CRIMPRO RULE 119
The prosecution moved for reconsideration but the motion was
G.R. No. 143093 May 21, 2007
RIMBERTO T. SALVANERA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LUCITA PARANE, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal are the Decision dated April 30, 1999 and the two Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, dated September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945. The
Court of Appeals discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the
Information in Criminal Case No. TM-1730 for Murder, pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Trece Martires City, to become state witnesses. The appellate court likewise
cancelled the bail bond of petitioner Rimberto Salvanera.
First, the facts:
In an Information1 dated November 30, 1996, petitioner Rimberto Salvanera, together
with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is charged with the
murder of Ruben Parane, committed as follows:
That on or about October 23, 1995, in the Municipality of Gen. Trias, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with treachery
and evident premeditation, then armed with a firearm, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one RUBEN PARANE Y MAGSAMBOL,
inflicting gunshot wound on his body, resulting to his instantaneous death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
As per theory of the prosecution, petitioner was the alleged mastermind; Lungcay, the
hired hitman; Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle which carried Lungcay to the place
of the commission of the crime; while Tampelix delivered the blood money to the latter.
All the accused have been arrested and detained, except Edgardo Lungcay who
remained at-large.
Respondent Lucita Parane is the spouse of victim Ruben Parane.
On January 22, 1997, petitioner applied for bail. The prosecution, on March 4, 1997,
moved for the discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix, to serve
as state witnesses.
In an Omnibus Order2 dated September 5, 1997, the trial court granted petitioners
application for bail and denied the prosecutions motion for the discharge of accused
Abutin and Tampelix.
denied.
The prosecution then appealed to the Court of Appeals. It contended that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to discharge
accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state witnesses. It alleged that the testimonies of
the two accused are absolutely necessary to establish that petitioner masterminded the
murder of Ruben Parane. The prosecution likewise claimed that it was premature and
baseless for the trial court to grant petitioners application for bail because the
prosecution had not yet rested its case in the hearing for the discharge of the two
accused.
The Court of Appeals sustained the prosecution. It discharged accused Feliciano Abutin
and Domingo Tampelix from the Information to become state witnesses, and cancelled
the bail bond of petitioner Salvanera. In its Resolution dated September 22, 1999, it
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner then filed his Motion for
Clarification with Leave of Court. The same was also denied in a Resolution dated May
11, 2000.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner enumerates the grounds for his appeal, as follows:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE FIRST,
SECOND AND THIRD ASSAILED ORDERS DEFYING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE THEREON
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE "SUBSTANTIAL CORROBORATION" REQUIREMENT UNDER SECTION
9, RULE 119 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT WAS SATISFIED BY THE PROSECUTION DESPITE
THE FACT THAT -
A. THE "SUBSTANTIAL CORROBORATION" REQUIREMENT MUST BE SATISFIED THROUGH THE
TESTIMONY OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHO ARE NOT AN (sic) ACCUSED
SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED AS STATE WITNESS, NOT BY ANOTHER ACCUSED LIKEWISE
SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED.
B. THE SWORN STATEMENT OF AN ACCUSED SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED CANNOT BE
USED AS EVIDENCE FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN HIS OWN DISCHARGE PRIOR TO THE
ISSUANCE BY A COMPETENT COURT OF THE ORDER OF HIS DISCHARGE.
C. THE TESTIMONIES OF ABUTIN AND TAMPELIX CANNOT BE SUBSTANTIALLY
CORROBORATED IN ITS MATERIAL POINTS BY THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
D. THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY AN ACCUSED SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED AS STATE WITNESS
CANNOT BE USED TO CORROBORATE THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY ANOTHER ACCUSED
LIKEWISE SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED AS STATE WITNESS.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE FIRST,
SECOND AND THIRD ASSAILED ORDERS, DEFYING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
MATTER, WHEN IT CANCELLED PETITIONER'S BAIL BOND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL
COURT JUDGE ALREADY RULED THAT THE EVIDENCE OF HIS GUILT IS NOT STRONG.3
We uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following
conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.4
According to petitioner, the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged to
become a state witness must be substantially corroborated, not by a co-accused
likewise sought to be discharged, but by other prosecution witnesses who are not the
accused in the same criminal case. Petitioner justifies this theory on the general
principles of justice and sound logic. He contends that it is a notorious fact in human
nature that a culprit, confessing a crime, is likely to put the blame on others, if by doing
so, he will be freed from any criminal responsibility. Thus, in the instant case, petitioner
supposes that both Abutin and Tampelix will naturally seize the opportunity to be
absolved of any liability by putting the blame on one of their co-accused. Petitioner
argues that prosecution witnesses Parane and Salazar, who are not accused, do not
have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the alleged conspiracy.
Thus, they could not testify to corroborate the statement of Abutin and Tampelix that
petitioner is the mastermind or the principal by induction.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in dismissing this reasoning as specious. To require
the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and
Tampelix on the exact same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there
must be no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of the state witness."5 The corroborative evidence
required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same evidence as will be
testified on by the proposed state witnesses. We have ruled that "a conspiracy is more
readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown
that the statements of the conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we
have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to
some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other
respects."6 It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some
other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the
records that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important
points by each others testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the
testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent that their
trustworthiness becomes manifest."7
As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the
conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the
conspirators is essential because only they have knowledge of the crime.8 The other
prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No
one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the
accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link petitioner
to the commission of the crime.
In Chua v. Court of Appeals,9 we ruled that the trial court has to rely on the information
offered by the public prosecutor as to who would best qualify as a state witness. The
prosecutor knows the evidence in his possession and the witnesses he needs to establish
his case. In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan,10 we held:
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the
prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person
for government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right
of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its
justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more
guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or
not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the
timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the
prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be
prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.
We further ruled:
In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the
respondent court is limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial
tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to
prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies,
but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct
the blunders of the defense. For fairness demands that courts keep the scales of justice
at equipoise between and among all litigants. Due process demands that courts should
strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and perpetually level.
Lastly, we affirm the ruling of the appellate court in cancelling the bail bond of
petitioner. The grant of petitioners application for bail is premature. It has to await the
testimony of state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix. Their testimonies must be given their
proper weight in determining whether the petitioner is entitled to bail.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945, dated April 30, 1999, September 22, 1999 and May
11, 2000, respectively, are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100295 April 26, 1994 231 scra 783
PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., and J. LORENZO VERGARA, petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
Estelito P. Mendoza for Placido L. Mapa, Jr.
Filemon Flores for J. Lorenzo Vergara.
PUNO, J.:
The denial of the right to be free from further prosecution of a cooperative witness who
has been granted immunity is the core issue posed in this petition. On balance are
important rights in conflict: the right of an individual who has surrendered his
constitutional prerogative to be silent to the State to be exempt from further
prosecution; the right of the State to prosecute all persons who appear to have
committed a crime and its prerogative to revoke the immunity it has granted to an
accused for breach of agreement; and the extent of the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as an impartial tribunal to review the grant of immunity extended by
the PCGG to an accused.
First, the facts.
On January 20, 1987, petitioners Placido L. Mapa and Lorenzo Vergara, together with
Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, Fernando Balatbat, Ramon Aviado, Jr., Dominador Lopez, Jr.,
Fernando Maramag, Jr., and Jose Crisanto, Jr., were charged with violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) as amended, docketed as Case No. 11960
in the respondent court, as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 1985 and March 1986, in Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan,
accused Placido L. Mapa, Jr., J. Lorenzo Vergara, Ramon F. Aviado, Jr., Dominador
Lopez, Jr., Fernando Maramag, Jr., Jose C. Crisanto, Jr., acting in various capacities as
management officials of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), National Investment and
Development Corporation (NIDC) and/or Pantranco North Express Inc. (PNEI), all
government-owned and controlled corporations, as well as Dolores Potenciano of BLTB,
acting in concert in the performance of their duties, in utter neglect of their fiduciary
responsibilities, and with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating with one another
and with accused Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, son-in-law of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and therefore related to the deposed President by affinity within the third
degree, and Fernando Balatbat, did then and there, willfully and unlawfully, with
manifest partiality and evident bad faith, without proper board resolution and in
disregard of better offers, promote and facilitate the sale of a major portion of the
public utility assets of the Pantranco Express, Inc., for a consideration of SEVEN HUNDRED
SEVENTY-FIVE MILLION (P775,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to the North Express
Transport, Inc. (NETI), which the accused knew to be a newly organized paper
corporation with a purported paid-up capital of only FIVE MILLION (P5,000,000.00) PESOS
and owned and controlled by accused Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, by misleading,
inducing and/or unduly influencing the Board of Directors of PNB, NIDC and PNEI into
approving a Memorandum of Agreement and later a Purchase Agreement with
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous terms and conditions which made possible the
premature delivery of said PNEI assets to NETI without any down payment, and which,
inter alia, allowed NETI to operate PNEI's franchises and utilize, even before the
execution of the said Purchase Agreement, not only the PNEI assets subject of the
proposed sale, but also other utility buses and properties of PNEI not covered by the
sale, thereby allowing NETI to derive an income from said operation between the period
of actual delivery and execution of the Purchase Agreement of the sum of EIGHTY-FIVE
MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND, ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (P85,689,180.00)
PESOS before the actual payment of the agreed FIFTY-FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00)
PESOS down payment, thereby giving accused Gregorio Ma. Araneta III unwarranted
benefits, advantages and/or preferences and causing undue injury to the damage and
prejudice of the Government in the amount of FOUR HUNDRED MILLION
(P400,000,000.00) PESOS, and such other amounts as may be awarded by the Court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Except for petitioner Araneta, all the accused in Criminal Case
No. 11960 were arraigned. Their trial started on September 20, 1988.
In the interim, the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos were
charged in New York with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO) by transporting to the United States and concealing the
investment of money through cronies and offshore organizations. To insure the
conviction of the Marcoses, the prosecution solicited the testimonies of witnesses.
Among these witnesses were petitioners Vergara and Mapa. Petitioner Vergara was
interviewed in 1987 by PCGG lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera and by United States
Prosecutor Charles La Bella. Petitioner Mapa was interviewed on November 14, 1988
and August 11, 1989 also by Prosecutor La Bella at the behest of former Secretary of
Justice Sedfrey Ordonez and former PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas. After their
interviews, petitioners were requested to testify in the said RICO cases against the former
First Couple. They were promised immunity from further criminal prosecution. They
agreed.
On May 16, 1990, the Philippine Government through the PCGG, and the petitioners
formalized their separate agreements in writing. The agreement with petitioner Mapa
provided:
WHEREAS, REPUBLIC has requested MAPA to make himself available as a witness in the
case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," more particularly
in the on-going trial of the case;
WHEREAS, MAPA is a defendant or respondent in several civil and criminal cases which
the REPUBLIC has filed or intends to file in relation to this participation in various contracts
that are alleged to have resulted in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos in violation of Philippine laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, on the basis of MAPA's express intent to make himself available as witness in
the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," and in light
of REPUBLIC's re-appraisal of the civil and criminal cases which it has filed or intends to
file against MAPA under the terms and conditions herein below set forth.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties agree
as follows:
1. MAPA shall make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United
States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al."
2. In consideration of the same, REPUBLIC grants MAPA immunity from
investigation, prosecution and punishment for any offense with reference to which his
testimony and information are given, including any offense and commission of which
any information, directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information is
used as basis thereof, except a prosecution for perjury and/or giving false testimony.
3. Likewise, in consideration of such cooperation, and in light of REPUBLICs
review of the cases both civil and criminal which it has filed or intends to file against
MAPA within the purview of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the REPUBLIC shall
cause the dismissal or exclusion of MAPA as party defendant or respondent in all PCGG
initiated civil cases and criminal proceeding or investigation.
4. The immunity has been granted by the REPUBLIC to MAPA on the basis of and
relying on MAPA's promise of cooperation as described herein. In case of breach of his
commitment to fully cooperate and make himself available as a witness in the case
entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.", the immunity herein
granted shall forthwith be deemed revoked, and of no force and effect.
5. The parties agree that the grant of immunity from criminal prosecution to
MAPA and his exclusion from PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal proceeding or
investigations has been undertaken in the exercise of the PCGG's authority under
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. Accordingly, nothing herein shall be construed
as an admission by MAPA of any criminal or civil liability.
The agreement with petitioner Vergara stated:
WHEREAS, REPUBLIC has requested VERGARA to make himself available as a witness in
the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," more
particularly in the on-going trial of the case;
WHEREAS, Vergara is a defendant in Criminal Case No. 11960 entitled "People vs.
Gregorio Ma. Araneta, et al.", now pending before the Sandiganbayan, Second
Division;
WHEREAS, on the basis of VERGARAs express intent to make himself available as witness
in the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," and in the
light of REPUBLIC's re-appraisal of VERGARA's participation in Criminal Case No. 11960,
the REPUBLIC approved to grant immunity to VERGARA under the terms and conditions
hereinbelow set forth.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties agree
as follows:
1. VERGARA shall make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United
States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al."
2. In consideration of the same, REPUBLIC grants VERGARA immunity from
investigation, prosecution and punishment for any offense with reference to which his
testimony and information are given, including any offense and commission of which
any information, directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information is
used as basis thereof, except a prosecution for perjury and/or giving false testimony.
3. Likewise, in consideration of such cooperation, and in light of REPUBLICs
review of VERGARAs participation in Criminal Case No. 11960, the REPUBLIC shall cause
the dismissal of VERGARA from Criminal Case No. 11960.
4. The immunity has been granted by the REPUBLIC to VERGARA on the basis of
and relying on VERGARA's promise of cooperation as described herein. In case of
breach of h is commitment to fully cooperate and make himself available as a witness
in the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.", the
immunity herein granted shall forthwith be deemed revoked, and of no force and
effect.
5. The parties agree that the grant of immunity from civil and criminal prosecution
to VERGARA and his exclusion from Criminal Case No. 11960 has been undertaken in the
exercise of the PCGG's authority under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
Accordingly, nothing herein shall be construed as a admission by VERGARA of any
criminal liability.
On the same day, May 16, 1990, former PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote to
petitioner Mapa the following letter:
Dear Sir:
With reference to the agreement executed between yourself and the Republic of the
Philippines on May 16, 1990, we would like to confirm
that among the criminal cases which the Republic agrees to cause the dismissal of the
case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mr. Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, et. al., " Criminal
Case No. 11960 of the Sandiganbayan. We understand that in that case the
prosecution is in the process of closing its evidence with the submission of its offer of
documentary evidence and that it is your intention thereupon to submit a Motion to
Dismiss for failure of the prosecution to prove its case. We affirm that if, because of the
situation of the case, it would not be possible for the Republic to file the necessary
motion to cause the dismissal thereof, then we shall upon submission of your Motion to
Dismiss offer no objection to its favorable consideration by the court in relation to you.
We also affirm our understanding that we shall arrange with the U.S. prosecutors the
grant of immunity in your favor no less broad or extensive than that granted to Mr.
Jaime C. Laya.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) M.A.T. Caparas
A similar letter was sent to petitioner Vergara.
The petitioners complied with their respective undertaking. They travelled to New York to
testify against the Marcoses. Their travel fare and hotel accommodations were even
furnished by the PCGG. But despite their availability and willingness to testify, the US
prosecutors decided not to call them to the witness stand. The result was a debacle for
the US prosecutors and the PCGG. Mrs.Imelda Marcos was acquitted by the jury. Earlier,
former President Marcos was delisted as an accused as he died in the course of the
proceedings.
The legal struggle shifted back to the prosecution of petitioners in Criminal Case No.
11960 before the respondent court. On the basis of the immunity granted to them,
petitioners filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss on October 22, 1990. Deputized PCGG
prosecutors Vivencio B. Dionido and Angel J. Parazo filed a Manifestation interposing no
objection to petitioners' Motion, viz:
That herein accused Placido L. Mapa, Jr. and J. Lorenzo Vergara were granted
immunity by the Presidential Commission on Good Government from criminal liability
arising from cases which PCGG had or intends to file against them;
The PCGG, therefore, interposes no objection to the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by
accused Placido L. Mapa, Jr. and J. Lorenzo Vergara in Criminal Case No. 11960-PCGG
by reason of the immunity aforestated.
Despite PCGG's concurrence, the respondent court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss,
by a vote of 4-1. 1 Petitioners were undaunted. On April 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. This was followed on May 23, 1991, by a Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration. The deputized prosecutors again filed a Manifestation reiterating
PCGG's acquiescence to petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent court,
however, refused to budge from its prior position. It denied petitioners' motions.
Hence, this recourse where petitioners charge the respondent court with grave abuse of
discretion in denying their Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration. They pose
the following issues:
2.00.a. Does the fact that the information provided by petitioners to the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) did not refer to Criminal Case No. 11960
make the immunity granted to them inapplicable to Criminal Case No. 11960?
2.00.b. Is it necessary that information furnished the PCGG, which would become
basis of the grant of immunity, be submitted to the Sandiganbayan in order that it may
determine whether such information is necessary to ascertain or prove the guilt or
liability of a respondent, defendant or an accused in an action involving the recovery
of ill-gotten wealth?
2.00.c. Does the fact that the prosecution in the RICO cases did not actually present
petitioners as witnesses abrogate the immunity granted to them?
2.00.d. Was the immunity granted to petitioners too late considering that when it was
granted, the prosecution in Criminal Case
No. 11960 had already rested its case?"
The proceedings before us took a new wrinkle with the appointment of Atty. David
Castro as Chairman of PCGG. In its Comment dated January 6, 1992, the PCGG
somersaulted from its stance supporting the petitioners. Its Comment states:
1. The Presidential Commission on Good Government has indeed granted Messrs.
Placido L. Mapa, Jr., and Jesus Lorenzo Vergara immunity from investigation,
prosecution and punishment for any offense for which civil and criminal cases have
been or to be filed against them within the purview of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A but such immunity is conditional.
2. The conditions for giving such immunity is the cooperation said petitioners shall
give to said Commission by way of information and testimony in cases now pending or
to be filed before the Sandiganbayan against other defendants therein to prove the
latter's acquisition or accumulation of property or properties in violation of existing laws.
3. Failure on the part of petitioners Placido Mapa, Jr. and Jesus Vergara to testify
in favor of the government and against other defendants on matters referred to in the
immediately preceding paragraph nullifies the immunity granted to both defendants
(emphasis supplied).
