruppenbil-
dung wurden und werden dabei durch Branchen- und Organisationsdynamiken genauso
20 BAG: Feststellung eines Lohnwuchers. AppNo. BAG (5 AZR 436/08), NZA 2009, 837.
Erfurt: 22.04.2009.
Rn 24; BAG: Lohnwucher; Aufflliges Missverhltnis; Mageblicher
Wirtschaftszweig [Zuordnung nach
Unionsrecht]. AppNo. BAG (5 AZR 630/10), NZA 2012, 978. Erfurt: 18.04.2012;
ausfhrlich zur Feststel-
lung der Tarifbindung LAG Hamm: Sittenwidriger Lohn im Einzelhandel. AppNo. 6
Sa 1284/08, BB 2009,
893. Hamm: 18.03.2009.
21 BAG: Ein-Tages-Arbeitsverhltnis; Betriebsbergang; Lohnwucher; verwerfliche
Gesinnung. AppNo. BAG
(5 AZR 268/11), BB 2012, 2375. Erfurt: 16.05.2012. Ausfhrlich zu
diesen Problemen auch Nassibi, G.
(2012) pp. 48 ff.
22 Zum Begriff Eichenhofer, E. (2012); Seifert, A. (2011); siehe aus heutiger
Sicht: Kocher, E./Groskreutz, H. et
al. (2013).
23 Zu Konzept und Bedeutung Sinzheimers im Einzelnen Blanke, S. (2005).
24 Siehe ausfhrlich Kocher, E./Groskreutz, H. et al. (2013), Kap. 5.
25 Brecht-Heitzmann, H./Kempen, O.-E. et al. (eds.) (2013) p. 106, Rn 78;
Dieterich, T. (1998) pp. 121 ff; Die-
terich, T. (2012b); Lwisch, M.; Rieble, V.: Tarifvertragsgesetz (2012);
Rieble, V. (2000) pp. 12 ff; Bayreuther,
F. (2005) pp. 57 ff und passim.
26 Zu Lotmar siehe z.B. Zachert, U. (2007) Siehe auch BVerfG: Verfassungsmigkeit
der durch Heimarbe-
iterausschsse Entgeltsfestsetzungen. AppNo. BVerfG (2 BvL 27/69),
BVerfGE 34, 307, 316. Karlsruhe:
27.02.1973; BVerfG: Schutzumfang des Art. 9 Abs. 3 - Arbeitskampf.
AppNo. BVerfG (1 BvR 779/85),
BVerfGE 84, 212, 229. Karlsruhe: 26.06.1991.
355
----------------------- Page 395-----------------------
Eva Kocher
bestimmt wie durch die kollektiven Zusammenhnge, die durch die Gemeinsamkeit im
arbeitsteiligen Arbeitszusammenhang entsteht.
Rechtstechnisch hat die Tarifautonomie nicht nur dazu gedient, Normen
und
Generalklauseln auszufllen sowie neue Schutznormen zu entwickeln. Sie war in
der
Vergangenheit auch hufig Grund dafr, auf sozialen Schutz, den das Zivilrecht
anbot,
im Arbeitsrecht zu verzichten. So werden Allgemeine Arbeitsbedingungen erst seit
der
Schuldrechtsreform 2002 einer Einbeziehungs- und Inhaltskontrolle unterzogen (
305
ff. BGB); zuvor war man der Auffassung, dass die weitgehende kollektive berformung
der individuellen Arbeitsvertrge einen Interessenausgleich gewhrleiste, der den

Rck-
griff auf die gerichtliche AGB-Kontrolle nicht erforderlich mache. Auch heute noch
werden
Arbeitsvertrge keiner Inhaltskontrolle unterworfen, soweit sie nur auf
Tarifvertrge
Bezug nehmen ( 307 Abs. 3, 310 Abs. 4 Satz 3 BGB27). Das Argument des Vorrangs
der Tarifautonomie vor der gesetzlichen Regelung ist in den letzten

Jahren sogar auf
Arbeitgeberseite Mode geworden28; diese betrachten die Tarifautonomie zu diesem
Zweck
allerdings nur formal und trennen sie von ihren materiellen Grundlagen eines
effektiven
und funktionierenden solidarischen kollektiven Zusammenschlusses29.
10.1.3 Die Regelung der arbeitsteiligen Kooperation
Die betriebliche Mitbestimmung lsst sich systematisch von der kollektiven

Selbstorgani-
sation in Gewerkschaften unterscheiden und zwar nicht nur deshalb, weil die
betriebli-
che Mitbestimmung durch Betriebsrte in Deutschland gesetzlich geregelt ist und
nicht
auf dem freien Zusammenschluss, sondern der gesetzlichen Verfasstheit beruht. Hier
geht
es hufig auch um andere Gegenstnde als im Tarifvertrag; oft geht es
um den hori-
zontalen Interessenausgleich unter den Beschftigten des Betriebes. Es ist
kein Zufall,
dass 75 BetrVG mit der Anforderung von Gleichbehandlung, Diskriminierungsschutz
und Gewhrleistung persnlicher Freiheit die zweitwichtigste Grenze der
betrieblichen
Mitbestimmung darstellt (die wichtigste Grenze ist die der Kompetenz der
Tarifparteien
und der Tarifautonomie, siehe 77 Abs. 3, 87 Eingangssatz BetrVG, dort auch zu
den
Grenzen der Gesetze).
Bezugspunkt und Gegenstand der betrieblichen Mitbestimmung ist die Regelung
des
arbeitsteiligen Zusammenhangs fr die im Individualarbeitsrecht ansonsten allein
das
Direktions- und Weisungsrecht des Arbeitgebers bereit stnde.
27 A.A. (kein allgemeiner Grundsatz, wonach die Hauptkondition immer kontrollfrei

bleiben msse): Dubler,
W./Bonin, B. et al. (2010) 307 BGB, Rn. 281 ff; Dubler, W. (2012) p. 545.
28 Z.B. Sodan, H./Zimmermann, M. (2008) pp. 528 ff; Thsing, G. (2008).
29 Dies uerst sich konkret meist in der Nichtbercksichtigung der Notwendigkeit
einer Tariffhigkeitskon-
trolle (sehr deutlich bei Thsing, G./Lembke, M. (2007)).
356
----------------------- Page 396-----------------------
Besonderheit
Die Norm ber das Weisungsrecht des Arbeitgebers ( 106 GewO) stellt in
zweifacher
Hinsicht eine Grundlage des Arbeitsrechts dar: Einerseits geht sie von der
vertraglichen
Vereinbarung eines einseitigen Weisungsrechts in Bezug auf Inhalt, Ort
und Zeit der
Arbeitsleistung aus andererseits scheint sie dies als Rechtsfolge erst zu
begrnden. Die
Regelung dokumentiert und erkennt die Risikoverteilung des Arbeitsverhltnisses an:
Der
Arbeitnehmer oder die Arbeitnehmerin verpflichtet sich gerade nicht zur Erbringung
einer
bestimmten Leistung, sondern lediglich dazu, seine Arbeitskraft und damit ihr
menschli-
ches Vermgen zur Verfgung zu stellen.30 Die Nutzung dieser Arbeitskraft zur
Wertschp-
fung und damit zu Gewinnerzielung auf den Gter- und Dienstleistungsmrkten ist
dem
Arbeitgeber berlassen der dies in einem konkreten arbeitsteiligen Zusammenhang
erst
zu organisieren hat. Er trgt dieses Nutzungsrisiko; die Regelung ber den
Annahmeverzug
in 615 BGB ist deshalb das notwendige Gegenstck zum Direktionsrecht.
In der Organisation dieses kollektiven arbeitsteiligen Zusammenhangs haben
die Be-
triebsrte als Interessenvertretungen der Beschftigten ihre Rolle zu spielen.
10.1.4 Zugang zum Arbeitsmarkt und Diskriminierungsschutz31
Bei der Regelung des arbeitsteiligen Zusammenhangs geht es in erster Linie um

Gleichbe-
handlungsfragen und meist nur indirekt um Fragen der Verteilung zwischen
Arbeitgeberin
und Arbeitnehmer. Es ist dabei kein Zufall, dass individuelle Rechte der
Arbeitnehmerin-
nen und Arbeitnehmer, die sich auf Kontinuitt und/oder konkrete Anpassungen ihres
Arbeitsverhltnisses richten, wie z. B. Rechte auf Neuorganisation der Arbeitzeit

fr allein
erziehende Eltern, typischerweise in Konflikt mit der betrieblichen Mitbestimmung
ge-
raten, die solche Ausgleichsprozesse herkmmlich nach dem Prinzip der formalen
Gleich-
behandlung organisiert.32
Solche Rechte, die Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer nicht allein in ihrer

Funk-
tion fr den Betrieb, sondern gerade in ihren Unterschieden und
Privatheiten respek-
tieren, sind nicht zuletzt deshalb lange Zeit von den Gewerkschaften und
Betriebsrten
wenig beachtet worden, weil diese mit der Stammarbeiterschaft
gleichzeitig auch
das herrschende Produktionsmodell und mit diesem das herrschende
Familienmodell
reprsentierten, das auf einer geschlechtshierarchischen Arbeitsteilung beruht.33
Sogar in
30 Stndige Rechtsprechung des BAG (BAGE 109, 87; BAGE 125, 257: Die
Leistungspflicht [ . . .] orientiert
sich an der Leistungsfhigkeit des Arbeitnehmers).
31 Prinzip Nr. 8 (Zugang).
32 Ausfhrlich Kocher, E./Groskreutz, H. et al. (2013).
33 Zu diesen Zusammenhngen Kohlrausch, B./Zimmer, B.: Erwerbsbiographien
im Wandel (2012); zum
Wandel siehe auch Sachverstndigenkommission zur Erstellung des Ersten
Gleichstellungsberichtes der
Bundesregierung; Klammer, U. et al.: Neue Wege - Gleiche Chancen (2011).
357
----------------------- Page 397-----------------------
Eva Kocher
der rechtswissenschaftlichen Debatte ist dies nachvollzogen worden, indem die

liberale
Entgegensetzung von konomischem Interesse und Diskriminierungsschutz als innere
Logik des Arbeitsmarktes behauptet wurde.34
Hier wird eine spezifische Entwicklung der kollektiven Zusammenschlsse, die

sich
im Zeitalter des Fordismus entwickelt hat, zu Unrecht verallgemeinert und
bersehen,
dass gerade die Bedeutung eines langfristigen Vertrags, auf dem die
konomische
Existenz beruht, ein Menschenrecht auf Zugang zu diesen Gtern und Dienstleistungen
erforderlich macht und es deshalb kein Zufall ist, dass der

Diskriminierungsschutz
im Arbeitsrecht weiter entwickelt ist als in anderen zivilrechtlichen Bereichen.
Genauso
wenig ist es jedoch ein Zufall, wenn der Diskriminierungsschutz viele
exklusive Rege-
lungen in Kollektivvertrgen zum Angriffsobjekt hatte.35
10.2 Der Rechtsbegriff des Arbeitnehmers
Die hier beschriebenen Rechtsfolgen und Regelungsinstrumente sind insofern

spezifisch
arbeitsrechtlich, als sie nicht in gleicher Weise im sonstigen Vertrags-
und Zivilrecht
aufzufinden sind. Es liegt deshalb nahe anzunehmen, dass die besonderen Merkmale
des
Arbeitsverhltnisses diese besonderen Rechtsfolgen begrnden (knnen).
10.2.1 Persnliche Abhngigkeit: Einbindung in den arbeitsteiligen

Zusammenhang
Arbeitsrechtliche Gesetze und Kollektivvertrge beziehen sich in der Regel auf ein
Ar-
beitsverhltnis zwischen Arbeitnehmer und Arbeitgeber, dessen
Zentralbegriff die
persnliche Abhngigkeit darstellt.
Dieser Begriff wird in der deutschen Rechtsprechung insbesondere aus der
Abgren-
zung zur Selbststndigkeit i. S. d. 84 Abs. 1 Satz 2 HGB entwickelt. Diese Norm
sieht es
als mageblich fr die Selbststndigkeit eines Handelsvertreters an, dass er im
wesentli-
chen frei seine Ttigkeit gestalten und seine Arbeitszeit bestimmen kann. Nach
Meinung
des BAG enthlt diese Norm eine allgemeine gesetzgeberische Wertung36, ein
typisches
34 Kritisch dazu auch Schiek, D. (2012) in der Auseinandersetzung mit Somek.

35 Siehe insbesondere die Rechtsfragen zur Zwangspensionierung und zu
Altersgrenzen (EuGH Royal Copen-
hagen; EuGH: Rosenbladt gegen Oellerking Gebudereinigungsges. mbH.
AppNo. C-45/09. Luxemburg:
12.10.2010; EuGH: Prigge, Fromm, Lambag gegen Deutsche Lufthansa AG. AppNo. C-
447/09. Luxemburg:
13.09.2011; EuGH: Hennings gegen Eisenbahn-Bundesamt / Land Berlin
gegen Mai. AppNo. C-297/10,
C-298/10. Luxemburg: 08.09.2011; BAG: Unmittelbare Diskriminierun wegen des
Alters bei altersabhngiger
Staffelung der Urlaubsdauer - 26 TVD. AppNo. BAG (9 AZR 529/10), NZA 2012,
803. Erfurt: 20.03.2012.
36 BAG: Befristeter Arbeitsvertrag mit studentischer Aushilfskraft. AppNo. BAG (7
AZR 657/92), AfP 1994, 72.
Erfurt: 20.10.1993.
358
----------------------- Page 398-----------------------
Besonderheit
37
Abgrenzungsmerkmal, zumal dies die einzige Norm ist, die dafr Kriterien enthlt
.
Der Typus knpft ausschlielich an das Verhltnis zwischen den
Arbeitsvertragsparteien
an und fragt, inwiefern der Arbeitnehmer in die Organisation des
Arbeitgebers einge-
bunden ist. Mageblich sei der Grad der persnlichen Abhngigkeit im
Verhltnis
zum jeweiligen Arbeitgeber, das heit insbesondere die Weisungsgebundenheit und die
Eingliederung in die betriebliche Ablauforganisation, vor allem hinsichtlich

der Ar-
beitszeit und der Ausfhrung der Aufgaben.
Fr das Sozialrecht wurde der Kern dieser Rechtsprechung in 7 Abs. 1 Satz 2
SGB
IV kodifiziert (Anhaltspunkte fr eine Beschftigung sind eine Ttigkeit nach
Weisun-
gen und eine Eingliederung in die Arbeitsorganisation des Weisungsgebers).
Hier wird offensichtlich versucht, die Machtbeziehung rechtlich zu
beschreiben, die
aus der Organisation des arbeitsteiligen Zusammenwirkens durch den
Arbeitgeber er-
wchst. So ist die Weisungsabhngigkeit und Eingebundenheit in den Betrieb sowohl
Tat-
bestandsmerkmal als auch Rechtsfolge (siehe 106 GewO). Die Merkmale Vertrag und
Begrndung des Weisungsrechts werden in der Regel wohl deshalb konstruktiv selten
getrennt, weil die Begrndung des Herrschaftsverhltnisses gerade durch den

Vertrag
erfolgt. Schon Sinzheimer definierte deshalb den Anstellungsvertrag als
Dienstvertrag
ber abhngige Arbeit, bei der eine Hingabe in fremde Verfgungsgewalt
und eine
tatschliche Einordnung in den Gewaltbereich des Arbeitsgebers erfolge.38
Die Verwendung eines Typus-Begriffs erleichtert eine flexible Einbeziehung

neuer
Elemente und Gesichtspunkte. Er erleichtert auch die Durchsetzung des Prinzips
Vor-
rang der Tatsachen39: Die Zuordnung zu einem Typus wird nicht durch die
Bezeich-
nung und Beschreibung des Vertrags durch die Parteien bestimmt, sondern
durch die
tatschliche vertragliche Praxis. Im Einzelnen bedienen sich die Arbeitsgerichte
(sowie
der daran anknpfende Gesetzgeber des 7 Abs. 1 SGB IV) nicht des
tatbestandlich
scharf kontrollierten Begriffs, der auf eine einfache Subsumtion hoffen
liee, sondern
der Rechtsfigur des Typus; die [erfassten . . .] Personen werden nicht im Detail
definiert,
sondern ausgehend vom Normalfall in der Form eines Typus beschrieben. Den
jeweiligen
Typus und dessen Kenntnis setzt das Gesetz stillschweigend voraus; es bernimmt ihn
so,
wie ihn der Gesetzgeber in der sozialen Wirklichkeit idealtypisch, d.h. im Normal-
oder
Durchschnittsfall vorfindet. Es ist nicht erforderlich, da stets smtliche als
idealtypisch
erkannten, d.h. den Typus kennzeichnenden Merkmale (Indizien) vorliegen. Diese kn-
nen vielmehr in unterschiedlichem Mae und verschiedener Intensitt gegeben sein;

je
37 BAG: Rechtsanwalt als arbeitnehmerhnliche Person. AppNo. BAG (2 AZB 32/92), AP

Nr. 12 zu 5 ArbGG
1979. Erfurt: 15.04.1993.
38 Zur Auseinandersetzung mit der sog. Eingliederungstheorie siehe aber unten
bei Fn.95.
39 Waas, B. (2012); siehe auch unten bei Fn. 86.
359
----------------------- Page 399-----------------------
Eva Kocher
fr sich genommen haben sie nur die Bedeutung von Anzeichen oder Indizien.
Entschei-
dend sind jeweils ihre Verbindung, die Intensitt und die Hufigkeit ihres
Auftretens im
40
konkreten Einzelfall. Mageblich ist das Gesamtbild .
10.2.2 Wirtschaftliche Abhngigkeit: Basis der Existenzsicherung
Die deutsche Rechtsprechung noch des Reichsarbeitsgerichts hatte sich fr die

Bestim-
mung der Arbeitnehmereigenschaft allerdings zunchst an der wirtschaftlichen
Abhn-
gigkeit orientiert, wobei als mageblich gesehen wurde, aus welchen Erwerbsquellen
die
abhngige Person ihr Einkommen bezieht. Gesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung haben sich
in den letzten Jahrzehnten zwar von diesem Ausgangspunkt entfernt. Der Gedanke der
wirtschaftlichen Abhngigkeit findet sich im heutigen deutschen Recht

jedoch immer
noch im Rechtsbegriff der arbeitnehmerhnlichen Person ( 5 Abs. 1 Satz 2 ArbGG,
2
BUrlG, 7 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 PflegeZG, 12a TVG, 2 Abs. 2 Nr. 3 ArbSchG, 3 Abs. 11
BDSG,
6 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 AGG)41 . Auch das Heimarbeitsgesetz definiert seinen
Anwendungsbereich
nach dem Ausma der wirtschaftlichen Abhngigkeit ( 1 Abs. 2 Satz 2 HAG).

Fr die wirtschaftliche Unselbststndigkeit42 in diesem Sinn ist nicht die
grundstz-
liche Abhngigkeit von der Erwerbsquelle Arbeitsverhltnis mageblich,

sondern
die konkrete wirtschaftliche Abhngigkeit von einem bestimmten Arbeitgeber
bzw.
Auftraggeber; es kommt darauf an, ob das dienstberechtigte Unternehmen ihre einzige
Erwerbsquelle darstellt43 . In 12a TVG wird dies soweit konkretisiert, dass es

sich um
Personen handeln muss, die im Rahmen eines Handels- oder Dienstleistungsvertrags

die
Arbeit im wesentlichen selbst verrichten, ohne dabei auf eigene Beschftigte
zurckzu-
greifen, und deren Umsatz zu mehr als 50% durch einen einzigen Kunden generiert
wird.
Des Weiteren msse der wirtschaftlich Abhngige, um als arbeitnehmerhnlich
an-
gesehen werden zu knnen, seiner gesamten sozialen Stellung nach einem Arbeitnehmer
vergleichbar schutzbedrftig sein; hierfr seien die gesamten Umstnde des

Einzelfalls
unter Bercksichtigung der Verkehrsanschauung mageblich.44 Strittig ist
allerdings, ob
40 So kennzeichnet das BVerfG in seinem Nichtannahmebeschluss diese Methode, und

hielt sie im Zusam-
menhang mit der Definition der sozialversicherungs- und beitragspflichtigen
Beschftigung in 7 Abs. 1
SGB IV fr zulssig und sinnvoll; sie genge dem Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz (BVerfG
AP Nr. 82 zu 611 BGB
Abhngigkeit, Rn 7).
41 Siehe auch 1 Abs. 1 des Gesetzes zur Strkung des Ehrenamtes in der
Jugendarbeit oder die Bildungs-
urlaubsgesetze der Lnder Berlin, Hessen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,
Niedersachsen, Rheinland-Pfalz,
Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein.
42 BAG: Arbeitsgerichtliche Zustndigkeit fr arbeitnehmerhnliche Personen.
AppNo. BAG (5 AZR 639/89),
BAGE 66, 113 (116). Erfurt: 17.10.1990; BAG 8.9.1997, AP Nr. 38 zu 5 ArbGG;
BAG 16.7.1997, AP Nr. 37
zu 5 ArbGG; BAG 11.4.1997, AP Nr. 30 zu 5 ArbGG; ebenso BGH 4.11.1998, NZA
1999, 53.
43 Wank, R. (1988).
44 BAG 16.7.1997, AP Nr. 37 zu 5 ArbGG.
360
----------------------- Page 400-----------------------
Besonderheit
dem Merkmal der einem Arbeitnehmer vergleichbaren sozialen

Schutzbedrftigkeit
( 12a TVG) eine eigenstndige Bedeutung zukommt. Das BAG hat die Ansicht vertre-
ten45, die soziale Schutzbedrftigkeit sei ein eigenstndiges Kriterium.
Eine Person sei
z.B. dann nicht als arbeitnehmerhnlich einzustufen, wenn sie noch

erhebliche andere
Erwerbsquellen habe. In der Literatur wird das Merkmal der einem Arbeitnehmer ver-
gleichbaren Schutzbedrftigkeit aber als berflssig beurteilt; die

arbeitnehmerhnli-
che Person sei persnlich selbstndig, aber wirtschaftlich abhngig und deshalb
sozial
schutzbedrftig46 .
10.2.3 Beschftigung als Anknpfungsmerkmal?
Zuletzt sei ein dritter Begriff erwhnt, der im deutschen Recht immer hufiger als
Ober-
begriff fr unterschiedliche Rechtsformen von Erwerbsarbeitsverhltnissen benutzt
wird:
Der Begriff des Beschftigten wird in vielen Gesetzen verwandt, die auch Bereiche
des
ffentlichen Dienstes, also unabhngig von der zivil- oder ffentlich-rechtlichen
Rechts-
form erfassen sollen. In 4 Abs. 1 BPersVG (Bundespersonalvertretungsgesetz) z. B.
heit
es: Beschftigte im ffentlichen Dienst im Sinne dieses Gesetzes sind die Beamten
und
Arbeitnehmer einschlielich der zu ihrer Berufsausbildung Beschftigten sowie
Richter,
die an eine der [. . .] genannten Verwaltungen oder zur Wahrnehmung einer
nichtrich-
terlichen Ttigkeit an ein Gericht des Bundes abgeordnet sind. Auch das
Gesetz zur
Gleichstellung der Geschlechter im ffentlichen Dienst (BGleiG) definiert in 4
Abs. 1 als
Beschftigte im Sinne dieses Gesetzes darber hinaus noch Inhaberinnen und
Inhaber
ffentlich-rechtlicher mter.
Fr den Anwendungsbereich des Arbeitsschutzgesetzes erweitert 2 Abs. 2
ArbSchG
den Anwendungsbereich vor allem auf Beamtinnen und Beamte (sowie
Richterinnen
und Richter und Soldatinnen und Soldaten). Der Begriff erfllt hier noch eine
weitere
Funktion: Er bezieht neben den Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmern sowie
den
Auszubildenden die arbeitnehmerhnlichen Personen sowie die Heimarbeiterinnen und
Heimarbeiter ein. Daran knpft 7 Abs. 1 PflegeZG an (der jedoch die Beamtinnen
und
Beamten nicht erfasst), sowie 6 Abs. 1 AGG, wo der Begriff darber hinaus dazu
ver-
wendet wird klarzustellen, dass auch im vor- und nachvertraglichen Bereich der
Anwen-
dungsbereich desjenigen Kapitels des AGG erffnet sei, das den
Diskriminierungsschutz
der Beschftigten regelt.
Darber hinaus kommt der Begriff im Sozialversicherungsrecht vor, wo
nach 2
Abs. 2 Nr. 1 SGB IV alle Personen, die gegen Arbeitsentgelt oder zu ihrer
Berufsausbildung
45 BAG AP Nr. 1 zu 12a TVG; BAG AP Nr. 9 zu 5 ArbGG.

46 Hromadka, W. (1997); hnlich Boemke, B. (1998).
361
----------------------- Page 401-----------------------
Eva Kocher
beschftigt sind, versichert sind (siehe auch fr die Rentenversicherung 1 Satz

1 Nr. 1
SGB VI und fr die Krankenversicherung mit etwas anderem Wortlaut 5 Abs. 1 Nr. 1
SGB V); hier sind Beamtinnen und Beamte sogar ausdrcklich ausgenommen ( 5 SGB
VI)). Hier wird erst durch die Bezugnahme auf Merkmale der persnlichen
Abhngigkeit
in 7 SGB IV klar, dass letztlich nicht viel anderes gemeint ist als mit dem
Begriff des
Arbeitnehmers.
Die einheitliche Verwendung des Beschftigten-Begriffs fr ganz
unterschiedliche
Sachverhalte Ausweitung auf Beamtinnen und Beamte einerseits und Ausdehnung auf
47
wirtschaftliche abhngige Personen andererseits fhrt zu einer gewissen
Unklarheit.
Sie weist aber auch auf ein Problem hin: Rechtssystematisch wird zwischen
Arbeitsrecht
und Zivilrecht unterschieden der Anwendungsbereich zahlreicher
arbeitsrechtlicher
Regelungen lsst sich mit dem Begriff des Arbeitnehmers jedoch nicht
angemessen
abgrenzen und reicht deshalb mit dem Schutz arbeitnehmerhnlicher Beschftigungs-
verhltnisse und Beschftigter in das Zivilrecht hinein. Dies erfolgt jedoch

nicht sys-
tematisch; vor allem aber wird es hinsichtlich seiner Folgen fr das
Zivilrecht nicht
ausreichend reflektiert.
10.3 Schutzbedrftigkeit in der Beschftigung? Arbeitsrechtliche

Vorbilder fr das allgemeine Zivilrecht
Eine solche Reflektion wre jedoch nicht zuletzt deshalb dringend erforderlich,
weil Er-
werbsarbeit in unterschiedlichen privatrechtlichen Gestaltungsformen erbracht wird,
die
in Konkurrenz zueinander treten (knnen). Werk-/Dienstvertragsrecht und
Arbeitsrecht
knnen auf diese Weise in Konkurrenz geraten.
10.3.1 Zivilrechtliche Gestaltungsformen der Erwerbsarbeit
Denn die Organisation der Erwerbsarbeit ist von Seiten der Auftraggebenden nicht
selten
disponibel. Wer einen arbeitsteiligen Zusammenhang organisiert, kann unter
verschiedenen
vertraglichen Formen und verschiedenen Organisationsformen whlen:
Arbeitsvertrag
(persnliche Abhngigkeit); arbeitnehmerhnliche Personen, Heimarbeit
(wirtschaftliche
Abhngigkeit), abhngige Selbststndige; Leiharbeit und andere Formen der
mittelbaren
Arbeitgeberstellung (hufig auch: Konstellationen der Entsendung aus dem
Ausland);
Werkvertragskonstellationen, in denen andere Unternehmen in ihrer Funktion als
Arbeitge-
ber Dritter beauftragt werden; selbststndige Dienstleistungs-
(Honorar-)Ttigkeit.
47 Richardi, R. (2010) meint, dass der Gesetzgeber insofern gegen das

Transparenzgebot verstoe.
362
----------------------- Page 402-----------------------
Besonderheit
Die Abgrenzungsfragen zwischen den zivilrechtlichen Vertragsformen der

Beschf-
tigung einerseits und dem Arbeitsverhltnis andererseits waren schon immer ein
rechts-
politisches Problem; es ist lange Zeit unter dem Stichwort
Scheinselbststndigkeit
diskutiert worden. Es geht hier aber um mehr und anderes als die bloe
Falschbezeich-
nung von abhngigen Erwerbsttigen als Selbststndige48 . Hier geht es um
diejenigen
Vertragsverhltnisse, bei denen wegen entsprechender Ausgestaltung der

Beschftigung
die Merkmale der persnlichen Abhngigkeit und damit der
Weisungsgebundenheit
durch Einbindung in einen organisatorischen Zusammenhang gerade nicht vorliegen.
Der Europische Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss nannte in seiner
Initiativstellung-
nahme von 2010 zum Thema Neue Trends bei der selbststndigen Erwerbsttigkeit: der
Sonderfall der wirtschaftlich abhngigen selbststndigen Erwerbsttigkeit49

folgende
Kategorien selbststndig Erwerbsttiger, die zu unterscheiden wren:

- Unternehmer, die ein Unternehmen betreiben und dabei Arbeitnehmer
beschfti-
gen, d.h. auf deren Untersttzung zurckgreifen;
Angehrige der traditionellen freien Berufe, die zur Ausbung ihres

Berufs spezi-
fische, im nationalen Recht festgelegte Anforderungen erfllen mssen (Nachweis
ihrer
Fhigkeiten, Befolgung eines Berufskodex) [. . .]; Beispiele sind Anwlte und
rzte;
Handwerker, Kaufleute und Landwirte, die den Kern der traditionellen Formen der
selbststndigen Erwerbsttigkeit bilden und gegebenenfalls von

Familienangehri-
gen und/oder einer kleinen Zahl Festangestellter oder anderer Mitarbeiter
untersttzt
werden;
neue Selbststndige, die eine qualifizierte Ttigkeit ausben, deren Berufe
jedoch im
Gegensatz zu den vorgenannten freien Berufe nicht in allen Lndern geregelt
sind;
selbststndig Erwerbsttige, die einer hoch- oder geringqualifizierten
Ttigkeit nach-
gehen, ohne dabei Arbeitnehmer zu beschftigen, und deren Erwerbsttigkeit auf
Un-
ternehmensstrategien [wie Outsourcing] zurckzufhren ist.
Besonders problematisch, da weitgehend nur durch zivilrechtliche Vertrge

geregelt,
erscheinen die Erwerbsverhltnisse der beiden letzten Gruppen. Darunter fallen z.
B. die
neuen Selbststndigen und Solo-Selbststndigen, insbesondere im Bereich von
Dienst-
leistungen, in der Kreativwirtschaft und der Wissensarbeit, wo Unternehmen
auf die
Ttigkeit von Einzelpersonen zurckgreifen, ohne diese vollstndig in die
betriebliche
Organisation einzubinden (und ohne dass diese durch die Vielzahl oder Gre der
Pro-
jekte von einem einzigen Unternehmen wirtschaftlich abhngig wren).
48 Das Grnbuch der Europischen Kommission zum Arbeitsrecht (Kommission der

Europischen Gemein-
schaften: Grnbuch: KOM(2006) 708 endg. (22.11.2006)). bezeichnete dies als
verschleierte Beschftigung.
49 Europische Union: Stellungnahme des Europischen Wirtschafts- und
Sozialausschusses zum Thema
Neue Trends bei der selbststndigen Erwerbsttigkeit: der Sonderfall der
wirtschaftlich abhngigen selbst-
stndigen Erwerbsttigkeit (Initiativstellungnahme): C 18/08 (19.01.2011), pp.
44-52.
363
----------------------- Page 403-----------------------
Eva Kocher
Bereits das Grnbuch der Kommission aus dem Jahre 2006 sprach dieses Problem
an:
Braucht man einen Grundstock an Vorschriften, welche die Beschftigungsbedingungen
50
aller Beschftigten, unabhngig von der Form ihres Vertrags, regeln? (Frage 8)
.
10.3.2 Arbeitsrechtliche Anknpfungen und allgemeine Prinzipien
Fr die Suche nach einem solchen Grundstock wren de lege lata zunchst die Formen
zu
suchen, in denen zivilrechtliche Vertrge der Beschftigung geregelt werden. Hier
gibt es
bereits eine Reihe von Anstzen:
10.3.2.1 Regelungen fr selbststndige Erwerbsarbeit

So wird in Bezug auf die selbststndige Erwerbsarbeit vor allem ber die soziale
Sicherung
vor Risiken nachgedacht, insbesondere in der Rentenversicherung51. Dies lsst sich
einer-
seits mit dem hufigen Wechsel zwischen abhngig-selbststndigen Ttigkeiten

begrn-
den52, aber auch mit der Gefahr der Altersarmut und dem Wunsch nach Entlastung der
ffentlichen Hand und der Sozialversicherung. Auch grundstzliche Gerechtigkeits-

und
Verteilungsfragen werden mit der Forderung nach einer Erwerbsttigen- oder
Brger-
versicherung thematisiert53. Diese Formen der Risikoabsicherung sind
allerdings nicht
vertragsbezogen im engeren Sinn, sondern personenbezogen.

Strker mit der arbeitnehmerhnlichen Schutzbedrftigkeit in der
Erwerbsarbeit
argumentiert der Europische Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss bei seiner
Forderung,
selbststndig Erwerbsttige in den Europischen Fonds fr die Anpassung an die Glo-
balisierung einzubeziehen54. Der Fonds soll der EU eine rasche und

flexible Reaktion
zur Untersttzung von Arbeitnehmern ermglichen, die aufgrund der

Globalisierung
(oder neuerdings auch der Wirtschaftskrise) arbeitslos wurden. Da viele
Selbststndige
einen mageblichen Teil des Arbeitsmarkts bildeten, bekmen sie mitunter als erste
die
Folgen von Globalisierung und Wirtschaftskrisen zu spren. Hier ginge es
(wenn dies
50 Kommission der Europischen Gemeinschaften: Grnbuch: KOM(2006) 708 endg.

(22.11.2006).
51 Fr einen berblick im deutschen Recht siehe Bernhardt, U. (2012); zur
Einbeziehung in die Rentenver-
sicherung (und Streichung des 2 S. 1 Nr. 9b) SGB VI) siehe
Beschluss 13 der Abteilung Arbeits- und
Sozialrecht des 68. DJT 2010 im Anschluss an Waltermann; siehe zuletzt auch
Vorschlag fr eine gesetzliche
Rentenversicherungspflicht fr Selbststndige im Frhjahr 2012.
52 Zum Beispiel in der Kreativwirtschaft, siehe Bieback, K.-J. (2012).
53 Von besonderem Interesse fr deutsche Beobachterinnen und Beobachter in
den Jahren der Groen
Koalition war insofern die Reform des niederlndischen
Krankenversicherungssystems im Jahre 2006, die
Elemente der Brgerversicherung sowie der Gesundheitspauschale enthielt.
54 Europische Kommission: Vorschlag fr eine Verordnng des Europischen
Parlaments und des Rates ber
den Europischen Fonds fr die Anpassung an die Globalisierung (2014-
2020): KOM(2011) 608 final
(06.10.2011).
364
----------------------- Page 404-----------------------
Besonderheit
durchgesetzt wrde) in erster Linie um den sozialen Risikoausgleich auerhalb

konkreter
Vertragsverhltnisse.
Dagegen gibt es nur einige wenige Regelungen, die die Erwerbsarbeit der
selbststn-
dig Erwerbsttigen und ihre Erwerbsarbeitsvertrge unmittelbar betreffen.
Wichtig ist
zunchst festzustellen, dass Rechte auf kollektive Organisation
grundstzlich auch auf
55
selbstndig Beschftigte anwendbar sein knnen .
Weiter interessant ist die Anwendung des Arbeitsschutzrechts als
Ausfluss allge-
meiner vertraglicher Nebenpflichten auch auerhalb der abhngigen
Erwerbsarbeit.
Hier ist aus dem deutschen Recht insbesondere auf die allgemeine
arbeitsschutzrechtliche
Frsorgepflicht des 618 BGB hinzuweisen, die in einem werkvertraglichen
Verhltnis
analog angewandt wird, wenn der Unternehmer zur Erfllung der ihm obliegenden Ver-
richtungen die Rume des Bestellers betreten muss56. Die Europische
Bildschirmrichtli-
nie 90/270/EG ist nach der Rechtsprechung des EuGH auf alle Arbeitspltze
anwendbar,
unabhngig davon, ob sie mit Arbeitnehmern besetzt sind57. Nicht uninteressant
sind
auch die Regelungen der Arbeitszeiten von Kraftfahrern; sie sind mit der Sicherheit
des
Straenverkehrs begrndet, verfolgen aber gleichzeitig Arbeitsschutzziele58.
Die (nicht
verbindliche) Empfehlung 2003/134/EG zur Verbesserung des Gesundheitsschutzes und

der Sicherheit Selbststndiger am Arbeitsplatz hingegen richtet sich nur an den
Staat, der
Sensibilisierungskampagnen unternehmen sowie den Zugang zu Schulungsmanahmen
und zur Gesundheitsberwachung sichern soll.
Darber hinaus ist die Richtlinie 2010/41/EU zur Verwirklichung des
Grundsatzes
der Gleichbehandlung von Mnnern und Frauen, die eine selbstndige Erwerbsttigkeit
ausben zu nennen, die auf einer entsprechenden Richtlinie von 1986 beruht59. Nach
wie
vor sieht die Richtlinie fr alle Personen, die nach den Bedingungen des
innerstaatlichen
Rechts eine Erwerbsttigkeit auf eigene Rechnung ausben (Art. 2a), lediglich
Rechte auf
Mutterschutz (Art. 8) sowie die Zustndigkeit der nationalen
Gleichbehandlungsstellen
55 Schlachter, M. (2010) p. 643, die auf das ILO-bereinkommen Nr. 141 ber die
Verbnde lndlicher Ar-
beitskrfte hinweist, das auch selbststndig Ttige erfasst, und ein
Arbeitskampfrecht selbstndig Beschftigter
aus Art. 9 Abs. 3 GG ableitet.
56 BGHZ 5, 62; siehe schon RGZ 159, 268.
57 EuGH: Vorabentscheidungsverfahren - Anrufung des Gerichtshofes -
Einzelstaatliches Gericht im Sinne
des Artikels 177 des Vertrages - Begriff - Procura della Repubblica, die die
Strafklage erhebt - Ausschlu.
AppNo. EuGH (Rs C-74/95), NZA 1997, 307. Luxemburg: 12.12.1996.
58 Gesetz zur Regelung der Arbeitszeit von selbstndigen Kraftfahrern v.
11.7.2012, das insofern Richtlinie
2002/15/EG umsetzt (siehe dazu z.B. Wiebauer, B. (2012), der die Notwendigkeit
des Arbeitsschutzes von
Selbststndigen bestreitet).
59 Im Vorschlag der Kommission war noch ein Recht auf Urlaub zur Pflege von
Familienangehrigen vorge-
sehen (Kommission der Europischen Gemeinschaften: Vorschlag fr eine
Richtlinie des Europischen
Parlaments und des Rates zur Verwirklichung des Grundsatzes der
Gleichbehandlung von Mnnern und
Frauen, die eine selbstndige Erwerbsttigkeit ausben, und zur Aufhebung der
Richtlinie 86/613/EWG:
KOM(2008) 636 final).
365
----------------------- Page 405-----------------------
Eva Kocher
vor. Die Zustndigkeit dieser Stellen allerdings hat einen interessanten

Hintergrund: Denn
die Richtlinie, die Diskriminierung wegen des Geschlechts in der Erwerbsarbeit
verbietet
(Richtlinie 2006/54/EG), erfasst ber Art. 14 Abs. 1a) auch den Zugang zur
selbststndigen
60
Erwerbsttigkeit .
10.3.2.2 Regelungen fr abhngige Selbststndigkeit

Sucht man nach Vorbildern fr eine Regelung der zivilrechtlichen Grundlagen der Er-
werbsarbeit, so drften die Vertragsformen der abhngigen Selbststndigkeit mehr

Er-
folg versprechen. In zahlreichen europischen Staaten gibt es einen solchen Status,
der
zwischen dem Arbeitsvertrag und der Selbststndigkeit liegt.
So kennt Spanien mit der Gruppe der wirtschaftlich abhngigen Beschftigten
bzw.
wirtschaftlich abhngigen Solo-Selbststndigen (Art. 11 des Gesetzes 20/2007 LETA
(Es-
tatuto del trabajo autnomo), eine Gruppe von Personen, deren Recht auf Urlaub und
Ruhezeit genauso anerkannt wird wie deren Rechte auf kurzfristige

Freistellung aus
familiren und persnlichen Grnden; hier gibt es darber hinaus nicht nur ein
gewisses
Mindestma an sozialer Sicherheit (Art. 12), sondern auch Elemente eines
Kndigungss-
chutzes (Pflicht des Kunden, eine Vertragsauflsung zu begrnden sowie Abfindung
fr
den Fall des willkrlichen Verlust des Beschftigung, Art. 15 Abs. 1)61.
In Italien gibt es einen gewissen arbeitsrechtshnlichen Schutz fr die in

parasubordin-
azione Beschftigte (Art. 409 No. 3 Civil Procedure Code) und Projektbeschftigte
(Art. 61
Gesetz 2003/276). Im Rahmen eines Vertrags fr projektbezogene Zusammenarbeit
gelten
Schutzbestimmungen bezglich Schwangerschaft, Krankheit, Arbeitsunfall und
Ruhestand62.
Das Arbeitsrecht des Vereinigten Knigreichs regelt neben dem employee die
Katego-
rie der worker, die z. B. einen Krankengeldanspruch haben, aber auch Rechte auf
Mindest-
lohn, Begrenzung der Arbeitszeit und Unterbrechung der Ttigkeit in besonderen
Fllen.63
60 Siehe auch Richtlinie 2000/43/EG zum Verbot der Diskriminierung wegen Rasse
oder ethnischer Herkunft
(Europische Gemeinschaften: Richtlinie 2000/43/EG des Rates vom 29.
Juni 2000 zur Anwendung
des gleichbehandulngsgrundsatzes ohne Unterschied der Rasse oder der
ethnischen Herkunft: L 180/22
(19.07.2000) sowie Richtlinie 2004/113/EG in Hinblick auf
Geschlechtsdiskriminierung, die sich beide auf
den Zugang zu/Versorgung mit Gtern und Dienstleistungen beziehen
(Europische Union: Richtlinie
2004/113/EG des Rates vom 13. Dezember 2004 zur Verwirklichung des Grundsatzes
der Gleichbehandlung
voon Mnnern und Frauen beim Zugang zu und bei der Versorgung mit
Gtern und Dienstleistungen:
L 373/37 (21.12.2004)).
61 Prinzip Nr. 11 (Kndigung). Vgl. auch Soravilla, J. B./Herrezuelo, I. (2010);
Landa Zapirain, J.-P. (2012).
62 Ausfhrlich Borzaga, M. (2012); Nogler, L. (2009b).
63 Zum englischen Recht siehe z.B. Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2010) pp. 117 ff. Zum
Ganzen auch Razzolini, in
diesem Buch Abschnitt 3.4; ein berblick ber diese Regelungen findet
sich schon in der Europische
Union: Stellungnahme des Europischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschusses
zum Thema Neue Trends
bei der selbststndigen Erwerbsttigkeit: der Sonderfall der wirtschaftlich
abhngigen selbststndigen Er-
werbsttigkeit (Initiativstellungnahme): C 18/08 (19.01.2011); siehe auch
Waas, B. (2012), dort auch zum
schwedischen und sterreichischen Recht.
366
----------------------- Page 406-----------------------
Besonderheit
Im deutschen Recht gibt es fr solche Zwischenzonen die Figur der

arbeitneh-
merhnlichen Person; mit ihrer Hilfe wird der Anwendungsbereich bestimmter Schutz-
normen auf nur wirtschaftlich abhngige Personen erweitert:

Arbeitnehmerhnliche
Personen haben Rechte auf Urlaub, auf Zugang zu den Arbeitsgerichten, auf
Tarifau-
tonomie ( 12a TVG), auf Schutz der Sicherheit und Gesundheit am
Arbeitsplatz, auf
Diskriminierungsschutz, Datenschutz sowie Freistellung fr familire
Pflegeobliegen-
heiten. Das Sozialrecht kennt darber hinaus fr die Rentenversicherung den Begriff
der
arbeitnehmerhnlichen Selbststndigen nach 2 Nr. 9 SGB VI (Personen, die a) im
Zusammenhang mit ihrer selbstndigen Ttigkeit regelmig keinen versicherungspfli-
chtigen Arbeitnehmer beschftigen und b) auf Dauer und im Wesentlichen nur fr

einen
Auftraggeber ttig sind; bei Gesellschaftern gelten als Auftraggeber die
Auftraggeber der
Gesellschaft).64
10.3.3 Allgemeine Prinzipien fr Vertrge ber Arbeit?
Ergibt sich aus solchen Regelungen eine bergeordnete Kategorie des

Arbeitnehmer-
schutzvertrag bzw. eines Vertrags ber Arbeit?
10.3.3.1 Schutzbedrftigkeit als Abgrenzungsmerkmal?65
Im Dienstvertragsrecht als solches sollte dabei nicht gesucht werden; den dort
erfassten
Ttigkeiten ist jedenfalls als solche keine besondere
Schutzbedrftigkeit zu eigen.
Denn das Dienstvertragsrecht definiert sich in der allgemeinen zivilrechtlichen
Struktur
allein durch die Abgrenzung zum Werkvertrag, und damit allein durch die
Verteilung
des Risikos an der mangelfreien Erstellung eines Produkts (Ware oder
Dienstleistung).
Hier gilt im Gegenteil sogar: Der Werkunternehmer oder die Werkunternehmerin ber-
nimmt mit dem Risiko der mangelfreien Erstellung sogar ein greres
Risiko als der
Dienstnehmer oder die Dienstnehmerin. Die Regeln ber den Schutz selbststndiger
oder wirtschaftlich abhngiger Erwerbsttiger differenzieren deshalb zu

Recht nicht
nach dem zivilrechtlichen Vertragstyp.
Allein der Hinweis auf eine mgliche strukturelle Unterlegenheit oder
Ungleich-
gewichtslage kann hier genauso wenig weiterhelfen. Das BVerfG verwendet
diese
Kriterien in seiner Handelsvertreter- und Brgschafts-Rechtsprechung, um deutlich
zu
machen, inwiefern die Verfassung Eingriffe in die Vertragsfreiheit erlaube66. Damit
wurde
zwar ein Begrndungszusammenhang fr arbeitsrechtliche, arbeitsrechtsnahe

sowie
64 Fr einen berblick siehe Griese, T. (2008).

65 Prinzip Nr. 5 (Rcksichtnahme).
66 BVerfGE 81, 242 (Handelsvertreter); 89, 214 (Brgschaft).
367
----------------------- Page 407-----------------------
Eva Kocher
verbraucherrechtliche und hnliche Regulierungen geboten; eine eigene trennscharfe

Ab-
grenzung geben diese Merkmale jedoch noch nicht her. Schlielich bedarf es immer
noch
einer Wertung dahingehend, welcher Art festgestellte Ungleichgewichte sind und
inwie-
67
fern diese einer Korrektur bedrfen .
10.3.3.2 Das Verhltnis von wirtschaftlicher Abhngigkeit und
Solo-Selbststndigkeit
Mgliches Vorbild knnten die Regelungen ber die abhngige Selbststndigkeit
sein,
wie sie sich in vielen Staaten finden. Hier ist allerdings im Rechtsvergleich
bemerkenswert,
dass die Reichweite des Schutzes ganz unterschiedlich geregelt ist. Zum Teil wird
fr die
abhngigen Selbststndigen lediglich ein sozialer oder
sozialversicherungsrechtlicher
Schutz vorgesehen. Hufig werden darber hinaus die vertraglichen
Beziehungen zum
Kunden geregelt, womit auch ein gewisses quivalent zum Arbeitsrecht geschaffen
wird
(Mindesteinkommen, Arbeitszeit usw.).
Abhngige Selbststndigkeit wird meist in Bezug auf die wirtschaftliche
Abhngigkeit
von Solo-Selbststndigen definiert. In diesem Zusammenhang wird die
Schutzbedrftig-
keit in aller Regel durch zwei Merkmale definiert und begrndet, deren Verhltnis
zuein-
ander alles andere als klar ist: Vorausgesetzt wird in aller Regel, dass der/die
Erwerbsttige
die Leistung persnlich und ohne eigene Beschftigte erbringt, und
darber hinaus in besonderer Weise an einen einzigen Kunden oder eine
einzige
Auftraggeberin gebunden ist.
Die letztgenannte wirtschaftliche Abhngigkeit wird z. T. nach der Hhe

des Um-
satzes aus der fr diesen Kunden geleisteten Arbeit, z. T. nach der Dauer der
Beziehung
zwischen Erwerbsttigem und Kunden bestimmt68. Es gibt wenige Versuche,
dies
hnlich wie es Rolf Wank mit dem Arbeitnehmerbegriff versucht hatte69 anhand der
Funktion der Ttigkeit fr die Gter- und Dienstleistungsmrkte zu definieren70.
Was haben aber diese beiden Merkmale mit dem jeweils

gewhrten Schutz
und Schutzniveau zu tun? Beide Aspekte bezeichnen schlielich
unterschiedliche
Regulierungsnotwendigkeiten.
Wirtschaftliche Abhngigkeit fasst in der Regel die Probleme
zusammen, die
sich aus dem faktischen Fehlen oder der Einschrnkung von exit-Optionen
ergeben.
67 Vgl. auch Medicus, D. (1994).

stndigen Erwerbsttigkeit (Initiativstellungnahme): C 18/08
(19.01.2011); siehe z.B. die italienischen
Kriterien der Dauer der Beziehung sowie der Koordination zwischen
Arbeitsaktivitt und betrieblichen
Zielen (Borzaga, M. (2012) pp. 100 f).
69 Wank, R. (1988).
70 Perulli, A. (2003). URL:
http://www.metiseurope.eu/content/pdf/n8/7_parasubordination.pdf.
368
----------------------- Page 408-----------------------
Besonderheit
Wirtschaftliche Abhngigkeit in diesem Sinn erfordert auf den ersten Blick

lediglich
einen gewissen Kontinuittsschutz (= Kndigungsschutz) und Schutz vor willkrlichem
Umgang. Wirtschaftliche Abhngigkeit gibt es insofern im Zivil- und

Wirtschaftsrecht in
vielfacher Form, nicht nur in Erwerbsarbeitsvertrgen, sondern auch in anderen
Dauer-
beziehungen zwischen Unternehmen wie z.B. langfristigen Lieferbeziehungen oder den
Abhngigkeiten zwischen Zuliefer- und Abnehmerunternehmen. Im Begriff der arbeit-

nehmerhnlichen Person dient das Merkmal berwiegend dazu, die Verantwortlichkeit
des Auftraggebers oder der Auftraggeberin zu markieren, es umschreibt keineswegs
eine
eigenstndige erwerbsarbeitsbezogene Schutzbedrftigkeit.
Im Gegensatz dazu bezieht sich das Merkmal der Solo-Selbststndigkeit auf ein
grund-
legendes Merkmal abhngiger Erwerbsarbeit: Gegenstand ist die
Zurverfgungstellung
von Arbeitskraft71. Solche Schuldverhltnisse sind zwar nicht
personenrechtlich, aber
personenbezogen, denn der Mensch kann bei der Erfllung des Arbeitsvertrags und der
Arbeitsleistung seine Personenhaftigkeit nicht ablegen; die Arbeitskraft, die

Vertragsge-
genstand ist, lsst sich nicht von der Person trennen72. Daraus erwachsen Gefahren
fr die
Person (Gesundheit und Sicherheit), der Vereinbarkeit von Privatleben und

Erwerbsleben
sowie Notwendigkeiten der langfristigen Sicherung sozialer Risiken sowie
der sozialen
Kooperation.
Diese Gefahren bestehen unabhngig von der wirtschaftlichen Abhngigkeit. Auch
wenn eine Person fr eine Reihe unterschiedlicher Auftraggeberinnen und

Auftraggeber
Erwerbsarbeit im Rahmen zivilrechtlicher Vertrge ausbt, kommt sie in der
Vertrags-
durchfhrung an die Grenzen der Person. Die Verhandlungsposition wird auch in sol-
chen Konstellationen dadurch beeinflusst, dass die Arbeitskraft notwendige
krperliche
Grenzen hat. Zum sozialen Problem wird dies durch die grundstzliche Abhngigkeit
von
der Erwerbsquelle Arbeitskraft mit wirtschaftlicher Abhngigkeit in dem
Sinne, wie
es die Gesetze zur abhngigen Selbststndigkeit beschreiben, hat dies jedoch nicht
not-
wendig etwas zu tun. Es ist insbesondere dieses Merkmal der Solo-
Selbststndigkeit,
das jenseits der wirtschaftlichen Abhngigkeit ein allgemein zivilrechtliches
Konzept des
Schutzes der Erwerbsarbeit begrnden knnte.
10.3.3.3 Organisationszusammenhnge: Arbeitsvertrag und Arbeitsverhltnis

Welche Rolle spielt nun aber das Merkmal der persnlichen Abhngigkeit,
das doch
den Anwendungsbereich des Arbeitsrechts als spezifischen Rechtsbereich
begrndet?
Tatschlich sind fr das typische Normal-Arbeitsverhltnis die organisatorischen
Ein-
bindungen nicht nur beilufig relevant, sondern geradezu konstitutiv. Ein
Unternehmen
71 Vgl. BAG, 17.1.2008, NJW 2008, S. 3019 ff; siehe auch BAG, 11.12.2003, BAGE
109, 87.
72 Schwerdtner, P. (1970) p. 86. Prinzip Nr. 2 (Humanitt).
369
----------------------- Page 409-----------------------
Eva Kocher
wird gerade dann einen Arbeitsvertrag abschlieen, wenn es ber die

Arbeitskraft der
73
anderen Seite intensiv und nicht nur punktuell verfgen will .
Und dies drckt sich letztlich tatschlich in der Weisungsgebundenheit aus:
Die Nut-
zung der Arbeitskraft kann sich in konkreten und ausgesprochenen Weisungen
konkre-
tisieren. Sie muss das aber nicht; die Einbindung kann auch ber die
Benennung von
Zielen und informelle Steuerungsmechanismen wie Teambesprechungen funktionieren74.
Der kollektive Zusammenhang Betrieb kann im Arbeitsalltag die Erteilung konkreter
Weisungen ersetzen75.
Es ist deshalb kein Zufall, wenn im Rechtsvergleich keine entscheidenden

nationalen
Unterschiede bei diesem wichtigsten Begriff des Arbeitsrechts bestehen76. Bei allen
Un-
terschieden in der Gesetzgebungstechnik: Nicht nur europa-, sondern weltweit

herrscht
eine ontologische oder phnomenologische Begriffsbildung vor, die an das Merkmal
der
Weisungsbindung oder der persnlichen Abhngigkeit anknpft77. Da hier - anders als
im
Fall des Verbraucherrechts - die relative hnlichkeit der Begriffe und Konzepte
nicht der
europarechtlichen Harmonisierung geschuldet ist, darf vermutet werden, dass diese
Be-
griffslogik die funktionale Sachlogik des Arbeitsrechts einigermaen zutreffend
erfasst. Es
geht hier um die Schutzbedrfnisse und rechtlichen Formen, die sich aus der
Begrndung
eines Herrschaftsverhltnisses durch Organisation ergeben.
Wenn dies das Alleinstellungsmerkmal des Arbeitsrechts im engeren Sinn ist:
Was
kann das Zivilrecht hieraus lernen?
Verbundene Vertrge: Drei- und mehrseitige Beschftigungsverhltnisse78
Interessant wre ein Lernprogramm fr Konstellationen, in denen eine Umgehung ar-
beitsrechtlichen Schutzes droht, und zwar nicht, weil eine Vertragsgestaltung in

Richtung
Selbststndigkeit gewhlt wird, sondern weil die Arbeitgeberstellung in
Dreiecksbezie-
hungen aufgespalten wird.
In neuerer Zeit geschieht dies wieder zunehmend durch Werkvertrge.
Denn mit
Hilfe der werkvertraglichen Form haben sich in Deutschland einige Unternehmen in
den
letzten Jahren bemht, den Anforderungen der arbeitsrechtlichen
Leiharbeitsregulierung
zu entkommen. Nachdem bei der Regulierung der Leiharbeit mit
Mindestentgelt und
Branchenzuschlgen Fortschritte gemacht wurden79, werden hufiger personalintensive
73 Rebhahn, R. (2009).
74 Rebhahn, R. (2009); siehe auch Reichold, H. (1998).
75 So die Formulierung von Schren, P. (1999); genauer auch Wank, R. (1988) pp. 46
f; Rieble, V. (1996) Rn 94 ff.
76 Genauer Nogler, L. (2009a); Wank, R. (2007); Rebhahn, R. (2009).
77 Rebhahn, R. (2009); siehe auch zum europischen Recht Wank, R.
(2007); Wank, R. (2008); Ziegler, K.
(2011).
78 Prinzip Nr. 4 (Verbundene Vertrge).
79 Siehe jetzt z.B. die Mindestentgeltregelung fr die Leiharbeit nach 3a AG im
deutschen Recht; zu den
Tarifvertrgen der Metallindustrie fr die Leiharbeit siehe z.B. Krause, R.
(2012).
370
----------------------- Page 410-----------------------
Besonderheit
Arbeiten an Fremdfirmen vergeben, die keiner Tarifbindung unterliegen und die

deshalb
ihren Beschftigten Lhne noch unter den gesetzlichen Mindeststzen der
Leiharbeit
zahlen drfen. Zum Teil mag es sich um Scheinwerkvertrge handeln80,
nicht selten
werden aber zivilrechtlich echte Werkvertrge vorliegen.81 Dann entsteht
letztlich das-
selbe Problem wie beim Outsourcing: Ttigkeiten, die durch eigenes Personal
erledigt
werden knnten (und in der Vergangenheit z.T. auch so erledigt wurden), werden an
ein
Drittunternehmen weitergegeben, das Arbeitnehmer/innen zu letztlich schlechteren
Be-
dingungen82 beschftigt. In solchen Konstellationen entsteht eine
Dreieckskonstellation,
bei der ein Arbeitsvertrag mit dem Subunternehmen abgeschlossen wird, das wiederum
einen Werkvertrag mit dem Kunden abschliet der wiederum die Arbeitskraft der Ar-
beitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer indirekt nutzt.

Das Grnbuch der Kommission aus dem Jahre 2006 sprach solche
Problemlagen
folgendermaen an: Sollten [..] die Verantwortlichkeiten der einzelnen
Parteien in
mehrseitigen Beschftigungsbeziehungen eindeutiger geregelt werden, um
festzulegen,
wer fr die Einhaltung von Beschftigtenrechten verantwortlich ist? Wre die
Anordnung
einer nachrangigen Haftung eine wirksame und praktikable Mglichkeit, um diese Ver-
antwortlichkeiten bei der Einbeziehung von Subunternehmern sicherzustellen?

Wenn
nein, sehen Sie andere Mglichkeiten, einen angemessenen Schutz der Beschftigten
in
dreiseitigen Rechtsverhltnissen zu gewhrleisten? (Frage 9)83.
Eine wirtschaftliche Betrachtungsweise der Organisation bei Aufspaltung von

Arbeitgeberfunktionen
Dies knnte der Ort fr eine wirtschaftliche Betrachtungsweise sein, mit der ein
einheitli-
ches wirtschaftliches Verhltnis, das rechtlich in zwei getrennte Verhltnisse
aufgespalten
wird, in Hinblick auf die ratio legis bestimmter Schutzvorschriften wieder
zusammenge-
fhrt werden knnte. Udo Reifner hat dargestellt, wie nach diesem Prinzip
(und nach
dem Vorbild des 358 Abs. 3 Satz 2 BGB) ganz generell eine wirtschaftliche
Einheit als
Anknpfungspunkt fr die erweiterte Anwendung von Schutzrechten definiert werden
und so zum Ausgangspunkt fr ein allgemeines Prinzip des effet utile entwickelt
werden
knnte. Etwas hnliches hat Thomas Blanke mit dem arbeitsrechtlichen Instrumenta-
lisierungsverbot vorgeschlagen: Der Schutz des Normalarbeitsverhltnisses drfe
nicht
durch den Rckgriff auf atypische Beschftigung gezielt unterlaufen werden84. Fr
das
Arbeitsrecht ist dies wie fr andere einseitig zwingende Ordnungen kein

grundstzlich
80 Schren, P. (1999); Hamann, W. (1995).

81 Siehe insbesondere den Hinweise von Schren, P. (1999) darauf, dass das Merkmal
der Inanspruchnahme
von Gewhrleistung bei Bauvertrgen in der Regel vorliegen wird.
82 Dies betrifft insbesondere die kollektivvertraglichen Bedingungen (fehlende
oder andere Tarifbindung).
83 Kommission der Europischen Gemeinschaften: Grnbuch: KOM(2006) 708 endg.
(22.11.2006).
84 Blanke, T. (2004).
371
----------------------- Page 411-----------------------
Eva Kocher
fremder Gedanke. Das BAG hat einmal als allgemeinen Grundsatz formuliert:
Bieten
sich dem Arbeitgeber verschiedene arbeitsvertragliche Gestaltungsformen an, die fr
den
Arbeitnehmer zu einem unterschiedlichen arbeitsrechtlichen Schutz fhren, darf er
nicht
willkrlich die ihm gnstigere auswhlen85. Auch der Vorrang der Tatsachen86 ist
ja eine
Ausprgung wirtschaftlicher Betrachtung bei der Bestimmung des

Anwendungsbe-
reichs des Arbeitsrechts wird so nicht auf die Bezeichnung durch die Parteien
abgestellt,
sondern auf die tatschliche Praxis.
Einen flexiblen Umgang mit unterschiedlichen wirtschaftlichen
Gestaltungen soll
auch der Typus-Begriff der persnlichen Abhngigkeit leisten87: Fr das
Sozialrecht
meinte jedenfalls das BVerfG88, es sei [g]erade der Verwendung der Rechtsfigur des
Typus
[. . .] zu verdanken, da die Vorschriften ber die Versicherungspflicht und die

Beitrags-
pflicht trotz ihres Festhaltens an Begriffen wie Angestellte, Arbeiter,
Arbeitsverhltnis
oder Beschftigungsverhltnis in Verbindung mit ihrer Konkretisierung durch
Recht-
sprechung und Literatur ber Jahrzehnte hinweg auch bei genderten sozialen
Strukturen
ihren Regelungszweck erfllen und insbesondere die Umgehung der Versicherungs- und
Beitragspflicht zum Nachteil abhngig beschftigter Personen, z.B. durch

der Realitt
nicht entsprechender, einseitig bestimmter Vertragsgestaltungen, verhindern
konnten.
Dieser Begriff lst aber lediglich das Problem der Schutzbedrftigkeit und
beant-
wortet damit nur die Frage, wem welche Rechte zukommen mssen. In den genannten
Dreiecksbeziehungen ist es jedoch die Frage der Verpflichtung wer ist
Arbeitgeber? ,
die nach Antworten verlangt. Hier wre darber nachzudenken, wie die
formalrechtliche
Anknpfung an dem Vertragsarbeitgeber durch eine wirtschaftliche Betrachtungsweise
ergnzt werden knnte.

Auch fr eine solche Betrachtungsweise gibt es Beispiele aus der
Rechtsprechung. So
hat das Bundesarbeitsgericht fr Umgehungskonstellationen mit dem Begriff des
mittel-
baren Arbeitgebers gearbeitet89. Es msse verhindert werden, dass die Rechtsform
durch
die Einschaltung von Mittelsmnnern, die keine unternehmerischen Entscheidungen

tref-
fen und keinen Gewinn erzielen knnten, missbraucht wrde. Arbeitgeber sei
deshalb
derjenige, der unternehmerische Entscheidungen treffen und Gewinn erzielen knne90.
85 BAG: Zulssige Differenzierung zwischen unmittelbaren und mittelbaren

Arbeitnehmern bei der Zusatz-
versorgung. AppNo. BAG (3 AZR 446/80), 3 AZR 446/80. Erfurt: 20.07.1982.
86 So der Begriff von Waas, B. (2012).
87 Siehe oben bei Fn. 36 ff; vgl. auch Perulli, A. (2003). URL:
http://www.metiseurope.eu/content/pdf/n8/7_
parasubordination.pdf. p. 32. zur unterschiedlichen Flexibilitt rechtlicher
Konstruktionen.
88 BVerfG AP Nr. 82 zu 611 BGB Abhngigkeit, Rn 8.
89 BAG 20.7.1982, BAGE 39, 200.
90 Auch der EuGH spricht in seinem Urteil vom 21.10.2010 (EuGH: Albronn gegen FNV
Bondgenoten und
Roest. AppNo. C-242/09. Luxemburg: 21.10.2010.) von einem nichtvertraglichen
Arbeitgeber.
372
----------------------- Page 412-----------------------
Besonderheit
Ein weiterer Versuch einer wirtschaftlichen Betrachtungsweise ist der

arbeitsrecht-
liche Durchgriff 91 fr Flle eines Missbrauchs formeller Rechtsstellungen
durch die
Berufung auf die Selbstndigkeit einer juristischen Person. Diese Figur hat
hauptschlich
in Haftungsfllen Bedeutung92. Im positiven Recht gibt es hierfr Vorbilder bei der
vor-
bergehenden Haftung des Betriebsbergebers nach 613a Abs. 2 BGB, der Haftung des
Entleihers in 10 Abs. 1, 13-13b AG oder der Haftung des Auftraggebers fr den
Subunternehmer nach 14 AEntG.
Die betriebliche Eingliederung als Anknpfungsmerkmal?

Auch wenn das Gericht bislang eine mittelbare Arbeitgeberstellung nur bei der
Zwischen-
schaltung von Arbeitnehmerinnen oder Arbeitnehmern (also natrlichen
Personen)
in Betracht gezogen hat93: Die berlegung einer arbeitsrechtlichen Verpflichtung
des-
jenigen Unternehmens, das die Arbeitskraft tatschlich fr seine Wertschpfung

nutzt,
neben oder anstelle des Vertragsarbeitgebers erscheint grundstzlich als
berzeugen-
der Ansatz94. Fraglich ist allerdings, ob mit der Marktposition des
Unternehmens die
Gegenseite der arbeitsrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit richtig bezeichnet

ist. Denn
wenn die Einbindung in die Organisation, die durch das Weisungsrecht
begrndet
wird, Grund arbeitsrechtlichen Schutzes ist, msste sie auch auf der anderen Seite
die
Arbeitgeber-Verpflichtung begrnden knnen. Die Marktposition des
Unternehmens
ist insofern nur ein Indiz, mit dessen Hilfe sich die Organisation der Arbeit
rechtlich
verorten lsst.
Das Merkmal der Eingliederung in den Betrieb als Definitionsmerkmal
des Ar-
beitsverhltnisses hat das Arbeitsrecht von Anfang an begleitet. Sptestens
seit den
1950er Jahren ist allerdings unumstritten, dass die Eingliederung
allenfalls zustzlich
zum Vertragsschluss eine Rolle spielen kann, nicht anstelle des
Vertragsschlusses95. Denn
selbstverstndlich ist es allein der Vertrag, der eine Legitimation fr die

Begrndung or-
ganisatorischer Herrschaftsverhltnisse bieten kann.
Leider wurde die Eingliederungstheorie lange Zeit ohne Not mit der
Behauptung
vermischt, mit dem Arbeitsverhltnis werde ein Gemeinschaftsverhltnis
begrndet96
91 Fink, H.-C. (1999) pp. 186 ff.

92 Siehe aber auch BAG 9.4.1987, BAGE 55, 206.
93 Vgl. BAG: Tarifvertragliche Durchfhrungspflicht im Ausland. AppNo. BAG
(4 AZR 71/91), AP Nr. 28
Intern Privatrecht, Arbeitsrecht: 11.09.1991 (Goethe-Institut).
94 Siehe auch Fink, H.-C. (1999).
95 Siehe insbesondere den damaligen Hauptvertreter der Eingliederungstheorie
Nikisch, A. (1960) (modifi-
zierte arbeitsrechtliche Eingliederungstheorie) nach Unterseher, L. (1969) pp.
64 ff, 42 ff; vgl. auch Molitors
Unterscheidung zwischen Einigung ber den Arbeitsvertrag (Verpflichtung zur
Einordnung) und tatschli-
cher (nicht-rechtsgeschftlicher) Einigung ber die Einordnung selbst
(Molitor, E. (1929) pp. 17 ff).
Vgl. auch anschaulich LAG Nrnberg ZIP 1999, 769; BAG 16.2.2000, BAGE 93, 310
(Zwangsarbeiter).
96 Sehr deutlich bei Nikisch, A. (1960).
373
----------------------- Page 413-----------------------

Eva Kocher
(eine nichtssagende romantische Metapher des Organismus97). Beide Aussagen

sind
aber unabhngig voneinander. Bereits Ernst Fraenkel, der den

Interessengegensatz im
Arbeitsverhltnis betonte, wies darauf hin, dass das Recht an das durch
das Vertrags-
verhltnis geschaffene Sozialverhltnis eigenstndige Rechtsfolgen
anknpfe98. Denn
die Eingliederung in eine hierarchische Organisation ist eine soziale Tatsache, die
ihre
rechtliche Grundlage im Arbeitsvertrag findet, und die eine wesentliche Grundlage
arbe-
itsrechtlichen Schutzes (vor allem der betriebsrtlichen Interessenvertretung)
ist99. Wenn
ein Arbeitgeber die Eingliederung von ihrer vertraglichen Grundlage lst und die
Arbeit-
geberverantwortung in Drittbeziehungen auflst, spricht viel dafr, jedenfalls
diejenigen
Aspekte des arbeitsrechtlichen Schutzes unmittelbar an der organisatorischen
Einbindung
anzuknpfen, die der einseitigen Herrschaftsmacht der betrieblichen Organisation
etwas
entgegensetzen100; dies gilt insbesondere fr betriebsverfassungsrechtliche
Rechte101.
10.4 Zusammenfassung und Ausblick
Der impliziten Forderung von Anton Menger102, ein Rechtsverhltnis, auf dem die
un-
geheure Mehrheit der Besitzlosen, ja die groe Mehrheit der ganzen Nation [. . .]
ihre
Existenz grndet, msse auch Gegenstand des Zivilrechts sein, ist zuzustimmen:
Wenn
die Diskussion ber ein Europisches Privatrecht das Arbeitsrecht auen vor lsst,
droht
eine Festschreibung der zweipoligen Betrachtung von Erwerbsarbeit unter Missachtung
von Grauzonen und Zwischenformen103.
Dies bedeutet einerseits, die gemeinsamen Grundlagen der Vertrge der

Erwerbsar-
beit zu erkennen und ernst zu nehmen. Unter den Begriffen der Solo-
Selbststndigkeit
und der wirtschaftlichen Abhngigkeit hat das Zivilrecht der Erwerbsarbeit
Regelungs-
vorbilder anzubieten, mit denen sich die zivilrechtliche Regelung der
abhngigen
97 Kahn-Freund, O. (1966) p. 233, kritisierte so die Rspr des RAG. Zur Kritik
ausfhrlich Nogler (Fn. 58) (der
auch betont, dass die Metapher keineswegs so wenig aussage wie sie sich
anhre); zu den deutschrechtli-
chen Hintergrnden bei Gierke siehe z.B. Becker, M. (1995) pp. 221 ff.
98 Fraenkel, E. (1999-2011) (dort Zitat S. 77 ff der Vertrag als Tatsache).
siehe die Zusammenfassung dieser
Debatte bei Unterseher, L. (1969) (S. 37 ff zu Fraenkel); die
heftige Gegnerschaft gegen den Eingliede-
rungsgedanken fhrte bei Simitis, S. (1957) pp. 318 ff. bei nichtigem Vertrag
zur Konstruktion des Einglie-
derungsverhltnisses als weiterem vertraglichem Verhltnis.
99 Siehe auch Sinzheimer mit seiner Einordnung der Eingliederung als
personenrechtlichem Akt und der
Unterwerfung als dem obligatorischen Teil des Anstellungsvertrags (Nogler,
in diesem Buch 3.1.4 und
3.1.5.).
100 Siehe die Vorschlge von Heide Pfarr und IG Metall, zitiert bei Wendeling-
Schrder, U. (1992) pp. 367, 372 f.
101 Siehe z.B. Karthaus, B./Klebe, T. (2012).
102 Siehe oben Fn. 5.
103 Siehe auch Freedland, M. R./Kountouris, N. (2011) p. 207.
374
----------------------- Page 414-----------------------
Besonderheit
Selbststndigkeit systematisieren und auf den Punkt bringen liee. Vor allem die
Regeln
fr die Solo-Selbststndigkeit als Regeln fr die in Person geleistete Arbeit zur
Existenz-
sicherung sollten Ausgangspunkte fr allgemeine zivilrechtliche Konzepte des
Schutzes
der Erwerbsarbeit darstellen knnen. Zwar ist eingewandt worden, dass die
Einfhrung
einer zustzlichen Gruppe von nicht-ganz-aber-fast-ArbeitnehmerInnen dazu fhren
knnte, dass die Arbeitgeberinnen und Arbeitgeber knftig auf diese Vertragsform
aus-
weichen knnten104. Allerdings: Diese Ausweichmglichkeiten gibt es bereits heute,
mit
dem Unterschied, dass es in den zivilrechtlichen Beschftigungsformen

hufig an aus-
reichender sozialer Absicherung mangelt. Das Vertragsrecht ist aber jedenfalls
heute nicht
105
mehr einer der schlimmsten Feinde eines wirklich demokratischen Staatslebens
es
existieren bereits Elemente eines Schutzes der Erwerbsarbeit in zivilrechtlichen
Vertrgen,
deren systematische Herausarbeitung die Umgehungsanreize strker vermindern msste.
Hier geht es letztlich um eine Fortsetzung des Projekts von Grundrechten der
Erwerbs-
arbeit als eines innersten Kerns der in Person erbrachten Arbeit zur
Existenzsicherung106.
Dies heit nicht, dass die Alleinstellungsmerkmale des Arbeitsrechts in
ihrer Ei-
genstndigkeit nicht ernst zu nehmen wren. Dies gilt insbesondere fr die
Unterschei-
dung zwischen der zivilrechtlich zu regelnden Koordination der Arbeit ber den
Markt
und der arbeitsrechtlich zu regelnden Koordination von Arbeit ber eine
Organisation107.
Hier bietet die zivilrechtliche berschtzung des formalen Vertragsschlusses

gegenber
den entstehenden tatschlichen Organisationsverhltnissen
Umgehungsmglichkeiten,
denen eine strker arbeitsrechtliche Anknpfung der Arbeitgeberpflichten an der
orga-
nisatorischen Eingliederung als solcher begegnen msste.

stndigen Erwerbsttigkeit (Initiativstellungnahme): C 18/08
(19.01.2011) mit Nachweisen aus Italien,
wo die Zahl der arbeitnehmerhnlichen Selbststndigen zwischen 2003 und 2005
deutlich zunahm, nach-
dem die Vertrge fr projektbezogene Zusammenarbeit eingefhrt worden waren
(vgl. Perulli, A. (2003).
URL: http://www.metiseurope.eu/content/pdf/n8/7_parasubordination.pdf.). Zu
diesem Einwand auch
Davidov, G. (2012) p. 176; Langille, B. (2011) pp. 107 ff.
105 Menger, A. (1906).
106 Arthurs, H. (2011) p. 23; Supiot, A. (2001); daran anschlieend auch Perulli,
A. (2003). URL: http://www.
metiseurope.eu/content/pdf/n8/7_parasubordination.pdf. pp. 104 ff.
107 Auch die Bedeutung der Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit als wichtiges Element
legitimer Eigenstndigkeit des
Arbeitsrechts sollte nicht unterschtzt werden (zum historischen Hintergrund
Rehder, B. (2011)).
375
----------------------- Page 415-----------------------
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11 Self-Employment and Economic
Dependency in the Light
of the Social Contract Law
Orsola Razzolini
Summary
In the last decade, the evolution of the law relating to the self-
employment contract has
gradually permitted the insertion of social thinking into the law of contract and
obligation.
This has occurred, in particular, through the definition of the concept of
economic depen-
dency, which in turn has led to a rediscovery of the social long-term and personal
dimension
of self-employment contractual relationships. The development of the concept of
economic
dependency and the subsequent attribution of a certain number of social contractual
rights
to economically dependent workers might be seen as having two aspects. On the one
hand,
it supports the social contract law view, which is that, by rediscovering the time
and the per-
sonal dimensions of work, contractual relationships may be differentiated from the
standard
sales model, and social and redistributive justice thinking can be inserted into
contract law.
On the other hand, it helps to carve out a new dimension for labour law. This new
labour law
dimension or perspective should be detached for the first time from the concept of
power,
subordination and inequality of bargaining power and linked to the concept of
life time,
personal work and dignity.
11.1 The Link Between Economic Dependency and Social

Contractual Rights
In an interesting contribution Luca Nogler and Udo Reifner stress the need for
redis-
covering the life time social dimension of the Sales Contract Model.1 They retrace
the
evolution of the law relating to the employment contract and the release of the Law
of
Obligation from the Standard Sales Model, which has enabled the latter to be opened
up to
the social dimension of long-term contracts and the protection of non-economic
interests.
In the following we would like to juxtapose this concept to the traditional concept
of eco-
nomic dependency explaining the supremacy of the employer of the dependent worker.
387
----------------------- Page 427-----------------------
Orsola Razzolini
Broadly speaking, the concept of economic dependency is focused on the fact

that
a workers income derives, to a large extent, from one single relationship and one
single
client who becomes the predominant source of that income as well as the means by
which
the worker satisfies existential needs.
In Europe, it is possible to find a number of different definitions of the
concept of
economic dependency.
In Spain, Article 11 of the Law 20/2007/LETA (Ley Estatuto Trabajo Autnomo)
de-
fines the category of economically dependent self-employed workers by means of
six
concurrent factors, the most important of which is that the worker only works for
one
single client, who accounts for 75% of that workers turnover. In fact, according
to Article
11, the client is not allowed to control or coordinate the workers activity
(he/she can give
to the worker only technical instructions that are generally consistent with a
contract for
service), the worker has to provide his/her own material infrastructure and has the
right
to organise his/her working activity according to proper organisational criteria.
The economically dependent worker enjoys several contractual rights,
such as the
right to eighteen days paid holiday a year and specific days rest during the week
or the
month; the right to be granted suspension of the contract in the event of urgent
and sud-
den needs related to family obligations, maternity or paternity leave, an imminent
and
serious risk to the workers life or health, force majeure, with social benefits
provided by
the Social Security System (Art. 12), and the right to an indemnity for termination
by the
client without just cause (Art. 15.1). Finally, there is a right to a written form
of agreement
and to specification, in writing, of all the relevant contractual terms.
In Germany, the employee-like person (Arbeitnehmerhnliche Person)
enjoys the
right to twenty-four days paid holiday a year and is entitled to non-
discrimination on
the grounds of race, ethnic origin, sex, religion, belief, disability (Section 6,
paragraph 1,
No. 3, AGG). In addition, working conditions are determined by collective
agreements
(Section 12 TVG) and the Employment Tribunal is recognised as having jurisdiction
in
litigation concerning quasi-employees (Section 5, ArbGG).
The condition of quasi-dependency results from the fact that more
than 50% of
workers income or life time is dependent on one single relationship. However, the
law is
very different in practice. As stated, German judges identify who is an employee-
like per-
son for the purpose of this protection by means of a list of qualitative indices
(such as the
duration of the contract and the existence of some form of coordination between
worker
and client), which go far beyond mere quantitative parameters.2
In Italy, a recent bill reframes the limited protection afforded to

parasubordinate
workers (Article 409, No. 3, Civil Procedure Code) and project-based
workers (Law
2 Borzaga, M. (2002).
388
----------------------- Page 428-----------------------
11 Self-Employment and Economic Dependency in the Light of the Social
Contract Law
2003/276, Article 61). The aim is to maintain the dichotomy between employee and
self-
employed worker and to grant specific contractual rights to economically
dependent
self-employed workers, defined as those who derive most of their income from one
single
client (Draft of a Statute of economically dependent self-employed workers
drawn by
Senator Tiziano Treu, in 2009 and 2010). The economically dependent worker is
entitled
to a written agreement (with all the relevant terms of the agreement specified in
detail in
the contract), the right to basic income (proportionate to the quantity and quality
of the
work and also sufficient to permit the worker a decent standard of living), the
right to paid
holidays during the year and days off during the week, the right to be granted
suspension
of the contract in case of maternity, paternity, health and safety
needs, and protection
against unfair termination of the contractual relationship.
Recent Italian labour market reform enacted by Law 92/2012 takes a very
different
perspective by re-establishing the sanctity and primacy of the traditional
employment
contract. There is no attempt to regulate and protect self-employment or economic
de-
pendency. The legal re-qualification of the work relationship in terms of the
traditional
employment contract, also facilitated by a number of legal presumptions, is the
only pro-
tection provided by the reform.3
Another interesting example is provided by the UK definition of worker. In

the UK,
defining who is a worker, covered by working time or minimum wage regulation, is
a con-
troversial question. Statutory law defines the worker as: an individual who has
entered
into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) (a) a
contract
of employment; or (b) any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is
express)
whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform
personally
any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by
virtue of the
contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking
carried on
by the individual. The content of the definition is then left to common-law.
According to a
first line of thought, defining who is a worker requires ascertaining whether the
worker is
economically dependent on the relationship with the particular client/employer. The
fact
that a consistent portion of a workers annual income derives from the
client/employer is
considered of great assistance.4 On the contrary, according to a second line of
thought,
defining who is a worker requires ascertaining whether the obligation of personal

service
is the dominant purpose of the contract for service. What matters is not the fact
that the
independent contractor is placed into a condition of economic dependence similar to
that
of ordinary employees. What matters is the fact that the independent contractor is
not a
business undertaking, who performs an impersonal obligation of service in the
capacity
3 See the new Article 69-bis, d.lgs. 276/2003 as modified by the Law 92/2012.
4 See Giannelli v. Edmund Bell & Co Ltd, 6.9.2005 (EAT).
389
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Orsola Razzolini
of running a business or conducting a profession, but rather an individual, who

person-
ally executes the service.5 The worker enjoys the right to national minimum wage
and the
working time regulations.6
From an interdisciplinary point of view, it is interesting to note that there

are some
similarities between the British definition of worker and the EU definition of
consumer.
Quantitative remunerative parameters, together with the obligation to deliver
services
personally, represent one possible (and questionable) legal tool for determining
whether
or not social protection and social distributive justice are required. The need for
this form
of protection stems from the fact that the worker predominantly devotes a
consistent por-
tion of his/her life time (measured through remunerative rather than time
parameters) to
one client, who then becomes the main source of the workers income, as well as the
main
tool by which he/she satisfies human and existential needs.
11.2 From Inequality of Bargaining Powers to Long-Term Life Time

Contracts
This trend towards the definition of economic dependency in order for certain
social con-
tractual rights to apply shows that the insertion of social thinking into the law
governing
work relationships does not appear to be founded on inequality in the bargaining
powers
between the contracting parties, but instead on the time and personal human
dimension
of the long-term relationship. From this perspective, the linkage between
inequality of
bargaining powers and employment protection has been recently questioned as being
the
right approach to the regulation of modern contractual relationships around work.7
Broadly speaking, in employment contract law, the exchange of employees

insurance
against uncertainty in income for the employers power of direction of personal
labour
justifies the transferring of social risks and costs upon the employer. It is now
widely ac -
cepted all over Europe that the employers power of control and direction is
founded on
a contract, rather than on the status of Master or on a form of property rights
over the
employee, as well as the employment subordination that is the content of the
contractual
8
obligation to work. Inequality of bargaining power, rooted in the contract, rather
than in
socio-economic reality, justifies the reallocation of rights and duties between the
employer
and the employee as well as social contractual protection.
5 See James v. Redcats (Brands) Ltd. [2007] I.C.R. 1006 (EAT).

6 Employment Relations Act 1996, section 13 and 230(3); National Minimum Wage Act
1998 section 54(3);
Working Time Regulation Act 1998, section 2; Employment Relations Act 1999,
sections 10-13.
7 Freedland, M. R./Kountouris, N. (2011).
8 See Kahn-Freund, O. (1967).
390
----------------------- Page 430-----------------------
Contract Law
The concept of economic dependency is used to underline that, in the emerging

law
governing self-employment contracts, it is the clients appropriation of the
self-employed
workers life time that appears to justify, in exchange, the protection of the
worker against
uncertainty in their income and other social expectations, although within certain
limits.
Mainly, the fact that the worker devotes a consistent portion of his/her working
life time
to the client and that the contract is a long-term social relationship that, during
certain
periods of the life time of individuals, provides essential goods, services and
income op-
portunities to the worker9 is the rationale behind workers entitlement to specific
social
contractual rights to the detriment of the clients contractual freedom (the right
to paid
annual leave and weekly rest-days, the right to suspension of the contract when the
indi-
vidual is unable to work and the right to indemnity in respect of anticipated
termination,
and the right to a social minimum wage in the UK).
Italian and British case law is also relevant here. The following two
decisions do not
deal with the concept of economic dependency. However, they both clearly reflect
the idea
of the employment or self-employment contract as a life time contract and a
continuing
long-term relationship in which a human being is central. The need for social
contractual
protection appears clearly to be founded in this notion.
In Malik v. BCCI [1998], the House of Lords granted the two appellants (long-
serving
employees of a bank that collapsed as the result of a massive and notorious fraud
perpe-
trated by those controlling the bank) stigma compensation because they had been
put at
a disadvantage in the employment market. The House of Lords held that the implied
obli-
gation of mutual trust and confidence is apt to cover the great diversity of
situations in which
a balance is struck between an employers interest in managing his business as he
sees fit and
the employees interest in not being unfairly and improperly exploited (. . .) The
employer will
not, without reasonable and proper cause, so conduct itself in its dealings with
third parties as
to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence between
employer and
employee. As emphasised above, the common law development of the implied
obligation
of trust and confidence in this context means that the personal element in
employment
is reflected in the content of the employment contract. The obligation
acknowledges the
human factor in employment relations by promoting the dignity of the worker.10 In
other
words, the implied duty of trust and confidence, associated with long-term
relationships,
has gradually allowed the personal element in the employment relationship to be
reflected
in the content of the employment contract itself. The inequality of bargaining
power does
not play any role. In this regard, the contractual protection of dignity and other
personal
values can be extended to cover all work relationships of long-term duration,
regardless of
the existence of a situation of juridical subordination.
9 See the definition of life time contracts provided by our group.

