G. R. No. 136773 June 25, 2003
Under the Stipulation of Facts and Compromise
MILAGROS MANONGSONG, joined by her husband, CARLITO MANONGSONG,
vs. FELOMENA JUMAQUIO ESTIMO, EMILIANA JUMAQUIO, NARCISO ORTIZ, CELESTINO
ORTIZ, RODOLFO ORTIZ, ERLINDA O. OCAMPO, PASTOR ORTIZ, JR., ROMEO ORTIZ
BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, SR., BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, JR., AURORA NICOLAS, GLORIA
RACADIO, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSELITO DELA CRUZ and LEONCIA S. LOPEZ,
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of 26 June 1998 and the
Resolution of 21 December 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51643. The Court of
Appeals reversed the Decision dated 10 April 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 92-1685, partitioning the property in controversy and awarding
to petitioners a portion of the property.
Antecedent Facts
Spouses Agatona Guevarra ("Guevarra") and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6) children, namely: (1)
Dominador Lopez; (2) Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio, the mother of respondents Emiliana
Jumaquio Rodriguez and Felomena Jumaquio Estimo ("Jumaquio sisters"); (3) Victor Lopez,
married to respondent Leoncia Lopez; (4) Benigna Lopez-Ortiz, the mother of respondents
Narciso, Celestino, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr. and Romeo Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo; (5) Rosario
Lopez-dela Cruz, married to respondent Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. and the mother of respondents
Benjamin Jr., Roberto, and Joselito, all surnamed dela Cruz, and of Gloria dela Cruz Racadio and
Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas; and (6) Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez
Manongsong ("Manongsong").
The contested property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street, Manuyo Uno, Las Pias, Metro
Manila with an area of approximately 152 square meters ("Property"). The records do not
show that the Property is registered under the Torrens system. The Property is particularly
described in Tax Declaration No. B-001-003903 as bounded in the north by Juan Gallardo,
south by Calle Velay, east by Domingo Lavana and west by San Jose Street. Tax Declaration No.
B-001-00390 was registered with the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Las Pias on 30
September 1984 in the name of "Benigna Lopez, et al".4 However, the improvements on the
portion of the Property denominated as No. 831 San Jose St., Manuyo Uno, Las Pias were
separately declared in the name of "Filomena J. Estimo" under Tax Declaration No. 90-001-
02145 dated 14 October 1991.5
Milagros and Carlito Manongsong ("petitioners") filed a Complaint6 on 19 June 1992, alleging
that Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the Property. Invoking
Article 494 of the Civil Code,7 petitioners prayed for the partition and award to them of an area
equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or its prevailing market value, and for damages.
Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. Upon Guevarras
death, her children inherited the Property. Since Dominador Lopez died without offspring,
there were only five children left as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the five children, including
Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth of the Property. As Vicente
Lopez sole surviving heir, Manongsong claims her fathers 1/5 share in the Property by right of
representation.
There is no dispute that respondents, who are the surviving spouses of Guevarras children and
their offspring, have been in possession of the Property for as long as they can remember. The
area actually occupied by each respondent family differs, ranging in size from approximately
25 to 50 square meters. Petitioners are the only descendants not occupying any portion of the
Property.
Most respondents, specifically Narciso, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr., and Celestino Ortiz, and Erlinda
Ortiz Ocampo ("Ortiz family"), as well as Benjamin Sr., Benjamin Jr., and Roberto dela Cruz,
Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas and Gloria Dela Cruz Racadio ("Dela Cruz family"), entered into a
compromise agreement with petitioners.
Agreement8 dated 12 September 1992 ("Agreement"), petitioners and the Ortiz and Dela Cruz
families agreed that each group of heirs would receive an equal share in the Property. The
signatories to the Agreement asked the trial court to issue an order of partition to this effect
and prayed further that "those who have exceeded said one-fifth (1/5) must be reduced so that
those who have less and those who have none shall get the correct and proper portion."9
Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez who each occupy 50 square
meter portions of the Property and Joselito dela Cruz, did not sign the Agreement.10 However,
only the Jumaquio sisters actively opposed petitioners claim. The Jumaquio sisters contended
that Justina Navarro ("Navarro"), supposedly the mother of Guevarra, sold the Property to
Guevarras daughter Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio.
The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No. 911 11 for the year 1949 in the
sole name of Navarro. Tax Declaration No. 911 described a residential parcel of land with an
area of 172.51 square meters, located on San Jose St., Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal with the
following boundaries: Juan Gallardo to the north, I. Guevarra Street to the south, Rizal Street to
the east and San Jose Street to the west. In addition, Tax Declaration No. 911 stated that the
houses of "Agatona Lopez" and "Enriquita Lopez" stood on the Property as improvements.
The Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG
LUPA12 ("Kasulatan") dated 11 October 1957, the relevant portion of which states:
AKO SI JUSTINA NAVARRO, sapat ang gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa LAS PIAS,
ay siyang nagma-may-ari at nagtatangkilik ng isang lagay na lupa na matatagpuan sa Manuyo,
Las Pias, Rizal, lihis sa anomang pagkakautang lalong napagkikilala sa pamamagitan ng mga
sumusunod na palatandaan:
BOUNDARIES:
NORTH: JUAN GALLARDO SOUTH: I. GUEVARRA ST. EAST: RIZAL ST., WEST: SAN JOSE ST.,
na may sukat na 172.51 metros cuadrados na may TAX DECLARATION BILANG 911.
NA DAHIL AT ALANG ALANG sa halagang DALAWANG DAAN LIMANGPUNG PISO (P250.00),
SALAPING PILIPINO, na sa akin ay kaliwang iniabot at ibinayad ni ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, may
sapat na gulang, Pilipino, may asawa at naninirahan sa Las Pias, Rizal, at sa karapatang ito ay
aking pinatutunayan ng pagkakatanggap ng nasabing halaga na buong kasiyahan ng aking
kalooban ay aking IPINAGBILI, ISINALIN AT INILIPAT sa nasabing, ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, sa
kanyang mga tagapagmana at kahalili, ang kabuuang sukat ng lupang nabanggit sa itaas nito sa
pamamagitan ng bilihang walang anomang pasubali. Ang lupang ito ay walang kasama at hindi
taniman ng palay o mais.
Simula sa araw na ito ay aking ililipat ang pagmamay-ari at pagtatangkilik ng nasabing lupa kay
ENRIQUETA LOPEZ sa kanilang/kanyang tagapagmana at kahalili x x x.
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila certified on 1 June 1994 that the
"KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA, between Justina Navarro (Nagbili) and Enriqueta Lopez
(Bumili), was notarized by Atty. Ruperto Q. Andrada on 11 October 1957 and entered in his
Notarial Register xxx."13 The certification further stated that Atty. Andrada was a duly
appointed notary public for the City of Manila in 1957.
Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their portion of the Property for
more than thirty years, they also invoked the defense of acquisitive prescription against
petitioners, and charged that petitioners were guilty of laches. The Jumaquio sisters argued
that the present action should have been filed years earlier, either by Vicente Lopez when he
was alive or by Manongsong when the latter reached legal age. Instead, petitioners filed this
action for partition only in 1992 when Manongsong was already 33 years old.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial on the merits, the trial court in its Decision14 of 10 April 1995 ruled in favor of
petitioners. The trial court held that the Kasulatan was void, even absent evidence attacking its
validity. The trial court declared:
It appears that the ownership of the estate in question is controverted. According to
defendants Jumaquios, it pertains to them through conveyance by means of a Deed of Sale
executed by their common ancestor Justina Navarro to their mother Enriqueta, which deed
was presented in evidence as Exhs. "4" to "4-A". Plaintiff Milagros Manongsong debunks the
evidence as fake. The document of sale, in the observance of the Court, is however duly
authenticated by means of a certificate issued by the RTC of the Manila Clerk of Court as duly
notarized public document (Exh. "5"). No countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to
overcome or impugn the documents legality or its validity.
xxx The conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the property
conveyed had a conjugal character. No positive evidence had been introduced that it was solely
a paraphernal property. The name of Justina Navarros spouse/husband was not mentioned
and/or whether the husband was still alive at the time the conveyance was made to Justina
Navarro. Agatona Guevarra as her compulsory heir should have the legal right to participate
with the distribution of the estate under question to the exclusion of others. She is entitled to
herlegitime. The Deed of Sale [Exhs "4" & "4-1"(sic)] did not at all provide for the reserved
legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect against Agatona Guevarra and her
six (6) legitimate children including the grandchildren, by right of representation, as described
in the order of intestate succession. The same Deed of Sale should be declared a nullity ab
initio. The law on the matter is clear. The compulsory heirs cannot be deprived of
their legitime, except on (sic) cases expressly specified by law like for instance disinheritance
for cause. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Since the other respondents had entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, the
dispositive portion of the trial courts decision was directed against the Jumaquio sisters only,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and
against the remaining active defendants, Emiliana Jumaquio and Felomena J. Estimo, jointly
and severally, ordering:
1. That the property consisting of 152 square meters referred to above be
immediately partitioned giving plaintiff Milagros Lopez-Manongsong her lawful share
of 1/5 of the area in square meters, or the prevailing market value on the date of the
decision;
2. Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as compensatory damages for
having deprived the latter the use and enjoyment of the fruits of her 1/5 share;
3. Defendants to pay plaintiffs litigation expenses and attorneys fee in the sum
of P10,000.00; and
4. Defendants to pay the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.15 (Emphasis supplied)
When the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration, the Jumaquio sisters appealed to
the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners, in their appellees brief before the Court of Appeals, presented for the first time a
supposed photocopy of the death certificate16 of Guevarra, which stated that Guevarras
mother was a certain Juliana Gallardo. Petitioner also attached an affidavit 17 from Benjamin
dela Cruz, Sr. attesting that he knew Justina Navarro only by name and had never met her
personally, although he had lived for some years with Agatona Guevarra after his marriage
with Rosario Lopez. On the basis of these documents, petitioners assailed the genuineness and
authenticity of the Kasulatan.