It reiterated its breakaway from petitioners in its Comment to the Reply of petitioners
dated June 10, 1992, where it adopted the respondent Sandiganbayan's questioned
Resolution and Concurring Opinions dated
March 6, 1991. It further stressed that "[T]he granting of 'Immunity' from criminal liability
and/or prosecution is a matter subject to the court's judicious determination and
approval, after applying the test of compliance and the standard of reasonableness
with the rigid requirements for such grant under Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14-A,
as amended." The Solicitor General defended the stance of the PCGG and the
respondent court.
We find merit in the petition.
The practice of granting government, its officials, and some accused or respondents
immunity from suits, has a long history.
We begin with the Constitution which expressly grants some of these immunities. Article
XVI, section 3 provides that "the State may not be sued without its consent." The classic
justification for the non-suability of the State is that provided by Mr. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes: ". . . there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the
law on which the right depends." 2 Article VI, section 11 of the Constitution also grants
parliamentary immunities, viz: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof." Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz explains the rationale for this
immunity in the following manners: ". . . The first is intended to ensure representation of
the constituents of the member of the Congress by preventing attempts to keep him
from attending its sessions. The second enables the legislator to express views bearing
upon the public interest without fear of accountability outside the halls of the legislature
for his inability to support his statements with the usual evidence required in the court of
justice. In other words, he is given more leeway than the ordinary citizen in the
ventilation of matters that ought to be divulged for the public good."3 The President was
also immunized from suit during his tenure in the 1973 Constitution.
Aside from the Constitution, Congress has enacted laws giving immunity to witnesses to
facilitate the solution of crimes with high political, social and economic impact against
the people. Some of these statutory grants are related in the impugned Resolution. Thus,
PD 749 provides:
Section 1. Any person who voluntarily gives information about any violation of
Articles 210, 211, 212 of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 3019, as amended;
Section 345 of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs
Code and other provisions of the said codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part
of the public officials concerned; and other laws, rules and regulations punishing acts of
graft, corruption and other forms of official abuse; and who willingly testified, such
violator shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference
to which his information and testimony were given, and may plead or prove the giving
of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided, That this
immunity may be enjoyed even in cases where the information and the testimony are
given against a person who is not a public official but who is a principal or accomplice,
or accessory in the commission of any of the above-mentioned violations: Provided,
further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness notwithstanding
that he offered or gave bribe or gift to the public official or is an accomplice for such
gift or bribe-giving; And, Provided, finally, That the following conditions concur:
1. The information must refer to consummated violations of any of the above-
mentioned provisions of law, rules and regulations;
2. The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the accused
public officer;
3. Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;
4. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points;
and
5. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.
Likewise, under PD No. 1886, the Agrava Fact Finding Board, created to conduct a fact-
finding inquiry in the Aquino-Galman double murder case, was given the power to
compel testimony of a witness. In exchange for his testimony, such a witness was
extended transactional immunity from later prosecution. Section 5 of said PD No. 1886
states:
No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books,
records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena
issued by the Board on the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him
may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or
any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any
transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his
privilege against self-incrimination to testify or produce evidence, except that such
individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury
committed in so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from prosecution and punishment for
perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal
from office.
Indeed, as early as April 16, 1951, R.A. 602, establishing a minimum wage law, extended
transactional immunity to persons who testify or produce books, papers or other records
and documents before the Secretary of Labor or a Wage Board. A similar but not
identical power is given to the prosecution under section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused to be utilized as a state witness.
Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States, there are two types of
statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are the transactional immunity and the
used-and-derivative-use immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its
protection. By its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense
whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction. 4 In contrast, by the grant of use-and-
derivative-use immunity,
a witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and
evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent
prosecution. 5 In Kastigar vs. US, 6 the rationale of these immunity grants is well
explained, viz:
The power of government to compel persons to testify in court or before grand juries
and other governmental agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence
. . . The power to compel testimony, and the corresponding duty to testify, are
recognized in the Sixth Amendment requirements that an accused be confronted with
the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor. . .
xxx xxx xxx
But the power to compel testimony is not absolute. There are a number of exemptions
from the testimonial duty, the most important
of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. The privilege reflects a complex of our fundamental values and
aspirations, and marks an important advance in the development of our liberty. It can
be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or
adjudicatory; and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably
believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that
might be so used. This Court has been zealous to safeguard the values that underlie the
privilege.
Immunity statutes, which have historical roots deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence,
are not incompatible with these values. Rather, they seek a rational accommodation
between the imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to
compel citizens to testify. The existence of these statutes reflects the importance of
testimony, and the fact that many offenses are of such a character that the only
persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime. Indeed,
their origins were in the context of such offenses, and their primary use has been to
investigate such offenses . . . (E)very State in the Union, as well as the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico, has one of more such statutes. The commentators, and this
Court on several occasions, have characterized immunity statutes as essential to the
effective enforcement of various criminal statutes. . .
We shall now examine the powers granted to PCGG by Executive Order No. 14, as
amended, to grant immunity from criminal prosecution. The pertinent sections provide:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 4. A witness may refuse on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or provide other information in a proceeding before the Sandiganbayan if the
witness believes that such testimony or provision of information would tend to
incriminate him or subject him to prosecution. Upon such refusal, the Sandiganbayan
may order the witness to testify or provide information.
The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or
any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony, or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury,
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the other.'
Sec. 3. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 5. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized to grant
immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who provides information or testifies in
any investigation conducted by such Commission to establish the unlawful manner in
which any respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the
property or properties in question in any case where such information or testimony is
necessary to ascertain or prove the latter's guilt or his civil liability. The immunity thereby
granted shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats such testimony before
the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the Commission.
There are obvious differences between the powers granted to the PCGG under sections
4 and 5. Section 4 deals with the power which PCGG can use to compel an unwilling
witness to testify. On the other hand, section 5 speaks of the power which PCGG can
wield to secure information from a friendly witness. Under section 4, the hostile witness
compelled to testify is not immunized from prosecution. He can still be prosecuted but
"no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used
against the witness in any criminal case . . . ." In contrast, under section 5, the friendly
witness is completely immunized from prosecution.
The case at bench involves an exercise of power by PCGG under
section 5, supra. Petitioners are not hostile but friendly witnesses. It is not disputed that
they furnished information to the PCGG during their interviews conducted by PCGG
lawyers and US prosecutor La Bella. Due to their cooperation, they were extended
immunity from prosecution by the PCGG. In return, they flew to New York to testify in the
RICO trial of Imelda Marcos. As they were witnesses for the prosecution, their expenses
were shouldered by the PCGG itself. At the last minute, however, US prosecutor La Bella
decided to dispense with their testimony. The rest is history. The prosecution failed to
convict Mrs. Marcos.
The first issue is whether the respondent court has jurisdiction to review the immunity
granted by PCGG in favor of the petitioners. We sustain the jurisdiction of the
respondent court. To be sure, we have grappled with this once slippery issue in the case
of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 76, 80-81, and we held:
We first ascertain whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to look into the
validity of the immunity granted by the PCGG to Jose Y. Campos which was extended
to his son, petitioner-intervenor herein,
Jose Campos, Jr.
xxx xxx xxx
The powers of the PCGG are not unlimited. Its jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten
wealth must be within the parameters stated in Executive Order No. 14. Necessarily, the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which is tasked to handle the ill-gotten wealth cases
must include the jurisdiction to determine whether or not the PCGG exceeded its power
to grant immunity pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No.14.
It should also be noted that the respondent court has already acquired jurisdiction to try
and decide Case No. 11960 where petitioners stand accused of violating RA 3019. It has
started receiving the evidence of the prosecution against the petitioners. Petitioners,
with the conformity of PCGG, then claimed their immunity via a motion to dismiss
addressed to the respondent court. The motion to dismiss is thus a mere incident well
within the jurisdiction of the respondent court to resolve.
The next issue is a finer and more difficult one, i.e., gauging the range of the power of
the respondent court to review the exercise of discretion of the PCGG granting
immunity to petitioners pursuant to section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended.
Respondent court, thru the Solicitor General, pushes the proposition that said power of
review is plenary in reach. It is urged that its plenitude and panoply empower the
respondent court to reverse the grant of immunity made by the PCGG by supplanting
the latter's judgment. The submission will warrant the respondent court in examining the
intrinsic quality of the given information or testimony, i.e., whether it truly establishes the
"unlawful manner" in which the respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or
accumulated the property or properties in question. Likewise, it will give a warrant to the
respondent court to change the judgment made by the PCGG that the witness'
information or testimony is "necessary" to ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of
the respondent, defendant or accused.
We are not prepared to concede the correctness of this proposition. Neither the text nor
the texture of E.O. No. 14, as amended, lends color to the suggested interpretation.
Section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, vests no such role in respondent court. In
instances, where the intent is to endow courts of justice with the power to review and
reverse tactical moves of the prosecution, the law confers the power in clear and
certain language. Thus, under section 9 of Rule 119, the prosecution in the exercise of its
discretion may tactically decide to discharge an accused to be a state witness but its
decision is made subject to the approval of the court trying the case. It has to file a
proper motion and the motion may be denied by the court if the prosecution fails to
prove that it has satisfied the requirements of the rule on discharge of a witness. The rule
is crafted as to leave no iota of doubt on the power of the court to interfere with the
discretion of the prosecution on the matter. In the case at bench, E.O. 14, as amended,
is eloquently silent with regard to the range and depth of the power of the respondent
court to review the exercise of discretion by the PCGG granting a section 5 immunity.
This silence argues against the thesis that the respondent court has full and unlimited
power to reverse PCGG's exercise of discretion granting a section 5 immunity.
Legitimate power can not arise from a vacuum.
We observe that in contrast to our other laws on immunity, section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as
amended, confers on the PCGG the power to grant immunity alone and on its own
authority. The exercise of the power is not shared with any other authority. Nor is its
exercise subject to the approval or disapproval of another agency of government. The
basic reason for vesting the power exclusively on the PCGG lies in the principles of
separation of power. The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a
constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego
prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate
renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having
committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the
conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm
of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be
extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the
sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to
determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to
prosecute. In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the
jurisdiction of the respondent court is limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be
an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the
prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection
of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts
should correct the blunders of the defense. For fairness demands that courts keep the
scales of justice at equipoise between and among all litigants. Due process demands
that courts should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and
perpetually level.
Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we hold that in reviewing the grant of a
section 5 immunity made by the PCGG to the petitioners, the power of the respondents
court can go no further than to pass upon its procedural regularity. The respondent
court should only ascertain: (a) whether the person claiming immunity has provided
information or testimony in any investigation conducted by the PCGG in the discharge
of its functions;
(b) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, the information or testimony given
would establish the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused
has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question; and (c) whether in
the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, such information or testimony is necessary to
ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or accused.
Respondent court cannot substitute its judgment to the discretion of the PCGG without
involving itself in prosecution and without ceasing to be a court catering untilted justice.
Applying this standard, we hold that the respondent court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners' motion to dismiss based on a claim of immunity
granted by the PCGG under section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended.
The records show that petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the
prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. They gave the
information in the course of interviews conducted by PCGG lawyers Kendall and
Severina Rivera and US prosecutor Charles
La Bella. They collaborated with the prosecution.
Sec. 5 requires that the information should relate to "any case" which PCGG can
prosecute as mandated by the Constitution and E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. It does not
limit said information to be given only in a case where the informant is himself an
accused or a respondent. Such a reading adopted by the respondent court is unduly
restrictive of the intendment of section 5 of E.O.
No. 14, as amended, even as it is clearly in contravention of its plain language.
It is also fairly established that the pieces of information given by the petitioners would in
the judgment of the PCGG, establish the "unlawful manner" with which the Marcoses
acquired or accumulated their properties and were "necessary" to prove their guilt. The
totality of the circumstances of the case established this element. Thus, after their
interview, the PCGG was obviously convinced of the evidentiary value of the
information given by the petitioners. It forthwith signed and sealed an agreement with
petitioners extending them immunity from prosecution. In the case of petitioner Mapa,
"the Republic shall cause the dismissal or exclusion of MAPA as party defendant or
respondent in all PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal proceeding or investigation." In
the case of petitioner Vergara, "the Republic shall cause the dismissal of Vergara from
Criminal Case No. 11960." This commitment was reiterated by former Chairman Mateo
Caparas of PCGG in his May 16, 1990 letters to the petitioners, as related above. The
parties' agreements were then implemented. Petitioners travelled to New York to testify
in the RICO cases against the Marcoses. It was even the PCGG that shouldered their
expenses. All these circumstances prove the judgment of the PCGG that the pieces of
information given by petitioners would establish the "unlawful manner" with which the
Marcoses acquired their wealth.
Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, the failure of petitioners to testify in the
RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York can not nullify their immunity. They have
satisfied the requirements both of the law and the parties' implementing agreements.
Under section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, their duty was to give information to the
prosecution, and they did. Under their Memorandum of Agreement, they promised to
make themselves available as witnesses in the said RICO cases, and they did. Petitioners
were ready to testify but they were not called to testify by the US prosecutors of the
RICO case. Their failure to testify was not of their own making. It was brought about by
the decision of the US prosecutors who may have thought that their evidence was
enough to convict the Marcoses. Since petitioners' failure to testify was not of their own
choosing nor was it due to any fault of their own, justice and equity forbid that they be
penalized by the withdrawal of their immunity. Indeed, initially, the PCGG itself adopted
the posture that the immunity of petitioners stayed and should not be disturbed. It joined
the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners in the respondent court. When the respondent
court denied the motion, PCGG stuck to its previous position as it again joined the
petitioners in their motion for reconsideration. It is only in this petition for review on
certiorari that PCGG, after a change of Chairman, flip-flopped in its position.
We also rule that there was nothing irregular when PCGG granted a section 5 immunity
to petitioners while they were already undergoing trial in Criminal Case No. 11960.
Section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended, does not prohibit the PCGG from granting immunity
to persons already charged in court and undergoing trial. As long as the privilege of
immunity so given will in the judgment of the PCGG assist it in attaining its greater
objectives, the PCGG is well within legal grounds to exercise this power at any stage of
the proceedings. This section 5 immunity frees and releases one from liability, and as it
inures to the benefit of an accused, it can be invoked at any time after its acquisition
and before his final conviction. Our regard for the rights of an accused dictates this
result. Thus, we have consistently held that laws that decriminalize an act or a grant of
amnesty may be given retroactive effect. They constitute a bar against the further
prosecution of their beneficiaries' regardless of the appearance of their guilt. To be sure,
the guilt of the petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960 has yet to be established beyond
doubt. The PCGG itself does not appear certain and confident of the strength of its
evidence against the petitioners in said criminal case. The records show that petitioners
Mapa was granted immunity not only because of the information he gave to the
prosecution but also ". . . in light of Republic's review of the cases both civil and criminal
which it has filed or intends to file against . . ." him. Similarly, petitioner Vergara was
granted immunity ". . . in light of Republic's review of Vergara's participation in Criminal
Case No. 11960 . . . ." After reviewing its evidence against the petitioners, PCGG
appears to have sensed the sterility of its efforts of continuing their prosecution. Its
former chairman, M.A.T. Caparas, learned that petitioners would file a Motion to Dismiss
Criminal Case No. 11960 after PCGG rest its evidence, "for failure of the prosecution to
prove its case." In his May 16, 1990 letters to the petitioners, he assured them that "we
shall . . . offer no objection to its favorable consideration." This is a patent admission that
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss has merit and that the PCGG cannot prove its case
against the petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960.
Finally, we reject respondent court's ruling that the grant of section 5 immunity must be
strictly construed against the petitioners. It simplistically characterized the grant as
special privilege, as if it was gifted by the government, ex gratia. In taking this posture, it
misread the raison d'etre and the long pedigree of the right against self-incrimination vis-
a-vis immunity statutes.
The days of inquisitions brought about the most despicable abuses against human
rights. Not the least of these abuses is the expert use of coerced confessions to send to
the guillotine even the guiltless. To guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian
method, the right against self-incrimination was ensconced in the fundamental laws of
all civilized countries. Over the years, however, came the need to assist government in
its task of containing crime for peace and order is a necessary matrix of public welfare.
To accommodate
the need, the right against self-incrimination was stripped of its absoluteness. Immunity
statutes in varying shapes were enacted which would allow government to compel a
witness to testify despite his plea of the right
against self-incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of unconstitutionality, a
witness is given what has come to be known as transactional or a use-derivative-use
immunity, as heretofore discussed. Quite clearly, these immunity statutes are not a
bonanza from government. Those given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for it
the surrender of their precious right to be silent. Our hierarchy of values demands that
the right against self-incrimination and the right to be silent should be accorded greater
respect and protection. Laws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent rights
must necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual. The
government has a right to solve crimes but it must do it, rightly.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolutions of the respondent court dated March 7, and June 3,
1991 are annulled and set aside and the Amended Information against the petitioners in
Criminal Case No. 11960 is ordered dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE
GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN,
and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents,
LAURO VIZCONDE, intervenor.
G.R. No. 121245 August 23, 1995
MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE
GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents.
G.R. No. 121297 August 23, 1995
ANTONIO L. LEJANO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE
GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN,
and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Before the Court are petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to: (1) annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against
petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal
Case No. 95-404; (2) enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in the
aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica
Alfaro as one of the accused therein.1
From the records of the case, it appears that on June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging
petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other
persons,2 with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the Department of Justice
formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R.
Zuo to conduct the preliminary investigation3 of those charged with the rape and
killing on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde;4 her mother Estrellita Nicolas-
Vizconde,5 and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer6 in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons,
St., BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila.
During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the following: (1) the sworn
statement dated May 22, 1995 of their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who
allegedly saw the commission of the crime;7 (2) the sworn statements of two (2) of the
former housemaids of the Webb family in the persons of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila
S.Gaviola;8 (3) the sworn-statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who alleged that on March 9,
1991 he was a passenger of United Airlines Flight No. 808 bound for New York and who
expressed doubt on whether petitioner Webb was his co-passenger in the trip; (4) the
sworn statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who narrated
the manner of how Biong investigated and tried to cover up the crime at bar;9 (5) the
sworn statements of Belen Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids,
and the sworn statements of Normal White, a security guard and Manciano Gatmaitan,
an engineer. The autopsy reports of the victims were also submitted and they showed
that Carmela had nine (9) stab wounds, Estrellita twelve (12) and Jennifer nineteen
(19).10 The genital examination of Carmela confirmed the presence of spermatozoa.11
Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a
Motion for Production And Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to
produce the following:
(a) Certification issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on the admission to
and stay of Hubert Webb in the United States from March 9, 1991 to October 22, 1992;
(b) Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 of the Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Prospero A.