10 Brodie, D. (2001); contra Anderman, S. (2004) at p. 101.
391
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Orsola Razzolini
In the Italian case of Ausl v. DCM,11 the Italian Corte di Cassazione upheld
the Court
of Appeals decision to grant compensation for professional economic and non-

economic
losses to a professional self-employed worker (a dentist), which were caused by
AUSLs
(Azienda Unitaria Sanitaria locale) negligence in the provision of the tools and
infrastruc-
ture necessary for the dentist to perform his/her work. The Italian court held
that, even
though the dentist was a self-employed worker, the continuity of the relationship
with
AUSL, together with the personal nature of the obligation,12 were factors capable
of ex-
tending the contractual relationship to the protection of non-economic,

constitutional
rights such as the workers dignity and professionalism.13 The
coordination between
AUSL and the dentist did not play a significant role in the reasoning of the court.
What
mattered was the long-term nature of the relationship and the essential life time
invest-
ment made by the worker.
11.3 Long-Term Work Relationships in the Light of European Social

Contract Law
Within this framework, the debate around self-employment and economic dependency
appears to be closely linked to the debate around European Social Contract Law.
Broadly
speaking, we would question whether emerging European contract law is an
adequate
legal tool for regulating contractual relations where not only financial and
economic in-
terests are at stake, but human, social and life interests as well. To the extent
that European
contract law remains based on the sales model (that is to say an economic
transaction
characterised by instantaneous agreement and instantaneous performance), there is
no
place for human, life and existential needs to be taken into consideration. As a
possible
consequence, there is no scope for a justice with regard to the person to be
inserted into
contract law.14 The opening up of European contract law to social and distributive
justice
oriented to existential human needs can be achieved by focusing on the

rental model
rather than the sale model and rediscovering the life time social dimension the
contrac-
tual relationship inevitably gains whenever time and human factors are involved.
In this context, the recent evolution of the law of self-employment
and economic
dependency plays a dominant role. Indeed, self-employment and economic dependency
can be regarded in terms of long-term contracts or relationships to which several
of the
sixteen Principles of Life time Contracts could be applied.
11 Corte di Cassazione, September 17, 2008, no. 23744, in Argomenti di diritto del
lavoro, 2009, 131 ff with
comment by R. Salomone.
12 Salomone, R. (2009).
13 See, for an in-depth analysis of this mechanism, Mengoni, L. (2011d) here at
351; Castronovo, C. (1997b).
14 Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2011); Working Paper Massimo DAntona, (2010) 80, 25.
392
----------------------- Page 432-----------------------
Contract Law
First, self-employment and economic dependency may by no means consist of

long-
term work relationships which provide essential goods, services and income
opportunities
for certain periods of the life time of individuals (Principle 1). It is worth
emphasising
that long-term work relationships usually derive from contracts of long-term
duration.
Here, long-term duration may assume two different meanings. On the one hand, it
may
refer to the fact that the duration of contract satisfies the creditors
interest,15 while on the
other hand, the duration of the contract might be accidental and does not satisfy
any
creditors interest.16 A contract of long-term duration inevitably involves a
social relation-
ship between the contracting parties quite apart from the simple exchange of work
for
remuneration. Here, there is a need to enrich the legal analysis of extensive long-
term
contractual relationships where the participants derive complex personal, non-
economic
satisfaction.17 In particular, the worker invests his/her life time in a long-term
work re-
lationship (see principles 2 and 3, human and long-term dimension) and, in turn,
expects
to see fundamental existential needs (services and income opportunities) satisfied
as well
as protection of and respect for his/her physical, moral and psychological
personality (see
the Principle 5, Needs and Regard and the Italian and British case discussed above
para. 3).
As has recently been pointed out,18 the personal long-term work relationship cannot
be
completely understood from a purely bilateral perspective, since the worker lives
within a
nexus or network of legal connections, the nature and the duration of which can
influence
or affect the ongoing work relationship (see Principle 4, Linked Contracts).
Secondly, several of the social contractual rights increasingly granted to
the economi-
cally dependent worker, such as the protection against discrimination and
anticipated ter-
mination without just cause, the right to minimum wage, the right to granted
suspension,
embody several principles of European Social Contract Law. These include the
principle
of termination (Principle 11), which must be socially responsible and based
entirely on
significant personal behaviour, or circumstances or economic interests on the
client side;
the principle of the adaptation of the contract to particular circumstances (such
as illness
or pregnancy) (Principle 10), thereby redistributing the risks between the
contracting par-
ties; the principle of commutative and distributive justice that govern the
determination
of the contract price (Principle 9). In this regard, a principle of distributive
justice can
at least be found in the UK and in Luxembourg, and also in Italy where there have
been
15 For instance, the creditor asks the debtor to perform certain services for a
considerable period of time. Here,
what satisfies the clients interest is not only the performance of the
services, but rather the performance of
the services for a considerable period of time. See, G. Oppo, G. (1943).
16 For instance, the creditor asks the debtor to perform a single outcome that
requires the debtor to work for
a considerable period of time. The time is, in this case, suffered by the
creditor who must wait for the con-
tractual outcome to be realised. See, Oppo, G. (1943).
17 See Macneil, I. R. (ed.) (1980) p. 12.
18 Freedland, M. R./Kountouris, N. (2011) at pp. 316 ff.
393
----------------------- Page 433-----------------------
Orsola Razzolini
recent moves towards the idea of the workers (not only employees) right to the
minimum
social wage (see the new article 63, Legislative Decree no. 276/2003, as modified
in 2012).
Lastly, the principle of information and transparency (Principle 13) underlies the
Spanish
requirement of written form for the most significant terms of the agreement.
Finally, it is worth noting that, under EU anti-discriminatory law, a work
relationship
is also governed by the general principle of access (Principle 8). According to
this prin-
ciple, those who provide life time contracts must refrain from any discrimination
as to
personal and social characteristics in all stages of the contractual relationship
from access
to termination. With regard to access to employment and self-employment, this
principle
is clearly embodied in Article 3 of Directive 76/207/CE (as modified by Directive
2002/73/
CE), which prohibits any direct or indirect discrimination on the grounds of gender
in
the public or the private sector in relation to conditions for access to
employment, to
self-employment or to occupation, including selection criteria, recruitment
conditions
and promotion.19
19 With regard to the supply of goods and services to satisfy fundamental

existential needs, it is worth men-
tioning Council Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal
treatment between men and
women in access to and supply of goods and services. With particular regard to
access to the market of
Member States and the freedom of provision of services, see, recently, ECJ,
European Commission v. King-
dom of Belgium, December 19, 2012, C-577/2010 and, particularly, the opinion
delivered by the AG Pedro
Cruz Villaln. The case is about the Limosa legislation, according to which,
prior to the performance of
any professional activity by an independent (self-employed) worker or an
independent trainee in Belgium,
his or her authorised representative must give prior (electronic) notice to the
National Institute for Social
Security of Independent (self-employed) Workers. This is considered to be a
disproportionate and unjustifi-
able obstacle placed on the freedom of provision of services by self-employed
workers. In its opinion, the
AG emphasised that the EU should pay particular attention not only to employees
but also to economically
dependent self-employed workers, who are increasingly recognised at EU level
(see para 46).
394
----------------------- Page 434-----------------------
Bibliography
Albanese, Antonio; Castronovo, Carlo, et al. (eds.) (2011): Luigi Mengoni, Scritti
Vol II.
Milano: Giuffr.
Anderman, Steven (2004): Termination of Employment. Whose Property Rights?

In:
Barnard-Deakin-Morris (eds.): The future of labour law. Liber amicorum Bob Hepple
QC.
Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 101128.

the Draft
Borzaga, Matteo (2002): Subordinazione e diritto della sicurezza sociale.

Le riforme
fallite nella Repubblica Federale Tedesca. In: Diritto delle relazioni
industriali (4/2002),
pp. 655683.
Brodie, Douglas (2001): Mutual Trust and the Values of the Employment
Contract. In:
Industrial Law Journal, 30 (1/2001), pp. 84100.
Castronovo, Carlo (1997): Lobbligazione senza prestazione ai confini fra contratto

e torto.
In: Castronovo, Carlo: La nuova responsabilit civile. Milano2: Giuffr, pp. 177
ff.
2
Castronovo, Carlo (1997): La nuova responsabilit civile. Milano : Giuffr.
Davidov, Guy; Langille, Brian (eds.) (2011): The idea of labour law.
Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Freedland, Mark R.; Kountouris, Nicola (2011): The Legal Construction of Personal
Work
Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press..
Kahn-Freund, Otto (1967): A note on status and contract in British labour law. In:
The
Modern Law Review, 30 (6/1967), pp. 635644.
Macneil, Ian R. (1980): The new social contract. An inquiry into modern
contractual
relations. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Mengoni, Luigi (2011): Responsabilit contrattuale. In: Albanese, Antonio;

Castronovo,
Carlo, et al. (eds.): Luigi Mengoni, Scritti Vol. II. Milano: Giuffr, pp. 299353.
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Dimension
Finland (JFT),
3 (4/2009), pp. 437455.
Nogler, Luca; Reifner, Udo (2011): Social Contracts in the Light of the Draft
Common Frame
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Fiorentini, Francesca
(eds.): A factual Assessment of the Draft Common Frame of Reference. Mnchen:
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del diritto
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396
----------------------- Page 436-----------------------
12 Tarifautonomie und
Vertragsgerechtigkeit: der Beitrag
des kollektiven Arbeitsrechts zur
Vertragstheorie
Florian Rdl
Summary
The starting point of this chapter is that social contracts are existential
contracts. They are
characterised as such because human beings cannot live a decent life without
entering into
them. The subject matter of existential contracts is human labour,
housing or consumer
credit. The latter are what the economic historian Karl Polanyi named fictitious
commodi
ties. Polanyi warned against submitting these commodities to untamed market
forces. From
a private law perspective, this means that existential contracts require a legal
infrastructure
that is distinct from standard contract law.
However, as the chapter will show, this distinct infrastructure can also serve
to illumi
nate aspects of contracts that are usually not visible. The argument starts with an
overview of
collective bargaining. The conventional view is that collective bargaining
compensates for the
structural disadvantage of employees in contracting with employers. This approach
is, however,
inadequate. The theory of private law does not allow for structural weaknesses to
be taken into
consideration. It therefore makes more sense to see collective bargaining as means
to determine
what should be a fair price for human labour. Despite its neglect by modern legal
doctrine and
the theory of contract law, the concept of the fair price is also present in
general contract law. In
Germany, it is present in the doctrine of unconscionability contained in Sec. 138
(2) BGB. It is
also present in the Common Law. In a nutshell, the fair price is the competitive
market price.
There is, however, some confusion in contract theory as to the role in
general contract
law of the fair price in contract formation. The standard view is that the
requirement of a fair
price arises only when the parties to a contract have unequal bargaining power.
This is not
convincing and perhaps not even coherent. An alternative analysis is that equal
bargaining
power is indicative of whether the relevant transaction is a full contract of
exchange, which
is submitted to the principle of contractual fairness, including the fair price, or
whether the
transaction is partly a gift. This approach not only offers a coherent
understanding of the role
of the fair price in contract. It is also consistent with labour law, given that
collective bargain
ing is a particular means of determining the fair price for labour.
397
----------------------- Page 437-----------------------
Florian Rdl
The chapter ends with a short overview of housing and consumer credit
contracts. It
discusses current suggestions of legal reform to institutionalise, also for these
fictitious com
modities, mechanisms to generate fair prices beyond the untamed market.
12.1 Existentielle Vertrge ber fiktive Waren
Der groe Wirtschaftshistoriker und soziologe Karl Polanyi ist seit

einigen Jahren in
verschiedenen Disziplinen wieder entdeckt worden.1 In seinem zentralen Werk
The
Great Transformation2 hatte Polanyi einst im Angesicht der katastrophischen
globalen
wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in den 30er und 40er Jahren die zentrale Bedrohung der
3
menschlichen Zivilisation durch die kapitalistische Marktwirtschaft
analysiert. Er sah
sie in der gesellschaftlichen Landnahme der Marktwirtschaft, in der Transformation
der
Marktwirtschaft in eine Marktgesellschaft. Das zentrale Gefhrdungsmoment fr einen
solchen Umschlag erkennt Polanyi in der Kommodifizierung von Boden, menschlicher

Arbeit und Geld. Diese werden im Kapitalismus zu fiktiven Waren. Sie sind
fiktiv in
dem Sinne, dass sie nicht wie die brigen Waren fr den Markt hergestellt werden.
Boden
kann von vorne herein nicht hergestellt werden, sondern er ist immer schon da und
lsst
sich nicht vermehren. Menschliche Arbeit als produktive Auseinandersetzung
mit der
Natur wird gleichfalls nicht hergestellt sondern bildet eine grundlegende
Mglichkeit der
menschlichen Existenz. Geld ist zwar als Wertausdruck und Tauschmittel mit der
Markt
wirtschaft eng verknpft, aber es kann nicht im gleichen Sinne
hergestellt werden wie
die mithilfe von Geld getauschten Waren. Wenn die fiktiven Waren dessen
ungeachtet
ebenso behandelt werden wie gewhnliche, fr den Markt hergestellte Waren, dann
so
Polanyi entfalten sich die zerstrerischen Krfte der
marktwirtschaftlichen Ordnung
und gefhrden am Ende den inneren und ueren Frieden der Staatenwelt. Um dies zu
verhindern mahnt Polanyi, das Marktgeschehen um die fiktiven Waren sozial
einzubetten.
Zwar besteht in der Rezeption von Polany's Arbeit einige Unklarheit darber, was
die Idee
der sozialen Einbettung alles einschlieen soll.4 Klar ist indessen, dass
jedenfalls auch
eine rechtliche Regulierung des jeweiligen Marktes gemeint ist, die das
Marktgeschehen,
welches sich unter Garantie von liberaler Eigentums und Vertragsfreiheit
an sich er
eignen wrde, zivilisierend transformiert.
1 Zum Beispiel Harvey, M./Ramlogan, R. et al. (2007); Hann, C.; Hart, K. (eds.)
(2009); Joerges, C.; Falke,
J. (eds.) (2011); Caporaso, J. A./Tarrow, S. (2009).
2 Polanyi, K. (1944/1957).
3 Die Bedrohung wurde Polanyi seinerzeit durch Faschismus und II. Weltkrieg nur
allzu anschaulich (dazu
Polanyi, K. (1944/1957) pp. 237 ff). Siehe im brigen auch Streeck, W. (2009)
pp. 246253.
4 Dazu Block, F. (2003); Beckert, J. (2009).
398
----------------------- Page 438-----------------------

Arbeitsrechts zur
Vertragstheorie
Die Forderung nach einer regulativen Einbettung der Mrkte fr fiktive Waren
hat
eine erstaunliche Reichweite. Sie betrifft im Falle der menschlichen Arbeit deren
Verkauf
in Gestalt abhngiger Arbeit oder persnlicher Dienstleistung, also das
Arbeits und
Dienstrecht. Sie betrifft im Falle des Bodens die Rechte des Grundeigentmers,
also deren
ffentlichrechtliche Einschrnkungen etwa durch Umweltrecht, aber auch Kauf,
Pacht
oder Miete von Grund in allen Formen einschlielich des Wohnraummietrechts. Es geht
insoweit auch um den Verkauf der Erzeugnisse des Bodens, also Lebensmittel und Roh
stoffe. Sie betrifft im Falle des Geldes vor allem den Kredit, vom Zentralbank bis
zum
Verbraucherkredit einschlielich des Rechts der Kreditsicherheit.
Es ist alles andere als zufllig, dass die Konzeption des
Sozialvertrages, die Luca
Nogler und Udo Reifner entwickelt haben,5 gerade von Vertrgen dieser Art handelt.
Es
geht um Vertrge ber Arbeit, Wohnraum und Darlehen. Es geht also um Vertrge ber
fiktive Waren: menschliche Arbeit, Boden und Geld. Dabei ist das Darlehen als
Vertrag
ber Geld noch einmal mit den beiden anderen Arten von Vertrgen ber Arbeit und
Boden verknpft. Denn beim Verbraucherdarlehen geht es um die vorgezogene Nutzung
von Arbeitseinkommen, beim (Verbraucher)Immobiliendarlehen geht es zustzlich um
den Erwerb von Wohnraum anstelle von Miete. Die Begrndung von Nogler und Reifner
fr die Rolle des Sozialvertrages speist sich nicht unmittelbar aus Polanys
Analyse, aber
ist mit dieser sehr gut verknpfbar.
Nogler und Reifner argumentieren mit der Bedeutung der sozialen Vertrge fr
ein
wrdiges menschliches Leben unter modernen Bedingungen.6 Dabei verweist das Etikett
des
Sozialen zugleich auf den Modus, in dem sich die beiden Autoren eine progressive
Mod
ernisierung des am schlichten Kaufvertrag orientierten Modells des Allgemeinen
Vertrags
rechts erhoffen: Das Soziale verweise letztlich auf das Solidarische, dessen
ursprngliche
Form die Tarifautonomie darstellt, das sich aber auch in den Regeln von
Verbraucher
7
kreditschutz und Wohnungsmiete spiegele. Wenn man jedoch von diesem
kollektiven
Aspekt zunchst absieht, liee sich die Bedeutung der Vertrge ber Arbeit,
Wohnraum
und Darlehen fr den einzelnen ohne berzogene Dramatisierung auch als
existentiell
bezeichnen: Unter modernen Bedingungen ist es fr eine wrdige menschliche Existenz
im
Regelfall notwendig, Vertrge ber den Verkauf der eigenen Arbeitskraft und
Vertrge ber
8
die Nutzung von Wohnraum zu schlieen. Mit beiden stehen Vertrge ber Darlehen
zur
Finanzierung von Verbrauchsgtern und selbstgenutzten Immobilien in einem
auxiliaren
5 Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2011); Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2010).

6 Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2011) pp. 337 ff.
7 Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2011) p. 348.
8 Vertrge ber den Erwerb von Lebensmitteln sind an dieser Stelle nur deswegen
nicht aufzufhren, weil die
Versorgung in den westlichen Industrielndern durch eine Verschrnkung von
Plan und Marktwirtschaft
gelst ist, die sich allenfalls dem Endverbraucher als kompetitiver Markt
darstellt. Das war nicht immer so
und kann sich auch wieder ndern.
399
----------------------- Page 439-----------------------
Florian Rdl
Zusammenhang. Mit Rcksicht auf die existentielle Notwendigkeit dieser Vertrge fr

die
menschliche Existenz in der Gegenwart knnte man sie existentielle Vertrge
nennen.
Die direkte Linie dieser Erluterung der Besonderheit von Vertrgen
ber Arbeit,
Wohnraum und Darlehen als existentielle Vertrge zu Polanyis Analyse der Problema
tik der fiktiven Waren besteht nun gerade darin, dass der existentielle Charakter
der
fiktiven Waren wichtige Aspekte erhellt, warum diese nicht zum Gegenstand eines
nor
malen Marktgeschehens werden drfen. Die rechtliche Infrastruktur eines solchen
Markt
geschehens liefert nmlich ein Privatrecht, das vor allem Eigentum und
Vertragsfreiheit
ins Werk setzt. Da die besagten Vertrge aber je fr sich nur fr die eine Seite
von exis
tentieller Natur sind, fr die andere hingegen ein gewhnliches Geschft, entsteht
eine
soziale Asymmetrie, die sich in grundlegenden Verzerrungen des Marktes
niederschlgt.
Es sind Verzerrungen, denen man mit den Mitteln des Wettbewerbsrechts nicht beikom
men kann, weil sie nicht von der Struktur der Anbieterseite herrhren, sondern von
der
existentiellen Bedeutung des Vertragsinhalts fr den anderen Teil. Wird man den
Verzer
rungen nicht auf regulative Weise Herr, dann entfalten sich die destruktiven
Potentiale,
von denen Polanyi spricht. Dass dem so ist, bedarf wohl keiner groen Begrndung:
Es
gengt sich kurz auszumalen, wie die soziale Welt ohne Tarifautonomie, ohne jeden
Miet
erschutz und ohne jeden Schutz von Verbraucherkreditnehmern denn ausshe. Vertrge
ber Arbeit, Wohnraum und Darlehen bilden darum die zentralen Gegenstnde
einer
rechtlichen Regulierung, die dem existentiellen Charakter der Vertrge Rechnung
trgt.9
Allerdings wre es falsch, hieraus zu folgern, dass sich der gewhnliche

Kaufvertrag
und der existentielle Vertrag als begriffliche Antipoden gegenberstehen, in dem
Sinne,
dass ein reines Privatrecht mit einem exklusiven Fokus auf Eigentum und
Vertragsfrei
heit durchaus die richtige Form fr ersteren, nicht aber fr letzteren lieferte.
Richtig ist
vielmehr, dass der existentielle Vertrag Aufschluss geben kann ber die Form des
Ver
trages schlechthin.10 Das ist das Thema des folgenden Beitrags.
9 Hieraus erhellt sich das zentrale Programm der EuSoCoErklrung 2012 der EuSoCo-
group: Das Modell
des Zeit indifferenten Kaufvertrages muss um ein zweites grundlegendes Modell
ergnzt werden, das wir als
Lebenszeitvertrag bezeichnet haben. Es soll soziale Gerechtigkeit fr die
Menschen ausdrcken knnen, fr
die konomische Effizienz im Sinne von Profitabilitt nur ein Mittel ist. Es
sollte Antworten fr Vernderun
gen in der Lebenssituation bereithalten und mehr als eine einfache
Tauschgerechtigkeit bieten. Materieller
Schutz fr soziale Schwche neben der Information fr die Auswahl auf dem Markt
gehrt dazu ebenso wie
eine kollektive und soziale Dimension von Arbeit und Konsum, wie sie in
Tarifvertrgen aber auch in allge
meinen Prinzipien enthalten sind. Die Vertragsfreiheit der Anbieter und
Arbeitgeber sollte um die Anerken
nung sozialer Freiheit der Arbeitnehmer, Mieter und Verbraucher ergnzt werden,
in der die drei groen
Bedrohungen unserer Zeit: Arbeitslosigkeit, berschuldung und Obdachlosigkeit
ernst genommen werden.
10 Zu notwendigen Lernprozessen des Allgemeinen Vertragsrechts mit Blick auf die
Sozialvertrge auch: No
gler, L./Reifner, U. (2009) Whrend Nogler und Reifner bestrebt sind, die
rmischrechtliche Tradition der
locatio conductio als Vertragsmodell zu beleben, geht es hier darum
zu zeigen, dass auch das Kaufver
tragsmodell auf die Idee der Gerechtigkeit verpflichtet ist. Das steht einer
Suche nach einem passenden Mo
dell fr die Sozialvertrge nicht etwa entgegen, sondern unterstreicht ihre
Berechtigung und Notwendigkeit.
400
----------------------- Page 440-----------------------

Arbeitsrechts zur
Vertragstheorie
Der Argumentationsgang verluft wie folgt: Am Anfang steht eine

Reflexion auf
den Sinn der Tarifautonomie (12.2). Es wird entfaltet, dass dieser letztendlich
darin liegt,
einen gerechten Preis fr die menschliche Arbeitskraft zu bestimmen. Die
Frage nach
dem gerechten Preis ist allerdings keine, die sich nur fr den Arbeitsvertrag
stellt. Wie
im zweiten Teil zu zeigen sein wird, ist die Idee des gerechten Preises nicht auf
den Ar
beitsvertrag begrenzt. Sie wird dort nur besonders sichtbar, ist tatschlich aber
Bestandteil
des allgemeinen Vertragsrechts (12.3). In einer abschlieenden Rckwendung zu den
existentiellen Vertrgen erfolgt ein kursorischer Blick auf die Mechanismen zur
gerechten
Preisbildung bei Miete und Darlehen (12.4).
12.2 Zum Sinn von Tarifvertrag und Tarifautonomie
12.2.1 Ausgleich struktureller Unterlegenheit?
Die StandardErluterung zum Sinn der Tarifautonomie lautet, wie folgt: Die
Grundlage
der Nutzung fremder Arbeitskraft fr eigene Zwecke ist der freie Arbeitsvertrag.
Doch
aufgrund einer strukturellen Unterlegenheit des Arbeitnehmers drfe er im
Verhltnis zu
seinem Vertragspartner, dem Arbeitgeber, nicht allein gelassen werden. Diese
strukturelle
Unterlegenheit des Arbeitnehmers auszugleichen ist fr viele der
wesentliche Sinn der
Tarifautonomie. Tarifautonomie ist die fr das Arbeitsrecht spezifische kollektive
Form
des Schutzes der typischerweise schwcheren Vertragspartei.
Fr das deutsche System betonen einige Stimmen zustzlich, dass dieses mit
seiner
mitgliedschaftlichen Vermittlung der Tarifwirkung eine Schutzform
verwirkliche, die
ihrerseits besonders stark darauf angelegt sei, am Ende doch vor allem die private
Autono
mie des einzelnen Arbeitnehmers zu verwirklichen. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist die
Rede
von der kollektiven Privatautonomie oder der kollektiv ausgebten
Privatautonomie
geprgt worden.11 Aber das ist eine ideologische Besonderheit der deutschen
Diskussion,
die im europischen Mastab mutmalich keine Bedeutung hat.

Wesentlich ist also: Tarifautonomie gleicht die strukturelle
Unterlegenheit des Ar
beitnehmers aus. Ein im liberalistischen Vertragsrechtsdenken geschulter Geist wird
jedoch
immer wieder fragen, warum sich das private Vertragsrecht fr derlei strukturelle
Unter
legenheiten, fr Machtasymmetrien interessieren sollte. Es ist doch das besondere
Ver
sprechen des brgerlichen Privatrechts, eine Idee der Gerechtigkeit nur in Ansehung
von
Handlungen, nicht aber in Ansehung der Person zu reprsentieren. Die damit
verbundene
11 Beide Redeweisen fr kollektive Privatautonomie: Dieterich, T. (2012a) Art.

9 GG, Rn. 55 f, fr kollek
tiv ausgebte Privatautonomie: Bayreuther, F. (2005) sind freilich nicht
gleichsinnig. Die letztere nuanci
ert eine individualistische Fundierung, der gegenber die erstere neutral ist.
401
----------------------- Page 441-----------------------
Florian Rdl
Idee formal gleicher Freiheit schliet es gerade aus, die Rechtspersonen mit
unterschiedli
chem Status wie Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer zu belegen und hieraus im Privatrecht
irgendwelche Konsequenzen zu ziehen. Genau aus diesem Grund ist jede

Institution
des Schutzes einer schwcheren Vertragspartei auch immer wieder unter ideologischem
Druck, weil es sich um eine Abweichung vom Privatrechtsversprechen

brgerlicher
Gleichheit handelt.
Es gibt zwei Mglichkeiten hierauf zu erwidern. Man kann entweder in Zweifel
ziehen,
dass das brgerliche Versprechen formal gleicher Freiheit berhaupt eine sehr
beglckende
Botschaft sei, angesichts der sozialen Ungleichheit und Armut, die damit
augenscheinlich
einhergehen knnen. Doch es fllt eben furchtbar schwer, ein besseres und zugleich
grund
legend anderes Versprechen also keines, das nur die negativen Effekte mildern
soll auch
nur zu artikulieren. Man kann andererseits sagen, dass die Bewltigung
struktureller
Ungleichheit eine unvollstndige Auskunft zum Sinn der Tarifautonomie darstellt.
12.2.2 Gerechter Lohn durch Tarifvertrag
Denn im Arbeitsrecht wie auch sonst, wenn es um den Schutz einer strukturell
schwcheren
Vertragspartei geht, ist die strukturelle Ungleichheit fr sich allein genommen
tatschlich
kein Grund, die Regeln des allgemeinen Vertragsrechts zu modifizieren. Der
ausschlagge
bende Grund ist vielmehr, dass Vertrge zwischen Parteien, die untereinander in
einem
Verhltnis struktureller Ungleichheit stehen, regelmig zu manifest
ungerechten Ver
trgen fhren. Wre es anders, das heit wrden Arbeitgeber, Vermieter,
Verbraucher
kreditgeber ungeachtet ihrer berlegenheit immer nur gerechten Austausch zu
fairen
Bedingungen anbieten, wren Arbeitsrecht und Tarifautonomie, Mieterschutz und Ver
braucherkreditrecht niemals entstanden. Den Kern der Tarifautonomie macht nun aber
die Festsetzung des Lohns fr die geleistete Arbeit aus. Damit wird die Festsetzung
des
gerechten Lohns als zentraler Sinn von Tarifvertrag und Tarifautonomie sichtbar.
Die Idee des gerechten Lohns ist nun aber nichts anderes als die fr den
Arbeitsver
trag spezifizierte aristotelischthomistische Idee des gerechten Preises.
Doch viele Ver
tragstheoretiker meinen, diese Idee sei berholt. Einen objektiv gerechten Preis
knne es
nicht geben, denn es sei nicht klar, wie dieser anders als durch die
vertragschlieenden
Parteien bestimmt werden knnte. Das berrascht, weil das Privatrecht die Idee des
ge
rechten Preises durchaus kennt, in unterschiedlicher Fassung: Das auffllige
Missverhlt
nis von Leistung und Gegenleistung in 138 Abs. 2 BGB,12 die kongruente Deckung
im
Insolvenzrecht, aber auch der Wertersatz im Bereicherungsrecht. Es erscheint vor

dem
12 Auf die in 138 Abs. 2 ausgedrckte Idee des gerechten Preises als
aufflliges Missverhltnis der ausge
tauschten Leistungen nimmt auch Nr. 9 der Prinzipien fr Lebenszeitvertrge
Bezug.
402
----------------------- Page 442-----------------------

Arbeitsrechts zur
Vertragstheorie
Hintergrund dieses Kontrasts der Prsenz der Idee des gerechten Preises im
Privatrecht
und des Mangels ihrer vertragsrechtstheoretischen Reflexion angezeigt,
einige Worte
darber zu verlieren.
12.2.3 Zur allgemeinen Idee des gerechten Preises
Mutmalich ist die Antwort des Rechts in Gestalt der Rechtsprechung zu 138 Abs. 2
BGB
bekannt. Abzustellen ist auf den objektiven Wert der Leistung, die subjektiven
Auffassun
gen oder besonderen Interessen der Beteiligten spielen keine Rolle.13 Den
objektiven Wert
liefert der marktbliche Preis.14 Leistung und Preis stehen dann in einem
Missverhlt
nis, wenn der Preis vom Marktpreis abweicht. Das Missverhltnis ist dann auffllig
und
die Grenze zum ungerechten Preis berschritten, wenn das Verhltnis vom
objektiven
15
Wert der Leistung und Preis 1:2 bzw. 2:1 betrgt. Je nach Leistung,
etwa im Bereich der
Wohnraummiete, kann auch eine niedrigere Abweichung ausreichen, um einen Preis als
ungerecht zu qualifizieren.16 Mit anderen Worten: ein ungerechter Preis liegt vor
im Falle
einer qualifizierten Abweichung vom Marktpreis. Ein gerechter Preis ist der, der
sich in
nerhalb des so gesteckten Rahmens hlt.
Dass der gerechte Preis nicht mit dem Marktpreis sondern mit einer
qualifizierten
Abweichung von diesem identifiziert wird, ist indessen kein Zugestndnis
an die Ver
tragsfreiheit, etwa in dem Sinne, dass dann eben wenigstens in gewissen Grenzen
auch
ungerechte Vertrge erlaubt wren. Es wre nmlich gar nicht mglich, den
gerechten
Preis als bezifferte Gre rechtlich zur Geltung zu bringen. Denn wenn man sich auf
den
Marktpreis als rechtlich magebende Gre festlegen will, muss die Festlegung auch
des
sen dynamischen Charakter reflektieren. Der Marktpreis kann sich ndern. Mit einem
ge
rechten Preis als bezifferter Gre wre er auf diese Gre fixiert und knnte sich
knftig
nicht mehr der Marktlage entsprechend ndern.17
Freilich ist nach alldem noch nicht beantwortet, ob die Magabe des
Marktpreises
fr den objektiven Wert einer Leistung auch zu rechtfertigen ist. Aber das ist an
dieser
Stelle nicht zu leisten. Insofern sei nur herausgehoben, dass eine Alternative zum
Markt
preis als Orientierung des gerechten Preises nicht ernsthaft diskutiert wird.
Gleichwohl ist
eine Qualifizierung erforderlich. Gemeint ist nicht jeder Marktpreis, sondern der
Preis,
wie er sich auf polypolistischen oder auch kompetitiven Mrkten
herausbildet. Diese
13 Sack, P. S. (2011) 138 Rn. 206 mit Nachweisen zur Rechtsprechung.

16 Zur Wohnraummiete: BGH vom 8.12.1981, BGHSt 30, 280, 281: etwa 50%.
17 In diesem Sinne auch BGH, Urt. v. 28.4.1999, in: BGHZ 141, 257, 265: 138 BGB
(im Fall: Absatz 1) liefert
keine Grundlage zum regulierenden Eingriff der Rechtsprechung in die freie
Marktpreisbildung.
403
----------------------- Page 443-----------------------
Florian Rdl
Anforderung an den Marktpreis ist in der Rechtsprechung und der

Kommentarlitera
tur nicht klar herausgearbeitet. Aber die Traditionslinie im Privatrechtsdenken,
die die
Norm des gerechten Preises immer verteidigt hat, sie reicht von Aristoteles ber
Thomas
von Aquin bis zu einigen nordamerikanischen Autoren der Gegenwart, ist immer vom
kompetitiven Marktpreis ausgegangen.18 Es ist wohl auch leicht einzusehen, warum
ein
Monopolpreis nicht als Mastab taugen kann. Der Monopolist kann gegen den Vorwurf
eines ungerechten Preises nicht einwenden, bei ihm sei es immer so teuer. Aber auch
ein
Oligopolist kann nicht auf den Oligopolpreis verweisen. Denn letzterer wrde bei
einer
kompetitiven Marktstruktur regelmig sinken. Es kann aber nicht sein, dass der
objek
tive Wert einer Leistung von der Struktur der Angebotsseite abhngt. Die hat
nmlich mit
der Leistung selbst und ihrem Wert nichts zu tun.
Nachdem dies geklrt ist, knnte ein liberalistisch gesonnener Geist freilich
erneut
fragen: Wieso sollte sich das Vertragsrecht fr gerechten Austausch zu fairen
Bedingun
gen interessieren? Jedoch liegen die Dinge begrifflich jetzt etwas anders als noch
vorhin,
als es um die soziale Ungleichheit der Beteiligten ging. Whrend klar ist, dass das
brgerli
che Vermgensrecht in der Folge seines universalen formalen
Gleichheitsversprechens
keine Unterschiede in Bezug auf den sozialen Status der Beteiligten machen will,
ist es
weitaus weniger selbstverstndlich, inwiefern ein Desinteresse an der Gerechtigkeit
des
vertraglichen Austauschs ebenfalls zur Essenz des Privatrechts zhlen sollte. Das
ist nun
zu klren.
12.3 Vertragsgerechtigkeit und gerechter Preis im allgemeinen

Vertragsrecht
12.3.1 Vertragsfreiheit ohne Gerechtigkeit
Eine mgliche Antwort auf die Frage nach dem logischen Verhltnis von
Vertragsfreiheit
und Vertragsgerechtigkeit ist, dass die Idee der Gerechtigkeit unter der
Vertragsfreiheit
keine logische Rolle spielt. Dies ist die Position, die man bisweilen als
Willenstheorie des
Vertrages charakterisiert.19 Die Willenstheorie geht eben davon aus, dass die
Legitimation
rechtlicher Bindung des Vertrages allein darin liegt, dass die Parteien seinen
Inhalt ber
einstimmend wollen. Was die Parteien wollen, ob der Inhalt des Vertrages einen
gerechten
Austausch reprsentiert, spielt keine Rolle. Der Preis der zu vertauschenden Sache
also,
in welchen beide Teile frei einwilligen, ist nach dem natrlichen PrivatRechte
gerecht.20
18 Benson, P. (2001) pp. 184 ff; Gordley, J. (2001) p. 311.

19 Dazu etwa Barnett, R. E. (1986) pp. 272 ff.
20 Zeiller, F. v. (1819) 128 p. 185.
404
----------------------- Page 444-----------------------

Arbeitsrechts zur
Vertragstheorie
Das wesentliche Kennzeichen der Willenstheorie ist, dass sie diesen Gedanken
strikt
durchhlt. Ein Vertragsrecht, das dieser Position uneingeschrnkt entsprche,
enthielte
Regeln ber den Vertragsschluss, einschlielich von Anfechtungsregeln im
Falle von
Irrtum, Tuschung oder Drohung. Es enthielte keine zwingenden Schutzvorschriften
zu
gunsten schwcherer Parteien, keine Vorschriften ber AGBKontrollen und auch kein
Wucherverbot. Allenfalls verbte es Vertrge, mit denen die
Vertragsfhigkeit selbst
veruert wrde, also etwa Vertrge ber die Ttung oder Versklavung des einen
Vertrags
teils.21 Das vertritt in der Vertragstheorie wohl niemand mehr. Aber es ist eine
lobenswert
klare Alternative.
12.3.2 Gerechtigkeit nur bei Machtungleichgewicht (Flume)
Werner Flume steht der willensbezogenen Legitimation des Vertragsrechts zwar nahe.
Er
schreibt ber die privatautonome Gestaltung von Rechtsverhltnissen,22 deren
Haupt
form der Vertrag sei,23 sie bedarf, soweit sie vom Recht anerkannt wird, keiner
anderen
Rechtfertigung als dass der einzelne sie will. Doch wie schon im Einschub
soweit sie
vom Recht anerkannt wird anklingt, steht es Flume fern, zwingendes Recht zum
Schutz
von Schwcheren oder AGBKontrolle in den Bereich des Illegitimen zu verweisen. Er
versucht indessen, diese Rechtsregeln so zu deuten, dass sie in ihrem Kern auf die
Legiti
mation des Vertrags durch den Willen der Parteien bezogen sind. Er schreibt:
Weil die Privatautonomie ihre Rechtfertigung nur darin hat, dass die
Selbst
bestimmung als Wert anerkannt ist, kann die Privatautonomie als
Rechtsprinzip
nur verwirklicht werden, wenn auch tatschlich die Macht zur
Selbstbestim
24
mung besteht.
Es sind demnach ungleichgewichtige Machtlagen, die auf Seiten des Schwcheren

hnlich
wie im Falle von Irrtum, Tuschung oder Drohung verhindern, dass die Vertragsform
ein Werk der Selbstbestimmung wird. Das Problem etwa des Miet oder Arbeitsvertrages
ist aus Flumes Sicht also nicht, dass er ohne flankierendes zwingendes Recht
regelmig
grob ungerecht ausfiele. Das Problem ist, dass die schwchere Partei nicht in
Selbstbestim
mung handelt.
Flume will also den Begriff der Vertragsimparitt ohne Bezug auf den der
Vertrags
gerechtigkeit etablieren und so Vertragsimparitt als reines Freiheitsproblem
akzentuieren.
21 Zur Rekonstruktion dieser Implikationen in Kants Vertragstheorie: Ripstein,

Ripstein, A. (2009) pp. 133 ff.
22 Flume, W. (1979) p. 6.
23 S. Flume, W. (1979) p. 7.
24 Flume, W. (1979) p. 10.
405
----------------------- Page 445-----------------------
Florian Rdl
Aber dieses Vorhaben muss scheitern.25 Wre Vertragsimparitt, so wie Flume meint,
ein
Freiheitsproblem, dann liefert zwingendes Recht keine Lsung. Denn inwiefern wird
die
Selbstbestimmung der schwcheren Partei gewahrt, wenn an die Stelle der
Fremdbestim
mung durch den strkeren Vertragsteil die Fremdbestimmung durch das Gesetz tritt?
12.3.3 Gerechtigkeit durch Vertragsfreiheit (Larenz)
Dieser Kritik entgeht Karl Larenz. Dessen Auskunft zur Rolle der
Gerechtigkeit geht
dahin, dass die Vertragsfreiheit gerade aufgrund des in den Vertragsschluss
eingelassenen
heteronomen Moments, nmlich das Erfordernis der Zustimmung eines anderen Teils,
die Gerechtigkeit des Vereinbarten garantiere.26 Bei Larenz ist Vertragsfreiheit
damit auch
ein Instrument zur Generierung gerechter Vertrge. Konzentriert man sich

allein auf
diese Auskunft, bedeutete das, dass die Idee der Vertragsgerechtigkeit logisch
Vorrang vor
der Privatautonomie htte.27 Letztere kann rechtlich erffnet werden, wenn und weil
sie
zu gerechten Vertrgen fhrt.

Auf der begrifflichen Ebene ist das natrlich ein Paukenschlag
gegenber Flume.
Allerdings gert dieser Kontrast schnell aus dem Blick. Dies liegt zum einen an
Larenz
Zugestndnis, dass die Vertragsfreiheit die Gerechtigkeit des Vertrags nur im
Normalfall
garantiert und im Ausnahmefall sehr wohl auch zu ungerechten Vertrgen fhren
kann, den
das Vertragsrecht aber zugunsten der Vertragsfreiheit nicht sanktioniert.28 Die
Differenz zu
Flume kommt damit nur im logischen Raum zum Tragen. Rechtlich spielt sie keine
Rolle,
weil das Recht bei Vertrgen unter Gleichen die Gerechtigkeit des Vereinbarten
unwider
leglich unterstellt. Insofern steht auch bei Larenz das Problem der ungleichen
Machtlagen
im Zentrum. In ungleichen Machtlagen kann man sich auch fr den Normalfall nicht
mehr
auf den Konsens verlassen, um Vertragsgerechtigkeit zu wahren, sondern man muss mit
zwingendem Vertragsrecht helfen. Auch bei Larenz wird also eine strikte Grenze
markiert
zwischen Vertrgen unter Gleichen und Vertrgen unter Ungleichgewichtsbedingungen.
12.3.4 Alternative: Vertragsfreiheit in Gerechtigkeit
Damit trennt Larenz immer noch ein Schritt von der klaren Alternative zur
Willensthe
orie. Die besagt, dass die Vertragsgerechtigkeit nicht nur logisch Vorrang hat,
sondern
25 Zllner, W. (1996) pp. 15 ff.

26 Larenz, K. (1987) pp. 77 f; siehe auch Larenz, K./Wolf, M. (2004) 42 Rn. 1.
27 Larenz spricht etwas weniger zugespitzt davon, Vertragsfreiheit und
Vertragsgerechtigkeit forderten sich
wechselseitig (Larenz, K. (1987), a.a.O.).
28 Larenz, K. (1987) p. 79.
406
----------------------- Page 446-----------------------

Arbeitsrechts zur
Vertragstheorie
sich dieser Vorrang auch im Recht niederschlgt: Das Recht kontrolliert auch den
Ver
trag unter Gleichen auf seine Gerechtigkeit hin.29 Die Willenstheorie verwies die
Idee der
Vertragsfreiheit des logischen Feldes, die Gerechtigkeit hatte hier nichts zu

suchen. Die
Alternative verweist die Vertragsfreiheit zwar nicht des Feldes aber auf die
Pltze. Die pri
vate Autonomie, um die es im Privatrecht geht, bedeutet im Vertragsrecht nicht das
Recht,
Vertrge beliebigen Inhalts zu schlieen. Sie bedeutet nur das Recht, gerechte
Vertrge zu
schlieen.
Eines ist hier sogleich klarzustellen: Es wre ein Missverstndnis, in diese
Position die
Aufhebung der Vertragsfreiheit hineinzulesen. Vertragsfreiheit bedeutet weiterhin,
dass
der einzelne frei ist darin, welche seiner mglichen Leistungen er zum Gegenstand
eines
Vertrages macht. Es bedeutet auch weiterhin, dass er frei ist, mit
welchem Gegenber
er einen Vertrag ber die jeweilige Leistung schliet. Schlielich bleibt die
Mglichkeit
vollstndig erhalten, fr die eigene Leistung eine beliebige Gegenleistung zu
akzeptieren.
Die einzige Einschrnkung ist diejenige, dass der nach Belieben
eingegangene Vertrag
mit beliebigem Inhalt und beliebigem Gegenber gerecht sein muss. Eigentlich ist
das gar
nicht viel verlangt.
Den gerade nur behaupteten auch rechtlichen Vorrang der Gerechtigkeit vor der
Ver
tragsfreiheit kann man auf zweierlei Weise zu begrnden versuchen, zum einen
grundbe
grifflich, zum anderen anhand des geltenden Rechts. Um den grundbegrifflichen
Ansatz
gibt es in der Vertragstheorie der USA eine interessante Kontroverse
zwischen James
Gordley und Peter Benson, wobei Gordley seine Position auf Aristoteles
und Benson
die seinige auf Hegel sttzt.30 Aber diese Diskussionslinie kann hier nicht weiter
verfolgt
werden. An dieser Stelle kann es nur um das geltende Recht gehen.

Die Idee des materiell ungerechten Vertrages finden wir im geltenden Recht in
138
BGB. Er wird in 138 Abs. 2 BGB przise gefasst als Vertrag, in dem Leistung und
Ge
genleistung in einem aufflligen Missverhltnis stehen, und es war schon oben
entfaltet
worden, dass das auffllige Missverhltnis fr eine qualifizierte Abweichung vom
Markt
preis steht.
12.3.4.1 138 Abs. 2 BGB als Grundnorm zur Vertragsimparitt (Canaris)

Neben dem ungerechten Austausch setzt 138 Abs. 2 BGB voraus, dass der begnstigte
Teil eine qualifizierte Schwche seines Vertragspartners ausgenutzt hat. In einer

vertrags
rechtstheoretischen Deutung der Vorschrift hat der akademische LarenzSchler Claus
Wilhelm Canaris betont, dass das Prinzip der Vertragsgerechtigkeit nicht fr sich
allein,
sondern nur in Verbindung mit subjektiven Elementen relevant wird, die sich auf
Seiten
29 Weinrib (1995), S. 138 f.
30 Gordley, J. (2001) Fn. 19, 265; Benson, P. (2001) Fn. 19.
407
----------------------- Page 447-----------------------
Florian Rdl
31
des Benachteiligten als Einschrnkungen der Entscheidungsfreiheit verstehen
lassen.
Diese Akzentuierung zielt auf den Umkehrschluss, dass 138 Abs. 2 BGB und das Ver
tragsrecht insgesamt gegen ungerechte Vertrge nichts einzuwenden haben, wenn sie
in
Entscheidungsfreiheit geschlossen wurden. Die gemeinsame Festlegung von Flume und
Larenz, dass die Idee der Vertragsgerechtigkeit unter Gleichen rechtlich keine
Rolle spielt,
erscheint sich also anhand von 138 Abs. 2 BGB demonstrieren zu lassen.
12.3.4.2 Alternative: 138 Abs. 2 als Gebot des gerechten Preises

Doch lsst sich dem eine andere Deutung von 138 Abs. 2 BGB
entgegenstellen.32 In
dieser Deutung sind diese Tatbestandsmerkmale nicht als selbststndige

Voraussetzungen
zu lesen, die neben die objektive Voraussetzung des ungerechten Vertrages treten
mssen.
Fr die alternative Lesart gehren die Voraussetzungen des 138 Abs. 2 BGB
vielmehr
zum ungeschriebenen Tatbestandsmerkmal des Austauschvertrages. 138 Abs. 2
BGB
kommt nmlich nur bei Austauschvertrgen zur Anwendung.33 Das hat auch einen tie
feren Grund. Denn die Frage nach Vertragsgerechtigkeit stellt sich von vornherein
nur bei
Austauschvertrgen und nicht bei unentgeltlichen Vertrgen wie allem voran der
Schen
kung. Der Inhalt eines Schenkungsversprechens ist vielleicht knickrig oder
grozgig,
aber von Gerechtigkeit kann man insoweit nicht sprechen.
Ob ein Austauschvertrag oder eine reine Schenkung vorliegt, ist regelmig
leicht zu
entscheiden. Schwierig ist aber der Fall einer gemischten Schenkung. Bei einer
gemischten
Schenkung erfolgt ein Teil der Leistung unentgeltlich. Vergleichsweise hufige
Beispiele
liefern Veruerungen unter Wert zum Freundschaftspreis und ber Wert zum Liebha
berpreis.34 Regelmig wird hier der berschieende Wert unentgeltlich
zugewendet.
Wenn sich ein vordergrndig aufflliges Missverhltnis von Leistung und

Gegenleistung
dadurch erklren lsst, dass es sich um eine gemischte Schenkung handelt, dann
handelt
es sich nicht um Wucher nach 138 Abs. 2 BGB. Insofern ist im Falle eines
aufflligen
Missverhltnisses nach 138 Abs. 2 BGB regelmig vor allem eines zu klren:
Handelt es
sich um einen Austauschvertrag oder handelt es sich um eine gemischte Schenkung ?
Genau in diesem Zusammenhang haben die subjektiven Voraussetzungen in 138
Abs. 2 BGB ihre Rolle zu spielen. Die Voraussetzungen des 138 Abs. 2 BGB liefern
je
fr sich hinreichende Indizien gegen das Vorliegen einer gemischten Schenkung.
Befand
sich der Benachteiligte in einer Position qualifizierter Schwche, die der andere
Teil aus
nutzte, steht fest, dass es sich nicht um eine gemischte Schenkung,
sondern um einen
31 Canaris, C.W. (1997) Fn. 12, pp. 51 f.

32 Ich folge hierbei Peter Bensons Deutung der unconscionabilityDoktrin im
Common Law: Benson, P.
(2001) Fn. 19, pp. 184 ff.
33 BGH vom 8.7.1982, NJW 1982, 2767; Sack, P. S. (2011) 138 Rn. 204 f.
34 Koziol, H. (1988) p. 193.
408
----------------------- Page 448-----------------------

Arbeitsrechts zur
Vertragstheorie
reinen Austauschvertrag handelt. Es geht also nicht um subjektive Voraussetzungen,

die
auf logisch gleicher Stufe neben den ungerechten Vertragsinhalt treten, sondern
mithilfe
der subjektiven Voraussetzungen wird geklrt, ob es sich tatschlich um einen
ungerech
ten (Austausch)Vertrag und nicht vielmehr um eine gemischte Schenkung handelt.
Liegt
ein reiner Austauschvertrag und darum ein ungerechter Vertrag vor, ist er nichtig.
Das
bedeutet im Umkehrschluss: Aus 138 Abs. 2 BGB lsst sich ersehen, dass der
Grundsatz
der Privatautonomie soweit es um Austauschvertrge geht, nur den Abschluss
gerechter
Vertrge erlaubt. Dieser alternativen Deutung zufolge belegt 138 Abs. 2 BGB also
nicht
die These von Flume oder Larenz, sondern die hier vertretene.
Es sei betont: Es geht hier nicht um eine praktisch umstrzende Neudeutung von
138 Abs. 2 BGB. Mutmalich fhrt die hier entfaltete Deutung zu keinen anderen
Ergebnissen in der Rechtsanwendung. Es geht um einen hermeneutischen
Kontrast.
Wie soll die Idee der Vertragsfreiheit verstanden werden? Canaris zufolge
reprsentiert
138 Abs. 2 BGB die grundlegende Struktur, der zufolge die Gerechtigkeit im
Vertrags
recht zwar logisch immer im Spiel sein mag, aber nur bei
Ungleichgewichten auch
rechtlich zum Tragen kommt. Unter Gleichen hingegen ist sie unwiderleglich
durch
den Konsens gesichert. Im Ergebnis erlaubt darum die Vertragsfreiheit unter
Gleichen
den Abschluss ungerechter Vertrge. Freiheit geht vor Gerechtigkeit. Nach der hier
ent
falteten kontrren Auffassung reprsentiert 138 Abs. 2 BGB die grundlegende
Struk
tur, dass die Gerechtigkeit im Vertragsrecht immer zum Tragen kommt, wenn es um
Austauschvertrge geht. Im Ergebnis erlaubt darum die Vertragsfreiheit, soweit Aus
tauschvertrge in Rede stehen, nur den Abschluss gerechter Vertrge. Freiheit
entfaltet
sich in Gerechtigkeit.
Es sei allerdings eingerumt, dass keine Argumente auf der Hand
liegen, um die
Auffassung von Canaris zum Sinn von 138 Abs. 2 BGB zu widerlegen. Es gengt aber
zu zeigen, dass die hier alternativ vorgestellte Deutung von 138 Abs. 2 BGB
mglich
ist. Sollte das geglckt sein, dann bedeutet das, dass das Gesetz das
begriffliche Ver
hltnis von Vertragsfreiheit und Gerechtigkeit offen lsst. Der wesentliche Vorzug
der
hier vertretenen Deutung von 138 Abs. 2 BGB ist nun allerdings, dass auf dieser
Basis
die revolutionre Botschaft des modernen Privatrechts, als Ordnung unter freien
Glei
chen, nicht verunklart werden muss, um spezifische Gesetze zum Schutz von
struk
turell Schwcheren vor ungerechten Vertrgen zu erlutern und zu rechtfertigen.
Dies
geschieht aber, wenn das radikale Gleichheitsversprechen des Privatrechts
zugunsten
seiner Desintegration in Sonderprivatrechte fr Ungleichgewichtslagen35
verabschie
det wird.
35 In terminologischem Anschluss an: Lieb, M. (1978).
409
----------------------- Page 449-----------------------
Florian Rdl
12.4 Vertragsgerechtigkeit fr existentielle Vertrge
Oben war ausgefhrt worden, dass sich Tarifvertrag und Tarifautonomie letztlich
nicht
anders denn als Modus zur Herstellung von Vertragsgerechtigkeit im
Arbeitsverhltnis
erlutern lassen. Ein solcher besonderer Modus ist anders als im Falle von
gewhnlichen
Waren notwendig, weil der Arbeitsmarkt ein essentiell verzerrter Markt ist. Der
Arbeits
vertrag bedarf darum einer anderen Art der Bestimmung seines Inhalts als allein
durch
Angebot und Annahme.
Auch die brigen existentiellen Vertrge ber Wohnraum und
Verbraucherkredit
beziehen sich auf fiktive Waren und damit auf essentiell verzerrte Mrkte. Auch
hier er
scheint darum die Bestimmung des Preises der Hauptleistung allein durch Angebot und
Annahme unter einer ex postKontrolle anhand von 138 Abs. 2 BGB

problematisch.
Aber anders als im Bereich der Arbeit stehen jedoch keine belastbaren sozialen
Struk
turen zum Abschluss von Kollektivvertrgen zur Verfgung. Veritable
Kollektivvertrge
fr Miet oder Verbraucherkreditvertrge auf der Basis kollektiver Organisation von
Mie
tern und Kreditnehmern einerseits und staatlich zuerkannter Normwirkung
andererseits
erscheinen auerhalb praktischer Reichweite.36 Insofern bedarf es anderer aber
funktional
vergleichbarer Mechanismen.
Der wesentliche Mechanismus im Wohnraummietrecht ist die Begrenzung des Miet
zinses durch die ortsbliche Vergleichsmiete. Im deutschen Recht ist die
Vergleichsmiete
jedoch nur fr Mieterhhungen im laufenden Mietverhltnis mageblich, nicht aber
fr
Neuvermietungen. Damit bleibt der Entwicklung der Mietpreise eine
Marktdynamik
unterlegt. Notwendig wre daher, die bliche Vergleichsmiete auch fr
Neuvertrge in
Anschlag zu bringen. Dies ist in Deutschland lange an den vllig berzogenen
Anforde
rungen gescheitert, die deutsche Gerichte an den Nachweis der subjektiven
Vorausset
zungen der Parteien stellen,37 also nach der hier vorgetragenen Lesart an den
Nachweis,
dass die im Vergleich zum Ortsblichen berhhten Mieten nicht teilschenkweise

als
Liebhabermietzins gezahlt werden. Es allerdings zu erwarten, dass der
deutsche
Gesetzgeber angesichts um sich greifender Wohnungsnot zumindest in den
groen
Stdten und Metropolen nach den Bundestagswahlen 2013 ttig wird.38
An dieser Stelle sei hervorgehoben, dass die Bindung der Mietpreise an die
rtli
che Vergleichsmiete vertragsrechtstheoretisch leicht einzuordnen ist, gerade auch
wenn
sie den Abschluss von Neuvertrgen betrifft: Wie jeder Vertrag unterliegt
auch der
36 Das hindert nicht, ihre Entwicklung von Kollektivsystemen auch in diesen

Bereichen zu postulieren; vgl.
Nr. 7 der EuSoCoPrinzipien.
37 BGH, Urt. v. 28.01.2004, in: NJW 2004, 1740 und Urt. v. 13.04.2005, in: NJW
2005, 2156.
38 Die Programme der Parteien zur Bundestagswahl von CDU, SPD, Grnen und
Linkspartei sehen entspre
chende Regelungen vor.
410
----------------------- Page 450-----------------------

Arbeitsrechts zur
Vertragstheorie
Wohnraummietvertrag dem Gebot des gerechten Preises. Den gerechten Preises wirft
normaler Weise der Markt aus. Die Bindung an die Vergleichsmiete ist nichts anderes
als
eine Spezifizierung dieser allgemeinen Bindung an den Marktpreis. Der Mietzins darf
den blichen Preis, den die rtliche Vergleichsmiete spiegelt, nicht um mehr als
einen
bestimmten Prozentsatz (in Deutschland: 20%) berschreiten. Zulssig bleibt zwar
die
freiwillige Zahlung eines an sich berhhten Liebhaberzinses. Doch einem der
sozi
alen Realitt nicht vllig abgewandten Beobachter sollte eigentlich klar vor Augen
ste
hen, dass auf dem Mietmarkt die Zahlung berhhter Mieten selten aus Teilschenkung
resultiert.
Diese vertragstheoretische Erluterung der rtlichen Vergleichsmiete
reflektiert da
bei noch nicht einmal, dass der Wohnraummarkt wegen der Begrenztheit des
Bodens
einerseits und der existentiellen Bedeutung des Gutes fr den nachfragenden Mieter
ver
zerrt ist. Die Bindung an die Vergleichsmiete setzt lediglich das bliche Ma der
nach
138 Abs. 2 BGB zulssigen berschreitung herab. Dieser Aspekt, dass sich das
Recht
der Vergleichsmiete trotz essentieller Verzerrung auf den Marktpreis einlsst, ist
letztlich
auch ihr schwacher Punkt, der im Zuge der zunehmenden Krise sozialer
Wohnraumversor
gung jedenfalls in den groen Metropolen knftig immer strker sichtbar werden
wird.
Darum drften alsbald weitere Manahmen erforderlich werden, wie etwa die Rckkehr
zu ffentlich verantworteter Erhhung des Angebots an Wohnraum, die Ersetzung pri

vaten Immobilienbesitzes durch Erbbaurechte an ffentlichem Boden oder innerhalb
des
Mietvertragsrechts der bergang von der Bindung an die Vergleichsmiete zu einer
Index
miete, die Mietsteigerungen sowohl im laufenden als auch im neuen Mietverhltnis
nur
in der Grenordnung laufender Inflation erlaubt.
Im Verbraucherkreditrecht ist das Problem des gerechten Preises einerseits wie
stets
durch die Kontrolle am marktblichen Zins nach 138 Abs. 2 BGB gelst. Doch das
reicht
nicht hin. Im Kreditvertragsgeschft spielen fr die Hhe des Zinssatzes
Sicherheiten und
Bonitt des Kreditnehmers die entscheidende Rolle. Als Mastab fr den gerechten
Preis
nach 138 Abs. 2 BGB gilt der Marktzins fr eine Kombination von Qualitt der
Sicherheit
und Bonittsniveau.
Doch wie eingangs dargestellt ist auch der Kreditmarkt ganz generell durch
existenti
ellen Bedarf der Kreditnehmer an (vorgezogenen) Einknften essentiell verzerrt. Das
gilt
insbesondere fr ungesicherte Kredite weniger solventer Kreditnehmer. Darum
bedarf
es einer alternativen Festlegung des gerechten Preises fr Verbraucherkredite.
Ernsthaft
in Frage kommt nur deren gesetzliche Festlegung, und zwar in Gestalt
einer przisen
Zinsobergrenze. Zwar wird immer wieder behauptet, dadurch wrden besonders kredit
bedrftige Personen aus dem Kreditmarkt gedrngt. Doch diese Behauptung
lsst sich
schon empirisch schlecht belegen. Andernfalls wre die richtige Reaktion hierauf
freilich
nicht die Ablehnung von Kreditobergrenzen, sondern die Flankierung durch Kontrahie
rungsvorgaben und staatliche Kreditgarantien.
411
----------------------- Page 451-----------------------
Florian Rdl
Diese wrden natrlich die Kosten fr solventere Kreditnehmer erhhen. Sie

bedeu
ten im Ergebnis eine Kollektivierung des Ausfallrisikos. Das ist freilich
ein Effekt, der
vom Tarifvertrag vertraut ist: Bei einer Aufspaltung der Beschftigten entsprechend
ihrer
persnlichen Qualifikationen (analog der Bonittsniveaus) knnten
Facharbeiter mut
malich hhere Lhne erzielen, whrend die Ungelernten nur deutlich geringere
Einknfte
vereinbaren knnten. Wenn aber der gerechte Preis eben nicht durch einen
kompetitiven
Markt generiert wird, sondern durch politischen Mechanismus Tarifvertrag,
zwing
endes Recht festgelegt wird, bedeutet dies nicht, dass die nichtmarktfrmige
Festset
zung gerechter Preise die Ergebnisse einer nicht verzerrten Marktpreisbildung
simulieren
wrden. Es ist eben eine nichtmarktfrmige Festsetzung des gerechten Preises.
412
----------------------- Page 452-----------------------

the Draft
Barnett, Randy E. (1986): A Consent Theory of Contract. In: Columbia Law Review,
86
(1986), pp. 269321.
Bayreuther, Frank (2005): Tarifautonomie als kollektiv ausgebte

Privatautonomie. Tarif
recht im Spannungsfeld von Arbeits, Privat und Wirtschaftsrecht. Mnchen1: C. H.
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Beckert, Jens(Rdl) (2009): The Great Transformation of Embeddedness: Karl Polanyi

and
the New Economic Sociology. In: Hann, Chris; Hart, Keith (eds.): Market and
Society: The
Great Transformation Today. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 3855.
Benson, Peter (ed.) (2001): The theory of Contract Law. New essays. Cambridge:
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Benson, Peter (2001): The Unity of contract Law. In: Benson, Peter (ed.): The
theory of
Contract Law. New essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 118205.
Block, Fred (2003): Karl Polanyi and the writing of The Great Transformation. In:
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and Society, 32 (3/2003), pp. 275306.
Canaris, ClausWilhelm (1997): Die Bedeutung der iustitia distributiva im

deutschen
Vertragsrecht. Aktualisierte und stark erweiterte Fassung des Vortrags vom 2. Juli
1993.
Mnchen: C. H. Beck.
Caporaso, James A.; Tarrow, Sidney (2009): Polanyi in Brussels: Supranational

Institutions
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Dieterich, Thomas (2012): Art. 9 GG Rn. 55f. In: MllerGlge, Rudi;

Preis, Ulrich;
Schmidt, Ingrid (eds.): Erfurter Kommentar zum Arbeitsrecht. Mnchen12: C. H. Beck.

Individuelle und
1
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Nomos.
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Flume, Werner (1979): Allgemeiner Teil des brgerlichen Rechts. Berlin3: Springer.
Gordley, James (2001): Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition. In: Benson,
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The theory of Contract Law. New essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University
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pp. 265343.
Hann, Chris; Hart, Keith (eds.) (2009): Market and Society: The Great
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Today. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harvey, Mark; Ramlogan, Ronnie; Randles, Sally (2007): Karl Polanyi. New
Perspectives
on the Place of the Economy in Society. Manchester, New York: Manchester
University
Press.
Joerges, Christian; Falke, Josef (eds.) (2011): Karl Polanyi, Globalisation and the
Potential
of Law in Transnational Markets. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Koziol, Helmut (1988): Sonderprivatrecht fr Konsumentenkredite. In: Archiv

fr die
civilistische Praxis, 188 (1988), pp. 183229.
Larenz, Karl (1987): Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts. Band I: Allgemeiner Teil.

Mnchen14:
C. H. Beck.
9
Larenz, Karl; Wolf, Manfred (2004): Allgemeiner Teil des Brgerlichen Rechts.
Mnchen :
C. H. Beck.
Lieb, Manfred (1978): Sonderprivatrecht fr Ungleichgewichtslagen. In:

Archiv fr die
civilistische Praxis, 178 (1978), pp. 196226.
MllerGlge, Rudi; Preis, Ulrich; Schmidt, Ingrid (eds.) (2011): Erfurter Kommentar
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3 (4/2009), pp. 437455.
Con
tract Law zwischen Merkantil und Dienstleistungsgesellschaft. In: Dieterich,
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Friant, Martine; Nogler, Luca et al. (eds.): Individuelle und kollektive Freiheit
im Arbe
itsrecht. Gedchtnisschrift fr Ulrich Zachert. BadenBaden1: Nomos pp. 5874.
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Arbeitsrechts zur
Vertragstheorie
Draft Com
mon Frame of Reference for a Future EU Contract Law. In: Antoniolli, Luisa;
Fiorentini,
Francesca (eds.): A factual Assessment of the Draft Common Frame of
Reference.
Mnchen: Sellier pp. 335376.
Polanyi, Karl (1944/1957): The great transformation. The political and economic
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our time. Boston: Beacon Press.
Ripstein, Arthur (2009): Force and freedom. Kants legal and political
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bridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Sack, Philipp S. (2003). In: Staudinger, J. v. (ed.): BGB. Kommentar zum

Brgerlichen
Gesetzbuch mit Einfhrungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen. Mnchen: Sellier.
Sack, Philipp S. (2011). In: Staudinger, J. v. (ed.): BGB. Kommentar zum

Brgerlichen
Gesetzbuch mit Einfhrungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen. Mnchen: Sellier.
Staudinger, J. v. (ed.) (2003): BGB. Kommentar zum Brgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit

Einfh
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Staudinger, J. v. (ed.) (2011): BGB. Kommentar zum Brgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit

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Streeck, Wolfgang (2009): Reforming Capitalism. Institutional Change in the German

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Zeiller, Franz v. (1819): Das natrliche PrivatRecht. Wien3: C. H. Beck.
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fr die
civilistische Praxis, 196 (1/1996), pp. 136.
415
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----------------------- Page 456-----------------------
Part III
Consumer Credit Contracts
----------------------- Page 457-----------------------
----------------------- Page 458-----------------------

13 Darlehensvertrag als Kapitalmiete
(locatio conductio specialis)
Udo Reifner
Summary
The consumer credit contract as defined and regulated in Article 3 of the

Consumer Credit
Directive 2008/48/EC (CCD) deviating from the traditional concept of a
freeloan (prt;
Darlehen; mutuo) has introduced a purpose-driven economic language into civil law.
In its
intention to evade any circumvention of its norm through legal constructions, it
has lost its
traditional aspirations of certainty and justice, which are the gift of legal
formalism. Credit
is now defined by the will of the lender to provide the use of his capital to the
borrower in
order to uphold its value and to earn interest. Consumption is equally an intention
now of the
borrower to use the purchasing power provided for personal expenditure. Both
expressions
are not new to the law, but they deviate from the history of civil law. They follow
the logic of
state intervention in tax and police law as well as in consumer, labour or tenancy
protection
legislation in order to make state intervention effective where freedom to
influence contrac-
tual definitions by the stronger party would jeopardise its effectiveness. The
basic idea of such
economic language is laid down in Article 22 (3), which wants to ensure that the
provisions
they adopt in implementation of this Directive cannot be circumvented as a result
of the way
in which agreements are formulated.
While the EU Directive still refers to a contract, the US Consumer Credit
Protec-
tion Act avoids any reference to legal forms and refers directly to credit and
consumption.
Such consequences have not yet been openly incorporated into European law. Both the
CCD and UK law combine contract with credit and consumption and create a consumer
credit contract. They then define credit through the enumeration of legal terms
(loan,
deferred payments, financial aids) and by empirical products such as overdraft,
overrid-
ing, credit cards, financial leasing. Consumption is defined as the activity of a
consumer
(13 BGB) who is not an entrepreneur (14 BGB). In this labyrinth of definitions,
the
entrepreneur then acts commercially, which means acting for purposes which are
his
trade, business or profession (CCD). The criterion that underlies these
definitions is
profit maximisation.
While this modern capitalist form of law is the necessary legal compensation
for the
right of lenders to define reality according to their interests and needs within
contractual
419
----------------------- Page 459-----------------------
Udo Reifner
forms, the language has lost its foundation in the historical traditions of the
law. Long before
capitalism became the dominant form of thought in the 19th century, the perils of
synallag-
matic exchange mechanisms in foreign trade and the dangerous opportunities
provided by
contractual freedom to the strongest had been tempered by the need to exercise
this power in
legal forms. It is one of the paradoxes that formal justice as a shelter for the
weaker party has
gradually been abandoned in the name of consumer protection laws, which claim to
help the
weak and vulnerable, while simultaneously taking away from the use of capital the
shield of
security and justice provided by formal legal thinking.
We do not want to revive the conservative critique of the turn of the 19th
century. We
want more: the development of a secure and objective type of contract for consumer
credit
relationships, together with the further development of legal protection for life
time needs.
In order to achieve this objective, consumer credit protection rules need to be
gradually re-
integrated into secure, objective and just legal forms of the rent contract. This
leads to the
lifting of merely compensatory, unsafe, purpose-driven economic law, which
provides social
justice as something beyond justice. Its paternalistic information model fails to
achieve the
fulfilment of consumer credit protection law, blaming borrowers for their inability
to play the
market game properly and gradually deconstructing the rule of law. Consumer credit
protec-
tion needs a safe haven in the form of the loan contract as a life time contract.
For this we have to go back beyond the 19th century and its misuse of ancient
forms
of Roman law. It provided a synallagmatic means for the profit-driven
industrialisation
of society, which managed to combine the freedom of the salesman with the slavery
of the
dependent wage-earner within the same contractual concept. Despite the euphoria of
Com-
mon Law about the individualistic form of freedom, the bourgeois
revolution thus never
achieved its own ends. It did not provide freedom and equality to the working
class, it justi-
fied slavery (Pufendorf) and upheld slave-like conditions of subordination and
dependency
in labour and tenancy contracts. It kept its promise for freedom and democracy
outside the
gates of its workhouses and redefined the use-value of property as lifelong debt
for the user of
money capital. The amount of interest to be paid for the use of capital was
proportional to the
amount of capital owed, and not to the productivity of the labour employed.
Our historical review of the legal forms governing the use of capital by
cooperating individu-
als leads us to the conclusion that Roman law has intentionally been
misinterpreted and misused.
Credit relationships addressed as mutuo, Darlehen, loan, prt or prestito were
legal forms of a re-
ciprocal economy, where remuneration was seen as dishonest behaviour. The use of
money should
be free of charge, as money did not have the potential to bear fruit. Taking
interest was usury.
Those who were able to monopolise and accumulate money and lend it out to
those who
needed money were seen as thieves of the fruits of labour. The mutuum was unfit
for com-
mercial purposes. Free of charge in an honourable not-for-profit relationship
(contractus rea-
lis), it was revocable at any time. Consequently, the user was turned into a good-
for-nothing
debtor in default if the lender needed the money back. No voluntary agreement
defined time
420
----------------------- Page 460-----------------------
13 Darlehensvertrag als Kapitalmiete (locatio conductio

specialis)
and interest. Its purpose for the lender was to maintain its value. When Savigny
character-
ised it as undue enrichment, he intentionally missed the high ethical standards
applied by
the reciprocal economy to this form of donation when he managed to disqualify the
ordinary
user who paid for the use of money as a debtor.
This misunderstanding of the mutuum as a synallagmatic relationship, in
which the
user was simultaneously a debtor and unduly enriched, created a false idea in the
law. The
productive use of capital was turned into a questionable debt, the idle
lender became a
productive investor. Greed for interest was no longer linked to the productivity of
the bor -
rowers abilities to use this capital and was labelled as invested trust
(credit). Insolvency
became a fault, or a sin.
An honest analysis of Roman law would have found quite well-developed and
adequate
solutions in the form of the locatio conductio a rent contract for
money. But although
highly developed as a relational contract in Roman law and applied to all
replaceable and
consumable things (location conductio specialis), it was seldom applied to the use
of money.
Pre-capitalist societies had the concept of tort to understand the automatic growth
of money
capital where no fruits were possible. It is modern capitalism that teaches us that
in fact the
idea of fruits was the problem. In the synallagmatic relationships of the ancient
world, it was
in fact not the fruit you bought when you used slave labour, animals, plants or
soil. Incom-
prehensible for ancient thought it was its economic function as capital that,
through use, was
able to grow because it was applied in the productive processes of the borrower. As
interest
measures growth, the locatio conductio pecuniae could have made apparent that the
l.c. in
general was the modern counterpart of the emptio vendito in which tradeable things
also ap -
peared as capital and not as useful things.
The latest reform of credit law, and the new 488 of the German BGB in
particular,
makes it clear that credit is rental of money. It repeats word for word the
definition of a rental
contract over things (535 BGB), abandons the economic language of the CCD (credit)
and
gives up any nostalgia for the old mutuum. It is now a consensual synallagmatic
contractual
relationship, in which the use of money is provided in order to gain interest in
proportion
to the period of the loan and the amount of the capital borrowed. But
it reanimates the
old denomination of the mutuum (loan, Darlehen) and adds to it the word contract.
This
Darlehensvertrag combines the relationship (Darlehen) with the contract
(Vertrag). In fact
the modern credit, credit contract, loan, Darlehensvertrag is the old rent
agreement applied
to money. The Geldmiete or Geldpacht opens up thousands of years of legal
thinking, in
which the use of land, slaves, things and finally money has been discussed in the
context of
macroeconomic purposes. These contractual forms expressed the fact that every
society as a
whole has no interest in having capital, but only in using it, because only this
use provides
economic growth and progress. This led to high levels of respect for the users. It
made their
productivity a public and legal concern. Idle capital, withheld by the power of
those who
owned it, has been and remains the biggest problem of every society. Closed-down
factories,
421
----------------------- Page 461-----------------------
Udo Reifner
empty houses, uncultivated soil, unused and unemployed labour are the evils of
modern as
well as ancient societies. The idea that lenders are productive investors governing
our credit
law is a dangerous myth that justifies even the destruction of the productive basis
of society
by turning those who work into mere debtors.
Applying old legal concepts of the locatio conductio to the modern credit
society would
instead turn the idle debtor into a productive user, the investment into a risky
enterprise by
the lender to uphold and increase the value of his money when he himself is unable
to use it
and finally show that debtors protection laws, from interest caps to personal
bankruptcy and
exemption laws, are only the expression of old legal principles. The caveat locator
rule was,
as Paolo Grossi has revealed, the historical answer to the caveat emptor rule of
the sales law
society.
Die Einordnung des Darlehensrechts in die sozialen Dauerschuldverhltnisse kann

dazu
beitragen, das Darlehensrecht von seinen feudalen Formen des Realvertrages zu
befreien
und damit die historischen Errungenschaften des Kapitalnutzungsrecht (Mietrechts)
fr
diese Form moderner Kapitalmiete zu nutzen. Umgekehrt ist das
Verbraucherkreditrecht
eine ergiebige Quelle, um die allgemeinsten zivilrechtlichen Bestimmungen sozialer
Dauerschuldverhltnisse daraus zu destillieren. Die folgenden berlegungen

geben
hierzu Anregungen, beanspruchen aber noch nicht, eine in sich konsistente
neue
Dogmatik des Darlehensvertrages vorzulegen, die seiner Rolle als Lebenszeitvertrag
in der modernen Kreditgesellschaft gerecht wird.
13.1 Darlehen und Kredit
Kredit als Nutzung von Geldkapital gegen Zinsen in Form einer Geldmiete
ist seit der
Reform des BGB im Jahre 2002 geltendes Recht, ohne dass dies rechtsdogmatisch
berck-
sichtigt wrde. Der Vorschlag1, zur Klarstellung der Rechtsnatur des Darlehens die
Bestim-
mung ber die Sachmiete zu bernehmen, entsprach zwar schon der Rechtsprechung des
Reichsgerichts ber das Synallagma im Darlehensvertrag, wurde jedoch nur implizit

mit
der Schuldrechtsreform umgesetzt. In deutlichem Unterschied zu 607 a.F. BGB
erkennt
488 BGB an, dass das Darlehen ein Nutzungsverhltnis von Kapital gegen Zinsen ist.
Mietrechtliche Konsequenzen wurden daraus bis heute nicht gezogen. hnlich wie die
Dogmatik des Arbeitsverhltnisses sich immmer noch mit ihrem Unterordnungsprinzip

am Diener (Dienstvertrag) und Sklaven (service contract) und die Wohnungsmiete mit
ihrer Hausordnungsbefugnis des Vermieters an der feudalen Hausherrschaft
orientiert,
bleibt das Verbraucherkreditrecht mit dem Darlehensbegriff im Bild eines
ungerechtfertigt
1 Vgl. Reifner, U. (1991) 5 pp. 36 f.
422
----------------------- Page 462-----------------------
bereicherten Schuldners des bermchtigen Glubigers verhaftet, der Zinszahlungen

aus
den Frchten des von ihm berlassenen Kapitals verlangen kann.
Das liegt an der unbewltigten Vergangenheit des synallagmatischen Kredits im
real-
vertraglichen Darlehen. Die Rechtsfigur des unentgeltlichen Realvertrages,
wie sie fr
Sachdarlehen in 607 n.F. BGB fortgilt sowie in den Art. 1892, 1875, 1915, 2071,
931 frz.
Code Civil enthalten ist, stammt aus einer Statusgesellschaft, die das Darlehen als
Schen-
kung auffasste und das Interesse des Kreditgebers auf den Werterhalt der
hingegebenen
Darlehenssumme reduzierte. Sparen und Vorsorge waren seine Motive. Wo es um Gewinn
und Verdienst ging, herrschte die Gesellschaft (societas) oder aber baute antikes
Investi-
tionsrecht auf dem Fruchtziehungsrecht (usus fructus) auf, das nur solche
Gegenstnde
wie Boden, Tiere und Arbeit zulie, die Frchte tragen konnten. Das kanonische
Recht
hat dies religis untermauert.2
Die aufkommende Handelsgesellschaft verwandelte ntzliche Dinge in Kapital.

Im
ius commune wurde der Zins durch besondere Zinsvereinbarung oder als Schadensersatz
anerkannt, weil die Praxis im Auenhandel mit Geldwechsel und Zinsen zur Abgeltung
von Zeitdifferenzen die entgeltliche Kapitalnutzung erzwang. konomisch gab es

schon
frh die Kapitalmiete. Rechtlich diskutierte man bis vor kurzem, warum das Darlehen
laut
Gesetz als Realvertrag nicht durch Willenserklrungen, sondern durch Hingabe
zustande
3
kommen soll. Parallelen gibt es im Arbeitsrecht. Auch hier dominierte
der Sklave
(sciavus) und abhngige Bauer (colonus). Rechtsflle der locatio conductio operarum
ka-
men kaum vor, weil unter Freien (artes liberales) die Leistung von Diensten nur
un-
4
entgeltlich und als gegenseitige Hilfe gedacht wurde. Die Kooperation in
der antiken
Gesellschaft funktionierte ber ein nicht-synallagmatisches Geben und Nehmen, bei
dem
die noch funktionierenden engen Gemeinschaften garantierten, dass die
gegenseitige
Hilfe letztlich nicht zum eigenen Nachteil erfolgte. Mit dem bergang von der
Gemein-
5
schaft zur Gesellschaft htte an die Stelle der Leistung von Diensten oder der
Hingabe
von Geld oder anderen vertretbaren Sachen die Kapitalnutzung von Geld oder Sachen
treten und damit die Diskussion im Recht erffnet werden mssen, wie Gleichheit
auch
in der Kapitalnutzung umgesetzt werden kann und wessen Produktivitt innerhalb
dieser
Verhltnisse den Schutz der Gemeinschaft verdient.
2 Vgl. Benhr, H.-P. (2009) p. 114, 116 arbeitsloses Einkommen; Aquino, T. de

(1999) II, q. 78, a. 1: Annahme
von Zinsen fr ausgeliehenes Geld an sich ungerecht ist, denn es wird verkauft,
was nicht ist.
3 Vgl. Maschi, C. A. (1973) S. 37 zum Darlehen.
4 Honsell, H. (2010) 50 Dienstvertrge durch Sklaven wurden als
Sachmiete, durch Freie dagegen als
Arbeitsmiete betrachtet.
5 Vgl. Weber, M./Ulfig, A. (2005); Tnnies, F. (1988 (1887)) 1
(Gemeinschaft) und 19 (Gesellschaft).
Gemeinschaft aufbauend auf der Mutter-Kind-Beziehung ist Einheit (Blut,
Ort, Geist), Gesellschaft ist
Trennung aber Interessenkooperation. (Krwillen).
423
----------------------- Page 463-----------------------
Udo Reifner
Doch dazu kann es so lange nicht kommen, wie die Begriffe relativ
willkrlich
zwischen konomie und Recht hin und her schwanken. Kredit (crdit, credito,
Krediet)
und Darlehen (loan, prt, prestito) werden dort teilweise synonym
gebraucht. In den
Wirtschaftswissenschaften ist es die Kreditleistung,6 d.h. die zeitweilige
berlassung von
Kaufkraft (Geld) . . . aufgrund des Vertrauens des Glubigers in die

Zahlungsfhigkeit
7
des Schuldners. Im ffentlich-rechtlichen Kreditaufsichtsrecht stehen
Kredit(geschft)
(1 Abs.1 Ziff. 2 KWG) und Kreditinstitute (1 Abs.1 KWG) im Mittelpunkt. Das
deutsche
Privatrecht ist nach kurzfristiger Auslagerung des von der EU favorisierten
Verbraucher-
8
kreditvertrags in das Verbraucherkreditgesetz zum
Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag im
BGB (488 ff BGB; Art. 247 EG-BGB) zurckgekehrt.
Doch die Definitionen sind zirkulr.9 1 Abs.1 Ziff. 2 KWG bestimmt u.a.
Kredite im
Bankgeschft dadurch, dass er sich auf Gelddarlehen bezieht. Umgekehrt nutzt das
BGB
den Kreditbegriff, um dem Darlehen vergleichbar regulierte wirtschaftliche
Sachverhalte
zuzuordnen.10 Beim historischen Kreditauftrag (778 BGB; Art. 1958 ital. CC) ist
nach der
Schuldrechtsreform das Wort Kredit in der berschrift geblieben. Im Text wurde

dagegen
Kredit durch Darlehen und Finanzierungshilfe ersetzt. Bei der historisch
unvernderten
Aufnahme von Geld auf den Kredit des Mndels (1822 Ziff. 8 BGB) bedeutet das
Wort
Kredit wie im rmischen Recht jede Forderung zulasten des Mndels.11
Das am Common Law orientierte Europarecht bevorzugt den Kreditvertrag. Art. 3

(c)
Verbraucherkreditrichtlinie 2008/48/EG ebenso wie Art. 6 (7)
Fernabsatzrichtlinie bei
Finanzdienstleistungen 2002/65/EG machen den Kredit zur Grundlage fr die Bestim-
mung des Anwendungsbereiches der verbraucherschtzenden Vorschriften. Der Entwurf
fr ein europisches Vertragsrecht (DCFR) bezieht sich dagegen nominell auf
Darlehen
(loan contract; monetary loan), bestimmt dann aber, dass die Leistung im
Darlehen
der Kredit sei, was es von anderen schuldrechtlichen Vertragstypen
unterscheidet.12
Das Common Law zieht dem weiterhin benutzten Begriff des Darlehens (loan)
schon
seit langem den Begriff credit vor. In den USA bezeichnet credit das
Rechtsverhltnis
6 Vgl. Stein, J. H. v./Kirschner, M. (1993) 3. Teil 2.1 sowie Eichwald, B./Pehle,

H. (2000) 2.2.
7 Bschgen, H. E. (2001) Stichwort Kredit.
8 Reifner, U. (2001).
9 Einander berschneidende Begriffe Meincke, E./Hingst, K.-M. (2011).
10 Kreditanstalt/institut/versicherer (248, 551, 648a BGB),
Kredit(wrdigkeit) (824, 509 BGB) oder
Kreditgewhrung (312b, 675k BGB).
11 RG JW 1912, 590. Nicht dazu gehren soll allerdings ein Abzahlungskauf. (BGH
NJW 1972, 689) Diese
unsinnige Einschrnkung ist nur aus einem falsch verstandenen
begriffsjuristischen Ansatz verstndlich,
der Kredit doch als Darlehen ansieht.
12 (2) A loan contract is a contract by which one party, the lender, is obliged
to provide the other party, the
borrower, with credit of any amount for a definite or indefinite period (the
loan period), in the form of a
monetary loan or of an overdraft facility and by which the borrower is obliged
to repay the money obtained
under the credit, whether or not the borrower is obliged to pay interest or any
other kind of remuneration
the parties have agreed upon. DCFR IV.F. 1:101 (2) (Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et
al. (2009)).
424
----------------------- Page 464-----------------------
zwischen Kreditgeber und Kreditnehmer, whrend das englische Recht dem

Kreditbegriff
13
14
den Vertragsbegriff anhngt (credit agreement). Grobritannien,
aber auch sterreich
und Italien,15 sowie die meisten kleineren EU-Mitgliedsstaaten haben bei der
Umsetzung
der Verbraucherkreditrichtlinie anders als Deutschland und Frankreich ihre

Darlehens-
dogmatik unbesehen gesprengt und den Anachronismus eines Kreditvertrags bernom-
men, der fr das klassische Zivilrecht (nicht aber fr die Lebenszeitvertrge) neu
einen
Vertrag nicht vom Gegenstand, sondern von seinem Verwendungszweck her bestimmmt.
Doch das franzsische Recht mit seiner begrifflichen Strke gibt Hinweise zur
Auf-
lsung. Der Kreditbegriff dient nicht zur Bestimmung der rechtsdogmatischen
Vertrags-
form, sondern nur zur Kennzeichnung des Anwendungsbereiches zwingender gesetzlicher
Regeln im Verbraucherschutz hnlich wie dies bei der Bestimmung des Dienstvertrags
als Arbeitsvertrag und des Mietvertrages als Wohnraummietvertrag erfolgt. Whrend

der
Begriff Kreditvertrag im Code Civil nicht vorkommt, folgt das Konsumgesetz (Code de
la Consommation) im Titel 3.Verschuldung a) Kredit (1) Verbraucherkredit den

euro-
parechtlichen Vorgaben. Es schafft dadurch aber neben dem Darlehensvertrag
keinen
Kreditvertrag, sondern spricht unjuristisch von Kreditoperationen (opration de
crdit),
in die dann unbesehen Kreditsicherheiten, finanzierte Miet- und Abzahlungsgeschfte
in
den Anwendungsbereich des Schutzgesetzes einbezogen werden knnen. Kredit erfasst
also den Schutzzweck, Darlehen die rechtliche Form. Das deutsche Recht schafft dies
ber
die sonstige Finanzierungshilfe sowie das Umgehungsverbot in 506 S.2 BGB, mit
der
eine wirtschaftliche Betrachtungsweise juristischer Formen erreicht wird. 16 Es
gibt somit
im deutschen Recht keinen Vertragstypus Kreditvertrag.17 sondern nur Vertrge, in
deren
Rechtsform Kredite vergeben und in Anspruch genommen werden. Kredit ist der uere
Zweck verschiedener Vertragsgestaltungen, an den der Gesetzgeber anknpft,
um das
Verhalten derjenigen effektiv zu regeln, die ber die Macht verfgen,
Rechtsgestaltungen
auf dem Markt so durchzusetzen, dass dadurch Gesetze umgangen werden knnen, die an
formal definierte Darlehensformen anknpfen.
13 15 U.S.C. 1601 Sec. 103 (e): The term credit means the right granted by a
creditor to a debtor to defer pay-
ment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment. UK Consumer Credit Act
1974 (c. 39) 8 (1). Consumer
credit agreements: A consumer credit agreement is an agreement between an
individual (the debtor ) and
any other person (the creditor ) by which the creditor provides the debtor
with credit of any amount. 9. (1).
In this Act credit includes a cash loan, and any other form of financial
accommodation.
14 2 st. Verbraucherkreditgesetz 2010 Verbraucherkreditvertrag.
15 Art. 40 ff. ital. Codice del Consumo; Art. 124 ital. Bankgesetz (Testo Unico
Bancaria) benutzt den contratto
di credito al consumo und regelt zivilrechtliche Wirkungen, wobei mehrfach auf
das Darlehen (prestitio)
Bezug genommen wird.
16 Dazu oben pp. 59 ff.
17 Zutreffend Blow, P. (2001) pp. 154 ff; Deutscher Bundestag 14. Wahlperiode:
Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur
Modernisierung des Schuldrechts: Drucksache 14/6040 (14.05.2001) p. 252; anders
de lege ferenda Meinhof,
A. (2002); Kndgen, J. (2001) p. 1641.
425
----------------------- Page 465-----------------------
Udo Reifner
Whrend das Wort Kredit einen wirtschaftlichen Zweck schon zur Bestimmung der
Vertragsform benutzt, haben die anderen Lebenzeitvertrge mit Dienst- und

Mietvertrag
hier noch die traditionellen Rechtsformen bewahrt. Doch der hier interessierende
Kredit
ist der Verbraucherkredit. Dadurch wird hnlich wie bei Wohnen und Arbeiten ein so-
zialer Zweck in die Rechtsform bernommen. Whrend der Arbeitsvertrag in der Regel
ein Dienstvertrag mit dem Zweck unselbstndiger Arbeitsleistung und der Wohnraum-
mietvertrag ein Mietvertrag zu Wohnzwecken ist, hat der Begriff
Verbraucherkredit
den Verbraucher als Unterscheidungskriterium. Kredit und Darlehen unterscheiden
sich
daher doppelt, nach der Eingriffsermchtigung und dem Schutzzweck der damit
bezeich-
neten Rechtsregeln. Der Kreditbegriff bestimmt das Bankaufsichtsrecht18 ebenso wie
der
Begriff des Betriebs das Recht der Gewerbeaufsicht bestimmt, um es der

privatrechtlichen
Disposition der Parteien zu entziehen. Bankenkontrolle und Verbraucherschutz sind
die
ratio legis zwingenden Rechts. Sie fhren im brigen jedoch zu einer
rechtsdogmatischen
Vermischung von teleologischer Interpretation und formaler Struktur des
Darlehens.
Diese Unschrfe hat entscheidende ideologische Bedeutung fr das
juristische Vorver-
stndnis im Kredit- und Darlehensrecht, mit dem die anstehenden
gesellschaftlichen
Konflikte rechtsdogmatisch bewltigt werden mssen. Die sprachliche Gleichsetzung
von
vorwerfbarer Schuld (276 BGB) und obligatorischen Schulden (Schuldverhltnis) im
deutschen Recht ist dabei kein Zufall.
13.2 Schuld: Kredit und creditum
Kredit kommmt aus dem Lateinischen credere/creditum (glauben, vertrauen). Es soll

in
den Mittelpunkt der Transaktion das Vertrauen des Glubigers stellen, dass der
Schuldner
den Betrag termingerecht zurckzahlen wird.19 Dies leitet sich aus der
Spotvertragside-
ologie ab, wonach im Synallagma nicht die zeitliche Streckung, sondern der
unmittelbar
gleichzeitige Austausch die Regel ist. Fr die Geldmiete ist der Kreditbegriff
dagegen eine
verhngnisvolle Ideologie. Der Kreditgeber verleiht kein Geld, um es
zurckzubekom-
men, sondern wie bei jeder Kapitalinvestition, um aus der Bereitstellung seiner
Nutzung
Zinsen bzw. Gewinne zu erwirtschaften.
Dass der Kredit anders als alle anderen Kapitalinvestitionen mit dem
besonderen
Vertrauen erklrt wird, das alle Kapitalnutzungsverhltnisse gleichermaen
bestimmen
msste, fhrt zu einer Moralisierung des Kreditrechts zulasten der
Kreditnehmer. Im
18 Hierzu und zu 1, 19, 21 KWG vgl. Kmpel, S. (2004) Rdn 5.77 ff.
19 So immer Kmpel, S. (2004) (Kmpel, S. (1995)) p. 358 Rn. 5. 3 ff;
Staudinger/Hopt/Mlbert, BGB, Vorbem.
zu 607 ff Rn. 16; Canaris, C.-W. (1988) Rn. 1195.
426
----------------------- Page 466-----------------------
Prinzip der verantwortlichen Kreditvergabe ist diese Moral Gesetz (18 Abs. 2 KWG)
ge-
worden.20 In ihm wird der Mensch zum kreditunwrdigen unredlichen Kunden, wenn
die Rckzahlung bei Kreditaufnahme noch nicht gesichert ist. Er ist (kredit)
unwrdig.
Der Glubiger ist dagegen der vertrauensselige Kapitalgeber, der vom Schuldner
durch
den Verzug oder dessen Insolvenz enttuscht wird. Kunden- und
Bankinteressen sind
hier gemeinschaftlich gedacht. Beide wollen die Rckfhrung des Kredites.21 Solche
Ge-
meinschaftsideologien, wie sie auch die anderen Lebenszeitverhltnisse im

Arbeitsrecht
(Betriebsgemeinschaft Treue und Frsorge) und bei der Wohnraummiete (Hausge-
meinschaft) zwischen Kapitalgeber und Nutzer vorfinden, haben mit der
Logik synal-
lagmatischer Tauschbeziehungen in einer Marktwirtschaft wenig zu tun. So wrde etwa
die Behauptung, ein Mietwagenunternehmen wrde nur Autos verleihen, um sie nach der
Mietzeit zurckzubekommen, eher Kopfschtteln hervorrufen.