The Court of Appeals refused to take cognizance of the death certificate and affidavit presented
by petitioners on the ground that petitioners never formally offered these documents in
evidence.
The appellate court further held that the petitioners were bound by their admission that
Navarro was the original owner of the Property, as follows:
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees themselves admitted before the trial court that Justina Navarro
and not Juliana Gallardo was the original owner of the subject property and was the mother of
Agatona Navarro (sic). Plaintiffs-appellees in their Reply-Memorandum averred:
"As regards the existence of common ownership, the defendants clearly admit as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
History of this case tells us that originally the property was owned by JUSTINA NAVARRO who
has a daughter by the name of AGATONA GUEVARRA who on the other hand has six children
namely: xxx xxx xxx.
which point-out that co-ownership exists on the property between the parties. Since this is the
admitted history, facts of the case, it follows that there should have been proper document to
extinguish this status of co-ownership between the common owners either by (1) Court action
or proper deed of tradition, xxx xxx xxx."
The trial court confirms these admissions of plaintiffs-appellees. The trial court held:
"x x x xxx xxx
With the parties admissions and their conformity to a factual common line of relationship of
the heirs with one another, it has been elicited ascendant Justina Navarro is the common
ancestor of the heirs herein mentioned, however, it must be noted that the parties failed to
amplify who was the husband and the number of compulsory heirs of Justina Navarro. xxx xxx
xxx"
Therefore, plaintiffs-appellees cannot now be heard contesting the fact that Justina Navarro
was their common ancestor and was the original owner of the subject property.
The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court erred in assuming that the Property was
conjugal in nature when Navarro sold it. The appellate court reasoned as follows:
However, it is a settled rule that the party who invokes the presumption that all property of
marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coveture is a condition sine qua
non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to prove that the subject property was
acquired by Justina Navarro during her marriage. xxx
The findings of the trial court that the subject property is conjugal in nature is not supported
by any evidence.
To the contrary, records show that in 1949 the subject property was declared, for taxation
purposes under the name of Justina Navarro alone. This indicates that the land is the
paraphernal property of Justina Navarro.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new one is hereby rendered DISMISSING plaintiffs-appellees complaint in so far as
defendants-appellants are concerned.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.SO ORDERED.18
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its
Resolution of 21 December 1998.19
On 28 January 1999, petitioners appealed the appellate courts decision and resolution to this
Court. The Court initially denied the petition for review due to certain procedural defects. The
Court, however, gave due course to the petition in its Resolution of 31 January 2000.20
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:
1. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS NO COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE ON THE ALLEGED
SALE BY ONE JUSTINA NAVARRO;
2. WHETHER THERE IS PRETERITION AND THE ISSUES RAISED ARE REVIEWABLE;
3. WHETHER THERE IS CO-OWNERSHIP PRO INDIVISO;
4. WHETHER THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY CO-OWNERS ON THE LAND SHOULD
PREVAIL;
5. WHETHER THE ALLEGED SALE IS VALID AND BINDS THE OTHER CO-HEIRS;
6. WHETHER PRESCRIPTION APPLIES AGAINST THE SHARE OF PETITIONERS.21
The fundamental question for resolution is whether petitioners were able to prove, by the
requisite quantum of evidence, that Manongsong is a co-owner of the Property and therefore
entitled to demand for its partition.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issues raised by petitioners are mainly factual in nature. In general, only questions of law
are appealable to this Court under Rule 45. However, where the factual findings of the trial
court and Court of Appeals conflict, this Court has the authority to review and, if necessary,
reverse the findings of fact of the lower courts.22 This is precisely the situation in this case.
We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of evidence and
the burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals :23
xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon
the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a
civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must
be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The concept of
"preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing,
that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa
Petitioners anchor their action for partition on the claim that Manongsong is a co-owner or co-
heir of the Property by inheritance, more specifically, as the heir of her father, Vicente Lopez.
Petitioners likewise allege that the Property originally belonged to Guevarra, and that Vicente
Lopez inherited from Guevarra a 1/5 interest in the Property. As the parties claiming the
affirmative of these issues, petitioners had the burden of proof to establish their case by
preponderance of evidence.
To trace the ownership of the Property, both contending parties presented tax declarations
and the testimonies of witnesses. However, the Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized
KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA which controverted petitioners claim of co-ownership.
The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public document
and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution. To assail the authenticity and
due execution of a notarized document, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than
merely preponderant.24 Otherwise the authenticity and due execution of the document should
be upheld.25 The trial court itself held that "(n)o countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs
to overcome or impugn the documents legality or its validity."26
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient document and thus still
presumed to be authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper
custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It appears,
on its face, to be genuine.27
Nevertheless, the trial court held that the Kasulatan was void because the Property was
conjugal at the time Navarro sold it to Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio. We do not agree. The trial
courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal was not based on evidence, but rather on a
misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil
Code applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage.
Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.28
There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her
marriage. There is no basis for applying the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to
the present case. On the contrary, Tax Declaration No. 911 showed that, as far back as in 1949,
the Property was declared solely in Navarros name.29This tends to support the argument that
the Property was not conjugal.
We likewise find no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale embodied in the
Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a
disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration
does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration,
there is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values, 30 that is, the property
sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration.1wphi1
Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1) consent or
meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price certain in money or its
equivalent.31 The presence of these elements is apparent on the face of the Kasulatan itself. The
Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00.32
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting the documents presented by petitioners for
the first time on appeal
We find no error in the Court of Appeals refusal to give any probative value to the alleged birth
certificate of Guevarra and the affidavit of Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. Petitioners belatedly
attached these documents to their appellees brief. Petitioners could easily have offered these
documents during the proceedings before the trial court. Instead, petitioners presented these
documents for the first time on appeal without any explanation. For reasons of their own,
petitioners did not formally offer in evidence these documents before the trial court as
required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.33 To admit these documents now is
contrary to due process, as it deprives respondents of the opportunity to examine and
controvert them.
Moreover, even if these documents were admitted, they would not controvert Navarros
ownership of the Property. Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.s affidavit stated merely that, although he
knew Navarro by name, he was not personally acquainted with her.34 Guevarras alleged birth
certificate casts doubt only as to whether Navarro was indeed the mother of Guevarra. These
documents do not prove that Guevarra owned the Property or that Navarro did not own the
Property.
Petitioners admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. However,
petitioners denied before the Court of Appeals that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. We
agree with the appellate court that this constitutes an impermissible change of theory. When a
party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he cannot change his theory on appeal. To
allow him to do so is not only unfair to the other party, it is also offensive to the basic rules of
fair play, justice and due process.35
If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it would only further undermine petitioners case.
Absent any hereditary relationship between Guevarra and Navarro, the Property would not
have passed from Navarro to Guevarra, and then to the latters children, including petitioners,
by succession. There would then be no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership by virtue of
inheritance from Guevarra. On the other hand, this would not undermine respondents position
since they anchor their claim on the sale under the Kasulatan and not on inheritance from
Guevarra.
Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners failed to refute
by clear and convincing evidence, this Court holds that petitioners were not able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that the Property belonged to Guevarras estate. There is therefore
no legal basis for petitioners complaint for partition of the Property.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 26 June 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51643,
dismissing the complaint of petitioners against Felomena Jumaquio Estimo and Emiliana
Jumaquio, is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126376 November 20, 2003
SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and CONSOLACION JOAQUIN, SPOUSES JUANITO
EDRA and NORA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES RUFINO VALDOZ and EMMA JOAQUIN, and
NATIVIDAD JOAQUIN, , vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN and
FELICIANA LANDRITO, SPOUSES FIDEL JOAQUIN and CONCHITA BERNARDO, SPOUSES
TOMAS JOAQUIN and SOLEDAD ALCORAN, SPOUSES ARTEMIO JOAQUIN and SOCORRO
ANGELES, SPOUSES ALEXANDER MENDOZA and CLARITA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES TELESFORO
CARREON and FELICITAS JOAQUIN, SPOUSES DANILO VALDOZ and FE JOAQUIN, and
SPOUSES GAVINO JOAQUIN and LEA ASIS
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 to annul the Decision2 dated 26 June 1996 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41996. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision3 dated 18
February 1993 rendered by Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati ("trial court") in
Civil Case No. 89-5174. The trial court dismissed the case after it found that the parties
executed the Deeds of Sale for valid consideration and that the plaintiffs did not have a cause of
action against the defendants.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs
Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita,
Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in
this action by their respective spouses.
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed
by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant
children and the corresponding certificates of title issued in their names, to wit:
1. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-7 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395
executed on 11 July 1978, in favor of defendant Felicitas Joaquin, for a consideration
of P6,000.00 (Exh. "C"), pursuant to which TCT No. [36113/T-172] was issued in her
name (Exh. "C-1");
2. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-3 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394
executed on 7 June 1979, in favor of defendant Clarita Joaquin, for a consideration
of P1[2],000.00 (Exh. "D"), pursuant to which TCT No. S-109772 was issued in her
name (Exh. "D-1");
3 Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394
executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Fidel Joaquin and Conchita
Bernardo, for a consideration of P54,[3]00.00 (Exh. "E"), pursuant to which TCT No.
155329 was issued to them (Exh. "E-1");
4. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-2 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394
executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Artemio Joaquin and Socorro
Angeles, for a consideration ofP[54,3]00.00 (Exh. "F"), pursuant to which TCT No.
155330 was issued to them (Exh. "F-1"); and
5. Absolute Sale of Real Property covering Lot 168-C-4 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
256395 executed on 9 September 1988, in favor of Tomas Joaquin, for a consideration
of P20,000.00 (Exh. "G"), pursuant to which TCT No. 157203 was issued in her name
(Exh. "G-1").
6. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395
executed on 7 October 1988, in favor of Gavino Joaquin, for a consideration
of P25,000.00 (Exh. "K"), pursuant to which TCT No. 157779 was issued in his name
(Exh. "K-1").]
In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title,
plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver:
- XX-
The deeds of sale, Annexes "C," "D," "E," "F," and "G," [and "K"] are simulated as they are, are
NULL AND VOIDAB INITIO because
a) Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale xxx over the
properties in litis;
b) Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected in the
questioned deeds, the properties are more than three-fold times more valuable than
the measly sums appearing therein;
c) Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true intent of the parties
(vendors and vendees); and
d) Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate
conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs
herein) of their legitime.
- XXI -
Necessarily, and as an inevitable consequence, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 36113/T-172,
S-109772, 155329, 155330, 157203 [and 157779] issued by the Registrar of Deeds over the
properties in litis xxx are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of action against
them as well as the requisite standing and interest to assail their titles over the properties
in litis; (2) that the sales were with sufficient considerations and made by defendants parents
voluntarily, in good faith, and with full knowledge of the consequences of their deeds of sale;
and (3) that the certificates of title were issued with sufficient factual and legal
basis.4 (Emphasis in the original)
The Ruling of the Trial Court
Before the trial, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case against defendant spouses
Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis.5 Instead of filing an Answer with their co-defendants, Gavino
Joaquin and Lea Asis filed a Motion to Dismiss.6 In granting the dismissal to Gavino Joaquin and
Lea Asis, the trial court noted that "compulsory heirs have the right to a legitime but such right
is contingent since said right commences only from the moment of death of the decedent
pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil Code of the Philippines."7
After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The
trial court stated:
In the first place, the testimony of the defendants, particularly that of the xxx father will show
that the Deeds of Sale were all executed for valuable consideration. This assertion must prevail
over the negative allegation of plaintiffs.
And then there is the argument that plaintiffs do not have a valid cause of action against
defendants since there can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of their parents. The
court finds this contention tenable. In determining the legitime, the value of the property left at
the death of the testator shall be considered (Art. 908 of the New Civil Code). Hence, the
legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs
therefore cannot claim an impairment of their legitime while their parents live.
All the foregoing considered, this case is DISMISSED.
In order to preserve whatever is left of the ties that should bind families together, the
counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED.No costs.SO ORDERED.8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.1wphi1 The appellate court ruled:
To the mind of the Court, appellants are skirting the real and decisive issue in this case, which
is, whether xxx they have a cause of action against appellees.
Upon this point, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellants, like their defendant brothers
and sisters, are compulsory heirs of defendant spouses, Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana
Landrito, who are their parents. However, their right to the properties of their defendant
parents, as compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate and vests only upon the latters death. While
still alive, defendant parents are free to dispose of their properties, provided that such
dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.
Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties to the deeds of sale in question. Neither do they
claim to be creditors of their defendant parents. Consequently, they cannot be considered as
real parties in interest to assail the validity of said deeds either for gross inadequacy or lack of
consideration or for failure to express the true intent of the parties. In point is the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Velarde, et al. vs. Paez, et al., 101 SCRA 376, thus:
The plaintiffs are not parties to the alleged deed of sale and are not principally or subsidiarily
bound thereby; hence, they have no legal capacity to challenge their validity.
Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their action on the supposed impairment of their legitime by the
dispositions made by their defendant parents in favor of their defendant brothers and sisters.
But, as correctly held by the court a quo, "the legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of
the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an impairment of their
legitime while their parents live."
With this posture taken by the Court, consideration of the errors assigned by plaintiffs-
appellants is inconsequential.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against plaintiffs-
appellants.SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues
Petitioners assign the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CONVEYANCE IN QUESTION
HAD NO VALID CONSIDERATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT EVEN ASSUMING THAT THERE
WAS A CONSIDERATION, THE SAME IS GROSSLY INADEQUATE.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEEDS OF SALE DO NOT
EXPRESS THE TRUE INTENT OF THE PARTIES.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CONVEYANCE WAS PART
AND PARCEL OF A CONSPIRACY AIMED AT UNJUSTLY DEPRIVING THE REST OF THE
CHILDREN OF THE SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN AND FELICIANA LANDRITO OF THEIR
INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE A GOOD,
SUFFICIENT AND VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition without merit.
We will discuss petitioners legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale
before discussing the issues on the purported lack of consideration and gross inadequacy of
the prices of the Deeds of Sale.
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale
Petitioners Complaint betrays their motive for filing this case. In their Complaint, petitioners
asserted that the "purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate
conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of
their legitime." Petitioners strategy was to have the Deeds of Sale declared void so that
ownership of the lots would eventually revert to their respondent parents. If their parents die
still owning the lots, petitioners and their respondent siblings will then co-own their parents
estate by hereditary succession.11
It is evident from the records that petitioners are interested in the properties subject of the
Deeds of Sale, but they have failed to show any legal right to the properties. The trial and
appellate courts should have dismissed the action for this reason alone. An action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.12
[T]he question as to "real party-in-interest" is whether he is "the party who would be
benefitted or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."
xxx
In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are those who are
parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in
their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which
would positively result to them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it
(Ibaez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572 [1912]) xxx.
These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy
or future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. The phrase present substantial
interest more concretely is meant such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as
will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has
the legal title to demand and the defendant will be protected in a payment to or recovery by
him."13
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale. As
the appellate court stated, petitioners right to their parents properties is merely inchoate and
vests only upon their parents death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to
dispose of their properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime,
petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not affect the
value of their parents estate. While the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent
value replaced the lots taken from the estate.
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for lack of consideration
Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the prices stated in the
Deeds of Sale to their respondent father. Thus, petitioners ask the court to declare the Deeds of
Sale void.
A contract of sale is not a real contract, but a consensual contract. As a consensual contract, a
contract of sale becomes a binding and valid contract upon the meeting of the minds as to
price. If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is
valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment. If the real
price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale is valid but subject to reformation. If
there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, because the price stipulated in
the contract is simulated, then the contract is void.14 Article 1471 of the Civil Code states that if
the price in a contract of sale is simulated, the sale is void.
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of sale. Payment
of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment of the price goes into
the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of
consideration. The former results in a right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the
obligation under an existing valid contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid
contract.15
Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely simulated. To
prove simulation, petitioners presented Emma Joaquin Valdozs testimony stating that their
father, respondent Leonardo Joaquin, told her that he would transfer a lot to her through a
deed of sale without need for her payment of the purchase price. 16 The trial court did not find
the allegation of absolute simulation of price credible. Petitioners failure to prove absolute
simulation of price is magnified by their lack of knowledge of their respondent siblings
financial capacity to buy the questioned lots.17 On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which
petitioners presented as evidence plainly showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only did
respondents minds meet as to the purchase price, but the real price was also stated in the
Deeds of Sale. As of the filing of the complaint, respondent siblings have also fully paid the price
to their respondent father.18
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for gross inadequacy of price
Petitioners ask that assuming that there is consideration, the same is grossly inadequate as to
invalidate the Deeds of Sale.