Cabanayan, M.D.;
(c) Sworn Statements of Gerardo C. Biong (other than his Sworn Statement dated
October 7, 1991);
(d) Photographs of fingerprints lifted from the Vizconde residence taken during the
investigation;
(e) Investigation records of NBI on Engr. Danilo Aguas, et al.;
(f) List of names of 135 suspects/persons investigated by the NBI per Progress Report
dated September 2, 1991 submitted by Atty. Arlis Vela, Supervising Agent;
(g) Records of arrest, interview, investigation and other written statements of Jessica
Alfaro (other than the May 22, 1995 Sworn Statement) conducted by the NBI and other
police agencies;
(h) transmittal letter to the NBI, including the report of the investigation conducted by
Superintendent Rodolfo C. Sison, Regional Deputy Director, NCRC;
(i) The names of NBI officials/agents composing the Task Force Jecares, including their
respective positions and duties;
(j) Statements made by other persons in connection with the crime charged.
The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted photocopies of the
documents. It alleged it lost the original of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro.
This compelled petitioner Webb to file Civil Case No. 951099 in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, Br. 63, for the purpose, among others, of obtaining the original of said
sworn statement. He succeeded, for in the course of its proceedings, Atty. Arturo L.
Mercader, Jr., produced a copy of said original in compliance with a subpoena duces
tecum. The original was then submitted by petitioner Webb to the DOJ Panel together
with his other evidence. It appears, however, that petitioner Webb failed to obtain from
the NBI the copy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Report despite his request
for its production.
Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the
crime at bar as he went to the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the
Philippines on October 27, 1992. 12 His alibi was corroborated by Honesto Aragon,
Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and
Pamela Francisco.13 To further support his defense, he submitted documentary
evidence that he bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car while in the United States on
said dates14 and that he was issued by the State of California Driver's License No.
A8818707 on June 14, 1991.15 Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated July 25,
1995 of Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain records
tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at San Francisco, California on March 9,
1991 as a passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808.
The other respondents Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio "Tony
Boy" Lejano, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Gerardo Biong submitted sworn
statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss denying their complicity in the rape-
killing of the Vizcondes.16 Only the respondents Joey Filart and Artemio "Dong" Ventura
failed to file their counter-affidavits though they were served with subpoena in their last
known address.17 In his sworn statement, petitioner Gatchalian alleged that from 11
o'clock in the evening of June 29, 1991 until 3 o'clock in the morning of the following
day, he was at the residence of his friends, Carlos and Andrew Syyap, at New Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa watching video tapes. He claimed that his co-petitioner Lejano was
with him.
On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause
to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with
homicide be filed against petitioners and their co-respondents,18 On the same date, it
filed the corresponding Information19 against petitioners and their co-accused with the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-404
and raffled to Branch 258 presided by respondent judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was,
however, the respondent judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who
issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. On August 11, 1995, Judge Escano
voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality
considering his employment with the NBI before his appointment to the bench. The case
was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new
warrants of arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused. On August 11, 1995,
petitioner Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa
Sr., in Bicutan, Taguig. Petitioners Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave themselves up to
the authorities after filing their petitions before us.
In their petitions at bar, petitioners contend: (1) respondent Judges de Leon and
Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them: (2) the DOJ Panel likewise
gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them
with the crime of rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional
right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and (4) the DOJ Panel
unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the
Information as an accused.
We find the petitions bereft of merit.
I examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They insist that the May
22, 1995 sworn statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak and uncorroborated. They
hammer on alleged material inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22,
1995 sworn statements. They assail her credibility for her misdescription of petitioner
Webb's hair as semi-blonde. They also criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel
when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged incredulities and inconsistencies
in the sworn statements of the witnesses for the NBI.
We start with a restatement of the purpose of a preliminary investigation. Section 1 of
Rule 112 provides that a preliminary investigation should determine " . . . whether there is
a sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded belief that a crime cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial." Section 3 of the same Rule outlines the procedure
in conducting a preliminary investigation, thus:
Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or
information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be
accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other
supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2)
copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or
unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants
and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall
either dismiss the same if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and
other supporting documents. Within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, the respondent
shall submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. He shall have the right
to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent
shall also be sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof and copies
thereof shall be furnished by him to the complainant.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit
counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base his
resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set
a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during
which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to
investigating officer which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses
concerned.
(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating
officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus
adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient
ground to hold the respondent for trial.
Section 4 of Rule 112 then directs that "if the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and corresponding information. He
shall certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has
personally examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonable ground
to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof . . ."
The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right
of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature . . ."20 An arrest without a probable cause is an
unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not
to be intruded by the State.21 Probable cause to warrant arrest is not an opaque
concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of case law reiterate that they are
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.22 Other jurisdictions utilize the term man of reasonable caution 23 or the
term ordinarily prudent and cautious man.24 The terms are legally synonymous and their
reference is not to a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge but
to the average man on the street.25 It ought to be emphasized that in determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to
the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather,
he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an
abundance.
Applying these basic norms, we are not prepared to rule that the DOJ Panel gravely
abused its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. Petitioners
belittle the truthfulness of Alfaro on two (2) grounds: (a) she allegedly erroneously
described petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blond and (b) she committed material
inconsistencies in her two (2) sworn statement, thus:26
xxx xxx xxx
To illustrate, the following are some examples of inconsistencies in the two sworn
statements of Alfaro:
On whether Alfaro knew Carmela before the incident in question
First Affidavit: She had NOT met Carmela before June 29, 1991.
Second Affidavit: "I met her in a party sometime in February, 1991."
On whether Alfaro saw the dead bodies
First Affidavit: She did not see the three dead persons on that night. She just said "on the
following day I read in the newspaper that there were three persons who were killed . . ."
Second Affidavit: "I peeped through the first door on the left. I saw two bodies on top of
the bed, bloodied, and in the floor, I saw Hubert on top of Carmela."
On the alleged rape of Carmela Vizconde
First Affidavit: She did not see the act of rape.
Second Affidavit: She saw Hubert Webb "with bare buttocks, on top of Carmela and
pumping, her mouth gagged and she was moaning and I saw tears on her eyes."
On how Webb, Lejano, and Ventura entered the Vizconde house
First Affidavit: "by jumping over the fence, which was only a little more than a meter
high."
Second Affidavit: They "entered the gate which was already open."
On whether Alfaro entered the Vizconde house
First Affidavit: She never entered the house.
Second Affidavit: "I proceeded to the iron grill gate leading to the dirty kitchen."
In its Resolution, the DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged misdescription and
inconsistencies did not erode the credibility of Alfaro. We quote the pertinent
ruling, viz.:27
xxx xxx xxx
As regards the admissibility of Alfaro's statements, granting for purposes of argument
merely that she is a co-conspirator, it is well to note that confessions of a co-conspirator
may be taken as evidence to show the probability of the co-conspirator's participation
in the commission of the crime (see People vs. Lumahang, 94 Phil. 1084).
Furthermore, it is a well-established doctrine that conspiracy need not be proved by
direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. Indeed, "only rarely would
such a prior agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal
undertakings are only rarely documented by agreements in writing. Thus, conspiracy
may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that the several accused had acted in concert or in
unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design." (Angelo vs. Court of
Appeals, 210 SCRA 402 [1992], citations omitted; People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA 699).
Neither can we discredit Alfaro merely because of the inconsistencies in her two sworn
statements. In Angelo, the Court refused to discredit the testimony of a witness accusing
therein petitioner for the slaying of one Gaviano Samaniego even though said witness
failed to name Angelo in his affidavit which was executed five (5) months earlier.
Granting, the Court continued, that a part of the witness' testimony is untrue, such
circumstance is not sufficient to discredit the entire testimony of the witness.
On August 7, 1995, another counsel for respondent Webb submitted his memorandum
suggesting that the instant complaint "should not be decided within the month to give
time to the NBI to coordinate with the FBI on the latter's inquiry into the whereabouts of
Hubert Webb . . . and to check on our U.S.-based witnesses."
In said memorandum, counsel for respondent Webb calls for the application of the
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus arising from the inconsistencies of Alfaro's
statements, among others. This is untenable. As held in Angelo:
There is no rule of law which prohibits a court from crediting part of the testimony of a
witness as worthy of belief and from simultaneously rejecting other parts which the court
may find incredible or dubious. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a rule of
law, let alone a general rule of law which is universally applicable. It is not a legal
presumption either. It is merely a latinism describing the conclusion reached by a court
in a particular case after ascribing to the evidence such weight or lack of weight that
the court deemed proper.
In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that Alfaro was then having
reservations when she first executed the first statement and held back vital information
due to her natural reaction of mistrust. This being so, the panel believes that the
inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements have been sufficiently explained
especially specially so where there is no showing that the inconsistencies were
deliberately made to distort the truth. Consequently, the probative value of Alfaro's
testimony deserves full faith and credit. As it has been often noted, ex parte statements
are generally incomplete because they are usually executed when the affiant's state of
mind does not give her sufficient and fair opportunity to comprehend the import of her
statement and to narrate in full the incidents which transpired (People vs. Sarellana, 233
SCRA 31 [1994]; Angelo vs. Court of Appeals, supra). In the case at bar, there is no
dispute that a crime has been committed and what is clear before us is that the totality
of the evidence submitted by the complainant indicate a prima facie case that
respondents conspired in the perpetration of the imputed offense.
We note that the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro was given with the assistance
of counsel28 and consists of six (6) pages, in single space reciting in rich details how the
crime was planned and then executed by the petitioners. In addition, the DOJ Panel
evaluated the supporting sworn statements of Nerissa Rosales and Mila Gaviola, former
housemaids of the Webbs, Carlos J. Cristobal, a passenger in United Airlines Flight No.
808 and Lolita Birrer, a paramour of Gerardo Biong. The Panel assayed their statements
as follows:29
xxx xxx xxx
According to Nerissa E. Rosales, a former housemaid of the Webb family, on June 29,
1991, between 7:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Hubert was at home inside
his room with two male visitors. She knew it because she and her co-housemaid, Loany,
were instructed by Hubert to bring them three glasses of juice. It was the last time she
saw Hubert and was later told by then Congressman Webb that Hubert was in the
United States.
While Mila S. Gaviola, another former housemaid of the Webb family and who served as
a laundry woman, claims, aside from corroborating the statement of Nerissa Rosales,
that on June 30, 1991, she woke up at around 4:00 in the morning and as what she used
to do, she entered the rooms of the Webbs to get their clothes to be washed. As a
matter of fact, in that early morning, she entered Hubert's room and saw Hubert, who
was only wearing his pants, already awake and smoking while he was sitting on his bed.
She picked up Hubert's scattered clothes and brought them together with the clothes of
the other members of the family to the laundry area. After taking her breakfast, she
began washing the clothes of the Webbs. As she was washing the clothes of Hubert
Webb, she noticed fresh bloodstains in his shirt. After she finished the laundry, she went
to the servant's quarters. But feeling uneasy, she decided to go up to the stockroom
near Hubert's room to see what he was doing. In the said stockroom, there is a small
door going to Hubert's room and in that door there is a small opening where she used to
see Hubert and his friends sniffing on something. She observed Hubert was quite irritated,
uneasy, and walked to and from inside his room.
On that day, she noticed Hubert left the house at around 1:00 in the afternoon and
came back at around 4:00 in the same afternoon and went inside his room using the
secret door of the house. It was the last time that she saw Hubert until she left the Webb
family.
On the other hand, Carlos J. Cristobal alleged that on March 9, 1991, at about 10:00 in
the morning, he was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as he was then scheduled
to take the United Airlines Flight No. 808 at 2:00 in the afternoon for New York. At the
airport's lobby, he saw then Congressman Freddie Webb with a male companion. He
greeted him and Webb answered: "Mabuti naman, at ito, ihahatid ko ang anak ko
papuntang Florida." He knew Freddie Webb because he often watched him then in a
television show "Chicks to Chicks." He observed that the man whom Freddie Webb
referred to as his son, was of the same height as Freddie. The son referred to has fair
complexion with no distinguishing marks on his face. He (son of Webb) was then
wearing a striped white jacket. When he and his children were already inside the plane,
he did not see Freddie anymore, but he noticed his son was seated at the front portion
of the economy class. He never noticed Freddie Webb's son upon their arrival in San
Francisco. He claims that, while watching the television program "DONG PUNO LIVE"
lately, he saw the wife of Freddie Webb with her lawyer being interviewed, and when
she described Hubert as "moreno" and small built, with a height of five feet and seven
inches tall, and who was the one who left for United States on March 9, 1991, he
nurtured doubts because such description does not fit the physical traits of the son of
Freddie, who left with him for United States on the same flight and date.
Lolita Birrer, alleged that she know Gerardo Biong because she had an affair with him
for almost three (3) years and in fact, she had a child with him who is now four (4) years
old. Their relationship started in February, 1991 until she broke up with him in September
1993. She recalls that on June 29, 1991, at around 6:00 p.m., Biong invited her to play
mahjong at the canteen of a certain Aling Glo located at the back of the Paraaque
Municipal Hall.
At about 2:30, in the early morning of January 30, 1991, the radio operator of the
Paraaque police told Biong that he has a phone call. Before Biong went to the radio
room, she was instructed to take him over and after somebody won the game, she
followed Biong at the radio room where she overheard him uttering,
"Ano?, Saan? Mahirap yan, Paano, o sige, aantayin kita, O ano?, dilaw na taxi, o sige."
When he put the phone down, Biong told her, "Mayroon lang akong rerespondehan,
ikaw muna ang maupo" and then, he went outside the canteen apparently waiting for
somebody. Twenty minutes later, a taxi, colored yellow, arrived with a male passenger
sitting at the backseat and parked near the canteen. After it made some signals by
blinking its headlight, Biong rode thereat at the front seat beside the driver and then,
they left. She was not able to recognize the male passenger because the window of the
taxi was tinted. Biong came back at around 7:00 of the same morning and when he
arrived, he immediately washed his hands and face, and took his handkerchief from his
pocket which he threw at the trash can. She asked him why he threw his handkerchief
and he answered, "Hmp . . . amoy tae." She inquired what happened in BF Homes and
he replied, "Putang inang mga batang iyon, pinahirapan nila ako."
Biong later invited her for breakfast, but they first went to his office where she observed
him doing something in his steel cabinet while he appeared to be uneasy. Moments
later, Galvan, another policeman of Paraaque, arrived and said, "Oy Biong, may
tatlong patay sa BF, imbestigahan mo" to which Biong answered, "Oo susunod na ako."
Biong went to the office of Capt. Don Bartolome who offered to accompany him and
with whom she asked permission to go with them. Before they proceeded to the place
where the killings happened, she asked Biong if he knew the exact address and the
latter immediately responded, "Alam ko na yon." She was surprised because Galvan
never told him the place of the incident.
As soon as they arrived at the Vizconde's residence, Biong instructed the housemaids to
contact the victim's relatives, while the security guard fetched the barangay chairman
and the president of the Homeowners Association. When all these persons were already
in the house, Biong started recording the wounds of the victim. Inside the master's
bedroom, she saw Biong took a watch from the jewelry box. Because she could not
tolerate the foul odor, she and Capt. Bartolome went out of the room and proceeded
to the dining area. On top of the dining table, she saw the scattered contents of a
shoulder bag. Moments later, Biong came out from the room and proceeded to the
front door to remove the chain lock; asked the keys from the housemaid and it was only
then that the main door was opened. Biong noticed a stone in front of the broken glass
of the door and requested Capt. Bartolome to go inside the servant's quarters as he
doubted the housemaids' claim that they heard nothing unusual. Using the handle of his
gun, Biong broke the remaining glass of the door panel. Bartolome then came out of
the room and told Biong that he can hear the sound of the glass being broken. At the
garage, Biong also noticed same marks on the hood of the car.
On the following day, at around 12:00 noon, Biong arrived in her house together with
the Vizconde housemaids. When Biong was preparing to take a bath, she saw him
remove from his pocket the things she also saw from Vizconde's residence, to wit: calling
cards, driver's license, ATM card, a crossed check worth P80,000.00, earrings, a ring,
bracelet, necklace, and the watch he took from the jewelry box inside the room of the
Vizcondes. These jewelry items were later pawned by Biong for P20,000.00 at a
pawnshop in front of Chow-Chow restaurant in Santos Avenue, Paraaque. The next
day, she saw Biong took from his locker at the Paraaque Police Station an imported
brown leather jacket, which the latter claimed to have been given to him by the person
who called him up in the early morning of June 30, 1991.
Since then, Biong has been wearing said jacket until they broke up sometime in 1993.
She observed that Biong seemed not interested in pursuing the investigation of the
Vizconde case. In fact, when Biong and this group picked up Mike Gatchalian and
brought him to the Paraaque Police Station, she was surprised that Biong halted the
investigation when Gatchalian was profusely sweating while being interrogated. After
the father of Gatchalian talked to Colonel Pureza, the latter called up and instructed
Biong to bring Gatchalian to him (Colonel Pureza) and that was the last thing she
remembered regarding this case.
The DOJ Panel then weighed these inculpatory evidence against the exculpatory
evidence of petitioners. It ruled: 30
xxx xxx xxx
The voluminous number of exhibits submitted by respondent Webb to support his
defense of denial and alibi notwithstanding, the panel, after a careful and thorough
evaluation of the records, believes that they cannot outweigh the evidence submitted
by the complainant. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by a
prosecution witness. Verily, alibi deserves scant consideration in the face of positive
identification especially so where the claim of alibi is supported mainly by friends and
relatives (People vs. Apolonia, 235 SCRA 124 [1994]; People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316 and
a long line of cases).
Similarly, denial is a self-serving negative which cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight than the declaration of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters
(People vs. Carizo, 233 SCRA 687 [1994]). Indeed, denial, like alibi, is weak and becomes
even more weaker when arrayed against the positive identification by the witness for
the prosecution (People vs. Onpaid, 233 SCRA 62 [1994]).
Surprisingly, Gatchalian's defense of alibi was not corroborated by Lejano, whom he
claimed was with him watching video tapes at the Syyap residence. Other than
claiming that he "was not and could not have been at or near the area of the Vizconde
residence at the time of the alleged commission of the crime,"
respondent Lejano proffered no evidence to substantiate his claim of alibi.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent Webb seeks to enhance the acceptability of his alibi in
the form of documents tending to show that he was thousands of miles away when the
incident occurred. We have carefully deliberated and argued on the evidence
submitted by respondent Webb in support of his absence from the country since March
9, 1991 to October 26, 1992 and found the same wanting to exonerate him of the
offense charged. The material dates in this case are June 29 and 30, 1991. While
respondent Webb may have submitted proof tending to show that he was issued a
California driver's license on June 14, 1991, there is no showing that he could not have
been in the country on the dates above mentioned. Neither do we find merit in the
allegation that respondent Webb personally bought a bicycle on June 30, 1991 in
California in view of his positive identification by Alfaro and the two (2) househelps of
the Webb family who testified that he was here in the country on said dates.