Die Infinitesimalrechnung zeigt den Unsinn auf. Eine Bank, die einen Kredit
fr eine
unendliche Laufzeit herauslegt und stetig Zinsen einnimmt, mchte keine
Rckzahlung.
Weil im Unendlichen das Kapital gegenber den Zinsen gegen 0 strebt, ist Kredit
Tausch
von zeitlicher Kapitalnutzung gegen Zinsen. Hingabe und Rckzahlung sind nur tech-
nische Elemente zur Ermglichung dieses Tausches. In verstetigten
Langzeitbeziehungen
wie bei Hypotheken- oder Staatskrediten, Kreditlinien, berziehungsrahmen und Um-
schuldungen zur berwindung der Laufzeitgrenzen sind Kreditnehmer zu lebenslangen
Dauerschuldnern der Finanzdienstleister geworden. Natrlicher und
wirtschaftlicher
Tod (Insolvenz) stellen nicht nur die Rckzahlung, sondern vor allem die
Hauptleis-
tung des Kreditnehmers, die Zinszahlung und damit die eigentliche Kapitalverwertung
infrage.
Ein Interesse an der Rckzahlung entsteht erst, wo die Zinszahlung
auf Dauer ge-
fhrdet ist. Die Subprimekrise hat das Interesse der Banken an hochverzinslichen
unein-
bringlichen Krediten praktisch werden lassen.22 Deshalb investiert ein Kreditgeber
weniger
Vertrauen in die Rckzahlung eines Darlehens als jeder andere Glubiger einer
synallag-
matischen Schuld.
20 Fr eine zivilrechtliche Pflicht Reifner, U. (2006b); Rott, P. (2008) p. 1109;

Hofmann, C. (2010) p. 1786;
Reifner, U.: Bank Safety and Soundness -The Bergamo Report (1996) p.
158; kritisch Financial Stability
Board: Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial
Institutions (04.11.2011); Bank for
International Settlements; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Consultative
Document. Global sys-
temically important banks: Assessment methodology and the additional loss
absorbency requirement (July
2001); Markose, S./Giansante, S. et al. (2012); Safley, T. M. (ed.) (2013) pp.
629 f.
21 Z.B. Denn der Kreditgeber (lat. Creditor = Glubiger) vertraut darauf das
geliehene Geld vom Kreditne-
hmer (Schuldner) zurck zu erhalten. Auf diesem Vertrauen beruht die zeitlich
begrenzte berlassung des
Geldes, die dem Kreditnehmer die Kaufkraft ermglicht. (Avallone, P. (2013)).
22 Zu diesen Grnden bei der Insolvenz der Hypo Real Estate vgl. Reifner, U.
(2010) pp. 240 ff.
427
----------------------- Page 467-----------------------
Udo Reifner
Im rmischen Recht ist das noch offensichtlich. Als creditum galt

jede hinaus-
gezgerte Zahlung und Schuld und nicht nur die kreditierte Schuld.23
Dies ist bis heute in den anderen Sprachen insoweit erhalten, als der
Kreditbegriff hn-
lich wie der deutsche Schuldbegriff in doppelter Bedeutung erscheint. So benutzt
der itali-
enische Codice Civile (z.B. Art. 1992 ital. cc) den Begriff credito zur
Bezeichnung jeder
Obligation. Das gilt bei genauerer Betrachtung auch fr Deutschland, wo der
Creditor ein-
mal als Kreditgeber und zum anderen bersetzt als Glubiger herrscht. Ein
berbleibsel
wurde dabei bereits erwhnt (788 BGB).24 Im Englischen ebenso wie in den
romanischen
Sprachen ist unabhngig vom Kredit jeder Forderungsinhaber creditor, crditeur,

creditore.
Das deutsche Wort Glubiger (glauben) ist nur eine wrtliche bersetzung des
Kreditors.
Forderung heit im franzsischen Code Civile creance (Forderung), aber auch
obligation
25
(Verpflichtung) und dette (Schuld, lat. debere = sollen) (Art. 1210 frz. cc oder
362 BGB).
Die merkwrdige Reduktion des creditum auf Kapitalnutzungsverhltnisse
zusam-
men mit der Anwendung des realvertraglichen Darlehnsbegriffs der
Bereicherung und
der Verwechselung von Schulden und Schuld26 fhrt zu einer falschen
Moralisierung27
des Darlehensvertrages28: die Bank als Glubiger steht dem ungerechtfertigt
Bereicherten
gegenber, dessen Schuld und Verschulden es ist, wenn er oder sie kein Geld mehr
verdi-
enen, mit dem sie die ehern sich verzinsende Schuld begleichen knnten. Der
frhkapital-
istische Schuldturm, in dem man so lange einsa, bis man seine Schulden bezahlt
hatte,
ist dann nicht die Fortsetzung der Schuldsklaverei, sondern eine gerechte
Bestrafung.29
In allen Lndern der Welt erscheint der stetige Verzugszins (288 BGB) gerecht ,
mit dem
die Verwertung des Geldes des Darlehensgebers unabhngig von jeder
wirtschaftlichen
Produktivitt staatlich garantiert wird. Leichtfertiges ber-die-Verhltnisse Leben
ist dann
der berschuldungsgrund in Schuldnerberatungs- und Gerichtsvollziehersendungen des
23 Vgl. im einzelnen zum Creditum Kulischer, J. (1988) p. 168, der den

Unterschied im rmischen Recht zwischen
dem Gebrauch des Creditum (in credito esse, in creditum ire) vom Darlehen
herausarbeitet. P. 172 heit es:
Credit ist der Glaube auf konomischem Gebiet, die Glubigen sind die
Glubiger. Dann aber (p. 173) stlpt er
dem rmischen Recht die moderne Geldmiete ber wenn es heit: Hier wie dort
schiebt sich nach der meines
Erachtens ganz richtigen Ansicht der Rmer in das ursprngliche Geschft ein
verstecktes Darlehn ein.
24 Meincke, E./Hingst, K.-M. (2011) p. 634.
25 Zum rmisch-rechtlichen Kreditmandat vgl. Hausmaninger, H./Selb, W. (2001) p.
296.
26 Die anderen europischen Sprachen unterscheiden dagegen zwischen Schuld und
Schulden wie im eng-
lischen guilt/debt, im franzsischen faute/dette, im italienischen
colpa/debiti.
27 Ehrenberg, R. (1963) p. 134: Sicher ist, da jegliches Schuldenmachen in
breiten brgerlichen Kreisen die
abschtzige Nebenbedeutung von etwas Unsolidem besitzt. (zitiert nach Capital
v. 1. Juni 1998 S. 178);
ausfhrlich zu dieser Ideologie Kilger, J. (1975). In 276 BGB, den die
Herausgeber mit Haftung fr eigenes
Verschulden (der Begriff wird auch vom Gesetzgeber in 278 S. 1; 823 Abs. 2
S. 2 BGB gebraucht) ber-
schrieben haben, wird der Mastab fr das Verschulden des Schuldners
festgelegt, wodurch das Paradox
eines Wortes im Deutschen deutlich wird.
28 Dazu Bork, R. (2012); Canaris, C.-W. (1978); ein Beispiel dazu bei Wieacker,
F. (1941) pp. 261 ff, der die
Baufinanzierungsinteressen mit dem Prinzip der Genusucht (Hedonismus) deutet.
29 Bis vor kurzem konnte ein Schuldner in Irland noch im Gefngnis landen.
428
----------------------- Page 468-----------------------
Reality TV. Gerichtsurteile vermerken oft ohne Beweisaufnahme und erkennbare Funk-
tion fr die Subsumtion, dass Kredite zu Steuersparzwecken oder zur Anschaffung
von
Luxusgtern aufgenommen wurden und man die Verschuldung htte unterlassen knnen.
Wer Kredite in Anspruch nimmt, nimmt Schuld auf sich.30 Der Grundsatz der
unbegrenz-
ten Geldschuld und der unendlichen Verzinsung jeden Geldkapitals ist dann
nicht nur
vom Gesetzgeber anerkannt,31 sondern ebenso sozial gerechtfertigt, wie dies
Arbeits- und
Mietrecht in 1 KSchG bzw. 574 BGB unterstellen. Das Fehlen sozialer

Rechtfertigungs-
grnde wird dort nmlich zum Tatbestandsmerkmal einer erlaubten Kndigung erhoben.
Es bleibt daneben kein Raum fr die einfache Feststellung, dass an sich der durch
die Ver-
tragsbeendigung beschrittene Weg in die Obdachlosigkeit, Arbeitslosigkeit und
Insolvenz
schon grundstzlich nicht sozial gerechtfertigt sein kann und allenfalls aus den
konkur-
rierenden Gewinninteressen der Kapitalgeber zu erklren ist.
13.3 Produktivitt: Darlehen und mutuum
Dass der Darlehensbegriff diese Ideologien transportieren kann, liegt an seiner

Inhaltsleere un-
ter synallagmatischen Verhltnissen, fr die er nicht gemacht wurde. Das ist
paradox, weil das
historische Darlehen von Geben, Schenken und Leihen32 geprgt ist, gleichzeitig
aber der Rck-
griff darauf den ewigen Zins zu rechtfertigen scheint. Dies liegt daran, dass Zeit
und Zins fehlen.
Darlehen ist Lehen (egl. loan), Hingabe, und Geschenk (lat. prestitum, frz.
prt, ital. Pres-
tito; lat. mutuum). Die Leihe33 (Lehen) ist ein einseitig verpflichtendes Geschft
ohne Entgelt.
Weil Zinsen im Darlehen nicht gedacht werden konnten, haben sie sich
grenzenlos
entwickelt. Der usus fructus passte nicht. Geld trgt keine Frchte. Art. 578
frz. Code
Civil definiert dies wie folgt: Lusufruit est le droit de jouir des
choses dont un autre
a la proprit, comme le propritaire lui-mme, mais la charge den conserver la
sub-
stance. Bume oder Tiere ebenso wie Sklaven mit ihren Kindern oder ihrer Arbeit
tra-
gen sichtbar Frchte (Art. 583 cc zhlt Frchte der Erde, der Tiere und Pflanzen
sowie
von Mhe und Arbeit auf). Das Recht, diese Frchte zu genieen, stand dem
Eigentmer
(dominus, proprietas) zu, der auch die Verlustgefahr des zuflligen Untergangs
trug (ca-
sum sentit dominus). Dafr hatte der Nutzer die Pflicht, die Substanz zu erhalten
und
ggf. Schadensersatz zu zahlen (damnum emergens). Dieses Fruchtziehungsrecht konnte
der Eigentmer durch den usus fructus auf einen Dritten bertragen, wenn dieser
sich
30 Dies findet sich dann z.B. in Macpherson, C. B. (1964), die bertitelt ist:
Konsumwnsche hufiger Grund
fr Jugendverschuldung Als Beleg dient eine Umfrage unter
Inkassounternehmen. Vgl. demgegenber
Huls, N. J. (1994).
31 Dazu Medicus, D. (1988).
32 Dies prgt immer noch den Namen der deutschen antrophsophischen Bank GLS.
33 Darleiher statt Darlehnsgeber heit es dann auch noch in 312 schweiz.
Obligationenrecht.
429
----------------------- Page 469-----------------------
Udo Reifner
die Arbeit machte, den Baum zu pflegen, das Tier zu fttern, den Acker zu
bestellen, die
Sklaven zu beherbergen und anzutreiben sowie die Frchte zu ernten. Doch das
Frucht-
ziehungsrecht kannte eine natrliche Begrenzung: wo es keine Frchte gab, gab es
auch
keine Pflicht sie abzuliefern. Der Unterschied zwischen 903 BGB und Art. 14 Abs. 2
GG
zeigt die beiden Konzepte: Eigentum als Ausgrenzungsrecht und Eigentum als
Verpflich-
tung. Beides kennt auch das rmische Recht: das absolute Eigentum (dominum
directum)
und das Nutzungs- oder Gebrauchseigentum (dominum utile).34 Der absolute Eigentmer
musste das Gebrauchseigentum des Nutzers achten und sttzen, um seine Frchte zu
er-
halten. Der Kreditgeber aber erhlt den Zins wie den Apfel ohne Baum.
Paradoxerweise ist
es die radikale Einsicht der vorkapitalistischen Kultur, dass Zins keine Frucht
ist, die dem
Recht jede Mglichkeit nahm, ihn sinnvoll zu begrenzen. Das wusste schon
Aristoteles, als
er bemerkte, dass das Wuchergewerbe, . . . aus guten Grnden verhasst ist, da es
seinen
Erwerb aus dem Gelde selbst zieht und nicht aus den Dingen, zu deren Vertrieb das
Geld
eingefhrt wurde. Zinsen sollten Diebstahl und Geldverleiher Schurken sein, die
dem
Schuldner einen Tribut abpressten, der sich aus dem geliehenen Geld selber nicht
ergeben
konnte.
Die Fruchtlosigkeit des Geldes hat sich bis in die brgerliche Gesellschaft
erhalten.
Es zhlte dort zu den verbrauchbaren Sachen (92 BGB) wie Saatgut, Holz,
Baumateri-
alien oder anderen Lebensmitteln, die ins Eigentum des Nutzers bergingen und nur
in
gleicher Art, Menge und Gte zu erstatten waren. Dazu gehren bis heute gem. 92
BGB
auch Sachen, deren bestimmungsmiger Gebrauch in der Veruerung der einzelnen
Sachen besteht. Noch 983 ster. ABGB definiert das Darlehen in dieser Weise:
Wenn
jemandem verbrauchbare Sachen unter der Bedingung bergeben werden, dass er zwar
willkrlich darber verfgen knne, aber nach einer gewissen Zeit ebenso viel von
der-
selben Gattung und Gte zurckgeben soll, so entsteht ein Darlehensvertrag.
War der Verbrauch aus der Sicht des Nutzers noch das wesentliche
Merkmal der
Geldleihe, so nderte sich die rechtliche Perspektive vom Nutzer hin zum Verleiher,
als
die verbrauchbare Sache durch das Merkmal der Vertretbarkeit (93 BGB) ersetzt
wurde.
Entscheidend war nicht mehr, was mit der Sache passierte, ob sie in einen Prozess
der
Fruchtziehung oder des produktiven Verbrauchs eingebunden war. Entscheidend war nur
noch, dass der Glubiger Anspruch darauf hatte, Sachen gleicher Art und Gte
zurck-
zuerhalten. Die sachliche Vorstellung hierfr waren die bis heute unentgeltliche
Verwah-
rung (688 BGB, Art. 1915 cc) und Leihe (598 BGB), bei der der Entleiher das
Saatgut
fr sptere Zeiten verwahren lassen konnte, damit es nicht verdarb bzw. trotz
Verderbens
als Saatgut wieder geschuldet war und damit fr die Zukunft aufgespart wurde.
34 Luhmann, N. (1974); Weber, M./Parsons, T. (1958) pp. 414 ff.
430
----------------------- Page 470-----------------------
Wir geben ein Darlehen (mutuum) nicht in der Absicht, dieselbe bestimmte
Sache
zurckzuerhalten in diesem Fall wrde es sich um eine Leihe (commodatum) oder
eine
Aufbewahrung (depositum) handeln , sondern um eine Sache der gleichen Gattung wie-
derzubekommen. Wenn wir aber eine andere Gattung zurckerhalten, zum Beispiel Wein
statt Weizen, dann liegt kein Darlehen vor. Das Darlehen besteht in der
Hingabe von
Sachen, die nach Gewicht, Zahl oder Ma bestimmbar sind.35
Daher ist die Ablsung der sachenrechtlichen Nutzungsrechte durch

gewillkrte
Formen im italienischen, franzsischen und sterreichischen Zivilgesetzbuch bis
heute
durch Hingabe und Rckgabe geprgt, die als Realvertrag ebenso wie bei Leihe und
Ver-
wahrung der Verpflichtung kraft freien Willens keinen Raum gaben. Fr Art. 1875 cc
liefert der Darlehensgeber (prt) une chose lautre pour sen servir, la
charge par le
preneur de la rendre, was 607 BGB alter Fassung wie folgt umsetzte: Wer Geld
oder
andere vertretbare Sachen als Darlehen empfangen hat, ist verpflichtet, dem
Darleiher das
Empfangene in Sachen von gleicher Art, Gte und Menge zurckzuerstatten. Nach der
Reform von 2002 gilt diese Definition in Deutschland nur noch fr den
Sachdarlehens-
vertrag im neuen 607 BGB.
Ziel der Geldverwahrung des alten Darlehens war die Mobilisierung der
Wertaufbe-
wahrungsfunktion von Geld, die als Zahlungsfunktion in der Zeit begriffen werden
kann.
Das Sparen legitimiert sich fr den Sparer aus dem Zweck der Wertaufbewahrung. Der
Geldverwahrer verschafft ihm diese Werterhaltung. Fr Entgelte war in dieser

Konstruk-
tion kein Raum, weil der Verwahrer nicht noch dafr zu zahlen hatte, dass er dem
Sparer
half. Er trug schlielich das volle Verlustrisiko und musste auch dann
die Darlehens-
summe zurckzahlen, wenn sie ersatzlos verbraucht war, whrend beim usus fructus
wie
auch in der Gewinnbeteiligung der societas der Verleiher diese Gefahr trug.
In den modernen Geldgeschften ist diese Anschauung noch beim Sparvertrag er-
halten, bei dem die Hingabe des Sparers von Geld gegen Zinsen an eine Bank
teilweise
mit dem Recht der unregelmigen Sammelverwahrung gem. 700 BGB, teilweise aber
als Darlehen eingeordnet wird. 700 BGB erhlt den historischen Zusammenhang, wenn
er das Darlehensrecht fr die Abwicklung nur entsprechend fr anwendbar erklrt und
fr die wichtige Frage der Vertragsbeendigung in 700 Abs.1 S.3 BGB im Zweifel aber
die
Vorschriften des Verwahrungsrechts an Stelle der Kndigungsvorschriften des
Darlehens-
rechts zur Anwendung bringt.36 Der Sinn des Sparens bleibt damit getrennt von der
Ka-
pitalanlage die Wertaufbewahrung, whrend der moderne Darlehensvertrag als Ziel die
Kapitalnutzung gegen Entgelt verankert. Tatschlich will der Sparer auch heute nur
sein
Kapital erhalten. Die Zinsen decken gerade den Substanzverlust der Inflation,
wodurch er
35 Paulus (D.12.1.2 pr. 1).

36 Meier, A. (2003) Herrmann 700 Rdn 6; RGZ 67, 264.
431
----------------------- Page 471-----------------------
Udo Reifner
sich vom Kapitalanleger unterscheidet. Dieser Gedanke galt historisch auch fr das
Dar-
lehen. Er zeigt aber auch heute noch ein wichtiges Element dieses Vertragstypus
auf. Beim
Gelddarlehen stehen dem Verwahrer (Darlehensnehmer) als Eigentmer der verbrauch-
baren/vertretbaren Sache die Ergebnisse der Nutzung dieser Sache zu. Er muss
lediglich
nach Ablauf der Darlehenszeit eine Geldsumme gleicher Art und Gte zurckgeben und
damit vornehmlich fr den anderen deren Wert erhalten.

Die Auffassung, dass Zinsen deshalb nicht mglich seien, weil das Kapital
keine Frchte
hervorbringt, war aber falsch und der Verzicht auf die Nutzung der modernen Form
des
synallagmatischen Mietvertrages verfehlt und folgenreich. Zinsen sind, und dies
erst hat
der Kapitalismus als dominierendes Gedankensystem deutlich werden lassen,
Beteiligung
an einem von jedem einzelnen Darlehensnehmer zu erbringenden aliquoten Teil des
durch-
schnittlichen Gewinns, der aus der Kapitalnutzung insgesamt erwartet werden kann.
Dass klingt zwar hart, weil damit der Darlehensschuldner fr das Wohl der
gesamten
Volkswirtschaft allein haftet, whrend der Darlehensgeber mit der leeren Hlle des
Geld-
besitzes den Staat auf seiner Seite wei. Doch dieser Realismus schafft auch fr
ein sozial
verantwortliches Darlehensrecht groe Mglichkeiten. Der Siegeszug der
Schuldbefrei-
ung in der Verbraucherinsolvenz hat diese Einsicht aus der Natur jeden
Kreditvertrages
lediglich in das kollektiv wirkende Insolvenzrecht verlagert.
Fr die synallagmatische Kapitalnutzung entwickelten schon die antiken
Juristen die
Rechtsfigur der locatio conductio,37 deren Logik auf die Arbeit (operarum, operis),
die
Sachen (rei, servi) sowie auf vertretbare geldhnliche Gegenstnde

(specialis) bertra-
gen wurde. Im deutschen gemeinen Recht wurde dies alles noch als Miete38
bezeichnet.
Im franzsischen Code Civil findet sich die allgemeine Mietvertragsdefinition der

locatio
conductio auch heute noch in Art. 1709 cc: faire jouir lautre dune chose pendant
un
certain temps. Hier steht die Pflicht des Darlehensgebers im Vordergrund, dem
Kredit-
nehmer die produktive Nutzung des Kapitals zu ermglichen eine Pflicht, die
angesichts
der systematischen Ausbeutung der Notlagen vieler Kreditnehmer zur Erzielung von
Um-
schuldungsgewinnen heute eher ein sozialer Traum denn juristischer Alltag wre.
Auch
535 BGB ebenso wie Art. 1572 ital. cc sprechen davon, dass der
Vermieter den Ge-
brauch der Mietsache whrend der Mietzeit zu gewhren hat bzw. far godere
allaltra una
cosa mobile o immobile per un dato tempo. Nutzung und Zeit sind danach die
zentralen
Elemente dieser allgemeinsten Rechtsform fr Arbeitsteilung und Kooperation ber
Ka-
pital. Das franzsische Recht bezieht auch die Arbeitsleistung mit ein. Art. 1708
bestimmt:
Il y a deux sortes de contrats de louage: Celui des choses, et celui douvrage.
Der con-
trat de louage de service personnel gilt aber nur noch fr Hausangestellte,
Knechte und
37 Grossi, P. (1963); Mayer-Maly, T. (1956).

38 Noel, F. R. (2002); Hein. Sgard, J.: Bankruptcy law, creditors rights and
contractual exchange in Europe,
1808 - 1914: 109 (2006).
432
----------------------- Page 472-----------------------
Mgde in Art. 1667 cc,39 so wie es frher noch die feudale Dienst-40 oder
Gesindemiete des
19. Jahrhunderts war. Doch wie schon in der Einleitung ausgefhrt steht der
Arbeitsver-
trag als Mietvertrag im 19. Jahrhundert auf dem Kopf. Nicht der Arbeitgeber mietet
die
Arbeitskraft des Arbeitnehmers. Dies wre Sklaverei. Er kauft lediglich desssen
Leistung
und vermietet ebenso wie bei Darlehen und Wohnungsmiete sein Kapital, den Betrieb
mit
seiner Organisation, zur Nutzung an den Arbeitnehmer.
Dass man Geld nutzen kann, erschloss sich allerdings erst in der
Geldgesellschaft.41
Geld kann zwar nicht wie Tiere, Sklaven, Saatgut, Wagen, Arbeitsmittel
etc. Frchte
tragen und dadurch produktiv sein, es kann jedoch produktive Prozesse vermitteln,
die
Gewinnbeteiligungen ermglichen, die wir kollektiv als Zins bezeichnen knnen.
Geld ist in der Tat kein Wert. Es ist aber Reprsentant von Werten und als
solches
produktiv einsetzbar. Darber haben sich die Menschen von jeher mit ueren
Erschei-
nungsformen eines haltbaren bzw. allgemein begehrten Tauschmittels getuscht.
Zunchst
in der Form des Naturalgeldes (Steine, Schmuck, Muscheln, Salz, Rinder, Ziegen
etc.) und
dann in Gold und Silber bis zum Mnzgeld suggerierte der Schein einen inneren Wert
und
ermglichte so das blinde Vertrauen, dass der Handel fr dieses Tauschmittel
brauchte, um
Differenzen in Zeit und Ort zu berwinden. In den Bezeichnungen des Wertausdrucks
als
Geld (deutsch von Ghel = Gold), argent (frz. fr Silber), denaro (Spanisch vom
10fachen
Gewicht des rmischen Denarius), moneta oder money, der den Ort der Mnzprge im
alten Rom (Mint) bezeichnete, ist dieser Wertschein auch beim
elektronischen Bitcoin
noch lebendig. Juristen jedenfalls behandeln Mnzgeld und Scheine nach wie
vor wie
eine Sache, die einen eigenen Wert, ein eigenes Gewicht und eine eigene Substanz
hat, um
getauscht werden zu knnen. Als bloer Wertausdruck und Information ber Kaufkraft,
als Warenseele oder Buchgeld war die Geldnutzung bis zum Erscheinen des Giralgeldes
nicht fassbar. Die Erfllung einer Geldschuld konnte mit der Sachfiktion als
bereignung
i.S. des 929 BGB konstruiert werden. Die berweisung von Giralgeld bleibt auch
heute
nach herrschender Meinung eine Zahlung an Erfllungs statt. (362 BGB).
Fr die synallagmatische Kapitalnutzung entwickelten die Rmer stattdessen
das Bild
einer doppelten Leistung des Verleihers: der Darlehensgeber als Vermieter stellt
eine Sa-
che hin an einen anderen Ort (locare hinstellen). Diese locatio conductio wurde
auf alle
produktiven Kapitalien erstreckt. Fr die Nutzung der Arbeitsleistung anderer gab
es die
locatio conductio operarum/operis (Dienstvertrag/Werkvertrag),42 fr die Nutzung
frem-
der Sachen die locatio conductio rei (Miet- oder Pachtvertrag).
39 Luhmann, N. (1974).
40 Windscheid, B./Kipp, T. (1906) 399.
41 Reifner, U. (2010) pp. 125 ff.
42 Lotmar, P. (1902) p. 51.
433
----------------------- Page 473-----------------------
Udo Reifner
Doch diese Rechtsdogmatik verweigerte sich der Geldmiete. Erst im 19.

Jahrhundert
trat das Geld als Kapitalform neben die Sachen und Unternehmen und drehte das
Verstnd-
nis um: die Zinsen des Geldes sind der Gewinnanteil am Kapitalwachstum. Genau das
aber
erklrt auch den Miet- und sogar den Pachtzins sowie den Arbeitslohn, die lngst
mit den
Frchten des usus fructus nichts mehr gemein haben. Doch die mietrechtliche Nutzung
konnte sich gegenber dem Siegezug von exklusivem Eigentum (dominum directum) und
Kaufvertrag (emptio venditio)43 nicht durchsetzen. Savigny persnlich sorgte dafr,
dass
die locatio conductio als Alternativmodell zum Kaufvertrag keine Chance erhielt.
Haben
und nicht Tun bestimmte den Handels- und Industriekapitalismus. Das allgemeine
Schuld-
recht des BGB hat entsprechend die Dauerschuldverhltnisse ignoriert. Historisch
aber hatte
der Mietvertrag (locatio conductio) beim bergang von den sachenrechtlichen
Nutzungs-
verhltnissen und Realvertrgen zu den marktwirtschaftlichen Konsensualvertrgen
noch
gleichberechtigt daneben gestanden.44 Es ist daher nicht, wie Otto von Gierke
glaubte, die
Ignoranz des rmischen Rechts sowie der Vter des BGB gegenber den deutschrechtli-
chen personenrechtlichen Verhltnissen, die den Dauerschuldverhltnissen ihren

Platz in
der Vertragsrechtsdogmatik verweigerten.45 Schuld ist eine an den Bedrfnissen des
In-
dustriekapitalismus an unumschrnktem Eigentum ausgerichtete verflschende

Rezeption
des rmischen wie auch anderer brgerlicher Rechtsprinzipien in der Kaufrechts- und
Ei-
gentumsideologie des 19. Jahrhundert.46 Fr die Dienstleistungs- und
Kreditgesellschaft
mssen wir daher heute in die Zeit vor dieser Verflschung zurckkehren und die
ver-
schtteten Tore zur locatio conductio wieder frei legen.47
13.4 Zinsen: Geldmiete und locatio conductio
Zinsen mgen rechtlich gechtet gewesen sein. Wirtschaftlich aber hat es sie seit
Beginn
synallagmatischen Tauschens gegeben. Versptete Zahlungen in den
Tauschgeschften
43 Windscheid, B./Kipp, T. (1906) 167 p. 857 das Eigentum ist als solches
schrankenlos. Es ist die Negation
der Beschrnkung. Ebenso Warren, C. (1972 (1935)).
44 Gai.3.142: Der Miet-, Pacht-, Dienst- und Werkvertrag (locatio conductio) wird
nach hnlichen Regeln
wie der Kaufvertrag geschlossen. Ist nmlich noch kein bestimmter Zins / Lohn
bestimmt, ist der Vertrag
nicht zustande gekommen. 105 Inst.3.145 (Gaius): Emptio venditio und locatio
conductio weisen auch
insofern eine gewisse hnlichkeit auf, als in manchen Situationen die Frage
aufzutreten pflegt, ob eine emp-
tio venditio vorliegt oder eine locatio conductio, etwa wenn eine Sache auf
immer verpachtet wird. Dies ist
bei Munzipalgrundstcken der Fall, die mit der Vereinbarung verpachtet werden,
dass weder dem Pchter
selbst noch seinem Erben das Grundstck entzogen werden drfe, solange der
Pachtzins bezahlt werde.
Doch die Juristen haben entschieden, dass es sich eher um eine locatio
conductio handelt.
45 Gierke, O. v. (1914a) p. 411.
46 So der Vorwurf von Grossi, P. (1963) p. 25 ein tiefgreifend deformierender
Filter fr die Rezeption des
rmischen Rechts.
47 Dazu Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2011); Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2009); Nogler,
L./Reifner, U. (2010).
434
----------------------- Page 474-----------------------
des Handels verlangten nach Kompensation. Anders als der Kreditbegriff heute sugge-
riert, ging es dabei nicht um die Bereitstellung von werthaltiger Zeit der
Kapitalnutzung
sondern um die Banalitt, dass jeder Tausch mit seinem Zug-um-Zug Prinzip (320
BGB)
Ungleichzeitigkeiten mit Vor- und Nachleistungen hervorbringt. Dass der
Glubiger
(creditor) dabei einen Nachteil hat, wenn der Schuldner versptet das creditum
zahlt, fhrte
zu einem Schadensersatzanspruch, der anders als beim Substanzverlust (249 BGB dam-
num emergens) den entgangenen Gewinn (252 BGB lucrum cessans) zu kompensieren
hatte. Er bestand im Verzicht auf die Nutzung dieses Geldes fr andere Geschfte.
Die
Urform der Zinsen war damit der Verzugszins, der auf das creditum zu zahlen war.
Zinsen
fanden damit als Schadensersatz Eingang in das juristische Denken, whrend sie als
Ent-
gelt verpnt und unverstanden blieben. Damit bot sich aber dort, wo der
Zahlungsverzug
ber die Idee des Schadensersatzes einen Preis erhalten hatte, auch die Mglichkeit
der
gewillkrten Bereitstellung von Geld zur entgeltlichen Nutzung.
Die Geldmiete setzte sich damit faktisch und wirtschaftlich durch.
Doch nur bei
Sach- und Dienstmiete war das Tauschdenken mglich. Hier benutzte man locatio con-
ductio neben den unentgeltlichen Lehensverhltnissen des depositum (l.c.rei),
mandatum
(l.c.operarum), Verwahrung (688 BGB, Art. 1915 cc) und Auftrag (662 BGB, Art.
1986
cc). Fr den Geldkredit blieb aber nur die Verkleidung im unentgeltlichen
mutuum,
das die Gegenseitigkeit nur als unverbindliche Reziprozitt begriff und
fr die Zinsen
einen separaten Vertrag verlangte. Das hat sich mit Art. 2 Richtlinie 48/2008/EG
488
BGB des 2002 reformierten Darlehensrechts auch begriffsjuristisch gendert zu:
Durch
den Darlehensvertrag wird der Darlehensgeber verpflichtet, dem
Darlehensnehmer einen
Geldbetrag in der vereinbarten Hhe zur Verfgung zu stellen. Der
Darlehensnehmer ist
verpflichtet, einen geschuldeten Zins zu zahlen. 535 BGB lautet
entsprechend: Durch
den Mietvertrag wird der Vermieter verpflichtet, dem Mieter den Gebrauch der
Mietsache
whrend der Mietzeit zu gewhrenDer Mieter ist verpflichtet, dem Vermieter die
verein-
barte Miete zu entrichten.
In dem Wort Verfgung ist die Nutzung als wichtigstes Element der Leistung
des Dar-
lehensgebers verborgen. Lange nach der Entscheidung des Groen Senats des
Reichsge-
richts48 vom 30. Juni 1939 wird damit vom Gesetzgeber die Zeit als
Nutzungsparameter in
den Mittelpunkt des Synallagmas gestellt und die Ideologie vom unentgeltlichen
Realvertrag
zugunsten der Geldmiete verlassen. Wer die Rechtsgeschichte rekapitulieren mchte,
schaut
ins franzsische Recht. Im Abschnit Du prt usage, ou commodat (Art. 1875 cc) ist
die
Abfolge der Regelungen noch sichtbar. Erst nach dem eigentlichen Sachdarlehen, das
den
Verbrauch der geliehenen vertretbaren Sachen erlaubt (Du prt de consommation, ou
simple
prt Art. 1892 cc ), kommt das entgeltliche Gelddarlehen (Du prt intrt. (Art.
1905 cc).
48 RGZ 161, 52 ff.
435
----------------------- Page 475-----------------------
Udo Reifner
Das Gelddarlehen gehrt damit zu den Mietvertrgen der locatio conductio wie
Sach-
mietvertrag und Pacht. Der Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag verbindet es mit
menschlicher
Lebenszeit, die es mit Arbeitsvertrag und Wohnraummietvertrag teilt.
Verbraucherschutz,
Arbeitsschutz und Mieterschutz erweisen sich damit ebenso wie beim Mietprinzip nur
als Ausdruck eines ebenso einheitlichen Grundprinzips des Schutzes menschlicher Le-
benszeit. Zeit ist nicht nur Nutzungsmglichkeit sondern zugleich auch begrenzte
und in
ihrer Produktivitt durch menschliche Eigenschaften geprgte und durch
Beeintrchti-
gungen wie Krankheit, Arbeitslosigkeit, Unglck etc. bedrohte Lebenszeit.
13.5 Wucher: Verbraucherkreditrecht und Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag
Aus dieser Entwicklung lsst sich auch der Wucher verstehen. Geldwucher (usura) ist
die
Zinsnahme an sich und nicht erst die Zinsberhhung (laesio enormis) gewesen.
Bibel,
Koran und die Lehren des Siddhartha Gautama (Buddha) haben wie Aristoteles die
Waage
der ausgleichenden Gerechtigkeit (iustitia commutativa) gestrt gesehen, wenn
zustzlich
zur Rckzahlung der vollen geliehenen Summe und der bernahme der Gefahr ihres Un-
tergangs vom Schuldner fr die Nutzung einer prinzipiell verbrauchbaren
unproduktiven
Sache wie dem Geld ein Zins abverlangt wurde. Ulpian (D.12.1.11.1) schreibt: Habe
ich dir
zehn Goldstcke gegeben mit der Abrede, dass du neun schuldest, dann schuldest du
nach
richtiger Meinung des Proculus ipso iure nicht mehr als neun. Wenn ich dir aber
zehn gebe
mit der Absicht, dass du elf schuldest, so knnen nach Proculus nicht mehr als zehn
kondi-
ziert werden. Africanus (D.19.5.24) ergnzt: Aus einem Darlehen werden Zinsen
nicht
geschuldet, soweit sie nicht durch Stipulation vereinbart wurden.49 In seinem
apostolischen
Rundschreiben von 1745 ber den Wucher und andere ungerechte Gewinne (Vix Perve-
nit) schreibt Papst Benedikt XIV: Die Snde, die usura (Zinsnehmen, Wucher) heit
und
im Darlehensvertrag ihren eigentlichen Sitz und Ursprung hat, beruht darin, dass
jemand
aus dem Darlehen selbst fr sich mehr zurckverlangt, als der andere von ihm
empfangen
hat. Papst Leo XII beschwrt Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts in seiner Enzyklika Rerum
No-
varum dann nur noch die Iustitia distributiva als Mittel der Kirche gegen
Ausbeutung und
Wucher, whrend die Iustitia commutativa als Korrektiv des Geldtausches
grundstzlich
dem Markt unterstellt wird. Dabei gehen zinsfeindliche Antike und zinsgieriger
Kapita-
lismus eine merkwrdige Allianz ein: beide folgen der Fruchtziehungstheorie des
Zinses,
die die Abstinenz gegenber seiner Regulierung heute ebenso bestimmt wie
den durch
offizielle chtung hervorgerufenen grauen Kreditmarkt im Mittelalter.50
49 Honsell, H. (2010) Rn 218 ff.

50 Zum Wirken der Fugger und Welser vgl. z. B. Bitterli, U. (1999) pp. 118 ff.
436
----------------------- Page 476-----------------------
Der Weg der Rechtsformen der Kapitalnutzung vom usus fructus (Dienstbarkeiten
aus dem Eigentum) ber das mutuum (Darlehen als unentgeltliches Sparen) bis zur
heu-
tigen Geldmiete (Darlehensvertrag als Tausch von Zeit gegen Geld) hat dem modernen
Darlehensvertrag eine extrem unterschiedliche Behandlung im Recht zugemutet: aus

dem
verbotenen und dann berregulierten Geldkredit51 wurde durch sukzessiven Abbau
aller
prinzipiellen Regeln Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts der schrankenlose

unregulierte Kredit,
wie er im Werk Dostojewskis und Balzacs als Wucher der Geldflscher und
geldgieriger
Banker beschrieben ist und die Weltfinanzkrisen 1929 ebenso wie seit 200852 prgt.
Aristoteles legt die Wurzeln dieses Missverstndnisses noch frei, wenn er mit
dem
Zins auch gleich jeden Handelsgewinn geielt:
Die Form des Handels wird mit Recht getadelt, weil sie nicht der Natur
folgt,
sondern auf gegenseitige Ausbeutung ausgeht. Ihr zur Seite tritt
noch das
Wuchergewerbe, das aus guten Grnden verhasst ist, da es seinen Erwerb aus
dem Gelde selbst zieht und nicht aus den Dingen, zu deren Vertrieb das Geld
eingefhrt wurde. Denn dieses sollte nur zur Erleichterung des Austauschs
dienen; der Zins aber bewirkt, dass es sich selbst vermehrt.
Deshalb ist
diese Art des Erwerbs die allernaturwidrigste.
Die Religionen folgten ihm.53 Immer war Geldnutzung Diebstahl, Zinsnahme Raub. Aber
auch die Rechtsradikalen bedienen sich bis heute dieser Theorie. Im Nationalsozia
lismus,
einer Kommandowirtschaft, die durch ideologische Anleihen am Feudalismus politische
Diktatur mit privaten Wirtschaftsmonopolen zu verbinden suchte,54 wurde der

Kampf
gegen die (jdische) Zinsknechtschaft im Programm der NSDAP zur Ablenkung von
51 Vgl. Fikentscher, W./Heinemann, A. (2006) p. 300; zum Wucherverbot im

kanonischen Recht vgl. Weber,
M. (1967) p. 269 5; Weber, M./Ulfig, A. (2005) 2. Teil, Kapitel V 11; zum
islamischen Wucherverbot
(Riba) vgl. Reifner, U. (2006a) A variety of injunctions can be seen to
influence the course that commer-
cial activity may follow in an Islamic economy, of which those relating to
usury (riba), gambling (maisir)
and deception (gharar) are extremely important. These injunctions are embodied
in both the Quran and the
ahadith. The literal translation of the Arabic word riba is increase, addition
or growth, though it is usually
translated as usury. Usury is not to be regarded solely as the practice of
taking interest on a loan. Two major
forms of riba are defined in Islam. They are riba al-qarud which relates to
usury involving loans, and riba
al-buyu which relates to usury involving trade. Riba is mentioned in a number
of Quranic verses (2:275 279,
3:130, 4:161 and 30:39) and is sometimes referred to as the devouring of
others wealth.
52 Reifner, U. (2010) p. 27 ff, 309 ff.
53 2. Buch Moses, Kapitel 22 Vers. 24 Wenn du Geld leihst einem aus meinem Volk,
der arm ist bei dir, sollst
du ihn nicht zu Schaden bringen und keinen Wucher an ihm treiben.; Bergpredit
Lukas 6 Vers. 35: tut
wohl und leihet, dass ihr nichts dafr hoffet (Luther-bersetzung); Koran Sure
2 Vers. 275: Diejenigen, die
Zins nehmen, werden nicht anders dastehen als wie einer, der vom Satan erfasst
ist. (bersetzt vom Rdiger
Paret 7. Aufl. Kohlhammer Stuttgart 1996); Funk, F. X. v. (1876); Lehmann, E.
(1969); Lumpkin, S. (2010)
Kapitel IX 6. Abschnitt, pp. 710 f.
54 Dazu im einzelnen Office of Fair Trading: Irresponsible lending
OFT guidance for creditors (2011)
pp. 65 ff; Reifner, U. (1989).
437
----------------------- Page 477-----------------------
Udo Reifner
den eigentlichen Ursachen der Wirtschaftskrise genutzt. Damit rekurrierte

man histo-
risch auf die Zeit der Finanzkrise im 30jhrigen Krieg, wo das Mrchen von der
Schuld
der jdischen Kipper und Geldwechseler als antisemitische Propaganda von der Ver-
schwendungssucht der Frsten ablenkte. Die Differenz zwischen scheinbar
progres-
siver Alternativkonomie und diesen Vorstellungen ist nicht immer klar.55 Whrend
die
deutschen Grobanken zur Wirtschaftsmacht56 aufstiegen, blieb das Recht ohnmchtig
der Vorstellungswelt des Mittelalters verhaftet. Die Anstze des islamic finance,
das Zins-
verbot der Scharia durch Beteiligungsmodelle zu entschrfen,57 ver hindert auch
dort, dass
der Mietvertrag sich zum Lebenszeitvertrag fortentwickelt. Die sozialen Inhalte der
loca-
tio conductio (Miete) wurden gerade wegen des Festhaltens am Darlehensbegriff nicht
bertragen. Erst wo die Spuren des alten Zins- und Wu cherverbotes im BGB statt
getilgt
zur Entwicklung einer neuen Dogmatik der sozialen Mietvertrge entwickelt wird,
finden
die sozialen Umstnde fr die rechtliche Erfassung und Begrenzung von Entgelt
(siehe
Rdl), Dauer, Zugang und Kontinuitt ihren rechtsdogmatischen Platz.
13.6 Neuere Entwicklungen
Es geht bei dieser Aufgabe nicht darum, neue Vertragsformen zu erfinden, sondern
das-
jenige, was sich tatschlich etabliert hat, der nach Josef Esser notwendigen
rechtsdog -
matischen Kontrolle zu unterwerfen, d.h. es mit den spezifisch juristischen
Mitteln einer
am Topos der Gerechtigkeit orientierten Rechtsdogmatik zu verstehen. Tatschlich
hat
sich nmlich schon ein neues Verbraucherdarlehensrecht als Geldmiete entwickelt.
Dem
freien Darlehen in der Wirtschaft trat das gezgelte Darlehen beim
Verbraucher und
Kleinunternehmen entgegen.
Schon im 19. Jahrhundert zeigte sich in 56 Nr. 6 GewO, der bis zum Erlass
des Haustr-
widerrufsgesetzes von der Rechtsprechung als Schutzgesetz i. S. des 134 BGB
interpretiert
55 Die Befreiung der Wirtschaft vom Zins findet sich in der sog. alternativen
konomie vgl. z.B. Creutz, H.
(1993) Teil II: Der Zins und andere Fehlstrukturen pp. 77-166; fr den
anthropologischen Bereich Suhr,
D. (1983); Kennedy, M./Creutz, H. (2006); Diese Literatur geht hufig auf die
Arbeiten in den zwangziger
Jahren von Gesell, S. (1991) zurck. Zu unideologischen Versuchen einer
zinssparenden Wirtschaftsweise
vgl. Godschalk, H. (1984); Reifner, U. (1997b); Reifner, U. (2010) pp. 111 ff.
56 James, H. (2003); Historische Gesellschaft der Deutschen Bank (2005); Herbst,
L. (2004); Bhr, J. (2006);
Kopper, C. (2008).
57 Im Produkt Al-Bai Bithaman Ajil erwirbt die islamische Bank in Malaysia den
finanzierten Gegenstand
selbst und gibt ihn an den Kufer weiter, Kaufpreis und zustzlich
eine Profitmarge zahlen mu. Bei
Al-Mudharabah bekommt ein Unternehmer von der BIMB Geld fr eine neue
Fabrik. Macht das Pro-
jekt Gewinn, dann wird dieser zwischen Bank und Unternehmer aufgeteilt, meist
im Verhltnis dreiig zu
siebzig. Luft es schlecht geht auch die BIMB leer aus oder verliert sogar
ihren Einsatz. Al-Ijarah entspricht
dem Leasing bei herkmmlichen Finanzhusern (nach Unknown Author (10.02.1995));
vgl. ferner Herb
(18.05.1994). Mehr Informationen ber diese Formen unter Institute of
Islamic Banking and Insurance.
URL: http://www.islamic-banking.com/default.aspx.
438
----------------------- Page 478-----------------------
wurde58 sowie in der umfangreichen Regulierung von Pfandleihe59 und

Abzahlungsge-
schften, dass die Befreiung des Darlehensvertrags von Zinsverboten um die Mitte
des 19.
Jahrhunderts verheerende soziale Auswirkungen hatte. Der Schutz der
Sozialexistenz von
Privatpersonen in den Betrieben und Wohnungen sowie der Kleingewerbetreibenden
musste
auf die Probleme der berschuldung und bervorteilung im Kredit ausgedehnt werden.
Der Massenabsatz von Mbeln und Nhmaschinen an die vom Land in
die Stadt
getriebenen Arbeiterfamilien und die Auswchse der Abzahlungsgeschfte,
Mietkufe
oder Mbelleihvertrge,60 bei denen die Kufer die vollen wucherischen Raten
schulde-
ten, whrend der im Eigentum des Kreditgebers stehende Gebrauchsgegenstand

vorent-
halten wurde, fhrte zu Reregulierungen im Industriekapitalismus der
westlichen Welt.
Nach mehreren Enqueten und zwei deutschen Juristentagen zu diesem Thema61 wurde in
Deutschland 189462 das Abzahlungsgesetz erlassen, das erst von der Rechtsprechung
und
dann 1967 ber 1a AbzG auch vom Gesetzgeber auf Gelddarlehen im verbundenen Ge-
schft erweitert wurde.63 Durch die EU-Richtlinie 87/102/EWG musste es 1990 durch
das
Verbraucherkreditgesetz ersetzt werden, das mit dem

Verbraucherkreditvertrag dessen
wirtschaftliche Begrifflichkeit bernahm.64 Die Rechtsprechung hatte parallel
hierzu aus den
Generalklauseln des 242 BGB65 (Einwendungsdurchgriff, Kndigungsschutz), 315 BGB
(Zinsanpassung), 138 Abs.1 BGB (Zinsgrenzen, verantwortliche Kreditvergabe) sowie

dem
AGB-Recht (307, 309 Nr. 5a BGB: Transparenzgebot, Verzugszinsbegrenzung) ein
mate-
rielles Verbraucherschutzrecht entwickelt, das gegenber dem Informationsmodell der
EU-
Richtlinien an die sozial schtzenden historischen Restriktionen anknpfte.
Mit der Schuldrechtsreform 200266 zeigte der nunmehr in die
gegenseitigen Kon-
sensualvertrge eingebettete Darlehensvertrag seine engen Beziehungen zu

Miet- und
58 BGH NJW 1993, 2180; ZIP 1986, 1535 jetzt aber ablehnend soweit das
Haustrwiderrufsgesetz eingreift
BGH NJW 1996, 926.
59 34 GewO; Pfandleihe-VO v. 1. 6. 1976 (BGBl. 1335); 1204 ff. BGB. Der
Gesamtumsatz der 170 privaten
Pfandleiher sowie der 6 kommunalen Pfandleihanstalten betrug 2009 530 Mio
(1998: 332 Mio.). Der
anteil am Konsumkreditvolumen hat sich daher von 0,8 % auf 0,21% verringert.
Allerdings handelt es sich
berwiegend um geldhnliche Sachen wie Gold, Juwelen, Uhren (90%).
(Zentralverband des Deutschen
Pfandkreditgewerbes e.V.; Struck, J.: Presse-Information (07.04.2010); Sddt.
Ztg. vom 22. 9. 1999, 24).
60 Hausmann, W. (1891) p. 5.
61 Vgl. die wirtschaftlich und empirisch orientierten Gutachten von Heck, Jastrow,
Wilke zum Thema Wie
ist den Mistnden, welche sich bei den Abzahlungsgeschften herausgestellt
haben, entgegenzuwirken?
Verhandlungden des 22. DJT 1892, Bd. 1 Berlin 1892; Verhandlungen des 21. DJT,
1891, Bd. 2 Berlin 1891.
62 Hire Purchase wurde in den Staaten des British Commonwealth ab Mitte des 19.
Jahrhunderts in den Sales
Acts geregelt.
63 Zur Situation bis 1990 Reifner, Verbraucherverschuldung, S. 187 ff.
64 Zur Geschichte des Konsumentenkreditrechts vgl. Reifner,
Verbraucherverschuldung, S. 116-146; Benhr,
H.-P. (1974); zur Situation in den 70ziger Jahren vgl. Reifner, U./Weitz, E. et
al. (1978).
65 Zum Entwicklung des heutigen 358 BGB vgl. Reifner Verbraucherverschuldung, S.
187 ff; Bckmann, C.
(1985).
66 Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts v. 26.11.2000 (BGBl I 2001, 3138).
439
----------------------- Page 479-----------------------
Udo Reifner
Dienstvertrag so deutlich, dass man hinter diesen drei Verhltnissen die Konturen
eines
allgemeinen Dauerschuldverhltnisses erkennen kann, dessen Grundstruktur die Miete
im Gegensatz zum Kauf ist. Dieses Dauerschuldverhltnis der Kapitalmieten teilt

durch
die Fokussierung auf den Konsum mit Arbeit und Wohnen auch die Besonderheit der
fr das BGB systemwidrigen Einbeziehung sozialer Zwecke in die zu beachtenden Mo-
tive jenseits der verkehrswesentlichen Eigenschaften des 119 Abs.2 BGB.67 Jhering,
der
meinte, trotz zutreffender Analyse dem rmischen Creditum das Darlehen unterstellen
zu knnen, sah den sozialen Zweck im Lohn, der als Geldlohn seine umfassende
formale
Bestimmheit im Egoismus des Menschen erhielt. In diesem Geldzweck war
kein Platz
dafr, dass das Geld seinerseits nur Mittel fr die Zwecke der Konsumtion war: Das
Geld
ist der wahre Apostel der Gleichheit; wo es aufs Geld ankommt, verlieren alle
socialen,
politischen, religisen, nationalen Vorurtheile und Gegenstze ihre Geltung.68
Diese Auffassung ist trotz 150 Jahren sozialer

Privatrechtsgesetzgebung auch im
Verbraucherkredit nicht aufgegeben. Im Informationsmodell des erst krzlich neu
regu-
lierten Verbraucherschutzes spielt der Konsum letztlich keine Rolle. Entscheidend
ist al-
lein, dass eine natrliche Person auftritt, die nicht gewerblich handelt. In diesem
Modell
muss der Verbraucher im Geldkredit ebenso wie bei allen anderen Waren auf dem Markt
nur ber ausreichendes Wissen verfgen, um aus dem durch Wettbewerb verbrauchernah
gestalteten Angebot sich das Passende heraus zu suchen (Informationsmodell des Ver-
braucherschutzes, 492-495 BGB). Vorschriften, die dagegen den Verbraucher sozial

vor
dem Markt und seinen Diskriminierungstendenzen schtzen sollen, finden sich immer-
hin noch in den 489, 496 ff BGB (sozialer oder marktregelnder Verbraucherschutz).
Die Rechtsprechung hat den sozialen Verbraucherschutz um den Schuldnerschutz

speziell
fr Kredite aus den Generalklauseln der 138, 242, 307, 313, 315 BGB ergnzt.
Damit
wurden die Lcken geschlossen und die Konturen eines eigenstndigen Rechtsprinzips
der verantwortlichen Kreditvergabe erkennbar. Zunchst wurde mit den

sittenwidrigen
Ratenkrediten ab 1981, der Verzugszinsbegrenzung ab 1986, den
eingeschrnkten Til-
gungsverrechnungsklauseln, dem Verbot der Haustrgeschfte sowie dem als
unzulssige
Rechtsberatung qualifizierten Umschuldungen durch Vermittler die Regeln eines
sozialen
Verbraucherschutzes gestrkt. Hhepunkt war die Einfhrung einer
Restschuldbefreiung
fr berschuldete in 286 ff Insolvenzordnung vom 5.Oktober 1994 und der dann nie-
mals umgesetzte Entwurf einer Konsumkreditrichtlinie im Jahre 2002, in dem Ver
brau-
cherschutz und berschuldungsprvention ausdrckliche Ziele waren.69 Der Entwurf
hatte
sich vom reinen Informationsmodell distanziert. Er legte (siehe Prez-

Carrillo/Gallardo)
67 Meier, A. (2003) Plam 129 Rnd 50 ff; Zur sozialen Auslegung und
der Anerkennung einer causa
consumendi vgl. Reifner, U. (1979) pp. 91 ff.
68 Kulischer, J. (1988) p. 234.
69 Reifner, U. (2009).
440
----------------------- Page 480-----------------------
Regeln fr verbundene Geschfte, Zinsgestaltung, Umschuldungen, finanzierte

Sparver-
trge u..m. vor.70
Die EU-Richtlinie 2008/48/EG, die mit Gesetz vom 29.7.200971 zur Neuordnung
des Ver-
braucherdarlehensrechts im BGB in deutsches Recht umgesetzt wurde, beruhte auf dem

im
Jahre 2004 vorgelegten Entwurf von Kommission und Parlament.72 Darin waren die ber
100
vom EU-Parlament vorgeschlagenenen Abnderungen vollstndig bernommen. Ein kom-

pletter Alternativentwurf war von einem einzigen Lobbyisten, dem Abgeordneten
Wuerme-
ling (CSU), vorgelegt und durchgesetzt worden. Pnktlich vor Beginn der Finanzkrise
sollte
der freie Markt absoluten Vorrang vor der Regulierung erhalten. Alle sozialen
Produktregu-
lierungen des ersten Entwurfs wurden aufgehoben bzw. durch Informationsrechte
ersetzt.
Mit Maximalharmonisierung wurde das Ergebnis abgesichert, wenngleich man betonte,
der
nationale Gesetzgeber knne weiterhin fr sozialen Schutz sorgen. Die
Informationspflichten
der Anbieter wurden verfnffacht (Werbung, Vertragsanbahnung (Einzelinformation
sowie
standardisiertes Informationsblatt), Vertragsangaben und Vertragsverlauf).
Die Vorschriften zum Informationsmodell (Vertragsangaben in 247 EG-
BGB und
Widerruf in 495 BGB) erfuhren eine solche Ausweitung, dass die 491a 494 BGB
nur
noch Verweisfunktion auf die Art. 245-247 EG-BGB haben. Das merkwrdige Ergebnis
ist,
dass durch diese Auslagerung das BGB sich wieder mehr auf den sozial ausgerichteten
Ver-
braucherschutz konzentrierte und die Konturen des Darlehensvertrages als
Lebenszeitvertrag
deutlicher werden lie. Allerdings ist die Regelung chaotisch. Darlehen,
Stundungskredit und
Finanzierungshilfe sowie Leasing, Ratenkredit etc. stehen wie im US-amerikanischen
Recht
case by case nebeneinander. Die Zinsvorschriften sind in den allgemeinen Teil des
Schuld-
rechts verlagert, Kndigungsschutz reduziert sich auf ein Gesprchsangebot und zwei
Raten
Rckstand. Die wissenchaftlich dogmatische Durchdringung, auf die deutsche Juristen
in Be-
zug auf das Kaufrechtsmodell des BGB so stolz sind, fehlt bei den
Dauerschuldverhltnissen
noch fast vollstndig. Gefragt ist eine kleine Interdisziplinaritt, bei der wie
hier Arbeitsrecht,
Mietrecht und Kreditrecht sich auf der historischen Grundlage der locatio conductio
zusam-
menfinden und einen gemeinsamen Platz im Schuldrecht beanspruchen.
70 Commission of the European Communities: Proposal for a Directive of the

European Parliament and of the
Council on the harmonisation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States con-
cerning credit for consumers: COM(2002) 443 final (11.09.2001); dazu Nemeth,
K./Ortner, H. (2003); die folgen-
den Entwrfe der Kommission sowie Alternativen finden sich unter European
Coalition for Responsible Credit
(ECRC). URL: http://www.verantwortliche-kreditvergabe.net/index.php?id=1915;
Reifner, U. (2009) mwNchw.
71 BGBl. I, 2355.
72 Kommission der Europischen Gemeinschaften: Genderter Vorschlag fr eine
Richtlinie des Europischen
Parlaments und des Rates zur Harmonisierung der Rechts- und
Verwaltungsvorschriften der Mitglied-
staaten ber den Verbraucherkredit, zur Aufhebung der Richtlinie
87/102/EWG und zur nderung der
Richtlinie 93/13/EWG: KOM(2004) 747 final, 2002/0222 (COD) (28.10.2004),
ergnzt in Kommission der
Europischen Gemeinschaften: Genderter Vorschlag fr eine Richtlinie
des Europischen Parlaments
und des Rates ber Verbraucherkreditvertrge und zur nderung der
Richtlinie 93/13/EWG des Rates:
KOM(2005) 483 final, 2002/0222(COD) (07.10.2005).
441
----------------------- Page 481-----------------------
Abram, Nils (2001): Der Vorschlag fr eine EU-Versicherungsrichtlinie. In:

NVersZ
(2/2001), pp. 4954.

the Draft
Aquino, Thomas de (1999): Summa theologiae. Torino3: San Paolo.
8
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14 Change of Circumstances in
Consumer Credit Contracts The
United Kingdom Experience and
a Call for the Maintenance of
Sector Specific Rules
Geraint Howells
Summary
This chapter argues that the special nature of life time contracts needs to be
taken into account.
It focuses on consumer credit contacts as one example and describes the United
Kingdoms
rules that address three distinctive aspects that require particular
attention: continuing
information duties, variation in terms and change of circumstances. It argues that
each set of
life time contracts (consumer credit, tenancy, employment) gives rise to particular
concerns
and, even if there are common concerns, different sector-specific solutions are
needed. Equally,
these issues cannot be addressed easily through general contract law principles,
though any
background law should facilitate the sector-specific solutions.
14.1 Consumers and Vulnerability
Consumers as a class are a vulnerable group.1 Leaving to one side particularly

vulnerable
consumers, all consumers are in need of protection because they are not expert
purchasers
and often have problems in assessing the value of a product and its suitability for
them.
The legal responses to this have been varied, with some placing their faith in
information
2
provision, while others are more sceptical about information and favour some
degree of
3
regulation. There is also disagreement on whether the regulation should restrict
itself to
objective aspects of the products or also take into account a products suitability
for a par-
4
ticular individual. In the consumer credit area the notion of responsible lending
has taken
1 Wilhelmsson, T. (2007), cf. Stuyck, J. (2007).

2 Grundmann, S.; Kerber, W. et al. (eds.) (2001a).
3 Howells, G. (2005).
4 Wilson, T. (2008); Ramsay, I. (2005): Taffin, J. (2009) and Fairweather, K.
(2012).
451
----------------------- Page 491-----------------------
Geraint Howells
hold (perhaps slightly after the horse has bolted) and even if, in the Consumer
Credit
5 6
Directive, it took a watered down form. In financial services more broadly,
suitability
rules and the requirement to know your customer have been developed.7
14.2 Consumer Protection and Life Time Consumer Credit Contracts
This general consumer protection need is accentuated in the context of consumer

credit
contracts. These are a form of life time contract that demand a contract law and
form
of consumer protection different from traditional spot contracts.8 Consumer credit
takes
various forms. The life (or almost life time) dimension of a mortgage
is only too well
known to many of us. Credit cards also tend to stay with us for the duration with
the run-
ning account fluctuating over time. Some credits are for shorter terms where the
issues
considered below may seem less acute, but can still arise even in, say, a typical
three-year
loan period, circumstances can change, most notably base interest rates.
Payday loans
may look more like spot contracts, where for instance a hundred pounds
is borrowed
9
for a few days; however, the practice of roll-over loans may turn even these loans
into
life time contracts. Indeed, the current regulatory attention paid to roll-over
loans may
even cause some lenders to see whether they might not be better off adopting a
running
account model.
In the consumer credit context, several special consumer protection issues
arise
due to the life time nature of the contract. First, the information obligations
need to
extend beyond the formation stage. Over the years consumers may lose documenta-
tion and they should be able to receive copies. Also, as the contract is amended,
they
need documentation informing them of changes and to be able to track when changes
were made, but also they should have a clear picture of their current commitments.
Second, the power to amend the contract needs to be constrained within

tolerable
limits. Certain changes may be so serious that they should be an excuse for the
con-
sumer to exit the agreement. Third, although the initial assessment of
creditworthi-
ness may have been undertaken, the debtors circumstances may change over time.
5 Directive 20008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council

Directive 87/102/EEC:
OJ 2008 L 133/66.
6 It is now essentially limited to assessing creditworthiness (art. 8) with
supporting rules providing database
access for creditors.
7 Pearson, G. (2010).
9 On 24 February the Office of Fair Trading announced a review of payday lending
practices mentioning, in
particular, the practice of rolling over loans.
452
----------------------- Page 492-----------------------

This requires that the creditor take steps to be aware of problems that occur and
the
consumer protection policy should provide opportunities for the consumer to extract
himself from a contract that is no longer suitable to his circumstances or be dealt

with
sympathetically if exiting the contract is not a viable strategy.
14.3 Credit, Other Life Time Contracts and General Contract Law
It is a theme of this work that similar issues arise in other life time contracts
notably
contracts of employment and tenancy agreements. However, it is the contention of
this
chapter that while similar issues affect these types of contracts, the exact form
the conse-
quences take can be different, and certainly the solutions are best adapted to the
context.
This implies different tailored solutions may need to be adapted to each type of
contract,
and it will be suggested that for the most part this is best done
through specific solu-
tions. This means both that the solutions may vary for each sector and also that
they may
be independent of any general contract law principles. There are several
commentators,
especially from the common law world, who advocate that welfarist principles should
be constrained to social contract law. The area of social contract law overlaps
with life
time contracts. There are some, notably German scholars, who see the welfarist
values of
social contract law as introduced by EU law as a way of modernising their Civil
Code,
which took as its model the spot contract of the nineteenth century in much the
same way
as the common law did.10
In our context, the Common Frame of Reference (CFR)11 is more significant
than
the Regulations for a Common European Sales Law12 as the latter is only concerned
with
cross-border sales, whereas domestic agreements are typical of life time contracts.
The
draft CFR contains a section on loan contracts,13 but this excludes consumer
credit14; nev-
ertheless, wherever possible, reference will be made to general principles. While

some see
the CFR as being too welfarist,15 others note that it has failed to address life
time contracts
adequately.16 However, it is contended that there is no need for a Civil Code or
the general
common law to address the specific aspects of life time contracts. Indeed it is
suggested
they are better dealt with by context-specific regulations. It may well be that the
general
10 Zimmermann, R. (2005).
11 See Bar, C. v./Clive, E. et al. (2009).
12 COM (2011) 635 final.
13 Book IV Part F.
14 Book IV Part F, 1:101(1)(a).
15 It has been described as a massive erosion of private autonomy which goes far
beyond existing tendencies
to materialize private laws Eidenmller, H./Faust, F. et al. (2008).
453
----------------------- Page 493-----------------------
Geraint Howells
contract law could benefit from a few more drops of welfarism,17 but the point is
that there
is no necessary correlation. The only argument advanced for why there should be
such a
connection is that these background rules have a role to play in setting the tone
for the
type of society we want.18 In other words, the more welfarist the general law, the
more
likely welfarist principles are accepted in consumer law. However, so long as

society is
willing to accept that different values might be relevant in different contexts,
there is no
reason why one cannot have a hard-nosed commercial law and a very welfarist
consumer
law. It may be more of a problem in civil law systems to take this stance, as the
Code may
set the tone for general debates, but in the common law system there are examples
of the
common law modifying its harshness when faced with consumers. This is important as
one argument why the general law needs to be made welfarist is that there will
always be
gaps in special laws where the general law acts as a default. The systems should be
flexible
enough to apply the principles with an appreciation of the context or have some
overrid-
ing rule of good faith and fairness or reasonableness that applies in the consumer
con-
text.19 Certainly, the general law of contract should not impede sector-specific
solutions
and should facilitate sector-specific solutions. In some instances, it may well be

possible to
adopt similar general approaches, but that is for another discussion.
We will consider how the UK has dealt with consumer credit contracts.
14.4 Continuing Information Duties
There are several reasons why the information duties in consumer credit contracts
need
to extend beyond the signing of the contract.20 Being a life time contract, it is
likely that
some of the terms may need to be modified over time these rules are discussed in
the
next section. However, the length of the contractual term means, at a very basic
level, that
the debtor may have lost the original agreement and/or failed to keep up with the
changed
terms. Thus, obtaining a copy of the original and current terms seems necessary.
Also,
he may need to be kept informed of the state of his account, and this will be
particularly
important when it is in arrears.
The UKs Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA), based on the Crowther Report,21 was
an early example of the extensive regulation of consumer credit so much so that

when
17 Brownsword, R. (1996).
18 Kennedy, D. (2002).
19 In the common law this general standard is actually applied in the self-
regulatory context of the Financial
Ombudsman Scheme.
20 We do not touch on the sending of information on the right of withdrawal post-
contractually as that is con-
nected to the formation process.
21 Command 4596.
454
----------------------- Page 494-----------------------

the EU adopted its first Directive on Consumer Credit22 the UK did not amend its
law in
any respect.23 This Act was supported by a multitude of Regulations. It contained
exten-
sive duties to disclose information, both pre-contractually and in the agreement,

as well
as obligations to supply copies of the agreement.24 These were already in the
original Act
and were extended to cover post-contractual information. There were different

duties for
fixed sum credit,25 running account credit26 and hire agreements.27 These
essentially al-
lowed the debtor or hirer, on payment of a small fee, to obtain a copy of the
executed
agreement together with a statement of account. In the case of running account-
credit
there was already in the 1974 Act a duty to provide a periodic statement at
intervals of no
more than twelve months.28 Where there have been variations to the original
agreement,
the case of Carey v HSBC29 confirms that in addition to the original agreement Reg.
7 of the
Consumer Credit (Cancellation Notices and Copies of Documents) Regulations
1983
requires the debtor also to be provided with copies of the notices of variation or
the agree-
ment as varied it was not sufficient only to provide the amended agreement and
not the
original. By contrast, every copy of a credit token agreement issued (i.e. when
replacement
credit card is sent out) should contain the current terms.30 The debtor or hirer
also has
a duty to inform the creditor or owner of the whereabouts of any goods kept under
his
control under the agreement.
These post-contractual information duties were enhanced by the 2006
Consumer
Credit Act.31 The duty to provide a periodic statement at least once a month was
extended
to fixed-sum credit agreements.32 Failure to provide such a statement means that
during
the period of non-compliance the creditor is not entitled to enforce the agreement
and the
debtor has no liability for interest or to pay any default sum. Debtors can also
request an
update on their account.33
The continuing duty to inform was also enhanced under the 2006 Act
in relation
to agreements that had fallen into arrears. The creditor or owner must send a
notice of
22 Directive 87/102/EEC OJ 1987 L42/48.

23 Goode suggest only one minor amendment would have been necessary, but this was
not undertaken.
24 See Part 5 of the Act and the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983, SI
1983/1553 as amended,
The Consumer Credit (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2004 as
amended; the Consumer Credit
(Cancellation Notices and Copies of Documents) Regulations 1983: SI 1983/1557.
25 S. 77 CCA.
26 S. 78 CCA.
27 S. 79 CCA.
28 S. 78(4) CCA.
29 [2009] EWHC 3417 (QB).
30 Reg. 8 Consumer Credit (Cancellation Notices and Copies of Documents)
Regulations 1983 S.I. 1983/1557.
31 See Smith, J./McCalla, S. (2006).
32 S. 77A CCA.
33 S. 77B CCA.
455
----------------------- Page 495-----------------------
Geraint Howells
arrears34; usually this will have to be sent when two payments have been missed,
but if
the payment period is a week or less this is increased to four missed payments. As
with
the failure to provide periodic statements, the sanction for non-compliances is
that the
creditor is not entitled to enforce the agreement during that period, and the
debtor has
no liability for interest or to pay any default sum. The OFT is also required to
draw up an
arrears information sheet to help debtors and hirers receiving such notices.35
Equally, it
has drawn up a default information sheet for those receiving default notices.36
Separate
from the general default notice that has to be served before action is taken
consequent to a
breach of the agreement, the creditor or owner is also now required to serve notice
of any
default sums.37 Interest on default sums, which is in any event limited to simple
interest,38
is only payable 28 days from receiving such a notice, and the agreement is not
enforceable
until any required notice is served.
It is quite clear that these continuing duties to inform are far more
extensive than
those found in the EU Consumer Credit Directive: this merely requires information
to
be provided on an ongoing basis in relation to overdrafts39 and overrunning of
current
accounts.40 Equally, the CFR excludes consumer credit contracts, and one would not
ex-
pect a general ongoing duty to inform principle to be appropriate for most

contracts. This
reveals a fundamental point in that the nature of the obligations needs to be
tailored to the
type of contract. The level of detail is inappropriate even for a general rule
aimed at life
time contracts, and the nature of the obligations is specific to the consumer
credit context.
14.5 Variations Particularly of Interest Rates
The longer the credit term, the more likely it is that the agreement will include a
power
for the creditor to vary the terms.41 The most commonly varied term is the interest
rate.
Indeed in mortgage contracts it is common for the rate to be varied upwards as well
as
downwards in line with changes in the base rate. The Consumer Credit
Act 1974 has
34 S. 86B and C CCA.

35 S. 86A. These can be found at http://www.oft.gov.uk/about-the-oft/legal-
powers/legal/cca/CCA2006/
information/;jsessionid=10271B9B4E76AFA41DB3FD874FC6D710.
36 Ibid.
37 S. 86E CCA.
38 S. 86F CCA.
39 Art. 12.
40 Art. 18.
41 If a term was varied without there being a power to do so, this would be a
breach of contract, but, unless the
other party objected, continuing with the arrangements would normally be seen
as acceptance of the change
(query whether there was any consideration for the alteration: this most often
arises in employment con-
tracts. For one case where dinner ladies did not accept new conditions of
employment see Burdett- Coutts v
Hertfordshire CC, [1984] I.R.L.R. 91; (1984) 134 NLJ 359.
456
----------------------- Page 496-----------------------

provisions that require notice in the prescribed form to be served 7 days before
any varia-
tions are effective.42 There is also a specific provision on change of interest
rates to ensure
compliance with the EU Consumer Credit Directive.43
There has also been debate as to the form the clause relating to the power to
vary in
the agreement should take. Sched. 1 para 19 of the Consumer Credit Agreements
Regula-
tions 198344 requires [a] statement indicating the circumstances in which any
variation
. . . may occur. In Lombard Tricity Finance v Paton45 the judge at first instance
had rejected
Lombards argument that the term could be altered in its absolute discretion with
notice
being the only circumstance. He concluded:
To my mind the words a statement of circumstances require a reference to
external
factors by which the debtor can judge whether the variation is being properly
executed
e.g. by reference to base rates, retail price indices or other such guide-lines as
the creditor
may choose.
This was, however, rejected by the Court of Appeal. Staughton LJ noted that
while the
draftsmen might be able to state all the possible considerations, this would be
very cum-
bersome and run contrary to the statutory ambition to group all key information
together
in one place, known as the holy ground or, as the judge preferred to call it, the
childs
guide. He noted that the alternative of holding the provision had not been
complied with,
and thereby requiring lenders to go to court every time they wished to enforce the
agree-
ment was equally unpalatable as it would cause grave disruption in the business of
the
courts. A similar issue arose in the case of Brophy v HSBC46 in relation to credit
cards,
where the 1983 Regulations required agreements for running-account credit to

contain a
term stating the credit limit or the manner in which it will be determined or that
there is
no credit limit.47 Again it had been argued that leaving it to the bank to fix the
credit limit
was not sufficiently precise to convey the manner in which it will be determined.
How-
ever, the Court of Appeal again held it was sufficiently broad to cover any
arrangements
for the determination of the credit limit that may be agreed between the parties,
including
providing for the bank to determine the credit limit from time to time at its
discretion by
notifying the debtor of its amount. It should be noted that, as the term in Brophy
was a
prescribed term if it had been found to be non-compliant, then that agreement and
most
other credit card agreements would have been found to be irredeemably
unenforceable.
Given that there is a power to vary the terms of the credit agreement at the
discretion of
the creditor simply by giving notice, the question then arises as to whether there
are any limits
42 S.82 and the Consumer Credit (Notice of Variation of Agreements) Regulations

1977, S.I. 1977 No. 328.
43 S. 78A CCA.
44 S.I. 1983/1553.
45 1989 WL 649881.
46 [2011] EWCA Civ 67; [2011] Bus. L.R. 1004; [2011] E.C.C. 14.
47 Paragraph 3 of Schedule 6.
457
----------------------- Page 497-----------------------
Geraint Howells
to the exercise of that discretion. The initial approach in Lombard Tricity Finance
v Paton was
to be very laissez-faire, noting that the power to vary was conferred in plain
terms and with
no express restrictions and no justification for any implied restrictions. The
Court of Appeal
noted that market rates of interest are known to vary from time to time and some
variation
was likely over the lifetime of the agreement. It also noted that in theory the
debtor had the
power to repay the amount outstanding, but noted that in practice he was unlikely
to have the
money to do so or to be able to borrow at less than the prevailing market rate.
Refinancing
may indeed be an option if a lender raises its rate above the prevailing market
rate, but only
for those consumers who are not in debt. These are the very ones most vulnerable to
sharp
practices in hiking loan rates. The Court of Appeal also seemed to accept the view
that com-
petition was a check on lenders if they applied the same rules to old and new
borrowers, but was
reassured by the licensing powers of the Office of Fair Trading to deal with
capricious conduct.
The Court of Appeal did not express a view on the submission that the
extortionate
credit bargains only applied to the original deal struck and not to any subsequent
varia-
tions, though this view was confirmed by subsequent case law.48 Significantly, the
unfair
relationship provisions that replace the extortionate credit bargain

provisions have no
such limitation. Unfairness can flow from the terms of the agreement, but also the
way a
creditor has exercised any of his rights or any other thing done (or not done)
either before
or after the making of the agreement.49
The Court took a different view in Paragon Finance v Nash50 as regards
controlling the
power to vary. It considered that competition arguments, the power to redeem the
mort-
gage and controls by the Director General of Fair Trading through the regulatory
process
were reasons why any implied restrictions on the right to vary interest would in
practice
be unlikely to be broken rather than reasons why there should be no such controls.
Indeed,
the need for regulatory supervision showed that there was a risk that lenders would
need
to be supervised. Indeed, the Court saw no reason why the borrower should have to
go to
the inconvenience of finding a new lender when badly treated. The Court therefore
found
it relatively easy to imply a term that the rates of interest would not be set
dishonestly, for
an improper purpose, capriciously or arbitrarily.51 The Court gave as an example of
an
48 Paragon Finance v Nash [2001] EWCA 1466 and [2002] 1 WLR 685; this was later
qualified in Broadwick
Financial Services Limited v Spencer [20002] EWC Civ 35 to the extent that
failure to disclose a policy of
how a clause would be operated (or not as in the case in question the policy
was never to vary rate dependent
on rate fluctuations).
49 S. 140A CCA.
50 [2001] EWCA 1466 and [2002] 1 WLR 685.
51 Based on the charter party case Abu Dhabi National Tanker Co v Product Star
Shipping Ltd. (No. 2) [1993]
I Lloyds Rep 397. Discretion as to whether any port shipped ordered to was
dangerous should not only be
exercised honestly and in good faith, but, having regard to the provisions of
the contract by which it is con-
ferred, it must not be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably.
458
----------------------- Page 498-----------------------
improper purpose a lender deciding to raise the rate excessively of an individual

who was
considered a nuisance. The example of a capricious reason was where a manager did
not
like the look of the debtors hair. Obviously, the former is a far more realistic
scenario than
the latter. The theme here is really discrimination against an individual borrower.
As we
shall see, the court was unwilling to intervene in commercial judgments.
The Court had more difficulty with the suggestion that the rates should not
be var-
ied unreasonably. It expressly rejected the argument that the lender
could not impose
unreasonable rates and instead developed a test based on the administrative
Wednesbury
reasonableness test52 that had been applied in the reinsurance context53 and
implied a term
that the lender would not exercise the discretion in a way no reasonable lender
would.
As the Court itself said, any variation caught by that test was likely to fall in
any event to
be viewed as being dishonest, acting for an improper purpose, capricious
or arbitrary.
Indeed, it conceded that in the instant case the rates might be considered
unreasonable as
the gap between the rate charged and that of the Halifax Building Society had
increased
from 2 to 4-5%. However, it did not intervene because the decision was made for
sound
commercial reasons. Many of the lenders borrowers had defaulted, and it was having
to
pay more to raise capital, and this had to be passed on to borrowers. The Court
noted
that the business was not a charity. Any further protection was said to be a matter
for
legislative reform. The freedom of commercial judgment was again evident in the
deci-
sion in Paragon Finance Plc v Pender.54 In any event, the lender was found to have
been
very patient with the borrower, but the Court of Appeal held that even if the
policy had
been for old borrowers to finance new borrowers, that was simply a matter of
commercial
judgment that could not be challenged.
Although there is now an implied restriction on the power to vary interest
rates, it
is narrow in scope and preserves the commercial freedom of lenders even to the
extent
of allowing the imposition of unreasonable rates. Furthermore, it was noted in the
older
case of Sterling Credit v Rahman55 that it is only a negative restriction. There is
no posi-
tive obligation to, for instance, follow falling interest rates by lowering the
rate charged
accordingly.56
The new unfair relationship rules cover the unfair variation of

terms. This still
does not resolve the normative issue of whether the courts should intervene to
control
52 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. V Wednesbury Corpn. [1948] 1 KB 223.
53 Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd (No2) [20001] 2 All ER (Comm)
299.
54 [2005] EWCA Civ 760 and [2005] 1 WLR 3412.
55 [2002] EWHC 3008 (Ch).
56 See also Broadwick Financial Services Limited v Spencer [20002] EWCA Civ 35,
where it was held that
although the policy of not amending rates should have been disclosed, this did
not affect their decision to
enter into the contract as no one would have known in which directions the
rate would move: this, of course,
makes the whole obligation completely devoid of any value as this will always
be the case.
459
----------------------- Page 499-----------------------
Geraint Howells
unreasonable rates or only when the power has been used arbitrarily. One suspects
that
the courts will continue to allow a large measure of commercial freedom. The real
dan-
ger is where some consumers are trapped with a particular lender either through a
tie-in
agreement or because their financial situations mean they are unlikely to be able
to find
alternative finance. In these situations the court should be active to counter
sharp practice.
This needs to be worked out on a case-by-case basis.
Variation is not an issue covered by the Consumer Credit Directive beyond the
re-
quirement that the borrower be informed of changes in the rate of interest.57
However,
controls on the power to vary it are one aspect of the ongoing relationship that
could pos-
sibly be formulated as a general rule and included in the CFR. Indeed, there are
some rules
in a similar vein. Hence, II 9:105 specifies that Where the price or any other
contractual
term is to be determined by one party and that partys determination is grossly
unreason-
able then, notwithstanding, any provision in the contract to the contrary, a
reasonable
price or other term is substituted. It is not clear that this applies to the
ongoing power to
determine the price, but there is no reason why it could not be read in that way.
So a clause
allowing the creditor to charge any price as set from time to time would be subject
to this
control. By contrast, where a price was set, but there was a power to vary, III
I:109 applies
and is more permissive as it allows such variations and only has a provision for
termina-
tion on notice where there is no fixed end point in the contract. The solution may
be to
amend the good faith provision so that it covers the power to determine or vary
price or
other contractual terms. As currently formulated in III I.103, the good faith and
fair deal-
ing provision in relation to obligations only covers performing an obligation, in
exercis-
ing a right to performance, in pursuing and defending a remedy for non-performance,
or in exercising a right to terminate an obligation or contractual relationship.

However,
even if there is a power to control variation of interest rates, the scope of any
such rule will
have to be worked out in the context of credit contracts, that is, whether it is
only arbitrary
controls that are restricted or whether any charge must be reasonable, thus
interfering
with commercial judgments.
14.6 Change of Circumstances
During the course of a life time contract the consumers circumstances can change
drasti-
cally so that the original contract ceases to be appropriate. This may be because
the con-
sumers circumstances improve for instance, he comes into an inheritance and no
longer
needs a loan. Sometimes circumstances just change so that the goods being bought on
57 Art. 11.
460
----------------------- Page 500-----------------------

credit are no longer needed or so important to the consumers. All too often,
though, the
problem is that the consumer falls on hard times and an agreement that was once
manage-
able to the consumer becomes problematic. It can also be that external factors also
change:
a deal that was satisfactory when struck in times of high interest rates is no
longer the best
option available in the market. In these circumstances, while there can be sympathy
with
the consumer, there also has to be a balance struck with the creditors interest in
having
struck a deal and expecting a return on it.
The Consumer Credit Act 1974 provides certain rules that can assist the
debtor to
restructure his arrangements. For example, there are rules allowing the creditor to
repay
early and obtain a rebate.58 There is debate about how fair the
repayment rules are to
debtors,59 but they do at least allow the debtor some flexibility. For instance,
this option
might be used if cheaper finance had become available. Alternatively, a debtor in

distress
who has paid a significant part of the purchase price might find it best to repay
and then
sell the goods.
The debtor may terminate a regulated hire-purchase or conditional sale
agreement
subject to his having paid at least half the total price (in addition
to any installation
charge).60 This is often not an attractive option as usually the consumer walks
away with-
out the goods, but the consumer can ask the court to be allowed to pay a lower sum
if
this would be equal to the loss the creditor suffered.61 Hire agreements can be
terminated
once the agreement has been running for eighteen months.62 The Consumer Credit (EU
Directive) Regulations 201063 introduced a provision allowing the debtor to

terminate an
open-ended consumer credit agreement.64 Hire contracts can be terminated after
eighteen
months.65
We have already come across the unfair relationship provisions. These are
often called
upon when debtors are in straitened circumstances, but in truth are only of use in
the
limited circumstances where there has been an element of unfairness. Of more
potential
use are the provisions on time orders that allow the court to reduce the amounts
and ex-
tend the time for repayment. The provisions were little used,66 partly because they
could
only be invoked after an enforcement order had been applied for or

following service
of a default notice or a notice as required under s. 76 (before taking certain
actions) or
58 Ss. 94-97A and the Consumer Credit (Early Settlement) Regulations 2004, S.I.
2004/1483.
59 See, for instance, Competition Commission, Home Credit Market Investigation
(2006) appendix 3.4.
60 Ss. 99-100 CCA.
61 S. 100(3) CCA.
62 S. 101 CCA.
63 S. I. 2010/1010, Regs 38, 99(1).
64 S. 98A CCA.
65 S. 101 CCA.
66 B. Say, Enforcement in Philpott, F. (2009) at 432-433.
461
----------------------- Page 501-----------------------
Geraint Howells
s. 98 (termination in non-default cases). A time order can now be requested when

arrears
notices have been served, and this earlier possibility of intervention should make
them
more effective. However, the number of such applications is still likely to be low
as in many
cases creditors will take a sympathetic and practical approach to short term
difficulties.
Time orders are not a panacea for all solutions as the court will balance both the
debtor
and creditor interests, but they can be of use where the debtor has temporary
difficulties
and it is foreseen that he will be able to repay at the contractual rate in the
future,67 but the
debtor must be able to make instalments at least equal to the accumulation of

interest on
accumulated arrears.68
Default notices and other similar provisions have a protective function

during the
lifetime of the contract by alerting the consumer to the actions that
will be taken and
their options for seeking protection from the court as well as in the case of
default notices
giving the debtor the opportunity to remedy the default where that is possible.
There are
also some further protections to ensure fairness even if the consumer has fallen
into ar-
rears. For example, if the debtor has paid one-third or more of the total price
under a
hire-purchase or conditional sale agreement (plus any installation charges), the
goods are
protected and can only be recovered by court order.69 Equally, the creditor can
only enter
premises to take possession with a court order.

The recent problems of overindebtedness and the impact of repossessions of
mort-
gaged property have also brought about increased procedural protection by virtue of
the
Pre-Action Protocol for Possession Claims based on Mortgage or Home
Purchase Plan
Arrears in Respect of Residential Property. This sets out the conduct the court
will expect
of lenders before they seek possession orders. It does not affect legal rights as
such, but
does require lenders to communicate with borrowers; to consider offers from the
borrower
promptly and give reasons if they do not agree to them; to treat possession
proceedings as a
last resort by considering options such as lengthening the term, capitalising
arrears or defer-
ring interest; to give 15 days notice of possession proceedings and to consider
not seeking
possession orders if funds are likely to be realised from certain sources (such as
Payment
Protection Insurance) or the borrower takes reasonable steps to market the
property.
The EU Consumer Credit Directive actually has relatively few rules
on the post-
contractual conduct of the contract. It contents itself with rules on early
repayment and
termination of open-ended credit agreements.70 The DCFR has only a few
provisions
of general application dealing with change of circumstances. For instance, its

provision
dealing expressly with change of circumstances (III 1-110) does allow for
variation or
67 Southern and District v Barnes, [1996] CCLR 621 (1995) 27 H.L.R. 691.
68 First National Bank v Syed [1991] 1 All ER 250.
69 S. 90 CCA.
70 Art. 13.
462
----------------------- Page 502-----------------------

termination of an obligation by the court. However, it is only if the obligation

becomes
onerous because of an exceptional change of circumstances, so that it would be
manifestly
unfair to hold the debtor to the obligation, that the court will intervene. The
change of cir-
cumstances must have occurred post-contractually, not have been foreseeable or one
the
debtor assumed voluntarily. The debtor must also have attempted a renegotiation.
This is
fairly similar to the English doctrine of frustration, which is very narrow in
scope, though
it should be noted that the exceptional requirement in the DCFR seems to apply only
to
the changed circumstances rather than the contract having become exceptionally
oner-
ous. However, if the contract has not become exceptionally onerous, the court might
not
consider it manifestly too unjust and therefore not be prepared to rewrite the
contract.
Some protection around the enforcement of credit contracts may be provided by the
gen-
eral provision on good faith and fair dealing; but the consumer credit context
seems best
served by specific rules.
14.7 Conclusions
This chapter fully accepts that life time contracts need special protective
provisions. It fo-
cused on three dimensions continuing information duties, variation in terms and
change
of circumstances. It outlined the extensive rules already found in the United
Kingdom to
address these issues. These are more extensive than currently found in the EU
Consumer
Credit Directive or the CFR. The impact of European regulation should not be to
impose
any less protective rules. Significantly, they also need to be tailored to the
specific context
of consumer credit. The same issues may need different solutions in areas like
employment
and landlord and tenant law. Also, while a general law may be able to address some
of the
topics, such as variation and change of circumstances, any general rules are likely
to be of
little relevance in addressing the particular scenarios that consumer credit gives
rise to.
At best it will need the development of specialist jurisprudence. Solutions
tailored to dif-
ferent contexts need to be fashioned that acknowledge the special need for
protection in
life time contracts. The general law should do nothing to impede this, but also one
might
be sceptical about the ability of a general law to provide meaningful rules that
fit each and
every life time contract.
463
----------------------- Page 503-----------------------
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Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 167186.
Taffin, Jessica (2009): Responsible Lending Laws. Essential Development or

Overreaction?
In: QUT Law Review, 9 (2/2009), pp. 280310.
Wilhelmsson, Thomas (2007): The Informed Consumer v the Vulnerable

Consumer in
European Unfair Commercial Practices Law. A Comment. In: Howells, Geraint;
Nordhausen,
Annette; Parry, Deborah L. et al. (eds.): The yearbook of consumer law 2007.
Aldershot:
Ashgate, pp. 211228.
Wilson, Therese (2008): Responsible Lending or Restrictive Lending Practices?