Articles 1355 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a
contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as may indicate a
defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or
contract. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of the
Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale. Indeed, there is no
requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the subject matter of sale. All the
respondents believed that they received the commutative value of what they gave. As we
stated in Vales v. Villa:19
Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains, protect him
from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of foolish
acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of persons who are not legally
incompetent. Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by
another, but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things,
make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by them indeed, all they
have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must be, in
addition, a violation of the law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong,
before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it. (Emphasis in the
original)
Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive on the parties and carry
greater weight when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will
not weigh the evidence all over again unless there has been a showing that the findings of the
lower court are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious
abuse of discretion.20 In the instant case, the trial court found that the lots were sold for a valid
consideration, and that the defendant children actually paid the purchase price stipulated in
their respective Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by the buyer to the seller
is a factual finding that is now conclusive upon us.WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the
Court of Appeals in toto.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141882 March 11, 2005
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L. TEVES, vs. NANTONIO BALANSAG
and HILARIA CADAYDAY,
Once again, the Court is faced with the perennial conflict of property claims between two sets
of heirs, a conflict ironically made grievous by the fact that the decedent in this case had
resorted to great lengths to allocate which properties should go to which set of heirs.
This is a Rule 45 petition assailing the Decision1 dated 30 September 1999 of the Court of
Appeals which reversed the Decision2 dated 7 May 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 45, of Bais City, Negros Oriental.
The factual antecedents follow.
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena (Antonia),
and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio). Don Julian had two children
with Antonia, namely: Josefa Teves Escao (Josefa) and Emilio Teves (Emilio). He had also four
(4) children with Milagros Donio, namely: Maria Evelyn Donio Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose
Catalino Donio Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves (Milagros Reyes) and Pedro Reyes
Teves (Pedro).3
The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering nine hundred and fifty-four (954)
square meters, known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre, which was originally registered in the
name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and Antonia under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 5203 of the Registry of Deeds of Bais City. When Antonia died, the land was among
the properties involved in an action for partition and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443
entitled "Josefa Teves Escao v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al."4 Milagros Donio, the second
wife of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered
into aCompromise Agreement5 which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian.
On the basis of the compromise agreement and approving the same, the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District, rendered a Decision6 dated 31 January 1964. The
CFI decision declared a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned
in common by Don Julian and his two (2) children of the first marriage. The property was to
remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian.7 Josefa and Emilio likewise were given
other properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the "movie property," the commercial
areas, and the house where Don Julian was living. The remainder of the properties was
retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.
Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of the present dispute, lays down the
effect of the eventual death of Don Julian vis--vis his heirs:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties hereinafter
adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escao and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties
comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories and
accessions) shall be understood as including not only their one-half share which they
inherited from their mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights
which would correspond to them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L.
Teves. In other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L.
Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall
exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his
four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural
children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated
children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves. (Emphasis
supplied)
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets
with Assumption of Liabilities8 in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (petitioner). Less than a year later,
Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of
Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental Deed)9 dated 31 July 1973.
This instrument which constitutes a supplement to the earlier deed of assignment transferred
ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner.10 On 14 April 1974,
Don Julian died intestate.
On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, petitioner sought the registration of the
subject lot in its name. A court, so it appeared, issued an order11 cancelling OCT No. 5203 in the
name of spouses Don Julian and Antonia on 12 November 1979, and on the same date TCT No.
T-375 was issued in the name of petitioner.12Since then, petitioner has been paying taxes
assessed on the subject lot.13
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the
subject lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a
yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday, respondents
herein.14 On Lot No. 63, respondents temporarily established their home and constructed a
lumber yard. Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her children executed aDeed of Extrajudicial
Partition of Real Estate15 dated 18 March 1980. In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted
to Milagros Donio and her two (2) children, Maria Evelyn and Jose Catalino. Unaware that the
subject lot was already registered in the name of petitioner in 1979, respondents bought Lot
No. 63 from Milagros Donio as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate16 dated 9
November 1983.
At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute sale, respondents
discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner. Thus, they failed to register
the deed.17
Respondents, as vendees of Lot No. 63, filed a complaint before the RTC Branch 45 of Bais City,
seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation of TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner
and the transfer of the title to Lot No. 63 in their names, plus damages.18
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint filed by respondents. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, this Court finds
judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, and thus hereby orders:
(1) That complaint be dismissed;
(2) That plaintiffs vacate the subject land, particularly identified as Lot No. 63
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375;
(3) That plaintiffs pay costs.
Finding no basis on the counterclaim by defendant, the same is hereby ordered
dismissed.19
The trial court ruled that the resolution of the case specifically hinged on the interpretation of
paragraph 13 of theCompromise Agreement.20 It added that the direct adjudication of the
properties listed in the Compromise Agreement was only in favor of Don Julian and his two
children by the first marriage, Josefa and Emilio.21Paragraph 13 served only as an amplification
of the terms of the adjudication in favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first
marriage.
According to the trial court, the properties adjudicated in favor of Josefa and Emilio comprised
their shares in the estate of their deceased mother Antonia, as well as their potential share in
the estate of Don Julian upon the latters death. Thus, upon Don Julians death, Josefa and
Emilio could not claim any share in his estate, except their proper share in the Hacienda
Medalla Milagrosa which was adjudicated in favor of Don Julian in theCompromise Agreement.
As such, the properties adjudicated in favor of Don Julian, except Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa,
were free from the forced legitimary rights of Josefa and Emilio, and Don Julian was under no
impediment to allocate the subject lot, among his other properties, to Milagros Donio and her
four (4) children.22
The trial court further stressed that with the use of the words "shall be," the adjudication in
favor of Milagros Donio and her four (4) children was not final and operative, as the lot was
still subject to future disposition by Don Julian during his lifetime.23 It cited paragraph 1424 of
the Compromise Agreement in support of his conclusion.25 With Lot No. 63 being the conjugal
property of Don Julian and Antonia, the trial court also declared that Milagros Donio and her
children had no hereditary rights thereto except as to the conjugal share of Don Julian, which
they could claim only upon the death of the latter.26
The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julians death on 14 April 1974, Lot No. 63 was no
longer a part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to petitioner on 31 July 1973.
Consequently, the lot could not be a proper subject of extrajudicial partition by Milagros Donio
and her children, and not being the owners they could not have sold it. Had respondents
exercised prudence before buying the subject lot by investigating the registration of the same
with the Registry of Deeds, they would have discovered that five (5) years earlier, OCT No.
5203 had already been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner, the
trial court added.27
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial courts decision. The decretal part of the
appellate decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-375 registered in the name of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. as null and void.
With costs against defendant J.L.T. Agro, Inc. represented by its Manager, Julian L.
Teves.SO ORDERED.28
Per the appellate court, the Compromise Agreement incorporated in CFI decision dated 31
January 1964, particularly paragraph 13 thereof, determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don
Julians two sets of heirs their future legitimes in his estate except as regards his (Don Julians)
share in Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.29 The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and
possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to them in the CFI decision and Don
Julian himself could no longer dispose of the same, including Lot No. 63. The disposition in the
CFI decision constitutes res judicata.30 Don Julian could have disposed of only his conjugal
share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.31
The appellate court likewise emphasized that nobody in his right judgment would preterit his
legal heirs by simply executing a document like the Supplemental Deed which practically covers
all properties which Don Julian had reserved in favor of his heirs from the second marriage. It
also found out that the blanks reserved for the Book No. and Page No. at the upper right corner
of TCT No. T-375, "to identify the exact location where the said title was registered or
transferred," were not filled up, thereby indicating that the TCT is "spurious and of dubious
origin."32
Aggrieved by the appellate courts decision, petitioner elevated it to this Court via a petition for
review oncertiorari, raising pure questions of law.
Before this Court, petitioner assigns as errors the following rulings of the appellate court, to
wit: (a) that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of
Don Julian; (b) that Don Julian had no right to dispose of or assign Lot No. 63 to petitioner
because he reserved the same for his heirs from the second marriage pursuant to
the Compromise Agreement; (c) that the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a preterition of
his heirs from the second marriage; and (d) that TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner is
spurious for not containing entries on the Book No. and Page No.33
While most of petitioners legal arguments have merit, the application of the appropriate
provisions of law to the facts borne out by the evidence on record nonetheless warrants the
affirmance of the result reached by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents.