Additionally, the issuance of receipt evidencing the purchase of a bicycle in California is
no conclusive proof that the name appearing thereon was the actual buyer of the
merchandise.
Given these conflicting pieces of evidence of the NBI and the petitioners, we hold that
the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause
against the petitioners. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by
the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely,
not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United
States,31 while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than
evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds
over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of
probable cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not, gravely abuse its discretion in
refusing to call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. The decision to call witnesses
for clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the
investigator alone. If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the
investigator need not hold a clarificatory hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely
implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary
investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand
the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers
to establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that
enough evidence had been adduced to establish probable cause and clarificatory
hearing was unnecessary.
II
We now come to the charge of petitioners that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and,
later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without
conducting the required preliminary examination. Petitioners support their stance by
highlighting the following facts: (1) the issuance of warrants of arrest in a matter of few
hours; (2) the failure of said judges to issue orders of arrest; (3) the records submitted to
the trial court were incomplete and insufficient from which to base a finding of
probable cause; and (4) that even Gerardo Biong who was included in the Information
as a mere accessory had a "NO BAIL" recommendation by the DOJ Panel. Petitioners
postulate that it was impossible to conduct a "searching examination of witnesses and
evaluation of the documents" on the part of said judges.
The issuance of a warrant of arrest interferes with individual liberty and is regulated by
no less than the fundamental law of the land. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution
provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The aforequoted provision deals with the requirements of probable cause both with
respect to issuance of warrants of arrest or search warrants. The similarities and
differences of their requirements ought to be educational. Some of them are pointed
out by Professors LaFave and Israel, thus:32 "It is generally assumed that the same
quantum of evidence is required whether one is concerned with probable cause to
arrest or probable cause to search. But each requires a showing of probabilities as to
somewhat different facts and circumstances, and thus one can exist without the other.
In search cases, two conclusions must be supported by substantial evidence: that the
items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and
that the items will be found in the place to be searched. It is not also necessary that a
particular person be implicated. By comparison, in arrest cases there must be probable
cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed
it, which of course can exist without any showing that evidence of the crime will be
found at premises under that person's control." Worthy to note, our Rules of Court do not
provide for a similar procedure to be followed in the issuance of warrants of arrest and
search warrants. With respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides
that "upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the
arrest of the accused." In contrast, the procedure to be followed in issuing search
warrants is more defined. Thus, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 126 provide:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together
with any affidavits submitted.
Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is thereupon satisfied of the
facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe
that they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form
prescribed by these Rules.
We discussed the difference in the Procedure of issuing warrants of arrest and search
warrants in Soliven vs. Makasiar,33 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
The second issue, raised by Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of
the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible
officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that
the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusions as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law 34 repudiate the
submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted "searching
examination of witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest against them. They also reject
petitioners' contention that a judge must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a
warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior
to a warrant of arrest.
In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two
(2) sworn statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita
Birrer35 as well as the counter-affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking
recital and analysis of the parties' evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied
both judges that there is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners.
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely
determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing
so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable
cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a
probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the
review process cannot be measured by merely counting minutes and hours. The fact
that it took the respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm the probable cause
determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal evaluation of
the evidence attached to the records of the case.36
Petitioners' reliance on the case of Allado vs. Diokno37 is misplaced. Our Allado ruling is
predicated on the utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable
cause. Not even the corpus delicti of the crime was established by the evidence of the
prosecution in that case. Given the clear insufficiency of the evidence on record, we
stressed the necessity for the trial judge to make a further personal examination of the
complainant and his witnesses to reach a correct assessment of the existence or non-
existence of probable cause before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused. The
case at bar, however, rests on a different factual setting. As priorly discussed, the various
types of evidence extant in the records of the case provide substantial basis for a
finding of probable cause against the petitioner. The corpus delicti of the crime is a
given fact. There is an eyewitness account of the imputed crime given by Alfaro. The
alibi defense of petitioner Webb is also disputed by sworn statements of their former
maids. It was therefore unnecessary for the respondent judges to take the further step of
examining ex parte the complainant and their witnesses with searching questions.
III
Petitioners also complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process
and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They decry their alleged hasty
and malicious prosecution by the NBI and the DOJ Panel. They also assail the prejudicial
publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.
We reject these contentions. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct
the preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity
to prove lack of probable cause against them. The fairness of this opportunity is well
stressed in the Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General, viz.:
Again, there is no merit in this contention. Petitioners were afforded all the opportunities
to be heard. Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary investigation by
appearing in the initial hearing held on June 30, 1995 and in the second hearing on July
14, 1995; and by filing a "Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and
Documents" on June 27, 1995 (p. 4, Petition), a "Reply to the compliance and
Comment/Manifestation to the Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence" on
July 5, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), a "Comment and Manifestation" on July 7, 1995 (p. 6,
Petition), his "Counter-Affidavit" on July 14, 1995 (pp. 6-7, Petition) and a "Motion to
Resolve" on August 1, 1995. Numerous letter-requests were also sent by the petitioner
Webb's counsel to the DOJ Panel requesting the latter to furnish him a copy of the
reports prepared by the FBI concerning the petitioner's whereabouts during the material
period (Annexes "L", "L-1" and "L-2" of the Supplemental Petition dated August 14, 1995).
In fact, not satisfied with the decision of the DOJ Panel not to issue subpoena duces
tecum to Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., petitioner Webb filed a "Petition for Injunction,
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Makati
in order to compel said Atty. Mercader, Jr. to produce the first sworn statement of Alfaro
for submission to the DOJ Panel. (p. 4, Petition) The said court dismissed the petition after
Mercader produced and submitted to the DOJ Panel the first sworn statement of Alfaro,
without ruling on the admissibility and credence of the two (2) conflicting and
inconsistent sworn statements of the principal witness, Alfaro. (Attached hereto is a copy
of the order of Judge Ruben A. Mendiola, RTC-Makati, Branch 63 dated July 28, 1995)
marked as Annex "F."
It must also be pointed out that despite the declaration by the DOJ Panel that the
preliminary investigation was to be terminated after the hearing held on July 14, 1995,
the panel continued to conduct further proceedings, e.g. comparison of the photo-
copies of the submitted documents with the originals on July 17, 1995. (p. 7, Petition) The
panel even entertained the "Response" submitted by accused Miguel Rodriguez on July
18, 1995. (p. 17 Resolution) In addition to these, the panel even announced that any
party may submit additional evidence before the resolution of the case. (p. 8, Petition)
From the time the panel declared the termination of the preliminary investigation on
July 14, 1995, twenty-seven (27) days elapsed before the resolution was promulgated,
and the information eventually filed in the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque on August
10, 1995. This notwithstanding the directive of Section 3(f) Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Court that the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days from the
termination of the preliminary investigation. The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties
to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence
submitted more fully. This directly disputes the allegation of the petitioners that the
resolution was done with indecent haste in violation of the rights of the petitioners.
During the period of twenty-seven (27) days, the petitioners were free to adduce and
present additional evidence before the DOJ Panel.
Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following
circumstances are present:
(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the
R.P.C. or its equivalent under special laws;

Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process during the (b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
conduct of the preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ Panel promulgated
the adverse resolution and filed the Information in court against them. (c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed;
Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing of the Information in court against
them for rape with homicide on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the (d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. The filing of said
Information is in accord with Department of Justice Order No. 223, series of 1993, dated (e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and
June 25, 1993. We quote its pertinent sections, viz.:
(f) he has not at anytime been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. No appeal may be taken from a
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order
resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City
that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised
Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon showing of manifest error or grave
Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the
abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an
discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been
accused so that he can be used as a Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appeal
Court.
shall be dismissed motu propio by the Secretary of Justice.
Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section 12 of the said law mandates her
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause,
non-inclusion in the criminal Complaint or Information, thus:
however, shall not hold the filing of the information in court.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. When to appeal. The appeal must be filed within a period of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the questioned resolution by the party or his counsel. The period shall be
Sec. 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program. The certification of
interrupted only by the filing of a motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from
admission into the Program by the Department shall be given full faith and credit by the
receipt of the resolution and shall continue to run from the time the resolution denying
provincial or city prosecutor who is required NOT TO INCLUDE THE WITNESS IN THE
the motion shall have been received by the movant or his counsel. (Emphasis supplied)
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION and if included therein, to petition the court for
his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a State Witness. The court shall order the
Without doubt then, the said DOJ Order No. 223 allows the filing of an Information in
discharge and exclusion of the said accused from the information.
court after the consummation of the preliminary investigation even if the accused can
still exercise the right to seek a review of the prosecutor's recommendation with the
Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from criminal
Secretary of Justice.
prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given or used and
all the rights and benefits provided under Section 8 hereof.
Next, petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not including Alfaro in the Information
considering her alleged conspiratorial participation in the crime of rape with homicide.
The validity of these provisions is challenged by petitioner Webb. It is urged that they
The non-inclusion of Alfaro is anchored on Republic Act
constitute ". . . an intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the
No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security And Benefit
power under the Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused as a state
Program And For Other Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its
witness." The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 11938which gives the court the
Section 10, which provides:
prerogative to approve the discharge of an accused to be a state witness. Petitioner's
argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to
xxx xxx xxx
prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive
Sec. 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the
and desires to a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see
that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute
our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the
prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom
to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best
appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for
Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power to
determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted
immunity from prosecution.39Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that
the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative.
Under this provision, the court, is given the power to discharge a state witness only
because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The
discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of
an inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never been interpreted
to be beyond change by legislation designed to improve the administration of our
justice system. R.A. No. 6981 is one of the much sought penal reform laws to help
government in its uphill fight against crime, one certain cause of which is the reticence
of witnesses to testify. The rationale for the law is well put by the Department of
Justice, viz.: "Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation, usually refuse to
appear and testify in the investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases.
Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have been dismissed for insufficiency
and/or lack of evidence. For a more effective administration of criminal justice, there
was a necessity to pass a law protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and
benefits to ensure their appearance in investigative bodies/courts."40 Petitioner Webb's
challenge to the validity of R.A. No. 6981 cannot therefore succeed.
Further, petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery proceedings
during their preliminary investigation by suppressing the April 28, 1995 original copy of
the sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report. The argument is novel in this
jurisdiction and as it urges an expansive reading of the rights of persons under
preliminary investigation it deserves serious consideration. To start with, our Rules on
Criminal Procedure do not expressly provide for discovery proceedings during the
preliminary investigation stage of a criminal proceeding.41 Sections 10 and 11 of Rule
117 do provide an accused the right to move for a bill of particulars and for production
or inspection of material evidence in possession of the prosecution.42 But these provisions
apply after the filing of the Complaint or Information in court and the rights are
accorded to the accused to assist them to make an intelligent plea at arraignment and
to prepare for trial.43
This failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does not,
however, negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect
his constitutional right to life, liberty and property. Preliminary investigation is not too
early a stage to guard against any significant erosion of the constitutional right to due
process of a potential accused. As aforediscussed, the object of a preliminary
investigation is to determine the probability that the suspect committed a crime. We
hold that the finding of a probable cause by itself subjects the suspect's life, liberty and
property to real risk of loss or diminution. In the case at bar, the risk to the liberty of
petitioners cannot be understated for they are charged with the crime of rape with
homicide, a non-bailable offense when the evidence of guilt is strong.
Attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of
preliminary investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary
investigation conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial.44 As this
Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals,45 "the right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense, and
hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or
technical right; it is a substantive right." A preliminary investigation should therefore be
scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused
can be protected from any material damage. We uphold the legal basis of the right of
petitioners to demand from their prosecutor, the NBI, the original copy of the April 28,
1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report during their preliminary investigation
considering their exculpatory character, and hence, unquestionable materiality to the
issue of their probable guilt. The right is rooted on the constitutional protection of due
process which we rule to be operational even during the preliminary investigation of a
potential accused. It is also implicit in section (3) (a) of Rule 112 which requires during
the preliminary investigation the filing of a sworn complaint, which shall ". . . state the
known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents . . ."
In laying down this rule, the Court is not without enlightened precedents from other
jurisdictions. In the 1963 watershed case of Brady v. Maryland 46 the United States
Supreme Court held that "suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Its progeny is the 1935
case of Mooney v. Holohan 47 which laid down the proposition that a prosecutor's
intentional use of perjured testimony to procure conviction violates due process. Thus,
evolved jurisprudence firming up the prosecutor's duty to disclose to the defense
exculpatory evidence in its possession.48 The rationale is well put by Justice Brennan
in Brady49 "society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials
are fair." Indeed, prosecutors should not treat litigation like a game of poker where
surprises can be sprung and where gain by guile is not punished.
But given the right of petitioners to compel the NBI to disclose exculpatory evidence in
their favor, we are not prepared to rule that the initial non-production of the original
sworn statement of Alfaro dated April 28, 1995 could have resulted in the reasonable
likelihood that the DOJ Panel would not have found probable cause. To be sure, the
NBI, on July 4, 1995, upon request of petitioners, submitted a photocopy of Alfaro's April
28, 1995 sworn statement. It explained it cannot produce the original as it had been lost.
Fortunately, petitioners, on July 28, 1995, were able to obtain a copy of the original from
Atty. Arturo Mercader in the course of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 951099.50 As
petitioners admit, the DOJ Panel accepted the original of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn
statement as a part of their evidence.51 Petitioners thus had the fair chance to explain
to the DOJ Panel then still conducting their preliminary investigation the exculpatory
aspects of this sworn statement. Unfortunately for petitioners, the DOJ Panel still found
probable cause to charge them despite the alleged material discrepancies between
the first and second sworn statements of Alfaro. For reasons we have expounded, this
finding of probable cause cannot be struck down as done with grave abuse of
discretion.52On the other hand, the FBI Report while corroborative of the alibi of
petitioner Webb cannot by itself reverse the probable cause finding of the DOJ Panel in
light of the totality of evidence presented by the NBI.
Finally, we come to the argument of petitioner that the DOJ Panel lost its impartiality
due to the prejudicial publicity waged in the press and broadcast media by the NBI.
Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process
while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its
early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a
preliminary investigation.
In floating this issue, petitioners touch on some of the most problematic areas in
constitutional law where the conflicting demands of freedom of speech and of the
press, the public's right to information, and an accused's right to a fair and impartial trial
collide and compete for prioritization. The process of pinpointing where the balance
should be struck has divided men of learning as the balance keeps moving either on
the side of liberty or on the side of order as the tumult of the time and the welfare of the
people dictate. The dance of balance is a difficult act to follow.
In democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be
avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic
developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the
high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of
the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated
even today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which
are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the case the NBI, the
respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have participated in this media blitz.
The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal
trials cannot be completely closed to the press and the public. In the seminal case
of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,53 it was wisely held:
xxx xxx xxx
(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice
demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted,
criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving
assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and
discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias
or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was
recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and
public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an
important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility,
and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process "satisfy the
appearance of justice," Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11,
which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this
unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries
past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of
a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v. United States, 362
US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First
Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as
those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of
everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First
Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that
the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from
summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time
the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant,
having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to
augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it was
deliberately linked by
the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and
representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence
historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to
the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly
guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated
rights. The right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First
Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised
for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be
eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain
circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus,
in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al.,54 we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at
bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content, of the
publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and
impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of
publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown
and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is
a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg
lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias
for it does not appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except
evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was
conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no
instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ
Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.
It all remains to state that the Vizconde case will move to a more critical stage as
petitioners will now have to undergo trial on the merits. We stress that probable cause is
not synonymous with guilt and while the light of publicity may be a good disinfectant of
unfairness, too much of its heat can bring to flame an accused's right to fair trial.
Without imposing on the trial judge the difficult task of supervising every specie of
speech relating to the case at bar, it behooves her to be reminded of the duty of a trial
judge in high profile criminal cases to control publicity prejudicial to the fair
administration of justice.55 The Court reminds judges that our ability to dispense impartial
justice is an issue in every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always
stands as a silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent,
the business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be
done and is done and that is the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from
the bar of public opinion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed for lack of showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 126029. March 27, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. REY SUNGA, RAMIL LANSANG, INOCENCIO
PASCUA, LITO OCTAC and LOCIL CUI @ GINALYN CUYOS, accused,
REY SUNGA, RAMIL LANSANG and INOCENCIO PASCUA, appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
The sole, uncorroborated testimony of an accused who turned state witness may suffice
to convict his co-accused if it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner
and is full of details which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate
afterthought;[1] otherwise, it needs corroboration the presence or lack of which may
ultimately decide the cause of the prosecution and the fate of the accused.
On July 12, 1994, the mutilated body of Jocelyn Tan (Jocelyn), a minor and a high
school student of Palawan Integrated National School, (PINS), was found at a coffee
plantation in Jacana, Barangay Bancao-Bancao in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
The hunt for the possible killers of Jocelyn was swift, several arrests having been made in
a span of days, followed by the conduct of the requisite preliminary investigation by the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Puerto Princesa City which culminated in the
filing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Puerto Princesa City of the information for
rape with homicide against the suspects. The case was raffled to Branch 48 of the court.
Accused in the Information were Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and
Lito Octac as principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice the
accusatory portion of the information dated September 6, 1994 reads as follows:
xxx
That on or about June 29, 1994 in the afternoon, at Barangay Irawan, Puerto Princesa
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation, to
wit: by pinning down one JOCELYN TAN, a minor, fifteen (15) years of age, succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent; that on the
occasion of said rape and to enable them to conceal the commission of the crime, the
herein accused in furtherance of the conspiracy together with LOCIL CUI, a minor,
acting with discernment and who cooperated in the execution of the offense as
ACCOMPLICE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, taking advantage
of their superior number and strength, with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault,
and use personal violence upon JOCELYN TAN by repeatedly stabbing and smashing a
stone on her head, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds and multiple fractures on
her skull which were the direct cause of her death shortly thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
x x x.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 11984.
Upon arraignment all the accused pleaded not guilty.