Balancing
Concerns Regarding Over-Indebtedness with Addressing Financial Exclusion.
In: Kelly-
Louw, Michelle; Nehf, James P.; Rott, Peter (eds.): The future of consumer credit
regula-
tion. Creative approaches to emerging problems. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 91105.
Zimmermann, Reinhard (2005): The new German law of obligations. Historical and
com-
parative perspectives . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
465
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15 The EU Consumer Credit Directive 2008
in the Light of the EuSoCo Principles
Summary
Consumer credit contracts are Social Long-Term Contracts. They are durable
agreements
(not instant contracts). They are onerous and commutative. Their construction and
interpre-
tation must take into account the position of both parties to the contract during
the lifetime of
the agreement (often a natural lifespan), as well as the purpose of the agreement
(life needs).
The dominant model for the regulation of consumer credit under the 2008 CCD is
dis-
closure. Information is put forward as the means to turn consumers into
responsible and
empowered market players, motivated and competent to make financial decisions
that en-
hance their own welfare. Financial products are so complex and fluid that few are
able to un-
derstand them well. Regulation based only on the enlightened consumer approach is
bound
to be obsolescent from birth and to lead to personal, societal and structural
risks.
When drafting the CCD, European Member States did not meet their
responsibility to
determine the degree of protection required with regard to the nature, duration and
impor-
tance of the agreement for the lives of persons affected. The CCD fully
harmonised only some
issues involved in the provision of consumer credit, while leaving others outside
its scope.
Indeed, it does not regulate most of the contract law aspects of consumer credit.
Civil and
common law principles, such as those underlining the idea of synallagma in the
contractual
relationship (error, assent, fair prices, due consideration, etc.), were not
harmonised and risk
being relegated to what will increasingly be seen as an antiquated 19th century
legal frame-
work. The CCD is not an adequate foundation for full harmonisation in the area of
consumer
credit contract law.
15.1 The Historical Environment of the Consumer Credit Directive
The present financial crisis, which has exposed the high degree of
interdependence of
the global financial markets, may strengthen the case for further harmonisation of
finan-
cial services contract law. If this is the way forward, we propose that the CCD is
modi-
fied to take into full account the core contractual principles that form a basis
for social
justice related to human needs over a human life time. Consumer credit
contracts are
a fairly recent phenomenon in European contract law. In ius commune, loans were
free
467
----------------------- Page 507-----------------------

non-synallagmatic real contracts, providing the right to the use of capital for a
unilater-
ally definable period of time. They were similar to a donation.1 Where
modern credit
relationships already existed, they appeared in the form of shares, a letter of

credit or a
rental agreement. In the 19th century, long-term credit relationships
appeared as a
normal form of industrial finance. In the late 20th century, this kind of long-term
contract
entered the consumer realm as a life time contract, as defined by the
European Social
Contracts (EuSoCo) principles. However, until the 1950s in the most developed
European
economies, consumer credit was seen as an unproductive use of savings, and such
percep-
tions continued much longer in Mediterranean countries. The Keynesian psychological
rule linked the capacity of a society for investment into its future to its ability
to save and
use savings productively whilst consumption was not seen as investment, and
consumer
credit remained highly regulated as a form of synallagmatic use of foreign capital
by
private individuals. This changed as a result of liberalisation of the economy,
which led the
EU to initiate the process of consumer regulation in this area allowing consumers
a fair
share of the resulting benefit.2
Until the end of the 1970s, controls were maintained over both
interest rates and
credit growth, as part of an anti-inflationary policy based on the control of the
money
supply. In jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Finland,
Greece or
Spain, the volume of bank lending was restricted to guarantee the stability of the
banking
system, keeping interest rates low and stable, and channelling subsidised credit to
priority
sectors, such as the government or housing. Consumer credit was not one of these
priority
sectors. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the regulatory framework governing
consumer
credit has changed at the national and European levels. At the national level the
process
developed at a different pace from one country to another. Competition in the
financial
services industry increased and financial innovation accelerated. Strict
control of con-
sumer lending was brought to an end in the United Kingdom in 1980, in France in
1987,
and in Greece in 1994.
At the turn of the millennium, financial sector reform included the
liberalisation of
international capital flows, the deregulation of domestic financial markets, the
deregula-
tion of interest rates, the removal of credit controls and the reduction of
restrictions on
banking activities. Financial deregulation contributed to the fall in household
savings and
to increased competition in the field of financial services. The restructuring of
capitalism
since the 1990s brought finance capital and credit-driven neo-liberal
individualistic eco-
nomic concepts to centre stage.
The EU Commission started to prepare its working papers on instalment credit
sales
in 1965 and issued a working paper in 1974 entitled: Draft articles proposed for
discussion
1 See the contribution of Reifner I.

2 Articles 101.3, 114.3 and 169 (updated numbers, Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Market).
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15 The EU Consumer Credit Directive 2008 in the Light of

the
EuSoCo Principles
as the basis of a proposal for a Directive relating to consumer credit. Following

various reor-
ganisations of the Commission, a final proposal was presented to the Council in
February
1979, which led to the first Consumer Credit Directive of 22 December 1986 (87/102/
EEC) with amendments in 1990 and 1998.3 This Directive primarily addressed Member
States in a general way and provided only a limited amount of directly applicable
rules
centred on the informational first part of the Directive. Its core element,
however, was
the mandate to Member States to implement rules that were intended effectively to
reach
certain goals and prevent certain results, which also subjected the information
duties to
conditions of social effectiveness. Article 10 (b), for example, demanded that,
with regard
to certain securities, Member States shall ensure that the consumer is suitably
protected
when using these instruments in those ways.
But this Directive was soon recognised as insufficient and led to
inconsistent forms of
implementation. The Commission therefore prepared a new Directive, which resembled
much more a federal law than a traditional Directive based on the subsidiarity
principle.
A number of discussion papers and empirical surveys on social problems in consumer
credit, such as the effect of intermediaries, overindebtedness and linked products,

related
to the problems of consumers. This process led to the EU Commissions pioneering
draft
4
of 2002, to which this chapter will make positive reference. The 2002 draft
surpassed the
traditional concept of the sales law model, in which a consumer makes a single
decision
at the beginning of a long-term contractual relationship as to terms and conditions
will
govern his future relationship with his bank over many years. The proposed
regulation
was built on the 1987 Directive, that had introduced the idea of a special life
time relation-
ship. In this way, the legislator took over the task of organising unforeseen
developments
during the duration of the Consumer Credit Contrats with regard to changing income,
expenditure, well-being, marital status and needs that have been omitted by the
lender in
his fine print.
Unfortunately, as a result of a parliamentary intervention driven by
lobbying,5 this
draft was withdrawn and replaced by a new draft in 2004, which was further amended
in
3 These amendments concerning the calculation of the APRC were already

consolidated with the text of the
previous versions into CCD 1987 as presented on the Website of the Commission
at EUR-Lex (see for the
original text Directives 90/88/EEC of 22 February 1990 and 98/7/EC of 16
February 1998).
European Parliament and of
the Council on the harmonisation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member
States concerning credit for consumers: COM(2002) 443 final (11.09.2001). URL:
http://europa.eu/eur-lex/
en/com/pdf/2002/com2002_0443en01.pdf. Accessed: 02.01.2013). This draft has
been the work at the EU
Commission of Jens Rink, Thierry Thibaut and Johan van Lysebettens, who were
all excluded from the 2005
version, which in turn led to the 2008/48/EC Directive.
5 For the history of the draft see Reifner, U. (2009) as well as the numerous
interventions and papers from The
European Coalition for Responsible Credit, available in English for download
under together with the vari-
ous drafts by the Commission, Parliament, and the proposals of the different
Member States in the Council.
469
----------------------- Page 509-----------------------
2005 and finally led to Directive 2008/48/EC, which has been further amended by
addi-
tional definitions contained in the Directive of November 2011.6
Developed during the neo-liberal euphoria of the years after 2002, the 2008
Directive
erased consumer protection and the prevention of overindebtedness from its
objectives
(contrary to Article 1 of the 2002 draft). It returned to the
informational approach of
1987. There was, however, an important difference. The 1987 Directive was still
aware that
consumer credit needs two forms of regulation: the informational approach of a
credit
contract and the regulatory approach for its life time relation. It therefore
opted for the
minimum harmonisation approach, which gives national legislators the right to
provide
for more protective rules. It did this also in the light of national civil law,
which provided
social consumer protection in the form of debtors protection, for which the EU
lacked
regulatory competence.
The 2008 Directive extended the informational part of CCD 1987. An
enormous
amount of detailed information on all aspects of the loan must be provided by the
creditor
or the creditors intermediary at different stages of the creation of the contract
and, in a
few instances, afterwards as well, when significant changes occur. In addition, it
contains
provisions for the termination of open-ended credit agreements, for the consumers
right
of withdrawal and for the legal consequences of the exercise of a right of
withdrawal with
regard to linked agreements concerning the supply of goods or services. It also
contains
provisions relating to the rights and obligations of the parties on early
repayment, infor-
mation about the assignment of rights and basically repeated the traditional rules
for the
calculation of the annual percentage rate of charge. However, the CCD does not
interfere
with the contractual aspects related to the validity of credit agreements, these
being left to
the general law of contract applicable in the relevant Member State. Member States
may
maintain or introduce national provisions in conformity with Community Law.
Unlike the 1987 Directive, the 2008 Directive opted for a maximum
harmonisation
approach, which allows no leeway for improvements at the national level. In fact,
it does
not even mention national law, and it claims to have reached the
maximum possible
with regard to the regulation of consumer credit. There is, however, now the
question of
whether this Directive, much criticised for information overload and
ineffectiveness,
will deliver on its promise, despite the likelihood of a favourable outcome to its
official
evaluation by the Commission for the European Parliament.
In the meantime, the credit crisis has changed the ideological landscape.7 In
the USA,
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was enacted to
overcome the crisis. It established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
to
6 2011/90/EU of 14 November 2011.

7 Reifner, U. (2010).
470
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the
EuSoCo Principles
improve the enforcement of federal consumer financial laws, and expanded the scope
for
protective regulation. It explicitly prohibits abusive acts and practices by
financial firms,
which include taking unreasonable advantage of (A) a lack of understanding on
the
part of the consumer of the material risks, costs or conditions of the product or
service; [or]
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in
selecting or using
a consumer financial product or service.8 This new prohibition represents a shift
from the
neoclassical view of consumer financial protection, which assumes that citizens can
easily
protect their own interests when costs and terms are disclosed.
Financial summits, notably those of the G20, have demanded increased
regulation
with a view to responsible credit, not only before a credit contract is concluded
but at
all stages of its lifetime. Prevention of bad debt throughout a contractual
relationship
is now an explicit goal of regulatory policies. Article 8 (2) (i) of Regulation
1093/2010
adds consumer protection to the goals of bank supervision. Common methodologies
for assessing the effect of product characteristics and distribution processes on
the finan-
cial position of institutions and on consumer protection. In its high-level
principles of
October 2011, the G20, briefed by the OECD, states that financial consumer
protection
should be an integral part of the legal, regulatory and supervisory
framework and
should reflect the diversity of national circumstances and global market and
regulatory
developments within the financial sector. (1.1) The third principle
expressly refers to
the lifetime of the long-term financial relationship between consumers and
financial
suppliers: 3. Equitable and Fair Treatment of Consumers. All financial consumers
should
be treated equitably, honestly and fairly at all stages of their relationship with
financial
service providers. Treating consumers fairly should be an integral part
of the good
governance and corporate culture of all financial services providers and
authorised
agents. Special attention should be dedicated to the needs of vulnerable groups.9
There seems now to be a broad consensus in Europe to protect individuals

against mis-
10
fortune, and to guarantee basic levels of welfare. Personal finance-
related decisions require
recognition of a susceptibility to things like misfortune, illness and ageing,
which demand
trade-offs between money and the satisfaction of long-term basic needs. The
financial crisis
evidenced the fact that irresponsible lending and borrowing practices damage
consumers,
8 12 USC 5531. This new approach, based mostly on the substance of deals
rather than disclosure, is ar-
guably the most exciting development in consumer protection since the advent
of the modern consumer
movement in the 1960s. Prior to Dodd-Frank, the 2007 Talent-Nelson Amendment
imposed price caps and
prohibitions on certain lending practices, effectively banning payday lending
to military personnel and their
families.
9 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): G20
High-Level Principles on Fi-
nancial Consumer Protection (2011) URL:
http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-markets/48892010.pdf.
Accessed: 27.08.2013.
10 Judt, T. (2005) p. 793.
471
----------------------- Page 511-----------------------
Figure 15.1 Personal bankruptcies in Spain (2005-2011)
Chart 1 - Personal bankruptcies in Spain (20052011)

350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. (Spanish Statistical Office)
lenders, the financial system and the economy generally. Indeed, the sharp rise in
default
rates (mainly in the housing mortgage markets of USA, Spain and UK ) was one of the
causes of the constraint in access to credit in some countries, which in turn

affected busi-
nesses and households and increased the problems of financial exclusion,
while at the
same time flooding the economy with cheap money. Businesses, households and home-
owners experienced enormous upheavals, and the labour markets of countries like
Spain,
Portugal and Greece were particularly severely affected.
One indicator of the extent of the damage caused by the combination of
recession
with a high level of indebtedness is the number of personal bankruptcies, which are
a
remedy for the damage, rather than the damage itself. In the following chart we
show how
this variable has evolved recently in Spain. Beyond the data shown below, our
assumption
is that there are a large number of hidden insolvencies because of a reluctance to
begin the
process of filing for bankruptcy and because of the existence in Spain of the
safety net of
social networks, based mainly on family relationships.
Today there is a wide-ranging debate about the need to protect individuals
from mis-
fortune, in particular that deriving from the impossibility of obtaining access to
the basic
means of survival. A sound consumer credit system based on legally adjusted long-
term
contractual relationships would be a firm foundation for sustainable recovery.
472
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the
EuSoCo Principles
National authorities in Spain, the UK and the USA have since passed new
consumer
credit legislation following the responsible credit principles that have been
tentatively for-
mulated in civil society.11
15.2 The Directive in the Light of the Principles of Life Time Contracts
The existing 2008 Consumer Credit Directive does not follow nearly any of the
principles
promoted by the EuSoCo Group. There had been other possible ways of regulation: The
2002 draft of the Commission was far ahead of the existing situation. Other non-
official
proposals such as the 2004 draft of the European Coalition for Responsible Credit
that
deepened on elements such as payment protection insurance and bundled endowment
credit (which are major concerns in the UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands),
offered alternatives, but they were not followed by the EU legislators.
15.2.1 Life Time and Credit
The core assumption of these principles is that consumer credit impacts

significantly on
the lives of individuals. Borrowers become debtors at the outset of a credit
relationship.
Being in debt carries a number of risks for debtors and their families, which may
result in
overindebtedness, insolvency and the enormous pressure of debt collection,
foreclosures
and wage garnishments. Already, the mere fear of these threats has an enormous
impact
on consumers lives. The impact of cancellation and default is dwarfed by the
implica-
tions of the high level of new credit generated solely in order to refinance all or
part of an
existing debt under the threat of enforcement if the unilaterally imposed
conditions are
accepted. The traditional sales law model, which assumes that consumers have
freedom
of choice, is inapplicable when the need for additional or adapted credit is so
pressing
that freedom of choice is completely removed. An estimated 60% of all consumer
credit
contracts covered by Directive 2008/48/EC are entered into under this type of
duress. The
US sub-prime crisis started because most traditional fixed-rate credit contracts
had been
transformed into variable-rate contracts, which are highly disadvantageous to
borrowers,
with the customers informed consent. Also, a huge second mortgage market had
devel-
oped in which former credit card borrowings had been turned into secured loans.
While
before 2002 governments had still mandated empirical research to investigate the
reasons
of rising overindebtedness the time after has abandoned nearly all investigations
into the
11 http://www.responsible-credit.net/index.php?id=2516.
473
----------------------- Page 513-----------------------
strategies and offers of the financial world redefining consumer detriment

as a lack of
education, skills and rationality.
There is, however, another important aspect of the life time nature of
consumer credit
contracts. In traditional secured credit, lenders require collateral12 as a means
of enforcing
recovery of a debt through foreclosure or repossession. Collateral, especially a

home used
for living, makes borrowers use all kinds of liquid assets first and saves lenders
the cost of
verifying and monitoring the borrowers creditworthiness.13 Mortgage loans cover
basic
needs, especially for housing. The existence of the mortgage, and the imminent
threat of
foreclosure and eviction, all highlight the legal aspect of the relationship
between credit
and life time needs.
Consumer credit as defined in the 2008 CCD has the appearance of being about
un-
secured loans.14 In fact, credit contracts are linked to borrowers monthly income,
which
amounts to a form of security directly affecting their ability to support

themselves and
their family. This is even true in countries that prohibit the
attachment of earnings as
being detrimental to the employment relationship, because employers are
wary of the
problems and risks involved in making payments to a creditor, with the result that
they
are reluctant to employ heavily indebted workers. Where lenders target people who
are
essentially insolvent, for example with payday loans or loans to students, they do
so on
the implicit assumption that the sometimes usuriously high interest will be repaid
from
income normally used to satisfy basic needs.15 Unsecured consumer credit is
therefore
directly linked with human lives16: with basic needs such as food, housing,
tuition, or
clothing, as well as with the acquisition of certain consumer goods and services
for meet-
ing reputational needs.
This is why information about a borrowers social status, income
and personal
circumstances also plays a crucial role when a loan is made. A bad credit-rating
limits
access to consumer credit. Human lifetime is therefore the true collateral in a
credit
relationship, mediated by the threat that part of the means of
subsistence may be
removed in the event of default. Debt collection agencies and lenders therefore use
borrowers attachment to their homes to ensure payment of the secured loan. Debt
collection practices also include threats to honour, name, pride and

reputation if,
for example, debt collectors threaten to inform neighbours and employers, to phone
12 Mann, R. J. (1997).
13 Levmore, S. (1982).
14 Appearance because collateral must be capable of liquidation, preferably -
from the lenders point of view -
and its value should appreciate over time. However, collateral is not
necessarily physical, as intellectual and
other intangible assets, including goodwill, are all regularly used as
collateral for business loans.
15 Manning, R. D. (2000).
16 Rashmi, D.-C. (2006). URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract= 939587. Accessed:
02.01.2013.
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15 The EU Consumer Credit Directive 2008 in the Light of the
EuSoCo
Principles
other family members, to write open letters, and constantly appeal to the moral
values
of the debtor in the complete absence of their own.
With linked credit, the 2008 CCD addresses another element of the life time
nature of
the consumer credit relationship. Such agreements constitute a relationship between
pur-
chased goods and the services needed for subsistence and in the life time of the
consumer.
Linked credit demonstrates that credit is no more than rental of money, in the same
way
that tenancy contracts are contracts to rent housing.
In all life time contracts, the concept of life time expresses the ultimate
social desti-
nation of the use of capital. The 2008 CCD and its predecessors as far back as 19th
century
legislation show that credit and consumption cannot be artificially separated into
uncon-
nected contracts. This began with the holder in due course doctrine and the right
to with-
hold payment if goods and services are not properly delivered. It is now regulated
under
Article 3(n) of the 2008 CCD, which expressly refers to the necessary economic
aspect
of legal distinctions that are intended to prevent circumvention by parties in a
stronger
bargaining position.
The second paragraph of Article 3(n) CCD 2008 uses economic language to
ensure
that the purpose of the regulation is achieved. It states that those two
agreements form,
from an objective point of view, a commercial unit; a commercial unit shall be
deemed to
exist where the supplier or service provider himself finances the credit for the
consumer or,
if it is financed by a third party, where the creditor uses the services of the
supplier or service
provider in connection with the conclusion or preparation of the credit agreement,
or where
the specific goods or the provision of a specific service are explicitly specified
in the credit
agreement.
This approach has now been applied to the right of withdrawal, which amounts
to
a recognition that the purpose of the loan related to the life time of the
consumers is a
crucial element of the consumer credit contract. Where the consumer exercises the
right
of withdrawal from the purchase agreement, he should therefore no longer be bound
by
the linked credit agreement.
15.2.2 Credit for Consumption or Sale?
Consumer may mean a person who consumes, so that consumer protection would mean
protection of the activity of consumption as such in a market economy. The legal
concept
of consumer may also imply that only the process in which goods and services are
pro-
vided for consumption is regulated. While a regulatory approach is necessary for
the for-
mer, because the consumption process always comes after a contract has been
concluded,
the latter only requires protection of the acquisition of the goods and services,
leaving the
risk of bad consumption to the consumer himself.
475
----------------------- Page 515-----------------------
The Consumer Credit Directives, like all EU legislation, as well as national

law, have
opted for the second approach. Article 1 of the 2008 CCD does not even give its own
defi-
nition. Article 3(a) defines a consumer as a natural person who, in transactions
covered by
this Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or
professional ac-
tivity. This negative approach indeed only defines non-consumers as traders,
business or
professionals. A consumer is then a non-non-consumer. But this definition does not
give
an answer to the question of why non-professionals need protection since the
weakness of
consumption with regard to profit-driven activities is not mentioned. On the other
hand,
the Directive restricts protection to individuals. This restriction and the
exclusion seem to
come close to what is addressed positively in the concept of life time contracts.
A general concept of consumer of credit within the context of consumer
credit con-
tracts would include borrowers who enter into a legal transaction with a business
entity,
regardless of their personal situation, and regardless of the final destination of
the bor-
rowings.17 Some recommend the inclusion of small enterprises within the definition
of
consumer,18 which has, for example, in Germany been applied to start-ups. This
formal
definition does not, however, reveal the telos of consumer credit protection needed
for an
understanding of the body of consumer protection law.
This is the rationale for adopting an alternative approach based on the final
destina-
tion of the borrowings. This recognises that the destination of the borrowings
impacts on
the nature of the contract. The consumer uses credit to satisfy private needs,
unlike busi-
nesses, who can directly compare the financial profit from the investment of the
borrowed
amount with the interest they are charged.19
A compromise position sees the consumer as the weak contracting party. The
2008
CCD excludes loans for purposes such as the acquisition of real estate20 from
protection,
while the 2002 draft retained mortgage agreements linked to housing needs
within its
scope. 21 Some countries still apply these rules. The EU has now produced a
separate draft
for mortgage loans, which to a large extent merely copies the 2008 CCD but
maintains an
important distinction where the considerable interest of the mortgage industry in
early
repayment charges is at stake.
Not only does the 2008 CCD stick to the non-non-consumer approach, it even
ex-
cludes a large number of contractual relationships from its scope, in which no
protection
17 Prez Carrillo, E. (2013). URL:

http://www.usc.es/export/sites/default/gl/servizos/cede/ESTUDIOS_
PEREZCARRILLO_DISPOSICIONESGENERALES_LEY16_2011.pdf. Accessed: 15.04.2013.
18 Petit Lavall, M. V. (1996) p. 30.
19 Martin, D. (1978).
20 Aguilar Ruiz, L. (2001): Also Consejo de Estado de Espaa: Informe 1829/2010
Sobre el Anteproyecto de
Ley de Contratos de Crdito al Consumo (21.10.2010).
21 Our interpretation, following the ECJ, judgment of 1st April 2004, Case C-
237/02 Freiburger Kommunal-
bauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co. KG v. Ludger Hofstetter and Ulrike Hofstetter
[2004] ECR I-3403,
although based on a minumum harmonisation Directive.
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the
EuSoCo Principles
is seen to be necessary. However, the CCD does not exclude the ability of Member
States
to extend such protection beyond consumers.
A theory of consumer protection that could develop the original purpose of
the CCD
and its predecessors still seems to be a long way off. It cannot be based on the
official
uniform definition of what a consumer is. This definition is empty with regard to
social
purpose, which alone can explain the vulnerability of consumers in credit
relationships as
it does in employment and tenancy relationships. In all cases their life time is
involved,
as it is in consumer credit contracts. The following overview of regulations and
problems
shows that the legislator also implicitly acknowledges that protection for
consumers in
credit relationships is essentially the protection of their and their
familys life circum-
stances from the money system.
15.2.3 Transparency and Consumer Decisions
Asymmetries in information are seen as having influenced investment decision-

making,
regulation and lending practice worldwide.22 The assumption is that incorrect
informa-
tion creates inefficiencies at both micro and macro levels in the form of under-
and over-
investment. It has also generally been assumed that this does not only explain the
poor
decisions taken by professional investors, who invest according to a financial
profit and
loss assessment of the potential opportunity, but it also explains decisions by
consumers
who take out a loan in order to satisfy basic needs. The idea of life time
contracts based on
experience in housing and employment law, however, casts doubt on such assumptions,
as legislators the world over do not share the belief that greater information
rights would
correct the social deficiencies in the housing and employment markets.23 Meanwhile,
the
fact that even big investors and entire states fully equipped with expertise have
taken ex-
tremely risky and indeed irrational decisions and incurred enormous losses makes
these
assumptions even more dubious. A whole new economic discipline of behavioural
finance
has developed to explain the patterns of human behaviour in this area which are
very dif-
ferent from the assumptions of the homo oeconomicus model. With regard to consumer
credit, the rationale behind decisions driven by urgent needs should be viewed
differently
from that governing investment decisions. And as stated above, when consumers are
re-
financing debt in the face of enforcement procedures, they are not in a position to
take
matters into account that neo-liberal theory deems crucial to a market economy.
22 Karlan, D./Zinman, J. (2009); Stiglitz, J. E./Weiss, A. (1981).

23 The average consumer does not represent the ideal of a rational market
participant. Most consumers (and
many professionals) do not understand the clauses of the contract. Even if
consumers understand the terms
they are not able to negotiate or take out a better offer from a competing
supplier. (Osovsky, A. (2012). URL:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2146659##.)
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In terms of the theory of life time contracts, regulations of the relational

aspects do
not make transparency rules superfluous. Substantive regulation, however, changes
the
function of transparency. If the outcome of a credit relationship in terms of its
impact on
the lives of borrowers is the focus of the law, transparency is not an end but a
means. If
consumers, equipped with adequate information, are in fact enabled to achieve more
so-
cially viable results in the market, information is preferable to regulation,
because it offers
more freedom to the individual and probably better adapted and more diverse
solutions
than the law is capable of providing.
In neo-liberal thinking, however, the information-based approach is the only
option.
Sociological research into overindebtedness reveals the malfunctioning of
this model,
which, especially for vulnerable consumers, becomes a means for credit providers to
shift
the blame onto the individual for not having used the information properly.24 In
effect,
transparency rules are important, and everything should be done to make it more
effec-
tive, including financial education, as described below. Its impact must, however,
be as-
sessed empirically, and the legislator must then adopt other alternatives when
information
fails to address overindebtedness.
The CCD extends the pre-contractual information requirements of Directive
87/102/EEC,
and requires its continuous repetition in advertising, pre-contractual situations,
contract
and during servicing. At the same time, being a maximum harmonisation Directive, it
limits other or greater obligations on the part of Member States for information
provi-
sion. The 2008 CCD system essentially resembles the traditional informational model
as
applied in the sales contract context to greater or lesser effect. A closer look at
the 2008
CCD shows, however, that even its neo-liberal approach contains a number of
references
to making ends meet. The information should be effective, which requires both
effec-
tive understanding by all consumer groups and the element of advice, the adequacy
or
otherwise of which may be measured by the outcome of the relationship. National law
has long since found that an extremely detrimental outcome, for example in a
refinancing
transaction, demonstrates irrefutably that faulty and insufficient advice had been
given in
the first place, which therefore automatically leads to a no-fault damages claim
against the
supplier. Duties to advise may thus have the same effect as a duty not to cause a
certain
social and detrimental outcome for the borrower.
Recital 31 of the Preamble to the 2008 CCD reminds us that, in order to
enable the
consumer to know his or her rights and obligations, the credit agreement should
con-
tain all necessary information in a clear and concise manner. According to Article
5 (6)
24 CCD 2008 does not contemplate special rules for vulnerable consumers. This may
be considered regulated
under Art 5 of the Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices, as it
allows for a distinction be-
tween the average and the vulnerable consumer. However an explicit regulation
in the CCD would be prefer-
able. See Howells, G./Micklitz, H.-W. et al. (2006).
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Principles
creditors and, where applicable, credit intermediaries have to provide adequate

explanations
to the consumer, in order to put the consumer in a position to assess whether the
proposed
credit agreement is adapted to his needs and to his financial situation, where
appropriate by
explaining the pre-contractual information to be provided [. . .] as well as the
advantages and
the disadvantages associated with the products proposed.
The bias of such information is, however, apparent in the duty to disclose the
borrow-
ing rate. The consumer must be provided with this information in advertising,
before the
contract is concluded, in the contract itself, at the pre-contractual stage and yet
again dur-
ing the contractual relationship, where changes to the variable borrowing rate and
changes
to the payments occur. Where appropriate, the relevant pre-contractual information,
as
well as the essential characteristics of the products proposed, must be explained
to the
consumer in a personalised manner so that the consumer can understand the loans
effect
on his economic situation.
This rate is an insufficient and misleading indicator that can be and often is
arbitrarily
manipulated by the supplier to mislead consumers and divert them into an
expensive
product. Banks can, for example, arbitrarily fix the compounding periods from 1
month
to up to 12 months often used in mortgage loans. Because the period in
overdrafts is
normally 3 months, and in instalment credit it is 1 month, borrowing
rates cannot be
compared. Much more important are termination fees. If a bank takes up
to 6% clos-
ing fee of the total value of the initial loan and if this fee is, as is now the
practice, even
financed, which may double its impact on the APRC, the net borrowing rate appears
quite
low notwithstanding. The whole discussion about the need for a true effective
interest rate
before the APRC became a general standard in 1998 is jeopardised by this strange
legal
obligation to provide a borrowing rate, which uses a methodology whose
mathematical
errors are demonstrated even in the examples for the APRC in the Annex of the
Directive.
Whether a right of withdrawal is beneficial for consumers and whether they
have a
chance to reflect on the contract and to shop around after conclusion of the
agreement
has not so far to our knowledge been empirically assessed. Consumer organisations
report
that, after the lengthy process of obtaining the loan, true reflection about its
effect on a
consumers life time begins at the earliest when the first instalment falls due,
but more
often when the borrower discovers that he is unable to pay subsequent instalments
and
needs help. The 2008 CCD does not refer to these issues. Instead, the EU legislator
is more
concerned with harmonisation issues, even though there are no reports that the
right to
reflect has been exercised to any significant degree in any case. The alignment of
the dura-
tion of the withdrawal period must also be seen in the context of the review of the
Con-
sumer Acquis. Article 34 of the CCD states that, in order to approximate the
procedures
for exercising the right of withdrawal in similar areas, it is necessary to make
provision for
a right of withdrawal without penalty and with no obligation to provide
justification under
conditions similar to those provided for by Directive 2002/65/EC.
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15.2.4 Financial Literacy and Financial Education
While the neo-liberal informational model has already been adapted to the
regulatory
needs of product offers, a major pillar for its survival as an autonomous
explanatory
system is the quest for financial education, often referred to as
financial capacity-
building or even financial literacy. It is education about financial concepts
undertaken
with the express intention to increase knowledge, as well as the skills,
confidence,
and motivation to use it. Financial literacy education is conducted through
classroom
teaching, self-study materials, informational websites, interactive games and the
edu-
cational component of one-on-one counselling. Programmes vary in content, audi-
ence, and methodology, but they all aim to achieve welfare-enhancing behaviour in
financial terms.
Empirical work to date demonstrates that the gains claimed of financial
literacy edu-
cation have been meagre, and some studies report a small negative effect. Financial
firms
that would lose out if the programmes were truly effective support them,
which itself
suggests that they do not work. Many evaluations of these programmes rely on
partici-
pant self-assessments of whether a course changed their own knowledge, confidence
and
behaviour.25 Furthermore, direct assistance, which often comes bundled with
education,
could be the cause of any positive outcomes rather than the education element.26
Consumers are expected not only to acquire the knowledge and skills
described
above, but also the ability to deploy them all at once. It is implausible that
financial lit-
eracy education could impart the knowledge, comprehension and skills consumers need
to do what society and the marketplace currently demand. Even when not deterred
from
decision-making, individuals sometimes lack sufficient mental resources to consider
all
the available alternatives and relevant information. People faced with
more than three
alternatives typically use simplified decision strategies to narrow their range of
choices
quickly.27 Arguably, all the financial literacy education model achieves
is to enable the
consumer to be blamed for failing to become sufficiently literate to

manage his or her
retirement savings.28
25 In one study, consumers who attended retirement-related financial classes

thought their literacy had in-
creased, but their scores on financial tests did not. Hershey, D. A./Walsh, D.
A. et al. (1998). In another study,
employees who reported at the end of a retirement-investing seminar that they
would increase their savings
generally failed to do so. Choi, J. J./Laibson, D. et al. (2006) pp. 335-337.
26 See Braucher, J. (2001).
27 Kahn, B. E./Baron, J. (1995) (citing studies).
28 Willis, L. E.: Against Financial Literacy Education: University of Pennsylvania
Law School. Public Law Re-
search Paper No. 08-10 (2008). URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105384. Accessed:
27.08.2013.
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15.2.5 Responsible Lending
Despite pre-contractual information, consumers may still need additional assistance
to decide which credit agreement, within the range of the products

offered, is most
appropriate for their needs and their financial situation. This principle has been
char-
acterised as responsible lending, and is different from the
informational approach.
Its reference point is procedural fairness, based on criteria that introduce the
concept
of responsibility in which the effect of the credit relationship on
consumers lives is
central.
In the 2002 draft, responsible lending was included as a legal obligation.29
Article
9 of the draft addresses this principle using internationally recognised

wording. The
explanation of the draft states that some Member States have a number of rules in
con-
nection with credit requiring creditors to apply caution or to act as good
creditors. This
article is intended to establish a similar principle on a European scale, not only
in the inter-
ests of all consumers or guarantors but also of all creditors. The latter are at
risk of seeing
their clients solvency diminished because their competitors subsequently conclude
credit
agreements under circumstances that seriously jeopardise the consumers or the
guaran-
tors ability to repay. But this precaution is finally reduced to an inquiry into
databases
with negative data that remain uncontrolled and can consist of a repeated inquiry
of a
consumer for a credit.
Although the 2008 CCD appears to follow this database approach, there are
signifi-
cant differences.
Recital 26 states that without prejudice to the credit risk provisions of
Directive 2006/48/EC,
creditors should bear the responsibility of checking individually the
creditworthiness of the
consumer. However, the words responsible lending have been replaced by
the words
database access in the title of Article 9 of the 2008 Directive. Responsibility
is expressly
required only in the recitals and not in the articles of the Directive,
and therefore has
no mandatory force. It has been reduced to traditional prudential rules
of bank safety
and soundness with regard to investors when lending their savings to third persons.
This
principle was implemented in Germany in Article 16 of its administrative bank
supervi-
sory law and not in civil law. This duty is new to many national legal systems,
including
Germany, the Czech Republic and the UK, and was implemented expressly only in
Belgian
29 Article 6 No 5 of the Draft Directive: Exchange of information in advance and

duty to provide advice: Pre-
contractual information. 1. Without prejudice to the application of Directive
95/46/EC, and in particular,
Article 6 thereof, the creditor and, where applicable, the credit intermediary
may request of a consumer
seeking a credit agreement, and any guarantor, only such information as is
adequate, relevant and not exces-
sive, with a view to assessing their financial situation and their ability to
repay.
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law, and even then at a much more general level. The Spanish legal system has also
recently
introduced such a duty.30
As a result of this compromise among Member States, the 2008 CCD imposes only
the obligation to ensure that, before the conclusion of the credit agreement, the
creditor
assesses the consumers creditworthiness. It fails to address the issue of
excessively risky
loans offered to vulnerable consumers. This seems to fall outside the ambit of the
CCD,
which allows Member States to take differing approaches to responsible lending.
In this way, the compromise solution adopted by the 2008 CCD jeopardises any
pros-
pect of full harmonisation in this area. It does appear, however, that as a
result of the
extreme haste with which the 2002 draft was set aside and replaced by the new draft
in
2004, the legislator overlooked the fact that responsible lending had not been
completely
removed and as a result it remains present in informational law.
Article 6 of the 2002 draft provided a general duty of advice and the
exchange of
information in advance. The supplier should seek such information as is adequate,
rel-
evant and not excessive, with a view to assessing their financial situation and
their ability
to repay. . . . 2. The creditor and, where applicable, the credit intermediary
shall provide
the consumer with all the exact and complete information needed in respect of the
credit
agreement under consideration. The consumer shall receive this information on paper
or
on another durable medium before the conclusion of the credit agreement.
This has been partly upheld in Article 5 (6) of 2008 CCD, which requires
advice by
the provider that is compliant with the life time principle of responsible lending:
providing
credit with regard to its ongoing effects on the life time of consumers.
30 Spanish Law of Sustainable Economy. 2/2011- Article 29. Responsible credit and
consumer protection in fi-
nancial services. 1. Credit institutions, before concluding the credit
agreement or loan, must assess the cred-
itworthiness of potential borrowers, on the basis of sufficient information. .
. . credit institutions will carry
out practices for responsible lending and consumer credit. These practices
will be reflected in the written
document which will be reported in a note of the annual report of activities
of the entity . . . . . . 2 .- This Law
empowers the Minister of Economy and Finance to . . .adopt rules to ensure an
adequate level of protection
for users of financial services in its relations with institutions credit,
including, in any case, measures relat-
ing to transparency in financial conditions of loans and mortgage loans and
consumer credit. These rules
have the status of rules of discipline and. . . ., may have the following
contents: Rules designed to promote
responsible practices in granting loans or credits, including : 1. Proper
attention to the income of consumers
in relation to commitments made by them to receive a loan; 2. Adequate and
independent assessment of the
real estate collateral to secure loans so as to provide mechanisms to avoid
undue influence by the entity or its
subsidiaries; 3. Consideration of different scenarios for the evolution of the
rates on variable rate loans, the
possibilities of hedging against such changes while taking into account
throughout the use of non-official
reference indexes; 4. The collection and proper documentation of relevant data
concerning the applicant; 5.
The contractual information and appropriate assistance to the consumer; 6.
Observance of the rules of data
protection.
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This duty of advice thus takes future circumstances into account and implies
that a
product must be designed not to harm the social existence of consumers. This
Article in
the 2002 draft therefore addressed the general principle of responsible lending.
Article 9
of the 2008 draft, on the other hand, confuses responsible lending with prudential
lending.
In other words, it reflects the perspective of financial investors, not the
interests of bor-
rowers. We will see below that the regulatory solutions to the core problems of
irrespon-
sible lending have in fact been excluded from the Directive.
15.2.6 Early Repayment and Amortisation Table
The prevention of overindebtedness was the major concern of the 2002 draft. This
goal
was given prominence and set out in Article 1 alongside that of consumer
protection. It
was put on an equal footing with legal harmonisation and market integration. This
did not
survive in the 2008 CCD.
In the 2008 CCD, early repayment was seen as a core instrument for addressing
prob-
lems of overindebtedness. This was already present in Article 8 of the
1987 CCD. The
wording failed to provide a clear definition of the circumstances under which this
right
could be exercised. Some countries provided time periods of up to 9 months, while
oth-
ers interpreted it as meaning that the outstanding interest and equitable part
should be
given back to the consumer. This was of course erroneous, because in a credit
relationship
a consumer is not obliged to pay interest arising when he no longer has use of the
capital.
Some countries interpreted this as allowing penalties to be charged.
In the 2002 draft, Article 16 replaced the word equitable by objective and
fair and
provided exemptions under which no charge was required. This at least left leeway
for
states that until now had forbidden any indemnity.
Article 16 of the 2008 CCD now provides for a complicated, uncertain and
lengthy
system of fees a bank may charge on early repayment. The Directive even changes
general
concepts of civil law, as it allows to demand assumed damages, leaving the consumer
with
the burden of proof that the losses claimed were not incurred, a burden that quite
clearly
is almost impossible for consumers to discharge. Providing a limit of 1%
respectively 0.5%
of the total amount encourages application of that percentage irrespective of the
losses
incurred, if indeed there were any.
In practice, this regulation has led to an increase in early repayment damages
and a
fear of repayment of a loan because of the complexity of the rules in this area.
Given the
informational concept of consumer protection, the consumer should at least be able
to
assess the future cost of repayment, but, under this regulation, such an assessment
would
require provision of an amortisation plan showing all payments and costs of credit
and re-
lated services at the time they fall due. Because liquidity lies at the heart of
any household
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budget (which is widely recognised in microeconomics, in which cash flow analysis

is ap-
plied as a substitute for balance sheet analysis), this amortisation table would be
central to
the information a bank must provide to consumers in order to comply with the
Directive.
The 2002 draft therefore provided for an obligatory amortisation plan. This
was re-
moved from the final version of the 2008 Directive. Consumers are now only entitled
to
receive such a plan after the contract has been entered into, and then only on
request. No
sanctions are provided for non-compliance with that request (Article 10 (2) (i)).
This reflects the position described above in relation to the borrowing rate.
The Direc-
tive fails even in its informational objective in that only product information is
required,
while the effect of the product on the life time of consumers need not receive any
consid-
eration at all.
This is underlined by a new confusion. Instead of the traditional distinction
between
the net and the gross amount borrowed, in which the net loan is what the consumer
re-
ceives and the gross amount is what the consumer pays, the Directive now defines
the
total amount of credit not, as one might expect, as the gross amount of the loan,
but
as the net loan and even includes finance for by-products like PPI. The gross
amount is
now called the total amount payable by the consumer. This is misleading for
consumers,
because the important element of credit is time. This dimension is excluded when
sums
owed at different dates are accumulated in one single amount. Thus, a consumer who
has
a cheap long-term loan will think that it is much more expensive than a short-term
loan.
While a true APRC in conjunction with an amortisation table would have shown that
time
is the most important element of a life time contract, they are sent back in the
direction of
the ideology of spot contracts, in which two unequal sums are exchanged, namely the
total
amount of credit against the total amount of payments (see Article 10 (2) (d)).
15.2.7 Usury and the APRC
Usury (usura) was originally a concept whose aim was to keep credit productive by
re-
ducing the right to demand interest on investments. The lenders participation in
profits
(as is still the case in company law) or compensation for the lenders losses
justified provi-
sion of something resembling rents on living items, which themselves produced
fruits
(agricultural land, labour, slaves, trees, animals). An inanimate entity, money,
fulfilled
this role. Restrictions on interest were abolished in the 19th century and replaced
with
what Roman law called laesio enormis. This principle compared value for money in
sales
contracts and voided contracts if the price was found to be excessive as compared
with
the average price.
Many countries in both the developed and developing world have interest rate
ceil-
ings on consumer credit (i.e. France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia,
Ireland,
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some Australian states, Canada, some US states, Brazil, South Africa and Japan).31
In ad-
dition, Islamic banking prohibits the taking of interest and applies a profit-
sharing model.
There is a considerable amount of literature from a range of academic perspectives
on
interest rate ceilings,32 none of which was considered in the drafting of this
Directive.
With the exception of Spain, interest rate ceilings have been widely applied
in Catho-
lic states, which also focus on substantive responsibility as opposed to procedural
fairness
in legal ethics. Their approach follows the tradition of unproductive lending, in
which
it is assumed that consumers are not able to realise a profit beyond the ceiling
imposed,
which can be as low as 8% p.a. for small business loans as in France. Germany
prohibits
interest above double the average interest rates by application of the general
principle of
good morals.
The UK and Ireland followed a different philosophy, claiming that interest
rate ceil-
ings would exclude poor customers from access to credit. Their governments failed
to take
into account empirical evidence showing that the highest exclusion rates from
ordinary
banking services existed in precisely those countries and was almost non-existent
in coun-
tries where a certain moral dimension was imposed on the market with regard to the
life
time of consumers.
At the EU level, the UK philosophy, widely shared by the European banking
industry,
prevailed. In the EUs Financial Services Action Plan, one of the stated objectives
was even
to abolish interest rate ceilings as detrimental to a unified internal market. It
may come
as a surprise that none of the EU Consumer Credit Directives, including the 2002
draft,
contained any interest rate restrictions. Even the 2008 CCD excluded this area from
its
maximum harmonisation approach and left it to the Member States.
In the meantime, a trading survey and behavioural experiment carried out in
2010 by
the UKs Office of Fair Trading, which examined the issue of consumer product
awareness,
produced a number of interesting results:
controls are necessary to address the high costs charged for short-term small
loans
the APRC is a misleading way of measuring the cost of short-term lending, and
the
APR is not the most suitable method to control credit prices.
many consumers are unaware of the high cost of certain credit products.
advice is not available for consumers experiencing difficulties with existing
debt. Due
to the small size of many high-cost loans, it is not proportionate to seek
advice through
the normal channels used for larger loans and investments, as the cost of this
will often
be similar regardless of the size of the loan. This is borne out by the fact
that less than
4% of users of high-cost credit from the survey used professional advice as
part of
their decision-making process.
31 The German Supreme Court established a de facto ceiling through its

interpretation of the BGB.
32 Ramsay, I. (2010).
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62% of high-cost credit users surveyed did not consider any other options when
taking
out their credit agreement. Only 15% said they actually considered and
investigated alter-
natives; 20% of high-cost credit users in the survey said they took less than a
few days to
decide which type of credit to use, and only 12% took more than a month to
decide.
These findings clearly indicated that the basis for application of the
informational model,
as opposed to the regulatory model of interest rate restrictions, was more
ideological than
empirical.
The neutrality of the 2008 CCD to usury ceilings is not at all evident. As all
countries
use the definition in the CCD of the Annual Percentage Rate of Charge, which must
be
disclosed on several occasions in the contract and before it is entered into as a
yardstick
for measuring the commitment taken on by the consumer, and as a means of comparison
with similar products, the definition contained in the CCD is in fact a profound
interven-
tion into social consumer protection law at the national level.
The Commission obtained several expert reports before 2000, which revealed a
num-
ber of possible circumventions with regard to the true price of credit. Payment
protection
insurance (PPI) was and remains the worst offender. Through the forced sale of high
pro-
visioned insurance where the commission flows back to the bank (kick-back), it
provided
additional interest of up to 8% p.m. not disclosed in the APRC. In addition, these
products
were specially designed to require additional financing, because the life insurance
pre-
mium for up to 12 years had to be paid up front. The UK financial authorities have
now
defined this scandal as an infringement of good advice, and fined banks billions of
pounds
for miss-selling PPI again misleading the public with their assumption that
consumers
could have acted differently if they had understood its impact.
Another form of this was endowment mortgages where, instead of amortisation of
the
loan, the repayment was channelled into a savings product in the form of endowment
insur-
ance or even investments. Lenders told borrowers that, at the end of the term of
the contract,
the accumulated savings would suffice to repay the loan or would indeed probably
exceed
that amount. Another circumvention took the form of obligatory bank accounts from
which
instalments were taken, generating additional fees not disclosed in the APRC. The
strange
legal basis for all this circumvention, which should normally have been banned
under the
general prohibition against achieving illegal objectives through the use of
products not in
themselves illegal, was that a purely economically defined interest rate
(effective, charge) was
circumvented by a legalistic separation of the cost of the product into two
different products.
In mathematical terms, this separation would not have caused a problem. In a
cash
flow approach, all payments by consumers are offset against all payments by
suppliers at
the time they fall due. This is exactly the definition set out in the Annexes to
all CCDs
since 1992. But instead of applying this simple rule, the 1998 amendment allowed
these
practices if the consumer had chosen the second product voluntarily. Only if the
second
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product was obligatory was an integrated calculation required. In fact, the expert
analysis
provided to the Commission in 1998 showed that all suppliers were inserting clauses
into
the contract, which consumers had to tick to confirm that the insurance was being
taken
out voluntarily. This excluded any legal obligation, thereby excluding provision of
an inte-
grated calculation, but such an obligation would have been impossible in any case
because
there was no form for signature before signature of the credit contract itself, and
therefore
no legal instrument creating a legal obligation to purchase a related product.
The 2002 draft had a very simple and effective solution to this. Article 12
(2) stated that
costs relating to insurance premiums shall be included in the total cost of the
credit if the insur-
ance is taken out when the credit agreement is concluded. Since in practice such
insurance,
which can be up to 16 times more expensive than life insurance not linked to the
product, is
pressed on the applicant in conjunction with the decision as to whether or not the
loan will
be granted, the simple inclusion of all services concluded at the time of the
contract was an
effective way of preventing this abuse. Insurance contracts concluded after the
loan agree-
ment then remained outside the APRC, and the distinction was clear and simple.
The 2008 CCD instead returned to the old usurious approach. Article
3 (g) states
that in particular insurance premiums, are also included if, in addition, the
conclusion of a
service contract is compulsory in order to obtain the credit or to obtain it on the
terms and
conditions marketed.
As to endowment credit, the 2002 draft would have solved all those problems
that es-
pecially arose when capital life insurance returns decreased in the 2010 period,
and many
mortgages ran into difficulty in the UK and Germany because the calculated final
amount
was not sufficient to guarantee the envisaged full amortisation of the mortgage.
Article 20 Credit agreement providing constitution of capital (Endowment

credit)
1. If payments made by the consumer do not give rise to an immediate

corresponding
amortisation of the total amount of credit, but are used to constitute
capital during
periods and under conditions laid down in the credit agreement, such
constitution
of capital shall be based on an ancillary agreement attached to the credit
agreement.
2. The ancillary agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall provide for an

uncon-
ditional guarantee of repayment of the total amount of credit drawn down. If
the
third party providing constitution of capital fails to comply with his
obligations,
the creditor shall assume the risk.
3. Payments, premiums and recurrent or non-recurrent charges payable by the
consumer under the ancillary agreement referred to in paragraph 1, together

with
interest and charges under the credit agreement, shall constitute the total
cost of
the credit. The annual percentage rate of charge and the total lending rate
shall
be calculated on the basis of the total commitment subscribed to by the
consumer.
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As a result, interest rate restrictions at the national level are also undermined
by these dis-
closure rules.33 To assume, as some banking authorities (in the UK, Spain, Italy)
seem to
do, that, with the benefit of good advice consumers who may desperately need to
refinance
outstanding loans would reject the offer of PPI is only possible if captured
situations are
ignored, as it is by neo-liberal ideology.
Another form of usurious exploitation is credit card borrowing and overdraft
credit,
which, in many countries, is the main source of credit. Interest rates for both
have skyrock-
eted even in Continental Europe. The enormous strains usurious credit card lending
has
brought to the US financial system has been apparent in the sub-prime crisis, which
was
partly triggered by the transfer of irrecoverable credit card loans into second
mortgages.
The reason why this abuse is likely has been studied in the United States,
where con-
sumers commonly used one credit card credit to pay off another (flipping). This
creates
a vicious circle, trapping consumers into situations of insolvency and aggressive
debt col-
lection, in which choice of interest rate is of no importance.
Banks in Europe have linked their credit cards to overdraft facilities,
providing some
protection from flipping because all credit cards referred to the same overdraft,
which had
a ceiling on it. If the ceiling was breached the bank would inform the consumer
that he was
in default. Limited default rates applied, but the consumer had to pay back the
debt, and no
other account could be opened because their position would be shown on existing
databases.
These banks then, encouraged by neo-liberal developments in jurisprudence,
found a
system for exceeding the overdraft limit as tempting as credit card companies had
found
the system of flipping before them. They tolerated breaches of the overdraft limit
on the
basis that they could then impose additional interest at a fixed rate of 5%, even
though
the contract provided for a variable rate. This inevitably spiralled. Unpaid
instalments on
instalment loans were debited from the overdraft even when the limit had been
reached.
This caused not only anatocism (which again was not acknowledged as such as it did
not
occur within one single contract, but arose from two separate credit agreements) as
well
as extremely high levels of additional interest.
It should have been made clear that a bank has only one choice, which is to
conclude a
credit contract and set the interest rate, whether variable or fixed, and charge
default inter-
est when consumers are unable to pay. This would have mobilised the protection all
coun-
tries had built up for consumers in default. For that reason, the 2002 draft did
not mention
exceeding overdraft limits as a specific problem and left the solutions to general
civil law.
Instead, the 2008 CCD implicitly recognised the new usurious practice of
artificially high
default interest rates when the credit limit had been reached, and under normal
circum-
stances such a situation would have been called any charges payable for default
under
Article 5 (1) (l) of the Directive. Now this default is called overrunning in
Article 18:
33 Reifner, U.; Clerc-Renaud, S. et al. (2010).
488
----------------------- Page 528-----------------------

the
EuSoCo Principles
Overrunning
1. In the case of an agreement to open a current account, where there is a
possibil-
ity that the consumer is allowed an overrun, the agreement shall contain in
addi-
tion the information referred to in Article 6(1)(e). The creditor shall in
any case
provide that information on paper or another durable medium on a regular
basis.
This information provides just the opposite of what is needed. Consumers can now be
charged much more on default than would have been allowed under civil law on the
spuri-
ous basis that an informational duty would suffice to tame usurious practice.
Not only does the 2008 CCD fail to address the exploitation of the weakest, it
implic-
itly favours contractual circumventions and thereby facilitates usurious practices.
The most striking reference to the life time character of a consumer credit
relation
had been made in Article 15 of the 2002 draft, which addresses a number of
practices
that have been established by suppliers of credit to exploit the weakness of
consumers,
especially in imposed refinancing situations like savings as deposit (a),
bundling
(b), unilateral variations of fees (c), convene unfavourable rules for the
adaptation of
the interest rate (d and 3), and finally, a very important rule that credit
contracts should
be conceived in a way that full amortisation was secured in advance in order to
prevent
artificially dependent refinancing situations at the end. (f) None of
these rules have
survived the 2002 draft in the CCD 2008.
Unfair terms
Without prejudice to the application of Directive 93/13/EEC to the agreement
as a whole, terms in a credit agreement or surety agreement shall be

regarded as
unfair if their object or effect is to:
(1) impose on the consumer, as a condition for a drawdown, a requirement to
leave as surety, in full or in part, the sums borrowed or granted, or to use

them,
in full or in part, to constitute a deposit or purchase securities or other
financial
instruments, unless the consumer obtains the same rate for such deposit,
pur-
chase or surety as the agreed annual percentage rate of charge;
(2) oblige the consumer, when concluding a credit agreement, to enter into
an-
other contract with the creditor, credit intermediary or a third party
designated
by them, unless the costs thereof are included in the total cost of the
credit;
(3) vary any contractual costs, indemnities or charges other than the
borrowing rate;
(4) introduce rules on the variability of the borrowing rate that

discriminate
against the consumer;
489
----------------------- Page 529-----------------------
(5) introduce a system involving a variable borrowing rate which does not
relate to
the net initial borrowing rate proposed when the credit agreement was
concluded
and which would exclude all forms of rebate, reduction or other advantages;
(6) oblige the consumer to use the same creditor to refinance the residual
value
and, in general, any final payment on a credit agreement for financing the
pur-
chase of movable property or a service.
15.3 Conclusions
The dominant model for regulation of consumer credit under the 2008 CCD is
disclo-
sure. Information is put forward as the means to turn consumers into
responsible and
empowered market players, motivated and competent to make financial decisions
that
increase their own welfare.
Financial products are so complex and fluid that few understand them well. Given
the
vagaries of the credit market, a losing consumers strategy cannot automatically
be char-
acterised as a direct result of irresponsibility, laziness, greed or abject
incompetence.
The CCD does not have the potential to achieve full harmonisation in the
consumer
credit area of contract law. This is primarily due to the limited scope of the
CCDs ap-
plication to loan contracts and the exclusion of contracts similar to loan
contracts from
its ambit altogether, its incomplete coverage of the core elements of the
contractual
framework for consumer credit, and a wide margin of discretion explicitly or
implicitly
granted to Member States in a number of important areas covered by it.
Within the limited scope of its application, the CCD is likely to achieve a high
level
of harmonisation in only three areas: information requirements, the calculation
of the
annual percentage rate of charge, and the exercise of the right of withdrawal. A
modest
degree of harmonisation is likely to be achieved, however, in relation to other
important
issues, such as the provision of an adequate explanation to the consumer
concerning the
proposed credit agreement and the assessment of the creditworthiness of the
consumer,
as these issues are dealt with in the CCD at a high level of generality with no
significant
attention at the EU level to implementation and enforcement in the Member
States.
As credit products have become more complex, consumers inability to
understand
them is increasingly evident, and the consequences of the difficulties involved
in un-
derstanding sophisticated financial products become more serious. In response,
poli-
cymakers have embraced disclosure as a model for regulation.
The informational model offers more apparently reasonable choices than real
control
for consumers over their own financial decisions. Instead, choice and
information
serve to transfer the burden of responsibility onto consumers, even when their
deci-
sions may have disastrous consequences.
490
----------------------- Page 530-----------------------
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----------------------- Page 534-----------------------
16 Access to Long-Term Banking Services
in the Nordic States
Frey Nybergh
Summary
In the industrialised world and in many European countries in particular, there has
been a
general trend towards marketisation. This means that the market mechanism is being
in -
troduced into social activities where it has not previously operated, or that its
role is being
increased. In the financial services industry, this has resulted in a situation
where there are
no longer any banks whose relationship with the state is subject to specific
regulation.
There has also been an intensive technological and commercial
development of elec-
tronic communication. A substantial number of daily economic chores, such as
banking, are
now handled online, as is an increasing part of communications for other purposes,
such as
entertainment and social media.
This chapter examines how the legislators have ensured access to basic
banking. As a
minimum, basic banking consists of a right to an account with payment instruments
(such
as debit cards and Internet banking) and money transmission services (electronic
payments
between accounts).
Even though a person may change service provider during his or her life time,
there is
a continuing need for the services themselves. The services are delivered through
ongoing co-
operation that needs protection from early termination. The default assessment of
the power
relationship is that the purchaser of the service is the weaker party, and that
this needs to
be reflected in legal rules governing the contracts. This includes pricing, which
must not be
disproportionate. In situations of personal economic crisis, restraint from the
imposition of
swift contractual remedies on the user is needed, as principles of social force
majeure may
be relevant.
Basic banking services are comparable with traditional infrastructure
services. People
cannot live properly without running water, electricity, telephone services and
postal services
in an information society. It is difficult to see how these services
differ qualitatively from
basic banking services. In the EU, ensuring participation in the market is a
prerequisite for
the four freedoms, and basic banking services are necessary for participation in
the market.
The Proposal of 8 May 2013 for a Directive on the comparability of fees related to
payment
accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic
features is
now a possible legislative solution that is long overdue.
495
----------------------- Page 535-----------------------
Frey Nybergh
Expressly formulated legal rules of this nature may be seen as indicative of

a new ap-
proach to the principle of freedom of contract. Without express legislation, is it
possible to
say that there is an obligation to provide services in relation to life time
contracts for services
similar to those analysed here?
16.1 Introduction1
In the industrialised world and in many European countries in particular, there has
been a
general trend towards marketisation. One form that this process has taken is
deregulation
or, in many instances, re-regulation, the reform of the public sector and
privatisation, in
other words selling off publicly owned companies. Another very significant
development
is the intensification of the use of computers in networks since the end of the
1990s. This
was made possible when both the hardware and software became user friendly.2 The
in-
troduction of smartphones and tablets has started to compete with the traditional
use of
electronic media and computers. Commerce and other kinds of human interaction are
in-
creasingly taking place through the Internet. A substantial part of daily economic
chores,
such as banking, are now handled online, as is an increasing part of communications
for
other purposes, such as entertainment and social media.
The importance of services that enable this new behaviour is increasing in
step with
these changes. This raises the question of ensuring access to these services. Many
industries
in society are considered so important and complicated that they have to be
controlled by
regulation. It is of crucial importance to choose the right model of regulation.
There is a
tradition of viewing the sales contract as a model for rules governing all other
contract
types.3 This is not a suitable model for the types of contract relevant to this
context.
These developments have informed the thinking around the characterisation of

con-
tracts for certain services as life time contracts. Several principles are
applicable to the
services in question. Even though a person may change service provider during his
or her
life time, there is a continuing need for the services themselves. The services are
delivered
through ongoing cooperation that needs protection from early termination. The
default
assessment of the power relationship is that the purchaser of the service is the
weaker
1 This is a follow-up of a paper presented at the plenary session at the 10th

International Consumer Law Con-
ference in Lima, Peru, May 46, 2005. That paper was based on my doctoral
thesis, which was published in
Swedish in September 2004. The title of the abstract in English is The right
to services in the information
and credit society A study in legal dogmatics on the access to the
infrastructure of commerce, particularly
banking services, see Nybergh, F. (2004).
2 In April 1993 the NCSA Mosaic, which was the first user-friendly Web browser,
was released. Wikipedia
(1993). URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mosaic_%28web_browser%29.
3 See Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2009), where the tradition is described.
496
----------------------- Page 536-----------------------
16 Access to Long-Term Banking Services in the Nordic

States
party, and that this needs to be reflected in legal rules governing the contracts.
The acces-
sibility of the services is critical, which is why the service provider must be
sensitive to any
issues of discrimination. This includes pricing, which must not be
disproportionate. In
situations of personal economic crisis, restraint from the imposition of swift
contractual
remedies on the user is needed, as principles of social force majeure may be
relevant.4
There are several ways in which legal regulation may ensure access to
services and
goods. At a general level, access may be ensured by industry regulation, which
amounts to
interference with the principle of freedom of trade. The licensing of operators in
a regu-
lated business sector by the supervisory authorities may be used to
secure a sufficient
level of competence and thus prevent problems such as discrimination against
prospective
customers. In short, to ensure access to the contracts in question it is necessary
to interfere
with the principle of freedom of contract.
To ensure contract formation in a specific situation there is a need for
norms of com-
pulsory contracting. This solution is used in regulation when the nature of the
business
is the provision of infrastructural services. From the consumer point of view, that
duty
equates to a right to contract.
A rule of compulsory contracting means that the party on whom the duty is
imposed
is obliged on request to enter into a contract for the sale of goods or services on
the basis
of the general terms and conditions normally applied by the business. The request
is un-
derstood in terms of the mechanism of contract formation, namely acceptance of an
offer,
seen as offered to the public by the party under the duty. The agreement is
completed at
5
the end of this course of events. Even though availability is formally secured
through the
norms of compulsory contracting, circumstances may exclude some consumers because
of price discrimination. The obligation on the industry in question to act in
accordance
with good morals may, however, limit such discrimination.
The services required for electronic commerce consist in the main of
communication
services and services delivering the physical objects being purchased. Normally,
these are
Internet connection services and postal services, even though they are also a
prerequisite
for traditional commerce. On the other hand, financial services may be seen as a
substitute
for the original, direct means of payment on the exchange of goods and services.
Banking
services are a prerequisite for all commerce, both traditional and electronic. That
is why
this chapter focuses on banking services caught by the rule of compulsory
contracting or,
from the perspective of the other side of the transaction, by the right to
contract.
4 See the Principles of Life Time Contracts of the European Social Contract Law
Group (EuSoCo) research
network in this book.
5 See the Nordic literature, e.g. Vahln, L. (1966) pp. 12 f; Kivimki, T.
M./Ylstalo, M. (1973) pp. 263 ff; Hov,
J. (1991) pp. 77 f; Adlercreutz, A. (2002) pp. 105 f; Lynge Andersen,
L./Madsen, P. B. et al. (1991) p. 22 and
Gomard, B. (1996), pp. 15 f.
497
----------------------- Page 537-----------------------
Frey Nybergh
With regard to banking services, this chapter examines how the legislators
have en-
sured access to basic banking. Is there a right to an account with payment
instruments
(such as debit cards and Internet banking) and money transmission services
(electronic
payments between accounts)? Apart from the right to access these services, the
question
arises as to whether there should be a similar right to credit in various forms
(from credit
cards to bank loans). As it is inconceivable that banks should be compelled to
provide
these services in all cases, the chapter goes on to consider the grounds on which a
bank
may refuse to provide a service.
The financial crisis that emerged in the USA in 2007 showed another side of
the role
of the banking industry. When credit is provided too readily, the problems are
quite the
opposite from when a bank declines to provide a service. For instance, the high-
pressure
selling of mortgage credit to low-income customers on a large scale is said to have
been a
major reason for the crisis that later spread to Europe.6
The focus of this chapter at a national level is on the Nordic Member States
of the EU
7
or the EEA (to which it will refer as the Nordic countries). The main focus is on
Finland
and, when relevant information is available, it draws comparisons with other
countries. It
also includes some comparisons with the USA.
Before tackling the main problematic, the chapter will set out the social
changes that
may be called marketisation and the emergence of e-commerce, or the
virtual market
place.
16.2 The Development of Marketisation and the Emergence of

E-Commerce
16.2.1 Marketisation
16.2.1.1 Motives for marketisation and the consequences of marketisation
Marketisation reforms are based on an ideological perception of society in a

particular
school of economic thought. That perception became predominant in the USA during
the 1970s and, when Reagan became president in 1981, it also became a central theme
in
his political programme. In Thatchers UK, this process began in 1979. The same
thinking
started to take root in the Nordic countries in the 1980s.
6 See Stiglitz, J. E. (2010), pp. 85 ff, where he describes some mortgage schemes
used prior to the crisis in USA.
7 The Nordic states are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. I have not
extended my research to
Iceland, because Iceland is considerably smaller (the population is about
300,000) and the language is not
readily accessible by a Swedish speaker, unlike Danish and Norwegian.
498
----------------------- Page 538-----------------------

States
The earliest reforms in the USA were a kind of deregulation of the regulated
indus-
tries. The first wave of reforms concerned flight routes, the trucking business and
long-
distance telecommunications. The second wave of the transformation, which began in
the
late 1980s, entailed the break-up of what were vertical or horizontal monopolies of
public
utilities into separate segments. As a result, segments that were not natural
monopolies
were opened up to competition.8
From a Nordic perspective it is possible to categorise marketisation in

various ways.
Some relevant examples of reforms are:
1. A public service provider is converted into a separate legal entity as a
state or munici-
pal enterprise with its own accounting but without the status of a legal
person.
2. That enterprise is transformed into a limited company, or incorporated.9
3. The original public sector owner (the state or a municipality) sells an

incorporated
company or sells shares in it to outsiders, which amounts essentially to
privatisation.10
4. The public authority starts to buy in services from the private sector for
its customers,
but retains control of the activity (contracting out).
There are more categories, but these are not relevant in this context.
From a Finnish point of view the motives for the reforms towards
marketisation have
also been seen as a criticism of the welfare state. The welfare state, it is said,
circumscribes
the freedom of individuals by intervening too much in their lives.11 During the
1980s,
when this criticism was first made, the welfare state was still expanding, but at
the same
time new marketisation reforms were being planned.12
8 See, e.g., Kearney, J. D./Merrill, T. W. (1998) pp. 1324 ff and pp. 1408 f.
They say that deregulation is an in-
exact term for the reforms and point out that the Telecommunications Act of
1996 contains over 100 pages
of new regulatory requirements and directed the Federal Communications
Commission to commence more
than a dozen rule-making proceedings, while the earliest manifestation of the
transformation, the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, was genuinely deregulatory.
9 This term is used here for the purpose of describing the situation in the
Nordic countries, where the pub-
lic utilities were not necessarily organised into any kind of company before
this change. See, however, the
description of the situation in the UK, McEldowney, J. F. (1994) pp. 376 ff,
where he describes the situation
of the nationalised industries. The major utilities such as water, gas,
electricity, transport (including rail,
bus and air), as well as the British Steel Corporation, the Post Office and
the United Kingdom Atomic En-
ergy Authority were all organised as public corporations with a wide range of
statutory powers granted by
Parliament.
10 In selling off the public utilities, it is also necessary prior to the sale to
deregulate the industry in question in
order to make it possible for a market to develop. See McEldowney, J. F.
(1994) p. 385, where he makes the
distinction between the privatisation of smaller companies that operate in an
already competitive market
and larger privatisations, which require a regulatory framework with controls.
11 See e.g. Sipponen, K. (2000) pp. 312 f.

12 Kosonen, P. (1998) pp. 179 f.
499
----------------------- Page 539-----------------------
Frey Nybergh
The advent of the economic depression of the early 1990s led decision-makers
to take
comparatively serious decisions aimed at reducing the role of welfare state in
order in turn
to reduce public spending. The end result was a permanent shrinkage of the public
sphere
and the principle of universality was called into question. Despite this,
the role of the
welfare state remained considerable.13 The marketisation effort continued, however,
and,
according to a recent report analysing the development of the welfare state after
the crisis
of the 1990s, unresolved problems remain despite the economic upturn that lasted
until
2008. Those problems include the decline in basic universal social
security, long-term
unemployment, problems relating to the care of the elderly, growing disparities in
health
in the population, and the marginalisation of immigrants.14
Beyond these direct savings in social benefits, savings have been achieved
through
restructuring of the public sphere by means of marketisation measures such as the
priva-
tisation of publicly owned companies.15
16
The obvious motive for the reforms has been to save public resources.
Another is
the attempt to increase efficiency in the service sector, including in what were
once public
sector services. This may be done by meeting customer demands in a better way, by
ar-
ranging business activity more effectively, by more competition, by more
flexibility and by
improving the prospects of development of the industry in question.17 Of the
industries
relevant to this contribution, the communications industry has shown profound

changes.
The communications industry now mostly consists of listed companies, which
are the
main sources of investment and the main actors in these markets. The intensity of
the
deregulation of this sector would not have been possible without the theoretical
work of
the economists that preceded it.18
The position of the client, or consumer, within the prevailing norms of

private law
now arises.19 Access to these services, and the private law governing the
relationship be-
tween the privatised undertaking and its customers, especially if explicit

regulation is
lacking, have become pressing issues. This question will be dealt with in a later
study.
13 Kosonen, P. (1998) pp. 351 f and 379 f.

14 Riihinen, O. (2011) pp. 140 ff.
15 See Kosonen, P. (1998) pp. 360 f. However, a far greater influence has been
achieved by making public ser-
vices more effective and by decentralising them.
16 In Finland, marketisation or privatisation have never been discussed in
parliament at a general level and,
when the state planned to sell shares in companies, the consequences for
society have not been evaluated.
The selling of shares has not been concentrated and oversight of the
privatisation process has been problem-
ridden. The only purpose has been to increase income and to increase economic
efficiency. See Eilavaara, P./
Sarja, M. (1996) pp. 493 and 495.
17 See Bergman, M. (2002) p. 44.
18 See, for example, on behalf of Sweden the departmental report Bergman, M.
(2002) p. 154.
19 See Kulla, H. (1997) p. 1091.
500
----------------------- Page 540-----------------------

States
Obviously, the reforms would benefit if these questions were addressed before
imple-
mentation. Consideration should also be given to whether and how marketisation
should
be introduced at all.20
If these questions are ignored, the legal system loses its essential
attributes of certainty
and predictability. These considerations are of fundamental importance to staff and
service
users, the very people who should benefit from the reforms.21 Evaluation of the
reforms is
needed, although it may be that it will prove impossible to adequately quantify

their effect,
and an exact evaluation may not be achievable.22 Recently, a Swedish report
concluded that
there is still room for improvement in the methods of evaluation of regulatory
changes.23
It is obvious that the marketisation referred to above has led to an increase

in private
law relationships and that private law may gain more influence as a result. From a
welfare
state perspective and from the perspective of the principles of life time
contracts, access to
services on acceptable terms is critical. In this context, there may be a need for
norms of
compulsory contracting to be imposed on certain providers in the market that offer
ser-
vices and goods formerly part of the public sector.24 Examination of the former
position of
a few providers in Finland today may shed light on these issues.
16.2.1.2 The marketisation process in the relevant sectors

The postal, communications and financial services are related to each
other in several
ways. The post and telecommunications authority in the Nordic countries was
integrated
prior to marketisation. Moreover, the Post in Finland cooperated with the state-
owned
Post and Savings Bank (Swe. Postsparbanken, Fi. Postisstpankki). Providers in
postal,
20 See Tuori, K. (1999) pp. 538 f. He sees the reform of marketisation as a

threat to the Rechtsstaat (as an execu-
tor of welfare state tasks). He takes a critical stance on reforms of
marketisation, though without a desire to
stop any motivated changes in the administrative apparatus.
21 See Niemivuo, M. (1997) p. 248, who points to questions of human rights when
marketisation reforms are
introduced.
22 See Eilavaara, P./Sarja, M. (1996) p. 76. The authors found that at the time
no evaluation procedure had been
established. See also p. 502, where they conclude that the consequences of
marketisation had therefore not
been evaluated. In Sweden there have been some attempts: See Bergman, M. (2002)
p. 35. The purpose of
this report on deregulation is stated to be to show 1) how deregulation has
been implemented, 2) what the
empirical experience of the deregulation has been, 3) the theoretical
knowledge of how regulation should
be implemented and how deregulation should be carried out within the network
industries, 4) the lessons
of the empirical experience of the various methods of deregulation of network
industries, 5) what should
be taken into consideration in order to secure the success of future reforms.
See also a later report Reger-
ingskanseliet: Liberalisering, regler och marknader: SOU 2005:04 (17.01.2005)
pp. 45 f, which concludes
that the Regulatory Reform Commission has found relatively few studies that
evaluate liberalisation to date.
They also found that the quality of parts of the data compiled on behalf of the
Commission was sometimes
deficient and that the lack of material was the greatest methodological
problem. A formal and quantitative
general equilibrium analysis of the effects of liberalisation was not possible.
Instead, the Commission made
a mainly qualitative assessment, taking into account the weakness of the
method.
23 See Statskontoret 2012:10: Utvrderingar av om-och avregleringar en
kartlggning (2012) pp. 138 ff.
24 See Wilhelmsson, T. (2001) pp. 49 ff, 57 f and 64 f.
501
----------------------- Page 541-----------------------
Frey Nybergh
communications and financial services all operate businesses relevant to e-commerce

and
the effect on them of marketisation is instructive.
In 1994, two corporations were formed out of the post and telecommunications
au-
thority. Today they are Itella Corporation (formerly Finland Post Ltd, later
referred to as
Itella) and TeliaSonera Ltd. (after the merger of the national corporations Telia
of Sweden
and Sonera of Finland).
The Finnish state owns 100% of Itella, and the states of Finland
and Sweden own
no more than 49% of TeliaSonera Ltd.25 The publicly owned element therefore does
not
amount to a majority holding of TeliaSonera Ltd, even when combined together.

Itella operates in its home market since 1991 under conditions of competition
de jure,
but not de facto. So far, there has been no competition in the postal market in
Finland,
even though the legislation preceding the new Postal Services Act (Swe. Postlag
415/2011)
made it possible. There was no take-up because the terms of the legislation were
not ac-
ceptable to any potential operator.26 The Postal Services Act contains the
provisions setting
out the operators obligations with regard to provision of a universal service in

section 16,
and the Act implements the latest Directive (2008/06/EC).27 The main provision is
that
there must be at least one post office in every municipality.28 The reason for
state owner-
ship is that the state has a strategic interest in the sector.29 This circumstance
and the fact
that the postal office was formerly part the state seem to have had some impact on
the
evaluation of the companys obligations in terms of regulation and supervision.
The interest of the state in the communications industry is that of an
investor in a
publicly listed company. The obligations of providers may therefore only be derived
from
regulation of the industry.30 The markets in this industry have been under
competition
since the 1990s.
25 Ownership by the Swedish government as a percentage of issued shares is 37.3%,

and ownership by the
Finnish government is 11.7%. See TeliaSonera. URL:
http://www.teliasonera.com/en/about-us/corporate-
governance/shareholders/.
26 On 2 March 2012 the Government licenced another provider for a local postal
service in the districts around
the municipality of Lahti.
27 European Parliament/European Council (27.02.2008).
28 On the basis of this provision the Government has promulgated a decree on the
placement of post offices
(Statsrdets frordning om placeringen av verksamhetsstllen fr post
113/2012). The distance to the office
for 82% of service users may not exceed 3 km from their place of residence,
and the distance may exceed
10 km for only 3% of users.
29 See Report: Government Resolution on State Ownership Policy (03.11.2011) Annex
1. This states that in
order to secure the strategic interests of the State it may be necessary for
the State to remain the sole owner of
a company because of its special position in a given field of activity, the
obligations to provide basic services
imposed on the company, or the general duty to provide services imposed by
law. Itella, in the field of postal
services, is mentioned as one of the most typical of such companies.
30 See the assessment in the report of the Ministry of Trade and
Industry Tapio, M.; Haapasalo, S. et al.:
Omistajaohjaustyryhmn Raportti. Kauppa- ja teollisuusministeri. Tyryhm-
ja toimikuntaraportteja.
(18.12.2003), pp. 40 and 47.
502
----------------------- Page 542-----------------------

States
The only provider in the financial industry with a history of state ownership
is the
Finnish operation of a subsidiary of Danske Bank (formerly Sampo Bank plc.) Its
banking
activities were started in 1887 by the Finnish state-owned Post and Savings Bank,
which
accepted deposits from the public at post offices. After the Second World War, the
bank-
ing function was extended to include companies and credit for housing construction.
A
significant advance was made in 1939 with the introduction of the first modern
payment
transfer system, namely the postal giro service. In 1970, the Post and Savings Bank
was re-
constituted as the Post Bank, and in 1988 its legal status was changed from that of
a public
corporation to a state-owned limited liability company. In 2000, after the state
became a
minority shareholder in the bank that had merged with Sampo Insurance Company plc.,
co-operation with Finland Post was terminated.31 That ended its role as a company
that
carried out special tasks for the state.32 Finally, Danske Bank acquired the
banking busi-
ness of Sampo plc in 2006. Sampo Bank became a part of the Danske Bank Group, which
is one of the largest financial enterprises in the Nordic region.33
There is no longer any bank with separately defined tasks in the market. The
only pos-
sible means of control is regulation of the financial industry generally.34
16.2.2 The Virtual Marketplace
The development in recent years of Internet use for e-commerce and other kinds of
com-
munication has been substantial, and expectations have grown in line with it. The
Com-
mission expects that gains brought about by reduced online prices and a wider
choice of
products and services are estimated at EUR 11.7 billion, equivalent to 0.12% of
European
GDP. Furthermore, the Commission says that if 15% of retail sales are conducted
through
e-commerce and if the obstacles to the internal market are removed, the gains for
consum-
ers might be as much as EUR 204 billion, or 1.7% of European GDP.35
31 See Danske Bank. URL: http://www.danskebank.fi/en-

fi/About/Bankinbrief/History/Pages/History.aspx.
32 See the government bill Riksdagen 2000; Halonen, T.: RP 9/2000 rd:
Regeringens proposition till Riks-
dagen om inhmtande av riksdagens samtycke till en fusion mellan Leonia Abp,
som gs av staten, och
Frskringsbolaget Sampo Abp samt till en minskning av statens andel av
aktieinnehavet i den finanskon-
cern som bildas (03.03.2000) pp. 2 f and Riksdagen 2000: RSV 42/2000 rd - RP
9/2000 (28.03.2000).
33 Danske Bank. URL: http://www.danskebank.fi/en-
fi/About/Bankinbrief/History/Pages/History.aspx.
34 See Handels- och Industriministeriet: Statsrdets principbeslut om statens
garpolitik (19.02.2004) chapter
3 and Tapio, M.; Haapasalo, S. et al: Omistajaohjaustyryhmn Raportti. Kauppa-
ja teollisuusministeri.
Tyryhm- ja toimikuntaraportteja (18.12.2003), pp. 16 f.
35 European Commission: Stimulating growth and employment: an action plan
for doubling the volume
of e-commerce in Europe by 2015: IP/12/10 (11.01.2012); European
Commission: Staff working paper:
SEC(2011) 1641 (11.01.2012), pp. 6 f.
503
----------------------- Page 543-----------------------
Frey Nybergh
E-commerce is ideal for selling immaterial goods such as software or

digitalised prod-
ucts such as music, films or pictures. Services such as financial services may also
be sold
over the Internet. One form of e-commerce is where the Internet is used solely as a
means of
communication. The distribution of goods is then carried out in the same way as
before. The
use of the Internet may simplify communication and thus make the market more
effective.
E-commerce may also give rise to new legal problems. The Act on offering
informa-
tion society services (Swe. lagen om tillhandahllande av informationssamhllets
tjnster,
458/2002) implements the eCommerce Directive.36 Services sent electronically at a
dis-
tance (section 2) are the only ones to be regulated by the Act. The Act does not
address
questions of access, and it is therefore of no interest in this discussion.
Even though the Internet forms the infrastructure of the virtual
market, it cannot
function without the traditional infrastructure. A subscription with an operator
providing
broadband access through the broadband network is needed for access to the
Internet, as are
fixed connections or mobile connections. If the object of the transaction is a
tangible object,
it is necessary for postal services to deal with the transport, be it the
traditional postal service
or a parcel-delivery service. It is obvious that financial services constitute a
crucial link in
the chain of infrastructural services needed for e-commerce. Basic banking services
are the
most sophisticated of these services. It is not possible to supply basic banking
over the Inter-
net if other services are not available, and basic banking is replacing the
traditional means of
payment both in traditional commerce and most certainly in e-commerce.37
16.3 Regulation of Access to Basic Banking
16.3.1 General Remarks on the Banking Industry
Regulation of the financial industry is different in nature from that governing

contractual
relationships. It is based on EU law. The deregulation carried out prior to the
2007 crisis in
the financial sector in the USA is now subject to an intensive effort to re-
regulate, which is
unlikely to end in the foreseeable future. The latest manifestation of this is the
report of a
High-Level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector.38
36 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain

legal aspects of information
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market
(Directive on electronic com-
merce), OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p. 1.
37 Furthermore, a new net specific payment method is evolving, such as e-payment
providers, see European
Commission: Green Paper. Towards an integrated European market for card,
internet and mobile payments:
COM(2011) 941 final (11.01.2012), pp. 3 ff.
38 There are five central recommendations. The risk of trading operations should
be ring-fenced, private inves-
tors should share some of the realised risks, there should be an adjustment in
minimum capital standards
and corporate governance should be enhanced. Liikanen, E.: High-level Expert
Group on reforming the
structure of the EU banking sector Final Report (02.10.2012).
504
----------------------- Page 544-----------------------

States
The key Directives in the banking sector are the Capital Requirements
Directives,
which comprise four Directives, concerning the taking up and pursuit of
the busi-
ness of credit institutions and on the capital adequacy of investment firms and
credit
institutions. According to article 5 of Directive 2006/48/EC, the Member States
must
prohibit persons or undertakings that are not credit institutions from carrying on
the
business of taking deposits or other repayable funds from the public. This
regulation
is based on an arrangement whereby the role of taking deposits in society has been
reserved for credit institutions. There are several reasons for this, and the
wisdom of it
has been learned from expensive mistakes in the past. However, the credit
institutions
have not been assigned this special role without special obligations that I will
come to
later on.
Furthermore, the financial crisis has profoundly changed how the role of the
finan-
cial sector is seen. In Finland, this situation had already arisen during the
depression and
financial crisis that hit the country in the early 1990s. A similar situation now
prevails in
the EU and the USA, but on an unprecedented scale, and it has not hit Finland as
hard as
the earlier crisis. There is one main fundamental change that cannot be ignored:
the role
of the public sector in relation to the financial industry has changed. Very few
financial
institutions have been allowed to fail. In many cases, it is said that the
institution is too
big to fail.39 This problem exists on both sides of the Atlantic. A very recent
Commission
staff working paper states that the unprecedented levels of state aid
and its concentra-
tion on a limited number of beneficiaries do not appear to have affected the
competitive
structure of the European financial markets. In conclusion, it states that the
governments
bail-out of financial institutions has raised serious concerns about moral
hazard.40 This
may sound like an understatement given the severity of the implications, especially
for
the larger Member States.41 The state aid that the Commission approved for the
financial
industry between 1 October 2008 and 1 October 2011 is 4506.5 billion Euros, or
36.7% of
EU GDP.42
39 See Stiglitz, J. E. (2010) pp. 81 ff on the problem in the USA. He describes

the change in regulation from the
1930s to the start of the current crisis. The Federal Deposit Insurance system
founded in 1933 was built on
regulating the risks. When this regulation in the form of Glass-Steagall Act
was repealed in 1999 two prob-
lems arose, the moral hazard effect of the deposit insurance system and the
fact that too many big banks had
become too big to fail.
40 European Commission: Staff working paper: SEC(2011) 1126 final (05.10.2011), p.
105.
41 European Commission: Staff working paper: SEC(2011) 1126 final (05.10.2011) pp.
38 ff reports that the top
three banking markets, the United Kingdom, Germany and France, accounting for
almost 60% of the EU
banking sector, also received 60% of the total amount of aid granted during the
reporting period.
42 European Commission: Report from the Commission, State Aid Scoreboard, Report
on state aid granted by
the EU Member States: COM(2011) 848 final, SEC(2011) 1487 final (01.12.2011),
pp. 8 f.
505
----------------------- Page 545-----------------------
Frey Nybergh
16.3.2 The Development of Access Regulation at EU Level
In response to the question of what services should be seen as part of the

infrastructure to
which all should have access on reasonable terms, this contribution offers the
hypothesis
that financial services have acquired the character of services of infrastructure
because of
the development of the virtual marketplace.43 This should be reflected in the
formulation
of legal norms for access to them.

Services are very significant to the economy, which is why the free movement
of ser-
vices is regulated in articles 56-62 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union
(formerly articles 49-55 of the EC Treaty, and before that articles 59-66). Of
interest here
44
are the terms imposed by EU law for exclusions from the free movement of services.
The Commission has identified the following: (i) services of general interest, (ii)
services
of general economic interest, (iii) public services and (iv) universal services.45
All except
public services are relevant in this context.

Services of general interest include market and non-market services, both of
which
the public authorities class as being of general interest and subject to specific
public ser-
vice obligations. Services of general economic interest is the term
used in article 106
(formerly article 86 of the Treaty) and refers to market services upon which the
Member
States impose specific public service obligations by virtue of a general interest
criterion.
This would apply to such things as transport networks, energy and communications.
Uni-
versal services, in particular the definition of specific universal service
obligations is a key
accompaniment to the market liberalisation of service sectors such as
telecommunica-
tions in the European Union. The definition and guarantee of universal services
ensure
the continuous accessibility and quality of established services for all users and
consum-
ers throughout the process of transition from monopoly provision to openly
competitive
markets. Universal services, within an environment of open and competitive
telecommu-
nications markets, are defined as minimum services of specified quality to which
all users
and consumers have access under specific national conditions at an affordable
price.46
The Commission has resisted including financial services in any of these
categories.47
There is no answer to the question of why there is no explicit

symmetry between the
43 See Admati, A. R./Hellwig, M. F. (2013) p. 49, where a view of economists is

presented: Demand depos-
its and the payment system that is based on them make up an important part of
the infrastructure of the
economy, akin to a system of roads.
44 See Scott, C. (2000), p. 312.
45 See European Commission (19.01.2001) Annex II, p. 20.
46 See European Commission (19.01.2001) Annex II, p. 20.
47 In May 2013, however, the Commission has submitted a proposal for a Directive
with different terms. (See
Chapter IV in the Proposal for a Directive on the comparability of fees related
to payment accounts, pay-
ment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features,
Brussels, 8.5.2013 COM(2013)
266 final, 2013/0139 (COD)).
506
----------------------- Page 546-----------------------

States
freedom of movement of services and access to services by people who are free to
move
within the Union.48 It is difficult to understand how people can move freely if
essential
facilities are not readily available within the single market.

As long ago as 1996, the Commission found that certain credit institutions
refused
to offer some banking services such as current account and credit card to non-
residents.
According to the Commission, at the time, Community Law could not oblige financial
institutions to accept clients, be they national or foreign, since contractual

freedom is an
essential principle of contract law.49 This statement was not, however, based on
any in-
depth analysis of the concept of freedom of contract.

