THE STEVENSON UNIVERSITY

FORENSICS JOURNAL

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Carolyn Hess Johnson, Esq.

PUBLISHER
Carolyn Hess Johnson, Esq.

EDITORS
Patricia Ellis, Esq.
Steven Engorn
Stephen W. Oliner, CPA, CFE, CVA
Nanette Tamer, Ph.D.
John J. Tobin, Jr.
Stephanie Witt
 FORENSICS JOURNAL

Welcome to the premier edition of the Stevenson University Forensics Journal. The Journal provides the scholarly
community with a wide range of subjects pertaining to forensic studies as well as forensic science.

The articles written for the Journal are authored by current masters degree candidates, recent graduates and
faculty. It is our goal to offer students and graduates the opportunity to explore their chosen concentration in
the program through researching, writing and reviewing relevant topics, books or interviewing people in the field
of forensic studies.

The opportunity to submit articles is provided to every student in the masters program through a research and
writing course which allows the individual student to select a topic of interest and explore the same over the
eight week session. Each article is peer reviewed, allowing students to work together to provide constructive editing
advice to each other and to improve the quality of the submissions.

I would like to extend special thanks to the many students, graduates and faculty who submitted their work for
publication review. It was not an easy selection process as there were many fine articles from which to choose.
To those authors selected for publication, you have shown remarkable commitment and I am grateful for your
patience and willingness to continue working on your submissions.

My gratitude to the editors of the Journal knows no bounds. The faculty, staff and graduate assistants who
tirelessly edited the submissions demonstrated their commitment to this scholarly pursuit. Thank you also
to President Kevin Manning, Dean Paul Lack, Dean Joyce Becker and to our Program Coordinator, Thomas
Coogan for helping to make the Journal a reality.

Carolyn Hess Johnson, Esq.

Associate Professor of Forensic Studies

1
STEVENSON UNIVERSITY

2
 FORENSICS JOURNAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

4 18
THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN
EDITORIAL
PETIT JURY SYSTEM
BOARD
LAUREN MAXWELL

5 22
MORAL LAPSE VERSUS THE PSYCHO-
WELCOME
PATHIC FRAUDSTER: IMPLICATIONS
THOMAS COOGAN, ESQ.
FOR OUR JUSTICE SYSTEM
YVETTE FRUSCIANTE

6 27
AN INTERVIEW WITH PRINCE GEORGES
COUNTY STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE
SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR, RENATA JONES
CAROLYN HESS JOHNSON, ESQ.
THE GAP BETWEEN TRAINING AND
RESEARCH IN THE DETECTION OF
DECEPTION REVISITED
EDWARD R. KEMERY, PH.D.

7 33
ISSUES WITH CELL BOOK REVIEW:
PHONE FORENSICS CORPORATE RESILIENCY: MANAGING THE
MICHAEL ROBINSON GROWING RISK OF FRAUD AND CORRUPTION
BY TONY BISHOP AND FRANK HYDOSKI
KEN JOHANNING

10 35
PRINCESS DOE: WILL HER IDEN- BOOK REVIEW:
TITY EVER BE KNOWN? FRAUD EXPOSED: WHAT YOU DONT KNOW
MYRON BRETHOLTZ COULD COST YOUR COMPANY MILLIONS
BY JOSEPH KOLETAR
MARINA TAPIA

14 38
TECHNOLOGY AND FRAUD BOOK REVIEW:
INVESTIGATIONS IN THE OFFICE INVESTIGATING IDENTITY THEFT: A GUIDE FOR
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL BUSINESSES, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND VICTIMS
MARY BETH HUTCHESON BY JUDITH M. COLLINS
VERONICA ARZE

15
THE ANALYSIS OF
ECSTASY COMPONENTS
CHRISTINE BURNS

3
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY
FORENSICS JOURNAL EDITORIAL BOARD
CAROLYN HESS JOHNSON, ESQ. is an
attorney and a full time Associate Professor
of Forensic Studies in the School of Graduate
and Professional Studies at Stevenson Univer-
sity. She has worked in private practice, as
a Senior Assistant State Prosecutor for the
State of Maryland and as an Assistant States
Attorney in Baltimore City, Maryland.
PATRICIA ELLIS, ESQ. has served in many
capacities at Stevenson University, currently as
an Associate Dean in the School of Graduate
and Professional Studies. Among her accom-
plishments, she has published and presented at
national conferences and has given several work-
shops. She is currently the Vice Chair for the
Executive Board of the Commission for Accel-
erated Learning and is Editor of its Newsletter.
STEVEN ENGORN is the Chief Technology
Strategist in the School of Graduate and Pro-
fessional Studies at Stevenson University. He
is also the Program Coordinator for Business
and Technology Management and Informa-
tion Systems and an Assistant Professor of
Information Technology
NANETTE C. TAMER, PH.D. has taught
courses in writing and literature at Stevenson
University since 1989. She has published
several articles and contributed to textbooks in
writing and linguistics.
4
STEPHEN W. OLINER, CPA, CFE, CVA
is a partner at Hertzbach & Company, P.A.,
a regional public accounting firm located in
Owings Mills, MD. He is a director of the
Business Valuation, Forensic and Litigation
Consulting Group at Hertzbach, and concen-
trates his efforts in business valuations, foren-
sic accounting and litigation support services.
MIKE RYMAN is Treasurer and a member
of the Board of Directors, International Anti-
Corruption Resource Center, Washington,
D.C. and is Chief Operating Officer and
Director of Compliance, Lone Star Interna-
tional, LLC. Retired from Federal Service in
1991, he served as a White Collar Crime and
Public Corruption Field Supervisor, Opera-
tions Auditor on the Directors Staff, and a
Field Staff Program Manager for Anti-Racketeering. He then received
an appointment to the Federal Senior Executive Service, Office of
Inspector General, in the Commerce, HHS and Labor Departments.
Mr. Ryman also served as Senior Policy Advisor and Chief Investiga-
tor with the House of Representatives, Committee on Government
Operations and served the Speaker of the House as Special Advisor
to his Counsel.
JOHN J. TOBIN, JR. is a full time Assis-
tant Professor of Forensic Science as well as
the Coordinator of the Masters of Forensic
Science Program at Stevenson University.
Mr. Tobin was formerly the Director of the
Forensic Sciences Division of the Maryland
State Police. He currently holds a Masters in
Forensic Science and is pursuing a doctorate
in Forensic Toxicology.
STEPHANIE WITT is currently a student in
the graduate program at Stevenson University,
where she is pursuing a degree in Forensic
Science. She completed her undergraduate
studies in 2008 at the University of Baltimore,
with a B.S. degree in Forensic Science. Stepha-
nie works as a graduate assistant in Stevensons
School of Graduate and Professional Studies.
 FORENSICS JOURNAL

Dear Reader,

Welcome to the first edition of Stevenson Universitys Forensics Journal. Since 1947, we, along with Villa Julie
College, our predecessor institution, have had a vision: to educate, not only for the sake of higher learning, but
also for the sake of a better life. It has been and continues to be our hope that by doing well for our students,
and our students doing well for themselves, the Stevenson University community will do well by others.

The Forensics Journal is a direct outgrowth of the Stevenson University vision to become a national leader in
collaborative career-focused liberal arts education. The journal is a collaborative effort among students in various
fields of studyaccounting, information technology, investigations, law, and scienceand between the students
and our faculty.

What led us to publish this journal is our core belief in the value of career-focused higher education. The persons
who came up with the idea for the journal envisioned the journal as a career-building opportunity for our students,
not a career-advancement opportunity for academicians.1

The idea for a journal began a few years ago as part of a continuous improvement of our forensic studies masters
degree program. The program was established in 2004 to address a need identified by employers for persons in the
fields of accounting, information technology, investigations, and law to testify in court. The journal was not origi-
nally part of the curriculum. The original curriculum required all students to take a writing and research course, and
only law students to take a thesis course. Students in the law track were the only masters degree students who had
the responsibility and the opportunity to produce a significant piece of graduate-level writing. However, students
from other tracks occasionally expressed interest in conducting higher-level research and producing a thesis. Under
the original curriculum, we could not accommodate students from other tracks who did.

We found ourselves trying to encourage students to appreciate the value of writing, especially in the field of forensic
studies. By value, we meant more than just some sort of abstraction, but a very concrete, economic value of being
able to write well so our students can advance their careers. A required core writing course just did not seem like
enough to impress upon students the real value of writing. So in concert with the idea of a journal, we decided to
require our students to take a core course where they would prepare a written submission that, if good enough,
might one day be considered for inclusion in the journal. By having their articles published, students would have
a real product to show employers, and presumably would reap a real benefit from their achievement, beyond just
course credit and a grade.

It is our sincere hope that the journal will stand as a concrete example of our commitment to the mission of
Stevenson University, which is to provide a career-focused education. We hope the journal shows off the talents
of our students and enhances their career opportunities. Of course, we also hope the journal provides useful
information to students of forensic studies both at Stevenson University and elsewhere. Please enjoy this first
edition of our Forensic Studies Journal.

Thomas Coogan, Esq. Joyce Becker, Esq.

Program Coordinator, Forensic Studies, Dean, School of Graduate
and Associate Professor of Forensic Studies and Professional Studies

1
We are indebted to the leadership of President Kevin Manning and Dean Paul Lack, who have always provided the forensic studies and
this most recent effort with their unwavering support.

5
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY
A Day In The Life Of A Fraud Investigator
Renata Jones, Fraud Investigator for the Prince Georges County,
Maryland, States Attorneys Office
Carolyn Hess Johnson, Esq.
WHAT ARE YOUR PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES AS A
FRAUD INVESTIGATOR?
My work primarily consists of gathering and analyzing financial
documents pertinent to the alleged fraud. I work on fifteen to twenty
cases at any given time, each one involving multiple documents
and records. In addition, I spend a great deal of time speaking with
victims assessing the overall case and the damages.
PLEASE EXPLAIN THE TYPE OF FRAUD CASES YOU SEE
MOST OFTEN IN YOUR WORK.
Typically, our cases involve trusted employees who steal from their
employers through unauthorized credit card use or check forgery. The
theft can range anywhere from $10,000 to over $500,000 in losses
to the victim. Once the theft is discovered, the victim will either file
charges directly, or contact the police to begin an investigation and
then file charges.
HOW OFTEN DO YOUR CASES GO TO TRIAL AND WHAT
TYPES OF SENTENCES ARE GIVEN?
Not many cases go to trial, as we are often able to work out a plea
agreement. The sentence depends on a number of factors, but the
focus is usually on whether the defendant has any prior convictions
and the amount that was stolen. Generally, the sentence includes
restitution to pay the victim back at least some of the stolen monies.
Along with restitution, the offender is placed either on probation or
under house arrest so supervision is maintained for a period of time.
Although offenders are sometimes given jail time, the longest jail
sentence I have seen is two years.
WITH WHAT AGENCIES AND TYPES OF PROFESSIONALS
DO YOU WORK (BOTH IN AND OUT OF YOUR OFFICE)
ON A DAILY BASIS?
I work directly with my supervisor Isabel Mercedes Cumming, Chief
of the Economic Crimes Unit for Prince Georges County. I also work
with the Prince Georges County Police Department, which maintains
a detective in each district of the County to work on financial crimes.
Often, other State and Federal agencies are involved whose fraud
investigators work closely with my office. In addition, I work with
banks and credit card companies to trace the thefts.
6
WHAT IS YOUR GENERAL PROCEDURE FOR WORKING A
FRAUD CASE?
After speaking with the victim, I begin by sending out subpoenas for
bank records. The records of both the victim and the offender are
needed to allow for the examination and tracing of a money trail. I
will send subpoenas to any banks or credit card companies that might
have been used by the offender so that I can examine the monies
going in and out of the relevant accounts. I follow up the subpoenas
by contacting the fraud investigators or legal representatives of the
affected bank or credit card company and creating a theft schedule. In
this way, I have a clear sense of what happened to the money in ques-
tion, should I be called to testify in the case.
HOW DOES A TYPICAL FRAUD CASE PRESENT?
Most cases involve an employee stealing from an employer by cashing
checks without authorization and/or using company credit cards for
personal expenses. Often, these employees work for small businesses
and are trusted by the owner to have access to checks or credit cards
for limited and specified use. The fraud occurs when the employee
begins to cash checks or use a company credit card for personal and
unauthorized use.
WHAT ARE THE SKILLS AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
NEEDED TO BE AN EFFECTIVE FRAUD INVESTIGATOR?
It is extremely important to have compassion for victims of fraud.
Often, they are small business owners who have come to depend on
and trust an employee to help run the business. After a fraud is dis-
covered, victims seek closure as well as justice. In addition, maintain-
ing positive relationships with the legal and financial representatives
of banks and credit card companies allows a fraud investigator to get
the documents needed, often on an expedited basis.
WHAT OTHER TYPES OF CASES DO FRAUD
INVESTIGATORS HANDLE?
Computer scams have become more and more common in the last
few years. Often, the offender will create a fake company, promis-
ing money or items to the victim in exchange for personal financial
information, such as account numbers or a social security number.
These cases are difficult for investigators because we have to stay
extremely current in our knowledge of technology. However, many of
these scams could be prevented or caught early if people take the time
to check their credit reports once a year and carefully review their
monthly bank and credit card statements.
 FORENSICS JOURNAL
Issues with Cell Phone Forensics
Michael Robinson
ABSTRACT
The analysis of mobile phones is a relatively new discipline within
digital forensics that focuses on recovering and analyzing data within
cell phones. There are several differences between this field and clas-
sical computer forensics that pose obstacles to examiners in this new
discipline. In order to recover reliable forensic evidence from cell
phones, examiners must take into consideration these differences. The
astounding growth in use and rapidly changing cell phone technol-
ogy, issues with the procedures associated with acquisition of live cell
phones and the reliance on canned reports, are significant issues to
be overcome. Examiners will need to continue their training in this
new field and adapt their standard procedures if they hope to remain
successful in analyzing cell phones.
It is becoming increasingly common for cell phones to be associated
with illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, video recording gang
hazing activities, sexting1 between minors, driving a car while texting
on a cell phone, or detonating an Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
in a war zone. Cell phone forensics is a young field within digital
forensics that holds great possibilities to make contributions in legal
proceedings. A well-trained and talented cell phone examiner can
uncover significant information for use in civil and criminal proceed-
ings. Given the proper tools and sound techniques, it is possible to
recover address books, text messages, call logs, pictures, videos, and
a history of internet usage from a cell phone (Forte and de Donno,
2010). In many situations, deleted data can be recovered as well. Yet
even with these successes, cell phone forensics has its share of com-
plications. Practice within the field is riddled with characteristics that
separate it from classical computer forensics. An expert in computer
forensics may not be qualified in processing cell phones even though
both computers and cell phones fall in the discipline of Information
Technology. The differences between the two disciplines make the
acquisition and analysis of cell phone evidence challenging. Among
the list of issues facing forensic examiners are the cell phone industrys
growing and changing market, acquisition methods that require live
analyses through powered on devices and dependence on canned or
pre-formatted reports in current forensic tools. As precedent is created
in the courts,2 it is extremely important for forensic examiners to
know the primary characteristics of cell phone forensics and how they
differ from classical computer forensics.
1
Sexting is the practice of sending sexually explicit photographs between cell phone users. Incidents similar to the following have appeared across the United States. In Janu-
ary 2009, in Western Pennsylvania three teenage girls allegedly sent nude or seminude pictures of themselves to three teenage boys. All were charged with possessing child
pornography. See http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/15/national/main4723161.shtml.
2
Data recovered from cell phones are being used in more trials. Take for example, State v. Hernandez (Not Reported in A.2d, 2010 WL 816828, N.J.Super.A.D.,2010),
where a kidnapper was tracked using his cell phone. The defenses objection of using cell phone data on the grounds of inadmissible hearsay was overruled.
3
The range of 85-97% is attributed to the different polls taken regarding the use of Microsoft Windows.
7
CELL PHONES: WILDLY POPULAR AND
CONSTANTLY CHANGING
There are many different models of computers in use today. Yet, even
with a high number of competing manufacturers and vendors, the
number of file systems and operating systems being used on comput-
ers is relatively small. Microsoft Windows still dominates the desktop
computing environment, with approximately 85-97%3 of the market
(Steel, 2006). The cell phone industry does not operate the same way.
While cellular networks and communication signals are standardized
among a few technologies; e.g., Global System for Mobile Communi-
cation (GSM), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), and Inte-
grated Digital Enhanced Networks (iDEN), there are many different
cell phones being used. There are thousands of different models of cell
phones on the market (Jansen and Ayers, 2007). Cell phone manu-
facturers are constantly updating existing devices, releasing new mod-
els, and providing upgrades. Analysis of the various phones becomes
complex due to the sheer size of the market. An examiner may never
know what type of phone he/she may encounter.
In addition to the wide array of cell phones being used among the
over 200 million in operation (Kim, 2006), the nature of cell phone
development makes forensic analysis even more complicated. There
are very few standards in place when it comes to the phones them-
selves. Many cell phone manufacturers use proprietary operating sys-
tems to keep their competitive edge (Nelson, Phillips, Enfinger, and
Steuart, 2008). This means forensic examiners will continue to inter-
act with different phones and proprietary operating systems where
technical standards may not be published. In order to effectively
preserve, retrieve, and analyze data on a cell phone, it is necessary to
understand the technology upon which a cell phone is based and how
a cell phone operates. An examiner would not want inadvertently to
alter or destroy evidence on a seized device. Having familiarity with
the various devices in the field of mobile communications is challeng-
ing. Forensic examiners need constantly to learn about changes in the
industry to remain effective in their field.
The ever-changing cell phone market is a challenge, not only for the
examiner, but for the developer of court accepted tools as well. The
diversity in the market means that not all forensic tools will work
with all existing phones. Tool developers, such as Paraben Corpora-
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY
tion, Cellbrite, Susteen, and LogiCube focus their efforts on popular
cell phone models to obtain the highest return on their investments.
Some tools may be very successful in processing call logs on a par-
ticular phone, but not perform as well when recovering text messages.
Some tools acquire address books successfully, while others may
miss a list of contacts completely. Because of the vast number of cell
phones in use, each forensic tool has various degrees of success from
cell phone to cell phone. Different operating systems, hardware, and
cables are concerns that are addressed by forensic tool developers. As a
result, tools have different degrees of success when it comes to pro-
cessing the different types of data stored on the phones (Jansen and
Ayers, 2007). In order to compensate for this disadvantage, examiners
need to do three things to increase the likelihood of conducting a suc-
cessful examination. First, they must seize both phones and peripher-
als, such as cables, batteries, and memory cards. Second, they must
be comfortable using a number of tools to process a device. As noted
above, it is not sufficient to use only one tool. Finally, examiners must
constantly update their toolkits with new releases provided by the
forensic tool developers.
ACQUIRING DATA: CELL PHONES NEED TO REMAIN ON
One of the truisms in conducting an examination of computer media,
such as a hard drive or USB flash disks, is never to conduct an analy-
sis on the original evidence. Instead, a forensic copy of the evidence
should be analyzed. This preserves the chain of custody and avoids
the contamination or spoilage of fragile digital evidence. Addition-
ally, an examiner should never boot a computer from the hard drive
when performing an examination because this process will alter the
target media to be examined. The operating system files and associ-
ated data will change. Data preserved in temporary file locations may
be overwritten accidentally. These de facto standards work well for
computers; however, conducting an analysis of a cell phone requires
an analyst to operate counter to these rules.
In order to conduct an analysis of a cell phone, it is necessary for the
phone to be turned on and examined directly. An examiner cannot
perform a dead analysis4 as he/she would with a computer hard
drive. It is impossible to examine a cell phone while it is turned off.
This is true for several reasons. First, cell phone evidence exists in
volatile memory, which requires power to be running through the
phone. Without power, the contents of the phones Random Access
Memory (RAM) will be lost. Second, cell phones have the operat-
ing system, applications, and user data stored on internal memory
modules that require power. It is not possible to extract the modules
and examine their contents directly. Third, all forensic tools access the
4
A dead analysis is the process of conducting an examination of a hard drive in a computer after the computer has been turned off. A dead analysis has the benefit of not
having the contents of the hard drive change while the acquisition and examination take place.
8
evidence on the phone by working through a port on the phone and
interacting with the phones operating system; thus, modem com-
mands are sent to a cell phone through a USB cable, infrared port, or
Bluetooth connection in order to retrieve data (Nelson, B., Phillips,
A., Enfinger, F., and Steuart, C., 2008). If the cell phone is not pow-
ered on, it will not be able to receive the commands to retrieve the
data. These requirements for power have considerable implications for
processing a cell phone.
There are risks associated with examining a phone while it is powered
on. When a cell phone is seized, the examiner must ensure that
the cell phone has sufficient power to be transported to the forensic
lab and undergo an examination. This is so because if a cell phone is
turned off, data could be lost and security features, such as encryption
or a password, might be re-enabled on start-up. A power adapter or
battery charger will help maintain power to the cell phone. Having
the phone charged and operating opens the phone to another set of
issues. Unless communication to and from a cell phone is blocked,
cell phones are susceptible to having the information on them altered
by incoming communication. Text messages and inbound phone
calls can alter a cell phones logs. This has the potential to overwrite
existing evidence on the phone. For example, incoming text messages
will overwrite existing text messages if the database containing text
messages is full. A similar concept applies to call logs on phones. If a
call log is full, incoming telephone calls will force old records to be
overwritten on the phone. In cases where a BlackBerry must be pro-
cessed, remote commands can be issued to the mobile device from a
centralized server that would erase all information on the BlackBerry.
While the device must remain on, communication between the cell
phone and wireless signals must be blocked.
It is necessary to take precautions to block wireless communication
coming to and leaving a cell phone. Electromagnetic shielding by
means of a Faraday bag or other shielding material must be used to
prevent the contents of a cell phone from changing during transpor-
tation and analysis. This shielding will adversely affect the phones
battery life. This is a trade-off: increasing the blocked signal will
decrease the battery life. When most cell phones lose connectivity
with their cellular network, they compensate by boosting their signal
strength. This increased strength depletes the cell phones battery at
an increased rate. To address the trade-off, the examiner will need to
compensate. An examiner must not only shield the cell phone, but
must also include a battery charger within the shield to prevent the
cell phone from losing power. The process of acting quickly to shield
a phone and provide supplemental power requires the examiner to
have familiarity with the proper procedures and have immediate
access to Faraday materials.
 FORENSICS JOURNAL