On September 26, 1994, the accused through counsel filed a petition for
bail,[3] underscoring the weakness of the Peoples evidence, there being no direct
evidence against them, a fact admitted by the City Prosecutor in his resolution[4] for their
indictment. Hearings on the bail petition were conducted in the course of which the
prosecution, after presenting several witnesses, filed on October 18, 1994 a motion to
discharge[5] accused Locil Cui (Locil) to be a state witness, averring therein that the
legal requisites for her discharge had been complied with, and submitting her sworn
statement[6] which detailed how her co-accused carried out the crime. The respective
counsels for the other accused opposed the motion, insisting that it could only be filed
during trial on the merits and that Locils testimony was not absolutely necessary.[7] By
Order of October 20, 1994,[8] the trial court deferred the resolution of the bail petition
until after the prosecution had rested its case, but it granted the motion to discharge
Locil.
The accused assailed the discharge of Locil via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition[9] before the Court of Appeals which issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the trial of the case.[10] The TRO
lapsed, however, without a preliminary injunction being issued, hence, the trial of the
case resumed.
Through state witness Locil, then 14 years old and an elementary school dropout who
had been living away from her parents and using the alias Ginalyn Cuyos[11] to evade,
by her own account,[12] her mother and aunt who were looking for her after she got
pregnant (the pregnancy was later aborted), the prosecution established the following
version:
At about 2:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Locil boarded a tricycle bearing the marking Ryan-
Ryan from the Social Security System (SSS) Office in Puerto Princesa City. Already on
board the tricycle was a lesbian who had a birthmark on the right side of the face and
who invited Locil for a joy ride.[13] Upon instruction of the lesbian, the tricycle driver,
whom she did not know but whom she later identified and who answered to the name
Rey Sunga (Sunga), repaired to the Mendoza Park.
At the Mendoza Park, the lesbian alighted and spoke to Jocelyn Tan, the victim, who
was dressed in a PINS uniform. The lesbian, together with Jocelyn, then joined Locil
aboard the tricycle which was already driven by Inocencio Pascua (Pascua) vice
Sunga who had in the meantime left. Still aboard the tricycle, the four of them
proceeded to and reached Barangay Irawan, Puerto Princesa City and on reaching a
forested area, Jocelyn was met by Sunga who held her and by Ramil Lansang
(Lansang) who wrapped his arm around her waist as they dragged her to a nearby
buho clumps. There, Jocelyn was made to lie down. Her skirt was raised and her panty
was taken off by Lansang. As she lay face up with both her hands held by Sunga and
Pascua, Lansang stripped naked, placed himself on top of Jocelyn, inserted his penis
into her vagina and seemed to be pumping.[14]
After Lansang, Sunga took turn to have sexual intercourse with Jocelyn as Lansang and
one who was not known to Locil and whom the latter described as one who has chinky
or narrow eyes, later identified to be Pascua, kept Jocelyn pinned down by her
hands.[15]
Pascua too subsequently had carnal knowledge of Jocelyn who all along struggled
against her malefactors.[16]
After Pascua satisfied his lust, Sunga, with a sharp bladed weapon, stabbed the
abdomen of the motionless Jocelyn, drawing her to rise to a sitting position and clutch
her abdomen.Sunga then passed on the bladed weapon to Lansang who smashed
Jocelyns head with an irregularly shaped stone, causing her to fall to the ground
lifeless. Locil, who witnessed everything, was then pulled by the lesbian and led back
into the tricycle where they awaited Lansang, Sunga and Pascua to ride with them. All
five thereafter headed back to Puerto Princesa City proper, leaving Jocelyns body
behind.[17]
When the five reached the Mendoza Park where Locil alighted, she heard the voice of
someone from inside the tricycle warning her to keep mum about the incident,
otherwise something would also happen to her. Locil then repaired to her boarding
house. Until she was arrested following the discovery on July 12, 1994 of Jocelyns corpse,
she did not report the incident to anyone.[18]
The other prosecution witnesses provided testimonies pertaining to circumstances after
the fact.
Oscar Devilleres, a garbage truck driver, recalled that he was on his way home in
Jacana, Barangay Bancao-Bancao at 12:30 a. m. of June 30, 1994, a day after the
incident, when from a distance of about 30 meters, he saw Lansang walking back and
forth and appearing restless near the coffee plantation in Jacana, Barangay Bancao-
Bancao where Jocelyns body was later found on July 12, 1994. Although it was then
nighttime, Devilleres had a good look at Lansang due to the illumination provided by
the electric light post under which Lansang was situated.[19]
Igleceria Gabinete, a resident of Jacana, declared that she was among those who saw
the mutilated body of Jocelyn in the morning of July 12, 1994 at a coffee plantation
near her place; that in the afternoon of that date and while tending her sari-sari store, a
tricycle arrived with three men on board, one of whom, Lito Octac (Octac) alighted,
leaving the two inside the tricycle who seemed to be hiding their faces; that one of
those two men inside the tricycle inquired from her whether the discovered corpse, that
of Jocelyn, was from Barangay Caroray;that the following day, she reported to the
police about the three suspicious looking men who went to her store; and that two days
later, she was made to, as she did, identify Lansang at the police station as one of the
men who went to her store in the afternoon of July 12, 1994 and inquired as to Jocelyns
corpse.[20]
Galahad Tan (Tan), Jocelyns father, recounted as follows: During the wake of his
daughter at the Sampaton Funeral Parlor, at 1:30 a. m. of July 14, 1994 (15th day
following the incident), Lansang arrived and told him as follows: Total tayo ay
magkaisang barangay lang ay ayosin natin itong kaso at magtulungan na lang,
mayroon na akong alam na makakapagturo kung sino and may kagagawan sa
krimen. Huwag na lang nating sabihin sa mga polis. When he asked Lansang who he
was referring to, Lansang replied that he would return. Lansang did not return, however,
prompting Tan to relay to law enforcers the statements of Lansang, his neighbor who
was courting Jocelyn at the time and with whose family his own family was in good
terms.[21]
Testifying on the autopsy she conducted on Jocelyn, Dr. Ma. Carla Gallego - Vigonte
(Dr. Vigonte) affirmed the following findings in her report[22] dated July 12, 1994:
POST-MORTEM FINDINGS
1. The cadaver was seen in advanced stage of decomposition.
2. Depressed fracture noted at the frontal bone of the skull about 2 cm anterior to the
bregma, measuring 2.5 cm in width and 3.5 cm in length, with a rounded hole at its right
side with irregular edges measuring 4 cm x 5 cm in diameter; with a linear fracture
about 2 cm in length extending from the depressed fracture up to the bregma; linear
fracture about 3 cm in length along the coronal suture, right side, extending from the
hole to the bregma.
3. Multiple linear fracture with lengths ranging from 2 cm to 5 cm, noted at the
lambdoid suture, about 2 cm right side of the lambda, extending to the right side of the
occipital and parietal bones of the skull.
PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEATH: Intracranial Hemorrhage secondary to multiple fractures of
the skull.
Dr. Vigonte opined that a blunt object or instrument like a hard wood or a rock caused
the injury noted in post-mortem finding no. 2 which was fatal, it being a deep wound in
the skull affecting its inner organ and lacerating the tissues of the brain, thus causing
hemorrhage; that for said fatal wound, the assailant was probably at Jocelyns left side;
that for the injury in post-mortem finding no. 3, the attacker was at the back of Jocelyn;
and that in light of the multiple injuries, there were more than one perpetrator.[23] Dr.
Vigonte was, however, unable to determine whether Jocelyn was also raped.[24]
The prosecution adduced documentary evidence consisting mainly of two supposed
extrajudicial confessions made by Sunga.
In a sworn statement (Exhibit A)[25] dated July 18, 1994 which was executed before SPO2
Jose P. Janoras (SPO2 Janoras), Sunga made the following disclosures:
At about 10:00 a. m. of the day of the incident, June 29, 1994, as he was then at work as
a tricycle dispatcher, Lansang arrived in a tricycle bearing the marking Ryan-Ryan and
invited him to accompany him in fetching Jocelyn at the PINS. He obliged and just
before reaching their destination, Locil boarded the tricycle. At the gate of the school,
Lansang talked to Jocelyn who was then wearing the school uniform after which the
two boarded the tricycle which he (Sunga) drove to a spot at the corner of Rizal
Avenue and Lacao St. in the Puerto Princesa City proper where the four of them (Sunga,
Lansang, Locil and Jocelyn) transferred to an owners jeep brought by Octac alias
Toto. The group then proceeded to and reached Barangay Irawan at around 10:30 a.
m. and at a forested area in Sitio Tagaud, everyone alighted except for Octac. Lansang
then forcibly undressed Jocelyn and raped her while he (Sunga) and Locil
watched. After consummating his carnal desire, Lansang hit Jocelyn with a 2 x 2 piece
of wood on her head and successively on different parts of her body. When Jocelyn
was already dead, Locil also whacked Jocelyns body many times. The group then
headed back to the city proper, leaving Jocelyns remains at the scene of the crime.
In accordance with their previous agreement, he (Sunga), Lansang and Locil returned
to Barangay Irawan aboard a jeep driven by Octac four days after June 29, 1994 and
took Jocelyns body for the purpose of bringing it to Jacana in Barangay Bancao-
Bancao in accordance with Lansangs wish. On their way to Bancao-Bancao, Locil
inserted a cigarette into the corpses mouth . pinasigarilyo ni [Locil] ang bangkay upang
ikubli sa maaaring makakita ang tunay na kaanyuan ni Jocelyn Tan.[26] At Barangay
Bancao-Bancao, he (Sunga), Lansang and Locil carried the victims body and left the
same at a coffee plantation fifty meters away from Jacana Road while Octac served
as a lookout by the roadside. On their return to the city, the four parted ways at the
corner of Rizal Avenue and Lacao Street. He (Sunga) then drove the tricycle with the
marking Ryan-Ryan with Locil aboard while Lansang and Octac remained together at
the jeep.[27]
The above sworn statement bears Sungas signature and that of his assisting counsel,
Atty. Agustin Rocamora (Atty. Rocamora), Puerto Princesa City Legal Officer.
Testifying as to the investigation he conducted upon Sunga, SPO2 Janoras recalled that
he was on duty at the Puerto Princesa City police precinct in the morning of July 18,
1994 when SPO4 Boy Pantollano and patrolman Bolos arrived together with Sunga. The
two brought Sunga inside a room and asked him questions pertaining to Jocelyns death
and after about thirty minutes, Sunga was presented before him (SPO2 Janoras) for
investigation. He initially asked Sunga whether he knew anything about Jocelyns death
and Sunga replied affirmatively, prompting him to inform him of his rights under custodial
interrogation. After Sunga signified his desire to avail of the services of a lawyer, Sunga
chose Atty. Rocamora to be his counsel from among the names of lawyers mentioned
by him (SPO2 Janoras). He thereupon fetched Atty. Rocamora from his residence. Atty.
Rocamora briefly conferred with Sunga, asking him if he wanted to give a confession
and informing him of the consequences thereof. Thereafter, the investigation
proceeded with Sunga voluntarily giving his answers to questions he (SPO2 Janoras)
propounded at the end of which investigation Sunga and Atty. Rocamora affixed their
respective signatures on the recorded statement.[28]
The execution of Exhibit A was, during the preliminary investigation before the Municipal
Trial Court,[29] affirmed by Sunga. Apart from acknowledging its contents, Sunga
answered the investigating judges other queries as he implicated Lansang, Locil and
Octac in the killing of Jocelyn. This time, however, he alleged that not only Lansang but
also Octac raped Jocelyn, adding that he merely held Jocelyns hand.[30]
Subsequently or on August 3, 1994, Sunga executed another sworn statement (Exhibit
I)[31] before Special Investigator Reynaldo O. Abordo of the Puerto Princesa office of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Exhibit I varied in a number of respects from
Exhibit A. In Exhibit I, Sunga declared that in the morning of June 28, 1994 he already
had an agreement with Lansang to fetch Jocelyn from her school on the following day;
that at 8:00 a. m. of the following day, June 29, 1994, he, together with Lansang, Lito
Octa (should be Octac) and a certain Jun left Mendoza Park and proceeded to Irawan
after asking Locil, one Bing Manila, and a certain Josie to fetch Jocelyn at her
school; that Jun drove the tricycle back to the city proper andhe
transported their female companions including Jocelyn to Irawan; that at
Irawan, Lansang raped the struggling Jocelyn whose hands were then held by Josie;
that after Lansang and Junraped Jocelyn, Lansang smashed her head twice in
accordance with his plan to kill her which plan was known to him (Sunga), Locil, Octac
and Jun; that at 1:30 a. m. of June 30, 1994, Lansang, Sunga, Octa and Jun returned
to Irawan, took Jocelyns corpse and dumped it at a coffee plantation in Jacana Road;
and that he did not take part in the rape or killing of Jocelyn but merely joined the
group due to Lansangs promise to give him P500.00. Exhibit I embodied a waiver by
Sunga of his right to counsel.[32]
The prosecution evidence with respect to Jocelyns familys incurring of the amount
of P11,000.00 for Jocelyns funeral expenses was admitted by the defense.[33]
Upon the other hand, all the accused proffered alibi.
Accused-appellant Sunga, who had previously been convicted for robbery with
homicide, denied having anything to do with the rape and killing of Jocelyn. He
branded as false the testimony of Locil whom he claimed is a prostitute and a pimp and
was always seen loitering at Mendoza Park. While he acknowledged knowing Octac
and Pascua, he denied being in their company on June 29, 1994 or in Lansangs.[34]
Confronted with his sworn statement-Exhibit A, Sunga explained the circumstances
behind his execution thereof as follows: After having been arrested without a warrant by
the police in the evening of July 15, 1994 at the corner of Rizal and Valencia streets
while picking up passengers, he was brought to the police station where he was
subjected to violence and intimidation by SPO2 Pantollano and a certain Ka Ronnie to
coerce him to pinpoint to anybody, and he involuntarily did. After being mauled and
kicked, he was made to appear before police investigator Janoras on that same night
of July 15, 1994 during which he signed the second and third pages of a three paged
affidavit embodying his questioned extrajudicial confession without the assistance of
counsel and under threats and intimidation from SPO2 Pantollano. He was later brought
on July 18, 1994 to the Capitol building where he signed the first page of his confession
after which Atty. Agustin Rocamora also signed the same.[35]
As to his other sworn statement-Exhibit I executed before the NBI, Sunga initially affirmed
having given the answers to questions propounded therein by the NBI Investigator and
having executed the confession for the purpose of applying to become a state witness
in the case.[36] He subsequently retracted his acknowledgement of Exhibit I as his own
confession.[37] While he admitted having participated in the preliminary investigation at
the MTCC of Puerto Princesa City, he could not remember having given most of the
statements he made therein.[38]
The defense presented other witnesses.
Joel Esquela Mayo (Mayo), an employee of Puerto Princesa Citys crime watchdog
Bantay Puerto, declared that in the morning of July 14, 1994 he and a co-employee
Miguel Abrina (Abrina) were at Jacana in Barangay Bancao-Bancao upon orders from
their superior to be on the lookout for the possible return thereto of the perpetrators
behind Jocelyns killing; seeing Locil uneasy as she alighted from a tricycle, they
approached and asked her how she was related to Jocelyn to which she replied that
she was a friend; then Locil brought the two to the very spot where Jocelyns remains
were found and while there she acted as if she was looking for something; Locil later
commented that it was there that Jocelyn and she had a fight; and Locil was
subsequently apprehended by the police.[39]
Abrina substantially corroborated Mayos story.[40]
Another witness, Orlando Lacsamana (Lacsamana), a detainee at the Puerto Princesa
City jail, testified that while he was conversing with Locil, also a detainee, on August 15,
1994, they saw Lansang being brought inside. Lacsamana asked Locil if she knew
Lansang but she denied having known Lansang or having been her companion.[41]
Detention prisoners John Pulga (Pulga) and Jerry Galgarin (Galgarin) as well as Bureau
of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) personnel Joel Rabanal (Rabanal) and SPO2
Conrado Guzman Rafael (SPO2 Rafael) testified as to Locils failure to correctly identify
Lansang on separate occasions.