Later on, the Commission did communicate that it supports efforts to improve
ac-
cess at the national level and that it recognises that private companies are free
to decide
with whom to do business, provided that the exercise of this freedom does not give
rise
to anti-competitive behaviour.50 Surprisingly, the Commission left the question of
access
at that, even though the problem is fundamental to the freedom of movement of EU

citi-
zens within the common labour market. The Commission, however, said that there are
genuine commercial reasons for financial service providers not to sell their
services to
non-residents, such as potentially disproportionate costs to the seller, or the
lack of a dis-
tribution network or the need to appoint a fiscal representative. Crucially,
however, the
Commission stated that access to a bank account is one of the primary needs of
life, akin
to electricity or telephone, and that there are still many European citizens who
are not able
to obtain a bank account or any other financial services.51
No reason has been given as to why the Commission did not take further action
fol-
lowing these statements in relation to financial services, for example in
connection with
their potential status as a service of general interest. In a subsequent series of
reports on the
financial industry, reference to the problem of access to financial services was
omitted.52 An
exception was the personal standpoint of the then director of Directorate A
Consumer
Policy at, Directorate-General XXIV, Marina Manfredi, who said that basic
banking is
comparable with public utilities and asked whether it is not time to see basic
banking as
one of the services of general interest.53
It is surprising that, after the continuing financial crisis hit

Europe, the Commis-
sion until May 2013 did not deem it appropriate to impose mandatory regulation in
this
48 See Drexl, J. (2002) pp. 565 f, who advocates that fundamental freedoms should
be included in an evaluation
of the European contract law and p. 567, where he talks about a balance between
rights.
49 See COM(96) 209 final (22.05.1996), p. 8.
50 See COM(97) 309 final pp. 7 f.
51 See COM(96) 209 final (22.05.1996), pp. 7 f.
52 See the reports starting with Communication of the Commission, Commission of
the European Communi-
ties: Financial Services: Building a Framework for action to the Financial
Services, 03.12.2002 (28.10.1998).
53 See the EU Conference (09.03.1999). See also Nogler, L./Reifner, U. (2009), p.
455.
507
----------------------- Page 547-----------------------
Frey Nybergh
area. The traditional public utilities such as post and telecommunications services
are now
available in formally competitive markets. Financial services have been available
in a more
or less competitive market for a long time. The difference from the regulatory
point of
view between the industries has diminished, and these services are the most
important
infrastructural services for e-commerce.
Emerging e-commerce as part of the information society has been a
hot topic for
the Commission for some time.54 There have been other signs of
reorientation within
the European Union as well.55 Despite this there was no sign of a change in the
status of
financial services in the Green Paper on services of general interest.56 In 2011
the Com-
mission settled for a Recommendation to Member States on access to a basic payment

ac-
count. The Recommendation sets out the fundamental principles to be put in place at
the
national level to guarantee access to suitable payment services.57 The data of a
follow-up
report revealed that the Recommendation had not been adequately implemented.58
It is unclear where the Commission really stood in this matter. It has the
objective to
transform the EU into a competitive and dynamic economy. To achieve this goal,
access to
the Internet is essential. And what is the point of access to the Internet if there
is no cor-
responding access to payment systems?
54 See eEurope 2002; Commission of the European Communities 2000 An Information

Society For All Action
Plan prepared by the Council and the European Commission for the Feira
European Council 19-20 June
2000 pp. 3, 5 and 19 and: Communication from the Commission to the Council,
the European Parliament,
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: COM(2002)
263 final (28.05.2002)
pp. 6 f. The latter plan states that this action plan will succeed the eEurope
2002 action plan endorsed by
the Feira European Council in June 2000 and that many of the eEurope 2002
objectives have already been
achieved and the remainder would largely be completed by the end of that year.
In eEurope 2005 new objec-
tives are based on the new opportunities enabled by new broadband technology.
55 See Consumer Committee: Elaborating the Universial Service Concept in the
Services of General Interest
A Consumer Committee position paper (06.12.1999) Section 2.3. There is also
a strong case to apply the
universal service concept to other general interest services that are
presently outside the definition. One im-
portant example here is: certain banking services (such as access to an
account) are increasingly considered
essential to economic participation. See also the European Commission
(13.03.2001), p. 4 at II. Objectives
section 1.2. Facilitating access to resources, rights, goods and services for
all. . . (d) to develop, for the
benefit of people at risk of exclusion, services and accompanying measures
which will allow them effective
access to education, justice and other public and private services (italics by
FN). . . See further section 4. To
mobilise all relevant bodies . . . (c) To promote dialogue and partnership
between all relevant bodies, public
and private, for example: . . . by fostering the social responsibility of
business. (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
health_consumer/events/event17w1b_en.html).
56 See Commission of the European Communities: Green Paper on Services of General
Interest: COM(2003)
270 final (21.05.2003), pp. 6 f.
57 European Commission (21.07.2011).
58 See European Commission staff working document impact assessment, Brussels,
8.5.2013 SWD(2013) 164
final, p. 12.
508
----------------------- Page 548-----------------------

States
It is often argued that there is no real problem with access. This is
difficult to verify,
because people denied services during the severe depression in Finland in the 1990s
did not
have the means of dealing with the problem effectively. The objective that all
should be able
to transact by means of the Internet cannot be fully met if this discrepancy is
left unaddressed
at the EU level. It is noteworthy in a global context that some EU Member States,
and the
Nordic states specifically, moved some time ago to specific basic banking
provisions.59 These
legislative measures show what might be expected of legislation at the EU level.60
In the Rec-
ommendation, Member States were invited to take the necessary measures to ensure
the ap-
plication of the Recommendation within 6 months of publication. In 2012, a factual
overview
of the measures in place in Member States was published, which assesses the extent
to which
Member States have complied with the Recommendation. Three aspects are considered
in the
review: (i) the right to open and use an account, (ii) the features of the account
and (iii) the as-
sociated charges.61 These features are to be found to a varying degree in the
Nordic countries.
Finally, on 8 May 2013, the proposal for a Directive on the comparability of

fees re-
lated to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts
was published and subsequently submitted to Parliament. Articles 14-19 of Chapter

IV
contain detailed regulation as to access to payment accounts.62 The explanatory
memoran-
dum of the proposal states that the features of basic payment accounts should be
expanded
compared with those contained in the Recommendation. It proposes that internet
bank-
ing and online purchasing should be included as basic services, as this will
improve the
availability, accessibility and affordability of basic payment services. It is
expected that this
will substantially reduce consumer detriment, enhance financial and social
inclusion and
consumer confidence, encourage cross-border mobility and promote full participation
by
the greatest possible number of consumers in the internal market.63
59 Prior to the adoption of the Recommendation of 2011 a similar legal framework

had been adopted in Bel-
gium and France. See European Commission staff working document impact
assessment, Brussels, 8.5.2013
SWD(2013) 164 final p. 13.
60 See European Parliament 20092014: Committee on the Internal Market
and Consumer Protection
(28.10.2011) The Committee put forward argumentation along the same lines as
this paper. The conclusion
states that the Recommendation sets a series of principles as guidance for
possible forthcoming legislation
on access to a basic payment account. However, any forthcoming legislative
instrument in this matter must
be understood within the wider framework of consumer protection standards in
financial services, which is
currently being revised and strengthened at the global level as a growing and
increasingly important part of
regulatory and supervisory legislation.
61 See European Commission: Staff Working Document: SWD(2012) 249 final
(22.08.2012).
62 In the Draft report European Parliament 20092014: Committee on
Economic and Monetary Affairs
2013/0139(COD): COM(2013)0266, C7-0125/2013, 2013/0139(COD) (26.06.2013) also
these articles are
amended.
63 See European Commission: Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the
comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching
and access to payment ac-
counts with basic features: COM(2013) 266 final, 2013/0139 (COD) (08.05.2013)
p. 8.
509
----------------------- Page 549-----------------------
Frey Nybergh
16.3.3 Regulation of Access to Basic Banking in the Nordic Countries
The actors on the market in the Nordic countries, both banks and their customers,
have
accepted the new technological solutions to a very large extent. The
actual activity in
the industry as well as the standard of the regulation has been progressive by
interna-
tional standards when it comes to developing the economic life to function
electronically.
Already in 1999, the total value of card transactions in Finland was larger than
in Aus-
tria, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal. These are in absolute numbers and
the
activity would appear more intensive if the numbers were compared per capita.64
About
10 years later the situation had not changed very much. The annual (2009) number of
card
transactions per capita in Sweden, Denmark and Finland was the highest in EU (182,
180
and 172).65
16.3.3.1 Denmark
In Denmark the financial industry has recently been regulated anew with a new act
on
financial business (lov om finansiel virksomhed).66 The Danish act
regulates credit in-
stitutions, insurance, stockbrokers and pension societies.67 For all these
businesses there
is the same stipulation in section 43 that they are to be carried out with
complying with
good morals and by following good business custom for the activity in question.68
For the
banks this was nothing new because it is the same requirement as was already the
case in
the act from 1974.69 The provision had been introduced with the motivation that
banking
played a central role in the economy of the society as a broker and distributor of
the capital
resources in society. It is therefore important to support the trust to the
business in this
industry. It is crucial for the industry that there is an explicit provision
demanding that the
business comply with this standard. The Danish standpoint was that it was not
possible to
64 See the annexes in the Commission decision of 9 August 2001 relating to a

proceeding under Article 81
of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case No COMP/29.373
Visa International). See
also SOU 2000:11 p. 176 f. figure 8.4 on the situation 1997. According to it
Finland has the largest share of
electronic payments and the smallest share of cash in circulation with regard
to GNP. The payment system of
Finland had therefore been the most developed payment system to which only
Denmark and Sweden were
close.
65 European Commission: Green Paper. Towards an integrated European market for
card, internet and mobile
payments: COM(2011) 941 final (11.01.2012) Annex I, Table 1, pp. 22 f.
66 See bekendtgrelse. nr. 885 af 08/08/2011.
67 See the preparatory works of the first act with this scope Forslag 200001 L
165, under the subtitle Almin-
delige bemrkninger.
68 In Danish: 43 . . .drives i overenstemmelse med redelig
forretningsskik og god praksis inden for
virksomhedsomrdet.
69 See 1 6 stk. bank- og sparkasseloven.
510
----------------------- Page 550-----------------------

States
set a more exact content to the provision, but that the content should be open to
develop-
ment along the way (m vare underkastet en lbende tilpasning).70
There is also the Marketing Practices Act (markedsfringsloven), and the

Consumer
Ombudsman (Forbrugerombudsmanden) has found that the general clause in section 1
is to be applied when a bank makes contracts to open an account. A bank had
required
to get to see an inquest of the latest taxation (slutopgrelse fra skattevsenet)
when a
consumer wanted to open a current bank account for receiving payments of wages. The
consumer did not comply with the request because he or she could not see the point
that
the bank is allowed to be able to control the creditworthiness of the customers
when it is
a question of a current account for receiving of deposits without any possibility
to credit.
The Consumer Ombudsman referred to the notion of the necessity to be able to open
an
account in the society of today. Otherwise daily life would become too burdensome.
He
also said that the position of the banks in society is such that it follows an
obligation to
cooperate to facilitate life. By referring to these arguments he concluded that it
was not
in accordance with section 1 for the banks to require the inquest of the latest
taxation to
open an account.71
In section 43 subsection 2 in the act on financial business it is prescribed

that the
minister of economy and trade sets the detailed rules on good morals and good
business
custom. Subsequently the decree on good morals for financial businesses has been
given,72
and according to section 19, a credit institution may not without individualised
and per-
tinent reason refuse to open a current account for receiving deposits. The reason
must,
when asked for, be given in writing or in some other lasting media.73
The provision is not particularly wide when the obligation is restricted to a

current
account. Otherwise the formulation is normal in the sense that the bank is obliged
to give
its denial in writing and with an individualised and pertinent reason.
The Banking Supervisory Authority has published a further instruction to the
de-
cree.74 According to the preamble of the instruction, the status of the decree is
that of a
public law regulation. The same applies to the act itself, and in this sense it is
a question of
what the society demands of the financial businesses so that they will comply with
good
morals. Then it is provided that if a business does not comply with the provisions
in the
70 See Forslag 200001 L 165, under the subtitle Til 3 with reference to the
preparatory works for the
earlier act (bank- og sparkasseloven), see Folketingstidende 197374, Tillg A
sp. 307308.
71 See the yearly report of the Consumer Authority, Forbrugerstyrelsen, Juridisk
rbok 1996 p. 52 f. After-
wards the credit institutions notified the ombudsman that they would comply
with the decision.
72 Bekendtgrelse om god skik for finansielle virksomheder, 769 af 27/06/2011.
73 In Danish: 19. Et pengeinstitut kan ikke uden en individuel og saglig
begrundelse ngte at oprette en al-
mindelig indlnskonto. Begrundelsen skal p anmodning gives i papirformat eller
p andet varigt medium.
74 Vejledning til bekendtgrelse om god skik for finansielle virksomheder VEJ 86
af 13 oktober 2009.
511
----------------------- Page 551-----------------------
Frey Nybergh
decree, the Authority may demand that the business will accommodate itself with the
risk
of being penalised with fines.75
As a consequence of that, the regulations are of public law character and the
breach
of them will not have private law consequences, that is, a customer cannot direct
private
law demands on a business that is not complying with the regulation. However, the
failure
to comply with the regulation may influence certain private law matters
(afsmittende
virkning p visse civilretslige sprgsml). It is stated that it is the complaints
boards of
the financial industry and the courts when handling the individual cases that are
entitled
to decide whether a breach of the regulation may give a cause for a private law
demand.76
Concerning section 19 of the decree, it is repeated that it is a public law

demand di-
rected to the credit institutions, which is why the provision is not to be seen as
an actual
provision of compulsory contracting (egentlig civilretlig kontraheringspligt).
Concern-
ing the pertinent reason (saglig begrundelse), it is said that one should pay
attention to
the case law of the complaint board. It is also provided that only private
customers (privat
kunder) have a right to a current account, because these persons as wage earners
and re-
cipients of public benefits have a need of an account. It is, however, rather
surprising that
such a remarkable restriction of the application of the provision is mentioned only
on the
level of an instruction. Furthermore, there is an e contrario conclusion that the
provision
is to be interpreted that there is no obligation to offer credit or any other
services. Finally,
as examples of acceptable reasons for denial of service, it is mentioned that a
potential cus-
tomer behaves in an offensive manner or is making other customers feel
uncomfortable.77
16.3.3.2 Finland
In Finland the Credit Institute Act (Kreditinstitutslag 121/2007, laki
luottolaitostoimin-
nasta in Finnish) has an express provision in sec. 134, where it is prescribed that
a natural
person that legally resides in an EEA-state has a right to an account, including
instruments
for payments and money transmission services provided there are no significant
grounds
for refusal.78
75 See the Instruction (Vejledning) under the title Indledning.

76 See the Instruction (Vejledning) under the title Indledning.
77 See the Instruction (Vejledning) under the title Chapter 5 Separate rules for
credit institutions, section 19
(Kapitel 5 Srlige regler for penninginstitutter 19).
78 Sec. 134 in Swedish: Kunders rtt till grundlggande banktjnster. En
inlningsbank fr endast av vgande
skl vgra att ppna ett vanligt inlningskonto och att bevilja instrument fr
anvndning av ett sdant konto
eller vgra att skta betaltjnstuppdrag fr en fysisk person som lagligen
vistas i en EES-stat. Sklet till v-
gran ska ha samband med kunden eller med kundens tidigare beteende eller med en
uppenbar avsaknad av
ngot verkligt behov av ett kundfrhllande. Kunden ska underrttas om orsaken
till vgran.
This provision as such was already included in the former act of 1993 in 2003
with a new section 50 a (Act
number 69/2003).
512
----------------------- Page 552-----------------------

States
Access to a current account is the most important banking service. The main
cat-
egories of significant grounds for refusing to open an account are (i) that the
person who
intends to conclude a contract of a current account previously has committed a
serious
breach of contract concerning accounts or the like and (ii) that there is suspicion
that the
person intending to conclude the contract will commit a crime against the bank that
is
sanctioned in the penal law. Similar grounds are relevant also for refusal of
payment in-
struments and money transmissions.
Delay in payment is often a severe breach of contract and may
pose a significant
ground for refusal. It has to be a previous breach of contract in relation to the
same bank
that is about to conclude a new contract with the potential customer. The delay may
not
be insignificant or of a much earlier date for the bank to refer to it. If the
severe breach
of contract is a consequence of social force majeure the general principle of
social force
majeure prevents the bank from referring to the breach of contract.
The other significant ground for refusing to open an account is that there is
a suspi-
cion that the person intending to conclude the contract will commit a crime against
the
bank. The crime that comes foremost into question is fraud with means of payment.
If a
previously criminally active person changes his or her behaviour, the significant
ground
for refusal expires.
The provision does not expressly give a concrete form to which instruments
for pay-
ments every potential customer is entitled to. In the government bill ATM-card
(auto-
matic teller machine), debit card and Internet banking codes are mentioned as
examples
of basic banking services.79 Owing to the fact that the formulation of the
provision was
changed in the parliament it has been questioned whether this formulation could be
valid
as a ground for interpretation of the final provision. The Constitutional Law
Commit-
tee only mentioned the right to an ATM-card, but without saying anything else of
the
instruments.80 To this it is appropriate to add the actual changes in society in
the use of
the Internet and argue for an inclusive interpretation of the provision. In normal
circum-
stances it is of course correct to say that the banks have no reason to deny
service if there
79 See Bill: RP 33/2002 rd: Regeringens proposition till riksdagen med frslag
till lagar om ndring av kreditin-
stitutslagen och vissa lagar som har samband med den (2002), p. 80, where
online cards are not mentioned.
80 See Report: GrUU 24/2002 rd - RP 33/2002 rd: Regeringens proposition med
frslag till lagar om ndring
av kreditinstitutslagen och vissa lagar som har samband med den (29.05.2002) p.
4 and Wuolijoki, S. (2005)
p. 240, who does not elaborate this line of interpretation, but instead finds
that whether the Internet codes
are to be seen as basic banking services or not is merely an academic
question, because as he sees it, the
will of the banks to in practice refuse to conclude a contract on this service
is always related to suspicions of
misuse or money laundering. For those who have followed this theme during the
deep economic crises in
the 1990s, this standpoint may seem to be an over-simplification. One may, for
example, ask why the Finnish
Bankers Association so vehemently resisted the provision at all before and
during the legislative process.
This is described in Nybergh, F. (2004) pp. 218 ff in Swedish.
513
----------------------- Page 553-----------------------
Frey Nybergh
is no acceptable reason. These kinds of mandatory and express provisions are,

however,
not only put in place for normal market conditions, where they also play an
informative
role and thus get a symbolic value. The real test of the legislation and legal
system as a
whole comes in an extraordinary situation such as in the economic recession in the
1990s.
Afterwards, it is easy to see that many tragedies and problems could have been
avoided if
the Consumer Debt Adjustment Act of 1993 and the Business Reorganization Act of
1993
had been in place as well as the basic banking provision. Concerning the latter
provision,
it became perfectly clear that the arguments for applying a general principle had
hardly
any impact when the economic realities became rough.
The right to money transmissions services are again relatively problem free
from the
access point of view. The threshold is at the opening of the account. However, it
is moti-
vated to mention this service in the provision, since it dissolves potential
problems before
they can arise.
16.3.3.3 Norway
The Norwegian legislation is the oldest of the new generation of legislation of the
financial
industry. The act of financial agreements and transaction orders (lov om
finansavtaler og
finansoppdrag, finansavtaleloven, 1999-06-25 nr 46) had an express provision
concern-
ing refusal of clients in section 14. That provision was technically modified in
2009.81 It
provides that a financial institution cannot reject a deposit or a payment order

without
a just cause. Furthermore, the client must be told of the rejection without undue
delay.82
The provision is more detailed than the general clause solution in Denmark,
but
a bit less detailed than the Finnish provision. In the original government bill
there is
reference to the motivations of the committee for this provision, which at the bill
stage
were by this way kept the same.83 Hence, the development after 1989 concerning the
wide use of banking services, the intensified competition in the deregulated

industry
of the market, the continuing internationalisation and the experience of the
banking
crisis together with the case law of the banking complaint board (Bankklagenemnda),
is
81 The identification information of the modification of the act is: lov 19 juni
2009 nr. 81. The modification of
sec. 14 was made due to the implementation of directive 2007/64/EC. Among
others, a new sec. 26 b was
included in the act to regulate the grounds for refusal of a specific payment
order. See Ministry of Justice and
Public Security: Om lov om endringer i finansavtaleloven mv. (gjennomfring av
de privatrettslige bestem-
melsene i direktiv 2007/64/EF): Ot.prp. nr. 94 (2008-2009) Chapter 20.
82 In Norwegian: 14. Avvisning av kunder (1) Institusjonen kan ikke
uten saklig grunn avsl ta imot
innskudd eller utfre betalingstjenester p vanlige vilkr. (2) Kunden skal
underrettes om avslag uten ugrun-
net opphold nr ikke annet er bestemt i eller i medhold av lov. Underretningen
om avslag skal inneholde
opplysning om tvisteordning som er etablert etter 4.
83 See the government bill Ministry of Justice and Public Security: Om lov om
finansavtaler og finansoppdrag
(finansavtaleloven): Ot.prp. nr. 41 (1998-99) Parts 3.1 and 3.3.
514
----------------------- Page 554-----------------------

States
referred to when the committee expressed reasons for the need of a provision on
com-
pulsory contracting.84
It might be worth noting that, as in Finland, the Norwegian

Bankers Association
questioned whether it would be necessary to legislate on this matter as the
provision is
merely an expression of the actual business custom.85
It is also interesting to point out that from a regulation point of view the
provision
was no absolute novelty. In the former act of controlling and regulating of prices
and com-
petition of 1953 (Price Act, prislov) there was in section 23 a general prohibition
against
refraining from a business relation. In the banking industry this prohibition was
applied
both on contracts on current accounts and transfer of payments. There was the
possibility
to take a case of refusal to an administrative body named Prisrdet where normally
cases
of market law were handled. It was, however, possible for this body to prohibit an
under-
taking to refuse to contract if the refusal was unreasonable for the other party
(urimelig
overfor den annen part).86
The question of regulation of prohibition of refusal to supply would,

according to the
committee, have been most meaningful to do in the regulation of the general
contract law
legislation. At the time section 23 in the Price Act was repealed and any replacing
provi-
sion was not legislated at all. The committee found that this was deterioration and
would
have preferred a general provision on compulsory contracting in the Contracts
Act.87
16.3.3.4 Sweden
In Sweden there is also a regulation from the time before the crisis of 2008. There
is a
set of several acts that came into force in 2004. A total reform has
been enacted and
some of the acts are new. There is the main Act of banking and financial
undertakings
(lag 2004:297 om bank- och finansieringsrrelse), the Act on deposits
(lag 2004:299
84 See Ministry of Justice and Public Security: Finansavtaler og

finansoppdrag. Utredning nr. 1 fra Bank-
lovkommisjonen oppnevnt ved kongelig resolusjon 6. april 1990. Avgitt til
Justisdepartementet 15. desember
1994.: NOU 1994:19 (1994) p. 32.
85 See Ministry of Justice and Public Security: Om lov om finansavtaler og
finansoppdrag (finansavtaleloven):
Ot.prp. nr. 41 (1998-99) the special motives to Chapter 14 section 14 second
paragraph.
1994.: NOU 1994:19 (1994) p. 111 and the commentary of the law Eckhoff, T.
E./Gjelsvik, . (1955) p. 133,
where it is stated that the purpose of the law was not for the body (Prisrdet)
to reform the complete contract
law.
1994: NOU 1994:19 (1994) p. 112, where it is said that in the work of
reforming the Contracts Act such a
provision was considered, but the work was ended without any legislative
measures when the accommoda-
tion to the EEA treaty started.
515
----------------------- Page 555-----------------------
Frey Nybergh
om inlningsverksamhet) and the reform of the Act on the Deposit Guarantee Scheme
(lag 1995:1571 om insttningsgaranti), which was reformed (lag 2004:320).
The ques-
tion of right to basic banking had been already regulated in the previous Act on
Banking
(bankrrelselagen 1991:1018). In Chapter 2 section 1 it was prescribed that a bank
has a
duty to take deposits on an account from the public.88
Taking into consideration the political passion this question has aroused
later on, it
is surprising that in Sweden at this time there was not even a separate motivation
for this
provision. The discussion then concerned what activity should be allowed to be
included
in banking.89
The monopoly on deposits for the banks was seen as a way to guarantee the
mainte-
nance of a stable and effective system of payments. The deposit taking of the banks
was
seen as a necessary part of this payment system when the accounts are linked with a
gen-
eral payment instrument such as debit cards, checks or a function of transfer of
payments.
The main purpose for the accounts was that they are used for transactions as the
consum-
ers are dependent on having access to an account with that function. Apart from
this, in
the consumer interest is included that the accounts also function as savings
instruments.90
In the light of these statements it is quite surprising that the

interpretation of the pro-
vision was very restrictive. The rule of compulsory contracting was said to apply
only on
the right to conclude a contract to open a current account without additional
services such
as transfer of payments, some kind of cards and credit.91 Even this very limited
right to an
account could actually be hard to obtain if the potential customer had registered
interrup-
tions of payments. It has been documented that when this legislation was in force
(until
30.6.2004) private persons were refused current accounts despite the fact that the
Finance
Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen) had stated that a person in debt
adjustment
may not be refused an ATM-card only because of ongoing debt adjustment
proceedings.92
There were also the Guidelines on deposits and adherent services of the Authority
where
it was stated that only the fact that a customer had received a record of court
action for
88 In Swedish: En bank r skyldig att ta emot inlning p rkning frn

allmnheten. Lag (1992:1613).
89 See Sveriges Riksdag: Regeringens proposition 1990/91:154 om rrelseregler fr
bank mm.: Prop. 1990/91:
154 (21.03.1991) p. 3.
90 See Sveriges Riksdag: Regeringens proposition 1995/96:74. kad
bankkonkurrens.: Prop. 1995/96:74
(10.10.1995) p. 96.
91 See Finansinspektionen 1999:3: Bankernas betaltjnster Avgifter och
information. Regeringsrapport: dnr.
6039-98-019 (21.06.1999) pp. 8 f and Lehrberg, B. (2001) p. 258. In the latter
work the instruments for using
the account (ATM-cards and debit cards) are not mentioned. See also byhammar,
M./Nordenanckar, V.
(15.02.2001) p. 4.
92 See byhammar, M./Nordenanckar, V. (15.02.2001) pp. 4 f, where it is reported
that the banks in Sweden are
striving to replace the ATM-cards with debit cards, for which there are more
stringent demands on the card
holders than for the ATM-cards.
516
----------------------- Page 556-----------------------

States
93
non-payment of debt could not be a sufficient ground for the bank to refuse a
deposit.
There was also a provision on adherent services, and contrary to the Danish
Instruction it
was stated that an account holder has the right to them provided that there are no
grounds
against it, because these services are needed to enable an effective handling of
the with-
drawal of cash, transfers and payments.94
The reform of the banking regulation meant that the monopoly of the banks to
take
deposits on current accounts was repealed. Therefore, the duty of the banks to take
de-
posits was also repealed and exchanged against a regulation of a duty for banks and
other
institutions that are providing deposits covered by the deposit guarantee fund.95
This is the
reason that the provision on compulsory contracting now is found in the Act
(1995:1571)
on the Deposit Guarantee Scheme. According to section 11 b in the Act under the
heading
of duty to take guaranteed deposits, an institution, which is offering to take
deposits ac-
cording to the definition in section 2, is obliged to take deposits of anybody
provided that
there are no particular reasons against it.96 A deposit is defined in section 2 as
a nominally
fixed credit balance with a depositor that is accessible for the depositor at short
notice.
The provision in section 11 b means that anybody irrespective of citizenship
shall
have the possibility to invest his or her money safely. That is why the institution
has to con-
trol the identity of the potential customer according to the money laundering
legislation.
Hence, it is only in exceptional cases that the institution may refuse to serve a
potential
customer. As an example of a legitimate ground is that a customer has previously
been dis-
honest against a bank or another institution, that there is a suspicion of money
laundering or
that a representative will be furthering a crime by accepting the funds.97 In the
government
bill the argument for the provision is that there are grounds to prevent the
institutions that
are providing guaranteed deposits from excluding individuals from the possibility
to open
such accounts. Everybody should still have the possibility to have access to a safe
form of
saving, which is why it cannot be accepted that an institution refuses certain
persons the
93 See section 2 of Finansinspektionens allmnna rd om inlningskonton

och tillhrande tjnster (FFFS
2001:8). Enbart den omstndigheten att en kund har ftt en
betalningsanmrkning br inte utgra tillrcklig
grund fr banken att neka kunden inlningskonto.
94 See section 3 of Finansinspektionens allmnna rd om inlningskonton och
tillhrande tjnster (FFFS 2001:8).
95 See Sveriges Riksdag: Regeringens proposition. Reformerade regler fr bank-
och finansieringsrrelse.: Prop.
2002/03:139 (03.07.2003)p. 195 ff. and especially 199 and 260 ff.
(Finansutskottets betnkande 2003/04:
FiU15) See also the report of the Committee on Finance Sveriges Riksdag:
Regeringens proposition. Re-
formerade regler fr bank- och finansieringsrrelse: Prop. 2002/03:139
(03.07.2003) pp. 14 ff, where the
government bill on this question was recommended.
96 In Swedish: Skyldighet att ta emot garanterade insttningar. 11 b . Ett
institut som erbjuder sig att ta emot
insttningar enligt definitionen i 2 r skyldigt att ta emot sdana
insttningar av var och en, om det inte
finns srskilda skl mot det. Lag (2004:320).
97 See Sveriges Riksdag: Regeringens proposition: Prop. 2002/03:139 (18.06.2003)
pp. 262 and 598.
517
----------------------- Page 557-----------------------
Frey Nybergh
access to guaranteed deposits.98 One may note that the ground that was brought
forward
during the preparation of the previous provision concerning the purpose of the
accounts
as transaction accounts was not used this time.
The question of adherent services was addressed as before in this government
bill.
Hence, checks and cards that are connected to the account are not included in the
ob-
ligation. Despite that, it is also said that this question is addressed
in section 3 in the
general Guidelines on deposits and adherent services of the Financial Supervisory
Au-
thority (FFFS 2001:8). There it is provided that a customer with a current account
has to
be offered adherent services on condition that there are not any reasons for
refusal. It is
also said in the bill that the Authority during 2002 has made a follow-up of the
general
guidelines. In the follow-up it is stated that there have been problems indeed, but
they are
not of such an extent that the legislator must act on them.99 It seems that the
situation for
now is that the access to the adherent services is not regulated at the level of
the legisla-
tion, but instead in general guidelines that are included in the statute book of
the Financial
Supervisory Authority. One may ask how binding such general guidelines really are.
The general guidelines have been characterized as a recommendation that in
practice
has received a normative character for the activity of the banks.100 Taking this
into con-
sideration, it is not the best of solutions that there is no separate provision in

the guide-
lines on the right to some adherent service, despite the fact that the potential
customer
has a record for court action for non-payment. It must be seen as unsatisfactory
that the
regulation leaves these fundamental economic rights to be interpreted by possible
court
proceedings, especially when it is highly improbable that such cases will be put
forward.
16.3.4 The Regulation Model of Access in USA
Compared with the Nordic countries, there is in USA an extensive and complicated
federal
regulation in the financial industry. In this regulation there are extensive
provisions with
the purpose of securing access to basic banking as well as to credit. The federal
legislation
is in a consolidated form in United States Code (U.S.C.)101 and under the Title 12
Banks

p. 262.
p. 262.
100 See the report by the Consumer Agency, Konsumentverket: Rapport
2001:13 (2001) pp. 55 f. It is said
that the general guidelines of the Financial Supervisory Authority are
enacted on the basis of section 1
of the decree on the statute book (Justitiedepartement L6:
frfattningssamlingsfrordningen: (1976: 725)
(02.09.1976/01.05.2013)). It is also said in the report that it would have
been preferable to have this kind of
provisions in the act.
101 See Office of the Law Revision Counsel. URL:
http://uscode.house.gov/about/info.shtml. The Office of the
Law Revision Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives prepares and
publishes the United States Code
pursuant to section 285b of title 2 of the Code. The Code is a consolidation
and codification by subject mat-
ter of the general and permanent laws of the United States.
518
----------------------- Page 558-----------------------

States
and banking there is among others the Banking Act (1933), which is also called the
Glass-
Steagall Act. Originally commercial banking was separated from investment banking
ac-
cording to the acts. As a result of the deregulation efforts of the industry this
structure
was changed with the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
(1980) and with the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
(1994).
As a result of, among others, these deregulation measures, universal banking became
pos-
sible also in the USA. In addition to that, it also became possible to close
branches if they
were not profitable.102 Furthermore, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999) ended the
sepa-
ration of commercial and investment banking. Hence, banks, securities firms and
insur-
ance companies could affiliate under one holding company.103 As I mentioned above,
the
financial crisis started in USA owing to these deregulation reforms.104
Beyond this general regulation of the industry there is also a particular

regulation to
secure access to banking, especially for individuals with low income. The
regulatory mea-
sures, compared with those described above, are far-reaching considering the
attitude in
USA to the role of the public sphere in society in general.
These measures were brought about by the widely known development in the
1970s
when the inner-city areas started to decline because of increased crime. As a
consequence
of this development, the banks started to refuse to make loans in particular areas
because
it was perceived that the people who lived in them were higher credit risks
(neighbour-
hood redlining). Another consequence was that the banks still took deposits from
their
local communities only to ship the funds to major money markets in search of higher
interest rates, to the detriment of, for instance, local housing (disinvestment).
The most
central legislation is the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (below CRA).105
The regulatory technique in this act differs considerably from the acts in
the Nordic
countries. According to a provision of purpose 12 U.S.C. 2901, it is prescribed
that the
financial institutions are required by law to demonstrate that their deposit
facilities serve
the convenience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered to do
business.
The needs in question are both access to credit and deposit services.106
102 See Lee, J. (2002) pp. 206 f.

103 Wood, P. R. (2007) p. 106.
104 See footnote 39 and Stiglitz, J. E. (2010) pp. 15 and 82 ff.
105 See 12 U.S.C. 2901 and e.g. Lee, J. (2002) pp. 206 f, Cassity, W. (2000) pp.
347 ff and Cincotta 1996 p. 26 ff.
106 The provisions in its entirety read as follows: "Sec. 2901. Congressional
findings and statement of purpose
(a) The Congress finds that (1) regulated financial institutions are
required by law to demonstrate that
their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the communities
in which they are chartered
to do business; (2) the convenience and needs of communities include the need
for credit services as well
as deposit services; and (3) regulated financial institutions have continuing
and affirmative obligation to
help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are
chartered. (b) It is the purpose of
this chapter to require each appropriate Federal financial
supervisory agency to use its authority when
examining financial institutions, to encourage such institutions to help meet
the credit needs of the local
communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound
operation of such institutions.
519
----------------------- Page 559-----------------------
Frey Nybergh
An explanation for the character of the regulation is that the problems in

USA are of
another calibre than those in the Nordic countries. It is to a great extent a
question of the
services of the mainstream financial institutions being overtaken by alternative
financial
service institutions. It is a question of a problem that the Bankers
Associations in the
Nordic countries insist does not exist in the Nordic countries namely that there
are no
unacceptable refusals taking place at all. It is subsequently asserted that there
are low-
income households in the USA that are unbanked. When they receive
payments they
have been forced to take cheques that they must at first change to cash at check-
cashiers
and when they need credit, the pawnshops have been the only institutional
alternative.
The price for these alternative financial services, which are substitutes to
ordinary basic
banking, is higher.107 It may be a little bit surprising to find out that the
expression coined
by Caplovitz, the poor pay more, never seems to become pass despite the
increasing
welfare since the 1950s.108
In a survey on how the poor use financial products it was established that
during the
period 1995-1998 the use of financial services did not increase except the use of
savings
accounts. They hardly used electronic banking technology except automated teller
ma-
chines (ATM).109 Even though electronic banking technology and the use of both
debit
and credit cards have subsequently become more common, the regulatory approach in
USA has been criticised. The financial institutions have a high degree of freedom
to take
out fees that only afterwards may be adjusted.110
16.4 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether there is a need for the same set
of rules
for basic banking as for the traditional services of infrastructure. There are
comparatively
small differences between basic banking and services of communication. This fact
has in-
cited me to analyse how the legislators in the Nordic countries and USA have
tackled the
problem of access to basic banking.
That is why I focus in this chapter on which banking services are grasped by
the rule
of compulsory contracting, or as seen from the other side, the right to contract.
The solu-
tions vary in all of the Nordic countries, whereas there are most similarities in
Finland,
Norway and Sweden. The regulatory solution in Denmark is more restricted than in
the
other countries. The Danish model is based on a general clause with an
obligation to
107 See Lee, J. (2002) pp. 209 f.

108 See Caplovitz, D. (1969) pp. 188 ff. See also Lee, J. (2002) p. 203, who
observes that the poor tend to pay
more for depository and credit products due to a lack of creditworthiness
indicated by low credit scores.
109 See Lee, J. (2002) pp. 226 ff.
110 Rosenberg, A. S. (2007) p. 45.
520
----------------------- Page 560-----------------------

States
follow good morals on the level of the act. The rule is given its detailed content
by a rule
on a lower hierarchical level in a decree. Finally, there is the restriction in the
Instruc-
tion that is enacted, not by a politically elected entity but by a supervisory
authority. It is
obvious that the authority represents an older attitude towards basic banking than
that
of the Danish Consumer Ombudsman, which represents an attitude more suitable in an
information society.
The problem with this state of things is that the persons who have been
denied access
to basic banking on unacceptable grounds most probably will not take their case to
court
and not necessarily to the complaints board either. The regulation has then not the
for-
ward striving effect on this question. If there are no court cases where much
needed rules
are developed, there will be no legal development. Compared with this, it is
interesting to
note that before these regulations, there have been opinions on whether it is
possible to
apply a principle on a right to a current account in Denmark.111
The situation in USA, again, is very different from the one in all the Nordic
coun-
tries. The interesting thing about the solution in USA is that there is one at all.
This kind
of deep-going intervention in the principle of freedom of contract is relatively
unknown
in the Nordic countries. I find it rather strange that this solution of USA has not
been re-
ferred to in the Nordic literature to any wider extent or not at all in the
preparatory works
in the Nordic countries.
It has frequently been asked whether there is any point in regulating the
access in
this way as banks in a competitive market are competing for customers. The
experience
from the Nordic countries from the 1990s, however, showed that in economic
recessions
there is a tendency to exclude persons with economic problems from some or all the
basic
banking services.
Here comes the fruitful side of the comparison with traditional
infrastructure. You do
not live properly without running water, electricity, telephone services and postal
services
in an information society. It is hard to find any relevant difference from these
services to
the basic banking services. Furthermore, if one takes a look at the now enlarged
European
Union, the situation is far more heterogeneous than within the Nordic
countries. The
notion of unbanked persons comes to the fore. There are unbanked
consumers in the
European Union.112 It is worth asking why, still in 2011, the European Union did
not enact
rules to ensure access to financial services necessary for taking part in the
single market.
111 See Lynge Andersen, L./Mgelvang-Hansen, P. et al. (2001) pp. 48 f, which is

from the time when the former
act (bank- og sparekasseloven) was still in force.
112 See European Commission staff working document impact assessment,
Brussels, 8.5.2013 SWD(2013)
164 final p. 8 and 23 and the Proposal for a Directive on the comparability of
fees related to payment ac-
counts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic
features, Brussels, 8.5.2013
COM(2013) 266 final, 2013/0139 (COD) p. 3.
521
----------------------- Page 561-----------------------
Frey Nybergh
If harmonisation of private law is an important means of ensuring participation in

the
113
market, why has access to financial services only been addressed in a
recommendation
and not been seen as one of the most important issues considering the legislative
solutions
in the USA. With the new corrective measures in the new Proposal for a Directive,
this
shortcoming may be remedied.
A more general question may also be posed. What does this kind of regulation
tell us
about the status of the traditional purely negative definition of the freedom of
contract?
The new approach in EU law may also indicate a new approach in contract law as
required
by the principles of life time contracts outlined in this book. To make access to
financial
services a contractual right only legislative efforts can help.
113 European Commission Recommendation 2011/442/EU.
522
----------------------- Page 562-----------------------
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17 A Contractual Approach to Over-
Indebtedness: Rebus Sic Stantibus

Instead of Bankruptcy1
Juana Pulgar
Summary
This chapter adds to the discussion about life time contracts from the perspective
of bank-
ruptcy law, which only seemingly seems to be outside the contractual relationship
between
creditor and debtor. Its purpose is to analyse the rebus sic stantibus clause
with regard to
credit contracts and its effects on the lenderborrower relationship. This
provides the oppor-
tunity to revisit and, in some instances, develop some of the general principles
of the general
theory of obligations and contracts, particularly the principles of privity of
contracts and of
universal liability in the light of a newly emerging priniciple of responsible
credit. This also
implies reconsideration of the position of certain classes of creditors in
insolvency procedures,
in particular, secured lenders, in order to provide contractual solutions to
insolvency, since
insolvency unnecessarily stigmatises the insolvent individual and imposes
significant legal
and administrative cost as well as time onto the parties and the public. For this
we analyse
how the different systems of comparative law have evolved with respect to the
insolvency of
individual debtors.
Overcoming some of the general principles of the law of obligations and
contracts and
reconsidering the position of certain classes of creditor renders those general
principles put
forward in this volume with regard to long-term contracts (life time contracts)
applicable to
still predominantly administratively organised insolvency procedures that
have since long
been emancipated from the dominating Sales Law Model in the law of obligations as
well as
in the property-related form of straight bankruptcy.
One of the side-effects of the current global and systemic crisis is the
rehabilitation of the
basic Keynesian principles, developed as long ago as 1936, that underpin the
welfare state
1 This work has been done in the context of the research project on financing
for companies and individu-
als sponsored by the Spanish Ministry of Economy Ministerio de
Economa y Competitividad (DER
2011/28586) of which Ms Juana Pulgar Ezquerra is the main researcher. The work
has been terminated by
June 30, 2013 before the ley de apoyo a los emprendedores introducing a
second chance for entrepreuners
and entreprises, but not for consumers.
531
----------------------- Page 571-----------------------
Juana Pulgar
after the neo-liberal wave (see Tancelin) has swept away also ordo-liberal
postulates, as
reflected in the work of the Fribourg School in Germany, which is commonly seen as
the
theory of the welfare state in economics that aims at correcting certain market
inefficien-
cies (meeting social needs) on the one hand and, on the other, policies oriented
towards
regulations to create well-functioning markets (Ott, Hlter, Reich).2
This is relevant to the question of how over-indebtedness and individual

insolvency
should be addressed in connection with a reduction in state benefits.3
When an individual is regularly unable to meet payment obligations as they

fall due,
this usually arises against a background in which three circumstances arise
simultaneously.
First, the debtor is over-indebted. There is no unified European
definition of over-
indebtedness.4 It is, however, commonly related to situations in which the debtors
finacial as-
sets are insufficient to pay the debts; further, these debts frequently originated
in connection
with accessing finance, particularly from banks, by means of long-term contracts.
This access
to credit lowers the individuals overall level of consumption, because the cost of
credit must
be subtracted from regular income, with the result that the individual becomes
over-indebted.
Secondly, the freedom of contract allows one to adapt the initial terms of
the credit
agreement subsequently. This does not require a general rule (ex ante clause) in
the original
agreement for retrospective amendments, particularly in situations of over-
indebtedness or
insolvency. This may be done without prejudice to the possible (if uncertain)
application
of a clause providing for a situation in which a fundamental change of
circumstances
makes the original agreement inoperable (a rebus sic stantibus clause). Such a
contrac-
tual clause, as we will see below, may be insufficient or inadequate to address the
over-
indebtedness of individuals.
Finally, the debtor has no access to new finance, or cannot refinance by
extending or
renewing the original finance, because access to credit has been limited or
removed.
The bankruptcy of an individual could be prevented if it were possible to
modify the
contract ex ante, in terms of its provisions as to the timing and place of the
payments, with
the additional ability to redefine some of the initial credit positions and obtain
additional
credit to refinance existing debt or to get fresh money. This sets the stage for a
contractual
and conventional alternative to the insolvency/over-indebtedness of the individual
debtor.
2 I have addressed these issues in Pulgar Ezquerra, J. (1992) pp. 31-38, citing
extensive bibliography on this
subject.
3 See note on the social dimension of consumers over-indebtedness in Reifner,
U.; Ford, J. (eds.) (1992) See
Warren, E. (2003). Pulgar Ezquerra, J. (2008) pp. 43-73.
4 However, work has been done in this area for some time; see Common
operational European definition of
over-indebtedness (Contract num. VC/2006/0308 of December 19 2006), financed
by the European Com-
mission, General Directorate of Employment, social affairs and equal
opportunities, and performed by the
European monitoring center for saving. See, additionally, Study of the problem
of consumer indebtedness:
statistical aspects (Contract N B5-100% / 000197) and The World Bank;
Kilborn, J. et al.: Insolvency and
Creditor/Debtor Regimes Initiative Task Force (September 2012).
532
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17 A Contractual Approach to Over-Indebtedness: Rebus Sic

Stantibus Instead of
Bankruptcy
Insolvency proceedings as a mechanism to address individual over-indebtedness

or
insolvency result in stigma for the individual as well as legal and
administrative costs, and
loss of time generated by the length of the proceedings themselves. Moreover,
individual
insolvency proceedings are frequently proceedings without assets (the estate
normally
comprises only one asset, which is the individuals dwelling, usually mortgaged,
and the
individual is typically unemployed). Insolvency proceedings are, furthermore,
inadequate
to address liabilities in the form of secured debts (which in countries such as
Spain absorb
more than 60% of available earnings), tax, food, and maintenance payments in the
context
of matrimonial separation.
Finally, insolvency itself is inadequate as a solution to the insolvency of
individuals
who have to survive.
It follows that, even allowing for variables in the insolvency process as
between EU
member states, a solution based on a voluntary amicable composition with
creditors
would appear to be, in principle, the most effective and practical solution.
However, such
a composition has its limitations and faces a number of obstacles. It requires,
subject to
certain legislative differences between the various EU member states, a negotiation
based
on agreement between the parties within the legal framework applicable to
obligations
and contracts. Therefore, even if a composition offers flexibility to the parties,
it is also
subject to the limitations of this legal framework, including principles such as
privity of
contract (which can indirectly block the agreement, leading to hold-out). It is
also ques-
tionable whether clauses such as rebus sic stantibus are an effective way of
approaching
the subsequent amendment of terms initially agreed upon in the finance agreement.
Further, an amicable approach to a situation of insolvency or over-
indebtedness can
sometimes appear to be an uneven negotiation, given the legal position as between
debtor
and creditor, in terms of both the negotiation and the servicing of the debt (the
creditor
being usually a bank), which in turn exacerbates the problem of information
asymmetry
affecting all negotiations. Third party mediation may be called for in this
situation.
17.1 The Rebus Sic Stantibus Clause in the Economic Crisis
No 10 of the principles for life time contracts extends the rebus sic stantibus
clause as it
has been formulated in Article 313 German BGB to life time circumstances and the
social
environment. It reads:
10. Adaptation: If the social and economic circumstances upon which a life
time contract is based have changed significantly since the contract was en-
tered into, or if material circumstances from which the parties derived have
arisen that are found to be at variance with its original situation to such
an
533
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Juana Pulgar
extent that the social nature of the contract is jeopardised, and if the
parties
would not have entered into the contract or would have entered into it on
dif-
ferent terms had they foreseen this change, adaptation of the contract may
be
required if, taking into account all the circumstances of the specific
case, and
in particular the contractual or statutory allocation of risk and the
fundamen-
tal obligation of a human being, one of the parties cannot reasonably be
ex-
pected to continue to comply with the contract without variation of its
terms.
Collective regulation shall take precedence over individual adaptation.
This clause is not new in contract law. From a contractual point of view, the
treatment of
the insolvency of individuals could be analysed in terms of the application of
rebus sic
stantibus clauses. These clauses bind the parties to a contract (even long-term
contracts
that are executory in nature such as finance agreements) for only as long as the
initial
agreed conditions continue to apply. This has its origin in the rationalist school
of natural
law of the XVII and XVIII centuries (Grotius 1583-1645) and was revived in
Germany
as a result of the social and economic circumstances following the First
World War
5 6
(E. Kaufmann , P. Oertmann ). Arguably, these clauses could become applicable again
in
the current European economic context.
In this regard, it could be argued that, when a debtor becomes unemployed, or
suf-
fers an increase in the interest rates applicable to the finance agreement, or is
affected by
a global economic crisis such as the current one, the status quo of the contract
has been
breached. The contract should therefore no longer be binding upon the
parties by ap-
plication of the rebus sic stantibus clause and the prejudiced party would be
entitled to
amendment or termination of the contractual relationship.
The rebus sic stantibus clause, therefore, would allow the ex post, or
retrospective,
amendment of the terms and conditions initially agreed upon in the contract in
order to
rebalance the consideration resulting from it. However, the lack of statutory
recognition in
the majority of legal regimes, including Spanish law,7 and a doctrinal foundation
based on
equity principles coupled with a restrictive jurisprudential interpretation puts

into ques-
tion its operative effectiveness.
In order to determine whether a change in circumstances would have effect on
the
contract would require judicial determination of the intention of the parties,
which would
be costly in terms of both time and money. Where jurisprudential interpretation of
this
clause is restrictive, as it is in Spain, it is conditional on an extraordinary and
unforesee-
able alteration in the circumstances governed by the contract, far exceeding any
possible
calculation by the parties to the contract at the time they entered into it.
5 Kaufmann, E. (1911) (clausula rebus sic stantibus in international law).

6 See Oertmann, P. (1921) (clausula rebus sic stantibus).
7 In Germany the 2002 reform has introduced this principle as Article 313 of the
Civil Code.
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17 A Contractual Approach to Over-Indebtedness: Rebus

Sic
Stantibus Instead
of Bankruptcy
This could be argued in relation to the economic and systemic crisis

confronting Eu-
rope and a large part of the Western world, which has had an extraordinary impact
on
debtors capacity to repay loans. Such an argument would, however, be highly
unlikely to
be accepted by the Courts and, even if it were, the costs in terms of time and
money that
would result would be out of line with the requirements of the insolvency process
and
individual insolvency in particular, where timing is key.8
17.2 Superseding the Principle of Privity of Contract: Hold-Outs

and Information Asymmetry
An effective alternative to reliance on a rebus sic stantibus clause when facing

a change in
circumstances that may affect the capacity of the debtor to make loan repayments is
an ex
post renegotiation or refinancing of the original terms of the contract.
However, in order to achieve a contractual solution of this nature, the
problem of
privity of contract in order to neutralise the other problem of hold-outs has
to be over-
come. This arises in connection with negotiated solutions to debt crises,
essentially as a
result of the information asymmetry as between the different creditors.
Privity of contract (pacta sunt servanda ) is a fundamental principle in the
general
theory of obligations and contracts. It means that contracts bind only the parties
to them
(res inter alios acta) and not third parties. They neither benefit nor prejudice
third parties
(nec prodest nec nocet).
This makes it very difficult to overcome a key problem when negotiating a
consen-
sual solution to the debtors economic crisis, namely hold-out strategies, whereby
certain
creditors do not participate in the negotiations, in some instances due to
disagreement as
to how the value of the assets can be maximised, either through insolvency
proceedings
or a consensual negotiation, or even instances where a dissenting creditor tries to
use its
leverage to obtain an advantage.9
The problem of hold-outs results from the information asymmetries that

characterise
consensual negotiations, where creditors who do not have access to enough
information
are unable to clearly assess whether the debtors offer is the best outcome in
terms of their
own interests. This asymmetry is minimised in insolvency proceedings through the
dis-
closure duties imposed on the parties (fish bowl effect).
8 See in Spain the seminal resolutions of the Supreme Court of June 18, 2004,
October 25, 2007, January 25,
2007 and February 20, 2001 as well as the subsequent change in Case Law that is
in favour of the applica-
tion of the Rebus sic stantibus principle, vide the resolution of the Supreme
Court, first section (Civil), of
January 17, 2013 (Rec 1579/2010).
9 Roe, M. J. (1996); Wilson, R. et al. (1998) p. 401-407; focusing on
individuals, see Pulgar Ezquerra, J. (2012)
pp. 220-240.
535
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Juana Pulgar
In circumstances where blocking by minority creditors amounts to an abuse and

an
antisocial use of law against good faith, legal sanctions exist under the various
legal sys-
tems penalising such abuses (e.g. in Spanish law ex article 7 of the Spanish Civil
Code, in-
10
demnification for damages, adoption of precautionary measures to curtail such
abuses).
However, invoking these remedies requires the debtor or another party to satisfy
the court
that the conduct is in fact abusive, resulting in delay, costs and uncertainty.
This shows why it is more effective to introduce a legal exception to the
application of
the principle of privity of contract. In this regard, legal systems such as that of
the United
Kingdom, Italy, Spain or Colombia, have promoted consensual solutions to insolvency
by
acknowledging the right of the majority to modify contracts. This was initially
accepted by
French scholars (E. Thaller11) and jurisprudence with regard to partnership
contracts, and
has now been extended to other areas, and credit agreements in particular.
Thus, if an amicable agreement has been reached between the debtor and a
speci-
fied percentage of the creditors (three-fifths of total liabilities in the United
Kingdom and
Spanish models), this agreement will take effect and bind the creditors that did
not agree,
even affecting secured creditors in some jurisdictions (e.g. the United Kingdom).
Overcoming the principle of privity of contract requires that sufficient
notice be
provided in relation to all agreements in order that parties who did not
participate in
the negotiations or who dissented can challenge the agreement through the relevant
procedures.
In addition, the requirement to provide sufficient notice is also consistent
with
Principle 12 (communication) and Principle 13 (information and transparency) that
the European Coalition for Responsible Credit has put forward with regard to long-
term contracts.
17.3 The Principle of Universal Liability and Its Exception

in Responsible Credit
The idea of obligation has two elements: the duty or debt requiring the debtor to
perform
certain actions that are breached on the debtors failure to make payments and the
respon-
sibility derived from the breach of obligations to facilitate satisfaction of the
rights of the
creditors.
10 See an analysis of this approach from a Spanish law perspective Diez Picazo;
from a German law perspective
see Reifner, U. (1999).
11 Thaller, E.-E. (1887).
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Sic
Stantibus Instead
of Bankruptcy
In the vast majority of European legal systems the liability of the debtor
is, from a
purely contractual perspective, patrimonial and universal and benefits from express
statu-
tory recognition (e.g., article 1911 of the Spanish Civil Code). This patrimonial
liability
affects all the debtors assets, excluding direct enforcement over the
individual,12 and does
not affect any criminal liability that may exist due to criminal conduct (e.g.,
fraud, crimi-
nal insolvency).
This liability also has a universal character by operation of law (ex lege),
in order to
secure creditors rights, in the form of the liability of the debtor to the extent
of all her as-
sets. This applies to the assets owned by the debtor at the time the obligation was
assumed,
as well as any assets acquired by the debtor subsequently (ex post).
This universal patrimonial liability on the part of the debtor also operates
within in-
solvency proceedings in connection with the universal nature of such proceedings,
spe-
cifically with respect to individual debtors. This must necessarily be related to
the different
and multiple origins of the individuals debts and, particularly, to the
implications of ac-
cess to credit in this context, not only in the framework of a free market economy,
but also
in the currently prevailing credit society.
Traditionally, loans are seen as one and even the major source of the debt.
This identi-
fies the use of capital in long-term relations with the faultily unpaid debt
arising from spot
contracts. It has its basis in Savignys rather outdated theory that a mutuum
(loan) was a
kind of undue enrichment. Savigny had developed this theory still with the legal
definition
of a loan in Roman law (see Reifner I) as a contractus realis who was assumed to be
ide-
ally free of charge. This theory has now been superseded by a theory where it is
the need
of the creditor to find productive use of his idle money capital. In the light of
the general
welfare of society, this goal is at least as important as the goal of the debtor to
render his
own labour or consumption more productive. A declaration of insolvency,
accordingly,
represents the failure of contractual credit to generate benefits for capital, but
is at the
same time the mechanism by which the costs resulting from irrecoverable credit
can be
minimised. This loan may have been granted following an aggressive marketing
campaign
without sufficient assessment of the borrowers solvency; procedures for assessing
the bor-
rowers solvency need to be incentivised in connection with the granting of new
money or
12 However, the personal liability system was characteristic of Roman law in which
a debtor could be deprived
of his liberty and become a slave, could be sold trans tiberium or could even
be killed. It was not until the
Lex Poetelia was introduced in Roman law that a patrimonial liability system,
combined with personal li-
ability (additio) under Justinian law, when the additio was substituted by a
system of coercion for debts that
under European law lasted until the late XIXth century.
537
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Juana Pulgar
the extension of pre-existing loans, in order to protect the debtor from possible
abuses by
the lender, especially when the debtor is an individual.13
When a financial institution grants finance, which is ultimately defaulted on

(even if
the finance was granted using sophisticated legal frameworks, notwithstanding a
deficient
assessment of the credit risk), these institutions can manage the risk of default,
which they
do in practice by including provision for losses in their accounts (expected or
foreseen
losses). Conversely, debtors, and particularly individuals, as well as society as a
whole,
have no means of passing on the costs generated by irresponsible lending. In this
regard,
doubt as to the capacity of the debtor for borrowing is reasonable, especially in
circum-
stances where it is very doubtful that self-limitation will be effective when
access to credit
is available. Individual debtors tend to believe that the cost of the loan for
which they apply
will be lower than the anticipated depreciation of the underlying asset. This is
generally
wrong because access to new credit inevitably reduces the individuals overall
demand as a
consumer, because the cost of credit must be subtracted from available income. The
main
problem with regard to credit/loan contracts when the debtor defaults is that the
lender
has already passed on the costs of default in the calculation of the interest rate.
He there-
fore has less incentive to make a realistic plan for recovery of the loan. Instead,
placing the
emphasis on the irresponsibility of the borrower, he will accelerate the total
residual debt
and treat this as an (sometimes securitised) asset where the debtor does not have
even the
ability to make partial repayments.
This could be justified when the lender is threatened by the economic death
of the
debtor, which happens when the debtor is, for example, a limited company and not a
pri-
vate individual. However, when the debtor is an individual (consumer or
entrepreneur),
she will survive, and when the debt is accelerated by a demand for payment of the
total
amount of the loan, the economic well-being of this same individual will be
adversely
affected without the lender being sanctioned or penalised by its irresponsible
behaviour.
It is therefore necessary for the Government to step in, in order, on the one
hand, to
regulate to ensure responsible lending in general terms and, on the other hand, to
provide
for the debtors discharge in the context of an insolvency process. Discharge
should be
13 See The World Bank; Kilborn, J. et al.: Insolvency and

Creditor/Debtor Regimes Initiative Task Force
(September 2012) (cf World Bank's website and global insolvency law database),
particularly Section 1.8 and
1.9 (iii), where when dealing with the issues of credit insolvency
bankruptcy proceedings of individual
debtors it appears to approach these issues, especially Section 1.9(iii), from
a traditional one-dimensional
thesis of credit, which has been overcome as a source of debt, without
analysing this issue from the approach
of the use of third party capital for productive purposes. Additionally,
Section 1.9 (iii) in fine expressly ac-
knowledges that in an insolvency, the testimony provided by the individual
debtor should play a role in the
promotion of responsible lending, a contradiction that could be reversed
should Section 1.8 update the con-
cept of credit because it is exclusively conceived as a source of debt, and it
is therefore difficult to understand
why it should be incentivised in an insolvency procedure.
538
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Sic
Stantibus Instead
of Bankruptcy
distinguished from the death of debt doctrine, in short the concept that
individuals can-
not die as corporations do, and therefore the debt must be killed.14 This
doctrine pro-
vides that the loan was already dead at the time it originated in the case of
fraudulent loans
or irresponsible finance, or loans made in circumstances that did not allow the
debtor to
invest the finance productively. These debts must therefore be killed through
insolvency
proceedings in which the judge will formally declare the death by finally and
definitively
cancelling the debt.
This doctrine of the death of debt is different from the concept of
discharge. A dis-
charge means that the debtor is exonerated following the insolvency procedure from
any
and all liability in respect of claims not fully paid off. The debt still exists,
even if there is
public recognition that it will never be repaid, and it is resurrected even if it
has been
classified as having zero chance of repayment.
In order, as far as possible, to prevent the costs and problems
resulting from the
risk of complete default on credits/loans irresponsibly granted by lenders, it
appears to
be necessary to put in place mechanisms in the form of insolvency proceedings that
in-
centivise responsible finance. Insolvency regulations have the potential for a
positive im-
pact on lending activity, particularly with respect to individual debtors, as both
lenders
and borrowers can benefit from the certainty resulting from repayment
arrangements
made within insolvency proceedings (higher certainty, at least, than arrangements
made
outside such proceedings). A good example of this is the US Bankruptcy Codes
debtor-
in-possession finance, which is the regulation of post-petition finance aimed at
providing
the debtor with solid access to finance throughout the proceedings.
With respect to discharge it should be noted that, from a contractual
perspective, the
liability of the debtor is patrimonial and universal. Exceptions to that principle
are re-
quired in circumstances of individual insolvency. This applies when the
individuals assets
are insufficient to meet existing obligations, preventing a fresh start. This
fresh start is
not related, as with corporate debtors, to continuing or starting up a business
activity, but
instead to securing a dignified life free from social exclusion.
This exception to the principle of universal liability is linked in the vast
majority of
legal systems to judicial insolvency solutions to an individuals economic crisis.
The dis-
charge test operates in relation to, and as a result of, corporate extinction and
the cancel-
lation of corporate registration in cases of corporate insolvency when, as a result
of lack of
sufficient assets, insolvency proceedings end in liquidation. However, despite the
statutory
recognition of discharge, this does not apply in the context of a composition with
credi-
tors. This offers insolvency proceedings an advantage over other out-of-court
solutions
from this specific perspective.
14 See Reifner, U. (2003c).
539
----------------------- Page 579-----------------------
Juana Pulgar
Even so, limitations on the debtors universal liability is not totally alien
to out-of-
court solutions, and certain of the debtors assets are excluded from enforcement
or at-
tachment, such as a minimum level of earnings, tools needed for work, or assets
deployed
in the exercise of a profession.
It is also possible for debts to be written off as a result of an out-of-
court settlement
with creditors. This may be equivalent to a legal discharge (improper discharge).
However,
this discharge may lack certainty as its execution depends on the goodwill of the
creditors
unless it is not brought to the courts again.
In this context, Principle 1 (life time contract) and Principle 2 (human
dimension)
proposed with regard to life time contracts fit into the death of the debt
doctrine and the
discharge approach discussed above.
17.4 Mediation, Responsible Credit and Amicable Composition
of Creditors in Individual Insolvency
An amicable composition of creditors to resolve an individuals economic crisis

normally
requires refinancing of the debt, in the form of an agreement based on write-offs
and/or
extensions of term (percentage reduction in payments, waiver of
instalments), and re-
quires that the terms and conditions of the contract(s) be revisited generally.
An inter partes negotiation between debtors and their main financial
creditors,
usually financial institutions, takes place where the differing legal positions and
in-
equality between the individual debtor and the creditor become apparent. These dif-
ferences existed when the contract was entered into, and remain in the
context of
management and resolution of the crisis. In some instances, this may be prejudicial
to
the individual (i.e., expensive higher interest rate in exchange for a short-term
facility
in rescue to a long-term loan).
In this context, at least two different mechanisms could effectively
contribute to en-
hance consensus, which, while allowing the parties to retain their freedom to
participate,
could operate as a responsible and fair solution, preventing the abuse of one
partys ad-
vantageous position.
The principle of responsible credit introduced by Directive 2008/48/EC in
relation to
consumer credit contracts15 has defined the contractual obligations under which a
loan
can be granted to consumers and individuals. It is no longer only a principle of

safe and
sound banking. This principle must also apply, both when the loan is made, and if
the
15 See, additionally, the European Parliament and European Council Directive

proposal regarding credit con-
tracts for residential real estate (Brussels 31.3.2011 COM [2011], 142 final,
2011/0062 (COD)) and report
from the European Central Bank of 5 July 2011 with respect to this directive
proposal.
540
----------------------- Page 580-----------------------
Bankruptcy
loan is renewed or extended in the event that it is refinanced. The renewal of

credit must
therefore be based on the knowledge and informed consent of the contracting parties
and
must be fair, being both coherent and proportionate to the requirements placed on
each
of the parties.16
On the other hand, intervention by a third party in the form of a

conciliation process
is a convenient outcome. This may be mediation, attempting to create areas of
agreement,
or ultimately arbitration, imposing a solution, even where this is qualified by
the need for
the consent of the parties, as the solution will affect their legal rights and the
jurisdiction
of the courts cannot otherwise be ousted. As we will see below, different legal
models have
articulated different schemes with respect to third party intervention and
arbitration in
the context of an amicable resolution of individual insolvency or over-
indebtedness.
17.5 The Adoption of Contractual Solutions to Individual Insolvency

of Individuals Within the European Legal System
In the European context, in line with the emphasis on alternative dispute

resolution sys-
tems (ADR), we see a general tendency to promote consensual solutions to insolvency
and
over-indebtedness in general, and with regard to individuals in particular. The
systems
vary from a narrow focus on consumers to a broader approach applicable
to all indi-
viduals, whether or not they are defined as consumers, including small businesses
and
entrepreneurs. The form of implementation of these approaches ranges from out-of-
court
settlement (contractual solution of the crisis) to judicial insolvency proceedings
(judicial/
insolvency procedures).
17.5.1 The German Model: Verbraucherinsolvenzverfahren
In the German model, subsequently emulated by Portugal in the Cdigo da

insolvncia
e recuperao de empresas, specific rules simplify the procedure for this category
of debt
(article 304 to 314 InsO) (Verbraucherinsolvenzverfahren), with the effect that
discharge
(Restschuldbefreiung) is regulated by statute rather than contractual solutions
outside for-
mal insolvency proceedings. The approach to insolvency was reformed by the
Insolven-
zordnung (InsO), to place the emphasis on voluntary solutions. But similar to the
practice
in the Netherlands, the number of such contractual solutions have remained very
small,
and even if such solutions were achieved it mostly anticipated only what the
creditor would
16 See European Coalition for Responsible Credit (ECRC). URL:

http://www.responsible-credit.net/index.
php?id=2516.
541
----------------------- Page 581-----------------------
Juana Pulgar
anyhow have got out of a judicial procedure. The 2013 reform adapted the law to
this fac-
tual situation, reducing the requirement of a previous attempt for a voluntary
agreement
to a formalised statement of a debt advice agency that such attempts had been in
place or
were unpromising. In spite of this development, the memorandum of understanding be-
tween Portugal and the troika (International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank
and
the European Union) who paved the way for legal neocolonialism, which will
probably
predominate in the coming years, promotes amicable solutions to consumer
insolvency/
over-indebtedness through an insolvency procedure.
Other models introduce mechanisms to address an individuals financial crisis
at an
earlier stage and outside formal insolvency proceedings. These include the French,
Italian
and Spanish models.
17.5.2 The UK Model: Individual Voluntary Arrangements, Scheme of

Arrangements and Adjustment of Debts
The 1986 UK Insolvency Act, amended by the 2000 Insolvency Act and the Enterprise
Act 2002,17 introduced reforms all of which were influenced by the 1982 Cork
Committee
(Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency law and Practice).18 English law is
now
structured around amicable compositions between debtor and creditors with varying
lev-
els of judicial involvement.
In addition to the process of liquidation (winding up), there are
judicial com-
position agreements with creditors (company voluntary arrangements
for cor-
porations and individual voluntary arrangements for individuals), together
with
out-of-court administration (administrative receivership) and judicial
administration
(administration).19
The company voluntary arrangement for corporations and the

individual volun-
tary arrangements, together with the simplified version, the fast-track voluntary
arrange-
ment (section 263 Insolvency Act), represent a simple and inexpensive procedure
that
allows debtor, creditors and shareholders to reach a refinancing agreement even
before
17 See the amendments to both regulations:

http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/insolvency/docs/insolvency%20
profession/insolvency%20profession/insolvency%20law/insolvencyact.pdf.
18 The very important Cook Report of 1982 was the foundation of the 1985
Insolvency Act, as well as the
English Company Directors Disqualification Act of the same year, and indeed
modern insolvency law. The
report set out the objectives of insolvency proceedings, including the
perspectives for the credit system, an
early diagnosis of insolvency, together with the rapid monetisation of the
insolvency estate, and the honest
and swift distribution of the assets in liquidation, protecting not only the
debtors and the creditors interests
but also the interests of employees, suppliers and other interested parties.
See Finch, V. (1997).
19 See Weisgard, G. (2003); Finch, V. (2002).
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Sic
Stantibus Instead
of Bankruptcy
the debtor becomes insolvent. A third party (insolvency practitioner) is

appointed and
operates with limited judicial oversight. The role of the IP is similar in nature
to that of a
mediator. Under the 2000 Insolvency Act, a moratorium may be imposed at the request
of
the debtor in respect of enforcement action by creditors or automatic, if there is
an IVA,
enforcement proceedings. This moratorium will apply as long as certain
legal require-
ments are met in connection with the debtors total revenues, liabilities and
employees.
This moratorium, however, does not apply during the negotiation of the
composition,
which can make it more difficult to reach agreement. Company voluntary
arrangements
must be supported by creditors, with limited judicial intervention available to
address any
disputes between the creditors committee and the shareholders, and to preside over
any
application to declare the agreement null and void in the event of breach of the
arrange-
ment or fraud.20
However, the usefulness and flexibility of company voluntary arrangements as

judi-
cial agreements between debtor and creditors, with minimum judicial intervention,
does
not appear to have been favoured in practice. Other systems have shown
a preference
for a compromise between the judicial and contractual approaches. Under English
law,
this takes the form of arrangements in which judicial intervention is present but
where a
third party insolvency practitioner is not appointed. This occurs in the case of
company
voluntary arrangements. Such schemes, moreover, may bind secured creditors, thereby
superseding the principle of privity of contract, even if only with respect to

corporations
(schemes of arrangement only apply to corporations). This is not allowed under
company
voluntary arrangements.21
Indeed, these halfway schemes are also widely applied by corporations in

other ju-
risdictions, such as Germany or Spain. This is because the arrangements allow the
debtor,
within the context of a voluntary out-of-court procedure, to reach an
agreement with
creditors or classes of creditors. Moreover, the role of the court enables the
proposed ar-
rangements to be extended to dissenting and non-participating creditors, including
se-
cured creditors. This approach therefore facilitates both debt refinancing and
corporate
restructuring.22
20 Finch, V. (2002) p. 352.

21 See Bewick, S./Fennessy, M. (2007).
22 It can be argued that many out-of-court agreements are fleeing towards the UK
schemes of arrangement. In
this regard, with respect to German corporations, Tele Columbus, Rodenstock,
the insurer, Equitable Life;
or Spanish corporations such as Metrovacesa, La Seda and, more recently,
Cortefiel, which have decided to
conduct their refinancings and restructurings out of court in the UK, with
certain recognition issues that
could arise should these schemes of arrangement be challenged in the countries
where those corporations
are incorporated.
543
----------------------- Page 583-----------------------
Juana Pulgar
17.5.3 The US Bankruptcy Model
In the United States, the problem of over-indebtedness and individual insolvency

is ad-
dressed through Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code, Liquidation, and
by virtue of
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in relation to the adjustment of debt of an
individual
with regular income. By virtue of Chapter 7, the assets of the estate are
liquidated judi-
cially and the debtor is freed from all existing liabilities. Chapter 13 enables
the indi-
vidual debtor whose liabilities are lower than USD 250,000 for unsecured claims and
USD
750,000 for secured claims to negotiate an agreement to make payments over a
specific
period. However, this plan requires the prior assessment of the total income of the
debtor,
from which the payments will be deducted, and an analysis of the minimum
subsistence
needs of the debtor. Under this agreement, the debtor will retain her assets, the
judge will
approve the payment calendar, and, if the payments are met, the debtors future
earnings
will be freed, the debtor being exonerated from the balance of the debts (or
discharged).
Therefore, the discharge is present in both Chapters 7 and 13 of the US
Bankruptcy
Code. It must be noted that in the year 2005 the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Con-
sumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) was passed into law which toughened the requirements
for debtors to benefit from the discharge (discharge test) as a result of abuses
that occurred
under the previous regulation.23
17.5.4 The French Model: le surendettement des particuliers
The French model, introduced in 1984, represents the paradigm of

amicable, or out-
of-court, solutions to insolvency, especially with regard to individuals,
and specifically
consumers.
Book III of the French Consumer Code, Title III (articles L 331-1 and 333-8),
applies
to situations of over-indebtedness, and includes provisions for discharge of
outstanding
liabilities. The process entails a series of proceedings, leading to redressement
and the
debtors eventual rtablissement personnel. Mediation through an official body
(the Com-
mission de surendettement) plays a key role. The Commission can
recommend to the
debtor and the creditors, depending on the extent to which the economic
situation of
the debtor is reversible, the adoption of certain measures provided for in the
Consumer
Code, such as extended periods of payment, reduced interest rates or even write-
offs.
It should be noted that Act 2003/706 of 1 August 2003, the Loi
sur la scurit
financire has among its goals to reinforce consumer rights, in particular with
regard to
23 Dickerson, A. M. (2006); Warren, E./Tyagi, A. W. (2004) pp. 71-95. See a point

of view on the US reform,
Lawless, R. M./Warren, E. (2006).
544
----------------------- Page 584-----------------------

Bankruptcy
consumer credit. This Act introduced new disclosure and publicity requirements as
well as
measures to prevent surconsommation (over-consumption), a new legal term defined
in
connection with the regulation of irresponsible lending (soutien abusif) (articles
L 650-1
of the French Code du Commerce).
17.5.5 The Italian Model: Accordi di ristrutturazione/umbrella prottetivi
Italian law approaches insolvency and over-indebtedness on the basis of a

dichotomy
between the individual and their role as entrepreneur. It promotes
amicable composi-
tion of creditors in relation to individual insolvency through the accordi di
risanamento
and accordi di ristrutturazione, under the Decree of 14 March 2005, as amended by
the
Decree of 31 May 2012 (i.e. Decree 78/20120), and completed by Act 3/2012, of 27
Janu-
ary 2012. This applies to over-indebted individuals who cannot be made bankrupt
under
Italian law.
The mechanism of a debt restructuring agreement between debtor and creditors,
au-
thorised by the court, represents a remarkable legal advance in the development of
out-
of-court solutions to insolvency. Article 8.4 Act 3/2012 provides for the ability
to extend
the terms agreed in a standstill agreement to third parties who did not
participate in
the agreement. This is legally precluded for accordi di ristrutturazione y
risanamento. The
process relies heavily on mediation and authorises public entities to appoint, upon
the
request of an interested party, independent arbitrators and mediators. It also
introduces
the concept of the discharge of unpaid liabilities in the context of insolvency
proceedings
(esdebitazione).
17.5.6 The Spanish Model: the Enhancement of Pre-Petition Refinancing

Agreements, Both in General and with Respect to Secured Creditors
Spanish law provides no statutory provision for a specific procedure for out-of-
court reso-
lution of an individuals over-indebtedness. Nor does it include the concept of
discharge
(exoneracin del pasivo insatisfecho), although at the time of writing this chapter
there was
ongoing work on draft legislation in this regard. The present position is that
individuals
are subject to insolvency proceedings (concurso de acreedores) governed by the
Spanish
Insolvency Act (SIA). These are the only proceedings under Spanish law, and all
debtors,
corporations and individuals are subject to them irrespective of their status as
consumer
or entrepreneur.
Under Spanish law, however, by virtue of Royal Decree 3/2009 and Act 38/2001,
ma-
jor reforms have been introduced to the SIA aimed at furthering out-of-court
solutions
to insolvency and over-indebtedness through the protection of a pre-petition
refinancing
545
----------------------- Page 585-----------------------
Juana Pulgar
agreement, which may also benefit individuals as they are not limited to
corporations
or entrepreneurs (unlike in Italy under the accordi di ristrutturazione scheme
outlined
above).
An individual who is willing to refinance debts, particularly those obtained
from fi-
nance institutions may thus rely on the acuerdos particulares de refinanciacin
governed
by DA 4 Act 22/2003 by virtue of new provisions contained in Act 38/2011. For
these
agreements to apply, a minimum of 75% of the debt must be owed to financial
institutions,
but this threshold is usually easily achieved by individual debtors. The agreements
are vol-
untary under article 1255 Spanish Civil Code, and no limits are imposed on them
subject
to those applicable to dissenting creditors or those who did not participate.
This provision overcomes the principle of privity of contract with
two important
reservations: first, only compromises based on extension of the term of the loan
can be
imposed on other creditors, and not other compromises (e.g. debt-for-equity swaps).
Sec-
ond, compromises can be applied only to creditor financial institutions. Other
creditors,
such as suppliers and trade creditors, are excluded. This greatly limits the
potential ben-
24
efits of this exception to the privity of contract principle .
Additionally, and specifically with respect to the development in the Spanish
model
of out-of-court solutions to individual over-indebtedness and insolvency, these
solutions
have been promoted in the context of the relationship between debtors and secured
credi-
tors (relationships that are both numerically and quantitatively the most
significant with
respect to individuals) by means of Royal Decree 6/2012, of 9 March 2012, which
pro-
vides for urgent measures for the protection of mortgage debts, together with a
voluntary
banking code of practice that financial institutions have to date widely followed.
This has
recently been updated by Royal Decree 27/2012, of 15 November 2012, with urgent
mea-
sures to strengthen the protection of mortgagors.
This Royal Decree provides for the suspension, for a period of two
years from
16 November 2012, of any eviction arising from mortgage enforcement proceedings
where
the household contains vulnerable people and certain economic circumstances are
present.
On 15 May 2013, the State Official Gazette published the text of
Act 1/2013 of
14 May 2013 containing measures to protect mortgagees, debt restructuring and
social
rents, which entered into force on the date of publication. The Act amends certain
aspects
of both judicial and out-of-court mortgage enforcement proceedings in order to
increase
the protection of borrowers who have secured their debts with a mortgage on their
home,
and enable them to obtain better prices at auction, as well as allow for suspension
of the
enforcement proceedings when the loan or credit facility secured by the mortgage
con-
tains abusive clauses (see resolution of the Court of Justice of the
European Union of
14 March 2013 [Case of Aziz].
24 I have analysed this issue in connection with Spanish law in Pulgar Ezquerra,
J. (2011).
546
----------------------- Page 586-----------------------

Bankruptcy
In addition, the Act heavily amends Royal Decree 6/2012 of 9 March 2012, and
sets
special rules for the enforcement of mortgages where the borrower is at risk of
social ex-
clusion. It also envisages a voluntary Code of Practice (soft law) for credit
institutions.
The Act also contains other amendments to the legislation relating to Real Estate
valuation
companies.
Finally, there is no specific regulation of irresponsible credit in the
Spanish model,
unlike in France, or even jurisprudential precedent as in Italy. Various rules do,
however,
impose an obligation on lenders to assess the borrowers solvency before making a
loan.
In this context, the Consumer Credit Act of 24 June 2011, the Sustainable
Economy
Law of 4 March 2011 (art. 29), and the Order EHA/2899/2011 of 28 October 2011
provide
for transparency and the protection of consumers of banking services, provide
access to
the patrimonial solvency database offered by credit bureaus operated by private
enti-
ties (ASNEF, EQUIFAX, EXPERIAN, CCI, CIRBE Central de Informacin de Riesgo del
Banco de Espaa or, in English, the Bank of Spains Central Risk Information).
547
----------------------- Page 587-----------------------
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550
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18 Responsible Bankruptcy
Udo Reifner
Summary
The financial crisis has changed the image of the creditor debtor relationship.
It has con-
fronted society with the fact that bankruptcy procedures fall short of helping to
manage a ma -
jor economic crisis. It has further challenged our idea of justice in its failure
to treat insolvent
economic entities equally. Its basic ideas are outdated where only financial
interests or public
non-profit goals are at stake. In this chapter we put forward some ideas for the
reintegration
of bankruptcy procedures and credit contracts into the broader concept of the
credit relation-
ship which should equally integrate personal sureties given by third parties as
proposed in the
abandoned 2002 draft of the Consumer Credit Directive. (Prez-Carillo) This could
lead to a
revised legal concept that might come closer to providing an adequate framework
for modern
bankruptcy procedures.
18.1 Insolvency in a Credit Society
Credit is a form of productive cooperation over time. Modern capitalism has

reduced this
cooperation to a financial relationship. The consequences of default in the real
economy
are mitigated by the possibility of refinancing liabilities under spot exchange
contracts.
Credit has become a tool for postponing, circumventing and preventing traditional
insol-
vency where producers or traders have provided goods and services but payment
cannot
be made on time. Poverty, once the lack of access to goods and services, is now
lack of
access to credit. The failure of synallagmatic spot relationships with a multitude
of credi-
tors appears curable by means of credit obtained via the financial system. But
credit may
be a sham solution if default is not temporary. The problem resurfaces when a loan
has
to be repaid, now enhanced by interest and fees. Credit insolvency is then the
final stage
of economic failure in a credit society. Banks have thus become guardians of the
market,
providing access to it and exit from it. They hold the keys to and the
responsibility for the
proper functioning of its mechanisms. But we do not expect the solution to these
problems
and public wealth from the benevolence of bankers. We also cannot expect this
from their
regard for their own self-interest. It is the law and the state whose rules and
interventions
551
----------------------- Page 591-----------------------
Udo Reifner
must guarantee that banks work for the public good when managing the increasing
num-
ber of financial crises faced by individuals, states and enterprises.1
Contract law offers little for such credit arrangements. Loans are primarily
treated as
the purchase of credit where the intention of the parties at the time it is
entered into deter-
mines the relationship in future years. The synallagma also reflects the idea of
purchase
instead of a long-term service relationship. A bank supplies a certain amount of
money
2
in exchange for a secure(d), interest-bearing claim on the future income of the
debtor.
The Consumer Credit Directive 2008 mirrors this outdated concept perfectly. (see
Prez-
Carrillo/Gallardo) It requires disclosure of the same information five times and
gives a
right of withdrawal for better reflection, neither of which has any practical
impact at all.
When contracting, individuals are focussed on their access to credit, not on
repayment
of the loan. In 60% of cases they are partly at the mercy of a previous creditor,
because
they need to refinance an existing debt. Since constraints affect their behaviour,
they only
become aware of the burden of the loan with the first or second instalment, and
long after
the period for withdrawal has expired, when they recognise its impact on
their future
liquidity. The bargaining power needed for the user-friendly mechanisms providing
ade-
quate solutions to future distress would not be available even if consumers could
foresee
these events. In short, the sales ideology has led to the total exclusion of all
legal remedies
for credit and debt relationships. The first draft of the Directive of 2002
proposed that
the principle of clausula rebus sic stantibus (adaptation to changing conditions)
should be
applied to address dangerous situations such as open-ended credit, credit card
credit, vari-
able and second mortgage loans, as well as forced sales of related financial
products, in the
form of the general principle of responsible credit and two additional stated
objectives
of the Directive, namely consumer protection and the prevention of over-
indebtedness.
These are now absent from the Directive.3 The only duty of care for creditors
contained in
the Directive is to refuse a loan if it appears unaffordable to the user. The

lender need have
no regard to considerations such as the right choice of the right product having
regard to
other creditors and the debtors social environment.
1 This semi-quote uses Adam Smiths famous sentence: It is not from the
benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own self-interest. (Smith, A.
(1776) Ch.2 I.2.2.) Etzioni (Etzioni, A. (1988)) provides a thorough analysis
of the problem in his first book
and a poor solution in his second where the law is replaced by community
sentiments. (Etzioni, A. (1993)).
2 See the definition in the Codice Civile ital. Art. 1813 Il mutuo il contratto
col quale una parte consegna
allaltra una determinata quantit di danaro o di altre cose fungibili, e
laltra si obbliga a restituire altrettante
cose della stessa specie e qualit (1782), which corresponds to the German
version in force until 2002 in
Article 607 BGB.
3 After 17 years of thorough preparation of the 2002 draft of the Commission with
the help of all known
national experts, a totally new draft law appeared as an alternative within
three months and was channelled
through the parliament by the well-known single lobbyist Wuermeling.
552
----------------------- Page 592-----------------------
18
Responsible Bankruptcy
This liberal response to the prevention of insolvency has now failed so

deeply in the
present crisis it is even criticised by its former sponsors as information
overload. Where
problems occur, the relationship ends. The non-contractual period of serfdom after
de-
fault starts before the insolvent debtor is finally handed over to insolvency law.
In its two
forms of persecution, individual debt enforcement and collective bankruptcy,
insolvency
law is a remedy for the biggest failures of the capitalist market economy.
Insolvency comes too late, is often not applicable, is retrograde,
retaliating where re-
habilitation is needed. It organises the future of the creditordebtor relationship
in the
light of the losses purportedly flawless property rights of the creditor have
sustained.
But this is only theory. In practice, insolvency lawyers and judges have long
reached
into the periods before and after bankruptcy is pronounced. A large range of
autonomous
and semi-autonomous legal and economic resources exist.4 Bankruptcy, better
referred
to in Latin and German as the concurso (where creditors come together

(concurrere)),
provides for the distribution of assets. This economic death was introduced around
the
middle of the 19th century. The first quarter of the 20th century saw the
introduction of
consensual schemes in order to allow continuing economic activity by the debtor
after
default. Today, quasi-contracts as an alternative to strict bankruptcy provide all
the means
contract law denies to the debtor: the inclusion of third parties, the duty to
cooperate, the
regard for the debtors economic opportunities and future, and the effects on his
economic
or social environment. This insolvency law looks like a social form of a long-term
credit
relationship, replacing the spot contract that still dominates this part of the
law. The job
of insolvency law is to compensate for the shortcomings of general contract law, so
that
the latter can maintain the fundamental fiction that every participant in the
market can be
prosecuted because he has unlimited access to money at any time.
To understand this development, the concept of insolvency has to be re-
examined. The
negative denomination, in-solvency, reminds those applying it that insolvency law
does not
take part in the game of the market; it merely regulates the markets failure.
Economically,
this is contrary to the new insight that insolvency is a temporary and necessary
part of eco-
nomic risk-taking and investment, and not the result of immoral behaviour as such.
Just like in-solvency, the idea of failure is also expressed in the French
faillite , the
Italian fallimento , the German bankrott (ital. from banca rotta (broken
bank)) and the
Spanish words quiebra, bancarota and fallid. This idea reflects the
creditors view that
he has lost part of his fortune, ignoring the fact that he did not own real wealth,
only a
claim on future wealth through the work of another, although he should have known
that
the value of the asset had already been reduced by its inherent risk when he
contracted for
it. The 19th century freed claims and earnings from their relationship to the
productivity
4 See Pulgar Ezquerra, J. (2012); for credit law see Reifner, U./Niemi-
Kiesilinen, J. et al. (2010).
553
----------------------- Page 593-----------------------
Udo Reifner
and gain of the user of credit, which had still been visible in ancient law and
persists today
in the Islamic financial principle of riba.5 The productivity of borrowed capital
is today
taken into account only where credit is extended in the form of commercial papers
or
shares whose true return is participation in the increase in their value expressed
in the
equity price. In banking, credit relationships have lost this cooperative dimension
and are
treated as natural fruits, which it expects to harvest without regard to the
productivity of
the borrowers economic venture.
Financial claims are abstract property rights with a nominal value
in general cur-
rency. They persist and die only with the debtor. Bankruptcy law never admitted
that these
claims either had no value at all from the beginning or that they had later lost
their value
as a result of the trajectory of the debtors economic circumstances.
They are only de-
valuated in fact by the distribution of the bankruptcy estate, while legally they
persist as
nominal property. In historic situations like the London Debt Conference, on the
other
hand, interest due from Germany was waived in its entirety and its debt was halved.
The
asymmetrical devaluation in 2013 of claims against Cyprus banks helped to justify
the
6
rescue of foreign investors through the public ECB. Bankruptcy law solved the
problem of
nominal expressions of inexistent wealth by means of the heuristic of the economic
death
of the debtor. While the productivity of the use of credit became unimportant,
economic
Darwinism took care of credit itself. The role of sound competition (activity) in
the mar-
ket (life) is seen as eliminating those whose activity is detrimental to the
functioning of
the market. The over-indebted must be identified and forced to quit the market if
infected
by the incurable disease of over-indebtedness. Death of the legal person, and
economic
death of the natural person, whose belongings are taken away from them, are subject
to
minimum restraints provided by modern social welfare legislation. But with consumer
bankruptcy the heuristic reached its limits. It had to admit that it was not
possible for the
economic death of the debtor to readjust his economic activity in line with his
indebted-
ness. Instead the death of debt doctrine adjusted claims to the lives of the
consumers.7
Modern bankruptcy keeps empty and economically dead claims

artificially alive.
These claims are abstracted from their origins and isolated from their
future, and this
is made possible by the insurmountable separations between substantive and
proce-
dural, private and public, preventive and compensatory, individual and
collective law.
This guarantees that an indistinguishable pile of empty debt points to
the debtor as still
5 God permits commerce, and prohibits riba. Quran 2:275. Riba means
increase/growth, which indeed is
a more adequate expression of interest with regard to capital than the 19th
century ideology of interests as
fruits.
6 Only claims of over 100.000 are concerned. The rules also distinguish between
insured and uninsured
claims. Uninsured claims with the Laiki Bank have to be written off, and for
Bank of Cyprus the quota will
reach 40%.
7 Reifner, U. (2003c).
554
----------------------- Page 594-----------------------
18
responsible for it. It virtually canonises the creditor as the true

representation of a sane
economy.
A vast body of para-contractual procedures with mediated settlements,
whether
autonomous or court-induced, creates insolvency plans and contracts. They
are still,
however, perceived as exemptions from the overall principle that bankruptcy equates
to
failure. This doctrine provides destructive rights to creditors under contract law
abruptly
to terminate a long-term credit relationship. It accelerates the return of the
capital and
builds up an insurmountable burden of debt, untouchable by any legal mechanisms de-
signed to adapt long-term relationships to the productivity of the debtor.