AN EXPERTS ANALYSIS VERSUS CANNED REPORTS
Most cell phone forensic tools on the market, e.g., Parabens Device
Seizure, Cellebrites Universal Forensic Extraction Device (UFED),
Compelson Laboratories MOBILedit! Forensic, and Susteens Secure-
View, have the ability to generate reports using canned formats,
which list in detail the data recovered from a cell phone. The reports
are enhanced with features such as hash values of recovered files and
the reports themselves.5 Some tools, such as Parabens Device Sei-
zure, even have the ability to generate multiple versions of reports to
provide detailed information in a logically arranged format. Although
these reports assist examiners in presenting their data in clear, easy to
understand reports, as detailed below, the reports have drawbacks.
One of these is the appearance an incomplete report may present. As
previously mentioned, forensic tools have different degrees of success
when it comes to retrieving evidence from a cell phone. For example,
a particular tool may not recover the Short Message Service (SMS)
messages that are stored on a cell phone. The tool may not find the
messages or it may not be able correctly to parse the data into rec-
ognizable text. In this situation, no data would be returned to the
examiner, even though data might exist on the phone. If a report were
to be generated in this instance, there would be no data in the report;
therefore, one might draw an incorrect inference about the phone.
A blank report may not truly indicate the actual contents of a cell
phone; further examination of the phone would be necessary.
It is of critical importance that forensic examiners do not become
dependent on a specific tool or the canned reports generated from
a tool. Examiners must learn the craft of recovering data manually
to ensure that forensic tools do not miss significant findings. Tools,
such as Parabens Device Seizure, which recover raw operating system
files give examiners the opportunity to analyze data and offer their
own analysis rather than rely on a report. It is only when cell phone
examiners apply their understanding of the technology to a specific
situation that their expert opinion becomes reliable.
forensic examiners as the devices become ubiquitous. As more indi-
viduals discontinue their landlines and opt for reliable cell phones,
this technology will become further ingrained in everyday culture. In
order to keep pace with analyzing cell phones, examiners will need to
seek ongoing training on current and emerging technologies. Addi-
tionally, tool makers will need to develop more robust products that
can analyze a greater number of phones in circulation.
As cell phones evolve and incorporate greater computing power into
the palm of the user, cell phone analysts will need to develop this
branch of digital forensics. Examiners will not be able to share their
time between computer forensics and cell phone forensics. These
specially trained individuals will need to focus on this area with 100%
of their attention.
REFERENCES
Forte, D. and de Donno, A. (2010). Mobile Network Investiga-
tions. Handbook of Digital Forensics and Investigation. Elsevier, Inc.
Burlington, MA.
Jansen, W. and Ayers, R. (2007). NIST Special Publication 800-101.
Guidelines on Cell Phone Forensics. National Institute of Standards
and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD.
Kim, R. (2006, February 27). The worlds a cell-phone stage: The
device is upending social rules and creating a new culture. San Fran-
cisco Chronicle.
Nelson, B., Phillips, A., Enfinger, F., and Steuart, C. (2008). Guide
to Computer Forensics and Investigations. Third Edition. Course
Technology. Boston, MA.
Steel, C. (2006). Windows Forensics: The Field Guide for Conduct-
ing Corporate Computer Investigations. Wiley Publishing, Inc.
Indianapolis, IN.

CELL PHONES WHERE TO GO FROM HERE?

The popularity of cell phones will continue to climb as network ser-

vice providers offer better performance and faster speeds. Cell phone
manufacturers will continue to improve their devices by offering
new models with better battery life, improved product integration,
and new features. There will be no shortage of work for cell phone

5
A hash value is a large number that is created based on a mathematical algorithm and a data file. Each file will produce a unique hash value. If a files contents are later
altered, it will not be possible to generate a matching hash file. In this way a hash file serves as a digital fingerprint for a file: a unique identifier of a file where no two files
generate the same value.

9
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY

Princess Doe: Will Her Identity Ever Be Known?

Myron Bretholz

This article describes and analyzes some of the more intriguing aspects
of a crime that occurred over a quarter century ago. It also examines
the efforts of one man who created a website for the express purpose
of solving this murder.
In July 1982, the remains of a young Caucasian female who would
eventually become known as Princess Doe were found adjacent
to a cemetery in Blairstown, a small town in Warren County, New
Jersey, a mostly rural northwestern section of the state. Investigators
quickly concluded that the woman had probably been killed else-
where and then dumped where she was found. Princess Does remains
were laid to rest in the cemetery next to where she was initially
discovered, and have been there since that time, undisturbed but for a
single exhumation in 1999, performed in order to extract DNA. The
crime had occurred before the advent of DNA technology, but many
years subsequent to the murder, it was used in order to try to fill in
some of the crimes missing pieces.
Still more recently, a website, www.princessdoe.org, was created by
a man named Travis Riggs. The site, which is devoted solely to the
murder victim, is professionally laid out, with numerous links and
a wealth of information,3 and notes that Princess Doe became the
first Missing Person/Unidentified Person case entered into the NCIC
[National Crime Information Center] computer database by [then]
FBI Director, William Webster.4 The site lists her cause of death as
blunt force trauma to the head.5
This internet site dedicated to Princess Doe is a model of thorough
construction, easily legible text, and grammatical and contextual pre-
cision and clarity. The breadth and depth of information on the site is
a testament to a small but devoted group of people whose informa-
tion and knowledge Riggs has cohesively assembled and organized
who simply refuse to let their dedicatees passing go unnoticed, and
who relentlessly continue to pursue their mission of releasing the
victim from her anonymity, as well as finding her murderer.

A short time after her remains were found, the anonymous young
woman was dubbed Princess Doe by Blairstown Lieutenant Detec-
tive Eric Kranz, the original investigator assigned to the case, who
explained that there were too many Jane Does already, so at least our
victim should have a distinctive name.1 Kranz left the Blairstown
police department three years after Princess Does discovery. A series
of articles on Lt. Kranzs work in the case explains, [F]rustrated with
his constant run-ins with other investigators assigned to the case
by the New Jersey State Police, Kranz resigned from the township
department in 1985. He is now disabled, recovering from a back
injury.2
On the 25th anniversary of her discovery, a graveside service was held
to commemorate her anonymous life and mysterious death.6 And yet,
despite the initial flurry of investigative activity that naturally ensued
just after her body was found and the wealth of technological and sci-
entific advances that have occurred since, as well as the single-minded
dedication of at least two law enforcement officers7 and one private
citizen (Riggs), two critical facts still remain unknown to this day: the
identity of the victim and the identity of her killer.
The author of the Princess Doe website has proposed a number of
theories regarding the victims origins and identity, including one the-

1
Q20: Where did the name Princess Doe originate? A20: The original detective on the case, Lt. Eric Kranz from the Blairstown Police department, came up with the idea
during the original investigation. He did not want her to be known as another Jane Doe and forgotten. www.princessdoe.org/faq.html.

2
Policeman Haunted By Killers Presence, by Dan Burnett, The Pocono Record (Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania). This article, the second installment of a three-part story devoted
to Princess Doe, focuses on Lt. Kranz. It was added to the Records online site on December 15, 1997, and was later reprinted on the Vidocq.Org website www.vidocq.org/
doe/doe2.html as well as on the Crimeshots website www.crimeshots.com/Haunted04.html.

3
The name of the websites creator does not appear anywhere within the site itself. However, an email inquiry which the author sent to an address on the website early on
in his research for this article elicited a speedy and cordial reply from Travis Riggs, who is the sites creator. This in turn led to an email correspondence, and then a personal
meeting. Riggss comments and perspectives thus became an integral part of this article.

4
www.princessdoe.org/timeline.html (Emphasis in original.) The FBIs NCIC Unidentified Person File www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/missingpersons.htm#unidpersonfile is an es-
sential primary source for statistics pertinent to unidentified remains, and is part of the overall file maintained by the NCIC. Additionally, the US Department of Justices
Unidentified Decedents Database https://identifyus.org/ serves a similar purpose; i.e., providing lay access to statistics pertinent to unidentified remains.

5
http://www.princessdoe.org/details.html

6
The memorial service is described in two articles: Remembering Princess Doe by Jacqueline Lindsay, The Warren Reporter, July 14, 2007. http://blog.nj.com/warrenre-
porter/2007/07/jacqueline_lindsay.html; and A Grim Anniversary for Princess Doe, by Kevin Coyne, The New York Times, July 15, 2007.
www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/15colnj.html?_r=1. Both articles mention, and quote, Travis Riggs.

7
Lieutenant Detective Stephen Speirs, who works for the Warren County Prosecutors Office, is currently the investigator in charge of the Princess Doe case: Q7: Who is
currently handling this investigation? Is it active? A7: The Warren County Prosecutors Office is currently handling this case. The investigator in charge is Lieutenant Detective
Stephen Speirs. He can be reached at 908-475-6275 or via e-mail sspeirs@co.warren.nj.us. Yes, the case is active and being investigated/pursued. www.princessdoe.org/faq.html.

10
 FORENSICS JOURNAL

ory that she had been working as a prostitute. Just as quickly as this
theory was raised, however, it was struck down as being completely
unsubstantiated on the grounds that not one person came forward
to identify her, either on or off the record, and that if she had in fact
been known to work in prostitution in the local area, it would have
been highly unlikely for her remains to go unclaimed.8 Nevertheless,
the websites Frequent Questions page advises the reader to consult
the Americas Most Wanted website,9 which posits the theory that Prin-
cess Doe was in fact a prostitute and was killed by her pimp when she
was no longer of any use to him. Lieutenant Detective Stephen Speirs
was singlehandedly responsible for unearthing the information which
led to this conjecture, which is all the more tantalizing because it is
really the only viable theory that relies on the interviews of possible
witnesses to the girls murder.
One theory that is not raised on the website concerns the victims
country of origin; the site makes the implicit assumption that the
victim was in all likelihood from the United States; however, it is pos-
sible that the victim was from elsewhere in North America, or even
from overseas, and had entered into the US illegally, and/or without
the knowledge of her family and friends. This theory begs for further
investigation, and, for his part, Riggs allows that he, too, needs to
address the possibility of her being an international victim.10
So far, 13 of the entries have been ruled out as a possible match for
Princess Doe, but those entries remain on the site nonetheless. This
array of information is just one more example of, and is typical of, the
incredible work that has gone into the sites construction and mainte-
nance since its creation.
One name that appears on the site as a possible match is worthy of
note here, owing both to her local (Maryland) connection, and to
her seemingly uncanny resemblance to Princess Doe. Her name is
Karen Beth Kamsch, and although she disappeared from her home in
Pasadena, Maryland, in 1976, she was not reported to law enforce-
ment agencies as a missing person until 31 years had passed since
she had last been sighted. It took the curiosity and persistence of her
brother, Tate Kamsch, to finally make her disappearance known to
the police.11 The resemblance between the photograph of the miss-
ing Kamsch girl (left), and the artists reconstruction of what Princess
Doe might have looked like (right) is striking:

Another intriguing feature of the Princess Doe website is the Possible

Matches page. Here, the assiduous and patient Riggs has taken the
trouble to compile a list of no fewer than 85 women who have disap-
peared during the stretch from as early as August 1974, up to within
a month of the discovery of Princess Does body. The list includes the
obvious categories of name, date of birth, date missing, age [at the
time of disappearance], and [last known] city [of residence]. The list

also includes some absolutely vital categories such as ruled out [as a
match for Princess Doe], rule out method, and age at the time Prin-
cess Doe was found.