Thus detention prisoner Pulga narrated that on July 21, 1994, he was made to form part
of a police line-up together with three other detainees; and that when Locil was asked
by the police to identify who among them was Lansang, she pointed to him (Pulga)
whom she called Ramil Lansang.[42]
Corroborating Pulgas testimony was BJMP personnel Rabanal who brought out Pulga
and the three others for the police line-up, he too alleging that Locil indeed pointed to
Pulga as Lansang.[43]
Detention prisoner Galgarin, who was detained at the 263rd Mobile Post of the Philippine
National Police on July 23, 1994, declared that he saw Locil arrive in a police car after
which Lansang and three other detainees were made to stand in a police line-up; and
that when Locil was asked to identify Lansang, she said he was not there.[44]
SPO2 Rafael testified that while he was on duty in the aforesaid PNP Mobile Post on
August 23, 1994, Locil hesitated to identify Lansang even after the police assured her not
to be afraid.[45]
Accused-appellant Pascua disclaimed knowledge of anyone of his co-accused prior to
the June 29, 1994 incident. He denied having anything to do with the killing or rape of
Jocelyn and branded Locils account as a lie. He claimed that he was staying with his
uncle Victor de Felipe at 27 E. Burgos St., Puerto Princesa City from April to July 14, 1994;
that while he was driving the tricycle with the marking Ryan-Ryan for a living, he
returned it to its owner on June 27, 1994 due to engine trouble and never drove it
again; that at about 8:00 a. m. of June 29, 1994, he, together with his uncle Victor De
Felipe and a carpenter, went to San Pedro also in Puerto Princesa City where he helped
in recovering materials from De Felipes demolished house thereat for use in the latters
other residence at Burgos St.; and that he was at San Pedro until 4:00 p. m. of the same
day.[46]
Continuing, Pascua declared that on July 14, 1994, he left for his stepfathers home at
Barangay Burirao of the town of Narra where he was, on July 23, 1994, arrested without
a warrant by the police on suspicion that he might have been involved in the subject
crime, he having driven for sometime the tricycle bearing the marking Ryan-Ryan; that
the apprehending policemen sought his cooperation so he could be utilized as a
witness against Lansang, even offering him a P100,000.00 reward and his exclusion from
the criminal information, but he refused for he knew nothing about the crime; that inside
a small room at the police station in the city, he again refused to obey SPO4 Pantollanos
order for him to say certain things about the crime, thereby infuriating Pantollano who
threatened to implicate him; that while still under detention on July 24, 1994, he was
brought before Locil for identification purposes but Locil denied knowing him; and that
he did not go into hiding after June 29, 1994 for he took up a farming course at the
Palawan National Agricultural College (PNAC).[47]
Victor De Felipe corroborated his accused nephews testimony as to his whereabouts on
June 29, 1994 and his returning the tricycle two days before the incident.[48] Felix Mayor,
De Felipes carpenter, confirmed Pascuas being with him and De Felipe the whole day
of June 29, 1994 at Barangay San Pedro to retrieve building materials from De Felipes
demolished house in the said place.[49]
The testimony of witness Espiridion Labotoy was dispensed with when the prosecution
admitted its corroboration of Pascuas allegation that the latter returned the tricycle to
its owner on June 27, 1994.[50]
Filomena Pascua-Tesorio also corroborated her nephew Pascuas claim that Locil did
not identify him as one of those who wronged Jocelyn. And she added that during her
visit to Pascua at the police station on July 24, 1994, she asked Locil if she was
acquainted with Pascua and she replied in the negative, saying it was her first time to
see Pascua.[51]
Cesar Batin (Batin), an instructor at PNAC, attested that Pascua was enrolled at PNAC
Abo-Abo Center in Brookes point on July 18, 1994 but that he attended classes for only
about a week and resumed his studies on August 16, 1994 until October 11, 1994. Batin
affirmed the certification he issued as to Pascuas school attendance.[52]
Pascuas mother Teodora Espaola testified that she accompanied her arrested son when
he was brought by the police to Puerto Princesa City on July 23, 1994 and confirmed
that the policemen offered Pascua a reward in exchange for his admitting responsibility
for the crime but that she rebuffed them.[53]
Lito Octac, also clinging to alibi, alleged that on the day of the incident he was working
at Pambato Forwarder loading cargoes and pieces of baggage, in support of which he
presented an entry (Exhibit 9)[54] in his employers logbook showing that he reported for
work from 1:00 to 5:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994.[55]
Lansang, who operated a pump boat that ferried passengers from Barangay Caruray,
San Vicente, Palawan where his parents reside, to Barangay Bahile, Puerto Princesa City
and vice-versa, declared as follows: At about 8:30 a. m. of June 29, 1994, he met his
sister Gloria Negosa in her office at the Philippine Ports Authority for the purpose of
borrowing from her P3,000.00 which he would use to buy pieces of plywood and paint
for his boat. His sister, however, directed him to get the money from his mother who
happened to be at her office at the time and who received two PCIB checks both
dated June 29, 1994 payable to cash, one in the amount of two thousand (P2,000.00)
pesos, and another in the amount of Nine Thousand Six Hundred Sixteen (P9,616.00)
pesos from Gloria. Shortly after, he and his mother went to the PCI Bank where he,
instead of his mother who did not have any identification card and Community Tax
Certificate, did the encashing (at 9:53 a. m.) of the checks- (Exhibits 12 and 12-A). The
two left the bank and proceeded to the Palawan Poultry store from which they
purchased fertilizer. Thereafter, they bought plywood and paint at the Unico
Merchandising.[56] (An official receipt dated June 6, 1994 of P2,206 representing the
purchase price of the goods was marked as Exhibit 11.)[57]
Continuing, Lansang declared that while his mother left to make her other purchases,
he remained at the Unico Merchandising until 12:00 noon when he went to the house of
his brothers-in-law to pick up her mothers goods. At the said house, he briefly met a
resident thereof named Ariel Bactad and then took his mothers goods. He loaded all
their purchases in a jeep bound for Barangay Bahile from which point they were to be
transported via a pump boat to his parents home in Barangay Caruray. As his mother no
longer showed up, he was constrained to accompany his cargo aboard the jeep which
departed at 1:00 p. m. and reached Barangay Bahile at 3:00 p. m. of the same day,
June 29, 1994. At Barangay Bahile, he loaded the goods into his boat with the help of
the boat driver, Arnel Tulonghari. He then took lunch at the carinderia of a certain Jerry
(or Jerico) Rufano where he waited in vain for two hours for his mother to come to
Barangay Bahile. At 5:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Rufano drove him to Barangay
Salvacion where he got a jeepney ride on his way home to the city proper, arriving
there at about 8:30 p. m. still of the same day.[58]
Lansang further declared that he had never been to Barangay Irawan or to Jacana in
Barangay Bancao-Bancao. While he admitted that he, together with one Joel Egaa,
went to the Sampaton Funeral Parlor in the evening of July 13, 1994 to condole with the
Tans, he denied having told Tan that he (Lansang) knew somebody who could pinpoint
those responsible for the crime. He likewise denied asking Tan to refrain from seeking the
assistance of law enforcers, he having merely informed Tan that Sunga, with whom (he)
Lansang got to be acquainted earlier that same evening, knew Jocelyn. Finally,
Lansang disclaimed having been Jocelyns suitor for he had a live-in partner named
Mary Ann Dineros whom he intended to marry but could not do so due to his indictment
in the case at bar.[59]
Witnesses Jerry Rufano, Arnel Tulonghari and Ariel Bactad corroborated pertinent parts
of Lansangs testimony as to his whereabouts and activities on June 29, 1994.[60]
Joel
Egaa also affirmed having accompanied Lansang to Sampaton Funeral parlor on the ni
ght of July 13, 1994.[61]
Melisa P. Mateo, on the other hand, testified that as a bank teller of PCI Bank, she
received and processed for encashment the two checks (Exhibit 12)[62] from Lansang at
almost 10:00 a. m. of June 29, 1994, which checks as well as Lansangs signatures and
hers and other inscriptions thereon she identified.[63]
Edgardo Caisip declared that he was the driver of the jeepney which Lansang rode on
together with his cargo for a trip from the city proper to Barangay Bahile from 1:00 to
3:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994. Caisip added that he already knew Lansang before that
time, the Lansangs having been his usual passengers.[64]
Finally, Freddie Gallego, a barangay councilor of Barangay Caruray, claimed that
Lansang was with him in the afternoon of July 12, 1994 on the occasion of a birthday
party in the said barangay.[65]
By decision of March 7, 1996, the trial court convicted Sunga and Lansang as principals
of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of DEATH,
and Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused REY SUNGA and RAMIL
LANSANG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime charged and are
sentenced to each suffer the penalty of DEATH. Accused INOCENCIO PASCUA, JR., is
also found GUILTY as principal of the crime of Rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused RAMIL LANSANG, REY SUNGA and
INOCENCIO PASCUA, JR. are jointly and severally liable to indemnify the heirs of Jocelyn
Tan the sum of P150,000.00 as moral, actual and compensatory damages with all the
accessory penalties provided for the law and to pay the costs.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused LITO OCTAC beyond
reasonable doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
It appearing that Lito Octac is detained and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos is still under
the custody of the PNP, Puerto Princesa City their release are hereby ordered unless
held for other lawful cause or causes.
The City Jail Warden of Puerto Princesa City and Chief of Jimmy Carbonell of Puerto
Princesa City, are hereby ordered to transfer immediately the bodies of accused REY
SUNGA and RAMIL LANSANG to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila
pending review by the Supreme Court of this decision.
SO ORDERED.[66]
Hence, the automatic review of the case by this Court pursuant to Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Sunga, Lansang and Pascua filed their respective appeal briefs.
In the Appellees Brief, the Solicitor General prays for the affirmance of Sunga and
Lansangs conviction and the modification of Pascuas conviction such that he be also
convicted for rape with homicide and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
The issues in the case boil down to:
(1) Whether the discharge by the lower court of Locil Cui as a state witness is in
accordance with law; and
(2) Whether the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
After examining the record of the proceedings prior to the trial courts questioned
issuance of the order discharging Locil to become, as she did, a state witness, this Court
is satisfied that there was nothing irregular therewith. Her discharge was ordered in the
course of what originally were hearings on the petition of the accused for bail and after
the prosecution had presented several of its witnesses and submitted Locils sworn
statement. Contrary to accuseds counsels argument that a motion for discharge could
only be filed during trial on the merits, it could be done at any stage of the proceedings,
and discharge can be effected from the filing of the information to the time the
defense starts to offer any evidence.[67]
From the records, it appears that the following conditions for Locils discharge under
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court were satisfied:
1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought to be a state witness;
2. his testimony is absolutely necessary;
3. no other direct evidence is available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed except his testimony;
4. his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
5. he does not appear to be the most guilty; and
6. he has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
It is undisputed that at the start of the trial, the prosecution did not have direct
evidence, testimonial or otherwise, to establish the culpability of the accused.
Based on Locils sworn statement, she was the only person who saw what happened to
Jocelyn. Her testimony was thus indispensable. That she did not appear to be the most
guilty among the accused and that she had not been convicted of an offense
involving moral turpitude were shown, as was the susceptibility of material corroboration
of her testimony at the time of her discharge in view of the other evidence in the hands
of the prosecution.
That the trial court ordered Locils discharge a day before the scheduled hearing on the
motion for her discharge is of no moment. The requirement of a hearing in support of the
discharge had been substantially complied with when the trial court, during the
hearings on the bail petition, already received evidence from the prosecution including
Locils sworn statement and also heard in open court the defenses arguments in
opposition thereto. A hearing did take place but interspersed with the hearings on the
bail petition. So long as the trial court was able to receive evidence for and against the
discharge, its subsequent order granting or denying the motion for discharge is in order
notwithstanding the lack of actual hearing on said motion.[68]
In fine, even if Locils discharge failed to comply with all the requirements embodied in
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, her testimony would not, for that sole reason,
be discarded or disregarded for, in the discharge of a co-defendant, the trial court may
reasonably be expected to commit error which is not reversible, the underlying principle
being that it does not affect the competency and quality of testimony of the
discharged defendant.[69]
From the prosecution evidence, the testimony of the erstwhile accused-turned state
witness Locil is the most pivotal, for it is an eyewitness account of what transpired before
and at the time of Jocelyns death. Her testimony is the only direct evidence identifying
appellants and relating in detail their specific overt acts.
Yet like any other testimony, this Court may not readily accept Locils statements hook,
line and sinker because in the assessment of the testimony of a co-accused-turned
state witness, the same must be received with great caution and must be carefully
scrutinized.[70]
The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-
conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and
without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the latter
committed or participated in the commission of the crime. The testimony must be
substantially corroborated in its material points[71] by unimpeachable testimony and
strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes
manifest.[72]
Was Locils testimony corroborated in its material points by the prosecutions other
evidence? If in the affirmative, was the corroborative
evidence unimpeachable testimony and strongcircumstances to such an extent that
Locils trustworthiness becomes manifest?
Appellant Sungas two extrajudicial confessions, which strictly speaking
were admissions for they referred to statements of fact which did not directly involve an
acknowledgement of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he
was charged,[73] could have lent corroborative support to Locils testimony, having
likewise given details of how the crime took place. Contrary, however, to the trial courts
ruling, this Court finds Sungas admissions to be inadmissible in evidence not only against
him but also against his co-accused appellants.
A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is guaranteed the
following rights by the Constitution: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the right to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice, and to be provided with one if
he cannot afford the services of counsel; and (3) the right to be informed of these
rights.[74]
The right to counsel was denied Sunga during his execution of Exhibit A - admission
before the police on the ground that the counsel who assisted him, Atty. Agustin
Rocamora, was the City Legal Officer of Puerto Princesa.
In People v. Bandula,[75] this Court made it sufficiently clear that the independent
counsel for the accused in custodial investigations cannot be a special counsel, public
or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused. A legal officer of the city, like Atty. Rocamora,
provides legal aid and support to the mayor and the city in carrying out the delivery of
basic services to the people, which includes maintenance of peace and order and, as
such, his office is akin to that of a prosecutor who unquestionably cannot represent the
accused during custodial investigation due to conflict of interest.[76] That Sunga chose
him to be his counsel, even if true, did not render his admission admissible. Being of a
very low educational attainment,[77] Sunga could not have possibly known the
ramifications of his choice of a city legal officer to be his counsel. The duty of law
enforcers to inform him of his Constitutional rights during custodial interrogations to their
full, proper and precise extent does not appear to have been discharged.
Notatu dignum is the fact that nothing in the records shows that Atty. Rocamora
exerted efforts to safeguard Sungas rights and interests, especially that of his right not to
be a witness against himself. In fact, glaringly, Atty. Rocamora was not even made to
testify so he could have related the extent of legal assistance he extended to Sunga at
the police station. This Court is thus constrained to rely on the
following verbatim testimony of SPO2 Janoras which described how Atty. Rocamora
assisted Sunga during the investigation:
ATTY. ENRIQUEZ (Defense Counsel) -
Q: Did not Atty. Rocamora warn you, as the investigator, that simply he is invoking his
clients right to remain silent? Did not Atty. Rocamora first confer with the accused Rey
Sunga prior to the investigation?
A: They conversed.
Q: You said a while ago that immediately upon your arrival you already started the
investigation. And now you are claiming that they had a conversation first. Which is
correct?
A: They conversed for a very short while because everybody was already there. I was
on my typewriter and they were seated just very near me (Emphasis supplied.)[78]
xxx
ATTY. CRUZAT (Defense Counsel) -
Q: And you informed Atty. Rocamora that allegedly Mr. Rey Sunga wanted to confess
his alleged participation in the commission of the offense, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And so upon arrival at the police station it did not take Atty. Rocamora a long time
to confer with Rey Sunga before the alleged investigation started, as you said 6:00
oclock in the morning?
A: Yes, sir. It did not take long because they were already ready (Emphasis supplied.)[79]
xxx
COURT -
Q: Who propounded the questions to accused Rey Sunga?
A: I was the one, Your Honor.
Q: And who gave the answers?
A: Rey Sunga was the one answering me, Your Honor.
Continue.
PROSECUTOR GONZALES -
Q: And what, if any, did Atty. Agustin Rocamora do, if any, at the time these questions
were being asked Rey Sunga?
A: He instructed Rey Sunga to just answer the questions, sir (Emphasis supplied.)[80]
xxx
From the foregoing testimony of SPO2 Janoras, it can be gathered that Atty. Rocamora
did not, if at all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options prior to giving his (Sungas)
admission. Evidently, Atty. Rocamora, without more, merely acted to facilitate the
taking of the admission from Sunga.
Moreover, that Sunga was first questioned by SPO4
Pantollano and Patrolman Bolos before he was investigated by SPO2 Janoras does not
escape the attention of this Court. Although Sunga failed to present evidence as to the
maltreatment he claimed to have suffered in the hands of SPO4 Pantollano and
Patrolman Bolos, he did not have any lawyer by his side at the time these two
policemen started asking him questions about Jocelyns death. At that point, Sunga was
already under custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel.
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into
custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit
incriminating statements (Italics in the original; Emphasis supplied.).[81] Under such
circumstances, this Court cannot but entertain serious misgivings as to the admission
Sunga subsequently gave to SPO2 Janoras.
Like Exhibit A, Sungas second extrajudicial admission-Exhibit I is inadmissible, due to the
absence of counsel to assist him when he executed it on August 3, 1994 before the NBI
of Puerto Princesa City. Although Sunga declared in open court that he made such
admission in connection with his desire to apply as state witness which admission he
later repudiated, this does not make Exhibit I admissible. Sunga was at the time still
under detention at the NBI office and had been languishing in jail since his arrest in mid-
July 1994. His desire to regain his freedom is not difficult to understand, he having lost it
once due to his conviction for another crime. His admission which was done without the
benefit of counsel consisted of answers to questions propounded by the investigating
agent of the NBI and not of a unilateral declaration of his participation in the crime. To
this Court, these conditions are constitutive of an atmosphere pervading that of a
custodial investigation and necessitating the assistance of
a competent and independent counsel of Sungas choice as a matter of right but which
he had none.
Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear
harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent
counsel must be struck down as inadmissible.[82] Even if the confession contains a grain
of truth or even if it had been voluntarily given, if it was made without the assistance of
counsel, it is inadmissible.[83]
The waiver by Sunga of his right to counsel as contained in his sworn statement-Exhibit I
was not a valid waiver for, on its face, it was executed not in the presence of counsel,
contrary to the express requirement of the Constitution.[84]
Sunga having had no counsel when he made his admission before the NBI and his
waiver of the right to have one being invalid, his statement- Exhibit I is inadmissible.
The testimony of Sunga during the preliminary investigation before the Municipal Trial
Court whereby he expressly acknowledged having executed Exhibit A and affirmed the
contentsthereof did not render his extrajudicial admission into a judicial one which
could be used against him and his co-appellants. Neither could his other statements in
such proceeding admitting his participation in the crime be utilized to establish his and
the other appellants guilt. For in that preliminary investigation, Sunga again was
effectively denied of his essential right to counsel. Atty. Rocamora was appointed
Sungas counsel de officio but just like the assistance he extended during the execution
of Exhibit A, Atty. Rocamora utterly did nothing in defense of Sungas cause. While Sunga
was being asked by the judge a barrage of questions calling for answers which could
and did incriminate him, Atty. Rocamora did not offer the slightest objection to shield his
client from the damning nature thereof.
The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed critical
stages in the criminal process.[85] The preliminary investigation can be no different from
the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary
investigation will be subjected to no less than the States processes, oftentimes
intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal
prosecution. In the case at bar, Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and
while he did have a counsel, for the latters lack of vigilance and commitment to Sungas
rights, he was virtually denied his right to counsel.
The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or
the mere propounding of standard questions and objections; rather it means an
efficientand decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.[86] As
in People v. Abano[87] where the confession by the therein accused in the preliminary
investigation was excluded as inadmissible due to the absence of her counsel, this Consider the following portions of her testimony, quoted verbatim:
Court will not admit Sungas. This makes it unnecessary to discuss and emphasize the
conflict on material points of Sungas and Locils accounts of the incident. COURT:

As for the rest of the prosecution evidence, it fails to corroborate Locils testimony. The Q Do you know the name of the woman who died?
declarations of witnesses Tan, Devilleres and Gabinete can in no way enhance the
veracity of the essential, material aspects of Locils account for they relate not to the A Jocelyn Tan
crime itself but to events thereafter.
ATTY. GACOTT [Private Prosecutor]:
Tans testimony that Lansang informed him that he knew someone who could reveal the
identity of Jocelyns assailants and that Lansang suggested to him to no longer report to Maybe we can use the sound system.
the police does not at all constitute incriminating evidence, for there was no admission,
ATTY. GACOTT:
express or implied, by Lansang of any wrongdoing or criminal participation on his
part. Besides, why would Lansang suggest to Tan not to report to the police when the
Q: Miss Witness, you said that you are fourteen years old. How come that you are 14
police early on had its hands full in trying to solve the crime.
years old?