Being the key adjudicative provision, paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement has to be
quoted again:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties herein adjudicated to
Josefa Teves Escao and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be
understood as including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their
mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond
to them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L.Teves. In other words, the
properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his
share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the
wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely,
Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes
Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn
Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves." (Emphasis supplied)
With the quoted paragraph as basis, the Court of Appeals ruled that the adjudication in favor of
the heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage became automatically operative upon the
approval of the Compromise Agreement, thereby vesting on them the right to validly dispose of
Lot No. 63 in favor of respondents.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be
determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian. The Court agrees. Our
declaration in Blas v. Santos34 is relevant, where we defined future inheritance as any property
or right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a
person may in the future acquire by succession. Article 1347 of the New Civil Code explicitly
provides:
ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may
be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of
contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy
may likewise be the object of a contract.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the
commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be
entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the
partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.35
For the inheritance to be considered "future," the succession must not have been opened at the
time of the contract.36 A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance,
prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened;
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which
is purely hereditary in nature.37
The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the exception and
therefore aligns with the general rule on future things, reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by
will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the compulsory heirs.
....
In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if the partition
is made by an actinter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the Article.38 The partition will of
course be effective only after death. It does not necessarily require the formalities of a will for
after all it is not the partition that is the mode of acquiring ownership. Neither will the
formalities of a donation be required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the
ownership here after death; since no will has been made it follows that the mode will be
succession (intestate succession). Besides, the partition here is merely the physical
determination of the part to be given to each heir.39
The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New Civil Code is Article 1056 40 of the old Civil
Code. The only change in the provision is that Article 1080 now permits any person (not a
testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos. This was intended to
abrogate the then prevailing doctrine that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter
vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law.41
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to partition inter
vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and this partition is neither a donation
nor a testament, but an instrument of a special character, sui generis, which is revocable at
any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title
until his death. It derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the
owner of the property, limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the
forced heirs.42
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article
1347. However, considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death of Don
Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him
under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession
to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its
nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was at
the time nonexistent and might never exist.43
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of
petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot
would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the
owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his
lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that
it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.
Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian had validly transferred
ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime. The lower court ruled that he had done so
through the Supplemental Deed. The appellate court disagreed, holding that the Supplemental
Deed is not valid, containing as it does a prohibited preterition of Don Julians heirs from the
second marriage. Petitioner contends that the ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The
contention is well-founded.
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir
in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not
instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of
the properties.44 It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from
inheritance.45 It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir,
omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him
anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is
mentioned in the will in the latter case.46 But there is no preterition where the testator allotted
to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced
heir.47
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a
partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise
Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of
Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other
properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his
death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julians desire
along this line.48 Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julians heirs from the
second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
Despite the debunking of respondents argument on preterition, still the petition would
ultimately rise or fall on whether there was a valid transfer effected by Don Julian to petitioner.
Notably, Don Julian was also the president and director of petitioner, and his daughter from the
first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer thereof. There is of course no legal prohibition against
such a transfer to a family corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order, especially considering
that such transfer would remove Lot No. 63 from the estate from which Milagros and her
children could inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed and the title which necessarily must have
emanated from it have to be subjected to incisive and detailed examination.
Well-settled, of course, is the rule that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. 49 A certificate of title
accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held
by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly
the real interest of its owner.50
To successfully assail the juristic value of what a Torrens title establishes, a sufficient and
convincing quantum of evidence on the defect of the title must be adduced to overcome the
predisposition in law in favor of a holder of a Torrens title. Thus, contrary to the appellate
courts ruling, the appearance of a mere thumbmark of Don Julian instead of his signature in
the Supplemental Deed would not affect the validity of petitioners title for this Court has ruled
that a thumbmark is a recognized mode of signature.51
The truth, however, is that the replacement of OCT No. 5203 in the name of Julian by T.C.T. No.
T-375 is marred by a grave irregularity which is also an illegality, as it contravenes the
orthodox, conventional and normal process established by law. And, worse still, the illegality is
reflected on the face of both titles. Where, as in this case, the transferee relies on a voluntary
instrument to secure the issuance of a new title in his name such instrument has to be
presented to the Registry of Deeds. This is evident from Sections 53 and 57 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. The sections read, thus:
SEC. 53. Presentation of owners duplicate upon entry of new certificate.
No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds unless the
owners duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument, except in cases
expressly provided for in this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown.
(Emphasis supplied)
....
SEC. 57. Procedure in registration of conveyances. An owner desiring to convey his
registered land in fee simple shall execute and register a deed of conveyance in a
form sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds shall thereafter make out in the
registration book a new certificate of title to the grantee and shall prepare and deliver
to him an owners duplicate certificate. The Register of Deeds shall note upon the
original and duplicate certificate the date of transfer, the volume and page of the
registration book in which the new certificate is registered and a reference by
number to the last preceding certificate. The original and the owners duplicate of the
grantors certificate shall be stamped "cancelled." The deed of conveyance shall be
filed and endorsed with the number and the place of registration of the
certificate of title of the land conveyed. (Emphasis supplied)
As petitioner bases its right to the subject lot on the Supplemental Deed, it should have
presented it to the Register of Deeds to secure the transfer of the title in its name. Apparently,
it had not done so. There is nothing on OCT No. 5203 or on the succeeding TCT No. T-375
either which shows that it had presented theSupplemental Deed. In fact, there is absolutely no
mention of a reference to said document in the original and transfer certificates of title. It is in
this regard that the finding of the Court of Appeals concerning the absence of entries on the
blanks intended for the Book No. and Page No. gains significant relevance. Indeed, this aspect
fortifies the conclusion that the cancellation of OCT No. 5203 and the consequent issuance of
TCT No. T-375 in its place are not predicated on a valid transaction.
What appears instead on OCT No. 5203 is the following pertinent entry:
Entry No. 1374: Kind: Order: Executed in favor of J.L.T. AGRO, INC.
CONDITIONS: Lost owners duplicate is hereby cancelled, and null and void and a
new Certificate of Title No. 375 is issued per Order of the Court of First
Instance on file in this office.
Date of Instrument: November 12, 1979
Date of Inscription: Nov. 12, 1979 4:00 P.M.
(SGD) MANUEL C. MONTESA
Acting Deputy Register of Deeds II
(Emphasis supplied)52
What the entry indicates is that the owners duplicate of OCT No. 5203 was lost, a petition for
the reconstitution of the said owners duplicate was filed in court, and the court issued an
order for the reconstitution of the owners duplicate and its replacement with a new one. But if
the entry is to be believed, the court concerned (CFI, according to the entry) issued an order for
the issuance of a new title which is TCT No. T-375 although the original of OCT No. 5203 on file
with the Registry of Deeds had not been lost.
Going by the legal, accepted and normal process, the reconstitution court may order the
reconstitution and replacement of the lost title only, nothing else. Since what was lost is the
owners copy of OCT No. 5203, only that owners copy could be ordered replaced. Thus, the
Register of Deeds exceeded his authority in issuing not just a reconstituted owners copy of the
original certificate of title but a new transfer certificate of title in place of the original certificate
of title. But if the court order, as the entry intimates, directed the issuance of a new transfer
certificate of titleeven designating the very number of the new transfer certificate of title
itselfthe order would be patently unlawful. A court cannot legally order the cancellation and
replacement of the original of the O.C.T. which has not been lost,53 as the petition for
reconstitution is premised on the loss merely of the owners duplicate of the OCT
Apparently, petitioner had resorted to the court order as a convenient contrivance to effect the
transfer of title to the subject lot in its name, instead of the Supplemental Deed which should be
its proper course of action. It was so constrained to do because the Supplemental Deed does not
constitute a deed of conveyance of the "registered land in fee simple" "in a form sufficient in
law," as required by Section 57 of P.D. No. 1529.
A plain reading of the pertinent provisions of the Supplemental Deed discloses that the
assignment is not supported by any consideration. The provision reads:
....
WHEREAS, in the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities
executed by Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escao at Dumaguete City
on 16th day of November 1972 and ratified in the City of Dumaguete before Notary
Public Lenin Victoriano, and entered in the latters notarial register as Doc. No. 367;
Page No. 17; Book No. V; series of 1972, Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T.
Escao, transferred, conveyed and assigned unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., all its assets and
liabilities as reflected in the Balance Sheet of the former as of December 31, 1971.
WHEREAS, on the compromise agreement, as mentioned in the Decision made in the
Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District Branch II, on Dec. 31,
1964 pertaining to Civil Case No. 3443 the following properties were adjudicated to
Don Julian L. Teves. We quote.
From the properties at Bais
Adjudicated to Don Julian L.Teves
....
Lot No. 63, Tax Dec. No. 33, Certificate of Title No. 5203, together with all
improvements. Assessed value - P2,720.00
....