8
This is another one of the seven theories that are raised on the websites Princess Doe Possible Theories page. www.princessdoe.org/theory.html.

9
Q16: What is the most likely scenario for the case? A16: This is a tough, yet often asked question. The most likely scenario that has been published is on the Americas Most
Wanted Website. That is the best, most up-to-date lead available. We are always searching for new information to help identify Princess Doe and try to keep an open mind to
all new and old information. www.princessdoe.org/faq.html (See also Endnote 24.)

10
Email from Travis Riggs to the author, March 4, 2009.

11
Test Results Awaited In 1976 Disappearance: Arundel Police Have Person of Interest by Raymond McCaffrey, The Washington Post, September 6, 2007. www.washing-
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/05/AR2007090502370.html.

12
Apart from including Princess Doe in its Unidentified Remains listings, as well as the shared use of the Doe moniker, the Doe Network has no particular or exclusive
connection with Princess Doe. The name Doe (and its most common variants, John Doe and Jane Doe) are of course terms that are ubiquitous when referring to other-
wise unidentified or unidentifiable living persons or decedents.

13
Even though Princess Doe was discovered in a rural setting, the location is less than ten miles from Interstate 80. www.doenetwork.org

14
The administrator of the Maryland Missing Persons Website, Kylen Johnson, also volunteers for the Doe Network site, and she was instrumental in helping to identify
Tonya Gardners remains.

11
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY

The fate suffered by Princess Doe is, unfortunately, not unique far
from it, in fact. There are literally hundreds of cases nationwide with
characteristics similar to those of the Princess Doe case. The Doe
Network,12 a website dedicated to cases involving both missing per-
sons and unidentified human remains, lists over 100 cases of females
whose bodies were found alongside or close to interstate highways
(as was the case with Princess Doe).13 The Maryland Missing Persons
Network website14 was established specifically in response to one
womans obsession with finding the identity of a Jane Doe discovered
in 1991, in a culvert alongside Interstate 270 in Frederick County,
Maryland. In fact, the Maryland Missing Persons Network site also
lists and depicts Princess Doe, owing to her possible connection with
Maryland.
Clearly, there is a pattern that links many of these cases, which have
in common the victims sex (female), location found (near an inter-
state highway), and, most disquietingly of all, the fact that all of the
victims identities still remain a mystery. To its credit, Doe Network
volunteers have assisted in resolving several dozen previously open
cases, involving both missing persons and unidentified remains. Also,
apart from the fact that the decedent was eventually identified, one
of those cases fits the aforementioned pattern very closely: the body
of Tonya Gardner, a Pennsylvania resident, was found alongside
Interstate 70 near the exit for Maryland State 94 in Howard County
in 1996. She was finally identified eight years later,15 although the
question of howand by whose handshe met her demise has yet to
be satisfactorily answered.
The creator of and driving force behind the Princess Doe website,
Travis Riggs, is a native of Blairstown, New Jersey, and now makes
his home in Baltimore, Maryland; he administers the website on his
own time and at his own expense. Riggs was just four years old when
Princess Does remains were found. I was too young to remember
the specifics [of the murder], but I do remember how scared everyone
was. . . . We lived in a place where people rarely locked their doors
and then we suddenly had a murder. This was a total unknown. Blair-
stown is such a quiet place; you would never expect to see something
like this happen.16 His primary and indeed sole motive in establish-
ing the Princess Doe website is simply to find a name for the victim,
and then find out who killed her.

15
The administrator of the Maryland Missing Persons Website, Kylen Johnson, also volunteers for the Doe Network site, and she was instrumental in helping to identify
Tonya Gardners remains.

16
Remembering Princess Doe by Jacqueline Lindsay, The Warren Reporter, July 14, 2007. http://blog.nj.com/warrenreporter/2007/07/jacqueline_lindsay.html.

17
New York State Department of Correctional Services, Inmate Population Information Search, http://nysdocslookup.docs.state.ny.us/GCA00P00/WIQ3/WINQ130.

18
These highlights of Speirs investigative efforts are culled from the Americas Most Wanted website, www.amw.com/missing_children/case.cfm?id=44823, and merit recount-
ing herein. Travis Riggs says that the pimp is Arthur Kinlaw. In 1998, Lt. Stephen Speirs, of the Warren Co. [New Jersey] Prosecutors Office, was assigned to the case. He
immediately began looking through the evidence and informationmaking it his mission to find Princess Doe. . . .That year, Lt. Speirs received a phone call from N.Y. au-
thorities who had some interesting information. A former prostitute and her pimp were arrested in Calif. The cops told Lt. Speirs that the woman had been charged as an ac-
complice in at least one murder committed by her pimpand while cooperating with police, shed told them the pimp was responsible for the beating death of a teenager in
a N.J. [cemetery]. N.Y. cops told Lt. Speirs shed be willing to talk to him about the murder. . . .Lt. Speirs traveled to Rikers Island Prison to meet with the woman. She told
him the killer was a big-time pimp in Long Island who preyed on runaways and throwaways. She said he lured Princess Doe into his pimping businessbut she was naive, in-
experienced, and [of no value] to the pimp. Several times, he tried selling her to other pimps because she wasnt doing well as a prostitute, but no one wanted to buy her. Lt.
Speirs says the womans story made sense, but she was a criminal who lacked credibilityand the pimp she named wouldnt talk to him. Lt. Speirs was at a standstill with the
new lead. . . .Then, in 2005, Lt. Speirs received a copy of a letter originally sent to the Attorney Generals Office. The letter was from the pimp himself, and in it, he accepted
responsibility for Princess Does murder. Although the letter was not addressed to Lt. Speirs directly, the letter mentioned his namelikely because the pimp had remembered
it from 1998 when Lt. Speirs had reached out to him and [the pimp had] refused to cooperate. Lt. Speirs was thrilled by the new development, and began to correspond with
the pimp by mail, then by phone. In May 2005, they made arrangements to meet face-to-face at the Wendi Correctional Facility in upstate N.Y., where the suspect was being
held. [He has since been transferred to another facility.] There, the pimp gave Lt. Speirs some vital information. According to Lt. Speirs, the pimp admitted to the murder in
person and gave some specifics, lending credibility to his storybut he left out some key elements. Lt. Speirs says it may be because the pimp has a long criminal history, and
may be confusing parts of his other crimes with Princess Does murder. But that wasnt all. The pimp also revealed something new about the former prostitute Lt. Speirs had
interviewed back in 1998. The pimp told Lt. Speirs that she hadnt been telling him the whole truth. The pimp told cops that not only did she know about the murderbut
she was there during the murder. Lt. Speirs knew he had to go back and talk to herthis time as a murder witness. When Lt. Speirs and the former prostitute met up later
that month, she admitted shed been at the cemetery during the murder. Lt. Speirs says she was clearly uncomfortable during the meetingappearing guilt-ridden, and scared
to death of retaliation from her ex-pimp. But despite her fears, Lt. Speirs says she was willing to cooperate and wanted to move on with her life. Thanks to the witness coop-
eration, Lt. Speirs learned some important details about Princess Doe. According to the witness, Princess Doe was definitely from N.Y.probably the Long Island area. The
former prostitute also agreed to meet with a forensic sketch artist to create a sketch based on her eyewitness account of what Princess Doe looked like. Once the sketch was
completed on September 13, 2005, Lt. Speirs recalls the witness said, Yes, thats her! He could tell by looking at the witnesss eyes as she looked over the final product that
she was clearly looking into the face of the victim.

19
New York State Department of Correctional Services, Inmate Population Information Search, http://nysdocslookup.docs.state.ny.us/GCA00P00/WIQ3/WINQ130.

20
E.g., Couple Charged in 1984 Slaying Of Woman Found in East River, by Kit R. Roane, The New York Times, June 21, 1998. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html
?res=9A0CE1D8143CF932A15755C0A96E958260

12
 FORENSICS JOURNAL

In that vein, Riggs puts some stock in the possible involvement of
Arthur Kinlaw, a career pimp who is now serving a lengthy prison
sentence in New York state.17 Riggs has never met the inmate, but
Lieutenant Detective Speirs actually interviewed Kinlaw. Speirs came
away from that interview believing that he, Kinlaw, was somehow
connected to Princess Does death, even if, as Kinlaw himself asserted,
he never actually knew the girls name.18 Likewise, Donna Kinlaw
(who was married to Arthur Kinlaw in the 1980s, and also served
time in New York for a manslaughter conviction she incurred as a
result of being involved with another one of Arthur Kinlaws crimes,
but has since been released19) revealed details about several other mur-
ders of young women that only she and/or her then-husband could
have known.20 These two individuals might hold the key to Princess
Does death, if not her identity. Still, the passage of so much time
since the murders occurrence only makes the obtaining and corrobo-
rating of any fading memories or vague recollections by the Kinlaws
or anyone else who might come forward all the more difficult. The
best hope is for a person or persons to emerge who can positively
identify Princess Doe, and perhaps only then might her storys final
chapter be written.21
Riggs emphasizes that Lieutenant Detective Speirs, and Kranz before
him, were and are both every bit as committed if not more so to
solving the Princess Doe case as Riggs himself. [It should also be
noted that Riggs modesty about his own involvement with this case
is equaled only by his unstinting and ongoing praise of the two detec-
tives Eric Kranz and then Stephen Speirs who have devoted so
much of their time and energy to the case.] Still, Riggs cannot help
but lament the fact that budgetary and manpower constraints have
always been an obstacle to investigative efforts, not just in the Princess
Doe case, but in missing persons and unidentified decedent cases
nationwide. Cases involving unidentified remains are not a top prior-
ity for most law enforcement agencies, primarily because of the previ-
ously cited budgetary and manpower limitations, but also because
the nameless dead have no family or friends to act as advocates. Thus,
there is no onebarring, of course, the intervention of someone with
Riggss dedicationavailable to continuously monitor the progress
of such cases. By tirelessly championing and publicizing his case,
Riggs hopes and believes that he can help surmount the bureaucratic
obstacles that allow many more such cases to languish or be forgotten.
Finally, in defense of all of the amateur sleuths or would-be sleuths
who have come to embrace the internet as yet another tool for solving
mysteries: it is all well and good to sit at ones own computer and try
to match missing persons with unidentified remains, but it is a vastly
more daunting task to be part of an investigative team charged with
examining forensic evidence related to the discovery of unidentified
human remains. No ones efforts or interest, however, should ever be
considered too trivial or mundane to be somehow useful. It can only
be hoped that the Princess Doe websites mission to identify the vic-
tim of a crime, as well as her murderer can finally be accomplished
before too much more time has passed, and that all of the painstaking
work that has gone into the websites creation and upkeep will thus
not have been in vain.
Travis Riggs own words might serve as an appropriate coda to this
article, while also helping to maintain the hope for a successful resolu-
tion to the mystery of Princess Doe: I dont want people to forget
this case. I think its totally solvable. You have this young person that
was never identified. . . . This girl is missing from somebody. . . . I
want people to know that this brutal murder took place and its been
25 years that she has been buried without a name.22,23

21
In fact, as the Princess Doe website notes, a novel loosely based on her case has already been written: Death Among Strangers, by Deidre S. Laiken (Avon Books, pub. Sep-
tember 1988). The books title paraphrases a line inscribed on Princess Does gravestone: Dead Among Strangers.

22
Remembering Princess Doe by Jacqueline Lindsay, The Warren Reporter, July 14, 2007. http://blog.nj.com/warrenreporter/2007/07/jacqueline_lindsay.html.

23
Websites containing information relevant to the Princess Doe case, but which were not otherwise cited in this article, include the following:

A. Minutes of Township of Blairstown Committee Meeting, Wednesday, May 9, 2007 7:15 PM. Committeeman Salvatore Lascari noted: Princess Does body was
found about 25 years ago and she has yet to be identified. It appears that Americas Most Wanted has picked up this story and they may air it. www.blairstown-nj.org/
documents/2007May09minutes.doc

B. 07020 describes itself as the place to discuss Edgewater [New Jersey] and whatever else is on your mind. . . .This is a non-commercial site run by an Edgewater
resident. This site includes a lengthy thread devoted to Princess Doe. www.omgili.com/jmp/aHR0cDovL3d3dy4wNzAyMC5jb20vZm9ydW1zL3Nob3d0aHJlY-
WQucGhwP3Q9MzI2MyZtb2RlPWxpbmVhcg==

C. Weird N.J., the brainchild of Mark Sceurman and Mark Moran, describes itself as a travel guide and magazine to places you wont find on state funded maps or
located on any tourist attraction pamphlets. The site includes an entry for Princess Doe. www.weirdnj.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=186&
Itemid=28

D. Lost in Jersey describes itself as being dedicated to all those people places and things that make us unique, that make us go woah, or that make us say WTF?!?
On this I will share with you what Ive seen in my explorations. This somewhat macabre site (which is further hindered by rampant grammatical and syntactical
errors) contains photographs and descriptions of places throughout New Jersey that have captured the attention of the sites creator (whose identity proved elusive,
perhaps purposely so). www.lostinjersey.com/graves/janedoe.html