Dr. Vigontes affirmation of her finding of a fatal injury on Jocelyns head is supportive
A: (Witness handing a document to counsel.)
only of the fact that the victim was hit with something on her head which caused her
death, but this by no means is evidence that appellants inflicted said fatal injury. (To the Court:)

As for the circumstances testified to by the other witnesses, they do not, by and in Your Honor, the witness handed to me a birth certificate.
themselves, rise to the level of circumstantial evidence which warrant appellants
conviction. ATTY. CRUZAT (Defense Counsel): We are requesting for the witness to speak loud and
not merely hand over certain documents.
In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there must be at least two proven
circumstances which in complete sequence lead to no other logical conclusion than COURT: Instruct the witness to speak louder. (Emphasis supplied.)[90]
that of the guilt of the accused.[88] The circumstances that Lansang was seen on June
30, 1994, a day after the incident, walking back and forth and appearing restless near xxx
the place where Jocelyns body was eventually found; that Lansang was in the
company of Octac and inquired, the day after Jocelyns body was discovered on July ATTY. GACOTT -
12, 1994, if Jocelyn was from Barangay Caruray; that Lansang told Jocelyns father that
he knew someone who could pinpoint those responsible for the crime; and that Jocelyn Q: Miss Witness, how many times did you attain your Grade I schooling?
was fatally hit on the head by a blunt object are too fragile to lead to the inference that
Lansang and his co-appellants are liable for Jocelyns rape and slaying. These A: Three times.
circumstances in the scheme of things are not indubitable pieces of evidence of a
persons commission of a crime for they are susceptible of explanations which do not Q: What about your Grade II schooling?
necessarily speak of guilt or culpability.
A: Two years.
Standing alone and uncorroborated, can Locils testimony serve as a basis for appellants
Q: How about your Grade III schooling?
conviction? As an exception to the general rule on the requirement of corroboration of
the testimony of an accomplice or co-conspirator-turned state witness, her testimony
A: One year.
may, even if uncorroborated, be sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself
because it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full of details ATTY. CRUZAT: I am already tired of requesting this Honorable Court to instruct the
which, by their nature, could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought.[89] An witness to speak quite louder. She is just whispering to the interpreter.
exhaustive review of the transcript of stenographic notes of Locils testimony reveals,
however, that the manner by which she related it was punctuated with marks COURT: You speak louder (Emphasis supplied.)[91]
of tentativeness, uncertainty and indecisiveness which the trial court unfortunately
failed to take note of in its decision on review. xxx
ATTY. GACOTT - ATTY. CRUZAT: This woman does not speak quite loud, Your Honor.

Q: Now, Miss Witness, where were you last June 29, 1994 at around 2:00 oclock in the COURT: You talk louder (Emphasis supplied.)[93]
afternoon?
xxx
A: In Mendoza.
A scrutiny of her testimony likewise reveals a strain of improbability ingrained therein. To
COURT - recapitulate, Locil claimed that on June 29, 1994 she boarded a tricycle bearing a
lesbian who invited her for a joyride, proceeded to the Mendoza Park and picked up
Q: What is that Mendoza? Jocelyn, whom she was not acquainted with, then brought by the same tricycle to
Irawan where the latter was raped and brutally murdered. In other words, she wanted
A: Mendoza Park. to convey that she was deliberately brought by appellants with them on June 29, 1994
to the place where they were to carry out, which they did, their abominable acts
ATTY. GACOTT - against Jocelyn. This strikes this Court as improbable if not bizarre. For it is contrary to
human nature and experience for those who undertake the commission of a crime to
Q: During that date, do you remember any unusual thing that happened to you?
bring a spectator thereof. A criminal would certainly take steps to evade detection or
discovery of his criminal act, to keep it from being witnessed or known by others who
A: Yes, sir.
might later turn against him. Yet, from Locils testimony, appellants took the trouble of
Q: Could you please relate to this Honorable Court what happened during that date? bringing her to the locus criminis so she could bear witness to a horrible crime which
appellants carried out with evident secrecy in a remote, uninhabited place in Puerto
A: Yes, sir. Princesa City.

ATTY. CRUZAT: I may be compelled to ask this Honorable Court for a coercive authority That appellants required Locils presence at the time and place of the crime only to
to declare her in contempt for repeatedly disobeying the instruction of the Court for her threaten her later against divulging what she had witnessed thus defies comprehension.
to speak louder.
Evidence to be believed should not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
COURT: You speak louder, otherwise you will be cited in contempt of court. but should also be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.[94]
WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.[92]
This Court is not in fact prepared to accord Locil credibly as a witness. Who can trust
xxx one who, in her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home and stays in a boarding house
albeit she has no visible means of income to pay therefor, and carries an alias name to
ATTY. GACOTT - evade being traced by her mother and aunt?

Q: You mean to say, Miss Witness, that this Tomboy that you are referring to went upstairs Locils testimony on how appellants put her in a position to have direct knowledge of
of Mendoza Park, and once there she talked to the woman sitting there? their malevolent acts despite taking measures to conceal their deeds fails to inspire
belief and must, therefore, be discredited.
A: Yes, sir.
A serious question too abounds on Locils identification of appellant Pascua as one of
Q: Do you know the name of that woman? those who raped Jocelyn. She described Pascua, the man who according to her raped
the victim after appellants Lansang and Sunga did, as having, among other
A: No, sir. things, singkit (chinky) eyes. But as Pascua did not have singkit eyes, even the trial court
was prompted to ask her if she was sure that the third person who raped Jocelyn
Q: After getting near to that woman, what did they do after that? had singkit eyes.[95] Thus, with the courts approval, the defense made it of record that
Pascua did not have chinky eyes, contrary to Locils description of him.[96]
A: They talked, sir.
The aforementioned observations pertaining to both the weak, incomprehensible voice
Q: Then what happened next?
with which Locil gave her testimony, the improbability with which she was precisely
made by appellants to be a witness to their crime, and the failure of her description of
Pascuas eyes to match the latters actual physical feature cannot but engender serious
doubts as to the reliability of her testimony against all appellants. This Court thus finds her
uncorroborated account to have failed the jurisprudentially established touchstone for
its credibility and sufficiency, that of straightforwardness and deliberateness, as
evidence to warrant appellants conviction.
In light of the weak evidence for the prosecution, the defense of alibi as well as of
denial by appellants is accorded credence, for it is precisely when the prosecutions
case is weak that the defense of alibi assumes importance and becomes crucial in
negating criminal liability.[97] It bears noting that the alibi proffered by appellants,
especially that by Lansang, had been corroborated.
In fine, regardless of the probative weight of appellants alibi, the prosecution still has
the onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused and cannot rely
on the weakness of the defense evidence. The prosecution having failed to discharge
its burden, appellants presumed innocence remains and must thus be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
appellants Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang and Inocencio Pascua in Criminal Case No. 11984
the decision therein is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED and said appellants are hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to cause the IMMEDIATE
RELEASE of the appellants from custody, unless they are being held for some other lawful
cause, and to INFORM this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision of the
date appellants were actually released from confinement.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994
HONORATO GALVEZ and GODOFREDO DIEGO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (17TH DIVISION), First Asst. Provincial Prosecutor. DENNIS M. VILLA-
IGNACIO of Pasig, Rizal; THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and PNP P/SR. SUPT. RICARDO F.
DE LEON, Camp Commander and Head of the PNP Custodial Group, Camp Crame,
Cubao, Quezon City, respondents.
Emerito M. Salva & Associates; Juanito L. Andrade; and Lazaro Law Firm for petitioners.
REGALADO, J.:
Submitted for resolution in the present special civil action are: (1) the basic petition
for certiorari and mandamus with a petition for habeas corpus, to review the resolution
issued by respondent Court of Appeals, dated
February 18, 1994, in CA-G.R. SP No. 33261;1 (2) the Urgent Motion2 and Supplemental
Urgent Motion3 for Immediate Action on Petition for Habeas corpus; and (3) the Urgent
Petition to Declare Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. and First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio for Contempt and to Annul Proceedings (with Immediate Prayer
for another Cease and Desist Order).4
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate
informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide fot has been the rule
that under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, the amendment of the
information may also be made even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge
so long as it Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, and docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93.5 Both accused posted their respective
cash bail bonds and were subsequently released from detention.
On November 15, 1993, Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor Liberato L. Reyes filed a Motion to
Defer Arraignment and Subsequent Proceedings to enable him "to review the evidence
on record and determine once more the proper crimes chargeable against the
accused,"6 which was granted by Judge Villajuan in an order dated November 16,
1993.7 Thereafter, pursuant to Department Order No. 369 of the Department of Justice,
respondent Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio was designated Acting Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan and was instructed to conduct a re-investigation of the aforesaid
criminal cases filed against herein petitioners.8
By virtue of a Manifestation with Ex-parte Motion dated November 23, 19939 filed by
respondent prosecutor, the proceedings were again ordered suspended by Judge
Villajuan until after the prosecution's request for change of venue shall have been
resolved by the Supreme Court, and the preliminary investigation being conducted by
the former shall have been terminated. 10 It appears that on December 2, 1993, private
complainants, through their counsel, Atty. Silvestre R. Bello III, had filed with the Supreme
Court a Petition for Change of Venue of Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93,
purportedly to safeguard the lives of the victims and their witnesses, and to prevent a
miscarriage of justice. 11
On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos.
3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex
parte Motion to Withdraw Informations in said cases. 12 This motion was granted by
Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn
from the docket of the court. 13 On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new
informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms 14 which were
subsequently raffled to the sala of Judge Victoria Pornillos of Branch 10, Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and were docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-
M-93 to 4007-M-93. No bail having been recommended for the crime of murder, Judge
Pornillos ordered the arrest of herein petitioners. 15On December 23, 1993, said presiding
judge issued an order setting the arraignment of the accused for December 27, 1993. 16
On December 27, 1993, the scheduled arraignment before Judge Pornillos were reset
due to the absence of respondent prosecutor. On even date, petitioners filed before
Judge Villajuan a Motion for Reconsideration of his order of December 15, 1993 which
granted the motion to withdraw the original informations. 17
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack
of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. 18 At the
court session set for the arraignment of petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos
issued an order denying the motion to quash and, at the same time, directed that a
plea of not guilty be entered for petitioners when the latter refused to enter their plea. 19
In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge
Pornillos, an order was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of Criminal
Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, and setting the arraignment of the accused therein
for February 8, 1994. 20 On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in
the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by
Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners' motion to quash filed in Criminal Cases Nos.
4004-M-93 and 4007-M-93. As earlier stated, respondent court dismissed the petition in its
questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this petition.
I. On the Main Petition
The main issue in this case involves a determination of the set
of informations under which herein petitioners should be tried, that is, (a) the first set of
informations for homicide and frustrated homicide in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, or (b) the subsequent informations for murder,
frustrated murder, and illegal possession of firearms in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to
4007-M-93. Several corollary but equally important issues have likewise been addressed
to us for resolution, to wit:
1. Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on
the ground that (a) there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; and (b) the appropriate remedy which should have been
adopted by the prosecution was to amend the informations by charging the proper
offenses pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110;
2. Whether the order granting the withdrawal of the original informations was
immediately final and executory;
3. Whether Judge Pornillos was correct in denying the motion to quash and thereby
acquired jurisdiction over the new informations considering that (a) the designated
public prosecutor allegedly had no authority to file the second set of informations; and
(b) the filing thereof constituted forum shopping; and
4. Whether the arraignment proceeding held on January 24, 1994 in Criminal Cases Nos.
4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93 was valid.
We shall discuss these issues seriatim.
1. It is petitioners' submission that the prosecution's failure to serve them a copy of the
motion to withdraw the original informations and to set said motion for hearing
constitutes a violation of their right to be informed of the proceedings against them, as
well as a violation of Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Hence, so they
contend, the ex parte motion should be considered as a worthless scrap of paper and
Judge Villajuan had no authority to act on it. Ergo, the order granting the same is null
and void.
Petitioners advance the theory that respondent prosecutor should have amended the
original informations instead of withdrawing the same and filing new ones. They
postulate that the principle of nolle prosequi does not apply in this case since the
withdrawal or dismissal of an information is addressed solely to the sound and judicious
discretion of the court which has the option to grant or deny it and the prosecution
cannot impose its opinion on the court. It is further stressed that in case there is a need
to change the nature of the offense charged, that is, from homicide to murder, by
adding the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the only legal and proper remedy is
through the filing of the corresponding amended information; and that the withdrawal
of an information is allowed only where the new information involves a different offense
which does not include or is not included in the offense originally charged.
Normally, an accused would not object to the dismissal of an information against him
because it is to his best interest not to oppose the same. Contrarily, if the accused
should deem such conditional or provisional dismissal to be unjust and prejudicial to him,
he could object to such dismissal and insist that the case be heard and decided on the
merits. 21 However, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial
court petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to
withdraw was filed and granted before they could be arraigned, there would be no
imperative need for notice and hearing thereof. In actuality, the real grievance of
herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three informations but the filing of four
new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an additional
offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there would obviously have been
no cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed
procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases
Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real
position.
Petitioners' contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent
filing of the new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous
an argument. They would want to ignore the fact that had the original informations
been amended so as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise
be deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is strong.
Petitioners could not be better off with amended informations than with the subsequent
ones. It really made no difference considering that where a capital offense is charged
and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either an
amended or a new information.
Contrary to petitioners' submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a
trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held that
The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of
hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot
deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority
to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is
either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which
dismissed the complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari. 22
Besides, when petitioners were given by Judge Villajuan the opportunity to file a motion
for reconsideration, even assuming the alleged procedural infirmity in his issuance of the
order of dismissal, the same was thereby deemed cured. This is especially so in this case
since, on his order, the original informations were reinstated in Branch 14 of the trial
court.
The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in court any
disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of
the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although the prosecutor retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even when the case is
already in court, he cannot impose
his opinion upon the tribunal. For while it is true that the prosecutor has the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the
case had already been brought therein any disposition the prosecutor may deem
proper thereafter should be addressed to the court for its consideration and
approval. 23 The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
We reiterate once again the doctrine we enunciated and explained in Crespo vs.
Mogul, etc., et al.: 24
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to
dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant
the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper
determination of the case.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already
in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does
not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the
public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured. And, if after
such re-investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or
otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action may be
taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 25
It is not denied that in the present case, the court granted the motion of respondent
prosecutor for the suspension of the proceedings until the
re-investigation thereof shall have been terminated. Thereafter, the prosecutor arrived
at a finding that petitioners should have been charged with murder, frustrated murder,
and illegal possession of firearms. This prompted him to file an ex parte motion to
withdraw the original informations for homicide and frustrated homicide. Although the
motion did not state the reasons for the withdrawal of the informations, nevertheless, the
court in the exercise of its discretion granted the same, as a consequence of which a
new set of informations was thereafter filed and raffled to another branch of the court.
Petitioners now question the propriety of the procedure adopted by the prosecution,
insisting that an amendment, not a new information, was required under the
circumstances.
It must here be emphasized that respondent prosecutor sought, and was subsequently
granted, permission by the court to dismiss the original informations. It cannot therefore
be validly claimed that the prosecutor exceeded his authority in withdrawing those
informations because the same bore the imprimatur of the court. The issue is thus
focused on whether or not under the given situation the court acted correctly in
dismissing the original informations rather than ordering the amendment thereof.
It has been observed that while the Rules of Court gives the accused the right to move
for the quashal of the information, it is silent with respect to the right of the prosecutor to
ask for a dismissal or withdrawal thereof. 26 A perusal of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure will show that there are only two provisions concerning the dismissal of an
information other than on motion of the accused, namely, Section 14 of Rule 110 and
Section 11 of Rule 119. But then, it may be contended that these rules speak of a
dismissal by the court when there is a mistake in charging the proper offense, but make
no mention of a dismissal made upon application of the prosecution. That is not
necessarily so.
It is true that Section 11, Rule 119 is virtually a restatement of Section 14, Rule 110,
providing as it does that:
Sec. 11. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. When it
becomes manifest at any time before judgment, that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense
charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be
discharged, if there appears to be good cause to detain him. In such case, the court
shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case
upon the filing of the proper information. (Emphasis supplied.)
Rule 119 is the rule specifically governing the trial stage where evidence is necessarily
being presented, hence the trial court is now in a better position to conclude that
manifestly the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or of one that it
necessarily includes. It would primarily be the function of the court to motu proprio order
the dismissal of the case and direct the filing of the appropriate information. We do not
discount the possibility of either the prosecution or the defense initiating such dismissal
and substitution at that stage, although, from a realistic point of view, that would be a
rare situation. This provision, therefore, is more directly and principally directed to the
trial court to invest it with the requisite authority to direct by itself the dismissal and
refiling of the informations therein contemplated.
Rule 110, on the other hand, provides the procedural governance for the prosecution of
offenses. Section 14 thereof, quoted infra, provides in its second paragraph the
procedure and requisites for the substitution of a defective information by the correct
one. Although, just like Section 11 of Rule 119 the permissible stage for effecting that
substitution is "at any time before judgment," unlike the latter situation it is sufficient that
"it appears . . . that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, . . . ." The
situation under said Section 14 contemplates a longer time span, inclusive of the
period from the filing of the information up to and before trial. Since no evidence has
been presented at that stage, the error would appear or be discoverable from a review
of the records of the preliminary investigation. Of course, that fact may be perceived by
the trial judge himself but, again, realistically it will be the prosecutor who can initially
determine the same. That is why such error need not be manifest or evident, nor is it
required that such nuances as offenses includible in the offense charged be taken into
account. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the prosecutor can and should institute
remedial measures for the dismissal of the original information and the refiling of the
correct one, otherwise he would be recreant to his duties.
It is interesting to note that in the American jurisdiction, such right is specifically
recognized under Rule 48 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides
that the entry of a nolle prosequi by the Government is a permissible right, although
requiring in all cases the approval of the court in the exercise of its judicial
discretion. 27As a matter of fact, the prosecuting attorney is given the broad power, sole
authority and discretion to enter a nolle prosequi provided he does not act
arbitrarily 28 and subject to the discretion of the court.