In a democratic society, the state and its legal apparatus cannot kill,
liquidate, exclude
or enslave debtors. Equal rights require equal opportunities, including in
default. This
right extends to the debtors family, employees, networks and partners. It even
extends to
the whole of society and the public interest. Nobody able to work or invest and
cooperate
should be hindered from contributing to the general wealth of the nation. This is
why the
Supreme Court of the United States added an important element to the death doctrine
in
8
1934, the principle of fresh start, guaranteeing the life after.
But can bankruptcy law accomplish this task? Allocating public interest,
social regard and
the provision of new opportunities for further economic development primarily to a
point of
no return, at which a person is already branded by his or her insolvency, deprives
the law of
most of its impact. We will argue below that it is only if bankruptcy and credit
law merge, if
the gap between private and public law can be overcome, if a new understanding of a
long-
term responsible credit relationship defines insolvency procedures as well, if
concurso and
reorganisation are separated from each other as opposing principles, that
bankruptcy law can
lose its destructive threat and become efficient in the sense of general economic
development.
18.2 Bankruptcy of Bankruptcy
In the present financial crisis, bankruptcy law contributed little to its

prevention and still
less to its solution. Impeding the application of bankruptcy procedures seemed to
be the
best contribution to proper management of the crisis.
Too big to fail was the explicit reference to the limits of bankruptcy law
when Continental
Illinois Bank of the United States became insolvent.9 Even some large companies
outside the
financial sector (i.e. GM or Friedrich Krupp AG) profited from that doctrine, which
in the end
was applied in the financial sector alone. Hypo Real Estate and Commerzbank in
Germany,
8 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934): it gives to the honest but
unfortunate debtor. . .a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of
preexisting debt.
9 Dash, E. (20.06.2009). See also Hanson, C./Gould, P. et al. (2012); Sorkin, A.
R. (2010).
555
----------------------- Page 595-----------------------
Udo Reifner
Royal Bank of Scotland in the United Kingdom and Citibank in the United States are
only a
few examples of the numerous exemptions from bankruptcy procedures. Its predecessor
was
10
the rescue of banks during the Savings and Loan Crisis in the United States,
where a quar-
11
ter of all S&L institutions that failed were rescued. The Scandinavian (1990 ff)
and Japanese
12 13
banking crises were treated likewise. After deregulation, state
interventions and collective
rescue mechanisms helped to circumvent bankruptcy procedures. While bankruptcy laws
as-
sume that the state should only have a role as mediator and facilitator between
debtors and
creditors, its actual role was that of a parent company condemned to rescue the
bankrupt fi-
nancial institutions from the evils of its own bankruptcy law. After the
deregulation of bank
and credit law, bankruptcy law was simply abrogated by factual behaviour.
The Financial Stability Board of the G20 and the European Union, at its
conference in
Basle, have now turned this into an internationally renowned legal principle for
official bank-
ruptcy policies. Twenty-five systemically important banks (G-SIFIs) have
been eternally
exempted from bankruptcy. This list covers banks of global (G) importance but
induces the
14
G20 members to take similar decisions at the national level. The
change of the wording from
big to systemic itself indicates that the criterion for exclusion is not the
size but the role of
15 16
the bank in the economy as a whole. Too interconnected to fail
means irrespective of size.
Medieval public banks that, as well as being savings, credit and payment
institutions, were
especially important as public charities whose failure would have destroyed the
social welfare
system of the time, were propped up likewise, despite their inability to pay.17
There are also some debtors that are too powerful to fail. Exemptions from
bankruptcy
procedures apply to states and their public institutions (Article 12 German InsO).
This also
applies to the relationship between entire states (sovereign default). Greece,
Cyprus, Ireland
and Portugal are not bankrupt just as Argentina only repudiated its debt. Small
states like
10 Seven hundred and forty-seven small bank institutions were rescued with about
$88 billion. Their failure
was due to the deregulation of the savings market where NOW accounts offered
higher interest that the
savings and loan could not afford. They refinanced high interest with
investment into junk bonds consulted
by the big investment banks. It is basically the same mechanism that led to
the crisis of the public banking
sector in Germany, which lost the state guarantees through the European Union
and compensated for higher
refinancing rates by investing in bad debt offered by the big banks.
11 Ongena, S.; Smith, D. C. et al.: Distressed Relationships: Lessons from the
Norwegian Banking Crisis: CFS
Working Paper No. 2000/01 (December 1999).
12 Hoshi, T./Kashyap, A. (1999).
13 For an overview see Reifner, U.: Bank Safety and Soundness -The Bergamo Report
(1996) pp. 13-44.
14 Financial Stability Board: Policy Measures to Address Systemically
Important Financial Institutions
(04.11.2011). For its composition see Bank for International Settlements;
Basle Committee on Banking Su-
pervision: Consultative Document. Global systemically important banks:
Assessment methodology and the
additional loss absorbency requirement (July 2001); Markose, S./Giansante, S.
et al. (2012).
15 Markose, S./Giansante, S. et al. (2012).
16 See Fondo de Reestructuracin Ordenada Bancaria: Press Release (08.02.2013).
17 See the detailed research by Avallone, P. (2013).
556
----------------------- Page 596-----------------------
18
Venezuela were prosecuted through gun-boat diplomacy by Germany (1903) and the
United
States (1895), for example. Egypt and Haiti were at the mercy of English and
American gun-
boats. No law applied. Mighty debtors such as the United States are exempted. They
can pay off
their debt with a devaluated currency, which reveals the true value of the claims
against them.
Philipp II of Spain (1527-1598), whose territory covered half of the world, was
declared factu-
18
ally insolvent in 1557 and again in 1575 and 1596, when Spain was
unable to pay the 8 million
guilders it owed to Jakob Fugger the Rich in Augsburg. Fugger demonstrated the
new weapon
of private creditors: exclusion. He chose a reminder when he told Philipp II in a
letter that he
might provide financing to the English and French side in the next war.19
Some are too poor for bankruptcy, because liquidation20 needs assets to pay
the creditors
who come together (concurso). The slogan bankruptcy of bankruptcy

emerged at a time
when bankruptcy law was seen as a general remedy for insolvency. This happened late
in the
20th century, when the system of secured bank loans with preferential treatment of
securities
(Art. 47-51 InsO) reduced legal bankruptcy procedures to a symbolic handling of
insolven-
cies in society.21 Since the minimum requirement for such procedures is still that
the bank-
rupts assets22 cover at least the procedural costs, about 85% of the few
procedures initiated
in Germany in 1992 were rejected for this reason. The remaining 15% had assets
covering no
more than an average of 3% of claims.23 Konkurs, Concorso, Concurso describing
the com-
ing together (concurrere) of creditors for the distribution of assets does not
make sense where
such assets are inexistent or otherwise not available for the creditors.24
The legal efforts to extract assets from financial creditors and

return them to the
bankrupts assets by weakening the effects of credit securities in bankruptcy
(Germany),
providing extensive moratoriums (USA), requiring banks to make special
contributions
(France), or allowing procedures to be initiated at an earlier stage when liquidity
strains
have already started to show, have had little effect. The credit system and its
collaterals
have eroded the assets of the debtor. Its visibility is guaranteed by the principle
of pub -
licity25 in civil property law, and had once been the main source for
an assessment of
18 A fourth declaration followed by his successor in 1607.

19 See Kulischer, J. (1988) p. 248; Ehrenberg, R. (1963).
20 This is the title of chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Act, although this title
already provided discharge at an
early stage.
21 Kilger, J. (1975).
22 Article 26 (1) German Bankruptcy Code (InsO).
23 Reasons for reform provided in the law proposal of the German
Government Deutscher Bundestag 12.
Wahlperiode: Beschluempfehlung und Bericht des Rechtsausschusses zu dem
Gesetzentwurf der Bundes-
regierung: Drucksache 12/7302 (19.04.1994), pp. 72 ff.
24 For a comprehensive overview on the 1992 German insolvency reform see Bork, R.
(2012), pp. 4-7.
25 The German Civil Code, in its third book on Property Law (Sachenrecht), is
still a perfect example of 19th
century property ideology, according to which ownership must be visible for
all creditors. It needs either a
visible transaction or proof in a public register. A pledge on movables
without possession is still impossible.
(Art. 1205 BGB). But this is why it has lost its role in defining wealth to
the second book on contracts.
557
----------------------- Page 597-----------------------
Udo Reifner
the creditworthiness of the borrower. Property rights have moved away from real
things
to virtual claims.26 Reservation of property or purely legal transfer as
a security to the
creditor, the replacement of personal ownership by claims, shares and

participations when
transferred to legal persons (impersonal funds and societies) have replaced the
dominium
directum (exclusive property) of ancient Roman law. Modern property can be tacitly
as-
signed and transferred. The final stage of the age of access27 is reached where
access to
credit replaces wealth and determines who is rich or poor.

Some debtors are too dead to fail. Those who lost all assets and died an
economic
death before bankruptcy also escaped its procedures. The development of a legal
person
as the main actor in the economy during the 19th century was the predecessor of
mod-
ern discharge. Bourgeois societies with their possessive individualism 28 allowed
the debt
of capitalist owners to die by transforming the debt into an artificial debtor.29
The owners
of capital split into two: father and son or master and slave. The assets owned by
an indi-
vidual were brought to own life as a legal person in the form of the limited
company. The
mortality of these unanimated slaves did not pose a moral problem to their masters
who
were freed from all responsibility but enjoyed all of its fruits (just as had been
the case with
slaves in ancient societies). But the artificial killing of over-indebted legal
persons in or-
der to get rid of the debt after pillaging the slave became a major source of
fraud. Society as
well as bankruptcy law are to a large extent a means to remedy the evils of this
monster.30
Bankruptcy law contains liquidation,31 a word equally applied to the terrorist
killings of
human beings.32 Liquidation takes away the core element of bankruptcy: the debtor.
But
the concurso needs a debt, a debtor and assets.
26 See Dulckeit, G. (1951); Canaris, C.-W. (1978); Wieacker, F. (1941).

27 For an economic assessment of these developments see Rifkin, J. (2000).
28 See Macpherson, C. B. (1964).
29 Heirs only inherit a debt through their own will and not by law. See Article
1990 BGB (recourse of insuf-
ficient assets) and Article 1943 BGB (right to reject the heritage).
30 In the fantasy novel of Mary Shelley, Frankenstein or The Modern Prometheus,
of 1818 (at the same time
when the legal person emerged as an important actor in economics), this
creation of an artificial person
has become one of the most popular librettos for the mass film
industry. Previous fantasies concerning
reversed masterslave relationships regarded devils, witchcraft, gods and
aliens who were thought to be sub-
dued but later developed into masters of men, while the modern view concerned
artefacts of human beings
themselves. (See i.e. J.W. v. Goethe, The Sorcerers Apprentice, 1797 or the
corresponding English fairy tale
The Master and His Pupil (collected by Jacobs, J. URL:
http://www.authorama.com/english-fairy-tales-17.
html).) This is interesting for financial services as in many fairy tales
money/gold was recognised as a foreign
god or devil to whom one could lose ones soul but not as an artefact of
mankind.
31 It survived in the laws that regulate the liquidation of companies
(see i.e. Art. 145 ff Commercial Code
(HGB), 66 ff Law on ltd (GmbH-G)).
32 The German bankruptcy administrator Wellensiek denied a place for consumer
bankruptcy in the tradi-
tional bankruptcy code since he argued in parliament that he knew very well
how to liquidate a firm and
could not use this knowledge to liquidate a person.
558
----------------------- Page 598-----------------------

18
Finally, debtors emerged in bankruptcy law that are too alive to fail.
Consumer bank-
ruptcy developed in Europe in 1984.33 All EU Member States, with the exception of
Spain,
Italy and Bulgaria, have introduced schemes or draft laws for what can be called
the provi-
sion of a responsible start.34 All these laws have one common assumption: the debt
dies, is
discharged, in the wake of this procedure. Thus it allows the economic life of the
debtor
to continue, which in fact is his only life. While its effect is adequate, its
ideology is mis-
leading. It perpetuates the 19th century assumption that a user of external capital
turns
into a debtor in default when he or she is no longer able to pay due to a lack of
productive
investment opportunities. Since debt is thus assimilated into fault and crime or,
in Chris-
tian terminology, into a sin, discharge then corresponds to the absolution provided
by
the Catholic and Protestant Churches in the name of God. Creditors are
therefore
given the role of gods while debtors remain the sinners. All consumer bankruptcy
schemes
breathe this ideology when they provide for slave-like obligations for debtors to
acquire
assets for their gods within a certain period. Instead, the economic sin of debt
has already
evaporated of its own accord by the time it comes to bankruptcy. Its nominal value
should
be adapted to reality, which would make discharge and mercy superfluous.
Figure 18.1 Discharge in Germany: Draft Amendments 2013
Accepted
Wealthy Poor
Repayment Plan with
Income & up to
Plan Discharge
20 creditors
d Forced acceptance by
D
s
e
t court decision
c
c
e
h
j
a
e (Creditors quorum
g
R 50% & 50%
Cost covered = 5
ys e
Poor Poor
Period of good
No income & More than 35%
cov. = 3 ys
Certificate behaviour +
more than 20
Court Decision
creditors
i
Individual Debt Advisor Courts
Fiduciary Courts m
33 1984 Denmark, UK and France, 1992 Scandinavian states and Austria, 1994
Germany, 1998 Benelux, 2003
new accession states to the EU; 2012 Greece while Italy, Romania, Lithuania and
Hungary are preparing for
2013.
34 These two concepts have been elaborated in Huls, N. J. (1994) and
reconsidered in Reifner, U./Niemi-
Kiesilinen, J. et al. (2010), pp 343 ff. While a fresh start wipes out the
debt as the only condition for a new
start, the responsible start idea assumes that it is not the debt but the
exclusion of the debtor from a produc-
tive life that causes the problem. This is why a grace period is necessary, in
which debt advice and help is
associated with the debtors obligation to try to order his financial affairs
under the supervision of a trustee.
559
----------------------- Page 599-----------------------
Udo Reifner
Aristotle had a much more realistic view of the economy. Oikos nomos, the
order of the
house, assumed that human beings need the means to eat, to communicate and to
obtain
shelter, which they produce in a cooperative way delimited by the ancient estate.
Distrib-
uting these belongings to satisfy past debt would kill the debtor and his family.
Exemption
laws in debt enforcement procedures have recognised this from the very beginning.
Con-
sumer bankruptcy law transformed it into a general principle, which replaced the
death
of the debtor by the death of the debt. But unlike the traditional Protestant
system of fresh
start in Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code, the European system did not assume
that
this can be accomplished simply by writing off past debt.35 Its procedures usually
stretch
out over a period of 3-4 years, and in some cases more than 7 years.36 The
explanations
for this are different ones. They include penalising bankruptcy as default through
a duty
to live at the minimum level for x years (the old debt slavery), maintaining the
creditor
relationship with regard to the different origins of the debt claims, and/or
providing time
for the social and legal assistance necessary to reintegrate the debtors economic
life into
the general economic life of society. The old idea of debtors fault and guilt is
upheld in
the range of exemptions from discharge, notably with regard to delictual
claims, fines
and family support (half of EU member states), and in some instances also for taxes
and
student loans (a quarter of these states). In fact, there is no discharge in these
bankruptcy
laws. Economically speaking it is merely the adaptation of the debt to the
productive pos-
sibilities a user of anothers capital may have within a time horizon that
corresponds to the
use value of the borrowed capital.
This is why the seemingly conservative European approach is much more
progressive
than the fresh start approach in the United States, which simply expels debtors
from the
ordinary markets. In Europe, the procedure is prepared and accompanied by free debt
advice in many states. It has three elements: the attempt at an amicable settlement
out of
court; if this is unachievable, the court procedure starts with the traditional
distribution of
the debtors assets followed either by a semi-autonomous insolvency plan enforced
by the
judge; or, if this is not feasible, by a court-defined period in which the debtor
is obliged to
pay as much of his debt as he can.
But the insolvency plans do not work as intended. They usually contain only
the fi-
nancial elements of the bankruptcy procedure. It is even more disadvantageous for
the
debtor because, unlike court procedures, contractual plans can be cancelled on
default.
Most banks do not even look at proposals made by debt advisors. A Dutch and a
German
35 For on overview of its principles see Reifner, U./Niemi-Kiesilinen, J. et al.

(2010) pp. 387 ff and especially
Worldbank; Kilborn, J. et al.: Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of
Natural Persons (January 2013).
36 Austria 7, Belgium 3 to 5, Czech Republic 5, Denmark 3 to 5, England/Wales 3 or
less, Estonia 5, France 8-0,
Germany 5 or 3 (with assets), Greece 4, Lithuania 3 or 5, Luxembourg 7 or less,
Netherlands 3, Norway 5,
Poland 5 or less, Slovakia 3, Slowenia 2 to 5, Sweden 5.
560
----------------------- Page 600-----------------------
18
investigation revealed that the assessment of such plans is too costly for
creditors. They in-
evitably fear that other creditors will object. Without state intervention, the
weak debtor in
default is left to bargain with powerful creditors for an adequate insolvency plan.
His only
asset is the promise to give more than the creditor would get through state
procedures,
which means going below subsistence level in order to pay off more of the debt. The
vast
majority of cases in practice do not provide any expectation of repayments. No
income is
foreseeable above the minimum the debtor needs for his living. In these
circumstances,
banks will not invest in the procedure and leave it to the state to decide. The
insight has
not yet been accepted by lawmakers that bankruptcy law should help the debtor to
survive
the financial crisis and remind creditors that, instead of being inactive, they
should have
adapted the credit relationship to the debtors circumstances. A French bank
started by
including the task of adaptation and help in needy situations into their four
principles of
responsible lending.37 The seven principles of the European coalition for
responsible credit
(ECRC) likewise list this duty.38
In its summary report, the World Bank39 has enumerated the advantages a
rehabilita-
tion procedure in which creditors assist could have for the whole of society. They
include
establishing proper account valuation, reduced wasteful collections costs and
destroyed
value in depressed asset sales, encouraging responsible lending and reducing
negative ex-
ternalities, concentrating losses on more efficient and effective loss
distributors, reducing
the costs of illness, crime, unemployment, and other welfare-related costs,
increasing pro-
duction of regular taxable income, maximizing economic activity, encouraging
entrepre-
neurship, enhancing stability, predictability in the broader financial system.
The report clarifies the importance such procedures would have for
encouraging re-
sponsible lending under No. 89 of the recitals as follows:
When creditors make loans that ultimately default, they incur costs
themselves, but
they also externalize costs onto others. For creditors, these costs may be
expected, almost
37 See the four self-obligations of the Cetelem Bank: 1/ Lutter contre le

surendettement 2/ Favoriser laccs
au crdit au plus grand nombre 3/ Accompagner en souplesse chaque client 4/
Prendre en charge chaque
client en difficult (BNP Paribas Personal Finance. URL:
http://moncreditresponsable.com/tout-savoir/
credit-responsable-cetelem/engagements.).
38 See especially P3: Lending has at all times to be cautious, responsible and
fair. (Credit and its servicing must
be productive for the borrower. Responsible lending requires the
provision of all necessary information
and advice to consumers and liability for missing and incorrect information.
No lender should be allowed
to exploit the weakness, need or naivety of borrowers. Early repayment, without
penalty, must be possi-
ble. The conditions under which consumers can refinance or reschedule their
debt should be regulated.)
P4: Adaptation should be preferred to credit cancellation and
destruction. (There is a need for effective
protection against unfair credit cancellation. Default charges should be
adequate to cover losses only.) P6:
Over-indebtedness should be a public concern. (Profit-driven systems cannot
cope with over-indebtedness.
Consumers should have a right to discharge. Bankruptcy procedures should lead
to rehabilitation and not
to retorsion.) (European Coalition for Responsible Credit (ECRC). URL:
http://www.responsible-credit.net/
index.php?id=2516. in eight languages, endorsed by about 80 social
organizations worldwide).
39 Worldbank; Kilborn, J. et al.: (2013) pp. 26 ff.
561
----------------------- Page 601-----------------------
Udo Reifner
welcome casualties of an aggressive business model of high-risk, high-profit

lending. Even
substantial losses can be managed if an aggressive lending model produces
countervailing
substantial returns from the canpay debtors. Creditors can reduce the impact of
their
own lax credit underwriting decisions by factoring a loss ratio into their costs of
doing
business. They can plan for and adjust accordingly to expected losses, reducing the
effect
if not the incidence of default.
The World Bank paper does not, however, draw the conclusion that consumer
bank-
ruptcy is a hidden part of consumer credit relationships. This would lead to a
much-needed
broader approach to bankruptcy law. The recent spread of discharge to all
industrialised
states makes apparent that consumer credit contracts are flawed. The artificially
low value
of the claims, owing to their overrated nominal value, needs to be cured before
bank-
ruptcy. This should emphatically not take the form of religious
absolution. Adaptation
mechanisms need state intervention to protect debtors in default when they are
trying
to bargain with a powerful creditor from an extremely weak situation about what is,
in
fact, a common cooperative future in the credit relationship. The World Bank is
therefore
propagating a concept that 30 years ago might have paved the path to a modern
thinking.
Today it offers the Third World a concept that they would do better to ignore. We
will
return to this later.
18.3 From Bankruptcy Law to Debt Reorganisation
Luhmann has styled legal procedures as a technique to reduce complexity in conflict

com-
munication.40 Insolvency procedure is the communication process on the most
important
conflicts in a market economy. A sophisticated system of legal reductions and

divisions
have cut the problem into manageable pieces. This has developed in the last 170
years
with the rise of the credit society, which, paradoxically, deviated from
the 3,500 years
before, when such problems were still seen as part of the credit relationship
itself and not
as something analogous to crime, situated outside the normal credit relationship
after it
has been terminated unilaterally by the creditor, even in circumstances of adequate
and
necessary late or reduced payments. This abstraction allowed credit and investment
to
develop independently of the social and economic environment. The bankruptcy system
made this ideology tolerable. It created the abstract image of a good creditor and
a faulty
debtor, the god and the sinner.
In ancient law the debtor was seen instead either as the productive user
(locator)41
or a (divine) pauper for whom the wealthy creditor had to care. The creditor and
owner
40 Luhmann, N. (1974), pp. 22 f.

41 For this see the excellent study of long-term credit relationships in the
medieval time Grossi, P. (1963).
562
----------------------- Page 602-----------------------

18
of capital was presented as a greedy wealthy sinner who could gain religious
acceptance
through charity. In the Protestant image of modern capitalism,42 the creditor is
instead
glorified as a productive investor, a decent saver and owner of assets who has been
be-
trayed, while the debtor who used his capital has been turned into a guilty,
unreliable,
wealth consuming person living at the expense of others. Charity today is allocated
out-
side the synallagmatic relationships of the market and linked to the almost divine
right of
the rich to forgive those who are indebted to us.43
This was an important step for capital accumulation and the development of
produc-
tive money in universal credit relationships. But it is still a heuristic. Its
application has to
be justified by its economic utility. The financial crisis has called this into
question. The
belief that money as such creates wealth has faded away with the spread of private
money
in the form of securitised claims and its circulation. With the emergence of hedge
funds
and irresponsible investment bankers, the proposition that the debtors fault alone
cre-
ates economic distress has become less convincing. The American Presidents TV
speech
broadcast from a foreclosed home, in which he explained why foreclosures would lead
to
a chain reaction, destroying real estate markets and families,44 has had its
repercussions
in Spain, where foreclosures were given a moratorium in hardship cases.45 In the
mean-
time, the Spanish police followed their moral instincts and refused to oversee
foreclosures,
while Spanish judges recognised a general principle in these government decrees.
From
the perspective of legal dogma they are right, from that of actual law they are
wrong. If
these rules are not adjusted to the principles of justice, the gap between state
and society
will widen.
Reversal of the 19th century good investor-bad debtor ideology is fundamental
to
a coherent understanding of what real reform of bankruptcy entails. Society has
already
42 Weber, M./Parsons, T. (1958).

43 Translation of the American standard Bible 1995 and the New English standard
version 2001 of the Lords
prayer in the Bible (identical in the German Lutheran bible), but different
from the new international ver-
sion where it reads: Forgive us our sins, for we also forgive everyone who
sins against us, which had always
been the French version of the Lords Prayer (see Bible Hub. URL:
http://biblehub.com/luke/11-4.htm).
44 In 2008 3 million homes were foreclosed in the USA, more than three times the
average before. Outside
bankruptcy procedures, Obama ordered a moratorium on foreclosures in 2009 and
promised to spend $10
billion to bail out overindebted homeowners. While in Europe the focus is still
on help to investors and
creditors within the framework of the too big to fail strategy, the
following programmes were endorsed to
help homeowners restructure their loans and obtain lower interest rates:
Troubled Asset Relief Program;
Home Affordable Modification Program and Home Affordable Refinance Program.
For a critical review see
Goff, K. (2013).
45 Rajoy issued this moratorium in December 2012 after a woman
committed suicide after foreclosure for
families with two children and an annual income of less than 19,000, more
than half of which has to be
used for mortgage payments. Single parents with children under the age of
three also qualify. Shedlock,
M. (27.12.2012). URL: http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.de/2012/12/social-
trap-in-spain-mortgage-
nightmare.html.
563
----------------------- Page 603-----------------------
Udo Reifner
recognised that the debtor works in the real economy, and it is the real economy
alone
that determines our good life, as defined by Aristotle, and also the
constitutions of Bolivia
and Ecuador that relate to old indigent rules. Financial creditors in various
forms, such
as hedge funds and investment banks, have, on the other hand, become destructive
forces
dominating the world economy. Debtor protection is the protection of the productive
use
of our capital. This is what must frame creditors practices in order to preserve
the real
economy.
The bankruptcy law of the 19th century has a long way to go to overcome its
fragmen-
tation into the manageable pieces that perpetuate the structural image of the
capital user
as debtor and sinner. Bankruptcy and debt enforcement, private and administrative
(pub-
lic) rules, autonomous contractual regulations and government-directed solutions,
credit
relationships and insolvency procedures, abstract claims and debts, a pitiless
substantive
law and a procedural law modified by social considerations have together created
effective
communication barriers inside legal science and towards education and forensic
practice
that hinder necessary fundamental reform.
Bankruptcy law and the law of civil procedure for the enforcement of claims
already
overlap. They involve the same process at the same time for the same people.
Bankruptcy
law merely adds a collective dimension to the traditionally individualistic law of
debt en-
forcement in civil procedure. It recognises that in cases of insolvency, different
creditors
have to compete for the remaining assets in the process of debt enforcement.
Bankruptcy
procedures are therefore a form of collective debt enforcement. The exclusion of
this col-
lective dimension has a negative effect on rehabilitation. While debt enforcement
looks
at the debtor and the validity and history of the individual claim, bankruptcy law
shifts
the focus onto the creditors and their losses. Individual claims linked to real
economic
transactions that may have failed are merged into an indistinguishable conglomerate
of
the debt.46 It looks as if the hundreds of problems that led to the insolvency have
merged
into one single problem: lack of assets. However, understanding the history of a
conflict is
the key to an adequate solution in the future. Bankruptcy procedures have excluded
this
investigation by a mere fiction: the debtors (de)fault and the abstract debt.
Modern bank-
ruptcy reforms try desperately to retain some of the origins of this debt in the
insolvency
procedures by allowing semi-autonomous out-of-court settlements with insolvency
plans,
in which creditors are organised in groups according to the claims they hold, which
are
in turn defined by their origin.47 Increasingly, the need for the prevention of
bankruptcy
46 Article 178, 183 German InsO makes claims integrated in a Table of Insolvency
into an accepted collective
debt without regard to their origins if no objection has been raised.
47 While the first group of creditors consists of those with exclusive
preferential property rights (Article 222
(1) 1. InsO), in practice this favours banks and their provision of credit,
which thus receive an extra vote,
because the procedure takes place in groups, and banks are usually less
numerous than other creditors.
564
----------------------- Page 604-----------------------
18
Table 18.1 Insolvency as default in substantive law and bankruptcy in

procedural law
Debtor Creditor Contract law Procedural law
State intervention
Single Debt Debt en- Usury ceilings, Exemption laws
enforcement forcement default inter- (labour, fam-

est, protection ily, minimum
for early termi- income); State
nation, respon- and public

enti-
sible credit ties not
covered
Collective Debtors Bankruptcy Insolvency Moratorium,

Banks: too in-
collectives plans, pre- discharge, ex-
terconnected to
(i.e. family, bankruptcy emption from
fail; nationalisa-
networks) arrangements, bankruptcy
tion, guarantees,
not covered fresh money assets,
tenancy subsidies
privilege privilege;
State
privileges
creates a pressure to reallocate back into credit relationships what formerly had
been in-
solvency procedures. (see Pulgar) The move towards living wills, in which the
European
Union obliges banks to submit a plan indicating how they will survive without state
help
is the latest form in this development.48
The main barrier to problem-solving in default and insolvency is the barrier

between
autonomous private contract law governing credit relationships and public
administra-
tive bankruptcy law governing insolvency. Debt enforcement has historically never
been
abstracted from the normative questions of whether a debt existed, whether it had
been
acknowledged or rejected, postponed or written off. The history of bankruptcy49
began
with debt enforcement in individual debtorcreditor relationships. The sanctioning

of a
breach of trust in a reciprocal economy targeted the debtor personally. Killing,
debt slav-
ery, criminal sanctions were replaced by state rules following the synallagmatic
models of
the new economy. The shift of sanctions from the person of the debtor to his or her
assets
rationalised the law. Loss of assets instead of frustrated trust became the only
reason for
debt enforcement. Modern insolvency law instead tries to reactivate credit
relationships
and to introduce new trust and creditworthiness into the relationship between
financial
creditors and debtor. This process is, however, constantly threatened by the old
ideas of
48 Press Release of the European Banking Authority EBA on January 27, 2013.
Huertas, T. F.; Lasta, R. M.: Liv-
ing Wills: Nm. 21 2013 pp. 23 ff. URL: http://www.bde.es. Accessed:
05.08.2013.
49 For legal history see Pulgar Ezquerra, J. (2009) pp 43134; Noel, F. R. (2002);
Hein. Sgard, J.: Bankruptcy
law, creditors rights and contractual exchange in Europe, 1808 - 1914: 109
(2006); Meier, A. (2003) For a
non-legal history see the contributions in Safley, T. M. (ed.) (2013); further
Warren, C. (1972 (1935)).
565
----------------------- Page 605-----------------------
Udo Reifner
retaliation and fraud. The many exclusions from discharge in consumer bankruptcy,
the
counterproductive criminal sanctions for late bankruptcy filings as well as the
creditors
right to initiate bankruptcy at an early stage, hindering preventive measures at
the last mo-
ment, testify to the burden of the old image of the faulty debtor on new efforts to
reform
bankruptcy law. The progress in the rationalisation of attitudes in the economic
exchange
process accomplished by contract law is jeopardised by the exclusions, punishments
and
reproaches retained in public and criminal law. Where a creditor cannot recover
payment
of his valueless claim, he at least wants the satisfaction of punishing the debtor,
even where
the loan was irresponsible and most of the debt consists of compounded interest and
fees.
Bankruptcy as a penalty for what is seen as indecent behaviour and laziness
excludes
discharge where there has been personal fault. Thou shalt pay thy debts50 remains
a cor-
nerstone of morality in a legal system that once sought to provide rational and
free choices
in economic relationships. The reversal of the question of fault in lenderborrower
rela-
tionships becomes apparent if we look at the 3,700-year-old Article 48 of the Codex
Ham-
murabi: If any one owes a debt for a loan, and a storm prostrates the grain, or
the harvest
fails, or the grain does not grow for lack of water, in that year he need not give
his creditor
any grain, he washes his debt-tablet in water and pays no rent for this year.51
The insight
of Hammurabi, and indeed that of the Bible and the Koran, that a debt is a human
relation
of cooperation that necessitates mutual regard and active public management can
only
be regained if civil law is reinstated into its neutral role of organising the use
of capital.52
Hammurabi saw this protection as situated in substantive law. The

law governing
both individual and collective enforcement allocates the intrinsic
limitations of a legal
claim to procedural law. Contract law could retrieve the insight that lending is a
risk and
the claim is an attempt to uphold its value, or even to increase it through
interest charges
if it passes from abstract money claim, with its unconditional basis for
enforcement, to a
system in which the true value of a claim emerges in the course of the credit
relationship.53
50 See Reifner, U. (2003c).

51 Hammurabi/King, L. W. (2004).
52 Since at least 2002, German Article 241 (2) BGB now states: (2) An obligation
may also, depending on its
contents, oblige each party to take account of the rights, legal interests and
other interests of the other party.
(gegenseitige Rcksichtnahme) but its application still lacks consistency.
53 Discharge is erroneously located in bankruptcy law but belongs to contract law
since it nullifies the debt
itself, not merely its enforceability. Civil law could easily integrate it,
since the voiding of a debt (i.e. usury,
ordre public, coercive contract law), restrictions through ceilings or its
prescription are well known to civil
law. But the acceptance of a subjective impossibility to pay even without fault
has never been acknowledged
as a reason even to postpone payments. (The opposing view published in 1979 in
Reifner, U. (1979) pp. 148-
264 has received fierce rejections from legal doctrine. (See Medicus, D.
(1988); Fikentscher, W./Heinemann,
A. (2006) p 138; with a reply Reifner, U. (1997a).) But Medicus at least admits
that even at the end of the
19th century still the opposite was assumed. Anyhow, Scandinavian contract law
has developed the principle
of social force majeure in cases of temporal unemployment (Finland) and the
French Loi Neiertz gave the
judge the power to reduce debts arbitrarily, especially in cases of
foreclosures, to the amount of the money
received from forced sales of the real estate.
566
----------------------- Page 606-----------------------
18
Another barrier to sustainable conflict resolution is the division

between credit
law and insolvency law. Credit society represents enormous progress towards the
reso-
lution of temporal default through all forms of borrowing, and the inherent
possibility
of risk-sharing among a multitude of investors in securitised claims remains. But
this
possibility has not been used in bankruptcy law, because bankruptcy continues to
re-
quire or initiate the end of a credit relationship as a precondition for the
distribution
of assets, still assumed to be the core interest of the creditors. The diversity of
credit
relationships, the behaviour of lenders and their attitude in the triangle of
profit, risk
and liquidity are crucial elements for an understanding of the reasons for the
crisis and
the opportunities for its resolution. This historical insight should
remain present in
the conflict resolution process. It also lifts the veil on the equal values of
claims and al-
lows the conflict to develop according to the reasonable expectations within each
loan.
While the distinction between the different levels of collateralisation of claims
reflects
only the power of the lender, a future scenario in which debt acceleration is
replaced by
adaptation in default would render superfluous protective laws that are
circumvented
by all kinds of assignments and securitisation. Without termination of the loan,
the
devastating effect of a crash on the value of collateralised debt would not arise.
The following schema shows the traditional overlap between credit law and
insol-
vency law when credit is terminated.
Figure 18.2 Credit & Insolvency
Contract Servicing/Default/ Termi- En-

Birth Adaptation nation/ force-
default ment
Bank- Rehabilitation,
Discharge and
ruptcy reintegration,
rebirth
Death insolvency plans
CCD Insolve Insolvency plans,

rehabilitation period,
Civil Codes
2008/48 Code discharge
Law on responsible credit relations: lending, default,

adaptation.
567
----------------------- Page 607-----------------------
Udo Reifner
The practice of refinancing and rescheduling debt in credit law, the numerous
rules
providing for delays, grace periods and proposals for adaptation, the rules
excluding any
incentive for early termination by capping default interest and providing for the
much
preferable compounding of payments on capital instead of interest and fees, have
already
extended credit law into the area of insolvency law. State intervention and the
living will
pushes the parties to such credit relationships into continuing and preparing
measures to
address temporary liquidity problems. A whole body of para-insolvency law in
contract
law has been created between banks, borrowers and public entities where public and
pri-
vate interests coincide. On the other hand, insolvency law has reached out before
and after
the points at which traditional bankruptcy pronounced the death of the debtor and
the
distribution of his assets (see Pulgar).
This new discipline of credit adaptation at the earliest stage needs to be
incorporated
into an integrated approach to the core problem, which is the unequal
power between
creditor and debtor in a liquidity crisis. It needs to work with civil law within
the debtor
protection tradition, while insolvency and bankruptcy law could return to their
purely pro-
cedural role within civil procedure law. Such a development would be built on the
newly
emerging principle of responsible lending. This principle has recently been
introduced into
consumer credit. But just as consumer bankruptcy represents only the last phase of
a credit
relationship, responsible lending to consumers also provides a principle for
insolvency law.
18.4 Responsible Lending A New Insolvency Principle
Responsible lending is emerging worldwide as a legal principle in private banking

law. In
the light of the over-indebtedness of consumers and small businesses, it shifts
part of the
contractual obligations arising in long-term credit relationships from borrower to
credi-
tor.54 Its meaning, however, remains unclear.
While previous drafts of the Consumer Credit Directive referred to

responsible lend-
ing in all stages of a credit relationship,55 the final Article 8 of the Consumer
Credit Directive
200856 has abandoned this reference and the Directive now has the appearance of a
remake
54 Reifner, U. (2006b); Reifner, U. (2007); Reifner, U. (2006a).

European Parliament and of the
Council on the harmonisation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States
concerning credit for consumers: COM(2002) 443 final (11.09.2001) 2.4 p. 7:
The directive will improve
stability by putting in place a raft of provisions on responsible lending.
Art. 9 entitled Responsible lending
reads: Where the creditor concludes a credit agreement or surety agreement or
increases the total amount
of credit or the amount guaranteed, he is assumed to have previously assessed,
by any means at his disposal,
whether the consumer and, where appropriate, the guarantor can reasonably be
expected to discharge their
obligations under the agreement.
56 European Union (22.05.2008).
568
----------------------- Page 608-----------------------
18
of the traditional rules of bank safety and soundness. For responsible lending, the
Directive
requires only that the creditor assesses the consumers credit-worthiness on the
basis of suf-
ficient information. This view focusses on the initial decision of a rational
consumer to pro-
vide sufficient protection for the rest of the relationship. It also dominated
earlier statements
by the OECD,57 the World Bank,58 as well as the opinions of the UK Office of Fair
Trading.59
Consequently Germany, unlike most other EU Member States, has transferred this
principle
from a civil law Directive into its public bank supervision law in Art. 18 (2)
KWG.60 This is
contrary to EU bank supervisory Directives,61 which contain this risk assessment
principle as
part of bank safety, not the safety of their borrowers. There is also no need to be
more cautious
in consumer credit than with regard to bigger loans, since the risk is spread
evenly and can
be assessed quite easily. As a result, consumer credit has been exempted from
special risk-
based procedures for the assessment of capital requirements. The German legislator
made
this contradiction obvious when he introduced the same rule for unsupervised non-
banks
into Article 509 of the Civil Code owing to a lack of public supervision in this
area.
After the financial crisis, the G 20 adopted this view of responsible lending
as a form of
consumer protection. The principles of responsible business conduct by financial
services pro-
viders and of the Equitable and Fair Treatment of Consumers62 now go far beyond
the assess-
ment of creditworthiness and have to be applied to the whole lifetime of a credit

relationship:
All financial consumers should be treated equitably, honestly and fairly at
all stages of
their relationship with financial service providers. Treating consumers fairly
should be an in-
tegral part of the good governance and corporate culture of all financial services
providers and
authorised agents. Special attention should be dedicated to the needs of vulnerable
groups.63
57 Lumpkin, S. (2010) (Principal Administrator in the Financial Affairs Division

of the OECD Directorate for
Financial and Enterprise Affairs).
58 Worldbank; Rutledge, S. L. et al.: Good Practices for Consumer Protection and
Financial Literacy in Europe
and Central Asia: A Diagnostic Tool: ECSPF Working Paper 001 (August 2010) p.
I.
59 Office of Fair Trading: Irresponsible lending OFT guidance for creditors
(2011) pp. 36 ff.
60 Germany has not even decided between public and private law. The same article
regarding banks as creditors
can be found in the public bank supervisory act (Art. 18 (2) Bank Law), with
regard to non-banks as credi-
tors in Art. 509 Civil Code. For a critique see Hofmann, C. (2010). For
international comparison (Belgium
Art. 15 Loi sur le Crdit la Consommation, United Kingdom s 55 b Consumer
Credit Act 1974, Denmark
7 c Consumer Credit Act (G 535/2010) and France Art. L311-9 Code de la
Consommation) see Rott, P./
Terryn, E. et al. (2011) (Assessment of Creditworthiness: Prevention of
Consumer Protection by its alloca-
tion to adminstrative law).
61 European Union (30.06.2006) Part 6 The credit institution shall not undertake
business with a counterparty
without assessing its creditworthiness also implied in all rules concerning
Annex II Classification of off-
balance sheet items, i.e.: that do not effectively provide for automatic
cancellation due to deterioration in a
borrowers creditworthiness.
62 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): G20 High-Level
Principles on Finan-
cial Consumer Protection (2011).
63 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): G20 High-Level
Principles on Finan-
cial Consumer Protection (2011).
569
----------------------- Page 609-----------------------
Udo Reifner
This is also apparent in recital 26 of the actual Consumer Credit Directive
explaining
Article 8.
All phases of the credit relationship are covered and distinguished

distinction must
be made between irresponsible lending and the assessment of
creditworthiness.64
The true meaning of responsible lending is hidden in Article 5 (6) of Consumer

Credit
Directive 2008.65 This paragraph requires that creditors and credit intermediaries
pro-
vide adequate explanations to the consumer, in order to place the consumer in a

position
enabling him to assess whether the proposed credit agreement is adapted to his
needs
and to his financial situation, where appropriate by explaining the pre-contractual
infor-
mation . . ., the essential characteristics of the products proposed and the
specific effects
they may have on the consumer, including the consequences of default in payment by
the
consumer.
It is obvious that creditors who have to explain these things must
first know and
understand them themselves, and must act accordingly when fulfilling their
contractual
duties of due diligence.
The explanatory memorandum of the Mortgage Directive 2014 (ESIS
COM(2011)
142 final) adopted by the European Parliament on December 10, 2013 now
returns to
responsible lending, which was initially even used as the title of this Directive:
Many have lost confidence in the financial sector and certain lending
practices that
used to prevail are now having a direct impact. As borrowers have found their loans
in-
creasingly unaffordable, defaults and foreclosures have risen. Addressing
irresponsible
lending and borrowing is therefore an important element in financial reform
efforts.66
We can therefore conclude from this that responsible lending governs not only
the con-
clusion of a contract and its servicing, but also situations where consumers are in
default.
18.5 Conclusion
Bankruptcy has evolved into the reorganisation of debt. It should draw the
conclusion
from this process that it must split into a traditional bankruptcy procedure and a
debt
reorganisation procedure. Bankruptcy should apply only where the debt of the debtor
has
64 (26) Member States should take appropriate measures to promote responsible

practices during all phases of
the credit relationship, taking into account the specific features of their
credit market. . . . In the expanding
credit market, in particular, it is important that creditors should not engage
in irresponsible lending or give
out credit without prior assessment of creditworthiness.
65 European Union (22.05.2008).
66 European Commission: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on Credit
Agreements relating to residential Property: COM(2011) 142 final,
2011/0062(COD) (31.03.2011), Explana-
tory Memorandum 1. Context of the Proposal p. 2.
570
----------------------- Page 610-----------------------
18 Responsible
Bankruptcy
an adequate counterpart in his assets. Consumers just as states, banks and other
systemic
and listed economic entities, whose continued existence is crucial to the
whole of the
economy, and who must survive in order to preserve the economy, cannot be
prosecuted
with these ideas.
In the debt reorganisation procedure, accelerated claims derived from all
forms of
financing or other forms of non-pecuniary credit should be separated from short-
term
claims. The reorganisation could thus concentrate on actors whose relationship with
the
creditor is crucial and needs to be adapted to the new circumstances.
In this area the
debtor may be seen as the failed user of borrowed capital, freed from moral
prejudice. In
this debt reorganisation process, legal default is neither an adequate explanation
for the
necessity for the procedure itself or for liquidation, nor is the immediate
distribution of
assets a valid goal. They are only aspects and options to be applied in a procedure
that
is designed to rehabilitate, reorganise and adapt the economic situation of the
debtor to
become productive again.
The law of debt reorganisation requires to be integrated into credit
law, which in
turn needs to incorporate the debtor protection values of insolvency procedures
into its
concept of responsible lending, and that concept also needs to
incorporate responsible
bankruptcy. This new approach also puts into practice those EuSoCo Principles on
social
long-term contracts that concern (5) needs and regard, (6) productive use (10)
adaptation
and (11) termination with regard to a credit relationship.
571
----------------------- Page 611-----------------------
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Rott, Peter; Terryn, Evelyne; Twigg-Flesner, Christian (2011):

Kreditwrdigkeitsprfung:
Verbraucherschutzverhinderung durch Zuweisung zum ffentlichen Recht. In:
Verbraucher
und Recht (5/2011), pp. 163 ff.
Safley, Thomas M. (ed.) (2013): The history of bankruptcy. Economic, social and
cultural
implications in early modern Europe. London: Routledge.
Shedlock, Mike (27.12.2012): December 27, 2012: Social Trap in Spain: Mortgage
Night-
mare. Why Spain (or Germany) is Guaranteed to Leave Euro. URL:
http://globaleconomi-
canalysis.blogspot.de/2012/12/social-trap-in-spain-mortgage-nightmare.html.
Accessed:
01.02.2013.
Sorkin, Andrew R. (2010): Too big to fail. Inside the battle to save Wall Street.
London:
Penguin Books.
576
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Bankruptcy
Warren, Charles (1972 (1935)): Bankruptcy in United States history. New York: Da
Capo Press.
Weber, Max; Parsons, Talcott (1958): The protestant ethic and the spirit
of capitalism.
Students edition. New York: Scribner.
Wieacker, Franz (1941): Zum System des deutschen Vermgensrechts.

Erwgungen und
Vorschlge. Leipzig: Weicher.
Worldbank; Kilborn, Jason; Garrido, Jos M, et al. (January 2013): Report on the
Treatment
of the Insolvency of Natural Persons.
Worldbank; Rutledge, Susan L.; Annamalai, Nagavalli, et al. (August 2010): Good
Practices
for Consumer Protection and Financial Literacy in Europe and Central Asia: A
Diagnostic
Tool: ECSPF Working Paper 001.
577
----------------------- Page 617-----------------------
----------------------- Page 618-----------------------
Part IV
Residential Tenancy Contracts
----------------------- Page 619-----------------------
----------------------- Page 620-----------------------
19 Das Recht auf Wohnraum und der
Wohnraummietvertrag
Peter Derleder
Summary
Tenancy provides spatial connection with society and the development of

undisturbed private
life in a home. Owing to destruction during the Second World War and the great
expulsion
from the East, the quote of housing property rights, in comparison with that of the
other West -
ern European countries, is relatively low. The stock of houses offers about 40
square metres per
person, but its distribution is too unequal. The constitutional guarantee of a
state having social
targets was founded through the introduction of protection against unlawful
termination of
tenancy contracts in the 1970s. Necessarily, it was combined with the limitation
of the rent
during the length of the contract: the rent cannot exceed the usual amount on the
dwelling
market during the last years. In the meantime, both political sides have accepted
this model of
regulation. But actually, society is characterized by the economical downgrading
of the middle
class, especially owing to an increase in precarious labour contracts and minimal
incomes.
Therefore, the access to a tenancy contract has become more difficult. Several
communities
have sold their buildings, which had so far been designed for the poor. Also, the
consideration
of landlords towards tenants, particularly towards immigrants, is decreasing. This
is also the
case between tenants when heterogeneous familiarities and professions are not
respected. The
working costs of dwelling have risen in a disproportionate manner, and the
energetic moderni-
sation, item of the last regulation act in 2013, pursuing the implementation of an
ecological
ambition, will probably attain a new peak. It is not sure that the resources of
solidarity will be
sufficient to compensate these deficits through state interventions.
Bei keinem neuzeitlichen Philosophen ist das Wohnen und damit die Rumlichkeit in
der Zeit fr den sterblichen Menschen ein so fundamentaler Grundzug des Seins wie
bei
Heidegger1. Auch wenn Arbeit und Familie, die er nicht im Blick hatte, dem
mindestens
ebenbrtig sein drften, so stellt doch der Anschlussverlust (dazu oben

Derleder I)
im Mietrecht eine besondere Form von Armut und Entbehrung dar.
Gleichwohl
wird der Besitz einer Wohnung im Mietvertrag lediglich vorausgesetzt,
nicht jedoch
vermittelt. In der das Mietrecht erffnenden Vertragsdefinition des 535 BGB hat
der
Mieter immer schon einen Vermieter gefunden, der aus eigenem oder
abgeleitetem
1 Heidegger, M. (2000) p. 155.
581
----------------------- Page 621-----------------------
Peter Derleder
Recht sein exklusives Eigentum an bewohnbarem Raum dem Mieter zur

Verfgung
stellt. So wie im Kreditrecht dem berschuldeten der Grundsatz des Geld hat man zu
haben, dem Arbeitslosen die Chance einer Arbeitsstelle als Wirklichkeit

zugeordnet
werden msste, so muss sich auch der Obdachlose im Mietvertragsrecht entgegenhalten
lassen, dass der Einstieg in die Wohltaten des sozialen Mieterschutzes

ganz allein seine
Sache sei und den Vermietern weder individuell noch kollektiv entgegengehalten
werden
knne. Dabei zeigen die Wohnungskrisen in den USA, Spanien und
Grobritannien,
dass die Verfgung ber Wohnraum kreditvermittelt als Eigentum oder mietrechtlich
vermittelt als bloe Nutzung fremden Eigentums ein hoch modernes Problem
ist.
Gerade in Deutschland explodieren die Mietkosten und der relative
Mangel an
bezahlbarem Wohnraum hat eine ganze Kaste von Maklern hervorgebracht,
deren
2
horrende Ver dienste ohne erkennbare Leistung zur Zeit ffentlich diskutiert werden
.
Das war nicht immer so, wie der folgende Beitrag deutlich macht. Staatliches
Monopol
in der Wohnungsvermittlung, Zuweisung von Wohnraum an Kriegsheimkehrer, das
Recht der eigenhndigen Weitergabe von Wohnraum nicht nur an Verwandte,

Recht
zur Besetzung leerstehenden Wohnraums, gesetzliche Untermieterlaubnis sie
alle
bezogen und international gesehen beziehen sich auch heute noch auf den Zugang zur
Wohnung und nicht nur auf das Recht innerhalb des ergatterten Mietvertrages in
seinen
Wohnbedrfnissen geschtzt zu werden.
Doch selbst dieser Hinweis erfasst die Bedeutung des sozialen Mietrechts fr
das
Recht auf Zugang zur Wohnung nur unzureichend. Die europaweite
Mietpreisbin
dung schtzt ja nicht nur die Mieter vor berhhten Mieten sondern den Bestand an
erschwinglichem Wohnraum auch gerade fr die, die ihn erst noch erwerben mssen.
Die Lastenverteilung bei Reparatur und Erhalt ist nicht nur Mieter
sondern auch
Wohnraumschutz, dessen vertrgliche Bereitstellung damit ebenso gesichert wird wie
die
mannigfachen ins ffentliche Recht verbannten Umwandlungsverbote in Geschftsraum
oder gar Abriss.
Es ist an der Zeit, mit einem allgemeinen Konzept von Lebenszeitvertrgen, wie
es in
den diesem Buch vorangestellten Prinzipien angedacht ist, diese in alle
juristischen Winde
verstreuten Elemente eines kollektiven Rechts auf Wohnraum zu einem Prinzip des
Miet
rechts und der anderen Lebenszeitvertrge zu verdichten, das den unmittelbaren
Zugang
zum Lebenszeitvertrag als Teil des Lebenszeitverhltnisses selber begreift. Dieses
ist nicht
nur eine Forderung rechtsdogmatischer Systematisierung, sondern wie sich zeigen
wird,
ein Gebot der Verfassung an das Mietrecht.
2 Bundesrat: Gesetzesantrag der Lnder Hamburg, BardenWrttemberg,

Niedersachsen, Nordrhein
Westphalen: Drucksache 177/13 (22.032013).
582
----------------------- Page 622-----------------------
19.1 Zur verfassungsrechtlichen Verankerung eines Grundrechts auf

Wohnung
Familien und Einzelpersonen sind von der Teilhabe am sozialen Leben ausgeschlossen,
wenn sie keine Wohnung finden knnen oder ihnen der Zugang zu einer erschwingli
chen, bescheidenen Wohnung versagt ist. Eine derartige Exklusion droht ihnen
entweder
aus gesellschaftlichen oder privaten Grnden, sei es wegen des Verlustes eines
Arbeits
platzes, eines das Existenzminimum nicht deckenden Lohnes, wegen Trennung, Schei
dung, Krankheit oder Altersarmut. Es kann sich um eine vorbergehende Phase oder um
einen dauerhaften Anschlussverlust handeln. Die sozialstaatlichen Auffangangebote

ste
hen ihrerseits unter schwerem Druck, so wenn Kommunen ihre Sozialwohnungsbestnde
in der gegenwrtigen Schuldenkrise zum Schuldenabbau veruern oder
wesentlich
verkleinern.
Der durch die Globalisierung des Wirtschaftens ausgelste Trend zur
Arbeitsein
kommensminimierung in den westlichen Industriestaaten schwcht auf vielen
wirtschaftli
chen Sektoren die Selbstversorgungskompetenzen der Haushalte, insbesondere in einem
Land ohne allgemeinen Mindestlohn wie in Deutschland. Demgem hat die Debatte um
die Verankerung eines Grundrechts auf Wohnen auf nationaler und europischer Ebene
eine Belebung erfahren, wie sie seit den Nachkriegsjahren nicht mehr festzustellen
war.
Dementsprechend ist die Vereinbarkeit eines Grundrechts auf Wohnen mit den Mecha
nismen der Marktwirtschaft zu untersuchen, insbesondere seine Rolle als rechtlich
kontu
riertes Element einer sozialen Marktwirtschaft.
Aufgrund der Wohnungsnotlage nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg haben die Bundesln
der in ihren Verfassungen besonderen Wert auf den Schutz der Wohnung gelegt. Auer
den landesverfassungsrechtlichen Grundrechten auf Unverletzlichkeit der Wohnung,

die
in der Substanz Art. 13 GG entsprechen, haben sie zum Teil darber hinausgehende
Grund
rechte verankert. So wurde etwa in der Verfassung des Freistaates Bayern von 1946
die
Unverletzlichkeit der Wohnung proklamiert und jedem Bewohner Bayerns ein Anspruch
3
auf eine angemessene Wohnung zugebilligt .
Auch in weiteren zwei Landesverfassungen war eine Gewhrleistung eines
Anspruchs
auf eine angemessene Wohnung enthalten. Spter wurde allerdings teilweise mit Rck
sicht auf die ebenfalls gewhrleistete Frderung des Wohnungsbaus eine restriktive
Aus
legung praktiziert. Die magebliche Verfassungsnorm enthalte nur einen Programmsatz
4
und kein einklagbares Grundrecht .
3 Art. 106 der Verfassung, GVBl. 1946, S. 333.

4 BayVerfGH 42, 28, 32.
583
----------------------- Page 623-----------------------
Peter Derleder
Im Grundgesetz fehlt es an einer Gewhrleistung angemessenen Wohnraums. Durch
Obdachlosigkeit knnen allerdings die Menschenwrde nach Art. 1 I GG, die freie
Ent
faltung der Persnlichkeit nach Art. 2 I GG, die krperliche Unversehrtheit nach
Art. 2
II GG sowie das Grundrecht auf Schutz von Ehe und Familie nach Art. 6 I und II GG
berhrt sein. Insoweit gibt es jedoch bislang keine systematische
verfassungsgerichtliche
Konkretisierung eines Individualrechtsschutzes. Dagegen ist das Grundrecht auf
Unver
letzlichkeit der Wohnung in Art. 13 GG differenziert ausgestaltet, und auch Art. 14
GG
ist in Bezug auf den Schutz der Mieterwohnung durch das BVerfG konkretisiert
worden.
Das Grundrecht aus Art. 13 GG sichert die Privatheit der Wohnung als
elementaren
5
6
Lebensraum , also die rumliche Sphre, in der sich das Privatleben entfaltet .
Auch nach
der Rechtsprechung des BVerfG wurzelt das Grundrecht auf Unverletzlichkeit der Woh
7
nung in der Wrde des Menschen . Es geht dabei um die Abschirmung der Privatsphre
in rumlicher Hinsicht. Aber es bleibt bei einem Abwehrrecht gegen das Eindringen
in
eine vorhandene Privatsphre, in eine vorhandene Wohnung, whrend der Aufbau einer
Privatsphre nicht geschtzt ist.

Die Eigentumsgarantie des Art. 14 I 1 GG bezieht sich dagegen auf
alle verm
8
genswerten Rechte, die das brgerliche Recht einem privaten Rechtstrger
zuordnet ,
also vor allem auch auf das Eigentum an Grund und Boden, an Gebuden und Eigen
tumswohnungen. Bei Mietrechtsstreitigkeiten bestand deswegen lange Zeit eine
asym
metrische verfassungsgerichtliche Ausgangsrechtslage, da sich der Vermieter
gegenber
einer ihn beschwerenden Mietgerichtsentscheidung auf das Eigentumsgrundrecht
sttzen
konnte, nicht aber der Mieter, der eine Verfassungsbeschwerde nur mit der
Geltendma
chung einer Verletzung des Willkrverbots nach Art. 3 I GG begrnden konnte. Das
hat
9
das BVerfG jedoch korrigiert. In der mageblichen Entscheidung vom 26. Mai 1993
hat
es das Besitzrecht des Mieters an der gemieteten Wohnung als Eigentum im Sinn von
Art.
14 I 1 GG anerkannt.
Dazu hat es ausgefhrt, der Mieter knne sich nicht auf die
Gemeinwohlbindung
des Art. 14 II GG berufen, da diese Bestimmung nur Richtschnur und Grenze fr den
objektivrechtlichen Auftrag an den Gesetzgeber sei, Inhalt und Schranken des
Eigentums
zu bestimmen. Art. 14 II GG erhebe den Mieterschutz jedoch nicht zu einer
subjektiven
Grundrechtsverbrgung. Dagegen geniee die Mietwohnung den Grundrechtsschutz
des Art. 14 I 1 GG. Sie sei fr jedermann Mittelpunkt seiner privaten

Existenz. Der
Einzelne sei auf ihren Gebrauch zur Befriedigung elementarer Lebensbedrfnisse
sowie
5 BVerfGE 42, 212, 219; 103, 142, 150.

6 BVerfGE 89, 1, 12.
7 BVerfGE 103, 142, 150; 109, 279, 313.
8 BVerfGE 70, 191, 199.
9 BVerfGE 89, 1.
584
----------------------- Page 624-----------------------

zur Freiheitssicherung und Entfaltung seiner Persnlichkeit angewiesen. Der
Groteil
der Bevlkerung knne zur Deckung seines Wohnbedarfs jedoch nicht auf
Eigentum
zurckgreifen, sondern sei gezwungen, Wohnraum zu mieten. Das Besitzrecht des Mie
ters erflle unter diesen Umstnden Funktionen, wie sie typischerweise dem
Sacheigen
tum zukmen. Es stelle eine vermgenswerte Rechtsposition dar, die eine Nutzungs
und
Verfgungsbefugnis zum Inhalt habe. Dass das Besitzrecht des Mieters vom Vermieter
abgeleitet werde, stehe seiner Anerkennung im Sinne des Art. 14 I 1 GG nicht

entgegen.
Im Konflikt beider gehe weder das Bestandsinteresse des Mieters der geschtzten
Eigen
tumsposition des Vermieters automatisch vor noch umgekehrt. Der Vermieter werde in
seiner Freiheit geschtzt, die Wohnung bei Eigenbedarf wieder selbst als seinen
Lebens
mittelpunkt zu nutzen oder durch privilegierte Angehrige nutzen zu lassen. Die
Fach
gerichte htten die durch die Eigentumsgarantie gezogenen Grenzen zu beachten. Nach
anfangs heftiger Kritik10 hat sich die Anerkennung des Mieterbesitzrechts als
Eigentums
grundrecht im Sinne von Art. 14 GG auch durchgesetzt11.
Das Recht jedes Einzelnen auf angemessenen Wohnraum wird durch den eigentums
grundrechtlichen Schutz jedoch nur ausschnittweise verwirklicht. Dem Mieter wird
zwar
ein einklagbares Recht verschafft, mit dem er fr den Schutz des sozialen
Mietrechts ver
fassungsgerichtlich aktivlegitimiert wird und eine symmetrische Grundrechtsposition
ge
genber dem Eigentmer und Vermieter einer Wohnung erhlt. Damit wird faktisch der
Masse der Mieter angemessener Wohnraum gesichert, soweit sie sich diesen durch
Vertrag
am Markt besorgen knnen. Soweit es jedoch um den Anschluss an den Wohnungsmarkt,
um Schwierigkeiten beim Zugang zu einer Wohnung geht, erhlt der Wohnungssuchende
durch das Eigentumsgrundrecht ebenso wenig einen grundrechtlichen Schutz wie auf
grund der Garantie der Unverletzlichkeit der Wohnung nach Art. 13 GG.
Auch die Hartz IVGesetzgebung mit ihrer Zusammenlegung von Arbeitslosenhilfe
und Sozialhilfe hat daran nichts gendert. Das SGB II ist als soziales
Sicherungssystem an
alle erwerbsfhigen Hilfebedrftigen gerichtet, whrend das SGB XII unter Aufnahme
der
Grundstrukturen des BSHG die Sozialhilfeleistungen an nicht Erwerbsfhige regelt.
Der
Kreis der Bezieher von Sozialhilfe wurde damit betrchtlich verkleinert. Das Recht
der
Grundsicherung nach dem SGB II hat damit eine auerordentlich weitreichende gesell
schaftliche Bedeutung erhalten.
Die Grundsicherung fr Arbeitsuchende soll nach 1 I 1 SGB II die
Eigenverant
wortung von erwerbsfhigen Hilfebedrftigen und Personen, die mit ihnen in
einer
Bedarfsgemeinschaft leben, strken und dazu beitragen, dass sie ihren
Lebensunter
halt unabhngig von der Grundsicherung aus eigenen Mitteln und Krften
bestreiten
10 S. dazu Depenheuer, O. (1993); Finger (1993); Franke, DWW 1993, 281; Rthers
(1993); Sternel, MDR 1993,
729; Roellecke, JZ 1995, 74.
11 S. Derleder, P. (1993) und die Mehrzahl der aktuellen Kommentare zum GG.
585
----------------------- Page 625-----------------------
Peter Derleder
knnen. Die Grundsicherung fr Arbeitsuchende umfasst nach 1 II SGB II

Leistungen
zur Beendigung oder Verringerung der Bedrftigkeit insbesondere durch
Eingliede
rung in Arbeit (Nr. 1) und zur Sicherung des Lebensunterhalts (Nr. 2).
Erwerbsfhige
Hilfebedrftige erhalten gem. 19 Satz 1 SGB II als Arbeitslosengeld II Leistungen
zur
Sicherung des Lebensunterhalts einschlielich der angemessenen Kosten fr
Unterkunft
und Heizung. 22 regelt dann die Leistungen fr Unterkunft und Heizung in der
Weise, dass
diese in Hhe der tatschlichen Aufwendungen erbracht werden, soweit sie angemessen
sind
( 22 I 1 SGB II).
19.2 Recht auf Wohnung
Die Kritik an dieser Gesetzgebung hat sich in letzter Zeit jedoch wieder verstrkt.
Es wird
darauf hingewiesen, dass unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Angemessenheit der Wohnauf
wendungen Erwerbslose aus ihren bisherigen Wohnungen und Lebensbezgen hinausge
drngt werden, in Miet und Energieschulden geraten, oft nur noch
minderwertigen
Wohnraum in benachteiligten Quartieren anmieten knnen und in der Wahrnehmung
ihrer Rechte demotiviert werden. Teilweise knnen in den qualitativ schlechtesten
Woh
nungsmarktsektoren vergleichsweise hhere Mieten erzielt werden als in besseren
Seg
menten. Insgesamt hat die Hartz IVGesetzgebung das Risiko des Wohnungsverlustes und
der sozialen Exklusion erhht.

Bei der Sozialhilferechtsreform im Jahre 2005 hat der Gesetzgeber
zum Ausdruck
gebracht, dass er im Wesentlichen die Grundstze des bisherigen Sozialhilferechts
nach
dem BSHG fortfhren wollte12. Inhaltlich hat dennoch auch hier eine
Strukturvernde
rung zur Strkung der Eigenverantwortung des Leistungsberechtigten
stattgefunden13.
So wurden einmalige Bedarfe in den Regelbedarf einbezogen und durch diese

erweiterte
Leistungspauschalierung die individuelle Bedarfsdeckung zurckgedrngt. Die
Regelst ze
sind jedoch bereits in den Jahren zuvor nicht in der gleichen Weise
gestiegen wie die
Lebenshaltungskosten. Ferner wurden Verschuldenskriterien eingefhrt,
insbesondere
fr den Fall vorstzlicher oder grob fahrlssiger Herbeifhrung der Bedrftigkeit
( 41
III SGB XII). Nach Ausgliederung der Grundsicherung fr Arbeitssuchende in das SGB
II beschrnkt sich das Sozialhilferecht auf die Sozialleistungen an nicht

Erwerbsfhige.
Die Tendenz zu Einschnitten in das Sozialleistungssystem, auch bei den
Kosten einer
Unterkunft nach 29 SGB XII, ist unverkennbar und wird auch im
Hinblick auf die
12 Deutscher Bundestag: Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion SPD und Bndnis 90/Die Grnen:
Drucksache 15/1514
(2003) p. 53.
13 Deutscher Bundestag: Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion SPD und Bndnis 90/Die Grnen:
Drucksache 15/1514
(2003) pp. 52, 59.
586
----------------------- Page 626-----------------------
demografische Entwicklung, die Entwicklung des Arbeitsmarkts und die Belastung des
Sozialstaats politisch legitimiert.

Dabei schliet der sozialhilferechtliche Begriff der Unterkunft nicht nur
Mietwoh
14
nungen und selbstgenutztes Wohneigentum, sondern auch Obdachlosenunterknfte
,
Wohnwagen und Zimmer in Beherbergungsbetrieben ein15. Nur Zelte werden von dem
Begriff (noch) nicht erfasst16. Sozialhilfe wird geleistet, wenn der
Hilfesuchende die
Unterkunft auch tatschlich nutzt, wenn man von vorbergehenden

Unterbrechungen
(etwa aus Krankheitsgrnden) absieht17.
Unangemessen hohe Aufwendungen brauchen nicht bernommen zu werden. Die

Zumutbarkeitsregelung in 29 I 2 und 3 SGB XII gewhrt dem Hilfeberechtigten
jedoch
eine bergangsfrist von bis zu sechs Monaten, wenn besondere Umstnde dem
Um
zug in eine Unterkunft entgegenstehen, die nur angemessene Aufwendungen erfordert.
Sogar der Wechsel eines Hilfeberechtigten in eine zu teure Wohnung whrend des Hil
18
febezugs kann die bernahme der Kosten unter besonderen Umstnden rechtfertigen
,
insbesondere wenn keine angemessene Alternative zur Verfgung steht. Die Senkung
der
Aufwendungen durch Untervermietung und der Einsatz freier Mittel sind so schnell
wie
mglich zu vollziehen19. Die Aufforderung zur Senkung der Aufwendungen ist kein
Ver
waltungsakt, sondern lediglich ein Hinweis darauf, dass die Leistungen in Zukunft
nicht
mehr ohne Weiteres in Hhe der tatschlichen Aufwendungen gewhrt werden sollen20.
Bei einer Neuanmietung hat der Leistungsberechtigte den zustndigen Trger der
Sozial
hilfe nach 29 I 4 SGB XII ber seine persnlichen Umstnde und die Hhe der Miete
zu informieren. Der Trger der Sozialhilfe kann fr seinen Bereich die Leistungen
fr die
Unterkunft gem. 29 II 1 SGB XII durch eine monatliche Pauschale abgelten, wenn
auf
dem rtlichen Wohnungsmarkt hinreichend angemessener freier Wohnraum verfgbar
und in Einzelfllen die Pauschalierung nicht unzumutbar ist. Von dieser
Befugnis zur
Pauschalenbildung, deren Ausgrenzungsfunktion unverkennbar ist, wird zunehmend Ge
brauch gemacht.
Schon vor den Hartz IVReformen ist immer wieder eine Kontroverse darber ent
brannt, ob der Leistungsberechtigte, insbesondere der Hilfesuchende im
Sozialhilferecht
gegen den Sozialhilfetrger einen Anspruch auf Verschaffung oder Bereitstellung
einer
angemessenen Unterkunft hat. Insbesondere bis zum sog. Asylkompromiss hat es auch
in den 90er Jahren wegen der erheblichen Migrationsbewegungen drastische
Engpsse
14 BVerwG, NJW 1996, 1838.

15 S. nur Grube, C./Wahrendorf, V. et al. (2008) 29 Rn. 13.
16 VGH Mannheim, NVwZRR 1995, 446.
17 BVerwG, NVwZ 2000, 572.
18 VGH Kassel, FEVS 45, 335.
19 Grube, C./Wahrendorf, V. et al. (2008) 29 Rn. 33.
20 BSG, FEVS 58, 248.
587
----------------------- Page 627-----------------------
Peter Derleder
auf dem Wohnraumsektor in den Ballungsgebieten und zum Teil regelrechte Wohnungs
not gegeben, mit der Folge, dass sich ein erheblicher Teil der Wohnungssuchenden
nicht
selbstndig auf dem Wohnungsmarkt versorgen konnte. Kritische Stimmen
pldierten
deswegen fr einen Anspruch auf eine Sachleistung21. Dies wurde damit begrndet,
dass
keineswegs ausreichend preiswerter Wohnraum zur Verfgung stehe. Sozialhilfe fr

die
Unterkunft komme als persnliche Hilfe, Geldleistung oder Sachleistung in
Betracht,
wie es dem damaligen 8 I BSHG entsprach. Bei der Frage, ob dem
Hilfesuchenden
ein Anspruch auf eine Wohnung als Sachleistung zustehe, sei zu beachten, dass sich
der
Hilfesuchende im Wege der Selbsthilfe grundstzlich selbst und mit Untersttzung
des
Wohnungsamtes auf dem Wohnungsmarkt um eine Unterkunft bemhen msse. Gebe es
22
aber keine anderweitige Unterkunft, so msse der Sozialhilfetrger selbst dafr
sorgen .
Eine Sachleistung knne dieser vermeiden, wenn er auch hhere Unterbringungskosten,
z.B. in Pensionen oder Hotels, bernehme. Die berwiegende Auffassung hat diese
jedoch
abgelehnt23. Mit der Ablehnung eines Rechtsanspruchs auf Zuweisung einer
Wohnung
entfllt jedoch jeder Ansatz eines Grundrechts, wie es teilweise die

Landesverfassungen
verankert haben.
19.3 Die historische Entwicklung des Wohnraummietrechts seit dem

Zweiten Weltkrieg
Der Wohnungsmarkt war andererseits in den historischen Prozessen

des letzten
Jahrhunderts, insbesondere aufgrund der beiden von Deutschland begonnenen
Welt
kriege, praktisch nie ein Sektor, auf dem sich letztlich marktradikale
Grundauffassungen
durchgesetzt haben. Der Erste Weltkrieg war zwar nicht von groen Zerstrungen der
Stdte geprgt, da die deutschen Heere bei der Kapitulation des

kaiserlichen Deutsch
land noch in Feindesland standen und der Luftkrieg noch keine groe Rolle spielte.
In
Zeiten des wilhelminischen Imperialismus und der barbarischen Kriegsfhrung in blu
tigsten Materialschlachten la Falkenhayn musste der Wohnungsbau allerdings
zurck
stehen und die ersten Notgesetze fr den Wohnungsmarkt ab 191724 wurden vor allem
auch zur seelischen Stabilisierung der Soldaten gemacht, die die

Vernichtungsschlachten
21 Siehe etwa Steinmeier, F./Brhl, A. (1989) pp. 287 ff; Brhl, ZfF 1991, 49;
Schmidt, NVwZ 1996, 1041, 1045;
Deutscher Verein fr ffentliche und private Frsorge, NDV 1997, 337; in der
Instanzgerichtsrechtsprec
hung ebenso z.B. VG Hannover, info also 1992, 130; OVG Niedersachsen, info also
1992, 31.
22 Siehe insbesondere etwa Schmidt, NVwZ 1995, 1041, 1045.
23 Siehe z.B. VGH BadenWrttemberg, FEVS 43, 470; OVG SchleswigHolstein, FEVS 37,
242; VGH Kassel,
NJW 1994, 471; Berlit, in: LPK SGB XII, 29 Rn. 8; Grube, C./Wahrendorf, V. et
al. (2008) 29 Rn. 7.
24 Die Wohnungsmangelverordnung vom 23.09.1918 (RGBl. I, 1143) war die Grundlage
fr die ffentliche
Wohnraumbewirtschaftung, die den Mieteinigungsmtern die Handhabe fr
Beschlagnahmen, Zwangsein
quartierungen und Zwangsmietvertrge gab.
588
----------------------- Page 628-----------------------
von Verdun berstanden hatten. Seither blieb es im Grundsatz bei einer relativ
strengen
Regulierung des Mietwohnungsmarkts, obwohl in der Zeit der Weimarer Republik25 die
Wohnungsnot zurckging und revolutionre Architekten und Stdtebauer sogar

denk
wrdige Siedlungen errichten lieen. Die Nationalsozialisten planten ursprnglich
auch
grere Investitionen, stellten diese jedoch im Zeichen der umfassenden
militrischen
Aufrstung zurck, so dass die Vermieter sogar einem Preisstopp26 ausgesetzt
wurden.
Die ungeheuren Zerstrungen in Deutschland durch den Zweiten Weltkrieg

fhrten
dazu, dass sogar Adolf Hitler nur noch mit schwarz verhngten Fenstern durch
Mnchen
und andere Grostdte fuhr. Whrend die Trmmerfrauen die
Aufrumungsarbeiten
bernahmen27, strmten fast 14 Millionen Vertriebene in das nach dem Krieg
verbliebene
Deutschland. Die damit gebotene Wohnungszwangswirtschaft schloss Wohnungszu

weisungen, Mietenkontrolle und Kndigungsschutz ein, auch als die
Whrungsreform
und die liberale Wirtschaftspolitik zur Neubegrndung einer Marktwirtschaft
fhrten.
Schon Charles de Gaulle hatte, als er aus dem Londoner Exil gekommen die
franz
sische Regierung bernahm, trotz allem Heroismus proklamiert, jede Regierung werde
jetzt allein am Wohnungsbau gemessen. In noch viel dramatischerer Weise galt dies
fr
die von Adenauer gefhrten Regierungen. Das I. und das II. WoBauG28
sorgten dafr,
dass Rechtsgrundlagen fr einen schnellen Wiederaufbau existierten. Ein Dach ber

dem
Kopf war beim Bau vieler Siedlungen wichtiger als Bauqualitt und Infrastruktur.
Von
besonderem Gewicht war der soziale Wohnungsbau, bei dem die Eigentmer staatliche
Subventionen erhielten und dafr bei der Vermietung auf eine (moderate) Kostenmiete
beschrnkt wurden. Die Mieten fr Neubauten konnten von Anfang an frei

gebildet
werden. In den 50er Jahren gelang es allmhlich, Wohnungselend und Wohnungsnot ab
zubauen und an eine weniger staatlich getragene und eher privatwirtschaftlich
gesteuerte
Mietwohnungspolitik zu denken.
Mit dem sog. LckePlan29 nach dem Namen des zustndigen christdemokratischen
Wohnungsbauministers begann dann ab 1960 eine gespaltene Liberalisierung.

Es gab
weie Kreise mit freigegebenen Mieten und schwarze Kreise mit
Mietbegrenzung, wo
also der Nachfrageberhang30 greifbar war. Fr Berlin, Hamburg und Mnchen galt das
noch jahrzehntelang. In den weien Kreisen gab es zunchst bei einer Kndigung nur
die Hrteklausel fr besonders benachteiligte Mieter, die keine andere Wohnung

finden
25 S. zunchst allerdings das Reichswohnungsmangelgesetz vom 26.07.1923, ergnzt

durch VO vom 24.12.1923
(RGBl. I, 751, 754 und 1247).
26 VO ber das Verbot von Preiserhhungen vom 26.11.1936 (RGBl. I, 955).
27 Zur sog. Trmmergesetzgebung Stadler, O. (1955) pp. 431 ff.
28 Das Erste Wohnungsbaugesetz stammte vom 24.04.1950 (BGBl. I, 83), das Zweite
vom 27.06.1956 (BGBl. I, 523).
29 Durch das Gesetz ber den Abbau der Wohnungszwangswirtschaft vom 23.06.1960
(BGBl. I S. 389).
30 Mit einem Defizit von 3% des Wohnungsbestandes.
589
----------------------- Page 629-----------------------
Peter Derleder
konnten. Die Kommunen sorgten sich, nicht zu frh in die Marktwirtschaft entlassen
zu
werden und dann eine Flle von Wohnungslosen versorgen zu mssen. Der Liberalisie
rungsprozess zog sich dementsprechend lange hin.
Mit dem bergang zu einer sozialliberalen Regierung seit 1969 wurde
dann ein
allgemeines soziales Mietrecht zu einem politischen Zentralthema. Die erste
Regierung
Brandt wagte 1971 erst einmal nur ein Wohnraumkndigungsschutzgesetz31 auf Probe,
um zu demonstrieren, dass sich eine Regulierung berhaupt durchhalten lie. Aber

auch
32
1975, als ein Dauerrecht etabliert werden sollte, standen sich die groen
politischen La
ger noch uerst polemisch gegenber. Das brgerliche Lager nahm beim Kampf gegen
das soziale Mietrecht eine besonders pointierte Haltung neoliberalen Denkens an, da
nur
noch Hrteflle sich einer freien Kndigung des Vermieters sollten entziehen
knnen.
Nach 1975 galt aber nun allgemein der Grundsatz33, dass ein vertragstreuer
Mieter
nicht gekndigt werden konnte, wenn der Vermieter kein besonderes berechtigtes
Inter
esse an einer Vertragsbeendigung hatte. Um den Kndigungsschutz abzusichern, musste
man den Mieter vor berzogenen Mieterhhungen und in deren Gefolge auftretenden
Vertragsverletzungen schtzen, indem man das Prinzip der ortsblichen
Vergleichsmiete
zur Begrenzung von Mieterhhungen einsetzte34. Das war eine elegante Lsung, da
diese
Grenze selbstreflexiv auf die Marktentwicklung verwies und eine

Dimensionierung je
nach dem erlaubte, ob man die Mieten der letzten drei, vier oder mehr Jahre
einbezog.
Diese Rechtsgrundlagen waren noch lange Gegenstand mietrechtlicher und
verfas
sungsrechtlicher Kontroversen. Einmal erschwerte die Mietrechtsjudikatur die
Miet
erhhungen so sehr, dass das Verfassungsgericht eingreifen musste35. Ein
anderes Mal
erweiterte das Verfassungsgericht den Kndigungsgrund des Eigenbedarfs des

Vermieters
so sehr, dass der Vermieter seinen Eigenbedarf nach eigenem Gusto bestimmen
konnte36.
Diese Judikatur brach sich jedoch an der des BGH, der immer einen triftigen Grund
fr
die Eigenbedarfskndigung verlangte37.
Seit den 70er Jahren ging es aber nicht mehr nur um mglichst
hohe Zahlen neu
errichteter Wohnungen, sondern vor allem auch um die Modernisierung der
lteren
Wohnungsbestnde oder der neueren mit Qualittsmngeln. Dem entsprach die Einfh
rung eines Modernisierungszuschlags zur Grundmiete, der zunchst sogar mit 14% der
31 1. Wohnraumkndigungsschutzgesetz vom 25.11.1971 (BGBl. I, 1839).

32 Durch das 2. Wohnraumkndigungsschutzgesetz vom 18.12.1974 (BGBl. I, 3603).
33 In 564 b BGB verankert.
34 Hierfr wrde das MHRG vom 18.12.1974 (BGBl. I, 3603) als Sondergesetz
erlassen, dessen 2 die ortsbli
che Vergleichsmiete regelte.
35 BVerfGE 37, 132.
36 BVerfG WuM 1989, 114.
37 Der BGH konnte dabei an das gesetzliche Tatbestandsmerkmal anknpfen, das der
Vermieter die Wohnung
bentigt, s. zuletzt etwa BGH NJW 2010, 1068.
590
----------------------- Page 630-----------------------
aufgewendeten Kosten bemessen wurde. Die Bindungszeiten fr die ffentlich

gefrder
ten Sozialwohnungen liefen aber zunehmend aus, so dass die Wohnungsbestnde fr die
auf geringere Mieten angewiesenen Bevlkerungskreise schrumpften. Insgesamt
aber
setzte sich das Statut des sozialen Mietrechts in den 80er Jahren zunehmend durch.
Zu Beginn der 90er Jahre geriet der Wohnungsmarkt der Bundesrepublik Deutsch
land noch einmal in dramatisches Fahrwasser. Die Binnenwanderung aus den
neuen
Bundeslndern in die alten setzte als Folge der Brachlegung der DDRIndustrie ein.
Hinzu
kam ein Einwanderungsdruck aus Ost und Sd, der zeitweilig zu einem Bevlkerungszu
wachs von vielen hunderttausend Menschen in einem Jahr fhrte. Nunmehr
wurde
zur Behebung der entstandenen und entstehenden Wohnungsnotlagen eine von
Sub
ventionen induzierte Investitionswelle ausgelst, die mit einer Immobilienblase
endete.
Mit der Einschrnkung des durch das im Exil der deutschen Emigranten erlittene Leid
38
ursprnglich geprgten freiheitlichen Art. 16 GG mittels des sog.
Asylkompromisses
der groen politischen Lager (die Sozialdemokraten befrchteten allerdings nicht
ohne
Grund eine Expansion der Rechtsextremismus) lie der Nachfragedruck allmhlich
nach.
Im ersten Jahrzehnt dieses Jahrhunderts trat auf der Basis dieser massiven
Investi
tionen zum ersten Mal eine Art Gleichgewichtszustand ein, bei dem die Mieten
zunchst
im obersten und dann auch in anderen Sektoren stagnierten oder zu sinken begannen.
Das waren also geeignete Rahmenbedingungen fr eine Besttigung des sozialen Miet
rechts. Was den Justizapparat in besonderem Mae beschftigte, waren jetzt
Rechtsfragen
vom Kaliber der Schnheitsreparaturen, wo der Gesetzgeber sich im Jahre 2001 als zu
einer vereinfachten Regulierung unfhig erwies.

Zur Feier des sozialen Mietrechts und seiner Befriedungsfunktion
besteht jedoch
kein Anlass, wenn man die gegenwrtige gesellschaftliche Entwicklung nher ins Auge
fasst. Sie ist durch das langfristige Absinken der Lohnquote in Deutschland, durch
die im
mer noch zunehmenden Divergenzen zwischen hohen und niedrigen Einkommen (ohne
allgemeinen Mindestlohn) und durch die Verlagerung eines groen Teils der
Wirtschafts
ttigkeit in Billiglohnlnder geprgt. Dies hat zu einer drastischen
Ausweitung des
prekren Arbeitssektors gefhrt, mit kurzfristigen Arbeitsvertrgen, sich stndig
auswei
tender Leiharbeit und zeitlich begrenzter Projektarbeit. Der Anteil derjenigen
Mieter, die
ihre Miete nicht mehr aus stetigem Arbeits oder Renteneinkommen aufbringen knnen,
wchst.
Whrend durch die Bau und Modernisierungsttigkeit eine historisch
einmalige
Durchschnittswohnflche von ber 40 Quadratmeter pro Person in der
Bundesrepub
lik erreicht worden ist, droht einem grer werdenden Teil der Bevlkerung der
soziale
Besitzstand dadurch verloren zu gehen, dass die Arbeitseinkommen nicht mehr fr die
38 S. insbesondere das Asylverfahrensgesetz vom 27.07.1993 (BGBl. I, 1361).
591
----------------------- Page 631-----------------------
Peter Derleder
Mieten reichen. Zugleich zeichnet sich im Bereich der Sozialversicherung

bereits das
Modell ab, dass auch die Beitragszahlung ber mehr als drei Jahrzehnte
Berufsttigkeit
nur zu Renten in Hhe von Sozialhilfestzen fhrt. Kndigungsschutz und
Miethherecht
sowie die anderen Institute des sozialen Mietrechts werden also, selbst wenn die
Rechts
bestimmungen dazu nicht gendert werden, fr die schwchere Fraktion der Mieter,
fr
die sie allein von Bedeutung waren, in ihrer Substanz aufgezehrt, wenn die
sozialstaatli
chen Leistungen zurckgefhrt werden.
Schon jetzt verschrfen die Agenturen fr Arbeit die Angemessenheitskriterien
fr
die Wohnungen von Grundsicherungs und Sozialhilfeempfngern und geben auch im
Fall der Kndigung nur befristete Einstandserklrungen ab. Die Pauschalierung von
Un
terkunftskosten steht gegenwrtig auf der politischen Agenda. Sie htte zur Folge,
dass
kein Berechtigter mit seiner individuellen Notlage zur Kenntnis zu nehmen
wre. Der
aktivierende Sozialstaat, wie er mit den Hartz IVReformen ausgerufen worden ist,
hat
zwar zum zeitweiligen Rckgang der Arbeitslosigkeit gefhrt, jedoch eine
Flle von
prekren Arbeitsverhltnissen geschaffen, bis hin zu den Eineurojobs, und ist auch
sub
jektiv von vielen angenommen worden, die sich trotz strkerer Ausbeutung
ihrer Ar
beitskraft freier fhlen, wie etwa bei vielen kleinen Selbstndigen, die aus dem
Verlust eines
sozialversicherungspflichtigen Arbeitsplatzes das Beste zu machen versuchen. Wo
jedoch
Aktivierung rechtlich geboten ist, aber im Zuge der Globalisierung der
Weltwirtschaft
Arbeitspltze fehlen, die das Existenzminimum decken, wird eine repressive Ignoranz
ge
genber den Schwchsten der Gesellschaft praktiziert.
Andererseits verwundert es, dass auslndische Groinvestoren,
insbesondere auch
Fonds, die Wohnraumbestnde in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland attraktiv finden und
inzwischen die grten Vermieter sind39. Das erklrt sich zwar aus der manchmal
ver
zweifelt wirkenden Notlage des globalen Anlagekapitals, eine einigermaen

ertrgliche
stabile Rendite zu erzielen. Nach dem Interessenhorizont dieser Vermieter
ist jedoch
auf lngere Frist davon auszugehen, dass sie dem kurzfristigen Profit den
Vorrang vor
einer nachhaltigen Bewirtschaftung mit den erforderlichen Instandsetzungen und Mo
dernisierungen geben. Soweit die Kommunen und die von ihnen beherrschten
sozial
staatlich eingebundenen Wohnungsbaugesellschaften ihre Bestnde unter dem Druck der
Verschuldung veruern, geht ein fr die schwcheren Bevlkerungsschichten elemen

tar wichtiger Teil des Wohnungsbestands verloren. Die Wohnungsversorgung der darauf
angewiesenen Gruppen des Wohnungsmarkts knnte dann nur noch durch die Anmie
tung privater Wohnungen seitens der Kommunen gesichert werden, was zwangslufig zu
einer Ausweitung der Ausgaben fr diese soziale Aufgabe fhrt.
39 Das grte Wohnungsunternehmen in Deutschland (Stand: 2013) ist die Deutsche

Annington Immobilien
Gruppe (DAIG), die 2001 gegrndet wurde. Sie verfgt ber 210.000 eigene und
fr Dritte verwaltete Woh
nungen an rund 600 Standorten.
592
----------------------- Page 632-----------------------
Insofern ist zwar gegenwrtig der Normenbestand des sozialen

Mietrechts nicht
unmittelbar in Gefahr. Wohl aber dramatisiert sich die Gefahr fr die
Erfllung der
sozialen Funktion, die ursprnglich das Mietrecht hatte, durch Beschneidung der
sozial
staatlichen Leistungen. Wer seine Miete nicht bezahlen kann, dem hilft auch nicht
das
soziale Mietrecht. Fr ein Ausruhen auf den Lorbeeren der Mietrechtsreformen
besteht
also kein Grund.
19.4 Der Beitrag des sozialen Mietrechts fr die Sozialstaatlichkeit und

seine modernen Schwerpunkte
19.4.1 Die privat- und prozessrechtliche Seite
Nach dem langsamen bergang zur Wohnungsmarktwirtschaft in den 60er Jahren

ist,
wie schon dargelegt, in den 70er Jahren mit den beiden Wohnraumkndigungsschutzge
setzen 1971 und 197540 das soziale Mietrecht nach einer Erprobungsphase als
Dauerrecht
institutionalisiert worden. Durch den mietrechtlichen Kndigungsschutz, der dem

Vermie
ter eine Kndigung ohne Beendigungsgrund versagt, wird den Mietern von Wohnraum
grundstzlich Bestandsschutz gewhrt. Damit wird dem Recht auf Wohnen am bisheri
gen Lebensmittelpunkt des Mieters Rechnung getragen. Darber hinaus gibt es weitere
Auffangpositionen sozialstaatlichen Hrte, Rumungs und Vollstreckungsschutzes, die
berwiegend den Wohnraummietern zugutekommen.

Die Grundstruktur des Kndigungsschutzes besteht, wie dies jetzt in 573 I 1
BGB
verankert ist, darin, dass der Vermieter fr die Beendigung des
Mietvertragsverhltnisses
durch Kndigung eines berechtigten Interesses bedarf. Dieses kann sich
insbesondere
aus einer Vertragsverletzung des Mieters, Eigenbedarf des Vermieters und
erheblichen
Nachteilen des Vermieters bei Fortsetzung des Mietverhltnisses ergeben. Die
Rechtspre
chung der unteren Instanzen, die bis zur Abschaffung des Rechtsentscheids
durch das
Mietrechtsreformgesetz von 200141 weitgehend den sozialen Verhltnissen des
jeweiligen
Wohnungsmarktes nher gewesen waren und auch oft uneinheitlich entschieden,

war
berwiegend sozialstaatlich, mit dem von dem blinden, frhverstorbenen Mannheimer
Richter SchmidtFutterer geprgten Standardkommentar als Begleitlektre42 .
Mit der
Beseitigung des Rechtsentscheids kam zwar erstmals im Wohnraummietrecht durch die

laufende Rechtsprechung des BGH eine Rechtseinheitlichkeit zustande, die aber
Abwei
chungen von einer sozialstaatlichen Linie gelegentlich nicht vermied.
40 S. Fn. 84 und 85.