13
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY
Technology and Fraud Investigations in the
Office of the Inspector General
Mary Beth Hutcheson
The use of computers has become an important aspect of most peo-
ples home and work lives. The availability of the internet puts online
shopping, entertainment, social networking, and banking at the indi-
vidual users fingertips. Unfortunately, the ease of use and availability
of such technology also creates more opportunities to commit fraud,
waste and abuse in the workplace. How has this very same technology
that is used so widely today affected the work performed by a fraud
investigator in order to curb this problem?
Many entities, including government agencies, have teams devoted
solely to fighting crimes involving the use of a computer. Inspectors
General play an important role in this fight against cybercrime and
they are responsible for detecting and preventing violations of federal,
criminal and civil law through audits, investigations, inspections,
and other reviews. Among the duties of an Inspector General is the
investigation of computer crimes, which may range from common
violations of workplace policy to complex criminal matters such as
contract fraud.
The author had the opportunity to meet with two investigators who
currently work for an Office of Inspector General (OIG) at a Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) intelligence agency. Assistant Inspector
General (AIG) Carmen Shanholtz is a certified fraud examiner, and
Assistant Inspector General Irvin McCullough is the Chief of the
Office of Investigations within the DoD agencys OIG. They provided
interesting insight into the duties of an Inspector General and how
technology has affected those duties.
The Inspector Generals duties include responding to potential cyber
crimes that require further investigation. Concerns may include
allegations of suspected fraud, waste, and abuse previously committed
or ongoing. AIG McCullough reports that all fraud complaints are
treated as potential criminal violations until determined otherwise.
This is an important practice to ensure that evidence is properly col-
lected and handled in accordance with Constitutional requirements.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits unrea-
sonable searches and seizures so that it affects an investigation from
the time the concern arises to the time of its resolution. The Fourth
Amendment not only requires a search warrant, but also that the
search warrant clearly describe with particularity the exact location to
be searched and the items to be seized. Proper descriptions can be dif-
ficult in the area of cyber crime when determining where a particular
file is located on a computer.
Fortunately, warrants are not typically required when AIGs Shanholtz
and McCullough are investigating government workplace cybercrime
allegations. Upon commencement of duty, employees consent to
the Agencys monitoring of their usage of Agency computer systems,
including employee email systems; therefore, any potential expecta-
tion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment has been waived. In the
event the investigators are pursuing an abuse of government resources
14
and determine there may be additional criminal activity involving
systems outside of the Agencys control, the matter is referred to the
appropriate investigative entity.
The Inspector Generals job is complicated by security protections
such as passwords, encryption and the powerful delete key; how-
ever, AIG Shanholtz quickly provided several resources available
to continue an investigation when these hurdles are identified. As
technology has advanced, so have the forensic tools used to investi-
gate fraud, waste, and abuse. Data recovery tools are a huge asset to
the investigator. AIG Shanholtz commented that the end users may
believe they have permanently deleted an email or document, but
there is usually a way to recover that very same deleted item. Decryp-
tion software and password crackers are also of use to the investigator
when a file has been locked. Technological advancements have led
to improved software with the capability of querying multiple forms
of data and recognizing anomalies. This type of software provides
additional assistance when investigating multiple sources of data in,
e.g., a timecard fraud case.
Unfortunately, just as these tools and software are available to the
forensic examiners, many are just as readily accessible to individuals.
For example, Anonymizer software allows individuals to access web-
sites that may be locked down by a firewall ensuring that the activity
is not attributed to the intruder. Other software exists that is used to
reformat or destroy hard drives. Search engines, such as Google, can
be used to find all kinds of information, including how to reformat
a hard drive.
When pursuing an investigation involving computer forensics,
investigator training and awareness become crucial. Many of these
technological hurdles are overcome through the use of forensic tools.
AIG Shanholtz is a certified fraud examiner with a background in
accounting. Her area of specialty does not include computer forensics;
however, she has unlimited cyber resources at her disposal during an
investigation. Teams of analysts and computer forensics experts assist
with data extraction, recovery and other analyses that may be required.
AIGs Shanholtz and McCullough agree that when it comes to a cyber
crime investigation, email has provided some of the best evidence.
Email has, in some cases, taken the place of phone calls, mail, and
faxes, which makes email one of the best sources of evidence when
investigating fraud, waste, and abuse. There will always be two copies
that have the potential to be retrieved: the senders and the recipients,
thus increasing the likelihood that the email can be recovered and
used in an investigation.
It appears that for almost every hurdle technology has created there is an
alternative solution available. Whether it involves reliance on an expert
to recover data or the use of specialized software, Inspectors Generals
work is not as inhibited by the advances of technology as one might
believe. It is quite the opposite: technology seems to be on their side.
 FORENSICS JOURNAL
The Analysis of Ecstasy Components
Christine Burns, M.S.
ABSTRACT
As various substances of abuse come under the schedule restrictions
set by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), other designer
drugs are beginning to replace them. Many components present in
Ecstasy tablets today are derivatives and are making it increasingly
difficult to isolate certain components. This paper presents some
common, well-known methods used in forensic chemistry and their
application in separating the components commonly found in Ecstasy
tablets. Such components can be separated by using the Dragendorff
reagent and derivatization, with trimethylsilylation on a ZB-1 column.
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, many designer drugs are appearing that have
been created from other pre-existing drugs. These designer drugs
often have no medical use and when they are abused, they are identi-
fied as illegal substances. For instance, Ecstasy or 3, 4-methylene-
dioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) is a designer drug that was derived
from amphetamines, which are classified as stimulants, which tem-
porarily increase alertness and awareness, as well as the activity of the
sympathetic nervous system and the central nervous system. In the
medical field, stimulants are often used to treat narcolepsy, ADHD,
and depression. Stimulants are also commonly used in over-the-
counter medications to counteract lethargy and fatigue throughout
the day, to reduce sleepiness and to keep the person awake when
necessary.
MDMA or Ecstasy was initially popular among Caucasian adolescents
and young adults active in the nightclub scene or at weekend-long
dance parties known as raves. Ecstasy was quickly identified as an
illegal substance due to its highly addictive nature and harmful effects
on the body. The components commonly seen in combination with
or in place of MDMA are Benzylpiperazine (BZP), Triflourometh-
ylphenylpiperazine (TFMPP), Methamphetamine, Methylenedioxy-
amphetamine (MDA), and Ketamine. Providing distinct separation
instrumentally between the components found in an Ecstasy tablet
would allow forensic labs to accurately confirm the presence of these
controlled dangerous substances and provide more thorough and
precise analysis of the evidence submitted. Around the 1990s, forensic
laboratories were beginning to receive a new drug that was being sold
as legal Ecstasy and was later identified as Benzylpiperazine (BZP).
This BZP was immediately controlled and has become more common
in Ecstasy; however, new methods of analysis have not been devel-
oped to compensate for its vigorous growth in the drug market. There
are few presumptive tests for BZP and Ketamine. More presumptive
tests would allow the chemist to make an informed decision about the
sample components and what method of analysis to use.
15
Currently, chemists analyze BZP via the Gas Chromatograph/Mass
Spectrometer; however, the chromatograms produced are problem-
atic. BZP, MDMA and TFMPP do not separate easily from other
components. The extraction performed by the chemist does not
completely isolate BZP, and, depending on the pill composition, the
extraction process can produce peaks that may overlap or co-elute.
The development of better methods for the extraction of the compo-
nents found in Ecstasy tablets would be essential to drug analysis in a
forensic setting. Furthermore, Ketamine has been a recent recurring
drug in Ecstasy, and it would prove helpful if a color test were devel-
oped to determine if Ketamine were present in a tablet.
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this study was to improve the separation of the vari-
ous components commonly found in an Ecstasy tablet during tra-
ditional case analysis scenarios. The following were the specific aims
intended for this research:
Develop a new extraction method to separate BZP
from the sample
Identify a color test that can indicate the presence of
BZP or Ketamine
Develop a new technique to yield more defined and
individualized peaks on the GC/MS
Determine if a pure enough sample of BZP can be
extracted in order to utilize the Fourier Transform
Infra-Red Spectrophotometer for identification
METHODS
Liquid-liquid extractions, one and two dimensional Thin Layer
Chromatography (TLC), Gas Chromatograph column variation,
derivatization, and color tests were performed on six different samples
of seized Ecstasy tablets. An acetone, 0.1N NaOH/chloroform, and
0.1N HCl/chloroform extractions were performed on one sample in a
test tube and run via GC/MS.
One and two dimensional TLC were performed with seven different
basic solvents systems using glass backed silica gel TLC plates. Each
plate was spotted with a capillary tube ten times across with a sample
dissolved in methanol. Following development, the plates were
viewed under UV light and the fluorescent layers were extracted and
run via GC/MS.
Next, the two different columns were tested on the GC. The columns
used were a ZB-5 column and a ZB-1 column, which differed slightly
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY

in polarity. The ZB-5 column was the standard column used on the C. D.
Maryland State Police GC instrument and the ZB-1 column was the
experimental column. The method that is currently used on the GC
for the analysis of Ecstasy at the Maryland State Police-Forensic Sci-
ence Division lab is called LOW; it was altered with the ZB-1 column
and named BLOW. The flow rate, ramp time, oven temperature, and
hold time were individually altered for optimum separation.

Derivatization was performed using trimethylsilylation and the

method was followed according to the journal article titled, Analysis
of Benzylpiperazine-like Compounds (Inoue, Iwata, Kanamori,
Miyaguchi, & Tsujikawa, 2004). A small amount of sample was
added to a micro-centrifuge tube where derivatizing agent BSTFA w/
1% TMS, and Acetonitrile were added. The reaction tube was heated

at 30C for 30 minutes and run via GC/MS.
Figure (C) represents the GC/MS chromatogram of the standard
Presumptive color testing was then performed with BZP and Ket- mixture underivatized. Figure (D) represents the chromatogram of
amine standards on samples of seized Ecstasy tablets. A small amount the standard mixture derivatized.
of sample was added to the reagent and the instantaneous color
reaction was observed and recorded. The reagents used were Marquis,
Mandelins, Froehdes, Lafons, Dragendorff, Nitroprusside, Gold E. F.
Bromide, Cobalt Thiocyanate, and Mayers.

G. H.

RESULTS

A. B.
Figure (E) is a photo of the color reactions with BZP reference stan-
dard. Figure (F) is a photo of the color reaction with Ketamine refer-
ence standard. Figure (G) is a photo of the color reaction with sample
4 with the addition of Ketamine standard. Figure (H) is a photo color
test results when Dragendorff reagent was added to MDMA, Meth-
amphetamine, BZP, and Ketamine.

CONCLUSION

The 0.1N NaOH/chloroform extraction did reduce the abundance

of caffeine present in the sample; however, it did not eliminate the
Figure (A) represents a standard mixture run on ZB-5 column on cutting agent entirely. The 0.1N HCl/chloroform and acetone extrac-
method BLOW. Figure (B) represents a standard mixture run on tions did not produce the results desired. It was concluded that the
BLOWCB with the ZB-1 column.

16
 FORENSICS JOURNAL

extractions used were not able to separate the components found
in Ecstasy and would not be viable for chemists to use for future
analysis.
In one and two dimensional TLC, it was observed that with the
solvent systems used, the drugs of interest separated out together in
the same layer thus they did not provide distinct separation. It was
determined that based on the poor separation provided between the
components in the tablets that TLC would be an ineffective tech-
nique using these seven solvent systems.
Color testing was performed on standards, seized samples, and a
combination of both. Dragendorff would be an acceptable color
reagent to use for Ketamine because it turned red, whereas all the
other components commonly found in Ecstasy tablets turned fluores-
cent orange, shown in Figure H. The Dragendorff reagent provided a
color distinction to indicate the presence of Ketamine in the sample.
A color test was not found to identify BZP when MDMA, metham-
phetamine, and Ketamine were present in the sample. The Gold Bro-
mide reagent was not effective and more experimentation was needed;
however, it could prove to be a very beneficial presumptive test.
In the GC column variation, the method commonly used at the
MSP lab with Ecstasy tablets is called BLOW. The parameters of this
method were slowly altered using the ZB-1 column. It was concluded
that a lower ramp time and lower starting temperature resulted in
a better separation of methamphetamine, MDMA, BZP, TFMPP,
and Ketamine. In summation, the ZB-1 column was effective in
separating the components in the standard mixture, and is a practical
method to be utilized by forensic chemists in the drug lab.
The derivatization with Trimethylsilylation provided optimum sepa-
ration between Methamphetamine, MDMA, BZP, TFMPP, and
Ketamine. The peak shape was sharp with a bell-shaped curve and
provided distinct baseline separation, shown in Figure C. It was deter-
mined that this was an effective method for a chemist to use when
attempting to isolate these components when present in an Ecstasy
tablet.
REFERENCES
Inoue, H., Iwata, Y. T., Kanamori, T., Miyaguchi, H., & Tsujikawa,
K. (2004). Analysis Benzylpiperazine-like Compounds. National
Research Institute of Police Science, 9(2), 165-184. Retrieved June 28,
2008, from Science Direct database.
Sarwar, M., Ph.D. (n.d.). A New, Highly Specific Color Test for Ket-
amine. Microgram Journal. Retrieved October 16, 2008, from U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration Web site: http://www.usdoj.gov/
dea/programs/forensicsci/microgram/journal_v4_num14/pg3.html
GLOSSARY
3, 4: A method of identification used in chemistry to describe the
position of the functional groups in a molecule.
GC/MS: The Gas Chromatograph/Mass Spectrometer is an instru-
ment that separates and identifies the components present in a
mixture.
Co-elute: A process where two or more chemical compounds elute
from the Gas Chromatographic column at the same time, making
separation and identification difficult.
FTIR: The Fourier Transform Infra-Red Spectrometer is an instru-
mental technique where the sample is hit with a beam of electrons
causing the bonds in the molecule to stretch and bend and the energy
emitted is measured and charted on a spectrum.
BLOW: The initial B for Burns paired with a method used typically
to analyze amphetamines.
ZB-1: Zebron-1: a column that is slightly more polar and aids in the
separation of more polar compounds.
ZB-5: Zebron-5 is a less polar column and the ZB refers to the com-
pany Zebron that manufactures this specific column.

Unfortunately, the samples used could not be separated using Thin

Layer Chromatography (TLC), and a pure enough sample could not
be extracted to run on the FTIR.

In summation, the components found in Ecstasy tablets can be

separated by using the Dragendorff reagent and derivatization, with
trimethylsilylation on a ZB-1 column. A pure enough sample was not
extracted via TLC or various other extraction methods to analyze with
the FTIR, and further research in this area is required.