WHEREAS, this Deed of Assignment is executed by the parties herein in order to
effect the registration of the transfer of the above corporation.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises the ASSIGNOR
hereby transfers, conveys, and assigns unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., the above described
parcel of land[s] with a fair market value of EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS
(P84,000.00), Philippine Currency, and which transfer, conveyance and assignment
shall become absolute upon signing.54 (Emphasis supplied)
The amount of P84,000.00 adverted to in the dispositive portion of the instrument does not
represent the consideration for the assignment made by Don Julian. Rather, it is a mere
statement of the fair market value of allthe nineteen (19) properties enumerated in the
instrument, of which Lot No. 63 is just one, that were transferred by Don Julian in favor of
petitioner. Consequently, the testimony55 of petitioners accountant that the assignment is
supported by consideration cannot prevail over the clear provision to the contrary in
the Supplemental Deed.
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, apparently considered the 1948 mortgage which is
annotated on the back of the TCT No. T-375 as the consideration for the
assignment.56 However, the said annotation57 shows that the mortgage was actually executed
in favor of Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, not of petitioner.58 Clearly, said mortgage,
executed as it was in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and there being no
showing that petitioner itself paid off the mortgate obligation, could not have been the
consideration for the assignment to petitioner.
Article 1318 of the New Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a valid contract, namely: (1)
consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
and (3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Thus, Article 1352 declares that contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause produce no
effect whatsoever. Those contracts lack an essential element and they are not only voidable but
void or inexistent pursuant to Article 1409, paragraph (2).59 The absence of the usual recital of
consideration in a transaction which normally should be supported by a consideration such as
the assignment made by Don Julian of all nineteen (19) lots he still had at the time, coupled
with the fact that the assignee is a corporation of which Don Julian himself was also the
President and Director, forecloses the application of the presumption of existence of
consideration established by law.60
Neither could the Supplemental Deed validly operate as a donation. Article 749 of the New Civil
Code is clear on the point, thus:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must be made in
a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public
document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof
in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
In Sumipat, et al v. Banga, et al.,61 this Court declared that title to immovable property does not
pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been
accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be
made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same
document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the
acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is
either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate
acceptance, the donation is null and void.
In the case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a public document,62 the absence
of acceptance by the donee in the same deed or even in a separate document is a glaring
violation of the requirement.
One final note. From the substantive and procedural standpoints, the cardinal objectives to
write finis to a protracted litigation and avoid multiplicity of suits are worth pursuing at all
times.63 Thus, this Court has ruled that appellate courts have ample authority to rule on
specific matters not assigned as errors or otherwise not raised in an appeal, if these are
indispensable or necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded issues.64 Specifically, matters
not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which are necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case, or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice.65
In the instant case, the correct characterization of the Supplemental Deed, i.e., whether it is
valid or void, is unmistakably determinative of the underlying controversy. In other words, the
issue of validity or nullity of the instrument which is at the core of the controversy is
interwoven with the issues adopted by the parties and the rulings of the trial court and the
appellate court.66 Thus, this Court is also resolute in striking down the alleged deed in this case,
especially as it appears on its face to be a blatant nullity.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 30 September 1999 of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14070 March 29, 1961
MARIA GERVACIO BLAS, MANUEL GERVACIO BLAS, LEONCIO GERVACIO BLAS and LODA
GERVACIO BLAS, , vs. ROSALINA SANTOS, in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the
Estate of the deceased MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS, in Sp. Proc. No. 2524, Court of
First Instance of Rizal, defendants-appellants. MARTA GERVACIO BLAS and DR. JOSE
CHIVI
This action was instituted by plaintiffs against the administration of the estate of Maxima
Santos, to secure a judicial declaration that one-half of the properties left by Maxima Santos
Vda. de Blas, the greater bulk of which are set forth and described in the project of partition
presented in the proceedings for the administration of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas,
had been promised by the deceased Maxima Santos to be delivered upon her death and in her
will to the plaintiffs, and requesting that the said properties so promised be adjudicated to the
plaintiffs. The complaint also prays for actual damages in the amount of P50,000. (Record on
Appeal, pp. 1-65.) The alleged promise of the deceased Maxima Santos is contained in a
document executed by Maxima Santos on December 26, 1936 attached to the complaint as
Annex "H" and introduced at the trial as Exhibit "A". (Ibid., pp. 258-259.) The complaint also
alleges that the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit certain properties enumerated in paragraph 3
thereof, situated in Malabon, Rizal and Obando, Bulacan, but which properties have already
been in included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and evidently
partitioned and conveyed to his heirs in the proceedings for the administration of his (Simeon
Blas) estate.
Defendant, who is the administratrix of the estate of the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas,
filed an answer with a counterclaim, and later, an amended answer and a counterclaim. The
said amended answer admits the allegations of the complaint as to her capacity as
administratrix the death of Simeon Blas on January 3, 1937; the fact that Simeon Blas and
Marta Cruz begot three children only one of whom, namely, Eulalio Blas, left legitimate
descendants; that Simeon Blas contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos on June 28,
1898. She denies for lack of sufficient information and belief, knowledge edge of the first
marriage of Simeon Blas to Marta Cruz, the averment that Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz
acquired properties situated in Obando, Bulacan, that said properties were utilized as capital,
etc. As special defenses, she alleges that the properties of the spouses Blas and Santos had been
settled and liquidated in the project of partition of the estate of said Simeon Blas; that pursuant
to the project of partition, plaintiffs and some defendants had already received the respective
properties adjudicated to them; that the plaintiffs and the defendants Marta Geracio and Jose
Chivi are estopped from impugning the validity of the project of partition of the estate of the
deceased Simeon Blas and from questioning the ownership in the properties conveyed in the
project of partition to Maxima Santos as her own exclusive property; that the testament
executed by Maxima Santos is valid, the plain plaintiffs having no right to recover any portion
of Maxima Santos' estate now under administration by the court. A counterclaim for the
amount of P50,000 as damages is also included in the complaint, as also a cross-claim against
Marta Gervacio Blas and Jose Chivi.
Trial of the case was Conducted and, thereafter, the court, Hon. Gustave Victoriano, presiding,
rendered judgment dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiff, and dismissing also
the counterclaim and cross-claim decision ,the plaintiffs filed by the defendants. From this
district have appealed to this Court.
The facts essential to an understanding of the issues involved in the case may be briefly
summarized as follows: Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz sometime
before 1898. They had three children, only one of whom, Eulalio, left children, namely, Maria
Gervacio Blas, one of the plaintiffs, Marta Gervacio Blas, one of the defendants, and Lazaro
Gervacio Blas. Lazaro died in 1950, and is survived by three legitimate children who are
plaintiffs herein, namely, Manuel Gervacio Blas, Leoncio Gervacio Blas and Loida Gervacio Blas.
Marta Cruz died in 1898, and the following year, Simeon Blas contracted a second marriage
with Maxima Santos. At the time of this second marriage, no liquidation of the properties
required by Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz was made. Three of the properties left are fishponds
located in Obando, Bulacan. Maxima Santos does not appear to have apported properties to her
marriage with Simeon Blas.
On December 26, 1936, only over a week before over a week before his death on January 9,
1937, Simeon Blas executed a last will and testament. In the said testament Simeon Blas makes
the following declarations:
I
2. Sa panahon ng aking pangalawang asawa, MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, ay
nagkaroon ako at nakatipon ng mga kayamanan (bienes) at pag-aari (propriedades)
na ang lahat ng lupa, palaisdaan at iba pang pag-aari ay umaabot sa halagang ANIM
NA RAAN PITONG PU'T WALONG DAAN LIBO WALONG DAAN WALONG PUNG PISO
(678,880-00) sang-ayon sa mga halaga sa amillarimento (valor Amillarado.)
II
1. Ang kalahati ng lahat ng aming pag-aari, matapos mabayaran ang lahat ng aking o
aming pag-kakautang na mag-asawa, kung mayroon man, yayamang ang lahat ng ito
ay kita sa loob ng matrimonio (bienes ganaciales) ay bahagi ng para sa aking asawa,
MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, sang-ayon sa batas. (Record on Appeal, pp. 250-251.)
The above testamentary provisions may be translated as follows:
I
2. During my second marriage with Maxima Santos de Blas, I possessed and acquired
wealth and properties, consisting of lands, fishponds and other kinds of properties,
the total assessed value of which reached the amount P678,880.00.
II
1. One-half of our properties, after the payment of my and our indebtedness, all these
properties having been acquired during marriage (conjugal properties), constitutes
the share of my wife Maxima Santos de Blas, according to the law.
At the time of the execution of said will, Andres Pascual a son-in-law of the testator, and
Avelina Pascual and others, were present. Andres Pascual had married a descendant by the
first marriage. The will was prepared by Andres Pascual, with the help of his nephew Avelino
Pascual. The testator asked Andres Pascual to prepare a document which was presented in
court as Exhibit "A", thus:
Q Was there anybody who asked you to prepare this document?