41 Gesetz vom 19.06.2001 (BGBl. I, 1149).
42 SchmidtFutterer, W./Blank, H. (2011).
593
----------------------- Page 633-----------------------
Peter Derleder
Ein weiteres traditionelles Element des Kndigungsschutzes ist ferner der

sog. Hrte
schutz. Auch wenn der Vermieter fr seine Kndigung ein berechtigtes Interesse
anfhren
kann, kann der Mieter der Kndigung gem. 574 I 1 BGB widersprechen und die
Fortset
zung des Mietverhltnisses verlangen, wenn die Beendigung des
Mietverhltnisses fr
den Mieter, seine Familie oder einen anderen Angehrigen seines Haushalts eine
Hrte
bedeuten wrde, die auch unter Wrdigung der berechtigten Interessen des Vermieters
nicht zu rechtfertigen ist. Dies gilt gem. 574 I 2 BGB jedoch nur bei der
ordentlichen
Kndigung. Als Hrte sind alle wirtschaftlichen, beruflichen, finanziellen,
gesundheitli
chen, familiren und persnlichen Auswirkungen zu verstehen, die infolge der
Vertrags
beendigung eintreten knnen. Als Hrtegrund ist gem. 574 II BGB vor allem
anerkannt, dass
angemessener Ersatzwohnraum zu zumutbaren Bedingungen nicht beschafft werden kann.
Dabei erlegen Rechtsprechung43 und Literatur44 dem Mieter Obliegenheiten zur Suche
nach
Ersatzwohnraum auf, die grundstzlich mit dem Zugang der Kndigung beginnt und
sich u.
U. auf das gesamte Gemeindegebiet erstrecken muss. Die Obliegenheiten werden
teilweise so
streng gefasst, dass ihnen Mieter mit ohnehin schon bestehenden beruflichen,
sozialen oder
familiren Schwierigkeiten kaum zu gengen vermgen.
Hrtegrnde knnen fr den Mieter ferner hohes Alter, Krankheit,
Behinderung,
Schwangerschaft, schulische und berufliche Schwierigkeiten und
unverhltnismige
Probleme bei einem Zwischenumzug sein. In jedem Fall muss eine individuelle
Interes
senabwgung zwischen den Bestandsinteressen des Mieters mit dem Erlangungsinteresse
des Vermieters erfolgen. Bei gleichem Gewicht der Interessen der Vertragsparteien
soll
dem Erlangungsinteresse des Vermieters der Vorzug gebhren45 .
Der bereits im Gesetz stark ausdifferenzierte Hrteschutz ist insgesamt

dadurch ge
prgt, dass es einem in sozialen Schwierigkeiten befindlichen Mieter nicht
leicht fllt,
ihn in Anspruch zu nehmen. Der Hrteschutz spielt demgem in der mietgerichtlichen
Praxis des letzten Jahrzehnts eine sehr geringe Rolle. Wenn dem Mieter die allen
gesetz
lichen Voraussetzungen gengende Berufung auf den Hrteschutz nicht gelingt,
bleiben
ihm nur der Rumungsschutz und der Vollstreckungsschutz.
Hat der Wohnraumvermieter wirksam gekndigt und einen gerichtlichen
Ru
mungstitel erwirkt, sei es ein Urteil, sei es einen Rumungsvergleich, so kann dem
Mie
ter noch eine Rumungsfrist gewhrt werden. Mageblich dafr sind die
721 und
794 a ZPO. Auch hier ist eine Interessenabwgung wie im Rahmen des
Hrteschutzes
erforderlich, wobei aber bei gleichem Gewicht der einander gegenber stehenden
Interes
sen das Bestandsinteresse des Schuldners vorgehen soll46 . Wiederum steht die
Erlangung
43 LG Karlsruhe, DWW 1990, 238; LG Mnchen I, WuM 1990, 153.

44 Siehe nur SchmidtFutterer, W./Blank, H. (2007), 574 Rn. 31.
45 LG Berlin, WuM 1990, 504 und die h.M.
46 LG Hamburg, WuM 1988, 316; streitig.
594
----------------------- Page 634-----------------------

einer Ersatzwohnung im Mittelpunkt. Auch hier wird dem Rumungsschuldner, der nicht
unbedingt Mieter sein muss, eine strenge Obliegenheit zur Ersatzraumsuche wie im
Rah
men des Hrteschutzes nach 574 BGB auferlegt47 . Der Schuldner kann hier auch die
gleichen Grnde vorbringen wie beim Hrteschutz.

Die letzte Auffangebene fr einen Rumungsschuldner stellt der
Vollstreckungs
schutz nach 765 a I 1 ZPO dar. Danach kann das Vollstreckungsgericht
auf Antrag
des Schuldners eine Manahme der Zwangsvollstreckung ganz oder teilweise aufheben,
untersagen oder einstweilig einstellen, wenn die Manahme unter voller Wrdigung
des
Schutzbedrfnisses des Glubigers wegen ganz besonderer Umstnde eine Hrte bedeu
tet, die mit den guten Sitten nicht vereinbar ist.
In den letzten Jahren hat vor allem die Gewhrung von Vollstreckungsschutz
bei Ge
fahr der Selbstttung und bei Androhung des Suizids die Gerichte beschftigt48 .
Dies ist in
erster Linie auf die zunehmende Alternativlosigkeit von Rumungsschuldnern vor

allem
nach jahrzehntelanger mietvertraglicher Kontinuitt aufgrund ihres Alters oder auf
ihre
soziale Lage zurckzufhren. Die Rechtsprechung dazu ist nicht einheitlich. Vor
allem
soll der Suizidgefhrdete medizinische Hilfe in Anspruch nehmen. Insgesamt zeigt
die
Judikatur, dass es vor allem in der Phase der wirtschaftlichen Rezession eine
zunehmende
Anzahl berschuldeter Haushalte ohne Lebensperspektive gibt, wobei sich
Verschuldung,
Krankheit und Unglck oft verbinden, und die Rumung des langjhrigen Lebensmit
telpunkts nach einem Rumungsurteil oder in der Zwangsversteigerung als
Gipfel des
sozialen Verfalls empfunden wird. Auch die chinesische Lsung mit einer Einweisung
in
die Psychiatrie whrend der Rumung scheint Akzeptanz zu finden.
Das soziale Mietrecht leistet mit den komplementren Instituten des Rumungs
und des
Vollstreckungsschutzes zwar einen erheblichen Beitrag zur Verwirklichung eines
Rechts auf
Wohnen. Es knpft jedoch durchgehend an eine bereits bestehende Mieter,
Besitzrechts oder
Besitzposition an, ist also nicht geeignet, den Zugang zum Wohnungsmarkt zu ffnen,
also der
Hilfe fr diejenigen zu dienen, die sich nicht selbst versorgen knnen. Hierfr ist
spter noch
die polizeirechtliche Unterbringung Obdachloser zu errtern49.
19.4.2 Das Mietrechtsreformgesetz von 2001
Das grte privatrechtliche Reformvorhaben der ersten rot-

grnen Bundesregie
rung war die Schuldrechtsreform zum 01.01.200250, die vor allem das allgemeine
Leis
tungsstrungsrecht und das Kaufrecht aufgrund einer intensiven

Diskussion neu
47 Siehe nur SchmidtFutterer, W./Blank, H. (2007) 721 ZPO Rn. 12.

48 BVerfGE 52, 214; BVerfG NJW 1991, 3206 und 3207; 1992, 1378; 1994, 1719; ZMR
1997, 626; WuM 2004, 81.
49 S. dazu unter IV.
50 Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts vom 26.11.2001 (BGBl. I, 3138).
595
----------------------- Page 635-----------------------
Peter Derleder
regelte. Davon blieb die zum 01.09.2001 in Kraft getretene Mietrechtsreform

weitgehend
unberhrt, die noch schnell vorgezogen und mit dem sonstigen Schuldrecht
rechtsdog
matisch nicht oder kaum abgestimmt wurde. Die rckstndige dogmatische Analyse des
Dauerschuldverhltnisses wurde gar nicht vorangetrieben51. Inhaltlich brachte diese

Re
form berhaupt nur wenig Neues. Die bisher in ihrer Lnge symmetrischen Fristen fr
die Vermieter und die Mieter entfielen. Die Mieter konnten nunmehr52 mit einer
Frist
von knapp drei Monaten kndigen, wo doch auf dem Arbeitsmarkt Flexibilitt angesagt
war. Der einfache Zeitmietvertrag wurde abgeschafft, da er den

Kndigungsschutz zu
umgehen drohte. Zulssig sollte nach 575 BGB nur ein qualifizierter
Zeitmietvertrag
sein, bei dem anerkannte Beendigungsgrnde dem Mieter schon bei Vertragsabschluss
mitgeteilt sein wrden. Die Vorauszahlungen fr Betriebskosten waren nunmehr
jhrlich
abzurechnen, wobei zugleich der Wirtschaftlichkeitsgrundsatz verankert wurde53. Bei
Mie
terhhungen sollte ein qualifizierter, nach anerkannten wissenschaftlichen

Grundstzen
erstellter Mietspiegel den Vorrang genieen54. Staffel und Indexmiete
wurden zeitlich
unbeschrnkt zugelassen55, allerdings mit einem Sonderkndigungsrecht des Mieters
bei
der Staffelmiete nach vier Jahren und mit der ausschlielichen Orientierung der
Index
miete am Verbraucherpreisindex. Wichtiger war noch die Einfhrung der Barrierefrei
heit. Behinderten Mietern wurde ein Anspruch auf Duldung eines behindertengerechten
Umbaus der Wohnung und des Treppenhauses eingerumt, allerdings auf deren Kosten56.
Die relativ bescheidenen Ziele des Reformgesetzes wurden allerdings zum Teil durch
die
Rechtsprechung des BGH unterlaufen, der nach der Abschaffung des Zeitmietvertrages
sogar in AGB vorgesehene vierjhrige Kndigungsausschlussvereinbarungen

akzepti
erte57. Trstlich war jedoch, dass das Reformgesetz von 2001 die Grundlagen der
sozial
liberalen Wohnraumschutzgesetze nicht mehr in Frage stellte.
19.4.3 Das Mietrechtsnderungsgesetz 2013
Dabei blieb es auch, als das Mietrechtsnderungsgesetz zum 01.05.2013 in Kraft

getreten
ist58. In deren Mittelpunkt stand die energetische Modernisierung, die im Hinblick
auf
die zahlreichen Energieeinsparverordnungen59, die energierechtlich schon lnger
immer
51 S. etwa Oetker, H. (1994).

52 573 c I 1 BGB.
53 556 III 1 BGB.
54 S. die Regelung in 558 d BGB.
55 557 a und b BGB.
56 554 a BGB.
57 S. nur BGH NJW 2005, 1574.
58 BGBl. 2013 I, 434.
59 S. die erste Fassung der EnEV vom 16.11.2001(BGBl. I, 3085) und die letzte
nderung durch Gesetz vom
05.12.2012 (BGBl. I, 2449, 2452).
596
----------------------- Page 636-----------------------
bessere Wrmedurchgangskoeffizienten fr die verwendeten Bauteile forderten,

nach
dem GAU von Fukushima einen besonderen Schub erhalten hat. Im letzten Augenblick
hat der Gesetzgeber allerdings die Legaldefinition der nachhaltigen
energetischen Mo
dernisierung in 555 b Nr. 1 BGB auf die Einsparung von Endenergie beschrnkt, wie
sie an der Gebudehlle zu messen ist. Insoweit besteht eine Duldungspflicht des
Mie
ters, die auch zu modernisierungsbedingten Mieterhhungen nach 559 I BGB fhren
kann. Einsparungen von Primrenergie, also im vorgelagerten Bereich, muss der
Mieter
zwar dulden, etwa in der Form der Anbringung von Fotovoltaikanlagen,
desgleichen
Klimaschutzmanahmen, etwa durch Umstellung von Heizl auf Erdgas, das wesentlich
weniger CO2Emissionen zeitigt. Ein Mieterhhungsrecht, das einen bedeutsamen
Anreiz
fr den Vermieter darstellen wrde, folgt daraus jedoch nicht. Insoweit hat der
Gesetzge
ber also eher eine sozialliberale Lsung gefunden als eine kologisch
weiterreichende.
Ferner hat der Gesetzgeber das Contracting in 556 c BGB legalisiert, also
die Ein
schaltung eines Unternehmens durch den Vermieter, das Investitionen in
Anlagen der
Wrmeversorgung ttigt oder eine bessere Betriebsfhrung bernimmt. Die
Verteue
rungseffekte der Einschaltung von Dritten, die die Wrmeversorgung durchfhren,
sind
leicht vorstellbar, werden jedoch durch das Erfordernis der Kostenneutralitt
aufgrund
einer noch nicht ausdiskutierten Verordnung auf der Basis des 556 c III BGB
voraus
sichtlich ausgebremst. Ansonsten ging es noch um die Bekmpfung der Mietnomaden,
die von Wohnung zu Wohnung ziehen, ohne jemals Miete zu zahlen, was trotz einer
sehr
beschrnkten Zahl solcher Flle durch Horrormeldungen zu einem monstrsen Problem
aufgeblasen wurde60. In aufwendiger Weise wurde deswegen ein Eingriff in das System
der
ZPO mit einstweiligen Verfgungen und bevorzugtem Rumungsschutz speziell zuguns

ten der Vermieter realisiert.
Ernsthafter ist es dagegen, dass die Vermieter bei verwahrlosten Wohnungen
nach
dem traditionellen Recht der Rumungsvollstreckung gem. 885 ZPO immer
hhere
Vorschsse aufzubringen haben, nicht nur fr Schlosser und Spediteure,
sondern wo
mglich auch fr Reinigungskrfte und Tierpfleger. Aus diesem Grund hat der BGH61
schon
vor der Reform die sog. Berliner Rumung in einer extralegalen Entscheidung
gestattet,
gesttzt auf das Vermieterpfandrecht, das an den meist unpfndbaren Sachen der Ru
mungsschuldner gar nicht bestehen kann. Nunmehr lst sich der Gesetzgeber in 885
a
ZPO vom Vermieterpfandrecht, gestattet die Schlossauswechslung, die Vernichtung der
wertlosen Haushaltsgegenstnde und die Verwertung der anderen.

Auch weitere kleine Kompromisse wurden geschlossen. Die ortsbliche
Vergleichs
miete hat darber hinaus in 558 III BGB eine neue Kappungsgrenze erhalten, die
fr
60 S. dazu Artz, M.; Jacoby, F.: Mieterschutz und Investitionsbereitschaft im

Wohnungsbaur (2011).
61 BGH NJW 2006, 848.
597
----------------------- Page 637-----------------------
Peter Derleder
Gebiete mit angespannten Wohnungsmrkten von 20% auf 15% abgesenkt wurde. Dafr
kann dem Mieter nunmehr fristlos gekndigt werden, wenn er die Kaution nicht zu den
Flligkeitsterminen zahlt und mit der Hhe eines Betrages in Verzug ist, der der
zwei
fachen Monatsmiete entspricht.
Immerhin ist der Mietrechtsnderung 2013 zu bescheinigen, dass sie
die Moder
nisierungsmanahmen mit energetischer Perspektive durch Rezeption der energierecht
lichen Kategorien systematisiert hat. Die Betriebskosten haben sich in den beiden
letzten
Jahrzehnten ganz berproportional gesteigert, so dass von ihnen schon als der
zweiten
Miete gesprochen wird. Auch die Vermieter sehen sich hinsichtlich der Hhe der
Miete
unter Druck. Aus kologischen Grnden wird vor allem der Einsatz nicht erneuerbarer
Energien, der vom Wohnungsbestand aus ein Unma an Emissionen verursacht, weiter
hin Gegenstand der Gesetzgebung bleiben mssen.
19.4.4 Die ffentlich-rechtliche Intervention
Am Ende dieses Beitrags soll noch einmal auf die Personen eingegangen werden, denen
trotz aller sozialstaatlichen Institute des Mietrechts die Obdachlosigkeit

droht. Die
Bekmpfung der Obdachlosigkeit ist ein traditionelles Aufgabengebiet des Staates,
schon
des autoritren Staates des 19. Jahrhunderts, aber auch des Sozialstaats
seit Grndung
der Bundesrepublik. Die Wiedereinweisung des Mieters, dem die Rumungsvollstre
ckung droht, in seine bisherige Mietwohnung ist zu einem in den Lehrbchern
verblassten
bloen Ausschnitt der Wohnungslosigkeit herabgesunken.
Bei der Obdachlosenunterbringung muss auch nach einer Wohnungsbeschlagnahme
versucht werden, den Eingewiesenen alsbald anderweitig unterzubringen62, etwa in
einer
freigewordenen Wohnung oder Obdachlosenunterkunft. Bei der Obdachlosenunterbrin

gung in privaten Rumen muss die Wohnraumbeschlagnahme an den Eigentmer und
die Einweisungsverfgung an den von der Obdachlosigkeit Bedrohten gerichtet werden.
Die Behrde hat ein Auswahlermessen, wie sie die Unterbringung vollzieht, sei es in
einer
Privatwohnung, in einem Obdachlosenheim oder in einer Pension. Nur wo das Ermessen
aufgrund besonderer Umstnde auf null schrumpft63, kann sich theoretisch ein
Anspruch
auf behrdliches Einschreiten ergeben. Ein solcher Individualanspruch auf

Unterbrin
gung nach den Vorschriften des Polizei und Ordnungsrechts ist aber praktisch noch
nie
erfolgreich von einem Obdachlosen eingeklagt worden.
62 OVG Mnster, OVGE 35, 303, 304.

63 Siehe zur Ermessensreduzierung auf null insbesondere di Fabio, VA 86 (1995),
214 ff; Thomas Gro, ZR
61 (2006), 625 ff.
598
----------------------- Page 638-----------------------

Inhaltlich ist die behrdliche Verpflichtung ohnehin in der

Rechtsprechung stets
eingeschrnkt worden. So ist die Behrde nicht verpflichtet, dem Obdachlosen eine
Woh
nung zur Verfgung zu stellen. Als anfangs der 90er Jahre aufgrund der
Migrationsbewe
gungen teilweise drastische Wohnungsnot in den Ballungsgebieten entstand,
entschieden
die Verwaltungsgerichte, zur Vermeidung der Obdachlosigkeit genge eine Unterkunft,
die vorbergehend Schutz vor den Unbilden des Wetters biete und Raum fr die
elemen
taren Lebensbedrfnisse lasse64. Bei Alleinstehenden erklrte das OVG Mnster es
grund
stzlich fr ausreichend, dass eine Unterbringung in Sammelunterknften mit Tages

und
Schlafrumen erfolgt.
Seit langem wird etwa ber die Konstellationen diskutiert, in denen der
Vermieter
einen vollstreckbaren Rumungstitel erwirkt hat und die Ordnungsbehrde
zugunsten
des Mieters wegen dessen drohender Obdachlosigkeit intervenieren will. Hier sind
die
unterschiedlichen Voraussetzungen des zivilgerichtlichen Rumungsschutzes und
der
ordnungsbehrdlichen Unterbringung zu beachten. Whrend das Fehlen von
Ersatz
wohnraum fr den Hrte, Rumungs und Vollstreckungsschutz von Bedeutung ist, er
gibt sich aus dem Ordnungsrecht kein Anspruch auf eine Ersatzwohnung, sondern nur
auf eine Unterkunft65. Der zivilrechtliche Schutz ist an die Einhaltung von Formen
und
Fristen gebunden, nicht nur beim Hrteschutz, sondern auch beim Rumungsschutz und
beim Vollstreckungsschutz von einer unzumutbaren Hrte abhngig, whrend es fr die
Einweisung eines Obdachlosen auf das Fehlen von Ersatzwohnraum ankommt.

Bercksichtigt man diese Unterschiede in den Voraussetzungen von Einweisung
und
zivilrechtlichem Schutz, dann kann keine strikte Subsidiaritt der
Einweisung gerecht
fertigt werden. Diese ist vom Zivilverfahren zunchst unabhngig. Das
Eingreifen der
Behrde ist nicht erst dann zulssig, wenn der Rumungsschuldner schon auf der
Strae
steht. Der Gefahrtatbestand ist bereits verwirklicht, wenn die Vollstreckung
unmittelbar
bevorsteht, also ein vollstreckbarer Titel vorliegt. Auch wenn der
Rumungsschuldner
keinen Rechtsbehelf mehr einlegt oder dabei den Anforderungen an Form und Frist
nicht
gengt, kann eine die behrdliche Intervention rechtfertigende Gefahr
vorliegen. Die
Behrde kann nicht einfach auf den Zivilrechtsweg verweisen, es sei denn, dass auf
diesem
bereits Rumungsschutz gewhrt ist oder eine entsprechende Entscheidung unmittelbar
bevorsteht. Dementsprechend ist in der Rechtsprechung teilweise sogar die
Subsidiaritt
des ordnungsbehrdlichen Eingreifens ausdrcklich verneint worden66. Dies schliet
es
aber nicht aus, dass die Polizei und Ordnungsbehrde vor ihrem Eingriff jeweils
ber
prft, wie weit zivilgerichtlicher Rumungsschutz gewhrt worden ist oder
bevorsteht.
64 OVG Mnster, DWW 1992, 180; VGH BadenWrttemberg, VBlBW 1993, 146; so auch noch
spter VGH
BadenWrttemberg, ZMR 1997, 206.
65 Siehe Ewer/von Detten, NJW 1995, 358.
66 VGH Mannheim, ZMR 1990, 193, 195.
599
----------------------- Page 639-----------------------
Peter Derleder
In der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit war die Wiedereinweisung in eine

Mietwoh
nung nach dem Ende des Mietverhltnisses eine verbreitete Manahme gegen den
Eintritt
von Obdachlosigkeit. Damit war allerdings eine Belastung des Eigentmers und
Vermie
ters verbunden, der sich vor allem nach der Erwirkung eines Rumungstitels in
der
Verwertung seines Eigentums entscheidend beschrnkt sah und geltend machte,
dass
ihm ein Sonderopfer abverlangt werde. Dennoch ist die Wiedereinweisung ein
Thema
des Polizei und Ordnungsrechts geblieben, da der Mieter und seine Familie
in der
Mietwohnung ihren Lebensmittelpunkt hatten und die Wohnung fr die Familienstruk
tur regelmig eher adquat war als die auf einem ungleichgewichtigen Wohnungsmarkt
vorfindlichen Wohnungen. Steht die Rumung unmittelbar bevor oder hat der Gerichts
vollzieher bereits einen Rumungsversuch unternommen, liegt es nahe, dass eine
Mieter
familie sich an die Polizei oder Ordnungsbehrde wendet und um die Einweisung in
die
bisherige Wohnung ersucht, falls sie keinen anderweitigen Wohnraum beschaffen kann
und ihr Obdachlosigkeit droht.

Die Ordnungsbehrde kann, wenn sie intervenieren will, gegenber dem
Vermieter
als Nichtstrer eine Beschlagnahmeanordnung treffen. Gleichzeitig kann sie
gegenber
dem Mieter als Strer eine entsprechende Einweisungsverfgung erlassen67. Es
entsteht
dann ein ffentlichrechtliches Nutzungsverhltnis zwischen der Krperschaft, die

Trger
der Behrde ist, und dem Vermieter.
Im Zuge der Entwicklung zu zeitweiligem Gleichgewicht auf dem Wohnungsmarkt,
das jetzt wieder im Zeichen der Finanzkrise durch Aufwertung der
Immobilien been
det ist, hat sich eine sehr restriktive Haltung der Judikatur zur Wiedereinweisung
in die
bisherige Mietwohnung ergeben. Eine Einweisung soll nur noch mglich sein, wenn der
Obdachlose berhaupt nicht anderweitig untergebracht werden kann68. Die

Behrde
muss danach bei der Obdachlosenunterbringung vor der Inanspruchnahme des

Ei
gentmers und Vermieters als eines Nichtstrers alle eigenen
Unterbringungsmglich
keiten (Obdachlosenunterknfte) ausgeschpft haben und notfalls Zimmer in Hotels
und
Pensionen anmieten69, die Anmietung leerstehender Wohnungen realisieren und
sogar
die vorbergehende Beherbergung in Wohnrumen oder Wohncontainern in

Betracht
ziehen70. Daraus wird zum Teil auch der Schluss gezogen, grere
Gemeinden seien
grundstzlich verpflichtet, Obdachlosenunterknfte zu schaffen und zu unterhalten.

Aber
67 OVG Mnster, NVwZ 1991, 905, 906.

68 VGH BadenWrttemberg, ZMR 1997, 206.
69 VGH BadenWrttemberg, NJW 1997, 2832, 2833; OVG SchleswigHolstein, NJW 1993,
413, 414; Erichsen/
Biermann, Jura 1998, 371, 377.
70 OVG Mnster, NVwZ 1991, 692, wo allerdings eine entsprechende
Unterbringung im konkreten Fall
abgelehnt wurde.
600
----------------------- Page 640-----------------------
auch wo keine solchen Unterknfte bereit gehalten werden und Kommunen sogar ihre
Sozialwohnungsbestnde veruert oder abgebaut haben, wird nach inzwischen gngiger
Praxis stets die Anmietung einer bescheidenen Unterkunft fr einen

Alleinstehenden
oder auch einer Wohnung fr eine Familie durch den Trger der Obdachlosenhilfe als
geboten angesehen, so dass die Wiedereinweisung in eine Mietwohnung bei drohender

Vollstreckung aus einem Rumungstitel des Vermieters obsolet geworden ist. Es lsst
sich
somit konstatieren, dass der ffentlichrechtliche Schutz vor einem
Mietwohnungsverlust
inzwischen praktisch beseitigt ist. Diese Fehlentwicklung ist bislang
nicht hinreichend
kritisch verarbeitet worden.
19.5 Fazit
In Frankreich ist es periodisch blich, dass sich gesellschaftliche
Emprung ber das
Schicksal der Wohnungslosen und von Wohnungslosigkeit Bedrohten zeigt, etwa
in
Zeltaktionen vor Weihnachten, auch mitten in Paris. Davon ist in der
Bundesrepublik
Deutschland noch nichts zu spren, obwohl die Wohnungsmrkte vielerlei klandestine
Diskriminierungen bergen, nicht nur gegenber den Armen und den Alten, die sich
keine
neue Lebensmelodie in einer anderen Wohnung mehr vorstellen knnen, sondern auch
beim Zugang zu einer Wohnung, nicht nur fr Migranten71, sondern auch
fr kinder
reiche Familien. Das Mietrecht stellt zwar immer noch ein funktionierendes
Herzstck
des Sozialstaats dar, auch wenn umso mehr Obliegenheiten fr den Mieter aufgetrmt
werden, je mehr sich fr ihn soziale Probleme beim Ausschluss von Arbeits und Fami
lienbeziehungen hufen. Die verfassungsrechtlich verankerte Schuldenbremse wird
sich
jedoch in erster Linie auf den Sozialstaat auswirken, dessen Leistungen
entscheidend
beschnitten zu werden drohen. Wer seine Miete nicht mehr zahlen kann, wird auch
aus
dem Mietrechtsschutz eskamotiert. Insofern wird der in den USA schon deutlicher als
in
Europa ausgeprgte Abstieg der Mittelschicht die integrativen Funktionen
der Zivilge
sellschaft und die staatlichen Solidarittsressourcen vor neue Herausforderungen
stellen.
71 Insoweit verbietet 19 AGG allerdings Diskriminierungen, was aber oft nur

politisch korrekte Ausreden der
Vermieter erzeugt. Zur richtlinienkonformen Auslegung der Norm s. insbesondere
Gaier/Wendtland, AGG,
2006, 19 Rdnr. 127.
601
----------------------- Page 641-----------------------
Artz, Markus; Jacoby, Florian (2011): Mieterschutz und Investitionsbereitschaft im

Woh-
nungsbau. Mietausflle durch sogenannte Mietnomaden. Bielefeld.
Bundesrat (22.032013): Gesetzesantrag der Lnder Hamburg, Barden-Wrttemberg, Nie-
dersachsen, Nordrhein-Westphalen. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur nderung des Gesetzes

zur
Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung. Kln: Drucksache 177/13.
Depenheuer, Otto (1993): Der Mieter als Eigentmer? Anmerkungen zum

Beschlu des
BVerF vom 26.05.1993. In: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (40/1993), pp. 25612564.
Derleder, Peter (1993): Der Mieter als Eigentmer. In: WuM (1993), pp. 514523.
Deutscher Bundestag (2003): Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion SPD und Bndnis 90/Die
Grnen.
Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einordnung des Sozialhilferechts in das
Sozialgesetzbuch.
Berlin: Drucksache 15/1514.
Finger (1993): Willkr. Mietrecht. Eigenbedarf. In: Zeitschrift fr Miet und

Raumrecht
(1993), pp. 545 ff.
Grube, Christian; Wahrendorf, Volker; Schoenfeld, Christoph et al. (2008): SGB XII.
Sozi-
2
alhilfe; Kommentar. Mnchen : C. H. Beck.
Heidegger, Martin (2000): Gesamtausgabe. 1. Abteilung: Verffentlichte

Schriften 1910-
1976. Band 7. Vortrge und Aufstze. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Oetker, Hartmut (1994): Das Dauerschuldverhltnis und seine Beendigung.

Bestands-
aufnahme und kritische Wrdigung einer tradierten Figur der
Schuldrechtsdogmatik.
Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Rthers (1993): Ein Grundrecht auf Wohnung durch die Hintertr? In: Neue
Juristische
Wochenschrift (40/1993), pp. 25872588.
SchmidtFutterer, Wolfgang; Blank, Hubert (2007): Mietrecht. Kommentar.

Mnchen9:
C. H. Beck.
602
----------------------- Page 642-----------------------
10
SchmidtFutterer, Wolfgang; Blank, Hubert (2011): Mietrecht. Kommentar.
Mnchen :
C. H. Beck.
Stadler, Otto (1955): Handbuch der Wohnungsbaufrderung und des sozialen Wohnungs-
baues. Mnchen: C. H. Beck.
Steinmeier, Frank; Brhl, Albrecht (1989): Wohnungslose im Recht. Tradition und

Pers-
pektiven staatlicher Konzepte gegen Wohnungslosigkeit . In: Kritische
Justiz, 34 (3/1989),
pp. 275296.
603
----------------------- Page 643-----------------------
----------------------- Page 644-----------------------
20 Towards a Common Core of Residential
Tenancy Law in Europe?
The Impact of the European Court of
Human Rights on Tenancy Law
Summary
One-third of European citizens depend on rental housing, and yet, the regulation of
residen-
tial tenancy law constitutes a nearly blank space in comparative and European Union
law.
This inconsistency can be attributed to the fields national character, its
perceived political
nature and its embeddedness in widely divergent national housing policies.
Nonetheless, EU
law and policies in other areas do affect tenancy law significantly, albeit
indirectly and less
visibly. Most of these fields do not determine the core of private tenancy law, but
rather the
regulatory context in which private contracts or land law rules and principles are
embedded.
However, this is different for the continuously increasing impact of the European
Convention
on Human Rights on tenancy law. So far, communication rights, non-discrimination
rights,
the protection of the private sphere and family life, due process rights and the
landlords prop-
erty rights have been applied to tenancy law cases by the European Court of Human
Rights.
The present contribution begins with an introductory survey of the wide-ranging
influences
of European law on tenancy regulation, followed by a more detailed presentation of
the ju-
risprudence of the ECtHR in the second section. We then analyse to what extent
important
decisions on the economic basis of the tenancy relationship give rise to the
emergence of a
common core of European tenancy law in the form of a principle of socio-economic
balance.
20.1 Introduction
Perhaps nothing affects ones daily life more closely than ones home.1 Widening
the view
to the municipal, regional and national levels thus reveals layers of tenancy law
and hous-
ing policy that directly impact the daily lives of many European citizens, as from
one-third
1 EuSoCo Principles of Life-time Contracts, Principle 2 refers to the concept of

considering human beings in
their real-life context and placing the human dimension at the centre of
lifetime contracts.
605
----------------------- Page 645-----------------------
to as much as over one-half, in some countries, of the population rent homes.2

Accord-
ingly, EU constitutional law and the European Convention on Human Rights have been
increasingly extended to a range of tenancy issues, resulting in the recent

emergence of
a principle of socio-economic balance of the rights and obligations of landlords
and ten-
ants. The rapid development of this nascent principle in the jurisprudence of the
European
Court of Human Rights is impressive, considering the complexity of
tenancy law and
housing policy.
3
For example, residential tenancies are not typically considered a branch of
consumer
4
law, but in the field of social private law formed by residential tenancy law,
labour law
and consumer law, mandatory provisions oriented towards solidarity among citizens
su-
persede the core principle of party autonomy.5 These interventions into freedom of
con-
tract take the form of rent controls, limitations on unilateral termination of a

tenancy by
the landlord, guarantees of habitability and other measures. These social
considerations
reflect the embeddedness of tenancy law in the larger social, political
and economic
6
context of housing policy, which deals with the welfare state regulation of, for
example,
object-related social housing for low-income groups, subject-related housing
allowances
for low-income tenants, and tax-law incentives and capital grants for housing
construc-
tion. Housing policy extends further to encompass issues of macroeconomic
manage-
ment, energy policy, neighbourhood policy, and urban and spatial planning. The
various
manifestations of this regulatory context reflect differing models of capitalism
and of the
welfare state, as can be seen in the significant differences in housing policies
expressed
by the three types of welfare states classified by Esping-Andersen as the social
(Nordic),
7
the liberal, and the corporatist. In addition to the state and the market, the
household is
another significant actor determining housing policy in the welfare state, such as
when a
8
household provides its own housing by choosing to purchase a home. All of these
factors
contribute to the vast complexity of housing policy.
2 For the data, see European Commission; eurostat. URL:

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/
index.php/Housing_statistics.
3 Commercial tenancies will not generally be dealt with here as they are
normally regulated in different ways
and have widely different social and economic implications.
4 EU consumer contract directives generally deal only with B2C relations (which
in tenancy contracts would
presuppose a landlord renting out several apartments so as to qualify as a
commercial party), but it should be
noted that the legal basis for European consumer protection laid down in Art.
169 TFEU, and, in particular,
para. 2 lit. b, does not contain any such restriction.
5 EuSoCo Declaration 2012, Clause 8 calls for the protection of social interests
to complement contractual
freedom, and EuSoCo Principle 7 introduces the collective dimension, as well
as general values of good
morals and good faith, as influencing all stages of the contractual
relationship.
6 See, most recently, Fahey, T./Norris, M. (2010).
7 Esping-Andersen, G. (1990).
8 Esping-Andersen, G. (1999).
606
----------------------- Page 646-----------------------
Although comparative treatments of such housing issues are abundant in

sociology
and economics, the distinctly national or even regional character of tenancy law,
its strong
political nature and its embeddedness in widely diverging national housing policies
have
led to a relative absence of the subject in the European private law and
comparative law
disciplines. Only one larger comparative project has been undertaken,9 and apart
from
some publications on selected issues, the few more general accounts that are
available are
mostly outdated.10
Yet, just as in most other fields, the performance and effectiveness of the
legal system
in the area of tenancy law depends increasingly not only on its regulatory law
context but
also on its interconnections to European law and policy. Thus, with the increase in
mo-
bility of European citizens and the growth of Europe-wide job markets and the boom
in
tourism, tenancy regulation is increasingly important to the Single Market. Equal
access
to national housing markets is generally available, as prescribed long ago by
European
law.11 Nonetheless, national systems in the host country may unexpectedly place
tenants
in unfavourable conditions.12 The same may be true for relatively long periods of
notice
required of tenants in their country of origin, which may force a worker who moves
to pay
rent on two different properties over an extended period and so act as a
disincentive to
intra-European mobility. Moreover, European citizenship is also affected negatively
when
migrating citizens are caught by surprising and impenetrable regulations
in their host
countries to the detriment of the quality of their housing and, thus, ultimately of
their
quality of life. Beyond the free circulation of tenants, the freedom of capital is
also af-
fected by tenancy law. In recent years, as a consequence of globalisation and the
establish-
ment of new asset classes such as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), real
estate and
capital markets have integrated dramatically in Europe and beyond.13 These
investments
9 Tenancy Law and Procedure in the European University Institute - Department of

Law. URL: http://www.
eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/Law/ResearchAndTeaching/ResearchThemes/ProjectTenancyL
aw.aspx.
The project website contains 18 national reports, some background papers and a
general report, found at
http://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Law/ResearchTeaching/ResearchThemes/
European-
PrivateLaw/TenancyLawProject/TenancyLawGeneralReport.pdf. A Spanish
translation of the general re-
port is available on file with the author.
10 See Trenk-Hinterberger, P. (1977); Stabentheiner, J./Bydlinski, F. (1996);
Oberhammer, P./Kleteka, A. et al.
(2011). For more recent articles, see, however, Bargelli, E. (2007); Ball, J.
(2010); Hau, W. (2011).
11 Regulation 1612/68 implementing equal treatment rights emanating from the free
movement of workers
stipulates in its Art. 9 that a national of a Member State who is employed in
the territory of another Member
State shall enjoy the rights and benefits accorded to national workers in
matters of housing, including home
ownership, and in the allocation of public housing. (European Council
(19.10.1968)).
12 One example being the limit to six months security of tenure afforded in the
United Kingdom to a tenant
with an assured shorthold tenancy, as is usual in the United Kingdom, which
carries the risk of negative ef-
fects on the free circulation of workers, self-employed persons, pensioners and
students.
13 For example in Germany, foreign companies and funds provide more than 50% of
current real estate invest-
ment, compared with only 2 to 6% in the mid-nineties. Cf. Report of the Federal
Government on Housing
and Real Estate Economy in Germany: Deutscher Bundestag 16.
Wahlperiode: Unterrichtung durch die
Bundesregierung: Drucksache 16/13325 (04.06.2009), pp. 6, 14.
607
----------------------- Page 647-----------------------
predominantly concern commercial property, but in some countries they also extend
to
large municipal housing stocks put on the market by cities that are under heavy
financial
constraints. Against this background, it is evident that the tenancy laws of a
country are
important economic parameters for investors.
However, the European impact on tenancy law derives not only from its
importance
to the Single Market but even more so from the manifold effects on tenancy law
exerted by
EU regulation and policy in other fields.14 It seems that such effects are not
always inten-
tional but may instead constitute more or less unanticipated side effects of EU
regulation
and policy.
To start with, EU social policy against poverty and social exclusion extends
to selected
15
issues of housing, in particular the amelioration of housing conditions.
Moreover, policy
has also been affected by European competition and state aid rules to a certain
degree,
particularly with regard to State-subsidised social housing for the poor. In this
context, the
Commission allowed Ireland, for example, to provide bank guarantees for borrowings
by
the public Housing Finance Agency.16 Likewise, the Commission has repeatedly
allowed
public subsidies for housing developers aimed at promoting home ownership among so-
cially disadvantaged groups in deprived urban areas.17 In tax law, the Council
decided in
1992 that the supply, construction, renovation and alteration of housing provided
as part
of social policy may be subject to reduced VAT rates,18 while the letting of
accommoda-
tion is completely exempted from VAT in all Member States.19 Further aspects of
tenancy
law are dealt with under European consumer law. Whereas the Doorstep Sales
Directive
excludes lease contracts from the scope of its application (Art. 3 para. 2 lit. a),
the Unfair
Terms Directive extends to clauses contained in lease contracts, provided that the
tenant
is a consumer and the landlord is a commercial entity (which generally requires him
to let
several apartments). The tenant is also protected against misleading advertising
and similar
practices by the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, which provides in Art.
2 lit.
c that products include immovable property. In a completely different legal area,
tenancy
14 For an overview of EU law and policies impacting tenancy law, see Schmid, C.
U./Dinse, J. R. (2013). See
also, on the EU involvement in land law in general, Sparkes, P. (2007).
15 See FEANTSA Working Group Housing: Background Paper. Housing in EU policy
making (2002).
16 Case N 209/2001. Interestingly, the decision did not exempt the
measure under the state aid provision
(Art. 107 TFEU), but qualified the provision of a good dwelling in a good
housing environment to every
household and especially the most socially disadvantaged as a service of
general interest not to be affected
by competition rules according to Art. 106 para. 2 TFEU.
17 Cases European Commission: State aid N N497/01 - United Kingdom
(Scotland): C (2001) 3459 final
(13.11.2001) and 239/2002.
18 See Annex H of European Council (31.10.1992).
making (2002) 5.
608
----------------------- Page 648-----------------------

law is also affected by European provisions on energy saving according to which,

inter alia,
the landlord is bound to inform the tenant about the buildings energy consumption
when
they enter into the agreement. In Germany, these provisions have prompted the
legislator
to allow rent increases after modernisation measures aimed at energy saving (Arts.
554
para. 2, 559 BGB). Next, tenancy law is also dealt with under European private
interna-
tional law, including international procedural law. Thus, in actions concerning the
lease of
immovable property, Art. 22 no. 1 Brussels I Regulation establishes exclusive
jurisdiction
in the State where the property is located. Likewise, according to Art. 4 para. 1
lit. c Rome
I Regulation, tenancy agreements are governed by the law of the place where the
immov-
able property is situated. However, choice of law is possible even in residential
tenancy
agreements to the detriment of tenants, as the limitations on choice of law in
consumer
contracts do not apply to tenancy contracts (Art. 6 para. 4 lit. c Rome I).
Moreover, the
provision of housing has been incorporated in European anti-discrimination
legislation.
Based on Art. 19 TFEU, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council adopted a
Directive against discrimination based on race and ethnic origin in June 2000.20
This Di-
rective includes in Art. 3 para. 1 lit. h access to and the supply of goods and
services avail-
able to the public, including housing. This is important in practice because
members of
ethnic minorities are often discriminated against with respect to access to
housing. Finally,
European constitutional law has only limited relevance in this area. Although the
right to
housing (droit au logement) is recognised in several Member States, including
France
and Italy, it is not recognised generally across the European Union,21 and the
drafters of
the Nice Fundamental Rights Charter could agree only on including a right to
housing
assistance (without specifying what is meant by that term) in the Solidarity
chapter of the
Charter (Art. 34 para. 3). This has not, however, had a significant impact so far.
However, most of these fields do not determine the core of private tenancy
law, but
rather the regulatory context in which private contracts or land law rules and
principles
are embedded. The same cannot be said for the impact of the European Convention on
Human Rights in this area, which has increased continuously in the last years, and
almost
70 judgments affecting landlord and tenant relations have been delivered. So far,
commu-
nication rights, non-discrimination rights, the protection of the private sphere
and family
life, due process rights and the landlords property rights have been applied to
tenancy
cases by the European Court of Human Rights. This jurisprudence is set out in
greater
detail in the next section (20.2). We then analyse to what extent important
decisions on
the economic basis of the tenancy relationship give rise to the emergence of a
common
core of European tenancy law in the form of a principle of socio-economic balance
(20.3).
20 European Council (19.07.2000).

21 See the summary in Boccadoro, N.; Institut International de Paris-La-
Dfense: La Reconnaissance dun
Droit au Logement en Droit Europen (30.10.2010).
609
----------------------- Page 649-----------------------
20.2 Important Judgments of the ECtHR Affecting Tenancy Law
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) involving tenancy issues
covers a wide range of topics from (i) the more traditional due process rights of
the land-
lord to (ii) guarantees for the tenant against eviction and (iii) modern
communication and
non-discrimination rights of the tenant to (iv) a balancing of the landlords
property rights
with national regulation that grants housing rights to the tenant. The latter
jurisprudence
affects the economic basis or, legally speaking, the core of the synallagmatic
relationship
between the parties and, therefore, matters most from the private law perspective.
20.2.1 Due Process Rights of the Landlord
In a notably long line of cases originating in Italy, the ECtHR repeatedly found
violations
of landlords due process rights, as well as violations of their property rights,
in instances
concerning extremely long waiting periods for eviction, even when the landlord
intended
to use a house or apartment for herself or close family members.22 Remarkably,
between
1999 and 2005, the Court found violations in no fewer than 20 cases from Italy
alone
of the landlords right to adjudication within a reasonable time, as
protected under
Art. 6(1) ECHR.
Immobiliare Saffi was the first in this series of cases.23 Here, the
applicant, a corpora-
tion, had become the owner of an apartment, which had remained occupied by holdover
tenants since the expiry of the lease 5 years earlier. Despite an order of
possession issued
by the local magistrate, the tenant refused to vacate the premises, and the
bailiffs numer-
ous attempts to enforce the order were unsuccessful. This failure was due in great
part to
a statutory provision regulating the suspension of orders of possession, which
prohibited
the use of the police when attempting to enforce such orders. The owner was able to
re-
cover possession of the apartment only in consequence of the tenants death some 13
years
after the expiry of the actual tenancy and 8 years after the owner had first
attempted to
dispossess the tenant.
The owner complained to the ECtHR that being effectively denied
possession of
its apartment property infringed its right to peaceful enjoyment in violation of
Article 1
of Protocol 1 ECHR. Furthermore, and perhaps more interestingly, the
owner also
22 See, e.g., European Court of Human Rights: Immobiliare Saffi v.

Italy. AppNo. 22774/93. Strasbourg:
28.07.1999; European Court of Human Rights: A. O. v. Italy. AppNo.
22534/93. Strasbourg: 30.05.2000;
European Court of Human Rights: Ghidotti v. Italy. AppNo. 28272/95. Strasbourg:
21.02.2002; European
Court of Human Rights: Lo Tufo v. Italy. AppNo. 64663/01. Strasbourg:
21.04.2005.
23 European Court of Human Rights: Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy. AppNo. 22774/93.
Strasbourg: 28.07.1999.
610
----------------------- Page 650-----------------------

complained that the denial of access to police assistance and the unreasonable
duration
of the enforcement procedure violated its right to adjudication within a reasonable
time
in breach of Article 6(1) ECHR. The Court began its analysis by agreeing that the
aim of
the legislation in question was legitimate, that of preventing the large-scale
simultaneous
eviction of tenants, in order to preserve social and public order. The Court noted
that the
series of measures adopted by the Italian government to control rent and to extend
exist-
ing tenancies were intended as solutions to a chronic housing shortage.
Nonetheless, such
legislation must fairly balance the general interest and the protection of the
fundamental
rights of the individual. In the present case, nothing in the case file indicated
that the ten-
ants required any special protection from eviction. Nonetheless, the inflexible
provisions
of the statute resulted in multiple suspensions of the order of possession and a
consequent
6-year wait for its eventual execution. The Court, in finding a violation of
Article 1 of
Protocol 1 ECHR, concluded that this unnecessary denial of the owners possession
of its
property had imposed an excessive burden on the owner without striking the
requisite
balance of interests.
Furthermore, in considering the applicants complaint of violation of the
right to ad-
judication within a reasonable time, the Court stated that a legislative
intervention should
not unduly delay the execution of a judicial decision. The legislation challenged
in the
present case included a provision authorising a prefect, appointed by the
legislature, to
determine the ultimate enforcement of possession orders, with no judicial review
available
for these extrajudicial decisions. According to the Court, this deprivation of the
owners
right to have its dispute decided finally by a court not only violated Article 6(1)
ECHR, but
was incompatible with the principle of rule of law as well.
20.2.2 Guarantees for the Tenant Against Eviction
A second line of cases relates to a persons housing rights, as enshrined in

Article 8 ECHR,
which explicitly protects private and family life, the home and the correspondence
of a
person. A right to respect for the home is being defined and refined
in the context of
tenancies, and a significant number of these cases originated in the United
Kingdom. The
Court has articulated as the common core of this line of case law the principle
that any
person at risk of losing his home should be able to have the proportionality of the
measure
determined by an independent tribunal, even if, under domestic law, the right to
occupa-
tion has come to an end.24
24 See, e.g., European Court of Human Rights: McCann v. United Kingdom. AppNo.
19009/04. Strasbourg:
13.05.2008; European Court of Human Rights: Kay v. The United Kingdom. AppNo.
21.09.2010.
611
----------------------- Page 651-----------------------
In the first of these cases, the applicant and his family

(including four children)
were gypsies living a nomadic lifestyle in the United Kingdom.25 They ultimately
de-
cided to settle on a so-called gypsy site operated by a local public authority.

After 16
years of occupation on their plot in the gypsy site, the local
authorities summarily
dispossessed the applicant and his family, citing breach of the lease agreement,
which
prohibited the causing of a nuisance on the site. Despite the fact that
several of the
family members were in fragile health or that forcing the family to
move on would
jeopardise the schooling of the applicants children, the family was quickly
evicted in
the early-morning hours. Although procedural protections existed for the occupants
of
caravans under the Mobile Homes Act of 1983, due to an exception for gypsy sites,
the
applicant had no opportunity to contest the eviction based on his particular
personal
circumstances.26 The result of this eviction was that the family received no
assistance or
advice, other than an offer to be moved to a distant location, an option that

disregarded
the roots that they had established in the community in which they had lived for
over
20 years. The applicant claimed that, in large part as a result of the stress of
having re-
peatedly to move after their eviction, his wife decided to separate from him and
their
children did not return to school.
The applicant complained, pursuant to Article 8 ECHR (the right to respect
for fam-
ily life and for the home), that he had not been given a hearing to challenge the
alle-
gations against him leading to the eviction, which had resulted from the fact that
the
local public authorities running the gypsy sites were not required to prove their
alleged
grounds for evicting tenants, unlike the owners of privately run sites. The central
issue
in this case became whether the legal framework applicable to the occupation of
gypsy
sites provided the applicant with sufficient legal protection of his rights, and
the Court
found that the summary eviction procedure employed in this case did not. The State
had
failed to show that this system which enabled the government to evict tenants of
gypsy
sites without having to explain the basis for the eviction, which could then be
subjected
to the scrutiny of an independent tribunal did not pursue any specific aim and
did not
further any benefit to the community or to gypsies. On the contrary, the Court
found that
the existing system placed significant obstacles in the way of those pursuing a
nomadic
gypsy lifestyle while denying procedural rights to those striving to establish a
more set-
tled existence. Accordingly, the Court found that the eviction was not accompanied
by
25 European Court of Human Rights: Connors v. United Kingdom. AppNo. 66746/01.
26 Compare EuSoCo Principles, Principle 5, proposing that the provision of
services of first necessity, such as
housing, requires social regard for physical and psychological aspects to
protect weaker parties, including
taking into account the nature, duration and importance for the lives of the
persons affected; also EuSoCo
Declaration, Clause 5 calling for life time contracts to provide social justice
related to human needs.
612
----------------------- Page 652-----------------------

the requisite procedural safeguards and was neither justified by a pressing social
purpose
nor proportionate to a legitimate aim. The eviction therefore constituted a
violation of
Article 8 ECHR.
The ECtHR recently revisited the right to respect of a persons home in a
decision
involving facts very similar to the case discussed above. A gypsy mother and her
two chil-
dren had been threatened with eviction from the plot they occupied in a gypsy site,
with
no opportunity to challenge the governments grounds for the eviction.27
What distin-
guishes this case from the previous one is that, here, the applicant had availed
herself of a
12-month suspension of the eviction order that had become available under
amendments
made to the law since the earlier case. However, the applicant argued that such a
suspen-
sion provided insufficient procedural protection because she was still unable to
challenge
the ultimate basis of the eviction in a hearing before an independent tribunal.28
The Court
agreed, concluding that the system continues to violate Article 8 ECHR by denying
oc-
cupants of gypsy sites the requisite procedural safeguards for assessing the
proportionality
of the interference with their right to respect for their home.
Both of these cases emphasise how the Court considers the loss of a home to
be an
extreme intrusion into the right of respect for the home. The Court repeatedly
stated that
any person at risk of such a deprivation must have the opportunity to have the
propor-
tionality of the interfering measure evaluated by an independent tribunal according
to
Article 8 ECHR, even if the legal right to occupy the home has ended. Another
series of
ECtHR decisions concerning this issue originating in Croatia has led to the same
analy-
sis. For example, the applicant in the most recent example from Croatia complained
that
an order to evict her from the apartment where she had lived for over two decades
had,
in view of her advanced age and fragile health,29 infringed her right to respect
for her
home, especially in view of the fact that she had no other home to go to.30 Here
again, the
Court found that Article 8 ECHR demanded that the proportionality of her eviction
be
evaluated by an independent tribunal in view of her personal circumstances, even if
her
legal right to occupy the apartment had been extinguished by domestic law. This
seems
to have become the central principle in the ECtHRs Article 8 analysis in the
context of
tenancy law.
27 European Court of Human Rights: Buckland v. United Kingdom. AppNo. 40060/08.

28 Compare EuSoCo Principles, Principle 11, which states that the termination of
life time contracts must be
transparent, accountable and socially responsible.
29 Compare EuSoCo Principles, Principle 5; also EuSoCo Declaration, Clause 5.
30 European Court of Human Rights: Bjedov v. Croatia. AppNo. 42150/09. Strasbourg:
29.05.2012; see, also,
European Court of Human Rights: Orlic v. Croatia. AppNo. 48833/07. Strasbourg:
21.06.2011; European
Court of Human Rights: Paulic v. Croatia. AppNo. 3572/06. Strasbourg:
22.10.2009.
613
----------------------- Page 653-----------------------
20.2.3 Communication and Non-Discrimination Rights of the Tenant
Like the German Constitutional Court under the Grundgesetz, the ECtHR has also
pro-
tected the tenants right of communication under the Convention. In
particular, the
ECtHR has recognised the right of a tenant of foreign origin to install a satellite
television
dish to receive radio and television channels from her home country, a right
derived from
the freedom of opinion enshrined in Art. 10 ECHR.31 Tenants of Iraqi origin renting
an
apartment in Sweden put into use an existing satellite dish located on the outside
of the
apartment building in violation of a term in the lease agreement. The landlord
sought
eviction of the tenants, and the Swedish court ruled in favour of the landlord. The
tenants
then complained to the ECtHR that, under these circumstances, the domestic courts
evic-
tion order violated Article 10 ECHR (right to freedom of expression). The Court
held in
favour of the tenants, reasoning that the tenants and their children could maintain
contact
with their ethnic language and culture only via satellite TV broadcasts that were
not avail-
able through a standard antenna. The Swedish government, supporting the
arguments
put forward by the landlord, argued that safety and aesthetic considerations
compelled
upholding the restriction in the lease on installing satellite dishes, also arguing
that the
comprehensive set of tenancy laws would be undermined if not consistently
enforced.
In response to these arguments, the Court found, in this particular case, that the
satellite
television dish posed no safety hazard, and that aesthetic considerations did not
apply to
this apartment building, as it had no particular architectural merit. In balancing
the ten-
ants rights under Article 10 ECHR against these safety and aesthetic
considerations, it
was found that the tenants rights should prevail. The Court also noted that the
landlord
had made no other attempt to enable the tenants to receive such broadcasts, such as
by
installing internet access. Furthermore, the fact that a family with three children
had been
evicted from their home was found to be disproportionate to the purported aims, as
this
interference with the protected right had gone beyond what was necessary in a
democratic
society.
The ECtHR has, in other decisions, also upheld the non-discrimination rights
of ten-
ants.32 A significant decision was given, for example, in relation to the
succession of an
interest in a lease, in the context of a homosexual partners rights under a

tenancy. In its
first decision pertaining to this issue in the Austrian Karner case, the Court
considered
whether Article 14 ECHR (prohibition against discrimination), taken together with
Ar-
ticle 8 ECHR (right to respect for private and family life), provides protection
against dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation in the context of the right to succeed to a
tenancy
31 European Court of Human Rights: Mustafa and others v. Sweden. AppNo. 23883/06.
32 This is consistent with EuSoCo Principles, Principle 8, which insists that
providers of housing refrain from
discrimination based on personal and social characteristics in all stages of
the contractual relationship.
614
----------------------- Page 654-----------------------

after the death of the partner who had been a party to the lease agreement.33 Here,
the
applicant had shared a flat with his homosexual partner. After discovering that his
partner
was terminally ill, the applicant cared for him until his death, before which the
partner
had named the applicant as his sole beneficiary in his will. The landlord later
initiated pro-
ceedings to terminate the tenancy. In dismissing the action, the Austrian court
considered
that homosexual partners also enjoyed the statutory right of family members to
succeed
to a tenancy. That decision, initially upheld on appeal, was subsequently
overturned by
the Austrian Supreme Court, which found that the notion of life companion had to
be
interpreted as at the time the statute had been enacted and that the legislatures
intention
at that time had not been to include persons of the same sex.
The applicant complained under Article 14 ECHR, in conjunction with
Article 8
ECHR, that he had been the victim of discrimination based on his sexual
orientation. The
Court reasoned that different treatment due to sexual orientation must be founded
on
particularly grave reasons, to which the Austrian government argued that the
purpose of
the statute in question was the protection of the traditional family unit. While
the Court
recognised that this was, in principle, a legitimate aim, it found it to be so
abstract as to
permit a broad range of measures to pursue it in practice. In this instance, the
principle
of proportionality between the aim pursued and the measures implemented required
the
State to show that excluding homosexual couples from the scope of the legislation
was
necessary to achieve that aim. The Court found that the States arguments did not
support
such a conclusion and held that the domestic courts order terminating the lease
therefore
violated the prohibition against discrimination protected by Art. 14 ECHR in
conjunction
with the right to respect for private and family life enshrined in Art. 8 ECHR.
Another decision by the ECtHR dealing with facts similar to those of the
previous
case required the ECtHR to apply Article 14 ECHR and Article 8 ECHR in
contradiction
of a provision in Polands national constitution.34 In this case, the Polish
authorities and
courts cited an article in their national constitution defining marriage as a

union of a man
and a woman as justifying their refusal to recognise the tenancy rights of a
homosexual
partner. Largely on the basis of this constitutional argument, they insisted that
the only
legally recognised form of cohabitation relationship is that between a man and a
woman.
The ECtHR disagreed with this argument, holding that the refusal to recognise the
co-
habitation of same-sex partners was a violation of Article 14 ECHR and Article 8
ECHR.
Although the Court did not dispute the legitimacy of the aim of protecting the
traditional
notion of the family as being rooted in the union of a man and a woman, the Court
said
that the State must balance protecting that notion of family with the
rights under the
Convention of sexual minorities. The Court, in finding that de facto marital
cohabitation
33 European Court of Human Rights: Karner v. Austria. AppNo. 40016/98. Strasbourg:

24.07.2003.
34 European Court of Human Rights: Kozak v. Poland. AppNo. 13102/02. Strasbourg:
02.03.2010.
615
----------------------- Page 655-----------------------
must be understood in this context to include persons in a homosexual relationship,

im-
posed a requirement on nation states to take developments in society into
consideration.
20.2.4 Balancing the Landlords Property Interests
A fourth line of cases deals with the property rights of landlords in the context
of the
imposition of lease conditions on owners, or even the imposition of the
lease itself by
regulation or administrative decree.
The first ECtHR decision in this area originated in the United Kingdom. This
case
concerned the right of tenants under leases for a term of over 20
years to acquire full
ownership of the property, as established under the Leasehold Reform Act of 1967.
The
applicants had been named as trustees of a substantial estate under a will left by
a mem-
ber of the landed aristocracy.35 Tenants of some of the properties in the estate
exercised
their rights of acquisition under the Leasehold Reform Act of 1967,

thereby depriving
the trustees of their interest in these properties. The trustees applied to the
ECtHR, com-
plaining that the forced transfer of the properties and the amount of compensation
they
subsequently received violated their property rights under Article 1 of Protocol 1
ECHR.
Furthermore, the applicants complained that their inability to challenge the
legality of the
act violated Article 13 ECHR and that the transfer itself was discriminatory and,
therefore,
violated Article 14 ECHR.
The Court reasoned that a government may be permitted to compel the transfer
of
property as a legitimate means of pursuing a public interest, provided that the
means of
depriving the person of property is not disproportionate to the aim sought. With
regard to
the legitimacy of the States aim, the Court deferred to the national legislatures
judgment
to determine what falls within the public interest unless that judgment is
manifestly
unreasonable when implementing social and economic policies. Consequently, it
found
that the alleviation of social injustice in housing was a legitimate aim as pursued
by its
Leasehold Reform Act, which fell within the legislatures margin of
appreciation.36 As for
the proportionality of the measures implemented by the State, the Court found that
pro-
viding tenants with rights of acquisition in these circumstances was neither
unreasonable
nor disproportionate, as the statute limited this right to less valuable properties
that were
perceived by the legislature as representing the most severe cases of hardship. The
Court
therefore held that interference with the applicants property in furtherance of
the public
interest did not violate Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR.
35 European Court of Human Rights: James and others v. The United Kingdom. AppNo.
21.02.1986.
36 Margin of appreciation refers to the space to manoeuvre granted to national
authorities when fulfilling their
obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Greer, S. C. (2000),
p. 5.
616
----------------------- Page 656-----------------------

In response to the applicants complaint that they were afforded no mechanism

to
contest the legality of the Leasehold Reform Act, the Court stated that Article 13
ECHR
did not require that a remedy exist in the form of a challenge to legislation
introduced by
a national authority. The provisions of the article required only that an
individual be able
to ensure compliance with the law through the judicial process, and the applicants
in this
case had such a judicial process at their disposal. Finally, in considering the
applicants
complaint of discrimination under Article 14, the Court recognised that
the statute in
question was indeed discriminatory in that the measure applied only to a certain
class of
property, that of housing under a long lease, and that the statute had a harsher
impact on
landlords with property of lower value than on those with property of higher value.
The
Court stated that differences in treatment are not discrimination if there is an
objective
and reasonable justification for the different treatment. The Court reasoned that,
taking
into account the States margin of appreciation, there was no basis on which to
find that
the difference in treatment was not objectively and reasonably justified and within
the
scope of the exercise of a nation states legitimate authority, or that the
applicants were
forced to bear an unreasonable burden. The Court held that there had therefore been
no
violation of the Convention in this case.
A similar result was achieved in the Mellacher case from Austria. In this
case, land-
lords who owned or had an ownership interest in multiple apartment
buildings com-
plained that introduction of a statutory reduction in rent violated Article 1 of
Protocol
1 ECHR and was an unjustified interference of their right to peaceful enjoyment of
their
property.37 At least one tenant in each of the apartment buildings owned by the
appli-
cants applied for a reduction in rent on their existing lease under the Rent Act of
1981.
In considering the rent reductions in light of the ECHR, the Court accepted that
the rent
reductions permitted under the Rent Act amounted to an interference with the
owners
property rights and, thus, fell within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR.
However,
the Court did not find the Rent Act to be disproportionate to the aim pursued, and
held
that the enforcement of rent reductions against the owners in this case therefore
did not
violate the Conventions protection of property rights. In evaluating the
legislation under
challenge by the claimants, the Court recognised the national legislatures wide
margin of
appreciation in both identifying a problem of public concern and in determining the
mea-
sures needed to further the social and economic policies adopted to address it, in
this case,
in the field of housing. Furthermore, it was not for the Court to scrutinise
whether the
measures chosen by the State embodied the most effective solution to the problem,
so long
as those measures did not exceed the limits of the States margin of appreciation.
Applying
these principles to the present case, the Court found that it could have been
reasonable for
37 European Court of Human Rights: Mellacher and others v. Austria. AppNo.

10522/83, 11011/84, 11070/84.
617
----------------------- Page 657-----------------------
the Austrian lawmakers to conclude that social justice required reducing the
original rents
and that the rent reductions flowing from the statute, although substantial, did
not neces-
sarily place a disproportionate burden on landlords. The Court held, therefore,
that the
Rent Act did not violate the owners property rights under Article 1 of Protocol 1
ECHR.
However, this rather lenient approach towards regulatory or administrative
restric-
tions on the landlords property rights in favour of tenants seems to have changed
in more
recent jurisprudence. In a case originating in Malta, the owners tenement and
adjoining
field were requisitioned by the government to provide housing for the homeless.38
Fol-
lowing a decision by the national court that the States requisition of the
property and the
compensation paid did not violate the owners property rights, the owner complained
to
the ECtHR of a violation of his property rights as protected under Art. 1 of
Protocol No. 1
to the ECHR, claiming that he had been deprived of his property for almost 30 years
and
that the rent he received in compensation was ridiculously low compared with the
mar-
ket rate. In considering the complaint, the Court noted that the States
requisition of the
property imposed an involuntary landlordtenant relationship on the owner,
who had
no influence over the selection of the tenant or over any of the fundamental terms
of the
tenancy. The Court commented further that the level of rent fixed as compensation
was
not sufficient to meet the owners legitimate interest in deriving profit from his
property.
Finding that the requisition had imposed a disproportionate and excessive burden on
the
owner, who was compelled to substantially bear the social and financial costs of
providing
housing for others, the ECtHR concluded that the State had failed to strike the
requisite
balance between the general interests of the community and the protection of the
owners
property rights, in violation of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR.
Another Maltese case concerned an owners inability to repossess his house on
the
expiry of a lease and the frustration of his entitlement to receipt of a fair and
adequate rent
from the property.39 At the time that the owner acquired the premises from his
parents,
the property was subject to a 25-year lease. At the end of the term, the owner
informed
the tenants that he did not wish to renew the lease and that the tenants should
vacate the
premises. The tenants desired to stay in the house and availed themselves of the
right to
retain possession of the property under a renewed lease, relying on a law enacted
in 1979
creating a right for a tenant to retain possession of a rented property after
expiry of the
lease against the objection of the owner. The national court rejected the owners
claim that
he had been denied property without adequate compensation, finding that the
national
law furthered the legitimate purpose of preventing large-scale evictions.
Furthermore, the
national court found that the amount of compensation provided to the owner was
higher
38 European Court of Human Rights: Edwards v. Malta. AppNo. 17647/04. Strasbourg:

24.10.2006.
39 European Court of Human Rights: Amato Gauci v. Malta. AppNo. 47045/06.
618
----------------------- Page 658-----------------------

than what would have been available under other national rent laws and was,
therefore,
not a violation of his property rights.
Consequently, the owner complained to the ECtHR that he had been denied the
use
of his property without adequate compensation in violation of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1
ECHR. In response to the owners complaint that the 1979 law imposed on him a
unilat-
eral lease for an indefinite term without fair and adequate rent in violation of
his property
rights, the Court reasoned that by law the owner could not physically possess his
house
and had no effective remedy to empower him to either evict the tenants or demand an
adequate rent. The Court again noted that the owner had been expected to bear the
greater
burden of the social and financial cost of housing these tenants. The Court
therefore found
that the national law at issue lacked the procedural safeguards required to balance
the
interests of the tenants and the owners and concluded that the Maltese rent law had
been
applied in violation of the owners property rights, as protected under Art. 1 of
Protocol
No. 1 ECHR.
In a further interesting case from Poland,40 a rent-control scheme that had
evolved
from legislation introduced under the former communist government created a system
of
restrictions on landlords that set rent ceilings so low that landlords were unable
to realise
profits from their property or even recover the cost of legally mandated repairs.
The land-
lord in this case complained to the ECtHR that the situation created by this system
taken
as a whole violated her right to the enjoyment of her property under Art. 1 of
Protocol 1
ECHR. The Court acknowledged that the difficult housing situation in Poland in
par-
ticular an acute shortage of dwellings and the high cost of acquiring apartments on
the
market, as well as the need to transform the outdated system of distributing
dwellings that
had developed during the communist regime justified not only the introduction of
re-
medial legislation to protect tenants during the reform of the countrys political,
economic
and legal system but also the setting of a rent ceiling below the market rate.
However, the
Court found that Polish housing legislation suffered from systemic problems, in
that the
restrictions on rent increases imposed on landlords made it impossible for them to
receive
rent reasonably related to the general cost of legally mandated maintenance.41
Simply put,
under this scheme, letting property was a losing proposition for owners, and the
Polish
government had an obligation to eliminate the problem or to find a prompt remedy.
In
considering the consequences that the rent-control scheme had for the rights of
landlords
to the peaceful enjoyment of their property, the Court concluded that the Polish
authorities
had imposed a disproportionate and excessive burden on landlords in violation of
Art. 1
of Protocol 1.
40 European Court of Human Rights: Hutten-Czapska v. Poland. AppNo. 35014/97.

41 Using the terminology of EuSoCo Principle 9, this system placed grossly
disproportional obligations on the
landlord.
619
----------------------- Page 659-----------------------
The property rights of landlords remains a hot topic in ECtHR case law, as
evidenced
by a case originating in Norway.42 In 2004, amendments to the countrys Ground
Lease
Act granted lessees of land used for permanent or holiday homes the right to extend
their
leases on the same terms as the previous lease for an unlimited period of time. The
lessees
requested that their landlords extend their leases on the same terms as the
previous lease,
with no increase in rent. The owners of the properties attempted to negotiate
alternative
conditions without success and complained to the ECtHR that application of the 2004
amendments violated their right to protection of their property in breach

of Art. 1 of
Protocol 1 ECHR. The Norwegian Supreme Court had already held, in prior proceedings
instituted by lessees who were themselves not involved in the complaint to the
ECtHR,
that these provisions aimed at protecting the lessees right to housing did not
violate the
ECHR.
In considering the challenge to the Norwegian Ground Lease Act, the Court
found
that the aim pursued by the legislation to protect the interests of
leaseholders lacking
financial means was legitimate, as the lifting of rent controls in 2002 had
substantially af-
fected many unprepared tenants by drastically increasing their ground rent. With
regard
to the proportionality of the measures, however, the Court reasoned that,
because the
extension of the ground lease contracts imposed on the owners had been for an
indefinite
period with no possibility of any meaningful increase in rents, the actual value of
the land
would not be relevant in the assessment of the level of rent in such leases.
Furthermore,
only the lessees could choose to end the leases and were also free to assign the
leases to
third parties, and any change in ownership on assignment by the lessee would not
affect
the level of rent, as this control on the level of rent would be in force
indefinitely. These
factors effectively deprived the owners of any enjoyment of their property,
including the
possibility of disposing of their property at a fair market value. Consequently,
the Court
concluded that the financial and social burden had been imposed on the lessors
alone and
held that the legislation violated the owners right to protection of their
property.
Another relatively recent case regarding the balance of the parties
contractual obli-
gations arose in the context of privatisation, that is, the reversal of
nationalisation of the
housing market in Romania. Here, the ECtHR considered the compatibility with the
Con-
vention of an emergency government order regulating evictions, which severely
punished
landlords for non-compliance with that order.43 Here, the applicants were the
former own-
ers of three blocks of apartment buildings, which had been nationalised during the
period
of communist rule. A court judgment required that the property be returned to the
former
42 European Court of Human Rights: Lindheim and others v. Norway. AppNo.

12.06.2012.
43 European Court of Human Rights: Radovici and Stanescu v. Romania.
AppNo. 68479/01. Strasbourg:
02.11.2006.
620
----------------------- Page 660-----------------------

owners, who subsequently recovered possession of the apartment buildings concerned.
The owners, now landlords, offered new leases to the tenants occupying the
apartments,
who had previously had State tenancies, but the tenants declined to sign the leases
pro-
posed by the landlords. The landlords then applied for eviction orders, which
failed owing
to the landlords omission of some of the legal formalities required under an
emergency
government order regulating eviction proceedings. An additional consequence of
their
non-compliance was the automatic extension of the tenants leases. The applicants
were
eventually able to evict these tenants several years later, but they were unable to
collect
any rent arrears that had accrued during the occupancy imposed under the emergency
government order.
The owners complained to the ECtHR that the prolonged denial of possession of
their
property and the subsequent loss of rent violated Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR. In
scru-
tinising the measures implemented by the Romanian government, the Court focused on
the heavy penalty imposed on the landlords, namely, the significant burden of
providing
housing for up to 5 years with no effective ability to recover the rent for that
period. The
Court found that these provisions placed landlords under an excessive and
involuntary
burden of meeting the cost of housing others, and held that the emergency
government
order violated the owners property rights protected by Article 1 of Protocol 1
ECHR.
20.3 Some Provisional Conclusions: Towards a Principle of Socio-Economic

Balance?
While the jurisprudence of the Court on tenancy law remains to be analysed in depth
in
the context of the current comparative ZERP project on this subject,44 some
provisional
conclusions may be presented here.

First, the quantity and breadth of the jurisprudence in this field,
particularly in the
last 10 years, has become impressive and may surprise observers unfamiliar with
these
developments. As outlined above, the Court has delved into housing issues on the
ba-
sis of numerous fundamental rights, ranging from more traditional ones,
such as due
process, to more modern ones, such as guarantees relating to communication and non-
discrimination. The court appears to have abandoned its former judicial

self-restraint,
which was based on the close national and regional character of the provision of
housing
and the correspondingly wide margin of appreciation accorded to national regulatory
and
44 Tenancy Law and Housing Policy in the EU under the EUs Seventh Research
Framework Programme,
which is coordinated by the Centre of European Law and Politics (ZERP) at
Bremen University. (centre of
european law and politics (zerp) (2012-2015). URL: http://www.tenlaw.uni-
bremen.de/.)
621
----------------------- Page 661-----------------------
administrative authorities. The ECtHR is therefore becoming a serious player in the

field
and can no longer reasonably be ignored at national level. Just as it has been
contended
ironically for the German Federal Constitutional Court, which is also very active
in ten-
ancy law, the ECtHR might thus be seen as approaching the status of the highest
first
instance court of the continent.
From a private law perspective, the cases which matter most are those in which
the
Court scrutinises the owners property rights against national regulations
protecting
the tenant. As stated, these cases go to the heart of the contractual relationship
between the
parties. Unlike the German Constitutional Court, the ECtHR has not yet derived from
the
tenants possession of the house a property right requiring constitutional
protection. That
notwithstanding, the results reached by the Court are roughly similar. As is
apparent from
the cases reported from Malta, Poland and Norway, the Court seems to base its
reason-
ing on a kind of socio-economic balance. Whilst all sorts of legislative and
administrative
restrictions of the landlords property rights have been found legitimate for the
purpose
of protecting tenants, a limit is reached when the economic balance of the
contractual
exchange is manifestly disturbed, that is, when the rent to be gained by the
landlord is so
low that it does not even cover his or her costs or when the landlord is restrained
from
repossessing the house for an excessive, even unlimited, period of time.
It is true that the Court has not yet had to face crucial questions of
principle that go to
the heart of national legal policy preferences, that is, whether the legal
impossibility of ter-
minating a tenancy agreement when a tenant has complied with his or her duties
(even if the
landlord needs the house for himself or close relatives, as foreseen for example in
Scandina-
vian countries) is lawful, provided that an adequate rent is paid and reasonable
rent increases
are possible. If the Court actually decided to interfere with such national
regimes, a consti-
tutional recognition of the tenants possession rights (not limited to existing
controls over
eviction) would become urgent in order to maintain a just balance between the
parties at the
level of European constitutional law. Indeed, the Court would then also need to
review solu-
tions that operate to the serious disadvantage of the tenant, such as the assured
shorthold
tenancy, which is the standard arrangement in the United Kingdom, in which the
tenant has
a guaranteed rental period of only 6 months. The result of this form of tenancy is
that, if ten-
ants invoke any statutory rights, they risk termination of their tenancy by the
landlord on ex-
piry of the 6-month period (retaliatory eviction). However, it is, in our
submission, unlikely
that the ECtHR will go so far as to censure such national solutions that, though
working to
the clear disadvantage of tenants, may still be viewed not as arbitrary
disempowerment of
tenants, but as legitimate political solutions at the national level. That
notwithstanding, the
ECtHR already seems to be willing to protect, through ownership rights exercised
against
regulatory and/or administrative interventions, an adequate basic balance in the
contractual
obligations of the parties in other words, a kind of modern European laesio
enormis that is
likely to evolve further in the near future.
622
----------------------- Page 662-----------------------
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21 Exploring Interfaces Between Social
Long-Term Contracts and European
Law Through Tenancy Law
Elena Bargelli
Summary
Residential tenancy law is currently ignored by EU vertical harmonisation. This is

mainly
due to the limited sphere of competence of the European Union in the realm of
private law.
This chapter explores three possible levels of interface between residential
tenancy law and
European law in a broad sense: (i) parallels in the evolution of this branch of law
in west-
ern Europe and common principles that can be found through a comparative analysis;
(ii)
horizontal harmonisation pursued by the European Court of Human Rights; (iii) a
diagonal
impact of EU law on housing issues. To conclude, EU initiatives falling under the
heading soft
law such as the Open Method of Co-ordination would be welcome in such area of
law.
21.1 European Contract Law Ignores Residential Tenancy Law
Residential tenancy law is strongly related to basic human needs.1
Together with ground lease, consumer law and labour law, it represents one of
the
oldest core issues of social private law within European legal systems, and is
traditionally
located in statutes outside the civil codes.
In the debate on life time contracts, which once had been unified as a second
cor-
nerstone of rent (locatio) in Roman contract law, tenancy law shares the
separations not
only within the three pillars of social contract law. It also remains separated
from general
contract law in legal doctrine. But there is a third form of separation. While
European
legal harmonisation and its quest for a unified European contract law provide a
chance
for labour and consumer credit law to complement the traditional sales law approach
in
the civil law codes, tenancy law may be left out owing to its regional specificity.
Labour
and money may move, houses seem to be bound to the soil of the Member States, and,
therefore, viewed as national by status.

1 See EuSoCo Principles, Principle 5.
627
----------------------- Page 667-----------------------
Elena Bargelli
In this contribution we will show that tenancy law does not simply regulate
immov-
able properties but rather tenancy as long-term social and legal relationship aimed
at pro-
viding goods and services that are essential to human life.2 In fact, its core
problem of
eviction has reached the European Court at different instances, and, therefore, it
shares
with consumer credit and labour law the necessity that life time protection becomes
an
acknowledged part of social long-term contracts.
The recent academic debate on social justice in Europe has focussed
on general
3 4 5
principles of contract law, consumer and labour law, and has neglected landlord
and
tenant law.6
The reason for this neglect may be that, while general contract law has been
at the
centre of the debate on harmonisation, and consumer law and labour law
have been
reviewed in depth by European secondary legislation, the Directives have ignored
the law
relating to both ground leases and residential tenancies.
For examples, Directives on off-premises and distance contracts include the
lease of
movable property, but leave aside contracts for the rental of accommodation for
residential
purposes, on the basis that the provisions of this Directive are not appropriate
to those
contracts, which should be therefore excluded from its scope [see (26)
2011/83/EU].
As a consequence, interfaces between consumer law and tenancy law
are incidental,
and, therefore, very limited. For example, where residential tenancy contracts are
concluded
between businesses and consumers, the Directive on unfair contract terms may be
applicable.
Correspondingly, recent attempts to build a more coherent European contract
law
are mainly focused on the elimination of legal divergences relating to transaction
costs.
Since the 2001 Communication on European Contract Law, the initiatives of the
European
Commission aimed at strengthening the harmonisation of contract law have
therefore
been oriented towards consumer protection and competition law. The subsequent
Action
Plan of 2003 and the recent Green Paper of 2010(348) are both aimed at improving
the
quality and coherence of European Contract Law, and reducing national differences
in
contract law in order to implement the internal market. Both texts respond to the
prob-
lems of divergent legislation in order to reduce transaction costs and improve
consumer
confidence in cross-border transactions.
It is perfectly consistent with this scenario that the Common Frame
of Reference
(originally promoted by the Commission) contains nothing in relation to
residential
tenancy law. A Study Group was dedicated to the lease of goods, whose principles
were
2 See EuSoCo Principles, Principles 1, 2.

3 Lurger, B. (2005).
4 Weatherill, S. (2006).
5 Collins, H. (2007).
6 Apart from the study Tenancy Law and Procedure in the European Union (2003),
carried on by the European
Law Institute in Florence. (Schmid, C. U.: General Report (2003) URL:
http://www.eui.eu/Documents/
DepartmentsCentres/Law/ResearchTeaching/ResearchThemes/EuropeanPrivateLaw/TenancyLa
wProject/
TenancyLawGeneralReport.pdf. Accessed: 25.08.2013).
628
----------------------- Page 668-----------------------

European Law Through
Tenancy Law
included in the Draft Common Frame of Reference (articles IV.B.-1:101 DCFR).7 How-
ever, these Principles apply only to movable property (including ships, aircraft,
animals,
liquid, gases) and, therefore, are essentially directed at cross-border
transactions.
After the Green Paper [COM(2010)348] had launched a consultation
process in
8
2010 and the Expert Groups text was published on 3 May 2011, draft
regulations by
the European Parliament and the Council on a Common European Sales Law (CESL)
were published in October 2011 [COM(2011) 635]. The optional instrument, however,
remains focussed on cross-border transactions for the sale of goods, for the supply
of
digital content and for related services where the parties to a contract agree to
it. The
rationale can be found in the Explanatory Memorandum: Differences in contract law
between Member States hinder traders and consumers who want to engage in
cross-
border trade within the internal market. The obstacles which stem from these
differences
dissuade traders, small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in particular, from
entering
cross-border trade or expanding into new Member States markets. Consumers are hin-
dered from accessing products offered by traders in other Member States.
21.2 Vertical Harmonisation of Residential Tenancy Law Falls outside

EU Jurisdiction
The common explanation for this absence consists in the limited sphere of
competence of
the European Union in the realm of private law.9
In fact, of the activities falling within the (exclusive or shared)

competence of the
European Union as defined by the most recent version of the EU Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union, the following may affect contract law: establishing
the
competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market [art. 3(b)
TFEU],
internal market [art. 4(a) TFEU)], consumer protection [art. 4(f) TFEU]. Competence
on
social policy is restricted to aspects defined in the same Treaty [art. 4(b)
TFEU)], which
are included in articles 151 ff. In particular, art. 153 TFEU states as follows:
With a view
to achieving the objectives of Article 151, the Union shall support and complement
the
activities of the Member States in the following fields: (a) improvement in
particular of
the working environment to protect workers health and safety; (b) working
conditions;
(c) social security and social protection of workers; (d) protection of workers
where their
employment contract is terminated; (e) the information and consultation of workers;
EN
C 83/114 Official Journal of the European Union 30.3.2010 (f) representation and
col-
lective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including co-
determination,
7 Lilleholt, K./Victorin, A. et al. (2008).

8 Expert Group on a Common Frame of Reference: Expert Group Feasibility Study: A
European Contract Law
for consumers and businesses (April 2011).
9 Schmid, C. U.: General Report (2003); FEANTSA Working Group Housing: Background
Paper. Housing in
EU policy making (2002).
629
----------------------- Page 669-----------------------
Elena Bargelli
subject to paragraph 5; (g) conditions of employment for third-country nationals

legally
residing in Union territory; (h) the integration of persons excluded from the
labour mar-
ket, without prejudice to Article 166; (i) equality between men and women with
regard to
labour market opportunities and treatment at work; (j) the combating of social
exclusion;
(k) the modernisation of social protection systems without prejudice to point.
It is worth noting that, although the Union recognises the rights, freedoms
and prin-
ciples set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and
fundamen-
tal rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, this does not affect the Unions competences as defined
in the
Treaties (art. 6 TEU). Furthermore, no reference to the European Social Charter is
made
by the most recent versions of the Treaties.
Within this legislative scenario, the European Union is competent to
intervene in
many areas of contract law, but the core issue of its legitimacy seems to be still
that of com-
mercial transactions between business and consumer, or business and business.10
Beyond
consumer and competition law, most of the activities belonging to the field of
social policy
(see above) affect employment contracts.
To summarise, the reason why vertical harmonisation does not affect
residential ten-
ancy law is that, unlike employment contracts, timesharing and even the lease of
movable
property, tenancy agreements do not affect transaction costs in cross-border
transactions.
As a consequence, it is no wonder that both EU legislation and academic projects on
har-
monising contract law ignore this subject.
This chapter will focus on residential tenancy contracts, and will try to
emphasise that,
notwithstanding the lack of EU competence in vertical harmonisation, there are
interfaces
between such contracts and European law. It will argue that, on the one hand, the
debate
on European contract law would benefit from remembering its roots in national
social
contract law, which embraces those limits of contractual freedom related to human
needs
and positive rights concerning all individuals in their daily existence;11 and, on
the other
hand, a non-domestic, European perspective on this area of law would improve the
quality
of national legislation.
21.3 Interfaces Between European Law and Residential Tenancy Law

Nevertheless Exist
European law is not restricted to vertical harmonisation. In a more general sense,

it also
includes types of instruments with no binding force, and that come under the
generic
heading of soft law (see art. 288 TFEU). Within this broader context, EU
directives and
10 See Weatherill, S. (2006).

11 See EuSoCo Principles, Principle 5.
630
----------------------- Page 670-----------------------

Tenancy Law
regulations are not the only legal sources that may play a role in the European
arena. For
example, common core guidelines for private law, which can be identified from a
compar-
ative analysis of European legal systems, as well as principles contained in the
European
Convention of Human Rights and in the European Charter (recognised by art. 6 TEU)
may come into consideration.
From this perspective, the question of the possible interfaces between
European law
and residential tenancy law takes shape.
Below are three possible levels of interface.
21.3.1 Parallels in the Evolution of Residential Tenancy Law in Europe
As many other areas of private law that are not touched by European hard law,
residential
tenancy law deserves to become the subject of genuinely European scholarship.12
From a comparative perspective, residential tenancy legislation does not

arise in iso-
lation within and outside national systems.
From the domestic perspective, residential tenancy legislation mostly
derogates from
the general rules governing leases enshrined in national civil codes of continental
Europe,
whose origins lie historically in Roman law.13 They, nevertheless, also represent a
tradi-
tional aspect of contract law.

National legislators have of course adopted different measures in landlord
and ten-
ant law,14 and in residential tenancy law in particular. The evolution of the
latter, however,
follows similar basic common steps in some countries of western continental Europe.
It is not possible to conduct a deep comparative analysis of residential

tenancy law across
Europe within the framework of this chapter, which will be confined to looking at
the most
significant patterns of legislation enacted since the beginning of the twentieth
century.15
The first step took the form of emergency statutes that came into force to
address the
housing shortage after the First World War. They introduced exceptional measures
such as
the mandatory prolongation of tenancy agreements and rent freezes.
The second step took place between the 1970s and the 1980s, when strong
limita-
tions were imposed on contractual freedom by several national statutes (for
example, in
Austria, in France and in Italy). They provided for rent control and mandatory
minimum
terms for tenancies.
When the second step turned out to be unsuccessful, a second generation of
rent con-
trol models was developed in some countries. It aimed at balancing contractual
freedom and
14 Lilleholt, K. (2008).
15 For a deeper analysis see Schmid, C. U.: General Report (2003).
631
----------------------- Page 671-----------------------
Elena Bargelli
tenants protection (see, for example, the Italian Law n. 431/1998; the French loi
Mermaz of
1989).
These common steps are not sufficient in themselves to form the basis of a
common
European residential tenancy law. However, they show that, being many European
legisla-
tions founded against a similar economic and historical background, solutions that
have
been experienced are not exceptional, and may be compared or even transplanted from
one country to another.
21.3.2 A Certain Degree of Horizontal Harmonisation Is Being Pursued by
the European Court of Human Rights
As regards the horizontal effects of fundamental rights, a tenants interest in

maintaining pos-
session of a dwelling has emerged from the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human
Rights, notwithstanding the fact that the Convention protects the right to property
(art. 1
16
Protocol 1) and, conversely, does not mention a right to housing.
A detailed report of these
cases is given by the contribution of Schmid and Dinse, Towards a Common Core of
Residen-
tial Tenancy Law in Europe, above, 5.1. Below it is worth referring to the main
results pursued
by the ECtHR, in order to highlight the extent to which this court has protected
the right to
property in case of national provisions affecting termination of tenancy
contracts.17
Firstly, the ECtHR was repeatedly asked to state to what extent socially
disadvantaged
tenants deserve special protection. Most decisions are related to Italian
legislation on the
suspension of eviction orders in densely populated municipalities, as well as cases
of land-
lords prolonged inability, for lack of police assistance, to recover possession of
their flats,
together with the length of eviction proceedings in Italy.18 In this line of cases,
the ECtHR
repeatedly found violations of landlords due process rights, as well as violations

of their
16 As regards harmonisation through horizontal effect of fundamental rights see

Colombi Ciacchi, A. (2006).
17 Compare EuSoCo Principles, Principle 11.
18 See European Court of Human Rights: Spadea and Scalabrino v. Italy.
28.09.1995; European Court of Human Rights: Immobiliare Saffi v.
Italy. AppNo. 22774/93. Strasbourg:
28.07.1999; European Court of Human Rights: Ghidotti v. Italy. AppNo.
28272/95. Strasbourg: 21.02.2002;
European Court of Human Rights: Sorrentino Prota v. Italy. AppNo. 40465/98.
Strasbourg: 29.01.2004; Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights: Bellini v. italy. AppNo. 64258/01. Strasbourg:
29.01.2004; European Court of
Human Rights: Fossi Mignolli v. Italy. AppNo. 48171/99. Strasbourg:
04.03.2004; European Court of Human
Rights: Mascolo v. Italy. AppNo. 68792/01. Strasbourg: 16.12.2004; European
Court of Human Rights: Lo
Tufo v. Italy. AppNo. 64663/01. Strasbourg: 21.04.2005; European Court of Human
Rights: Stornelli and
Sacchi v. Italy. AppNo. 68706/01. Strasbourg: 28.07.2005; European Court of
Human Rights: Federici v. Italy
(No. 2). AppNo. 66327/01, 66556/01. Strasbourg: 20.01.2005; European Court of
Human Rights: Frateschi
v. Italy. AppNo. 68008/01. Strasbourg: 08.12.2005; European Court of Human
Rights: Cuccaro Granatelli v.
Italy. AppNo. 19830/03. Strasbourg: 08.12.2005; European Court of Human
Rights: Mazzei v. Italy. AppNo.
69502/01. Strasbourg: 06.04.2006.
632
----------------------- Page 672-----------------------

Tenancy Law
property rights.19 Nevertheless, the court reiterated that an interference,
particularly one
falling to be considered under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1,

had to
strike a fair balance between the demands of the general interest and the
requirements of
the protection of the individuals fundamental rights. In spheres such as housing,
which
played a central role in the welfare and economic policies of modern societies, the
Court
would respect the legislatures judgment as to what was in the general interest
unless that
judgment was manifestly without reasonable foundation (Immobiliare Saffi v.
Italy).
In a second line of judgments, the Court dealt with national statutory rent
regula-
tions. Again, the Court concluded that a government may be permitted to compel the
transfer of property or provide a rent reduction as a legitimate means of pursuing

a public
interest, provided that this means is not disproportionate to the aim sought.20
Finally, a protection against eviction was founded on arts. 8 and 14 ECtHR.