17
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY
The Future of the American Petit Jury System
A Look at the Problems in the American Jury System and the Use
of Professional Juries
Lauren Maxwell
Within the American judicial system, justice is intended to be the
single most important and steadfast principle, and it is expected to
withstand the pressure of all human ills and evils. Within that struc-
ture of justice, criminal defendants are constitutionally guaranteed
the right to have a panel of their peers determine their innocence
or guilt with regard to the commission of a crime. Unfortunately, the
number of innocent people who have wrongly been convicted under
the current system is alarming; instead of the members of a jury act-
ing as the final safeguard to ensure that an innocent persons freedom
is not erroneously taken away, a jurys decision is often the final
step in guaranteeing that someone who has wrongly been accused
of a crime has essentially lost all ability to prove his innocence. The
American petit jury system is broken, and the very people the system
is designed to protect are the ones who are paying the price. The time
has come for Americans to consider adopting a system of paid, profes-
sional jurors in order to ensure that the fairness and liberties guaran-
teed to all citizens are distributed and applied as equally as possible.
An extensive disparity exists within the American court system
about exactly who represents a peer group. Because there is no single
accepted definition of the term peer, defendants often have their
cases heard by juries that do not necessarily represent them. This is
not unfair, per se, but when a defendants jury consists of people from
different racial, social, and economic classes, the likelihood of the
defendants receiving a fair trial decreases significantly.
In the past, the majority of Americans who faced a courtroom trial
were truly judged by a jury of their peers only if they were white men,
which led to an exorbitant number of black men being wrongly con-
victed and imprisoned. In fact, of the 54 men executed in Virginia for
rape or attempted rape between 1908 and 1965, not a single one was
white (Dorr, 2004, p. 32). Currently, one in every four African-Amer-
ican males in Virginia is a convicted felon, and under current Virginia
law, and the laws of many other states, convicted felons permanently
lose their civil rights unless they are granted a restoration of those
rights by the state (Kutz, 2005). These men lose the opportunity to
serve on a jury, and potential jury pools are being significantlyand
dangerouslydiminished with regard to their African-American male
representation.
With regard to jury service, most Americans are taught to believe
that their peer group consists of other American citizens, whether
they are black, white, old, young, educated, uneducated, gay or
straight. Sometimes, however, when there is discrimination against
a prospective member of the jury because he is black, white, young,
old, etc., then a trial might not yield justice (Buckley, 1997, p. 63).
The use of peremptory challenges shows where this concept is best
illustrated. A peremptory challenge occurs when, in the course of
questioning jurors for suitability, an attorney seeks to dismiss a juror
18
without stating the cause for dismissal. In Batson v. Kentucky, the
United States Supreme Court handed down a decision that an attor-
ney could not use peremptory challenges to dismiss jurors solely on
the basis of race (476 U.S. 79 (1986)). Since an attorney need not
state the reason for a peremptory challenge, this standard is difficult
to uphold. The Batson decision has made the science of jury selec-
tion even more imperfect, and has caused race to be seen more as a
card to play within the system than simply the human characteristic
of skin color.
With prosecutors now depending on more sophisticated types of
evidencesuch as deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), physics-based blood
spatter analysis and forensics, computer-based crime scene re-enact-
ments, and other complicated advances in science and biologyto
obtain convictions, the need for jurors to be able to separate, analyze,
and arrive at accurate conclusions based on the evidence presented
at trial is becoming arguably more demanding and difficult for the
lay juror. DNA has essentially replaced the fingerprint as the primary
type of evidence that is used to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and its consistent appearance in the media has considerably
heightened the publics expectation of its appearance at trials. This
is not necessarily a bad thing, as DNA evidence helps to reduce the
number of innocent people who are convicted by witness accounts
and other less reliable evidence, but it leaves open the possibility that
potential jurors will believe that if DNA evidence is not presented
against a defendant, the person may not be guilty. Adding to this
issue are television shows that rely on crime scene investigation and
the complicated technologies and techniques used to drive their plots
and story lines. These shows create the danger that viewers incorrectly
deem themselves to be crime scene experts after a few months of
watching them.
The masses of reporters, pundits, and politicians who treat allegations
and accusations as truth, and make overt statements of guilt without
waiting for the court system to make the determination of innocence
or guilt, have a negative effect on the neutrality of potential jury
pools. The well-known case of the Duke University lacrosse team, in
which members were brought up on charges later proven to be false,
is an example of how the press can try suspects in the media before
they are tried in a courtroom. Although media coverage is protected
under the First Amendment and can act as a safeguard for the integ-
rity of the judicial process, when media coverage is biased and preju-
dicial, that integrity is weakened, and a fair trial becomes harder to
obtain. As more information becomes readily available to the masses
at faster rates via the internet, cellular phones, personal digital assis-
tants (PDA), and other similar devices, it is becoming more difficult
for the general public not to have an already-established opinion
about a local crime.
 FORENSICS JOURNAL
Incorrect or incomplete juror knowledge is also very dangerous when
potentially mentally ill defendants have been deemed competent to
stand trial, but assert a defense of not criminally responsible due to
mental disease or defect. Research has shown that although insanity
is a legal term, many people are surprised to discover that psychology
does not offer a definition of insanity upon which most psychologists
agree (Geiger & Weinstein, 2008, p. 990). Currently, at least seven
separate definitions of insanity exist, so when twelve individuals are
placed in a jury box and asked to determine whether or not a defen-
dant should be acquitted due to insanity, it is very likely each juror is
working with a different idea and definition of what it means to be
insane. According to research, even if jurors are given a precise defini-
tion of insanity for use to judge the evidence and testimony they hear
during trial, their interpretation of the information presented is likely
to be influenced by the definition they bring with them to the court-
room (Geiger & Weinstein, 2008, p. 990). Since roughly 9.5 percent
of the population of American adults suffer from a mood disorder,
a sizeable number of potential jurors have their own personal work-
ing definition of mental illness (National Institute of Mental Health
[NIMH], 2009). If practicing psychiatrists and psychologists are
unable to determine whether or to what degree someone suffers from
a mental illness, there should be considerable concern about whether
a jury composed of lay persons would be capable of doing so.
Another issue with the current system is that those who serve as jurors
are paid a wage representing a small fraction of what the average
working American earns as a full- or part-time employee. Although
some companies offer paid jury leave to their employees, many do
not, and those employees who work on commission, travel extensively
for their jobs, or are essential to their occupation or business would
seek to be excused. When people in these positions are forced to make
sacrifices in order to serve on a jury, they may feel resentment toward
the defendant for disrupting their business, personal and financial
lives, these factors have the potential to cancel out the good that may
be served by keeping these peers on the jury.
Participants in the American civil court system are not immune to
the injustices that can befall criminal defendants. A May 1997 issue
of National Review looks at a specific case in which a jury was asked
to assess subtle differences in opinion involving complex contentions
about rights and wrongs with regard to computer technology. In
this case, the judge was reported as having pulled aside a female juror,
asking her if she knew what was meant by software. She replied
with something to the effect that software was something soft, in
the sense that when you let it fall to the ground, there is no clattering
sound (Buckley, 1997, p. 63).
19
This type of situation should be unacceptable to Americans, yet
the use of less than competent jurors on cases of all types is all too
frequent. The plaintiff and defendant in this particular computer
technology case should have been arguing their points to jurors who
at least had the potential to understand the very complicated and
nuanced material presented to them throughout the course of the
trial. The fact that a companys future, and with it the futures of all
the firms employees and officers, could be in the very incapable hands
of an improperly trained or uneducated jury, is the very definition of
unfair and unjust.
The idea of professional juries is centuries old; what is new, however,
is the notion of using paid jurors, or jurors whose job it would be to
serve the Court and the judicial system as their full-time profession.
Teachers, police officers, and prosecutors, for example, are considered
professionals who fulfill very important roles and serve the public in a
manner vital to sustaining the American way of life. These public ser-
vants make decisions every day that not only affect the people directly
involved in the situations being handled, but also have an influence
on the safety and morality of society as a whole. Jurors are asked to
make many of these same determinations. It is time to ensure that
those who fulfill that function are the most qualified candidates for
the job. Offering wages based on the level of experience and educa-
tion each juror possesses is one way to ensure defendants are served by
the most capable jury possible to hear their cases.
Some opponents of a paid jury system assert that there is something
wrong with people who would be willing to choose to work as paid
jurors, but it is difficult to see how that same idea would not apply
equally to judges or prosecutors, who also serve willingly, yet are paid
fair wages for their service because society recognizes the importance
of the positions they fill. College students could choose to major in
the study of jurors and juror performance, and would be instructed
in various programs of study, such as how to evaluate physical and
circumstantial evidence, abnormal psychology, computer informa-
tion systems and computer forensics, basic accounting principles, and
other important fields with which jurors need to be familiar when
hearing a case. Salaries would be commensurate with experience and
aptitude, and regular evaluations would be conducted to ensure that
the jurors continue to serve honestly, effectively, and to the height of
their abilities.
The current system of jury selection is time intensive and would be
minimized by the use of professional jurors. Voir dire would still
occur, but the pool would be smaller and would consist only of pro-
fessional jurors, thus shortening the time between the beginning of
jury selection and commencement of the trial. Cases would be heard
more quickly, and the backlog alleviated to some degree.
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY
Of course, professional jurors must be funded. Monies currently
used to pay jurors for their service could be reallocated to pay pro-
fessional jurors, as could some portion of taxes paid. In addition, if
fewer people are wrongly convicted because of the implementation
of a more competent jury system, millions of incarceration dollars
would be saved. In addition, the rate of financial settlements to those
who are proven to be wrongly convicted would dramatically decrease.
With the current state of the economy, however, it is very unlikely
that Americans would be willing to sacrifice established programs and
already-allotted funds in order to create this new system.
More important than how these funds are generated, is that they need
to be generated; it is past time for America to begin to consider jury
duty a service that is not simply mandatory, but one that is held in
high esteem and one that the government and the people are will-
ing to make sacrifices to create and support. Although the process
of implementing this type of jury system would be a slow and ardu-
ous one, as issues are ironed out and the level of effectiveness, fiscal
feasibility, and usefulness are assessed and increased, the benefits that
would be reaped by each citizen of America, and America as a whole,
would far outweigh the sacrifices necessary in order to become much
closer to creating a system that truly dispenses justice for all.
REFERENCES
Amar, A. R., & Amar, V. D. (1996, July/August). Improving the judi-
cial system: Unlocking the jury box. Current, pp. 11-16. Retrieved
from Academic Search Premier database.
Balko, R. (2008, December). Innocence denied: DNA testing
stalled. Reason, 40(7). Retrieved from http://www.reason.com/news/
show/129822.html
Barro, R. J. (2002, July 22). Pleading the case for a paid-jury system.
BusinessWeek, (3792), 20. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier
database.
Berberich, S. (2007, October 12). Hey, scientists, its not cheap here.
Gazette.net. Retrieved from http://www.gazette.net/stories/101207/
businew45158_32360.shtml
Bernstein, R. (2004, November 30). Stay-at-home parents top 5
million, Census Bureau reports. In U.S. Census Bureau [Press release].
Retrieved April 10, 2009, from http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/
www/releases/archives/families_households/003118.html
20
Bradley, K. W., & Phillipson, G. (2008, Fall). The court of public
opinion: the practice and ethics of trying cases in the media. Law
and Contemporary Problems, 71(4), 1-201. Retrieved from Academic
Search Premier database.
Buckley, W. F., Jr. (1997, May 5). Any prospect for jury reform?
National Review, 49(8), 63. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier
database.
Cost of living in Maryland. (n.d.). Maryland Department of Business
& Economic Development [Fact sheet]. Retrieved March 1, 2009, from
http://www.choosemaryland.org/factsandfigures/qualityoflife/costofli-
vingoverview.htm
Dorr, L. L. (2004). White women, rape, and the power of race in Vir-
ginia, 1900-1960. Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books?id=
mq06NDClzZUC&printsec=frontcover&dq=White+women,+rape,+
and+the+power+of+race+in+Virginia&cd=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false
Featured Documents: The Manga Carta. (n.d.). National Archives &
Records Administration [Archives & Records]. Retrieved February 4,
2009, from http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/
magna_carta/
Frequently asked questions by prospective jurors. (n.d.). Maryland
Judiciary Jury Search [Fact Sheet]. Retrieved February 1, 2009, from
http://www.courts.state.md.us/juryservice/citizens_faqs.html
Geiger, J. F., & Weinstein, L. (2008, December). Definitions of
insanity in college students. College Student Journal, 42(4), 990-997.
Retrieved from Academic Search Premier database.
Goidel, R., Procopio, S., & Freeman, C. (2004). Television view-
ing, race, and attitudes toward juvenile justice and juvenile justice
reform. In Southern Political Science Association [Conference papers].
Retrieved from Academic Search Premier database.
Kutz, A. L. (2005, April). A jury of ones peers: Virginias restoration
of rights process and its disproportionate effect on the African Ameri-
can community. William and Mary Law Review, 46(6), 2109-2152.
Retrieved from Academic Search Premier database.
The numbers count: mental disorders in America. (2009, February 4).
National Institute of Mental Health [Fact sheet]. Retrieved February
19, 2009, from http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-
numbers-count-mental-disorders-in-america/index.shtml
 FORENSICS JOURNAL
Outrageous! Medias influence on jury trials. (n.d.). Readers Digest.
Retrieved from http://www.rd.com/your-america-inspiring-people-
and-stories/media-influences-the-legal-system/article81290.html
Phillips, K., & Smith-Parra, N. (Eds.). (2006, Fall). NC innocence
commission is worse than nothing. Justice Denied: The Magazine for
the Wrongfully Convicted, (34). Retrieved from http://justicedenied.
org/issue/issue_34/jd_issue_34.pdf
Posner, R. A. (1997). Aging and Old Age. Retrieved from http://
books.google.com/books?id=9gji7PeIsrYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=
Aging+and+Old+age&cd=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false
21
Sexton, T. (2007, January 8). The history and future of the jury
system in America. Associated Content. Retrieved from http://www.
associatedcontent.com/article/107695/the_history_and_future_of_
the_jury.html?cat=37
State & county quickfacts. (n.d.). U.S. Census Bureau [Fact Sheet].
Retrieved February 1, 2009, from http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/00000.html
Watching TV gives first aid clues. (2009, February 2). BBC. Retrieved
March 31, 2009, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7860557.stm
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY
Moral Lapse Versus the Psychopathic Fraudster:
Implications for Our Justice System
Yvette Frusciante, CPA, CFF
Past research and theory indicate that most occupational fraud (asset
misappropriation) is committed by individuals who face certain
situational pressures or motivations that result in one-hit wonder
crimes. They are not always seen as criminals, and often receive what
is perceived as lenient treatment in the justice system. A different
offender, however, whose character is in complete contrast to that
which the public has come to know as the typical white-collar crim-
inal, has emerged. This sub-classification is known as psychopathic
fraudsters. In some instances, the personality traits present in this
type of offender have led to violent crimes as they attempt to conceal
their fraudulent behavior. Unfortunately, those same personality traits
allow these individuals to conceal their true nature. The public and
the justice system often have difficulty distinguishing the psycho-
pathic fraudster, and as a result, they are classed with, and receive the
same sanctions as, the typical occupational offender.
THE TYPICAL OFFENDER IN AN OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD
The term white-collar crime was coined by Edwin H. Sutherland in
1939, and was defined as criminal acts of corporations and individu-
als acting in their corporate capacity (Wells, 2008, p. 12). Since
then, the term has been expanded to include any financial crime.
Much of todays literature and theory on the subject, however, is
based on the early studies conducted by Sutherlands student, Donald
R. Cressey. Unlike Sutherland, Cresseys studies concentrated solely
on embezzlers and the circumstances that resulted in their offenses; he
termed these criminals trust violators (Wells, p. 13). His resulting
hypothesis is known as the fraud triangle and has become the model
of the typical occupational offender. Cressey explains:
Trusted persons become trust violators when they
conceive of themselves as having a financial prob-
lem which is non-shareable, are aware this prob-
lem can be secretly resolved by violations of the
position of financial trust, and are able to apply to
their own conduct in that situation verbalizations
which enable them to adjust their conceptions of
themselves as trusted persons with their concep-
tions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds
or property (as cited in Wells, p. 13).
The three legs of the fraud triangle, therefore, are (a) a non-shareable
financial need, (b) a perceived opportunity, and (c) rationalization
(Wells, p.13). All three must be present or an occupational fraud will
not occur. For instance, the potential offender may have a perceived
non-shareable financial need and an opportunity to commit fraud.
Without the ability to rationalize his actions, however, he will not
be able to maintain his self-concept as a non-criminal and trusted
person, which is a necessary factor (Wells, pp. 14-18). What is
considered a non-shareable need to one person may not necessarily be
22
non-shareable to another. These range from true financial problems to
problems that are viewed as being solvable through financial means.
Cresseys study revealed that these non-shareable financial needs
typically arise as a result of a desire by the potential offender either
to achieve a higher status, or simply to maintain the one they have
(Wells, p. 14).
According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE)
2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, the
typical occupational offender is over the age of forty and a long-term
employee of the organization (greater than five years), holding a
position with an annual salary of less than $50,000. In greater than
80% of the cases surveyed, the offender had a clean employment and
criminal record with respect to fraud or abuse (pp. 48-61). It there-
fore stands to reason that the typical occupational offender is seen as
one who experiences a moral lapse in response to certain pressures
in life. As a result, the public perception is often one of pity and, on
some level, identification. These offenders are seen as more rational
than other criminals, almost innocuous. This public sentiment is
greatest when the offense is committed to feed a family, to care for a
sick loved one, or to pay a mortgage to prevent foreclosure. Although
recent high profile financial crimes have resulted in greater public
condemnation and outrage against white-collar criminals in general,
the middle-class occupational offender is still seen as genuinely
sympathetic.
A WOLF IN SHEEPS CLOTHING
The majority of society wants to believe people are inherently good.
This belief explains why many identify with, and make excuses for,
the guy next door who commits the once-in-a-lifetime crime of
moral turpitude. Unfortunately, this is exactly what makes people
and their businesses easy prey for what has come to be known as the
psychopathic fraudster. In stark contrast to the prevailing image of
the typical occupational offender, the psychopathic fraudster is a
social predator who often takes a position in an organization for the
sole purpose of committing fraud. It is in these cases that Cresseys
fraud triangle doesnt apply; there is no perceived pressure or requisite
rationalization there is only a perceived opportunity.
Approximately 1% of the population has psychopathic traits (Babiak,
2008, p. 1). Although varying in degrees of severity along the spec-
trum of non-violent to violent, they are all socially destructive. This
personality disorder is defined by specific traits and characteristics
that can be grouped into the four main characteristics of the psycho-
path. The first group of traits defines the psychopaths interpersonal
interactions which characterize the impression that psychopaths make
on others. Upon first meeting, one may find them to be charming,
charismatic, humorous, knowledgeable, and articulate. This is simply
a faade, which requires great skill and energy on the part of the
 FORENSICS JOURNAL
psychopath to maintain. They are successful because they constantly
tailor their faade to their immediate targets, winning over their
targets trust through lies (Babiak, 2008, p. 1). The second main trait
is emotional poverty. Other than anger and frustration, psychopaths
lack empathy, sympathy or remorse. They refuse to accept respon-
sibility for their own actions, and blame others for anything that
goes wrong. The closest they come to normal human emotions is by
mimicking them to manipulate their targets (Babiak, 2008, p. 1).
The third main trait characterizes the psychopaths daily life, which is
irresponsible, impulsive, and lavish. Although their resumes are full
of successes and achievements, their real life is the complete opposite.
They are easily bored by details and often neglect important work. In
fact, they lack goals and do not extend themselves to achieve anything
of significance. They act without thinking of, or caring about, the
consequences of their actions on others. Although they are unwill-
ing to achieve success on their own, they are more than willing to
take credit for someone elses (Babiak, 2008, p. 2). The final main
trait of psychopaths is a history of antisocial behavior, including
fraud in adulthood. This antisocial behavior is often the result of the
interaction and culmination of the other main traits of psychopaths.
Their emotional poverty and impulsive life create a belief system
that enables them to take what they want, when they want, without
remorse, guilt or fear, leading to a life of crime (Babiak, 2008, p. 2).
The corporate or compensated psychopaths have these same main
traits, albeit less severe. The difference lies in the corporate psycho-
paths ability to maintain a more consistent faade of normalcy. Their
interpersonal interactions are designed to meet organizational expec-
tations in order to advance quickly up the corporate ladder. They
gain status and responsibility simply to position themselves where
they need to be to commit fraud. Their targets are co-workers and
upper management, whom they spend a great deal of time convinc-
ing they are perfect, loyal, hardworking, and ambitious employees.
They manipulate useful people based on what they need from them;
these people become pawns, patrons, or patsies. The pawn is anyone
the psychopath perceives has power or access to some desired cor-
porate resource. The patron is anyone with key power who serves to
protect and defend the psychopath when needed. After the pawn or
patrons utility is used up, their power and influence are neutralized
by the psychopath and they become the patsy (Carozza, 2008, p. 41).
The game corporate psychopaths play is somewhat akin to a game of
chess, moving players around the board while avoiding checkmate.
The psychopaths fraud will continue to be successful as long as their
manipulations and lies are successful. If the fraud is discovered, they
will simply move on to the next organization and begin again. If an
organization decides to prosecute, the psychopathic fraudster will
use charm and pathologic lies to appear as if they were the typical
one-time offender, even feigning remorse. If successful, it is possible
psychopaths can escape the severe sanctions they truly deserve.
23
JUSTICE FOR SOME BUT NOT FOR ALL
A common complaint heard from those who investigate fraud is that
there is not enough done to punish occupational fraud and other
white-collar offenders. According to the ACFEs 2006 Report to the
Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, the most common employ-
ment action taken against alleged offenders was termination, followed
by restitution. While nearly three-quarters of the cases surveyed were
reported to the police, frauds with lower median losses were less likely
to be reported. Of the cases that were prosecuted, the most common
result was a guilty or no contest plea. Even withstanding prosecu-
tion, the main goal of an organization which has become a victim of
fraud is to seek restitution. Unfortunately, nearly half never see a dime
(Wells, 2008, pp. 40-44).
Regardless of what surveys tell us, an expectation gap exists between
what the public feels is justice and what the justice system is able, or
willing, to deliver (Rebovish & Kane, 2002, p. 1). Even though occu-
pational fraud continues to cost companies billions of dollars per year,
and in some cases, to force organizations into bankruptcy, these types
of crimes are not a priority for law enforcement. One reason is that
frauds are difficult to investigate defendants are often difficult to
identify and locate, assets disappear, investigations can require coor-
dination across multiple jurisdictions and agencies, and juries get lost
in the details. Another reason is that prosecutors have wide latitude
in deciding which cases to prosecute. Cases that go to trial are usu-
ally those that are sure winners, and since prosecutors are elected in
the majority of states, a winning record means re-election (Anderson,
n.d.). Addressing this problem, Kenneth Brelser wrote in the Winter
1996 issue of Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics:
The real-world harm is two-fold. A prosecutor
protective of a win-loss record has an incen-
tive to cut constitutional and ethical corners to
secure a guilty verdict in a weak case to win at all
costs. A prosecutor who counts convictions also
has a countervailing incentive to drop weak cases.
The prosecutor may decline, dismiss or otherwise
refuse to try cases that, although supported by
probable cause and sufficient evidence to convict,
would nonetheless be difficult cases in which to
secure convictions (Anderson, n.d.).
With such wide latitude, it is not unexpected that declination rates
across jurisdictions vary widely (TRAC Reports, Inc., 2003). Where
a prosecutor in one jurisdiction may vigorously oppose occupational
fraud, a prosecutor in the next jurisdiction may not. This broad spec-
trum serves to increase the publics frustration with the legal system
and widens the expectation gap. Several surveys conducted since
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY
2000 demonstrate an increasing public intolerance toward white-
collar crime in general. In the past, the public considered fraud and
other white-collar crimes to be somewhat innocuous when compared
to other, violent crimes; however, that is no longer the case. In fact,
according to survey results, some now view fraud as more serious than
certain street crimes (Rebovish & Kane, 2002, p. 6). Based on the his-
tory of white-collar crime scandals since 2000, and the resulting loss
of pensions and life savings suffered by many, this reaction should not
be unexpected; however, even with the Governments response to the
massive financial statements frauds that occurred in 2001 and 2002,
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) regulations have done little with respect to the
punishment of the everyday occupational offender (i.e. misappropria-
tion of assets). In fact, even with these regulations and the threat of
severe sanctions for the executive who commits a securities fraud, or
cooks the books, the ACFE 2008 Report to the Nation indicates the
existence of an inverse correlation with respect to SOX requirements
and the size of median losses from financial statement fraud schemes,
as well as the duration to detect them (p. 41).
The wide latitude and inconsistency in punishing occupational
offenders can be seen in many recent cases. A woman who admitted
to embezzling in excess of $1.2 million from a school district over a
ten-year period was sentenced to a year in jail, five years probation,
and ordered to pay restitution (Crawford, 2007); however, a woman
convicted of embezzling nearly $1 million from an amateur hockey
organization may not see one day behind bars; the judge delayed her
sentencing for a year during which she was ordered to pay restitu-
tion (Higgins, 2009). The latter case is a clear example of an instance
where the organizations goal of recovery overrides the publics percep-
tion and expectation of just desserts. It is in these instances that the
psychopathic fraudster benefits from conflicting goals. In sharp con-
trast to the above cases are two additional recent cases on the other
end of the spectrum. In the first, a three-time convicted embezzler
received a twenty-two year prison sentence after being found guilty
of three counts of embezzlement for stealing more than $16,000
(Gonzalez, 2009). Meanwhile, a Hawkins County, Tennessee woman
was sentenced to thirty months in prison and five years supervised
release for embezzling $105,900 from a credit union (Lane, 2009).
Much of the disparity seen above may be the result of the justice
systems attempt to restore leniency to what may be viewed as overly
strict Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Prior to the 2005 Supreme
Court decision, United States v Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for fraud were mandatory with sentences based
on a calculation of loss; no other factors could be considered. The
Booker decision made those Guidelines advisory, giving judges more
24
discretion and allowing them to use a lower standard of proof. The
loss table, however, still remains the starting point in any sentencing
decision (Harris & Kaminska, 2008, pp. 154-155). Following Booker,
the Supreme Court decisions in Gall v United States, 128 S. Ct. 586
(2007) and Kimbrough v United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007) made
further sweeping changes, as noted by Harris & Kaminska, including:
the consideration of certain soft factors
[under 18 U.S. 3553(a)] present in white-collar
cases, such as age, post offense employment, and
reputational harmwhich were either discour-
aged or prohibited under the mandatory Guide-
linesthus finally shifting the focus away from
loss as a controlling factor (p. 155).
These recent cases have instilled additional determination require-
ments aimed at a more fair determination of culpability, by requiring
the consideration of additional factors such as the mental state and
motive of the alleged offender, as well as other characteristics; how-
ever, they have also restored a significant degree of discretion to the
courts as can be seen in the above cases (Harris & Kaminska, p. 157).
Although these soft factors may result in a fair determination where
the typical occupational offender experienced a moral lapse of reason,
these same factors will also pave the way for a reduced sentence for
the psychopathic fraudster. If he need only show community service,
financial support for charities, and a remorseful mental state, he can
most likely escape severe sanctions and be on his way to his next
victim.
CONCLUSION
There is a common misconception that most occupational offend-
ers are not really like other criminals. Their crimes are not ones of
violence, rage or insanity, but only of moral turpitude; a slide down a
slippery slope they attempted to navigate in a moment of weakness.
These misconceptions help to mask the psychopathic fraudster, whose
sole reason for waking up every day is to lie, cheat, steal, and manipu-
late those around him. He hides behind the faade he has created
for himself and the misconceptions we have created for him. Once
again in our judicial history, we see these misconceptions resonate
through our justice system, with calls for leniency and discretion in
sentencing determinations. History has shown that for punishment
to be effective in any circumstance, it must be certain, severe, and
swift. Regardless of the severity and swiftness called for by our regula-
tions, if punishment is not certain, then it serves no purpose. While
 FORENSICS JOURNAL
societys attitude toward intolerance for white-collar crime in general
has changed, it seems our justice system has moved in the opposite
direction. Although over the past decade we have seen more severe
sanctions against those convicted of high profile fraud schemes, the
everyday occupational offender continues to benefit from our sympa-
thy and empathy for their particular situation, or for the fact that we
tend to want to see the good in those around us; emotions never to be
experienced by the psychopathic offender. http://federalsentencingreporter.com/back_issue.php
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life_and_style/article826475.ece?token=null&offset=0&page=1
 FORENSICS JOURNAL
The Gap between Training and Research in the
Detection of Deception Revisited
Edward R. Kemery, Ph.D.
ABSTRACT
In a recent article, Blair and Kooi (2004) argue that existing research
concerning detection of deception provides minimal support for the
Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation, the dominant
methodology currently taught to members of law enforcement. Con-
clusions offered by Blair and Kooi are predicated on a meta-analysis
of 1,338 statistical estimates of 158 cues to deception obtained from
120 independent samples (DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck,
Charlon, & Cooper, 2003). However, Blair and Kooi (2004) base
their pessimistic assessment of the viability of the Reid Technique on
a restricted interpretation of the technique and use only select infor-
mation from DePaulo, et al. (2003). Using a broader interpretation of
the Reid Technique and the breadth of data provided by DePaulo et
al. (2003), this paper offers more promise for using the Reid Tech-
nique for detecting deception.
THE GAP BETWEEN TRAINING AND RESEARCH IN THE
DETECTION OF DECEPTION REVISITED
There is nothing more practical than a good theory is a quote
from Kurt Lewin (1951), a noted behavioral scientist. Implicit in
this statement is that a good, solid theory, one based on sound,
scientific research will be of great value to those in the field whose
success depends on applying valid knowledge. This is perhaps no
more important in endeavors such as medicine and law because they
directly impact human lives. Regarding the former, applications of
sound theory have had profound impacts on a wide range of human
existence by providing methods to better treat, and in some instances
cure, previously vexing illnesses. In the latter, which is the focus of
this paper, theory and sound research in the social sciences have
informed various aspects of the legal process, the essence of which is
to dispense justice.
An essential aspect of criminal justice is determining the guilt
or innocence of individuals or deciding on their credibility. This
endeavor, while important to many forensic activities (Aamodt &
Custer, 2006), is a crucial component of criminal investigation
because decisions regarding guilt, innocence, and credibility of
individuals determine an investigations direction and ultimately,
its conclusion. In other words, because investigators routinely must
make decisions about the veracity of individuals, detecting deception
is an extremely important investigation skill.
This paper addresses the relationship among theory, research and
practice as applied to detecting deception in investigation inter-
views. In a recent article, Blair and Kooi (2004) claimed that the gap
between research and training in detecting deception is so wide that
current training practices are unjustified. Specifically, Blair and Kooi
27
(2004) argued that there is little research support for the widely-
touted Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation (Reid Tech-
nique; Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2001). Upon further review,
as described below, it is argued that the gap between research and
practice in detecting deception is not as large as previously suggested.
According to Trovillo (1939), interest in differentiating truth-telling
from lying dates back for centuries, and a variety of techniques have
been used to gauge truthfulness (Navarro & Schafer, 2001). While
numerous theories have been offered and studies conducted to iden-
tify valid ways for detecting deception, many rest on the premise that
deceptive subjects manifest observable physiological and behavioral
changes because lying causes anxiety.
That physiological reactions can be reliably measured and validly
reflect deception prompted creation of the polygraph machine (i.e.,
lie detector). In this procedure, a subject is connected to a device that
measures heart and respiration rate, breathing, blood pressure, and
galvanic skin response. A polygraph examiner then asks the subject
a series of questions to which the examiner knows the answer (i.e.,
baseline questions). A subjects physiological reactions are recorded
and subsequently compared with those to questions of substance
to the investigation (Lykken, 1959). Manifest changes in subjects
reactions to baseline questions and those measured after substantive
questions are viewed as indices of potential deception.
Despite their acceptance by, and wide use in, U. S. law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies, polygraph examination has not been
without its critics who argue that there is little credible research sup-
porting its accuracy (e.g., Lykken, 2006). Subjects highly motivated
to beat the polygraph machine can employ a variety of tactics such as
pressing on a tack hidden in their shoe to manipulate arousal during
baseline questions. Lykken (2006) concluded that polygraph find-
ings are biased against the innocent, and suggests that a lie detector
in Washington DC is about as useless as a compass at the magnetic
North Pole (p. 17). In recognizing limitations of polygraph findings,
the judicial system in Australia has gone so far as to entirely ban poly-
graph results from criminal proceedings (Freckelton, 2004). The U.S.
judicial system has not gone quite that far. A number of states con-
sider polygraph results inadmissible in a criminal trial, while others
will allow them, but only if admissibility is agreed to by both parties
(see, e.g., Greely & Illes, 2007, for a listing of U.S. state regulations
regarding polygraph use).
Another means of gauging witness and suspect credibility by law
enforcement officers is from information gathered through the inter-
view process. Based on the totality of information obtained, investiga-
tors must judiciously decide how to proceed with an investigation.
Tracking down false leads provided by deceptive witnesses or suspects
wastes valuable time, so investigators often must make snap credibil-
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY
ity judgments which are based on several factors operating contem-
poraneously, not only information provided but also the interviewees
overall demeanor (what is said, how it is said, and other attendant
behavioral cues).
To assist law enforcement in making valid credibility judgments
within an interview context, John E. Reid and Associates (Reid)
developed a model to guide investigators on paying attention to
what are the most important factors during an interview. The Reid
Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation (Reid Technique as it
has come to be known) has achieved a wide degree of acceptance.
As noted by Blair and Kooi (2004), Reid has trained over 150,000
criminal investigators from many countries throughout the world.
And, their book, Criminal Interrogations and Confessions (Inbau, Reid,
Buckley, & Jayne, 2001) has been touted as the most commonly
employed text in the criminal justice field (Gudjonsson, 2003; Leo,
2001; Vrij, 2000).
OVERVIEW OF THE REID TECHNIQUE OF INTERVIEW
AND INTERROGATION
The Reid Technique, one of many possible tools in an investigators
satchel, involves an on-going assessment of a subjects behavioral reac-
tions over the course of an interview. This behavioral analysis method,
predicated on the notion that deceptive subjects will display their
deception in an array of reactions, trains interviewers to focus on the
totality of interviewee behavior by simultaneously tuning in to three
channels of communication: verbal, non-verbal, and paralinguistic.
The verbal channel involves not only the meaning of the spoken
word, but also word arrangement and choice. The non-verbal chan-
nel contains information communicated through changes in posture,
eye contact, and facial expression, while the paralinguistic channel
involves response timing and length, and erasure behaviors, such as
clearing of the throat and laughing following a response (Inbau et al.
2001).
Underpinning the Reid Technique are several principles (Inbau et al.,
2001). First, and perhaps most important, is that there are no unique
behaviors associated with truthfulness or deception. Not unlike the
baseline approach to polygraph testing, interviewers using the Reid
Technique are trained to gauge a subjects normal behavior patterns
by focusing on all three communication channels simultaneously,
judging the consistency of the three channels, and evaluating the
preponderance of behavior during an interview. It is especially impor-
tant that interviewers be vigilant for behavioral changes and instances
where subjects display cross-channel inconsistency.
28
Blair and Kooi (2004) challenged the validity of the Reid Technique,
claiming that The existing literature reveals serious lack of knowledge
regarding The Reid Technique (p. 82). It is the contention of the
present paper that this conclusion is overly pessimistic in two regards:
one is that it is based on an incomplete representation of the Reid
Technique; the other is that, based on this incomplete representation,
the authors chose to ignore research findings that actually lend sup-
port to the viability of the Reid Technique.
Because Blair and Kooi (2004) evaluated results from a study by
DePaulo, et al. (2003) as their basis for claiming a disconnection
between research and practice in the detection of deception, details of
this study will be reviewed below. Following this review and discus-
sion of limitations of the analysis provided by Blair and Kooi (2004),
a broader analysis of DePaulo, et al. (2003) is proffered, one that
arguably lends more credence to the deception detection methods
taught by Reid and Associates.
THE DEPAULO ET AL. (2003) STUDY
DePaulo, et al. (2003) conducted an in-depth analysis of previous
empirical research involving cues of deception, including verbal,
non-verbal, and paralinguistic. They used an analytical tool called
meta-analysis in which results from a number of studies of the same
behavioral deception cue are combined to provide a best estimate
(also termed effect-size) of the relationship. The effect size (d) can be
tested for both statistical significance and the presence of moderator
variables which might condition (further explain) observed relation-
ships. For example, consider the deception cue, providing details.
According to the theoretical underpinnings of the Reid Technique,
when asked about a situation involving a crime, a deceptive indi-
vidual would be motivated to provide less detail. This way, the indi-
vidual would not have to create and commit to memory an elaborate
lie, the elements of which might be difficult to recall later. In their
analysis of research on providing details, DePaulo et al. (2003) were
able to identify 24 independent effect sizes, 16 of which contained
enough information to estimate differences in liars and truth-tellers.
From these studies, an average effect size of -0.30 was found which
is statistically significant. Because the data were coded such that liars
were compared with truth-tellers, this negative relationship indicates
that across the 16 samples, liars provided less detail than truth-tellers,
a finding that lends support to the Reid Technique.
 FORENSICS JOURNAL