A Don Simeon Blas asked me to prepare this document (referring to Exhibit "A"),
(t.s.n., Sarmiento to, P. 24).
The reason why the testator ordered the preparation of Exhibit "A" was because the properties
that the testator had acquired during his first marriage with Marta Cruz had not been
liquidated and were not separated from those acquired during the second marriage. Pascual's
testimony is as follows:
Q To whom do you refer with the word "they"?
A Simeon Blas and his first wife, Marta Cruz. When Marta Cruz died they had not
made a liquidation of their conjugal properties and so all those properties were
 included all in the assets of the second marriage, and that is the reason why this
document was prepared. (t.s.n., Sarmiento, p. 36.)
The above testimony is fully corroborated by that of Leoncio Gervacio, son-in-law of Simeon
Blas.
Q Please state to the Court?
A My children were claiming from their grandfather Simeon Blas the properties
left by their grandmother Marta Cruz in the year 1936.
Q And what happened with that claim of your children against Simeon Blas
regarding the assets or properties of the first marriage that were left after the death
of Marta Cruz in 1936?
A The claim was not pushed through because they reached into an agreement
whereby the parties Simeon Blas Maxima Santos, Maria Gervacio Bias, Marta Gervacio
Blas and Lazaro Gervacio Blas agreed that Simeon Blas and Maxima Blas will give
one-half of the estate of Simeon Blas. (t.s.n., Sarmiento, pp. 143-144).
The document which was thus prepared and which is marked as Exhibit "A" reads in Tagalog,
thus:
MAUNAWA NG SINO MANG MAKABABASA:
Na akong si MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, nasa hustong gulang, kasal kay SIMEON BLAS, taga
bayan ng Malabon, Rizal, Philippines, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay malaya kong
ipinahahayag:
Na aking nabasa at naunawa ang testamento at huling kalooban na nilagdaan ng aking asawa,
SIMEON BLAS, at ipinahahayag ko sa ilalim ng aking karangalan at sa harap ng aking asawa na
igagalang at pagpipitaganan ang lahat at bawa't isang bahagi ng nabanggit na testamento at
ipinangangako ko pa sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito na ang lahat ng maiiwang pag-aari at
kayamanan naming mag-asawa, na nauukol at bahaging para sa akin sa paggawa ko naman ng
aking testamento ay ipagkakaloob ko ang kalahati () sa mga herederos at legatarios o
pinamamanahan ng aking nabanggit na asawa, SIMEON BLAS, sa kaniyang testamento, na ako'y
makapipili o makahihirang na kahit kangino sa kanila ng aking pagbibigyan at pamamanahan
sang-ayon sa paggalang, paglilingkod, at pakikisama ng gagawin sa akin.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITO ay nilagdaan ko ang kasulatang ito ngayon ika 26 ng
Diciembre ng taong 1936, dito sa San Francisco del Monte, San Juan, Rizal, Philippines. (Exh.
"A", pp. 29-30 Appellant's brief).
(Fdo.) MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS
and which, translated into English, reads as follows:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, of legal age, married to SIMEON BLAS, resident of
Malabon, Rizal, Philippines, voluntarily state:
That I have read and knew the contents of the will signed by my husband, SIMEON
BLAS, (2) and I promise on my word of honor in the presence of my husband that I
will respect and obey all and every disposition of said will (3) and furthermore, I
promise in this document that all the properties my husband and I will leave, the
portion and share corresponding to me when I make my will, I will give one-half ()
to the heirs and legatees or the beneficiaries named in the will of my husband, (4) and
that I can select or choose any of them, to whom I will give depending upon the
respect, service and treatment accorded to me.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I signed this document this 26th day of December, 1936 at
San Francisco del Monte, San Juan, Rizal, Philippines. (Exh. "A", pp. 30-31, Appellant's
brief).
(Sgd.) MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS
The court below held that said Exhibit "A" has not created any right in favor of plaintiffs which
can serve as basis for the complaint; that neither can it be considered as a valid and
enforceable contract for lack of consideration and because it deals with future inheritance. The
court also declared that Exhibit "A" is not a will because it does not comply with the requisites
for the execution of a will; nor could it be considered as a donation, etc.
Both the court below in its decision and the appellees in their brief before us, argue
vehemently that the heirs of Simeon Blas and his wife Marta Cruz can no longer make any claim
for the unliquidated conjugal properties acquired during said first marriage, because the same
were already included in the mass of properties constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon
Blas and in the adjudications made by virtue of his will, and that the action to recover the same
has prescribed. This contention is correct. The descendants of Marta Cruz can no longer claim
the conjugal properties that she and her husband may have required during their marriage
although no liquidation of such properties and delivery thereof to the heirs of Marta Cruz have
been made, no action to recover said propertied having been presented in the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas.
But the principal basis for the plaintiffs' action in the case at bar is the document Exhibit "A". It
is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason
that the conjugal properties of me on Blas for the reason his first marriage had not been
liquidated; that it was prepared at the same time as the will of Simeon Blas on December 26,
1936, at the instance of the latter himself. It is also not disputed that the document was signed
by Maxima Santos and one copy thereof, which was presented in court as Exhibit "A", was kept
by plaintiffs' witness Andres Pascual.
Plaintiffs-appellants argue before us that Exhibit "A" is both a trust agreement and a contract in
the nature of a compromise to avoid litigation. Defendants-appellees, in answer, claim that it is
neither a trust agreement nor a compromise a agreement. Considering that the properties of
the first marriage of Simeon Blas had not been liquidated when Simeon Blas executed his will
on December 26, 1936', and the further fact such properties where actually , and the further
fact that included as conjugal properties acquired during the second marriage, we find, as
contended by plaintiffs-appellants that the preparation and execution of Exhibit "A" was
ordered by Simeon Blas evidently to prevent his heirs by his first marriage from contesting his
will and demanding liquidation of the conjugal properties acquired during the first marriage,
and an accounting of the fruits and proceeds thereof from the time of the death of his first wife.
Exhibit "A", therefore, appears to be the compromise defined in Article 1809 of the Civil Code
of Spain, in force at the time of the execution of Exhibit "A", which provides as follows:
Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in interest, by
giving, promising, or retaining something avoids the provocation of a suitor
terminates one which has already the provocation been instituted. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Exhibit "A" states that the maker (Maxima Santos) had read and knew the contents of the will
of her husband read and knew the contents of the will Simeon Blas she was evidently
referring to the declaration in the will(of Simeon Blas) that his properties are conjugal
properties and one-half thereof belongs to her (Maxima Santos) as her share of the conjugal
assets under the law. The agreement or promise that Maxima Santos makes in Exhibit "A" is to
hold one-half of her said share in the conjugal assets in trust for the heirs and legatees of her
husband in his will, with the obligation of conveying the same to such of his heirs or legatees as
she may choose in her last will and testament. It is to be noted that the conjugal properties But the main ground upon which plaintiffs base their present action is the document Exhibit
referred to are those that were actually existing at that time, December 26, 1936. Simeon Blas "A", already fully considered above. As this private document contains the express promise
died on January 9, 1937. On June 2, 1937, an inventory of the properties left by him, all made by Maxima Santos to convey in her testament, upon her death, one-half of the conjugal
considered conjugal, was submitted by Maxima Santos herself as administratrix of his estate. A properties she would receive as her share in the conjugal properties, the action to enforce the
list of said properties is found in Annex "E", the complete inventory submitted by Maxima said promise did not arise until and after her death when it was found that she did not comply
Santos Vda. de Blas, is administratrix of the estate of her husband, dated March 10, 1939. The with her above-mentioned promise. (Art. 1969, old Civil Code.) The argument that the failure
properties which were given to Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal properties are also of the plaintiffs-appellants herein to oppose the project of partition in the settlement of the
specified in the project of partition submitted by said Maxima Santos herself on March 14, estate of Simeon Blas, especially that portion of the project which assigned to Maxima Santos
1939. (Record on Appeal, pp. 195-241.) Under Exhibit "A", therefore, Maxima Santos one-half of all the conjugal properties bars their present action, is, therefore, devoid of merit. It
contracted the obligation and promised to give one-half of the above indicated properties to may be added that plaintiffs-appellants did not question the validity of the project of partition
the heirs and legatees of Simeon Blas. precisely because of the promise made by Maxima Santos in the compromise Exhibit "A"; they
Counsel for the defendant-appellee claims Exhibit "A" is a worthless piece of paper because it is acquised in the approval of said project of partition because they were relying on the promise
not a will nor a donation mortis causa nor a contract. As we have in indicated above, it is a made by Maxima Santos in Exhibit "A", that she would transmit one-half of the conjugal
compromise and at the same time a contract with a sufficient cause or consideration. It is also properties that she was going to receive as her share in the conjugal partnership upon her
contended that it deals with future inheritance. We do not think that Exhibit "A" is a contract death and in her will, to the heirs and legatees of her husband Simeon Blas.
on future inheritance. it is an obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of Neither can the claim of prescription be considered in favor of the defendants. The right of
her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or action arose at the time of the death of Maxima Santos on October 5,1956, when she failed to
declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the husband. The conjugal properties were in comply with the promise made by her in Exhibit "A". The plaintiffs-appellants immediately
existence at the time of the execution of Exhibit "A" on December 26, 1936. As a matter of fact, presented this action on December 27, 1956, upon learning of such failure on the part of
Maxima Santos included these properties in her inventory of her husband's estate of June 2, Maxima Santos to comply with said promise. This defense is, therefore, also without merit.