In several cases, we have also impliedly recognized the propriety of such a procedure
particularly in those instances where the prosecution is allowed to dismiss or withdraw an
information on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. We have even gone further by
imposing upon the fiscal, as he was then called, the duty to move for the dismissal of
the information if he is convinced that the evidence is insufficient to establish, at
least prima facie, the guilt of the accused. 29
In this case now before us, what is involved is a dismissal effected at the instance of the
prosecutor by reason of a mistake in charging the proper offense, in order that new
informations can be filed. The problem that may be posited, and should now be
resolved, is when the fiscal may be allowed to move to dismiss an information and when
he should merely move to amend it.
Section 14 of Rule 110, which is invoked by petitioners, reads as follows:
Sec. 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance
or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter
and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court,
when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the
filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section
11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may
also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
The first paragraph provides the rule for amendment of the information or complaint,
while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.
Under the second paragraph, the court can order the filing of another information to
charge the proper offense, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in
double jeopardy and that could only be true if the offense proved does not necessarily
include or is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the original information.
It has been the rule that under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, the
amendment of the information may also be made even if it may result in altering the
nature of the charge so long as it can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused. Hence, in the case of Dimalibot vs. Salcedo, 30 the accused therein were
originally charged with homicide and were released on bail. However, the then
provincial fiscal, after a review of the affidavits of the witnesses for the prosecution,
discovered that the killing complained of was perpetrated with the qualifying
circumstances of treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and employing
means to weaken the defense of the victim. Consequently, an amended information
for murder was filed against the accused who were ordered re-arrested without the
amount of bail being fixed, the new charge being a capital offense.
The Court ruled therein that the amendment was proper, pursuant to Section 13, Rule
106 of the 1940 Rules of Court (now Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure), thus:
Here these rules properly apply, since it is undisputed that the herein accused were not
yet arraigned before the competent court when the complaint for homicide was
amended so as to charge the crime of murder. Upon the authority of said rules, the
amendment could therefore be made even as to substance in order that the proper
charge may be made. The claim that such amendment can only refer to matters of
specification affecting the elements constituting the crime is not correct, for there is
nothing in the rule to show that the nature of the amendment should only be limited to
matters of specification. The change may also be made even if it may result in altering
the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
defendant.
Be that as it may, it is quite plausible under Section 14 of Rule 110 that, instead of an
amendment, an information for homicide may also be dismissed before the accused
pleads, to give way to the filing of a new information for murder. This may be deduced
from the pronouncement of the Court in the aforecited case of Dimalibot, to wit:
This clearly appears from the second part of Section 13 of Rule 106 which says that, if it
appears before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court may dismiss the original information and order the filing of a new one
provided the defendant may not be placed in double jeopardy. If a new information
may be ordered at any time before judgment no reason is seen why the court may not
order the amendment of the information if its purpose is to make it conformable to the
true nature of the crime committed. . . .
In the subsequent case of Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, et al., 31 however, Section 14 of
Rule 110 was clarified to mean as follows:
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information
may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following
respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution
necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court,
but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has
to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information,
another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the
new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original
information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has
been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original
information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the
other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a
different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original
charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first
paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second
paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same
offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first
information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new
information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged,
a substitution is in order.
In any event, we are inclined to uphold the propriety of the withdrawal of the original
informations, there having been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court in
granting the motion and, more importantly, in consideration of the fact that the motion
to withdraw was filed and granted before herein petitioners were arraigned, hence
before they were placed in jeopardy. Thus, even if a substitution was made at such
stage, petitioners cannot validly claim double jeopardy, which is precisely the evil
sought to be prevented under the rule on substitution, for the simple reason that no first
jeopardy had as yet attached. Consequently, we hold that although the offenses
charged under the three new informations necessarily include those charged under the
original informations, the substitution of informations was not a fatal error. A contrary
ruling, to paraphrase from our former pronouncements, would sacrifice substantial
justice for formal nuances on the altar of procedural technicalities. Furthermore,
petitioner's right to speedy trial was never violated since the new informations were filed
immediately after the motion to withdraw the original informations was granted.
2. The controversy over the jurisdiction of Judge Pornillos to entertain and act upon the
new informations for murder, frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms, is
grounded on three points of disagreement.
Firstly, it is argued that the new informations were prematurely filed considering that the
order granting the withdrawal of the original informations had not yet become final and
executory and that, as a matter of fact, the same was subsequently reconsidered and
the case reinstated by Judge Villajuan. Therefore, so petitioners postulate, Judge
Pornillos could not acquire jurisdiction over the same offense involving the same
incident and the same accused.
Secondly, petitioners contend that the dismissal of the original informations and the filing
of new ones which were raffled to another branch of the court constituted forum
shopping, and was tainted with malice considering the indecent haste with which the
motion to withdraw the informations was filed, the order granting the same was issued,
and the new informations were filed, all of which took place on the same day. Pursuant
to the doctrinal ruling that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts,
it is theorized that the cognizance of the case taken by Judge Villajuan barred Judge
Pornillos from assuming jurisdiction thereover.
Finally, the designation of respondent Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio (who was then First
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig, Rizal) as Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan
was arbitrary and without any justifiable reason. It follows, therefore, so petitioners
vigorously argue, that in the absence of such authority, the informations should be
considered null and void by reason of which Judge Pornillos did not acquire jurisdiction
over the same.
On the other hand, respondents question the propriety of petitioners' filing of a petition
for certiorari prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals against the order of the
lower court denying petitioners' motion to quash, claiming that the proper remedy was
to proceed to trial on the merits and thereafter raise on appeal, as special defenses, the
grounds invoked in the motion to quash.
It is a general rule that a nolle prosequi or dismissal entered before the accused is
placed on trial and before he is called on to plead is not equivalent
to an acquittal, 32 and does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 33 It
is not a final disposition of the case. 34 Rather, it partakes of the nature of a nonsuit or
discontinuance in a civil suit and leaves the matter in the same condition in which it was
before the commencement of the prosecution. 35
A dismissal is different from an acquittal. An order of dismissal which is actually an
acquittal is immediately final and cannot be reconsidered. 36 Furthermore, an acquittal
is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence
does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but a dismissal does
not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissals
terminate the proceedings, either because the court is not a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient
in form and substance. 37 For dismissal to be a bar under double jeopardy, it must have
the effect of acquittal.
All these go to show, therefore, that the dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 did not amount to an acquittal of herein petitioners.
Consequently, the same did not immediately become final, hence petitioners could still
file a motion for the reconsideration thereof. Moreover, such dismissal does not
constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. 38 Since jeopardy had not yet
attached, herein petitioners were not prejudiced by the filing of the new informations
even though the order of dismissal in the prior case had not yet become final. Neither
did it affect the jurisdiction of the court in the subsequent case.
In American legal practice, where a motion for an order of nolle prosequi is made, the
only power to deny the motion would be based on failure of the district attorney to
judiciously exercise his discretion. 39 In most cases, the motion will be readily granted and
should not be refused unless the court has some knowledge that it is based on an
improper reason or a corrupt motive. But such a motion to dismiss will not also be
approved unless the court is satisfied that the administration of justice requires that the
prosecution be ended, or if there appears to be a clear violation of the law. 40 Whatever
may be the reason therefor, a denial of the motion to withdraw should not be construed
as a denigration of the authority of the special prosecutor to control and direct the
prosecution of the case, 41 since the disposition of the case already rests in the sound
discretion of the court.
This brings us to the question as to whether or not an order of dismissal may be
subsequently set aside and the information reinstated. Again, in American
jurisprudence, the authorities differ somewhat as to whether a nolle prosequi may be set
aside and the cause reinstated. 42 Some cases hold that the nolle prosequi may be
recalled and that the accused may be tried on the same information,43 but before it
can be retraced, set aside, cancelled, or struck off, the permission or assent of the court
must be had and obtained, and such cancellation or retraction must be duly entered.
According to other authorities, however, the entry of an unconditional nolle prosequi,
not on the ground that the information is insufficient on its face, is an end to the
prosecution of that information, and such nolle prosequi cannot afterward be vacated
and further proceedings had in that case.44
Still in some cases, it has been held that a nolle prosequi may be set aside by leave of
court, so as to reinstate proceedings on the information, or unless it was entered by
mistake. 45 In our jurisdiction, we follow the rule which allows an order of dismissal to be
set aside by leave of court. In one case, it was held that in the absence of any statutory
provision to the contrary, the court may, in the interest of justice, dismiss a criminal case
provisionally, that is, without prejudice to reinstating it before the order becomes final or
to the subsequent filing of a new information for the offense. 46
The rule that in cases of concurrent jurisdiction the court first acquiring jurisdiction will
retain it to the end to the exclusion of other tribunals, is not to be given unyielding effect
in all cases and it does not apply where the jurisdiction of the first court has come to an
end in any legal way, such as by nolle prosequi. 47 The rule on exclusions is intended to
prevent confusion and conflicts in jurisdiction and to prevent a person from being twice
tried for the same offense, but no accused has a vested right to be tried in any
particular court of concurrent jurisdiction; and when one court of concurrent jurisdiction
voluntarily relinquishes it by a nolle prosequi or dismissal of the case, there can be no
legal or logical reason for preventing the other court from proceeding. 48 With much
more reason will this rule apply where only branches of the same court, and not
different courts, are involved in the jurisdictional conflict.
There was no forum shopping in the lower court with respect to the case involved. While
the procedure adopted by the prosecution was somewhat cumbersome, it was not in
bad faith and, accordingly, it did not affect the legality of the proceedings. There is no
showing, and petitioners failed to prove otherwise, that the assignment by raffle of the
new informations to another branch of the same court was intended to prejudice herein
petitioners, or to place them under less favorable circumstances, or to find a court
which would act favorably on the prosecution's case.
The authority of the special prosecutor appointed by the Secretary of Justice to sign
and file informations has long been recognized in this jurisdiction and it has been held
that such information cannot be quashed on that account. There is nothing so
sacrosanct in the signing of complaints, holding of investigations, and conducting
prosecutions that only an officer appointed by the President or one expressly
empowered by law be permitted to assume these functions. 49 And any irregularity in
the appointment does not necessarily invalidate the same if he may be considered
a de facto officer. 50
Of course, where the person who signed the information was disqualified from
appointment to such position, the information is invalid and the court does not acquire
jurisdiction to try the accused thereon. 51 Such is not, however, the situation obtaining in
the case at bar. It will be noted that respondent prosecutor was designated by the
Secretary of Justice to handle the re-investigation
and prosecution of the case against petitioners pursuant to Department Order No. 369.
Petitioners failed to show any irregularity in the issuance of said directive.
At any rate, the power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of Justice
under Presidential Decree No. 1275 had been broadened beyond the confines of the
old law, that is, Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code, wherein the power of
the Secretary was then limited only to certain instances. Pertinently, in Aguinaldo, et al.
vs. Domagas, et al., 52 we said:
The Court notes, however; that Department of Justice Order No. 85 was issued pursuant
to, among others, P.D. No. 1275 issued on 11 April 1978 which provides:
Sec. 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the
Secretary of Justice. There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution
Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed
of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of
Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal's Offices as are
hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and
prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws.
The power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of Justice includes the
authority to act directly on any matter within the jurisdiction of the Prosecution Staff, the
Regional State Prosecution Office or the Office of the Provincial or City Fiscal and to
review, modify or revoke any decision or action of the Chief of said staff or office.
The power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of Justice under P.D. No.
1275 had thus been broadened beyond the confines of the old law, i.e., Section 1679 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, where the power of the Secretary of Justice to
designate acting fiscals or prosecutors to handle a particular case was limited to
instances "when a provincial fiscal shall be disqualified by personal interest to act in a
particular case or when for any reason he shall be unable, or shall fail to discharge any
of the duties of his position." Indeed, the limitation upon which petitioners rely no longer
subsisted under P.D. No. 1275.
Having been duly designated in accordance with law, the panel of prosecutors had
complete control of the investigation and prosecution of the case. . . .
3. Petitioners similarly dispute the legality of their arraignment on January 24, 1994, when
Judge Pornillos entered a plea of not guilty for them after they refused to plead, without
furnishing them copies of the information with the list of witnesses, after merely reading
the informations against them and asking whether they understood the same, which
were allegedly in palpable violation of Section 1, Rule 116. Petitioners aver that they
were requesting for the suspension of the arraignment as they wanted to have a final
copy of the order of January 24, 1994 which was merely read in open court, and to take
the necessary steps to question the same by way of a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal.
In criminal cases, it is the duty of the accused, in addition to the other pleas authorized
by law, to plead whether he is guilty or not of the crime charged. In that way and in
that way only can an issue be created upon which the trial shall proceed. 53 Section 1
(c) of Rule 116 is quite explicit that where the accused refuses to plead, a plea of not
guilty shall be entered for him. Hence, under such mandatory language, if the accused
refuses to plead, the court must enter a plea of not guilty. The words are so plain and
unambiguous that no construction is necessary. It actually calls for a literal application
thereof. Any explanation or defense which petitioners would want to invoke can be
properly raised during the trial, but they cannot refuse to enter their plea. Nonetheless,
the alleged defect in their arraignment on January 24, 1994 is deemed to have been
cured when they were again arraigned on February 18, 1994 with the assistance of
counsel de oficio, and the information was read to them in the vernacular.
In conclusion, considering that Branch 10 of the same trial court handling Criminal Cases
Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93 legally acquired jurisdiction over the new informations
which we have likewise declared valid, petitioners may be prosecuted thereunder.
II. On the Petition for Habeas corpus
This petition is predicated mainly on petitioners' asseveration that the court which issued
the warrant for their arrest had no jurisdiction over the case, hence their detention
should be deemed illegal.
We have earlier declared that Branch 10 of the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
new set of informations. Consequently, the warrant of arrest issued on the bases of said
informations filed therein and the subsequent detention of herein petitioners pursuant
thereto are valid. What instead has to be resolved is the corollary issue of whether the
petition for habeas corpus was properly filed together with their present petition
for certiorari and mandamus.
The writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be ancillary to each other where
necessary to give effect to the supervisory powers of the higher courts. A writ of habeas
corpus reaches the body and the jurisdictional matters, but not the record. A writ
of certiorari reaches the record but not the body. Hence, a writ of habeas corpus may
be used with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. 54 However, habeas
corpus does not lie where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or certiorari because
it will not be permitted to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the
purpose of reviewing mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of a court having
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter. 55
Neither can we grant the writ at this stage since a writ of habeas corpus is not intended
as a substitute for the functions of the trial court. In the absence of exceptional
circumstances, the orderly course of trial should be pursued and the usual remedies
exhausted before the writ may be invoked. Habeas corpus is not ordinarily available in
advance of trial to determine jurisdictional questions that may arise. 56 It has to be an
exceptional case for the writ of habeas corpus to be available to an accused before
trial. 57 In the absence of special circumstances requiring immediate action, a court will
not grant the writ and discharge the prisoner in advance of a determination of his case
in court. 58 In the case under consideration, petitioners have dismally failed to adduce
any justification or exceptional circumstance which would warrant the grant of the writ,
hence their petition therefor has to be denied.
In addition, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for asserting a
right to bail or vindicating its denial. In the case of Enrile vs. Salazar, etc., et al., 59 we
held that:
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for
petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a
right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after
that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court
have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if
appropriate relief was also available there.
III. On the Motion to Cite for Contempt
The records show that on February 24, 1994, this Court issued a temporary restraining
order, pursuant to its resolution in Administrative Matter No. 94-1-13-RTC which is a
petition for change of venue filed by the Vinculados, requiring Judges Felipe N. Villajuan
and Victoria Villalon-Pornillos to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases
involving herein petitioners which were pending before them. 60
Subsequently, another resolution was issued in said cases, dated
March 1, 1994, with the following directive:
ACCORDINGLY, without prejudice to the final determination as to which of the two (2)
sets of information will be upheld or prevail, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan is hereby directed to transfer all the aforementioned criminal
cases filed against Mayor Honorato Galvez, et al. now in the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle
as one (1) single case among its branches and for the branch concerned, after raffle, to
proceed with all deliberate dispatch after the issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 33261 have
been resolved with finality. 61
As a consequence, the seven informations which were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-94-55481 to Q-94-55487 were assigned to and are now pending trial on the merits
before Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by Judge
Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. Petitioners now assert that Judge Salazar and Prosecutor Villa-
Ignacio proceeded with the trial of the cases despite the aforestated directives in the
above cited resolutions. We find no merit in the motion to cite them for contempt.
The records reveal that there was a manifestation dated May 31, 1994 62 filed by the
Solicitor General wherein the latter manifested his conformity to the agreement made
between the prosecution and the defense before Judge Salazar, the pertinent part of
which agreement is as follows:
1. During the hearing on May 26, 1994, the prosecution, through Senior State Prosecutor
Dennis Villa-Ignacio, the defense through Justice Alfredo Lazaro, and this Honorable
Court agreed that the trial in these cases shall proceed on condition that: (a) the
defense shall not be deemed to have waived any issue or objection it has raised before
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 114046; and (b) that the trial shall also be without
prejudice to whatever decision and resolution the Supreme Court may render in the
case before it.
Counsel for petitioners, retired Justice Alfredo Lazaro, takes issue with said agreement
on the pretension that the same is not the true agreement of the parties, but he failed
to state what they actually agreed upon. Withal, the resolutions of this Court in the
petition for change of venue, as well as the cease and desist order issued therein, are
clearly directed against the two aforenamed regional trial judges in Malolos, Bulacan.
By no stretch of the imagination can we interpret the same to include Judge Jaime N.
Salazar, Jr. of Quezon City.
For that matter, the issues involved in this petition for certiorari do not necessarily require
a suspension of the proceedings before the present trial court considering that the main
petition hinges only on a determination of which set of informations shall constitute the
indictments against petitioners and for which charges they shall stand trial. Whichever
set of informations prevails, the evidence of the prosecution and defense will more or
less be the same and can be utilized for the charges therein. Hence, no cogent reason
exists for the suspension of the proceedings before the court below.
As a final word, while it may well be that both sets of information validly exist for the
nonce, to allow both of them to subsist will only serve to confuse and complicate the
proceedings in the cases therein. Brushing aside procedural technicalities, therefore, it
becomes exigent to now consider and declare the four informations for murder,
frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms as having amended and superseded
the original three informations for homicide and frustrated homicide, there being no
substantial rights of herein petitioners which may be affected thereby. Correspondingly,
the three informations for homicide and frustrated homicide should be ordered
withdrawn from the Quezon City trial court's docket.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition
for certiorari and mandamus together with the petition for habeas corpus; DENYING, for
lack of merit, the motion to cite respondent judge and prosecutor for contempt and to
annul proceedings; and ORDERING the withdrawal and invalidation of the three
informations for homicide and frustrated homicide against petitioners from the docket
of Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
SO ORDERED