In the aggregate, the DePaulo, et al. (2003) study included data from TABLE 1
120 independent samples obtained from 116 studies. Based on their
results, they addressed the question: Do people behave differently Comparison of Reid Predictions and DePaulo et al. (2003)
when they are lying compared with when they are telling the truth? Observed Behaviors (adapted from Blair and Kooi, 2004)
and concluded:
DEPAULO ALL
BEHAVIORS REID MODELa
The combined results of 1,338 estimates of 158 STUDIES
cues to deception are reported. Results show that Posture Changes + 0.05
in some ways, liars are less forthcoming than truth
tellers, and they tell less compelling tales. They Illustrators 0.14 *
also make a more negative impression and are Adaptors (Fidgeting) + 0.16 *
more tense. Their stories include fewer ordinary Feet/Leg Movements + 0.09
imperfections and unusual contents. However,
many behaviors showed no discernible links, or Eye Contact 0.01
only weak links, to deceit. Cues to deception were Duration 0.03
more pronounced when people were motivated Latency + 0.02
to succeed, especially when the motivations were
Rate 0.07
identity relevant rather than monetary or mate-
rial. Cues to deception were also stronger when Pitch 0.21 *
lies were about transgressions (p. 74).
a
A + value indicates deceptive subjects exhibited more of a behavior.
THE BLAIR AND KOOI (2004) ANALYSIS A value indicates deceptive subjects engaged in less of a behavior
than truthful subjects.
In order to understand limitations of conclusions offered by Blair and * p < 0.05
Kooi (2004) regarding the efficacy of the Reid Technique for detect-
ing deception, it is important to consider evidence evaluated by Blair Taken together, these select results suggest very little support for the
and Kooi (2004) relative to what is taught in the Reid Technique. As Reid Technique; only three of the nine cues are statistically signifi-
noted previously, the Reid Technique trains investigators to focus on cant, and one of them, pitch, is contrary to what is suggested by
three behavioral response domains verbal, non-verbal, and paralin- Reid. Unfortunately, by limiting consideration to only two of the
guistic. While DePaulo, et al. (2003) included research from all three three focal response domains, Blair and Kooi (2004) provide at best a
in their study, unfortunately, Blair and Kooi (2004) chose to focus weak test of the Reid Techniques efficacy. In other words, excluding
only on what they termed non-verbal indicators of deception (in the verbal response domain ignores the richness of information avail-
Reids terms, non-verbal and paralinguistic), justifying their choice by able to investigators who would also pay attention to a subjects verbal
stating that, Because most existing research about the detection of behavior, and according to the Reid Technique, use this information
deception has focused on nonverbal indicators, this paper will focus in conjunction with other data to make a determination of credibility.
on nonverbal indicators of deception (p. 77).