In a first
line of cases, the Court affirmed that the loss of ones home is the most extreme
form of
interference with the respect for the home.21 It came to the conclusion that anyone
facing
a loss of that magnitude has the right to have the proportionality of the loss
determined
by an independent court or tribunal, even where the right of occupation has come to
an
end. In a second line of cases concerning the right of a homosexual partner to take
the
place of a deceased partner in the lease,22 the Court reasoned that, although
protection
of the right to family life remains within the competence of national legislators,
the non-
discrimination principle must be respected (art. 14 ECHR).
21.3.3 EU Cannot Ignore the Housing Issue
Several provisions of the European Union Treaties could indirectly affect tenancy
law.
First, the new version of the Treaty on European Union23 emphasises goals
such as
justice, solidarity (art. 2), social market economy, social progress, the fight
against social
exclusion (art. 3). Furthermore, the competences set out by Title X TFEU (Social
Policy)
include improved living and working conditions.
Secondly, the Treaty accedes to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and proclaims that fundamental rights, as
guaranteed
19 Schmid and Dinse in this volume.
20 European Court of Human Rights: James and others v. The United Kingdom. AppNo.
21.02.1986; European Court of Human Rights: Mellacher and others v. Austria.
AppNo. 10522/83, 11011/84,
11070/84. Strasbourg: 19.12.1989.
21 See, for example, European Court of Human Rights: Kay v. The United Kingdom.
21.09.2010.
22 See European Court of Human Rights: Karner v. Austria. AppNo. 40016/98.
Strasbourg: 24.07.2003; European
Court of Human Rights: Kozak v. Poland. AppNo. 13102/02. Strasbourg:
02.03.2010.
23 European Parliament (2010b).
633
----------------------- Page 673-----------------------
Elena Bargelli
by that Convention and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to
the
Member States, constitute general principles of the Unions law. Furthermore, the
new ver-
sion of the Treaty introduces a recognition of the rights, freedoms and principles
set out
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, among which art. 34
subs.
3 states as follows: In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union
recognises
and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent
existence
for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down
by Com-
munity law and national laws and practices. There is no doubt that this provision
does not
proclaim a genuine right to housing, but it does refer to the right to housing
assistance. It
is, however, unclear what is meant by the term housing assistance, which may be
limited to
housing benefits or might include all the policies needed to access housing
(financial and
social assistance, fiscal benefits, and, in a very broad sense, even legal
provisions aimed at
protecting the weaker party of a tenancy contract legal etc.).24
As stressed above, the provisions of the Charter as well as accession to the

European
Convention of Human Rights do not extend the EU competences on social
policy as
defined in the Treaties (see art. 6.1, 6.2 TEU). Therefore, it is not surprising
that the above
mentioned statement of art 34 has been sometimes defined as a moral obligation.25
However, EU initiatives cannot ignore the housing issue altogether.

In fact, European treaties provide for a patchy sphere of competence for the
European
Union and, consequently, give rise to gaps and the need to co-ordinate included and
excluded
areas.26 For example, national competence prevails in residential tenancy law.
However, deep
divergences in regulating access to housing or tenants protection could impair the

goal of
freedom of movement for workers (art. 45 TFEU), freedom of establishment of
nationals of
a Member State in the territory of another Member State (art. 49 TFEU), freedom to
provide
services within the Union (art. 56).27
Furthermore, access to housing represents a precondition for citizenship, as

well as the
values proclaimed by the Treaty such as respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy,
equality and human rights (art. 2 TEU).
Furthermore, before the Treaty even came into force, the European
Union took
several initiatives with a clear impact on housing and housing policy.28
To conclude, to the extent that the European Treaties ceased to be

exclusively focused
on creating a customs and economic union, the material preconditions for the
enjoyment
of freedoms and citizenship cannot be ignored by EU institutions.

making (2002).
25 Kenner, J. (2003).
26 Collins, H. (2008).
27 For a more detailed report of this level of interfaces between EU law and
tenancy law see Schmid and Dinse,
Introduction.
making (2002).
634
----------------------- Page 674-----------------------

Tenancy Law
According to this reasoning, EU law can have a diagonal impact on housing

policy
and law.
21.4 Beyond Vertical Harmonisation: Soft Law
As emphasised above, vertical harmonisation is not the only way to

intervene in social
policy. The European Union may deploy a variety of acts (recommendations,
opinions,
resolutions, declarations) in order to commit itself to respecting certain values,
or to setting
out best practice for Member States.29 In particular, soft law for making model
legislation
plays a role where the area of work is closely connected with national identity,
or there
is no political will for EU legislation among Member States, but there is a desire
to make
progress together,30 in order to implement the coordination of national
policies.31
Art. 151.2. TFEU adds that, in order to promote the fundamental social rights
that the
European Social Charter had in mind, the Union and the Member States shall
implement
measures which take account of the diverse forms of national practices, in
particular in the field
of contractual relations, and the need to maintain the competitiveness of the
Unions economy.
Among these measures, it is worth mentioning the Open Method of Co-
ordination,
which the EU has already experienced in other fields of social policy (employment,
social
security, rents).
This alternative method of harmonisation may coexist with national
legislative diver-
gences, avail itself of the best national practices and stimulate domestic legal
changes.32
In this context, the following approaches should be welcomed: a widespread

knowledge
of national statutes and courts practices on tenancy law, as well as the
comparative approach
to this topic; collection and communication of data on housing demand and supply,
the
proportion of public to private housing supply, the percentage of landlords to
tenants, the
percentage of vacant flats, etc.
Beyond (and before) any official initiative by the European Union,
a comparative
study of residential tenancy law will contribute to overcoming a nation-centred
approach
and to improving the quality of this legislation, and will be welcomed by
landlords and
tenants associations.
29 Chalmers, D./Davies, G. et al. (2010).

30 Chalmers, D./Davies, G. et al. (2010) p. 102.
31 This line of thought inspired Tenancy Law and Housing Policy in the EU under
the EUs Seventh Research
Framework Programme, which is coordinated by the Centre of European
Law and Politics (ZERP) at
Bremen University (centre of european law and politics (zerp) (2012-2015). URL:
http://www.tenlaw.uni-
bremen.de/).
32 Armstrong, K. A. (2003) URL: http://aei.pitt.edu/2814/1/081.pdf. Accessed:
25.08.2013.
635
----------------------- Page 675-----------------------
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European Court of Human Rights (29.01.2004): Bellini v. italy. AppNo.

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22 Das koreanische
Wohnungsmietschutzgesetz und
die Notwendigkeit der Kontrolle
des Mietwuchers
Shin-Uk Park
Summary
Housing Lease Protection Act in Korea and the need to control usury
Tenancy and consumer credit are both life time contracts where the use of
fixed or money
capital is provided to consumers in order to secure their living. Hundred percent
financed
homes where the owner without equity in his home pays his rent to a bank and
suffers
from all hardships of eviction when his property is foreclosed are no longer an
exception. The
subprime crisis has revealed that home ownership has become a questionable
substitute for
tenancy law. One hundred and fifty years of protection and state intervention for
tenants are
circumvented by developments of the credit society.
In this respect Korea is an interesting example since, owing to neo-liberal
pressures on
the housing market, credit and tenancy has been merged into one legal form where
the disad-
vantages of borrowing and renting seem to be accumulated. In Korea a significant
number of
tenants are forced to finance and pay up to 70% of the home price to the landlord
as a deposit
in order to access a home. Part of the rent is then paid off by the interest the
landlord earns
through these assets. The tenant has to pay the rest and his bank for the credit.
The insolvency
risk of the landlord with regard to the borrowed money lies with the tenant, who
also carries
the risk of eviction for default.
But social problems described in this chapter have triggered legislation that
increasingly
developed the right to use a dwelling for living into a new property right of
tenancy that can
be opposed to third parties and is prioritised in foreclosures. This revitalises
the tradition
of the Roman law principle of dominium utile, which, as a sister institute to the
capitalist
dominium directum, has been abandoned in the 19th century and recently also
emerged in
constitutional law. There is still a long way to go in coping with the rising
housing problems
in Korea, but the development shows that formerly emerging economies being able to
define
their own politics create new legal forms of life time contracts that are worth
recognising else-
where from where they once overtook the system and ideas of their actual civil
codes.
641
----------------------- Page 681-----------------------
Shin-Uk Park
The latest figures from Korea give a price to income ratio (PIR) of 4.4
years, and 7.7
years in Seoul. This means that to purchase an apartment in Korea, a buyer must
have
the equivalent of at least 4 years annual income for a deposit. At this current
PIR level,
it is obvious how difficult it is to become a homeowner in Korea, and especially in
Seoul.
The implication of the PIR is that people in Korea will be forced to remain tenants
for a
long time. During this period, their rights are secured by the Housing Lease
Protection Act
(KWMSchG), which has played an important role in the past and is likely to continue
to do
so in the future.
This chapter discusses the development, change and character of the Korean
housing
market, as well as the content of the KWMSchG and the Korean Civil Code (KBGB). A
prominent feature of the Korean housing market is leases with tenant capital. They
consist
of a lease and a consumer cash loan agreement (a mixed contract).
Furthermore, the
value of the lease with tenant capital commonly reaches 60-70% of the value of the
prop-
erty under the lease. The KWMSchG should therefore focus in particular on the
security of
tenant capital, the effect of the tenants rights on third parties and similar
protective regu-
lations. In this respect, the character of the KWMSchG is expressed in the concept
of the
right of the creditor to be a property right, because the KWMSchG granted a
subjectively
strong right to tenants through the guarantee of tenant capital and through
regulations
governing the effect of tenants rights in relation to third parties. This
subjective right on
the part of the tenant is ranked equally with property rights or, in some cases,
even above
property rights. The firm regulations of the KWMSchG guarantee the security of
tenants
living arrangements.
This chapter also highlights a shift in the current paradigm of the housing
market of
Korea. The former prevalence of leases with tenant capital is
increasingly being replaced
by monthly tenancies. The typical lease, being a long-term contract, is therefore
now in the
spotlight. The KWMSchG then regulates the lease agreement, taking its long-term
nature into
account, specifically in 7, 7b KWMSchG.
No solution for the problem of usury control has been proposed. The KWMSchG
does
not in fact regulate to control exorbitant rents. However, the general clauses (
2, 103, 104
KBGB) may be used. So far, the Korean Supreme Court (KGH) has not yet used the
general
clauses for usury control, so there is currently no standard for their application.
To justify
a disproportion between a benefit and a benefit in return under usury control
requires a
comparison standard and a maximum standard. The data for actual lease costs
collected by
the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs has been suggested for the
comparison
standard. To analyse these lease costs, the activity of the Housing Lease Committee
is neces-
sary and promising. For the maximum standard, the German method applied to
exorbitant
rents could be used.
Serious consideration of the suggestions contained in this chapter would not
undermine
the effectiveness of the KWMSchG but could make it more flexible, which is a
requirement
under the law.
642
----------------------- Page 682-----------------------
22 Das koreanische Wohnungsmietschutzgesetz und

die
Notwendigkeit der Kontrolle des
Mietwuchers
22.1 Wohnung als Lebensgut oder als Ware: zur Entwicklung des
koreanischen Wohnungsmarktes
Vor einigen Monaten strahlte das koreanische Fernsehen ein Drama aus. Das
Drama
hie Antworte 1997. Dabei ging es um die Geschichte des Jahres 1997 in Korea.
Diese
Sendung war aus verschiedenen Grnden sehr populr. Einer dieser Grnde liegt in
der
Bedeutung des Jahres 1997, als Korea den Internationalen Whrungsfonds (IWF) wegen
der Finanzierungskrise um einen Hilfsfonds ersuchte. Der IWF vernderte

daraufhin
einen groen Teil des Lebens der koreanischen Bevlkerung, da die vom IWF
geforderte
Politik u. a. aus einer Arbeitsmarkt-Flexibilisierung, der Privatisierung
ffentlicher
Unternehmen und einer ffnung des Kapitalmarktes bestand. Dies fhrte zu einer zu
schnellen neoliberalen Neustrukturierung, die Globalisierung und
Marktfundamenta-
lismus verkrperte. Obwohl diese Vernderungen der koreanischen Gesellschaft
groe
Opfer abverlangten, ertrug sie diese geduldig unter dem Begriff der
Belastungsverteilung
in der Tradition ihrer kollektiv organisierten Kultur. Auch der
Wohnungsmietmarkt in
Korea war von dieser neoliberalen Neustrukturierung betroffen.
Um dies besser verstehen zu knnen, sollen vor allem die juristischen Formen
der
Wohnungsnutzung im koreanischen Recht erklrt werden. Dazu gehren das Eigentum,
1
die dingliche Miete gem 303 ff. des koreanischen Brgerlichen Gesetzbuchs
(KBGB) ,
2
die Miete gem 618 ff. KBGB sowie Koreanisches
Wohnungsmieterschutzgesetz
3
(KWMSchG) . Beim Mietvertrag sind entsprechend der Zahlung der Miete drei Formen
4
zu unterscheiden: das Mieterkapital , das einer Kaution fr den genutzten
Wohnungswert
hnlich ist, die Monatsmiete sowie die Vermischung beider Elemente.
Das Mieterkapital, welches in der Regel rund 60-70% des Eigentumswertes
betrgt,
ist sowohl im Falle eines Mietvertrages als auch eines dinglichen Mietvertrages
nach der
Beendigung des Mietverhltnisses zurckzuerstatten. Die Zinsen fr das
Mieterkapital
werden mit der Miete verrechnet. Whrend der Vermieter eine groe Summe erhlt,
spart
der Mieter durch die Zinsverrechung an monatlicher Miete und bekommt das Mieter-
kapital nach Ende der Mietzeit zurck. Dieses dominierende Mietsystem im
koreanischen
1 So, J.-S. (1992) pp. 18 ff; Lee, B.-J. (2010) Darin nennt So die dingliche
Miete Tschonsae. Die koreanische
Aussprache der dinglichen Miete ist Tschonsae.
2 So, J.-S. (1992) pp. 26 ff.
3 So, J.-S. (1992) pp. 307 ff. Darin nennt So dieses Gesetz Koreanisches
Wohnungsmieterschutzgesetz
(KWMSchG). Laut dem koreanischen Sprachgebrauch sollte man das Gesetz
eigentlich das koreanische
Wohnungsmietschutzgesetz nennen. Das koreanische
Wohnungsmieterschutzgesetz (KWMSchG) passt
jedoch gut zum Ziel dieses Gesetzes. Das KWMSchG wird im Englischen als
Housing Lease Protection
Act durch die Justiz bersetzt. Die koreanische Justiz. URL:
http://www.moleg.go.kr/lawinfo/engLawInfo?
pstSeq=52450&searchCondition=AllForEngLaw&searchKeyword=%EC%A3%BC%ED%83%9D%EC
%9E
%84%EB%8C%80%EC%B0%A8.
4 Das Mieterkapital nennt So Kaution oder Tschonsaegeld. S. dazu So, J.-S.
(1992) pp. 55 ff.
643
----------------------- Page 683-----------------------
Shin-Uk Park
Wohnungsmarkt erklrt sich aus der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in Korea. Korea war
einer der sich wirtschaftlich seit 1960 schnell entwickelnden Staaten. Diese
wirtschaftliche
Entwicklung wurde durch sieben wirtschaftliche Fnfjahresplne von der koreanischen
Regierung gesteuert5. Vor allem der zweite Fnfjahresplan frderte die Entwicklung
von
Ballungsgebieten, in denen gesellschaftliche Bereiche und Bevlkerung konzentriert

wur-
6 7
den. (z. B. Bevlkerung , Universitten , die Regierung und ihre Behrden, das
Parlament,
Unternehmen, kulturelle Einrichtungen etc.). Die Zentralisierung fhrte in diesen
Gebie-
8
ten zu einer besonders hohen Nachfrage nach Wohnungen .
Die schnelle wirtschaftliche Entwicklung beeinflusste nicht nur diese
Nachfrage,
sondern auch das Angebot. Das Geld wurde knapp und die Kreditnachfrage nahm zu.
Mieterkapital wurde so zu einem wichtigen Mittel der Geldschpfung9. Der Vermieter
konnte mit dem Mieterkapital Investitionen ttigen, Sparen oder andere Wohnungen
kaufen. Der Mieter, der eine Wohnung zum Leben brauchte, war gezwungen, das Kapi-
tal, das 60-70% des Eigentumswertes deckte, dem Vermieter zur Verfgung zu stellen.
Die Wohnung war daher fr den Vermieter eine Ware bzw. ein Investitionsmittel, fr
den Mieter blieb sie ein Lebensgut. Hatte der Vermieter wirtschaftlichen
Misserfolg, so
fhrte dies zu der Konsequenz, dass der Mieter seinen Rckbertragungsanspruch auf
das Mieterkapital verlieren konnte. Das KWMSchG war der Versuch, dieses Problem
zu lsen.
Nach dem Inkrafttreten des KWMSchG glaubten die Mieter, dass nun ihr Mieter-
kapital gesichert sei. Diese Stabilitt wurde jedoch nicht erreicht10 wie die
Berichte des
5 Der erste wirtschaftlicher Entwicklungsplan ging von 1962 bis 1966 und
betraf die Sicherstellung der
Energiequellen und die Verstrkung der Grundstoffindustrie. Der zweite
wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsplan
(1967-1971) bezog sich insbesondere auf die Chemie-, Eisen- und
Maschinenindustrie. Whrend der dritten
wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsplan (1972-1976) den Fokus auf die Schwer- und
chemische Industrie legte,
betraf der vierte wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsplan (1977-1981) die Beziehung
der technischen Renovation
und Leistungserhhung. Diese Entwicklungsplne bezogen sich sehr stark auf die
Entwicklung. Der fnfte,
sechste und siebte Entwicklungsplan zielte nicht mehr auf die Entwicklung,
sondern nur auf die Stabilitt,
das Gleichgewicht etc. ab. Vgl. dazu Kim, D.-C. (1990).
6 Die gesamte Bevlkerung von Korea lag bei 49.779.000 im Jahr 2011. Die
Bevlkerung, die in Seoul bzw.
in der Umgebung von Seoul wohnt, lag bei 25.620.000 im Jahr 2011. S. dazu Das
koreanische statistische
Amt. URL:
http://www.index.go.kr/egams/stts/jsp/potal/stts/PO_STTS_IdxSearch.jsp?idx_cd=1009.
Damit
wohnten die Hlfte der gesamten Bevlkerung in Seoul bzw. in der Umgebung von
Seoul, obgleich das Areal
von Seoul bzw. die Umgebung von Seoul nur 11,8 % der gesamten koreanischen
Staatflche betrgt. S. dazu
Das koreanische statistische Amt.
7 In Seoul gibt es mindestens 45 Universitten.
8 Deswegen bezog sich die Wohnungspolitik auf das Quantittsproblem der
Wohnungen. Das Quantittsprob-
lem ist einigermaen gelst, weil seit 2002 die Ausschttungsquote der Wohnung
ber 100% betrgt. S. dazu
Kang, J. (2010) p. 250.
9 So, J.-S. (1992) p. 8.
10 Oh, J. (2010) p. 22; Kang, J. (2010).
644
----------------------- Page 684-----------------------

die
Mietwuchers
koreanischen statistischen Amtes ber die Preisnderung des Mieterkapitals im

Vergleich
11
zum Wohnungseigentum zeigen .
Jahr 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
08 09 10 11
Miete 0,8 -18,4 16,8 11,1 16,4 10,1 -1,4 -5 3 6,5 2,6
1,7 3,4 7,1 12,3
Eigen 2,0 -12,4 3,4 0,4 9,9 16,4 5,7 -2,1 4 11,6 3,1
3,1 1,5 1,9 6,9
Setzt man den Basiswert fr die Kosten im Jahr 1996 auf 100, so ergibt
sich die im
Folgenden dargestellte prozentuale Entwicklung. Sie verdeutlicht, welche groe
Belastung
die Mieter tragen mussten.
Jahr 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
08 09 10 11
Miete 100,8 82,2 96 106,7 124,2 136,7 134,8 128,1 131,9 140,5
144,2 146,6 151,6 162,4 182,3
Eigen 102 89,3 92,3 92,7 101,9 118,6 125,4 122,7 127,7 142,5
146,9 151,4 156,1 159,1 170,1
Wren alle Mieter Arbeitnehmer gewesen, so ergbe sich bei einer Lohnsteigerung von
90% bei Vollbeschftigung zwischen 1996 und 201112, dass die Steigerung des
Mietpreises
beim Mieterkapital tragbar gewesen wre. Doch der Prozentsatz der

vorbergehend
Beschftigten stieg von 26,8% im Jahr 2001 auf 33,3% im Jahr 2011 an13. Die
Steigerungen
bei den Finanzierungskosten des Mieterkapitals im Verhltnis zur Miete treffen, wie
die
folgende Tabelle zeigt, sozial Schwchere im Verhltnis zum Eigentmer besonders.
Sie
knnen das hohe Mieterkapital nicht mehr aufbringen, so dass sie stattdessen einen
nor-
malen Mietvertrag mit einer Monatsmiete abschlieen sollten. Dies macht die
folgende
Tabelle14 deutlich.
Jahr 1995 2000 2005

2010
Wohneigentum 55,3 54,2 55,6

54,2
Mieterkapital 29,7 28,2 22,4

21,7
Monatsmiete 11,9 12,6 17,2

20,1
Das KWMSchG a. F. regelte vor allem die Mietvertrge mit Mieterkapital, die die
sozial
Schwcheren betrafen. Deswegen wird das KWMSchG auch hufig in der ffentlichkeit
diskutiert und kritisiert. Jae-Seon So unterschied noch die Probleme in
Bezug auf das
11 In Bezug auf die Miete mit dem Mieterkapital s. Das koreanische statistische
AmtIn Bezug auf das Eigen-
tum s. Das koreanische statistische Amt. (12. 10. 2012). Die zugrundeliegende
Zahl ist der Prozentsatz des
vorhergehenden Jahres.
12 Das koreanische statistische Amt.
13 Das koreanische statistische Amt.
14 Das koreanische statistische Amt: Das Ergebnis der Untersuchungen ber
Volkszhlung und Wohnstile
(Familien, Wohnung) (2011) p. 22.
645
----------------------- Page 685-----------------------
Shin-Uk Park
KWMSchG a. F. (30. 12. 1983) nach Anwendungsbereich, Nutzungsnderung, Wirkung

des Mietrechtes gegenber Dritten, Kndigung, Mietpreis und Sicherung der Rckgabe
des Mieterkapitals15. Inzwischen wurde das KWMSchG mehrfach in den Jahren

1999,
2002, 2007, 2008 und 2009 novelliert, um auf die Probleme in einem sich auflsenden
Wohnungsmietmarkt fr dingliche Mietvertrge bzw. Mietvertrge mit

Mieterkapital
sowie der Mietvertrge mit Monatsmiete zu reagieren. Probleme verschlechternder
Woh-
nungsqualitt kamen hinzu16. Sie waren die Folge der berhhten Kosten fr
qualitativ
angemessenen Wohnraum, die zu einer langfristig angelegten Verarmung der

Mieter
fhrten17.
22.2 Miete zwischen Miete und Kreditkauf
22.2.1 Wohnung als Ware: der Erwerb der Wohnung auf Zeit im KBGB
Nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs und der japanischen Annexion wurde
am
15.9.1948 die Arbeit fr ein neues eigenes KBGB aufgenommen. Als Ergebnis wurde das
KBGB am 22.2.1958 verabschiedet und am 1.1.1969 in Kraft gesetzt. Trotz einiger

Novel-
lierungsversuche ist das KBGB bis heute ohne groe nderungen geblieben.
Im KBGB gibt es sehr interessante Regelungen in Bezug auf den Mietvertrag.
Dies
sind die Regelungen ber das dingliche Mietrecht ( 303 ff KBGB)18. Das dingliche
Miet-
recht ist eines der dinglichen Nutzungsrechte, durch das der Rechtsinhaber des
dinglichen
Mietrechtes ein Eigentum besitzen kann. Daneben kann er das Eigentum nach seinem
Verwendungszweck gebrauchen und die Frchte des Eigentums genieen. Dafr ist der
Rechtsinhaber verpflichtet, das vereinbarte Geld zu entrichten. Nach der Beendigung
des
15 Durch die nderungen des KWMSchG wurden einigen Probleme gelst. Die damaligen
Probleme des An-
wendungsbereiches und der nderung der Nutzung (So, J.-S. (1992) pp. 256 ff)
sind m. E. durch 2 KWM-
SchG zu lsen. Das Problem der Kndigung (So, J.-S. (1992) pp. 277 ff) kann
durch 6, 6b KWMSchG
gelst werden. Das Problem der Sicherung der Rckgabe des Mieterkapitals (So,
J.-S. (1992) pp. 297 ff) kann
auch durch die Gesetzesnderung gem 4 Abs. 2 KWMSchG gelst werden.
16 Man kann die Qualittsprobleme in zwei Klassen einteilen: Das erste Problem
bezieht sich auf die Vorausset-
zungen des 5b Koreanische Gesetz ber Wohnungen (KGW) in Bezug auf den
Mindestwohnstandard fr
Wohnheime. 5b Abs. 2 KGW delegiert die Bestimmung des Mastabs auf die
Verordnung des Prsidenten
fr das KGW. Gem 7 Verordnung des Prsidenten fr das KGW ist die
Bestimmung noch einmal zum
Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs delegiert. Die Verordnung des
Prsidenten fr das KGW
im Englischen als Enforcement Decree of the Housing Act durch die Justiz
bersetzt. S. Die koreanische
Justiz. URL: http://www.moleg.go.kr/lawinfo/engLawInfo?pstSeq=52512. Die
Verkndung des Ministry of
Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs (Nr. 2011-490) bestimmt den Mastab des
Mindestwohnstandards fr
Wohnheime. Laut dieser Verkndung muss eine Wohnung eine Kche, die verbunden
ist mit einem Wasser-
werk und Abwasserkanal, sowie eine Toilette enthalten. Daneben darf eine
Wohnung keine zeitweilige Wohn-
sttte sein und muss hitze-, feuer-, wrme- und wasserbestndig sein.
Zustzlich ist eine Schalldmmung,
Lftung, Beleuchtung, Heizung bzw. sonstige umweltfreundliche Faktoren
erforderlich. S. dazu Kang, J. (2010).
17 Oh, J. (2010); Kang, J. (2010) p. 250.
18 Lee, B.-J. (2010).
646
----------------------- Page 686-----------------------

die
Mietwuchers
dinglichen Mietverhltnisses ist der Rechtsinhaber des dinglichen Mietrechtes

verpflich-
tet, das Eigentum zurckzugeben. Umgekehrt ist der Eigentmer verpflichtet, das vom
Rechtsinhaber bei Vertragsabschluss bergebene Geld, das Mieterkapital,

zurckzuge-
ben. Der dingliche Mietvertrag ist eine Mischung aus Mietvertrag und Gelddarlehens-
vertrag19. Mit dem dinglichen Mietrecht wird zwar die Rechtsstellung des
Rechtsinhabers
des dinglichen Mietrechtes gestrkt. Die dingliche Miete wird jedoch selten
benutzt, weil
sie die Eintragung in das Grundbuch notwendig macht und weil die Rechtsstellung des
Rechtsinhabers des dinglichen Mietrechtes, nmlich das dingliche Nutzungsrecht und

das
Sicherungsrecht, starken Beschrnkungen ausgesetzt ist20.
Allerdings gibt es die Regelungen ber den Mietvertrag ( 618 ff KBGB). Als
lex
specialis geht das KWMSchG bei Mietverhltnissen ber Wohnraum dem KBGB jedoch
in der Regel vor, so dass es hierfr kaum Anwendung findet.
22.2.2 Wohnung als Lebensmittelpunkt: das koreanische Mieterschutzgesetz
21
Das KWMSchG wurde 1981 mit folgender Gesetzesbegrndung in Kraft gesetzt
:
[Das KWMSchG] regelt die Ausnahmen des KBGB in Bezug auf die Miet-
verhltnisse fr Wohnungen, um denjenigen, die ber kein Wohneigentum
verfgen, das Wohnen zu ermglichen, Probleme der Mieter zu lsen und ein
angemessenes Leben whrend der Mietzeit durch Gewhrleistung von Miet-
errechten zu ermglichen.
Der Zusammenhang zwischen den Novellierungen und der Finanzierungskrise wurde in

der nderungsbegrndung des KWMSchG im Jahr 1999 folgendermaen erklrt22:
Aufgrund der jngsten wirtschaftlichen Verschlechterung treten hufig

Flle
ein, dass in der Finanzkrise der Vermieter das Mieterkapital nach der
Beendi-
gung des Mietverhltnisses nicht zurckgeben kann. Auerdem sollte der
Mieter
die Wohnung trotz seiner Pflicht zum Umzug weiter nutzen knnen[]23.
Auf Grundlage dieser Gesetzesmotive wurden insbesondere die Voraussetzungen fr den
Zwangsvollstreckungsantrag des Mieters und seine Wirkung im KWMSchG verndert24.
19 Jee, W.-L. (2007).

20 Lee, B.-J. (2010) pp. 93 ff.
21 Die Gesetzesbegrndung des KWMSchG (Nr. 3379).
22 Die nderungsbegrndung des KWMSchG (Nr. 5641).
23 Sowohl der Besitz der Wohnung als auch die Einwohneranmeldung waren
die Voraussetzungen fr die
Wirkung des Mietrechtes gegenber Dritte gem KWMSchG sowie fr das
Recht auf vorzugsweise
Befriedigung.
647
----------------------- Page 687-----------------------
Shin-Uk Park
Im Jahr 2002 wurde eine Regelung in das KWMSchG eingefgt, welche die Kosten im
25
Falle eines Wechsels von der Miete mit Mieterkapital zur Miete als Monatsmiete
begrenzt .
Im Jahr 2007 wurden eine dingliche Wirkung des Mietrechtes gegenber Dritten26 und
das
Recht auf vorzugsweise Befriedigung fr juristische Personen in das KWMSchG

eingefhrt.
Dadurch sollte das Wohnen, das mit Hilfe des nationalen Wohnungsfonds durch
Mietvertrge,
die mit Mieterkapital dieser juristischen Personen fr sozial Schwchere
abgeschlossen wur-
27
28
den, geschtzt werden . 2008 erfolgte dann nur eine redaktionelle Klarstellung
. Im Jahr 2009
wurde ein Ausschuss fr Wohnungsmiete im Bereich der Justiz eingerichtet, der
Vorschlge
fr die vorzugsweise Befriedigung vorlegte29, die zu einer Prsidialverordnung
fhrte.
22.3 Anstze von Lebenszeitvertrgen im koreanischen

Mieterschutzrecht
22.3.1 Sozialer Zusammenhang Dritte im Mietvertrag
Das KWMSchG fhrt eine zum dinglichen Recht werdende Forderung ins Mietrecht
ein, die praktisch die alte Spaltung des Eigentums im rmischen Recht in
exklusives
(dominium directum) und staatlich geachtetes Nutzungseigentum (dominium utile) auf-
greift. Dies Recht ist eine rechtshemmende Einwendung. Aus einem Mietvertrag gem
KBGB konnte bis dahin der Mieter in der Regel nur relative Rechte
geltend machen.
Ohne Eintragung ins Grundbuch kann er nunmehr das Mietrecht Dritten entgegenge-
halten. Wenn ein Vermieter die Mietsache seinem Mieter berlsst und dieser sich
ord-
nungsgem angemeldet hat, ist der Mietvertrag gegenber Dritten gem
3 Abs. 1
KWMSchG wirksam, insbesondere gegenber Glubigern des Vermieters sowie nachran-
gigen Hypothekenglubigern. Diese Wirkung entsteht an dem Tag nach berlassung der
Mietsache und Wohnsitzanmeldung. Allerdings entfaltet das Mietrecht keine
Wirkung
gegenber vorrangigen Hypothekenglubigern. Der Mieter kann sein Wohnrecht
auch
gegenber Neuerwerbern des Eigentums geltend machen. Der neue Eigentmer
ber-
nimmt die Rechtsstellung des alten Eigentmers als Vermieter. ( 3 Abs. 3 KWMSchG).
Gem 60 KGW30 wird ein staatlicher Fonds fr Wohnungen gebildet. Um fr

Per-
sonen mit niedrigem Einkommen ohne Wohnungseigentum das Wohnen zu ermglichen,

schliet eine juristische Person fr sie die Vertrge ber das
Mieterkapital mit Hilfe des

26 Die Wirkung des Mietrechtes gegenber Dritten gem KWMSchG ist eine Art
rechtshemmende Einwend-
ung bzw. Widerspruchsrecht. S. dazu So, J.-S. (1992) pp. 272 ff.
30 Das KGW wird im Englischen als Housing Act durch die Justiz bersetzt. S. Die
koreanische Justiz. URL:
http://www.moleg.go.kr/lawinfo/engLawInfo?pstSeq=52511.
648
----------------------- Page 688-----------------------

die
Mietwuchers
Fonds ab31. Sobald die Wohnung bergeben ist und die Wohnsitzanmeldung
erfolgt ist,
bekommt diese juristische Person ein dingliches Mietrecht im Sinne des 3 Abs. 2
KWMSchG.
22.3.2 Einbeziehung Dritter
Die Wirkung des dinglichen Mietrechts ab Einzug fhrt zu folgendem Problem32:
Da die Umzugsanmeldung [= Einwohneranmeldung] erst einen Tag nach

der Anmeldung wirkt, kann der Mieter nicht geschtzt werden, wenn jemand
am gleichen Tag eine Hypothek aufnimmt oder wenn sich das
Eigentums-
recht ndert.
33
Im diesem Zusammenhang entschied der oberste koreanische Gerichtshof (KGH)
:
Die Wirkung des Mietrechtes gegenber Dritten bei der Mietsachberlas-

sung und der Erledigung der Einwohneranmeldung des Mieters gem
3 KWMSchG entsteht zu Beginn des Tages (0 Uhr) nach berlassung und
Einwohneranmeldung.
In dem zu entscheidenden Fall wurde der Mietvertrag am 16.8.1996

geschlossen. Die
Einwohneranmeldung erfolgte am 27.8.1996 und eine Hypothek wurde am
28.8.1996
eingetragen. Die Wirkung des Mietrechtes gegenber Dritten wurde bejaht.
Aus dem
Umkehrschluss ergibt sich, dass das zuvor genannte Problem nach dem gegenwrtigen
KWMSchG auftreten kann. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist der Vorschlag von So, der auf
die
effektive Nutzung statt auf die juristischen Elemente der Eintragung abhebt und
damit das
Nutzungseigentum deutlicher werden lsst, von Bedeutung34:
Das Mietrecht wirkt auch ohne Eintragung im Grundbuch von dem Tag an
gegenber Dritten, ab dem die Wohnung an den Mieter berlassen wird.
Mit seinem Vorschlag verzichtet So auf die Voraussetzung der

Einwohneranmel-
dung. Als Grund dafr nennt er ihren Zweck, nmlich die Erfassung der
Bevlke-
rungsbewegung. Sinn der Erfassung der Wohnsitze ist die Mglichkeit einer
effektiven
Verwaltung sowie die Mglichkeit der Menschen, Adressen zu erforschen (
1 Kore-
anisches Einwohnerregistrierungsgesetz).
31 Dies kann man mit der Sozialwohnung in Deutschland und mit Housing Choice
Voucher Program in den
Vereinigten Staaten vergleichen. S. dazu Park, M. (2012).
32 So, J.-S. (1992) p. 275.
33 KGH 99Da9981 (25. 5. 1999).
34 So, J.-S. (1992) p. 276.
649
----------------------- Page 689-----------------------
Shin-Uk Park
22.3.3 Schutz der Familie im Todesfall
Das dingliche Mietrecht kann nach dem 997 ff KBGB vererbt werden. Gem 1000
KBGB wird der Partner, der nicht Ehegatte ist, nicht zum gesetzlichen
Erben. Fr die
Rechtstellung des Lebensgefhrten (faktischer Ehegatte) wird gem 9 Abs. 1
KWM-
SchG bestimmt, dass der berlebende das Recht und die Pflicht des Erblassers als
Mieter
erbt, wenn der Erblasser keinen Erben hat. Wenn ein Erblasser einen Erben hat und
der
Erbe nicht bei ihm in der Mietwohnung lebt, erben der faktische Ehegatte und sein
Erbe
(nur innerhalb Eltern, Groeltern, Geschwister, Kinder, Enkelkinder)
gemeinsam ( 9
Abs. 2 KWMSchG). 9 Abs. 1 und Abs. 2 KWMSchG findet jedoch keine Anwendung,
wenn der Erbe gem 9 Abs. 1 und Abs. 2 KWMSchG innerhalb eines Monats nach dem
Tod des Mieters die Erbschaft ausschlgt ( 9 Abs. 3 KWMSchG). 9 Abs. 1 und Abs.
2
KWMSchG sind somit in gewisser Weise dispositiv.
22.3.4 Lebenszeit und Kontinuitt
Wenn die Mietzeit nicht bestimmt ist oder weniger als zwei Jahre betrgt, besteht
das
Mietverhltnis auf zwei Jahre ( 4 Satz 1 KWMSchG). Der Mieter kann
aber auch
eine krzere als die zweijhrige Mietzeit gem 4 Satz 2 KWMSchG in Anspruch
nehmen.
Wenn der Vermieter whrend des Zeitraums zwischen einem und sechs Monaten
vor Ablauf der Mietzeit eine Verlngerung des Mietverhltnisses nicht ablehnt oder
auf
das Angebot schweigt, wird der Mietvertrag unter gleichen Bedingungen automatisch
verlngert ( 6 Abs. 1 Satz 1 KWMSchG). Dies gilt hingegen nur, wenn der Mieter dem
Vermieter keine Ablehnung einen Monat vor Ablauf der Mietzeit anzeigt ( 6 Abs. 1
Satz 2 KWMSchG). Die Befristung des erneuten Mietverhltnisses betrgt dann zwei
Jahre ( 6 Abs. 2 KWMSchG). Wenn der Mieter mit der Entrichtung der Miete in Hhe
eines Betrages in Verzug ist, der die Miete fr zwei Monate erreicht,
oder wenn er
seine Pflicht schwer verletzt, findet 6 Abs. 1 KWMSchG keine Anwendung ( 6 Abs.
3 KWMSchG).
Die Frist eines neuen Mietverhltnisses gem 6 Abs. 2 KWMSchG
hat wenig
Wirkung, weil der Vermieter den neuen Mietvertrag jederzeit kndigen kann ( 6b
Abs. 1
KWMSchG). Die Wirkung dieser Kndigung entsteht drei Monaten ab dem Zeitpunkt, zu
dem diese Kndigung dem Mieter mitgeteilt wird ( 6b Abs. 2 KWMSchG).
22.3.5 Die Sicherung der Kapitalrckgewhr
Bei der Kapitalrckgewhr treffen das traditionelle exklusive Eigentum auf das
Nutzungs-
eigentum in Form des Rckgewhrsanspruchs fr die Kaution.
650
----------------------- Page 690-----------------------
22 Das koreanische Wohnungsmietschutzgesetz und die

Mietwuchers
22.3.5.1 Sicherung des Mieterkapitals

Wie beschrieben betrgt das Mieterkapital normalerweise rund 60-70% des Eigentums-
wertes, wodurch das Mieterkapital vielfach das ganze Vermgen des Mieters
darstellt.
Das KWMSchG bercksichtigt den Anspruch auf Herausgabe des Mieterkapitals, indem
es dem Mieter das dingliche Recht auf vorzugsweise Befriedigung einrumt.
Betreibt ein Mieter die Zwangsvollstreckung in die Wohnung aufgrund
eines Fest-
stellungsurteils oder eines anderen Titels ber den Anspruch auf Herausgabe des
Mieter-
kapitals bzw. aufgrund einer sonstigen Vollstreckungsgrundlage, so ist die
Erfllung der
Gegenleistung (z. B. Rckgabepflicht der Mietsache) gem 3b Abs. 1 KWMSchG
anders
als allgemein in 41 Koreanisches Gesetz ber die zivilrechtliche Vollstreckung
(KGZV)
festgelegt35, keine Vollstreckungsvoraussetzung mehr. Bei Zwangsversteigerung
gem
KGZV oder ffentlichem Verkauf gem dem Koreanischen Gesetz ber die Erhebung der
Staatssteuern (KGES)36 hat der Mieter das Recht auf vorzugsweise Befriedigung vor
anderen
Glubigern des Vermieters und nachstehenden Hypothekenglubigern ( 3b Abs. 2 KWM-

SchG), sofern sein Mietrecht gegenber Dritten gem 3 Abs. 1 KWMSchG wirkt und
er
sich das Vertragsdatum auf der Vertragsurkunde durch eine zustndige Behrde
bestti-
gen lie. Zwar ist sein Mietrecht beim Zuschlag der Mietsache nach KGZV
grundstzlich
erloschen ( 3e Satz 1 KWMSchG), das dingliche Mietrecht mit Wirkung gegenber
Dritten
ist jedoch nicht erloschen, soweit das Mieterkapital nicht vollstndig zurckzahlt
wurde
( 3e Satz 2 KWMSchG). Gibt es jedoch eine vorrangige Hypothek bei der
Versteigerung der
Mietsache, findet 3e Satz 2 KWMSchG keine Anwendung; denn das subjektive
Mietrecht
hat keine Wirkung gegenber vorrangigen Hypotheken. Diese erlschen gem 91 Abs.
2 KGZV beim Zuschlag genauso wie das subjektive Mietrecht gem 91 Abs. 3 KGZV.
Des Weiteren geniet ein anteiliger Herausgabeanspruch des
Mieters auf das
Mieterkapital Vorrang gegenber dem Herausgabeanspruch des Vermieters ( 8 Abs. 1
KWMSchG). In den 3 ff der Verordnung zum KWMSchG ist der anteilige Herausga-
beanspruch folgendermaen geregelt:
3 Anspruch auf Mieterkapital etc.

(1) Der Teils des Mieterkapitals, der mit dem Recht auf vorzugsweise Befriedigung
nach
8 KWMSchG geltend gemacht werden kann, wird wie folgt bestimmt:
1. Seoul: 25 000 000 KRW37
2. Ballungsgebiet (auer Seoul) gem dem Koreanischen Gesetz zum Anordnungs-
plan fr den Groraum Seoul (KGAS)38: 22 000 000 KRW
35 41 KGZV kann man mit 750 ZPO vergleichen. Das KGZV wird im Englischen als
Civil Execution Act
durch die Justiz bersetzt. S. Die koreanische Justiz.
36 Das KGES wird im Englischen als National Tax Collection Act durch die Justiz
bersetzt. S. Die kore-
anische Justiz.
37 Zurzeit entspricht ein Euro ca. 1,500 koreanischen Won (KRW).
38 Das KGAS (Nr. 10599) wird im Englischen als Seoul Metropolitan Area
Readjustment Planning Act durch
die Justiz bersetzt. S. Die koreanische Justiz.
651
----------------------- Page 691-----------------------
Shin-Uk Park
3. Grostdte39 (auer Ballungsgebiet und Landkreis), Ansan, Yongin,

Gimpo und
Gwangju in Gyeonggi-do: 19 000 000 KRW

4. Sonstige Gebiete: 14 000 000 KRW
(2) berschreitet der Teil des Mieterkapitals die Hlfte des
Wohnungswerts, kann das
Recht auf vorzugsweise Befriedigung nur bis zur Hlfte des Wohnungswerts
geltend
gemacht werden.
(3) Gibt es mehr als zwei Mieter in einem Wohngebude und berschreitet die Summe
der jeweiligen Teile des Mieterkapitals die Hlfte des Wohnungswerts, ist die
Hlfte des
Wohnungswerts in dem Verhltnis aufzuteilen, wie der Teil des Mieterkapitals zu
dieser
Summe im Verhltnis steht. Der sich daraus ergebende anteilige Betrag ist als der
(neue)
Teil des Mieterkapitals des jeweiligen Mieters anzusehen.
(4) Gibt es mehr als zwei Mieter in einem Wohngebude und fhren sie
ein gemein-
schaftliches Leben in diesem Gebude, so sind die Mieter als eine Mietpartei
anzusehen
und die jeweiligen Teile des Mieterkapitals zusammenzurechnen.
4 Recht auf vorzugsweise Befriedigung des Mieters

Das Recht auf vorzugsweise Befriedigung haben nach 8 KWMSchG nur
diejenigen
Mieter, deren Mietkapital weniger als den im Folgenden festgestellten Betrag
ausmacht:
1. Seoul: 75 000 000 KRW
2. Ballungsgebiet (auer Seoul) gem KGAS: 65 000 000 KRW
3. Grostdte (auer Ballungsgebiet und Landkreis), Ansan, Yongin,
Gimpo und
Gwangju in Gyeonggi-do: 55 000 000 KRW
4. Sonstige Gebiete: 40 000 000 KRW
Wie oben beschrieben, garantiert das KWMSchG den Herausgabeanspruch des

Miet-
kapitals des Mieters durch zwei Rechtsinstrumente, nmlich das Recht auf
vorzugsweise
Befriedigung gem 3b Abs. 2 KWMSchG und eine Garantie auf einen Teil des Heraus-
gabeanspruchs auf das Mieterkapital gem 8 Abs. 1 KWMSchG. Um den anteiligen

Herausgabeanspruch des Mieters auf das Mieterkapital vorrangig zum dinglichen Recht
werden zu lassen, darf das Mieterkapital den Betrag gem 4 Verordnung des KWM-
SchG nicht berschreiten. Nach 4 Verordnung des KWMSchG betrgt die Grenze in
Seoul 75.000.000 KRW (ca. 54,000 Euro). Wer fr weniger als 75.000.000
KRW einen
Mietvertrag in Seoul abgeschlossen hat, kann gem 3 Verordnung des
KWMSchG
39 Der koreanische Verwaltungsbezirk unterteilt sich in eine besondere

Stadt (Hauptstadt Seoul [Teukbye-
olsi]), sechs Grostdte [Gwangyeoksi] und neun Provinzen [Do]. Die
Provinz besteht aus den Stdten
[Si] und Landkreisen [Gun]. Das Ballungsgebiet wird in der Form der Verordnung
des Prsidenten fr das
KGAS bestimmt ( 9 Verordnung des Prsidenten fr das KGAS). Diese Verordnung
des Prsidenten fr
das KGAS wird im Englischen als Enforcement Decree of Seoul Metropolitan Area
Readjustment Planning
Act durch die Justiz bersetzt. S. Die koreanische Justiz.
652
----------------------- Page 692-----------------------

Mietwuchers
einen Herausgabeanspruch des Mieterkapitals in Hhe von 25.000.000 KRW (ca. 18.000
Euro) geltend machen. Der Betrag wurde im Laufe der Jahre folgendermaen erhht:40
Jahr 84 87 90 95 01
08 10
Teil 3.000.000 5.000.000 7.000.000 12.000.000 16.000.000

20.000.000 25.000.000
Bereich - - 20.000.000 30.000.000 40.000.000

60.000.000 75.000.000
Zwischen 2001 und 2008 wurde das KWMSchG und die Verordnung des KWMSchG
nicht angepasst, was scharf kritisiert wurde.

Die flexible Anpassung des KWMSchG an vernderte wirtschaftliche Situationen41
ist nunmehr Aufgabe eines Ausschusses fr die Wohnungsmiete der koreanischen

Justiz,
der den Anwendungsbereich und den anteiligen Herausgabeanspruch des Mieterkapitals
festlegt ( 8b KWMSchG). Dieser Ausschuss hat zwischen neun und fnfzehn Mitglie-
dern ( 8b Abs. 2 KWMSchG). Die Amtsdauer jedes Mitglieds betrgt zwei Jahre. Wenn
das Mitglied ein Beamter ist, ist seine Amtsdauer so lange wie seine Amtszeit ( 6
Abs.
1 Verordnung des KWMSchG). Der Vorsitzende dieses Ausschusses ist der Vizeminister
der Justiz ( 8b Abs. 3 KWMSchG). Der Ausschuss tagt mindestens einmal pro Jahr.
Eine
auerordentliche Sitzung kann durch den Vorsitzenden oder ein Drittel der
Mitglieder
einberufen werden ( 9 Abs. 1 Verordnung zum KWMSchG).
Wie oben beschrieben, ist das subjektive Recht aus dem Mietvertrag durch das
KWM-
SchG sehr stark abgesichert. So kann der Mieter das Recht auf vorzugsweise
Befriedigung
vor anderen Glubigern des Vermieters und vor nachstehenden Hypotheken
geltend
machen ( 3b Abs. 2 KWMSchG). Man kann dieses Recht einem dinglichen Recht gleich-
stellen. Das KWMSchG schtzt das subjektive Recht aus dem Mietvertrag teilweise
sogar
strker als die dinglichen Rechte, indem das KWMSchG das Recht auf
vorzugsweise
Befriedigung in Bezug auf den anteiligen Herausgabeanspruch auf das
Mieterkapital
gem 8 KWMSchG einrumt. Insofern kommt der Charakter des KWMSchG in der
zum dinglichen Recht werdenden Forderung zum Ausdruck.
Wenn der Mieter nach der Beendigung des Mietverhltnisses das Mieterkapital
nicht
zurckerhlt, kann er dies Mietrecht bei Gericht im Grundbuch eintragen lassen (
3c Abs.
1 KWMSchG). Vor der Gesetzesnderung im Jahr 1999 musste der Mieter seinen Wohnsitz
dort gemeldet lassen, um die Wirkung seines Mietrechtes gegenber Dritten zu

behaupten42.
Nun kann der Mieter darber hinausgehend die Wirkung seines Mietrechtes gegenber
Drit-
ten gem KWMSchG auch schon dann herbeifhren, wenn sein subjektives Mietrecht in
das Grundbuch eingetragen ist. Infolge dieser Eintragung verliert er auch dann
nicht mehr die
40 Die Benennung ist KRW.

41 Bcker, C. (2005).
42 Wenn der Mieter seinen Wohnsitz aufgrund eines Umzugs nderte, verlor er die
Wirkung des Mietrechtes
gegenber Dritten gem KWMSchG, wodurch er nur noch einen subjektiven
schuldrechtlichen Anspruch
in Bezug auf das Mietverhltnis hatte.
653
----------------------- Page 693-----------------------
Shin-Uk Park
Wirkung seines Mietrechtes gegenber Dritten gem KWMSchG und sein Recht auf vor-
zugs weise Befriedigung, wenn die Meldevoraussetzung wegfllt ( 3c Abs. 5
KWMSchG).
Daneben kann der Mieter die Kosten fr den Antrag auf Eintragung seines subjektiven
Rech-
tes in das Grundbuch vom Vermieter rckerstattet verlangen ( 3c Abs. 8 KWMSchG).
Ein
anderer Mieter, der einen Mietvertrag nach der Eintragung in das Grundbuch fr den
ehemali-
gen Mieter abschliet, hat kein Recht auf vorzugsweise Befriedigung ( 3c Abs. 6
KWMSchG).
Daneben bestimmt 621 KBGB fr die Eintragung in das Grundbuch:
621 Eintragung der Miete

1. Der Mieter von Immobilien kann vom Vermieter die Mitwirkung im Verfahren
zur
Eintragung der Miete verlangen, es sei denn, dass die Parteien die Ablehnung
ber
die Eintragung nicht vereinbaren.
2. Nach der Eintragung der Miete fr Immobilien (in das Grundbuch)
entfaltet es
Wirkung gegenber Dritten.
Die Wirkung der Eintragung erfolgt entsprechend 621 Abs. 2 KBGB, 3c Abs. 5 und
Abs. 6 KWMSchG i. V. m. 3d Abs. 1 KWMSchG.
22.3.5.2 Zurckbehaltungsrecht
Im deutschen Zivilrecht ist das Zurckbehaltungsrecht in 273 BGB im Recht der
Schuld-
verhltnisse geregelt. Dagegen befindet sich das Zurckbehaltungsrecht im
koreanischen
Privatrecht in 320 KBGB, dem Buch ber das Sachenrecht. Das Zurckbehaltungsrecht
ist ein Recht auf eine Sache.

Wie oben bereits dargestellt wurde, hat das subjektive Mietrecht gegenber
einer vor-
rangigen Hypothek bei Versteigerung der Mietsache keine Wirkung. Deswegen erlschen
die vorrangigen Hypotheken gem 91 Abs. 2 KGZV und auch das subjektive Mietrecht
gem 91 Abs. 3 KGZV beim Zuschlag. Das Zurckbehaltungsrecht erlscht

hinge-
gen nicht, so dass der Kufer bzw. der erfolgreiche Bieter die Haftung bernimmt,
die
mit dem Zurckbehaltungsrecht gesicherte Schuld zu erfllen ( 91 Abs. 5 KGZV). Das
Zurckbehaltungsrecht ist im Wesentlichen ein Priorittsablsungsrecht. Daneben

kann
das Zurckbehaltungsrecht nachrangig zu Hypothek, Pfandrecht etc. bestellt werden.
Der
Rechtsinhaber des Zurckbehaltungsrechtes kann die Zurckgabe des Eigentums
ver-
weigern, bis die Gegenleistung bewirkt wird43 . Dadurch kann der Mieter sein
subjektives
Mietrecht ber das Zurckbehaltungsrecht geltend machen.
22.3.5.3 Behandlung bei Vertragsnderung

Wandeln die Parteien des Mietvertrages das Mieterkapital bzw. einen Teil
des Mieter-
kapitals in Monatsmieten um, so darf die Monatsmiete einen bestimmten monatlichen
43 Palandt, O./Bassenge, P. (2010) 273 Rn. 1; KGH 2011Da 84298 (22. 12. 2011).
654
----------------------- Page 694-----------------------

Mietwuchers
Betrag gem 7b KWMSchG nicht berschreiten. Dieser monatliche Betrag errechnet

sich, wenn man den Teil des zur Monatsmiete umgewandelten Mieterkapital mit dem in
der Verordnung des KWMSchG geregelten Prozentsatz multipliziert. Der Prozentsatz
soll
sich nach dem (durchschnittlichen) Interbankenzinssatz und der wirtschaftliche
Situation
in der jeweiligen Region richten. Gem 2b Verordnung des KWMSchG liegt dieser
Prozentsatz aktuell landesweit einheitlich bei 14% pro Jahr.
22.3.6 Der angemessene Mietpreis
22.3.6.1 Wucherkontrolle
Daneben bleibt die Wucherkontrolle weiterhin notwendig. (vgl. dazu auch Reifner I
und Rdl)
Im KWMSchG gibt es keine Bestimmung hierzu. Um dies zu ndern, gibt es zwei
Vorschlge: Gesetzesnderung oder Anwendung der Generalklauseln.
Trotz der Kritik an einer Flucht in die Generalklauseln44 geht an ihnen kein
Weg
vorbei, um den Mietwucher zu kontrollieren.

Wie im deutschen Recht gem 138 BGB kann man durch die
Anwendung der
Generalklauseln im KBGB ein Rechtsgeschft als Wuchergeschft bzw. als wucherhn-
liches Geschft kontrollieren. Dabei knnen die Generalklauseln im KBGB
folgender-
maen bersetzt werden:
2 [Treu und Glauben]

(1) Die Ausbung der Rechte und die Erfllungen der Pflichten sollen nach Treu
und
Glauben erfolgen.
(2) Die Rechte drfen nicht missbraucht werden.
103 [Rechtsgeschft gegen die soziale Ordnung] Ein Rechtsgeschft, das gegen
die
guten Sitten bzw. die soziale Ordnung verstt, ist nichtig.
104 [Ungerechtfertigtes Rechtsgeschft] Nichtig ist ein

Rechtsgeschft, dem es
wegen der Ausnutzung der Zwangslage, der Voreiligkeit oder der
Unerfahrenheit an
Gerechtigkeit fehlt.
2 KBGB ist im Gegensatz zu 103, 104 KBGB positiv formuliert,

so dass eine
unmittelbare Anwendung des 2 KBGB Schwierigkeiten bereitet.
Nach der stndigen Rechtsprechung des KGH gehren zu den Voraussetzungen des
104 KBGB das Bestehen einer Zwangslage, die Voreiligkeit oder Unerfahrenheit, das
Bestehen eines aufflligen Missverhltnisses und die bewusste Ausnutzung45 . Jedoch

gibt
es bislang weder einen Mastab fr das auffllige Missverhltnis in der

Rechtsprechung
44 Hedemann, J. W. (1933) pp. 4 ff.

45 KGH 96 Da 34061 (12. 11. 1996).
655
----------------------- Page 695-----------------------

Shin-Uk Park
des KGH noch gibt es bisher eine entsprechende Anwendung des 103 KBGB. In den
Urteilen des KGH zu diesem Paragraph geht es eher um eine Ethik46, die die
bermige
Beschrnkung der Freiheit des Individuums sanktioniert47, um ein die
Gerechtigkeit
verletzendes Geschft48, den Doppelverkauf einer unbeweglichen Sache wegen
Eingriffs
in den zuerst geschlossenen Vertrag49, das den Lebensunterhalt gefhrdende
Geschft,50
das zum Glcksspiel verleitende Geschft51 und den Wucher bzw. das
wucherhnliche
Geschft im Darlehensvertrag52 53. Bisher wurde also noch kein Urteil zum
Mietwucher
gefllt. Der Begriff des Mietwuchers, den der KGH bisher nicht benutzt, knnte wie
folgt
konkretisiert werden:
Als Bewertungsmastab ist ein Referenzobjekt zu whlen, beispielsweise die
ortsbli-
che Miete, Rume einer vergleichbaren Anlage, Ausstattung, Gre, Beschaffenheit
etc.,
wie dies auch 558 BGB und 5 Wirtschaftsstrafgesetz im deutschen Recht
erfordern.
Hierfr knnten die tatschlichen Mietvertragskosten als Mastab genutzt werden,
die
das koreanische Ministerium fr Land, Transport und Maritime
Angelegenheiten jeden
Monat verffentlicht auf der Grundlage der tatschlichen Mietvertragskosten,
die der
staatlich anerkannte Vermittler innerhalb von 60 Tagen nach dem Vertragsabschluss
bei
dieser Behrde anmelden muss ( 27 Koreanisches Gesetz ber das Geschft des
staatlich
anerkannten Vermittlers und die Immobilienverkehrsanmeldung. Nr. 10580).
Diese
Informationen ber Mietvertragskosten kann man im Internet abrufen54.
Korrektheit
der erhobenen Daten sowie der freie Zugang zu diesem Informationsbestand

werden
dadurch garantiert. Dieser Datenbestand sollte zur Konkretisierung der
Generalklauseln
herangezogen werden, wodurch auch der Anfangsmietpreis einer Wucherkontrolle unter-
zogen werden knnte. Diese Bearbeitung sollte vom Ausschuss fr die Wohnungsmiete,
dessen Mitglieder Experten sind, vorgenommen werden.

Im Hinblick auf den Mastab ist die deutsche Rechtsprechung zum Mietwucher
ein
gutes Vorbild. Nach der stndigen Rechtsprechung des BGH zum
Ratenkreditvertrag
46 Beispielsweise ein Vertrag ber Polygamie. S. dazu KGH 4288 Minsang 156 (14. 7.
1955); KGH 4288 Min-
sang 245 (13. 10. 1955); KGH 60 Da 302 (29. 9. 1960).
47 Beispielsweise ein Vertrag ber ein Scheidungsverbot. S. dazu KGH 69 M 18 (19.
8. 1969).
48 Beispielsweise ein Vertrag ber eine prozessuale Falschaussage. S. dazu KGH 86
Daka 1802 (28. 4. 1987);
KGH 89 Daka 10514 (11. 5. 1990).
49 Lee, B.-J. (2010) pp. 88 ff; KGH 94 Da 2534 (10. 2. 1995) Dabei ist nicht nur
das Wissen des zweiten Kufers
ber den Bestand des ersten Vertrages notwendig, sondern auch, dass sich der
zweite Kufer dem untreuen
Geschft des Verkufers anschliet. KGH 77 Da 1804 (24. 1. 1978); KGH 94 Da
22231 (14. 10. 1994); KGH
94 Da 37349 (18. 11. 1994); KGH 94 Da 48721 (17. 3. 1995).
50 Beispielsweise eine Schenkung des wichtigsten Vermgens. S. dazu KGH 69 Da 2293
(31. 3. 1970); KGH 75
Da 2234 (13. 4. 1976).
51 Beispielsweise ein Darlehensvertrag, dessen Darlehenssumme zum
Glcksspiel verwandt wird. S. dazu
KGH 4291 Minsang 260 (16. 7. 1959); KGH 72 Da 2249 (22. 5. 1973).
52 KGH 2004 Da 50426 (15. 2. 2007); KGH 2007 Da 23807 (15. 5. 2008); KGH 2009 Da
12399 (11. 6. 2009).
53 Han, S.-i. (2001).
54 Man kann sich ber die Kosten auf Ministry of Land, T. a. M. A. URL:
http://www.onnara.go.kr/. informieren.
656
----------------------- Page 696-----------------------

Mietwuchers
besteht ein Missverhltnis zwischen Leistung und Gegenleistung, wenn der Wert der
Leis-
tung knapp doppelt so hoch ist wie der Wert der Gegenleistung55. Im Mietrecht
gengt
wegen der langandauernden Verhltnisse schon eine berschreitung zwischen

30 und
50%, um Wucher anzunehmen. Allerdings kommt es selten zu der Anwendung,
da in
Deutschland der Mietpreis vom Mieter gerichtlich auf das ortsbliche Ma
begrenzt
werden kann. (Miethhegesetz)
Auf der Grundlage des oben vorgeschlagenen Bewertungsmastabs sowie
jenes
Hchstmastabs sollte der KGH eine Kontrolle des Mietwuchers, insbesondere
bezglich
des Anfangsmietpreises vornehmen.
22.3.6.2 Mieterhhung
Whrend des Mietverhltnisses knnen die Parteien eine Vernderung der
Miete bzw.
des Mieterkapitals aufgrund einer eingetretenen nderung der Steuern oder
sonstiger
Nebenkosten der Wohnung oder aufgrund einer nderung der allgemeinen wirtschaftli-
chen Lage vornehmen ( 7 Satz 1 KWMSchG). Eine Erhhung der Miete darf
jedoch
diejenigen Grenzen nicht berschreiten, die in der Verordnung des KWMSchG bestimmt
sind ( 7 Satz 2 KWMSchG). Gem 2 Abs. 1 Verordnung des KWMSchG
darf der
Vermieter nicht eine 5% vom vereinbarten Mieterkapital berschreitende Erhhung der
Miete verlangen. Darber hinaus kann der Vermieter im ersten Jahr nach
Mietvertragsab-
schluss bzw. Vereinbarung einer Mieterhhung keine weitere Erhhung der Miete
fordern
( 2 Abs. 2 Verordnung des KWMSchG).
22.3.6.3 Schlussbetrachtung
Zur Zeit (2013) braucht man in Korea im Durchschnitt das Einkommen von 4,4 Jahren
(PIR), um Wohneigentum zu erwerben. In Seoul sind es 7,7 Jahre56. Dieses Verhltnis
verdeutlicht, wie schwer es ist, Wohneigentum in Korea bzw. in Seoul zu erlangen.

Die
Zahlen machen deutlich, dass die in Korea Wohnenden lange Mieter bleiben
sollten.
Whrend dieser langen Zeit wird das Recht des Mieters in Korea durch das KWMSchG
gesichert, das in der Vergangenheit eine wichtige Rolle spielte und in
Zukunft auch
spielen sollte.
Das bisherige Paradigma im Wohnungsmarkt Koreas hat sich verndert: Der alte
auf
den Mietvertrag mit dem Mieterkapital konzentrierte Wohnungsmarkt wird durch Miet-
vertrge mit Monatsmiete ersetzt. Das Dauerschuldverhltnis und nicht der Kauf
stehen
im Mittelpunkt. Die Wucherkontrolle wird notwendig. Um im Rahmen der Wucherkon-
trolle ein aufflliges Missverhltnis zwischen Leistung und Gegenleistung
festzustellen,
sollten die Statistiken des Transportministeriums herangezogen werden.
55 BGHZ 141, 257, 262; 146, 248, 302.

56 Korea Housing Institute: Die nderung des Wohnungsmarktes und
Bewltigungsstrategien (2012) pp. 1 ff.
657
----------------------- Page 697-----------------------
Bcker, Carsten (2005): Die diskurstheoretische Notwendigkeit der Flexibilitt im

Recht. In:
Bcker, Carsten; Baufeld, Stefan (eds.): Objektivitt und Flexibilitt im Recht.
Tagungen
des Jungen Forums Rechtsphilosophie (JFR) in der Internationalen
Vereinigung fr
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (IVR) im September 2004 in Kiel und im April 2005 in
Hagen. Stuttgart: Steiner pp. 96 ff.
Bcker, Carsten; Baufeld, Stefan (eds.) (2005): Objektivitt und

Flexibilitt im Recht.
Tagungen des Jungen Forums Rechtsphilosophie (JFR) in der Internationalen
Vereinigung
fr Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (IVR) im September 2004 in Kiel und im April 2005
in
Hagen. Stuttgart: Steiner.
Das koreanische statistische Amt: Der Bericht ber Seoul bzw. neben von
Seoul und
Provinz. URL:
http://www.index.go.kr/egams/stts/jsp/potal/stts/PO_STTS_IdxSearch.
jsp?idx_cd=2729&stts_cd=272901&clas_div=A&idx_sys_cd=&idx_clas_cd=1. Accessed:
12.10.2012.
Das koreanische statistische Amt: Der Prozentsatz der vorbergehenden

Beschftigten. URL:
http://www.index.go.kr/egams/stts/jsp/potal/stts/PO_STTS_IdxSearch.jsp?
idx_cd=2477&stts_
cd=247701&clas_div=A&idx_sys_cd=&idx_clas_cd=1. Accessed: 12.10.2012.
Das koreanische statistische Amt: Die gesamte Bevlkerung. URL:

http://www.index.go.kr/
egams/stts/jsp/potal/stts/PO_STTS_IdxSearch.jsp?idx_cd=1009&stts_cd=100901&clas_
div=A&idx_sys_cd=&idx_clas_cd=1. Accessed: 12.10.2012.
Das koreanische statistische Amt: Die Lohnerhhung der Vollbeschftigten. URL:

http://
www.index.go.kr/egams/stts/jsp/potal/stts/PO_STTS_IdxSearch.jsp?idx_cd=1490&stts_
Das koreanische statistische Amt: Die Preisnderung des Eigentums. URL:

http://www.
index.go.kr/egams/stts/jsp/potal/stts/PO_STTS_IdxSearch.jsp?idx_cd=1240&stts_
Das koreanische statistische Amt: Die Preisnderung des Mieterkapitals.

URL: http://
www.index.go.kr/egams/stts/jsp/potal/stts/PO_STTS_IdxSearch.jsp?idx_cd=1241&stts_
----------------------- Page 698-----------------------

Notwendigkeit der Kontrolle des Mietwuchers
Das koreanische statistische Amt (2011): Das Ergebnis der Untersuchungen

ber Volks-
zhlung und Wohnstile (Familien, Wohnung). Seoul.
Die koreanische Justiz: Das KGAS. URL: http://www.moleg.go.kr/lawinfo/engLawInfo?p

stSeq=52547&searchCondition=AllForEngLaw&searchKeyword=%EC%88%98%EB%8F
%84%EA%B6%8C. Accessed: 12.10.2012.
Die koreanische Justiz: Das KGES. URL: http://www.moleg.go.kr/lawinfo/engLawInfo?s
earchUsrDef3=&searchCondition=AllForEngLaw&searchKeyword=%EA%B5%AD%EC
%84%B8%EC%A7%95%EC%88%98%EB%B2%95&x=0&y=0. Accessed: 12.10.2012.
Die koreanische Justiz: Das KGW. URL: http://www.moleg.go.kr/lawinfo/engLawInfo?pst
Seq=52511&searchCondition=AllForEngLaw&searchKeyword=%EC%A3%BC%ED%83
%9D%EB%B2%95. Accessed: 12.10.2012.
Die koreanische Justiz: Das KGZV. URL: http://www.moleg.go.kr/lawinfo/engLawInfo?ps
tSeq=52451&searchCondition=AllForEngLaw&searchKeyword=%EB%AF%BC%EC%8
2%AC%EC%A7%91%ED%96%89%EB%B2%95. Accessed: 12.10.2012.
Die koreanische Justiz: Das KWMSchG. URL: http://www.moleg.go.kr/lawinfo/engLawIn

fo?pstSeq=52450&searchCondition=AllForEngLaw&searchKeyword=%EC%A3%BC%E
D%83%9D%EC%9E%84%EB%8C%80%EC%B0%A8. Accessed: 12.10.2012.
Die koreanische Justiz: Die Verordnung des Prsidenten fr das KGAS. URL:
http://www
.moleg.go.kr/lawinfo/engLawInfo?pstSeq=52534&searchCondition=AllForEngLaw&sear
chKeyword=%EC%88%98%EB%8F%84%EA%B6%8C. Accessed: 12.10.2012.
Die koreanische Justiz: Die Verordnung des Prsidenten fr das KGW. URL:
http://www.
moleg.go.kr/lawinfo/engLawInfo?pstSeq=52512&searchCondition=AllForEngLaw&sear
chKeyword=%EC%A3%BC%ED%83%9D%EB%B2%95. Accessed: 12.10.2012.
Han, Sam-in (2001): Die Analyse der Rechtsprechung zu 103 KGBG, Law
and Policy.
Cheju: Cheju National University.
Hedemann, Justus W. (1933): Die Flucht in die Generalklauseln. Eine Gefahr fr

Recht und
Staat. Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck.
5
Jee, Won-Lim (2007): Auslegung des KBGB. Seoul .
659
----------------------- Page 699-----------------------
Shin-Uk Park
Kang, Junghee (2010): A Study on Housing Status and Stability of the low income
group. In:
Social Science Research Review, 26 (2/2010), pp. 249 ff.
Kim, Duk-Choong (1990): Korean Experience in Economic Development Planning.

In:
Journal of Asian Economics, 1 (1/1990), pp. 4960.
Kim, Sung-Gil (2003): Beeinflussung der Wohnstandortentscheidung fr PNV-

Lagen
durch die Anreizstrategie Location Efficient Value (LEV). Hamburg, Hamburg-
Harburg:
ECTL Europ. Centre for Transportation and Logistics.
Korea Housing Institute (2012): Die nderung des Wohnungsmarktes und

Bewlti-
gungsstrategien. Seoul.
Korea Legislation Research Institute (ed.) (2010): Einfhrung in das

koreanische Recht
(German Edition). Dordrecht: Springer.
Lee, Byung-Jun (2010): Zivilrecht. In: Korea Legislation Research Institute (ed.):
Einfh-
rung in das koreanische Recht (German Edition). Dordrecht: Springer pp. 79114.
Ministry of Land, Transport a. M. A.: Die Information ber die Mietvertragskosten.

URL:
http://www.onnara.go.kr/. Accessed: 12.10.2012.
Oh, Jihyun (2010): Housing Status in the Light of Korea Welfare Panel Study. In:
Health and
Welfare Policy Forum, 12 (2010), pp. 14 ff.
Palandt, Otto; Bassenge, Peter (2010): Becksche Kurz-Kommentare: Brgerliches

Gesetz-
buch. Mit Nebengesetzen. Mnchen69: C. H. Beck.
Park, Miseon (2012): Housing Choice Voucher Programs achievements on low-

income
households housing welfare. In: Journal of The Korean Urban Management
Association,
25 (2/2012), pp. 121 ff.
So, Jae-Seon (1992): Der soziale Schutz des Mieters von Wohnraum in der Republik
Korea
und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Mnchen.
660
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Authors
Luca Nogler (born in 1965) has been Professor of Labour and Employment Law and
of Comparative Labour Law at the University of Trento (Italy) since 2001, where he
has
been the Director of the Department of Legal Sciences (2003 to 2008) and the Dean
of the
Faculty of Law (2009 to 2012). Since 2010 he has also been Adjunct Professor at
Shanghai
University, Finance and Economics Law School (China). He was Assistant Professor of
Comparative and International Law at Humboldt Universitt, Berlin (Germany 1998),

Visiting Professor at the University of Hamburg (Germany) and of Salamanca (Spain).
From 2009 to 2012 he was a member of the Steering Committees of the Italian
Association
of Labour Law and Social Security. In July 2013 he gave the Sinzheimer Vorlesung
2013
at the University of Frankfurt (Germany). His writings (edited volumes,
monographs
and journal articles) are concerned with labour and employment law, the
history of
European labour and employment law and legal theory
(http://www.jus.unitn.it/user/
home.asp?cod=luca.nogler).
Udo Reifner (born in 1948) is Professor of Commercial Law at the University of

Trento
and Director of the Institute for Financial Services, Hamburg. He studied sociology
and
law in Berlin and Marburg. In 2012 he retired from the University of Hamburg. He
was
Visiting Professor at North American universities as well as in the
United Kingdom,
France and Belgium. He is a member of the consumer advisory board of
the German
Financial Services Authority and a co-founder of the European Coalition for
Responsible
Credit. Recent publications: Die Geldgesellschaft 2010 (Money Society), Usury and
the
Law (2012), Payment Protection Insurance (2012). Social Contracts (2010), Poverty
and
Contract Law (2011); Lifetime Contracts (2009); Principles of European Contract Law
(2009); Renting a Slave (2007); Thou Shalt Pay Thy Debts (2003); The Lost Penny
(1999),
The Vikings and the Romans (1993) (http://www.iff-hamburg.de/media.php?id=2174).
Luisa Antoniolli (born in 1966) is Professor of Private Comparative Law at the

Faculty of
Law of the University of Trento (Italy) and Director of the School of International
Studies
of the University of Trento. She earned her Ph.D. in comparative law at the
University
of Florence. She has been a visiting scholar at the University of
Uppsala (Sweden),
Berkeley (CA), Makerere (Uganda), Cambridge (UK), and the Catholic
University
of Lisbon (Portugal). She is a member of the Societ italiana per la
ricerca nel diritto
comparator (SIRD), the European Law Institute (ELI), the Society for European
Contract
Law (SECOLA). She is a member of the Executive Committee of the American Society of
Comparative Law and of the Editorial Board of the American Journal of Comparative
Law.
Her areas of expertise are consumer protection in European legal systems; the
evolution of
661
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Authors
European contract law (and tort liability) and its impact on national legal
systems. Current
projects concern consumer law and the protection of weak parties; the development
of a
European contract law and the role of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR);
EC private law and its impact on national private law systems; measurement of law
and
the use of indexes (http://www4.unitn.it/Ugcvp/it/Web/ProdottiAutore/PER0004878).
Vincent Forray (born in 1976) has been a professor at McGill University (Canada)
since
2011, where he teaches contract law (civil law and common law) and the
civil law of
obligations. He was matre de conferences at the University of Savoie (France) from
2006
to 2011. He is the co-founder and the co-director of the French journal
Jurisprudence
Revue critique. He also collaborates on the Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil in
France.
His work deals with contract law, tort law and critical legal theory
(http://www.mcgill.ca/
law/about/profs/forray-vincent).
Andrea Nicolussi (born in 1964) is Professor of Civil Law in the Faculty of Law
Universit
Cattolica di Milano. His research concerns contract law, philosophy of law, law and
ethics.
He is a member of the Italian National Bioethics Committee. For more information
and
publications see (http://docenti.unicatt.it/ita/andrea_nicolussi/).
Maurice Tancelin (born in 1931) is Professeur Associ at the Lavalle University in

Quebec,
Canada. He was Professor of Private Law at this university from 1966 to 1996. He is
a
specialist in aviation law, where he started his career in Canada at McGill
University. He
has had several functions in the Organisation of International Civil Aviation in
Montreal
and was for several years a consultant for aviation law in Africa. At Lavalle he
focussed on
contract law, securities, maritime and aviation law and comparative law. He was a
Visiting
Professor at Louisiana State University, Bton Rouge, and the universities of
NDjamena,
Yaound, Abidjan, Bamako, Dakar and Vice-Dean for research, member of the Comit
for the revision of the Code Civil with regard to rent contracts, co-editor of the
Cahiers
de droit, and Bureau de direction du Centre international de recherche sur le
bilinguisme.
Major publications are: Les silences du Code civil du Qubec (1994);
Jurisprudence
commente sur les obligations, 1973, together with Daniel Gardner since the third
edition.
(10th edition 2010) ; Des obligations, 9th edition 2009 ; F. P. WALTON,
traduction et
introduction de Le Code civil du Bas-Canada. 1980 ; Des institutions Branches
et sources
du droit, 1989, 1991 with publications in Cahiers de droit, Revue du Barreau, Revue
du
Barreau Canadien, McGill Law Journal, 1983 (http://www.fd.ulaval.ca/maurice-
tancelin).
Peter Derleder (born in 1940) has been Professor of Private and Commercial Law at
the
University of Bremen from 1974 to 2004, where he is still teaching to date. He was
also a judge
of the Bremen High Court until 2005. His main areas of interest are consumer law,
tenancy
law, bank law and family law. He has contributed more than 370 publications to this
field.
He is co-editor of Handbuch zum deutschen und europischen Bankrecht, Neue
Zeitschrift
662
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Authors
fr Miet- und Wohnungsrecht, Verbraucher und Recht (VuR) and Kritische Justiz. He
is
vice president of the German Mietgerichtstags (Annual Tenancy Court Meetings) as
well
as counsultant to the German Test Foundation (http://www.jura.uni-
bremen.de/typo3/
cms405/index.php? id=228 and http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Derleder).
Helena Klinger (born in 1982) studied law at Humboldt University in Berlin. After
working
for 3 years in a law firm, she became a research associate of the University of
Hamburg.
Since 2013 she has been a research associate at the Institut fr
Finanzdienstleistungen,
Hamburg. Publication: Anmerkung zum BGH Urteil vom 13. Juni 2007 VIII ZR 36/06
Gerichtliche Kontrolle der Angemessenheit von Entgelten fr die Lieferung von
Erdgas
in: N & R 2007, S. 167
Ruben Houweling (born in 1980) is Professor of Labour Law at the

Erasmus School
of Law (Rotterdam, the Netherlands). He is legal counsel at
DingemansvanderKind
law firm and (chief) editor of several labour law journals in the Netherlands (e.g.
TAP,
ArA, www.ar-updates.nl) and a member of the supervisory board of
FNV Jong
(trade union for young workers). More information:
(http://www.esl.eur.nl/
profile_az/?tx_eurliaatmetismis_pi1[metis_id]=1001734).
Lisette Langedijk (born in 1986) is Lecturer and Researcher in

Labour Law at
the Erasmus School of Law (Rotterdam, the Netherlands)
(http://www.esl.eur.nl/
profile/?tx_eurliaatmetismis_pi1[metis_id]=1000903).
Eva Kocher (born in 1965) is Professor of Labour Law and Civil Law at the Vidriana
University
in Frankfurt/Oder. Her areas of work are civil law, labour and employment law,
gender
and the law, civil procedure. Recent publications are: Die Grenzen des
Arbeitsrechts. Der
rechtliche Schutz in der Erwerbsarbeit auerhalb von Arbeitsverhltnissen, KJ
(Kritische
Justiz) 2/2013, S. 145-157; Solidaritt und Menschenrechte Zwei verschiedene
Welten?,
in: Helena Lindemann/Nina Malaviya/Alexander Hanebeck/Felix Hanschmann/Rainer
Nickel/Timo Tohidipur (Hrsg.), Erzhlungen vom Konstitutionalismus, Baden-

Baden:
Nomos 2012, S. 151-162; Recht am Arbeitsplatz und Recht an der
Beschftigungsfhigkeit
- Zum Schutz der materiellen Basis der Existenzsicherung, in: Franz-Joseph
Peine/Hein-
rich Amadeus Wolff (Hrsg.), Nachdenken ber Eigentum. Festschrift fr
Alexander v.
Brnneck, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2011, S. 287-302; Private Macht im
Arbeitsrecht, in:
Mslein (Hrsg.), Private Macht (2014) (http://www.rewi.europa-
uni.de/de/lehrstuhl/br/
arbeitsrecht/Lehrstuhlinhaberin/index.html).
Orsola Razzolini (born in 1978) graduated in law, summa cum laude, at the
University
of Bologna, Faculty of Law, in 2002. In 2007 she earned a PhD in the Law of
Business
and Commerce at Bocconi University (Milan). From 2007 to 2012 she held
research
fellowship positions at Bocconi University and at the University of Verona. Since
2013 she
has been Associate Professor in European and International Labour Law at the
University
663
----------------------- Page 703-----------------------
Authors
of Luxembourg. In September 2010 she was Visiting Professor at the

University of
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, College of Law. Her main research interest is European
and
Comparative Labour Law. Her e-mail address is orsola.razzolini@uni.lu (http://wwwen
.uni.lu/fdef/droit/equipe/orsola_razzolini).
Florian Rdl (born in 1972) studied philosophy and law at Goethe-Universitt,

Frankfurt/
Main and at Freie Universitt Berlin. He received his PhD in Law from
the European
University Institute in Florence. Currently, he works as research group
director at the
Cluster of Excellence on the Formation of Normative Orders, at Goethe-
Universitt,
Frankfurt/Main. His research topic is the general form of private law,
including tort,
property and contract. Recent Publications: Contractual Freedom, Contractual
Justice
and Contract Law (Theory) (to be published in 2013); Zum Begriff demokratischer und
sozialer Union (2013); Private Law, Democracy, Codification (2011); Labour

Constitution
(2010) (http://www.normativeorders.net/en/organisation/junior-research-groups).
Geraint Howells (born in 1964) is Professor of Commercial Law and Head of the Law
School at Manchester University; Barrister at Gough Square Chambers, London (though
not currently practising) and former President of the International

Association of
Consumer Law. He previously held chairs at Sheffield and Lancaster. His books
include
Comparative Product Liability, Consumer Product Safety, Consumer Protection Law, EC
Consumer Law, Product Liability, European Fair Trading Law, Handbook of Research on
International Consumer Law and The Tobacco Challenge. He has undertaken extensive
consultancy work for the EU and UK government as well as for NGOs
(http://www
.manchester.ac.uk/research/Geraint.howells/personaldetails).
Elena Prez Carrillo is Profesor Asociado within the Area of Derecho

Mercantil
(Commercial Law), Faculty of Business Administration at Santiago de
Compostela
University. Recent attachments were the Max Planck Institute, Hamburg;
Valladolid
University and the London School of Economics. She is member of the European
Corporate
Governance Institute. Her research involves European Company Law,
Corporate
Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Issues. Her publications are as
follows:
Administracin de Sociedades Annimas, obligaciones, responsabilidad y
aseguramiento,
Marcial Pons (1999); Aseguramiento de la responsabilidad de administradores
y altos
ejecutivos sociales, Marcial Pons (2005) and Estudios de Derecho Mercantil
Europeo
(Coordinated by Elena F Prez Carrillo). In 2009 Gobierno Corporativo y
Responsabilidad
Social de las Empresas was published by Marcial Pons, Coleccin Economa y Derecho
(coordinated by Elena F Prez Carrillo)

(http://www.ecgi.org/members_directory/
member.php?member_id=514).
Juana Pulgar (born in 1962) is Professor of Commercial Law at the University

Complutense
of Madrid (Spain), Permanent Counsellor of the Spanish Law Commission, of counsel
664
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Authors
of the British law firm Ashurst LLP, Director of the Insolvency Journal edited by
La Ley
Wolters Kluwer, Revista de Derecho Concursal y Paraconcural since 2003. She is
also a
member of the International Bar Association
(http://www.upf.edu/organitzacio/treballar/
pdi/acces/funcionari/acces_11/f2_11/jpulgar.pdf).
Frey Nybergh (born in 1959) is a Senior Lecturer in Private Law, Adjunct Professor
in Civil
and Commercial Law, University of Helsinki. He has published three books on
contract
law (https://tuhat.halvi.helsinki.fi/portal/en/persons/frey-erik-
nybergh(9e9e1c82-2ad8-
42fd-910c-76d1faf30aea).html).
Christoph Schmid (born in 1967) is Professor of Private and Commercial

Law at the
University of Bremen and Director of its Centre of European Law and Politics
(ZERP).
He studied law and languages at the universities of Passau, Geneva and Munich and
was
Research Fellow at the European Institute in Florence, where he coordinated the
European
Private Law Forum. His Habilitation is on Die Instrumentalisierung des
Privatrechts
durch die Europische Union. Recent research projects concerned Real Property Law
and
Procedure in the EU (comparative research in the EU) and Tenancy Law and
Procedure
in Europe, comparative research project on tenancy law in Europe, General Report
March
2004. He is presently conducting a research project within the 7th Framework
Programme
of the European Union on Tenancy Law and Housing Policy in Multi-level
Europe.
For his publications see (http://www.jura.uni-
bremen.de/typo3/cms405/fileadmin/user_
upload/ Schriftenverzeichnisse/Publikationen_Christoph_Schmid.pdf).
Jason Dinse (born in 1975) comes from Wisconsin, USA, and has practiced law in the
State of Illinois. In addition to attending foreign study programs at

the universities in
Oldenburg and Vienna, he has researched and published as an intern at the Max
Planck
Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg. He completed
LL.M.
studies at the University of Bremen, and is now a research associate and PhD
student at
the Centre of European Law and Politics in Bremen. His past research has examined
the
impact of American civil procedure on private international law, and his current
work
focuses on comparative tenancy law.
Elena Bargelli (born in 1969) is currently Associate Professor of Private

Law at the
University of Pisa, with tenure. From 2008 to 2009 she was Research Fellow of the
Alexander
von Humboldt Stiftung at the Max Planck Institut fr auslndisches und
internationales
Privatrecht (Hamburg, Germany). She was Visiting Fellow at the Institute of
Advanced
Legal Studies, London, UK (2011/2012), at the Yale Law School, New Haven, USA
(2007),
at the Max Planck Institut fr auslndisches und internationals
Privatrecht, Hamburg,
Germany (2006, 2004). She published two books, both related to contract law
(Propriet
e locazione. Prelazione e valore di scambio [Property and tenancy law.
Right of first
refusal and market value], Giappichelli, 2004; Il sinallagma rovesciato
[Restitution after
665
----------------------- Page 705-----------------------
Authors
executed void and terminated contracts], Giuffr, 2010). She is also the author of
several
articles on tort law, unfair commercial practices, and family law. She is actually
involved
in the project Tenancy Law and Housing Policy in the EU (www.tenlaw.uni-
bremen.de)
under the EUs Seventh Research Framework Programme, which is coordinated by the
Centre of European Law and Politics (ZERP) at Bremen University
(http://ectil.org/ectil/
getdoc/444758f9-e531-4170-84e1-d759b5f84a95/Elena-Bargelli.aspx).
Shin-Uk Park (born in 1979) studied law at Hanyang University in Seoul,

Korea
(B.A/M.A) and did his PhD at the Albert-Ludwigs-University in Freiburg, Germany. He
is a researcher of the Institute for Legal Studies School of Law in

Hanyang University.
Recent publications: a comparative study on the state of emergency and the
compensation
claim (2012), a comparative study on defective goods (2012), The infringement of
contract
(2012), a study on damages caused by defects in toll roads and claims (2013), a
statutory
standard for restriction of the interest rate in consumer credit (2013).
666

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Life Time Contracts

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Life Time Contracts

Social Long-term Contracts in Labour, Tenancy

Luca Nogler & Udo Reifner (Eds.)

Social long-term contracts - soziale Dauerschuldverhltnisse - relational contracts

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Published, sold and distributed by Eleven International Publishing

Sold and distributed in USA and Canada

Eleven International Publishing is an imprint of Boom uitgevers Den Haag.

2014 The authors | Eleven International Publishing

This publication is protected by international copyright law.

Printed in The Netherlands

----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

Principles of Life Time Contracts (de/en/fr/it/es)

EuSoCo Declaration (de/en/fr/it/es)

1 Introduction: The New Dimension of Life Time in the Law

Luca Nogler and Udo Reifner

1.1 Life Time Contracts

Part I: Life Time in Contract Law

2 The Evolution of European Contract Law: A Brand New Code,

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2.3 The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)

3 Etica del contratto e contratti di durata per lesistenza della persona

3.1 Contratto, etica e contratti di durata per lesistenza della

4 Lebenszeitvertrge und Teilhabe der zivilrechtliche Anschlussverlust

4.1 Die Dimensionen des Anschlussverlustes

5 Lebenszeitvertrge Natur und Ethik

5.1 Charakteristika von Dauerschuldverhltnissen in der Form des

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5.3 Ethische Standards von Lebenszeitvertrgen als soziale

6 Le social et la dfaisance - introduction au problme de la critique

6.1 Premiers sentiments

7 Life Time et contrat - Ronald Coase (1910 - 2013) et le dtournement de

7.1 Le ddoublement du texte dorigine

Part II: Labour Contracts

8 The Historical Contribution of Employment Law to General Civil Law:

8.1 Employment Relationships before the Market Economy

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8.5 The Full Contractualisation of the Employment Relationship

9 The End of Mandatory Rules in the Employment Contract Law:

Ruben Houweling and Lisette Langedijk

10 Schutz und kollektive Privatautonomie das Arbeitsverhltnis

10.1 Arbeitsrecht: Rechtsfolgen

11 Self-Employment and Economic Dependency in the Light of the

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12 Tarifautonomie und Vertragsgerechtigkeit: der Beitrag des kollektiven

12.1 Existentielle Vertrge ber fiktive Waren

13 Darlehensvertrag als Kapitalmiete (locatio conductio specialis)

13.1 Darlehen und Kredit

14 Change of Circumstances in Consumer Credit Contracts The United

14.1 Consumers and Vulnerability

Elena F. Prez Carrillo and Fernando Gallardo Olmedo

15.1 The Historical Environment of the Consumer Credit Directive

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16 Access to Long-Term Banking Services in the Nordic States

17 A Contractual Approach to Over-Indebtedness: Rebus Sic Stantibus

17.1 The Rebus Sic Stantibus Clause in the Economic Crisis

18.1 Insolvency in a Credit Society

Part IV: Residential Tenancy Contracts

19 Das Recht auf Wohnraum und der Wohnraummietvertrag