Based on their limited focus, Blair and Kooi (2003) identified nine
cues to deception on which to judge support for the Reid Technique.
These cues are shown in Table 1, along with predictions based on
the Reid Technique, and aggregate effect sizes from DePaulo, et al.
(2003). This table partially reproduces the one found in Blair and
Kooi (2004, p. 81):
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEPAULO, ET AL. (2003) STUDY
FOR THE REID TECHNIQUE REVISITED
Of the 158 cues to deception identified by DePaulo, et al. (2003),
88 of them were reported in three or more empirical studies, their
criterion for final inclusion in the meta-analysis. In order to provide a
stronger test of the Reid Technique, each significant finding reported
by DePaulo, et al. (2003) was categorized according to its relevant
response domain (verbal, non-verbal, or paralinguistic). Results of
this categorization process are displayed in Table 2. In all, 22 effect
sizes (25%) are statistically significant in differentiating liars from
truth-tellers, including nine verbal cues, eight non-verbal cues, and
five paralinguistic cues.

29
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY

TABLE 2

Summary of Significant Findings (out of 88 indices) from DePaulo,

et al. (2003).

RESPONSE DOMAIN/ DEFINITION

EFFECT SIZE INTERPRETATION
BEHAVIORAL CUE (ADAPTED FROM DEPAULO, ET AL., 2003)
NON-VERBAL
Illustrators -0.14 Hand movements that accompany speech and illustrate it Deceptives exhibited
fewer illustrators
Cooperative (overall) -0.66 Speaker seems cooperative, helpful, positive, and secure Deceptives were seen as
less cooperative
Presses lips 0.16 Lips are pressed together Deceptives pressed their
lips more
Chin raise 0.25 Chin is raised; chin and lower lip are pushed up Deceptives raised their
chin more
Facial pleasantness -0.12 Speakers face appears pleasant; speakers show more positive Deceptives displayed less
facial expressions (such as smiles) than negative expressions facial pleasantness
(such as frowns or sneers)
Nervous, tense (overall) 0.27 Speaker seems nervous, tense; speaker makes body move- Deceptives appeared
ments that seem nervous more nervous
Pupil dilation 0.39 Pupil size, usually measured by a pupillometer Deceptives showed more
evidence of pupil dilation
Fidgeting (undifferentiated) 0.16 Object fidgeting and/or self-fidgeting and/or facial fidgeting Deceptives exhibited
(undifferentiated) more fidgeting
PARALINGUISTIC
Talking time -0.35 Proportion of the total time of the interaction that the Deceptives spent less
speaker spends talking or seems talkative time talking
Verbal immediacy -0.31 Linguistic variations indicative of speakers efforts Deceptives were less
(all categories) to distance themselves from their listener, the content immediate in their response
of their communications, or the act of conveying those latencies across all categories
communications (e.g., Theres Johnny is more non-
immediate than Heres Johnny), temporal non-
immediacy (the present tense is more immediate than
other tenses), and passivity (the passive voice is more
non-immediate than the active voice).
Verbal and vocal immediacy -0.55 Speakers respond in ways that seem direct, relevant, clear, Deceptives showed
(impressions) and personal rather than indirect, distancing, evasive, less immediacy
irrelevant, unclear, or impersonal
Verbal and vocal uncertainty 0.3 Speakers seem uncertain, insecure, or not very dominant, Deceptives showed
(impressions) assertive, or emphatic; speakers seem to have difficulty more uncertainty
answering the question
Vocal tension 0.26 Voice sounds tense, not relaxed; or, vocal stress as assessed Deceptives displayed more
by the Psychological Stress Evaluator, which measures vocal vocal tension
micro-tremors, or by the Mark II voice analyzer

30
 FORENSICS JOURNAL

VERBAL
Details
Plausibility
Logical structure
Discrepant, ambivalent
Word and phrase repetitions
Negative statements
and complaints
Spontaneous corrections
Admitted lack of memory
Related external associations
-0.3 Degree to which the message includes details such as Deceptives provided
descriptions of people, places, actions, objects, events, and less detail
the timing of events; degree to which the message seems
complete, concrete, striking, or rich in details
-0.23 Degree to which the message seems plausible, Deceptives provided less
likely, or believable plausible accounts
-0.25 Consistency and coherence of statements; collection of Deceptives accounts
different and independent details that form a coherent were less logical
account of a sequence of events
0.34 Speakers communications seem internally inconsistent or Deceptives provided
discrepant; information from different sources (e.g., face vs. more discrepant and
voice) seem contradictory; speakers seem to be ambivalent ambiguous information
0.21 Subcategory of non-ah speech disturbances in which Deceptives repeated words
words or phrases are repeated with no intervening and phrases more often
pauses or speech errors
0.21 Degree to which the message seems negative or includes Deceptives made more
negative comments or complaints (Measures of positive negative statements and
comments were included after being reversed.) complain more
-0.29 Spontaneous correction of ones statements Deceptives offered fewer
spontaneous corrections
-0.42 Admission of lack of memory Deceptives less likely to
admit a faulty memory
0.35 Reference to events or relationships that are external Deceptives offered more
to the event of immediate focus external associations
(events or relationships)
relative to key event

The missing component of the Blair and Kooi (2004) analysis, verbal
behavior, contained the largest number of significant findings. Gener-
ally, those who were deceptive provided less detail in their answers
and provided less logical and plausible accounts. They also provided
more discrepant and ambiguous information, repeated words and
phrases more often, and were more likely to complain and make
negative statements. They were also less likely to make spontaneous
corrections in their story, and less likely to admit having a faulty
memory. Overall, in terms of non-verbal behavior, deceptive indi-
viduals used fewer illustrators, were seen as less cooperative, pressed
their lips and raised their chin more often, appeared more nervous,
and displayed more facial unpleasantness than non-deceptive per-
sons. Relative to paralinguistic behavior, deceptive individuals spent
less time talking, showed less immediacy in their response latencies,
seemed more vocally tense, and were seen as less certain about what
they were saying than were their truthful counterparts.
Taken together, these findings suggest a more optimistic
evaluation of the efficacy of the Reid Technique, and a smaller gap
between research and practice than previously suggested by Blair and
Kooi (2004). That is not to say that the book is closed on the Reid
Technique. The study and conclusions provided by DePaulo, et al.
(2003) are from an aggregation of information obtained from a wide
range of deception studies. While research on its aspects conducted
by its proponents is included in the meta-analysis (Horvath, 1973,
1978, 1979; Horvath, Jayne, & Buckley, 1994), the meta-analysis
does not speak directly to the validity of the Reid Technique; rather,
because the analysis involves estimating an effect size across a num-
ber of research methods, observed effects are those that are hardy,
that is, they tend to manifest themselves independent of the method
employed. It follows from this analysis that the cues of deception
listed in Table 2 are those that manifest themselves rather consistently.

31
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY
CONCLUSION
While the findings may be interpreted as indicative of behavioral
tendencies of deception, and it would be tempting to create a profile
of the typical liar, it would be unwise for an investigator to attach
specific meaning to any one index or even to a constellation of them.
Just as with results from any investigative tool, information gleaned
from interviews should be considered suggestive, or perhaps even
presumptive. But in any event, hypotheses (e.g. hunches, suspicions)
generated from interviews should be corroborated with other infor-
mation, when available, in order to make prudent decisions guiding
an investigations direction.
REFERENCES
Aamodt, M. G., & Custer, H. (2006). Who can best catch a liar?
Forensic Examiner, 15(1), 6-11.
Blair, J. P., & Kooi, B. (2004). The gap between training and the
detection of deception. International Journal of Police Science &
Management, 6(2), 77-83.
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L.,
Charlon, K., & Cooper, H. (2003). Cues of deception. Psychological
Bulletin, 129(1), 74-118.
Freckelton, I. (2003, November). The closing of the coffin on foren-
sic polygraph evidence for Australia. Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law,
359-366.
Greely, H. T., & Illes, J. (2007). Neuroscience-basedlie detection: The
urgent need for regulation. American Journal of Law & Medicine, 33,
377-431.
Gudjonsson, G. H. (2003). The psychology of interrogations and confes-
sions: A handbook. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Horvath, F. (1978). An experimental comparison of the psychological
stress evaluator and the galvanic skin response in detection of decep-
tion. Journal of Applied Psychology, 63, 338-344.
32
Horvath, F. (1979). Effect of different motivational instructions on
detection of deception with the psychological stress evaluator and the
galvanic skin response. Journal of Applied Psychology, 64, 323-330.
Horvath, F., Jayne, B., & Buckley, J. (1994). Differentiation of truth-
ful and deceptive criminal suspects in behavior analysis interviews.
Journal of Forensic Sciences, 39, 793-807.
Horvath, F. S. (1973). Verbal and nonverbal clues to truth and decep-
tion during polygraph examinations. Journal of Police Science and
Administration, 1, 138-152.
Inbau, F. E., Reid, J. E., Buckley, J. P., & Jayne, B. P. (2001). Crimi-
nal interrogations and confessions. Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen.
Leo, R. A. (2001). False confessions: Causes, consequences, and
solutions. In S. D. Westervelt & J. A. Humphrey, Wrongly convicted:
Perspectives on failed justice. (pp. 36-54). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press.
Lewin, K. (1951). Field theory in social science: Selected theoretical
papers. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Lykken, D. (2006). Nothing like the truth. New Scientist, 183(2460).
Lykken, D. T. (1959). The GSR in the detection of guilt. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 43, 385-388.
Navarro, J., & Schafer, J. R. (2001). Detecting deception. FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, 70(7), 9-13.
Trovillo, P. V. (1939). A history of lie detection. Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology, 29, 848-881.
U.S. Department of Labor. (2008). Retrieved July 2, 2008, from
http://www.dol.gov//.pdf
Vrij, A. (2000). Detecting lies and deceit: The psychology of lying and the
implications for professional practice. New York: Wiley.
 FORENSICS JOURNAL
Book Review:
Corporate Resiliency: Managing the Growing Risk of Fraud
and Corruption by Toby Bishop and Frank Hydoski
Ken Johanning
The authors main idea presented in the book is that resilient compa-
nies can survive after a fraud has occurred. According to Bishop and
Hydoski (2009), [R]esiliency can be viewed as doing the things nec-
essary to minimize harmful effects and mobilize resources to facilitate
recovery (p. 32). The authors provide advice on what can be done
to assess risk areas and controls that can be implemented to detect
fraud. In addition, guidance is provided on establishing investigative
programs in the event a fraud actually occurs so as to help minimize
its effect.
The book reviews some fraud statistics from the Association of Certi-
fied Fraud Examiners (ACFE) 2008 Report to the Nation on Occupa-
tional Fraud and Abuse, e.g. the average company will lose around 7%
of its revenue to fraud (p. 8). It is therefore important for companies
to consider fraud and be prepared for it. In addition, A company
with a 10 percent profit margin that experiences a single $250,000
misappropriation of assets would have to generate an additional $2.5
million in revenue to restore its net income to pre-fraud levels (p.
22) Consequently, the recovery from fraud by a company is both a
time and cost consuming process.
Companies that are resilient can survive a severe fraud while those
that are not tend to fail. In order to continue after a fraud, the
authors suggest several steps to preclude the recurrence of fraud: per-
form a fraud assessment, establish an anti-fraud control environment,
implement preventive and detection controls, and develope a fraud
investigation plan.
The initial step is the preparation of a fraud assessment, a tool used
to determine where the company is vulnerable to fraud and how its
current anti-fraud strategies are working. The authors provide a help-
ful organized process to prepare a risk assessment including details for
each step that are easy to understand and implement. A list of ques-
tions is provided for those companies that already have prepared a risk
assessment to evaluate its effectiveness.
A second step is creating the companys control environment, the
rules of behavior within a company including a written code of eth-
ics, a hotline and a mechanism for investigating fraud allegations. The
authors explain, A strong control environment sets an appropriate
tone for the companys attitude toward ethical behavior, including
fraud (p. 67), and they provide an example code of ethics.
The third step addresses controls either to prevent or to detect fraud.
The authors cite numerous controls related to fraudulent financial
statements, misappropriation of assets, and bribery and corruption.
The authors stress the importance of monitoring after controls have
33
been put into place. Each of these components supports the theme of
the book: prepared companies can survive a fraud.
The fourth and final step outlines how a company should prepare for
a fraud and what actors need to be involved in preventing and inves-
tigating fraud. Investigations are crucial to limiting the frauds impact
and enacting steps to prevent future similar frauds. According to
Bishop and Hydoski, In many instances, the way a company investi-
gates an incident of fraud can be just as criticaland sometimes even
more criticalthan the fact that the fraud took place (p. 123). A
corporation should take careful steps in planning an investigation and
identifying areas that are susceptible to fraud.
The authors describe the actors who have roles in preventing, detect-
ing and investigating fraud to include internal auditors, management,
and the board of directors. Each persons role is clearly defined which
assists companies in clarifying employees responsibilities.
In conclusion, the authors present their views of what may happen
in the future. The authors believe that a companys approach to fraud
needs to be flexible as the schemes that fraudsters employ will change
over time. Knowing the types of schemes that have been perpetrated
in the past helps corporations prepare for the future.
Although the information provided is valuable, the book has several
shortcomings. First, there are no detailed examples of actual frauds.
The authors provide a few real life examples; however, these are too
general and vague to be of much value. Readers tend to relate to real
life examples more than to the presentation of theory alone. These
examples would have been helpful to put some of the concepts men-
tioned in the book into perspective. The authors could have followed
one fraud through from beginning to end as the book progressed.
Second, a majority of those quoted in the book actually work for the
same accounting and consulting firm as the authors. As such, this
presents a narrow view. Obtaining perspectives from people with
varying backgrounds in different industries would widen the aperture
and demonstrate the complexity of fraudulent schemes. Interviews
and insight from former fraudsters who actually committed fraud,
such as Sam Antar, former CFO of Crazy Eddie, Inc., who commit-
ted financial statement fraud and cost investors millions of dollars
would provide an invaluable perspective. This is a perfect example
of fraud committed by a company insider who is willing to share his
story, to demonstrate how he was able to commit the fraud, and over
what period of time. Antars website states that he shares his views
and advice on white collar crime (Antar, n.d.).
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY
There are many steps a company can take to prevent fraud and to
survive a fraudif it is prepared. The authors convincingly make the
case that the time and cost of implementing the ideas in this book
will be less than the cost of a loss due to an actual fraud. A useful
follow-up to the book would be to provide updated fraud schemes
that have been perpetrated. This will allow companies to become
aware of these schemes and realign their anti-fraud tactics to combat
these schemes.
According to the authors, In our experience, companies that prepare
for the eventuality of fraud and corruption do a better job of coping
and recovering than companies that wait until something unfortunate
has occurred. Formulating a response to fraud after it has occurred is
like closing the barn door after the horses have escaped. (p. 151)
This book is an effective tool for executives, board members, or
anyone who wants to learn more about ways a company can prepare
for a potential fraud. The reader will gain an understanding of what
34
is needed to help a company formulate or strengthen an existing
anti-fraud program from preparing a risk assessment to implementing
an investigative program before a fraud occurs. The book is easy to
understand and written in plain language that eliminates the use of
accounting and auditing terms that readers may not understand.
REFERENCES
Antar, S. (n.d.). White Collar Fraud. Retrieved September 28, 2009,
from http://www.whitecollarfraud.com
Bishop, T. J., & Hydoski, F. E. (2009). Corporate Resiliency: Managing
the Growing Risk of Fraud and Corruption. New Jersey: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc.
2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse. (2008).
Retrieved from http://www.acfe.com//.asp?copy=rttn
 FORENSICS JOURNAL
Book Review:
Fraud Exposed: What You Dont Know Could Cost
Your Company Millions by Joseph W. Koletar
Marina Tapia
ABSTRACT
In recent years, meaningful research by the Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners (ACFE) has revealed that occupational fraud con-
tinues to be a significant problem in most organizations. According
to the ACFE, the fraud problem, at $600 billion, is a problem that
cannot easily be identified or measured. A review of Fraud Exposed:
What You Dont Know Could Cost Your Company Millions by Joseph
W. Koletar, Certified Fraud Examiner, confirmed that forensic
professionals often place greater emphasis on identifying the symp-
toms of fraud rather than identifying the causes of fraud. However,
empirical research suggests that one of several steps can be taken in
organizations to minimize or curtail the opportunity for fraud, such
as instituting a reporting mechanism, adopting a minimal cost fraud
prevention measure, segregating the duties of employees, or develop-
ing a personal profile of a suspect.
REVIEW
On December 11, 2008, vast numbers of individuals and organiza-
tions lost their investments as the result of Bernard Madoffs $50
billion Ponzi scheme.1 Madoff, once the head of NASDAQ, a highly
admired and gifted financier of Wall Street, had it all, a penthouse
apartment in Manhattan, shares in two private jets, the yacht moored
off the French Riviera (Creswell & Thomas Jr., 2009, p. 1). How did
this fraudster achieve prominent status and power while manipulating
and depriving countless individuals and organizations of their invest-
ments? The answer is not readily apparent, but according to Creswell
& Thomas (2009), an easy answer is that Mr. Madoff was a charlatan
of epic proportions, a greedy manipulator so hungry to accumulate
wealth that he did not care whom he hurt to get what he wanted (p.
2). Without a doubt, fraud schemes of this magnitude lead the baffled
researcher to consider how an organization can mitigate its fraud risk
exposure, minimize its losses as a result of employee theft and avoid
becoming the next victim of fraud.
In his book entitled, Fraud Exposed: What You Dont Know Could Cost
Your Company Millions, Joseph W. Koletar, Certified Fraud Examiner
(CFE), helps his readers understand the truth about occupational
fraud and abuse.2 Despite proactive participation in part by the
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) in finding viable
solutions for fraud problems, Koletar effectively argues that insuf-
ficient resources have been allocated to address the fraud problems
that organizations often encounter. Consequently, forensic profession-
als often fail to identify the causes of fraud, and inefficiently place
greater emphasis on identifying the symptoms. In discussing these
and other fraud related issues, Koletar noted, that in order for the
field to continue to mature and develop, we still have a long way to
go (p. 85). Of particular importance, Koletar urges forensic profes-
sionals to recognize that regardless of the size of an organization, the
base levels of fraud are predominantly the same.
35
How can an organization mitigate its fraud risk exposure? Koletar
observed that managers, executives, and forensic professionals are
often unaware of effective compliance programs and as a result fail
to prevent and detect fraud. Koletar further contended that although
internal controls play a vital role in any organization large or small,
even when internal controls are in place, employees often decline to
use them and sometimes even override the controls. Indicative of this
observation, he noted that when an organization fails to implement
internal controls it gives an employee an opportunity to commit
fraud. Koletar confirmed that, we should also be sensitive to the fact
that controls should be part of a larger plan for mitigating the risk
to the organization and not an end unto themselves (p. 109). Most
importantly, Koletar emphasized that although compliance programs
and internal controls are available, internal and external forces (e.g.
internal and external relationships, the environment, and reputation
of the organization) often contribute to the ineffectiveness of such
programs.
An important area Koletar failed to address in his book was segrega-
tion of an employees duties, often recognized as an essential part of
internal controls, despite the additional cost and effort it requires. The
employee in charge of recording transactions, for example, should be
prohibited from handling the authorization and the custody func-
tions. Ultimately, when such segregation of duties is effectively insti-
tuted in an organization, coupled with an adequate system of internal
control and fraud policies, the risk of fraud is systematically reduced.
Employee theft as a source of occupational fraud was also explored
in the book. According to the ACFEs 2008 Report to The Nation
on Occupational Fraud & Abuse compiled by several certified fraud
examiners, an updated figure of fraud losses indicated that, organiza-
tions lose 7% of their annual revenues to fraud [and when] applied
to the projected 2008 United States gross domestic product, this 7%
figure translates to approximately $994 billion in fraud losses (p.
4). While retrospectively, the old estimate in the 1996 Report to the
Nation indicated that, over 80 percent of occupational frauds involve
asset misappropriation, cash being the target in 90 percent of the
incidents (p. 34), Koletar notes that only a few organizations report
fraud incidents to law enforcement due to fear of bad publicity.
While Koletar recognized that public beliefs and bad publicity could
damage an organizations reputation, recent empirical data sug-
gest that organizations adopting a minimal cost fraud prevention
measure such as the perception of detection are viewed favorably by
their customers while simultaneously reducing the risk of fraud. The
perception of detection measures is [an inexpensive, yet effective,
fraud prevention measure] that [allows your employees] to know that
the public entity is taking steps to detect fraud (Minnesota Office
of the State Auditor website, in Rebecca Ottos commentary section).
Koletar cited a study by researchers Richard C. Hollinger and John P.
Clark who discovered employees steal primarily as a result of work-
place conditions, and that the true costs of the problem are vastly
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY
understated (p. 54). Koletar reasoned that law enforcement models,
theories of social deviance, and learning organizations can help foren-
sic professionals better understand motivating factors and perceptions
of employees as well as aid in the development of better strategies to
deter occupational fraud.
How can an organization avoid becoming the next victim of occupa-
tional fraud? According to Koletar, expanded and meaningful research
is necessary to understand the causes of fraud. Koletar observes,
[sadly] we in the forensic profession have [a] dirty little secret: we are
remarkably ineffective in dealing with fraud (p. xiv). A positive first
step, Koletar insisted, is to look at the criminal and law enforcement
response models and determine why these models have been suc-
cessful in the battle against crime. For example, in an effort to better
serve the community, law enforcement officials redefined the roles
of its members and asked them to pay particular attention to what
is going on in the environment, whether that environment is the
community or the police department (p. 28). In response, Herman
Goldstein, a former executive assistant to O.W. Wilson (the Superin-
tendent of Police in Chicago, 1960) recognized the need for change
and subsequently developed a community policing model to address
these concerns. Goldstein emphasized, [community policing was] an
effort to conceptualize the police as part of the community (As cited
in Koletar, p. 19).
It is time for the forensic professional to reconsider his role in the
organization, prioritize his tasks, organize a professional body of
knowledge, and help organizations revisit their fraud efforts to cur-
tail the opportunity for fraud. While these guided efforts are laud-
able in writing, Koletar did address the reality that people do not
always embrace change and how to offset the challenge. Additionally,
in order to revitalize the field, extensive training and cooperation
between field experts and regulators is necessary, but these subjects are
not fully examined by Koletar.
To understand the underlying reasons why fraudsters commit fraud
in the first place, Koletar urges forensic professionals to think about
research concerning punishment and deterrence [and try to increase]
the possibilities for cooperation (p. 152-153). He stated they should
be mindful of a fraud perpetrators lifestyle and begin to think about
profiling organizations (p. 164). By focusing on the organization,
Koletar failed to emphasize the importance of developing a profile of
a fraud suspect. This profile would be composed of a financial and
personal profile that captures financial data and lifestyle habits of the
suspect. Although Koletar raised a compelling point that organiza-
tions are just like communities, he did not specifically state whether
organizations that foster this type of culture are more prone to
employee collusion.3
36
Koletar noted that a learning organization4 is very similar to a com-
munity since their members volunteer in the organization, share a
common language, and engage in power and politics. Koletars con-
tention was that until the forensic profession improves its statistics,
definitions, and anchor[s] itself conceptually within the organization
and within the academic community, it will forever drift in a state
of weakness (p. 184). Koletar suggested that forensic profession-
als consider having a system in place to measure the problems that
they often face. Particularly, Koletar asserted, a vision is necessary to
provide guidance and direction, and to help an organization achieve
its goals.
As forensic professionals, organizational pathologists and audit risk
managers, how do we effectively fight the battle against occupational
fraud? Koletar declared as forensic professionals, we must first for-
mulate answers to the most basic questions, increase our funding
and research efforts, and continually deliver our anti-fraud message.
While all of the aforementioned observations are open for discus-
sion, Koletar acknowledged the fact that it could take several years to
raise research funds and aggressive efforts taken before our anti-fraud
message is delivered effectively. Koletar observed that in order to
gain control of the fraud problem, [forensic professionals must first]
understand three things [about occupational fraud]: what it is, what it
is not, and why it is important (p. xv).
In order to minimize fraud in organizations, it is critically important
to implement an effective reporting mechanism, (e.g. a fraud hotline)
where employees can report a fraud suspect or fraudulent activity.
Thomas A. Buckhoff, CFE, pointed out that forensic accounting is a
rapidly growing field: the demand for forensic accounting began to
increase in the mid-1970s when fraud detection experts were needed
to assist various law enforcement agencies in the rapidly-growing area
of white-collar crime (p. 1).
Although Koletar posed some convincing arguments, the reality is
that the forensic profession is still evolving, expanding its sphere
of influence and continually attracting newly optimistic members
into its community. Creating a forensic community with shared
mores and beliefs remains an impressive challenge. Noticeably, more
universities are educating students about fraud prevention and detec-
tion due to the seriousness of the fraud problem. As perplexing as
the updated 2008 fraud figure of $600 billion may seem, perhaps
the only way to truly appreciate the field of forensic accounting is to
redefine leadership roles within our community to effectively lead,
guide and monitor our newest members.
 FORENSICS JOURNAL
REFERENCES
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. (2008). 2008 Report to the
Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse. Retrieved from http://acfe.
com/documents/2008-rttn.pdf
Buckhoff, T. A. (n.d.). Forensic Accountants: the fraudbusters. In
North Dakota State University. Retrieved September 26, 2009, from
http://www.ndsu.nodak.edu/ndsu/buckhoff/couses/ACCT410610/
Forensic.Accountants.The.Fraudbusters.doc
Creswell, J., & Thomas, L., Jr. (2009, January 25). The talented Mr.
Madoff. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/01/25/business/25bernie.htm
Koletar, J. W. (2003). Fraud Exposed: What You Dont Know Could
Cost Your Company Millions. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc.
Otto, R. (2008, June 27). Fraud prevention - the perception of detec-
tion. In Minnesota Office of the State Auditor. Retrieved September 28,
2009, from http://osa.state.mn.us/default.aspx?=page20090724.056
What is a Ponzi Scheme? (n.d.). U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mision [Frequently Asked Questions]. Retrieved from http://www.sec.
gov/answers/ponzi.htm
37
NOTES
1
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission defines a Ponzi scheme
as, an investment fraud that involves the payment of purported
returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors.
Ponzi scheme organizers often solicit new investors by promising to
invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with
little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the fraudsters focus on
attracting new money to make promised payments to earlier-stage
investors and to use for personal expenses, instead of engaging in any
legitimate investment activity. From Frequently Asked Questions.
2
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 2008 Report to The
Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse defines occupational fraud
and abuse as, the use of ones occupation for personal enrichment
through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing
organizations resources or assets. In Introductory section, 6.
3
Employee collusion occurs when an employee acting alone or col-
lusion with others engages in dishonest or fraudulent acts in order to
steal from their respective employing organization.
4
A learning organization is characterized as a decentralized structure
that fosters change, facilitates learning, and continually communicates
its objectives to its organizational members.
 STEVENSON UNIVERSITY
Book Review:
Investigating Identity Theft: A Guide for Businesses, Law Enforcement,
and Victims by Judith M. Collins
Veronica Arze
As individuals and businesses rely more on technology and technol-
ogy continues to advance, new methods to commit identity theft have
surfaced. With the introduction of and the growing reliance on the
Internet for everyday tasks such as online banking, online shopping,
and loan applications, identity theft via the Internet is becoming
more popular. In her book, Investigating Identity Theft: A Guide for
Businesses, Law Enforcement, and Victims, Judith M. Collins provides
guidance for investigators and victims investigating identity thefts
with the assistance of the Internet itself.
Collins is a highly regarded expert on identity theft and a former
associate professor at the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan
State University. She has written what she labels a how-to book
for investigators, criminal justice teachers, and victims who wish to
investigate their own identity thefts. According to Collins, Even
novice investigators can become professionals at online investigations
(p. 14). Investigating Identity Theft provides readers with instructions
on conducting investigations and includes exercises using the tech-
niques shared in the book. Additionally, the book contains many case
examples which assist the reader in understanding how the methods
work in real investigations.
In her opening message, Collins states that her book was written for
a broad audience from investigators new to the Internet to those with
advanced knowledge of computers. Its main purpose is to educate
individuals to use the Internet as a tool to gather, retain, and orga-
nize information pertaining to the crime (p.14).
The book is divided into five sections: the first two provide an intro-
duction to identity theft and steps for preparing and configuring
computers for investigations; the remaining three sections contain
information critical to a successful identity theft investigation. Besides
being a comprehensive guide for this process, it provides an extensive
list of useful websites in the appendix.
In the first chapter, Collins introduces four identity theft case
examples from investigations performed at the Identity Theft Crime
and Research Lab at Michigan State University. All four cases differ
in complexity, investigation methods used, and outcomes. The next
chapter expands on the authors introduction with a definition of the
crime. According to Collins, identity theft evolves continuously as
thieves find new ways to commit the crime (p. 17). In this chapter,
Collins discusses the theory that identity theft is a network crime. She
explains that neither personal identity thefts nor business identity
thefts are committed by a single criminal operating alone; rather,
identity thefts typically involve networks of individuals who are more
or less organized and who operate in cells that perform different but
interrelated functions (p. 18). To a reader who has little experience
or knowledge in this area, this information is especially beneficial in
order to understand the investigation process.
38
Following these initial chapters are two chapters dedicated to edu-
cating readers on configuring their computers for Internet security
and online investigations. These two chapters are primarily written
for investigators new to the internet. Regardless, the information
provided is useful for any reader as a check to ensure proper com-
puter security is enabled. Exercises and tutorials are included in these
chapters and serve as how-to steps for any reader not familiar with
settings on their computer. Collins dedicates part of chapter four to
an introduction to search engines and directories. Search engines are
critical to online investigations when the investigator has minimal
information on the crime, i.e. an address, phone number, or name.
Collins provides excellent examples of this in chapter seven where she
presents a case example of an identity theft investigation performed
with search engines.
In chapters five and six, Collins advises readers of two important
steps: The first includes preparing for the investigation. Victims must
take some steps immediately subsequent to discovering the identity
theft. Chapter six is primarily for investigators because it touches on
the second important step of any investigation, the authentication
process. According to Collins, authenticating simply means verifying
the identity theft claims before launching full-scale into the investiga-
tion (p. 89). All investigators should take this step in order to ensure
that they are not wasting valuable resources on a criminal rather
than a victim. Collins explains the layout of credit reports and points
out potential red flags that could appear on the reports. Exhibits are
provided to explain further the importance of the review of a credit
report.
Collins begins her introduction to Internet investigations in chapter
eight with an introduction to the World Wide Web for more hands-
on experience. One valuable tool that Collins presents to readers is
the Internets Wayback Machine. This tool allows investigators to
locate and view web sites that have been changed, discontinued, or
removed. If identity thieves are attempting to try and cover their
online tracks, this tool can assist the investigators by uncovering
the online information the thieves are trying to hide. Chapter nine
continues Collins explanation with the steps to trace IP addresses
and URLs and an exercise to learn how to conduct a trace. Collins
explains that if an investigator has an IP address, that is valuable
information since the IP address is a computers unique identifier.
Chapter ten is dedicated to tracing e-mail addresses. Again, Collins
takes time to provide a background on the topic (how e-mail works)
and exercises to assist readers with hands-on experience.
Finally, chapter eleven focuses on the investigators role during search-
ing and seizing. Collins addresses the future of identity theft and
investigations by stating that identity theft can be expected to increase
in the coming years (p.179). Large numbers of businesses and data-
bases contain pieces of personal information about individuals that
 FORENSICS JOURNAL
makes them susceptible to identity theft. The lack of security for these
databases, Collins feels, is another reason why identity theft crimes
will increase. While there are many federal and state laws aimed at
protecting consumers from identity theft, such as the Identity Theft
and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 and the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA), Collins believes that IT
security alone cannot prevent identity theft (p.180).
Collins experience with identity theft investigations is apparent
throughout the book. She shares many case examples and offers
numerous hands-on exercises throughout. Collins dedicates part of
each chapter to providing explanations for information technology
concepts, from firewalls and anti-virus software to Universal Resource
Locators (URLs). With this information, an individual with very little
computer experience can understand and perform an identity theft
investigation.
The only weakness of this book lies within the order of chapters. Col-
lins begins the introduction to computers in chapters three and four
where she explains how to properly configure a computer to secure it
during online investigations and to document key details (i.e., time
and date stamps) in order to preserve the chain of evidence. After
these chapters, Collins shifts from the technology aspect to the first
two steps of an identity theft investigation, preparation and investi-
gation. Chapter eight resumes discussing technology and continues
through chapter ten. It would be beneficial to readers to keep the
technology topics together in order to grasp the full concept of online
investigations.
39
From victims with no experience in identity theft investigations to
law enforcement officers with little knowledge of performing inves-
tigations on the Internet, this book provides useful information for
a wide audience. Containing a wealth of information on the topic of
identity theft, it includes excellent case examples to assist the reader
in understanding how the crime works, and helpful instructions on
using the resources available to all individuals who wish to perform
an identity theft investigation. These resources include the Internet,
lists of credit agency contacts and check verification contacts included
in chapter five. The exercises illustrate information Collins provides
throughout the book and they can easily be followed by readers to
assist in their own identity theft investigations. Any reader who is
interested in learning about identity theft and investigations would
benefit from this book.
REFERENCE
Collins, J. M. (2006). Investigating Identity Theft: A Guide for Busi-
nesses, Law Enforcement, and Victims. Hoboken, New Jersey: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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