1937. The promise does not refer to any properties that the maker would inherit upon the It is next contended by the defendant-appellee that Maxima Santos complied with her above-
death of her husband, because it is her share in the conjugal assets. That the kind of agreement mentioned promise, that Andres Pascual, Tomasa Avelino, Justo Garcia, Ludovico Pimpin
or promise contained in Exhibit "A" is not void under Article 1271 of the old Civil Code, has and Marta Gervacio Blas were given substancial legacies in the will and testament of Maxima
been decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of October 8, 19154, thus: Santos. To determine whether she had actually complied with the promise made in Exhibit "A",
Que si bien el art. 1271 del Codigo civil dispone que sobre la herenciafutura no se there is herein set forth a list only of the fishponds and their respective areas as contained in the
podra celebrar otros contratos que aquellos cuyo objecto seapracticar entre vivos la list of properties she acquired as her share in the conjugal partnership, which list includes,
division de un caudal, conforme al articulo 1056, esta prohibicion noes aplicable al besides many ricelands as well as residential lots, thus:
caso, porque la obligacion que contrajoel recurr en contrato privado de otorgar
testamento e instituir heredera a su subrina de los bienes que adquirio en virtud de 31. Paco, Obando, Bulacan 5.8396 has.
herencia, procedentes desu finada consorte que le quedasen sobrantes despues de 32. Pangjolo, Obando 3.5857 "
pagar las deudas, y del ganacial que se expresa, asi como de reconocer, ademas, con
alguna cosaa otros sobrinos, se refiere a bienes conocidos y determinados existentes 34. Batang Pirasuan, Lubao, Pampanga 11.9515 "
cuando tal compromisi se otorgo, y no a la universalidad de una herencia que, sequn el
art. 659 del citado Codigo civil, as determina a muerte, constituyendola todos los 35. Calangian, Lubao, Pampanga 30.2059 "
bienes, derechos y obligaciones que por ella no sehayan extinguido: ..." (Emphasis
supplied.) 38. Bakuling, Lubao, Pampanga 215.4325 "
It will be noted that what is prohibited to be the subject matter of a contract under Article 1271 39. Bakuling, Lubao, Pampanga 8.3763 "
of the Civil Code is " future inheritance." To us future inheritance is any property or right not in
existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the 40. Bangkal, Sinubli 23.0730 "
future acquire by succession. The properties subject of the contract Exhibit "A" are well defined
properties, existing at the time of the agreement, which Simeon Blas declares in his statement 41. Tagulod, 6.8692 "
as belonging to his wife as her share in the conjugal partnership. Certainly his wife's actual
share in the conjugal properties may not be considered as future inheritance because they 44. Bangkal Pugad (a) 34.2779 "
were actually in existence at the time Exhibit "A" was executed.
(b) 51.7919 "
The trial court held that the plaintiffs-appellants in the case at bar are concluded by the
judgement rendered in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas for the (c) 2.5202 "
reason that the properties left by him belonged to himself and his wife Maxima Santos; that the
project of partition in the said case, adjudicating to Maxima Santos one-half as her share in the 45. Magtapat Bangkal, Lubao, Pampanga (a) 18.0024 "
conjugal properties, is a bar to another action on the same subject matter, Maxima Santos
(b) 7.3265 "
having become absolute owner of the said properties adjudicated in her favor. As already
adverted to above, these contentions would be correct if applied to the claim of the plaintiffs- (c) 53.5180 "
appellants that said properties were acquired with the first wife of Simeon Blas, Marta Cruz.
 46. Pinanganakan, Lubao, Pampanga 159.0078 " It is evident from a consideration of the above figures and facts that Maxima Santos did not
comply with her obligation to devise one-half of her conjugal properties to the heirs and
47. Emigdio Lingid, Lubao, Pampanga 34.5229 " legatees of her husband. She does not state that she had complied with such obligation in her
will. If she intended to comply therewith by giving some of the heirs of Simeon Blas the
48. Propios, Lubao, Pampanga 80.5382 " properties mentioned above, the most that can be considered in her favor is to deduct the
value of said properties from the total amount of properties which she had undertaken to
49. Batang Mabuanbuan, Sexmoan, Pampanga 43.3350 " convey upon her death.
50. Binatang Mabuanbuan, Sexmoan, Pampanga 3.5069 " All the issues in the pleadings of the parties and in their respective briefs, have now been fully
discussed and considered. Reiterating what we have stated above, we declare that by Exhibit
51. Sapang Magtua, Sexmoan, Pampanga 56,8242 " "A", a compromise to avoid litigation, Maxima Santos promised to devise to the heirs and
legatees of her husband Simeon Blas, one-half of the properties she received as her share in the
52. Kay Limpin, Sexmoan, Pampanga 5.0130 " conjugal partnership of herself and her husband, which share is specified in the project of
partition submitted by herself on March 14, 1939 in the settlement of the estate of her
53. Calise Mabalumbum, Sexmoan, Pampanga 23.8935 "
husband, and which is found on pages 195 to 240 of the record on appeal and on pages 27 to
54. Messapinit Kineke, Sexmoan, Pampanga (a) 5.2972 " 46 of the project of partition, submitted by Maxima Santos herself before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 6707, entitled "Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon Blas,
(b) 5.9230 " Maxima Santos Vda. de Bias, Administradora"; and that she failed to comply with her
aforementioned obligation. (Exhibit "A")
(c) 1.4638 "
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellee,
(d) 1.4638 " administratrix of the estate of Maxima Santos, is ordered to convey and deliver one-half of the
properties adjudicated o Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal properties in said Civil
(e) 2.8316 " Case No. 6707, entitled "Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon Blas, Maxima Santos Vda. de
Blas, Administradora", to the heirs and the legatees of her husband Simeon Blas. Considering
(f) 10.4412 " that all said heirs and legatees, designated in the will of Simeon Blas as the persons for whose
benefit Exhibit "A" had been executed, have not appeared in these proceedings, the record is
(g) 3.9033 " hereby remanded to the court below, with instructions that, after the conveyance of the
properties hereinabove ordered had been effected, the said heirs and legatees (of Simeon Blas)
(h) 11.9263 "
file adversary pleadings to determine the participation of each and every one of them in said
(i) 6.0574 " properties. Costs against the defendant- appellee Rosalina Santos.
G.R. No. 165300 April 23, 2010
55. Dalang, Banga, Sexmoan, Pampanga 23.3989 "
ATTY. PEDRO M. FERRER, vs.
62. Alaminos, Pangasinan 147.1242 " SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ and IMELDA DIAZ, REINA COMANDANTE and SPOUSES
BIENVENIDO PANGAN and ELIZABETH PANGAN
80. Mangasu Sexmoan, Pampanga 10.000 " The basic questions to be resolved in this case are: Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of
another executed by a future heir while the parents are still living valid? Is an adverse claim
81. Don Tomas, Sexmoan, Pampanga 21.6435 "
annotated on the title of a property on the basis of such waiver likewise valid and effective as
82. Matikling, Lubao, Pampanga 16.0000 " to bind the subsequent owners and hold them liable to the claimant?
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
Total area ............................... 1045.7863 " December 12, 2003 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70888.3 Said
Decision modified the June 14, 2001 Summary Judgment4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
(See Record on Record, pp. 195-241.)
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 by holding respondents Spouses Bienvenido and
In her will, Maxima Santos devised to Marta Gervacio Blas the 80-hectare fishpond situated in Elizabeth Pangan (the Pangans) not solidarily liable with the other respondents, Spouses
Lubao, Pampanga. The fishpond devised is evidently that designated as "Propios" in Lubao, Alfredo and Imelda Diaz (the Diazes) and Reina Comandante (Comandante), to petitioner Atty.
Pampanga, item No. 8 in the list of properties adjudicated to her in the project of partition. Pedro M. Ferrer (Atty. Ferrer). Likewise assailed is the CA Resolution 5 dated September 10,
(Record on Appeal, p. 215.) Considering that the total area of the fishponds amount to 2004 which denied petitioners as well as respondents Spouses Diaz and Comandantes
1045.7863 hectares, the 80 hectares devised to Marta Gervacio Blas is not even one-tenth of respective motions for reconsideration.
the total area of the fishponds. Add to this the fact that in the will she imposed upon Marta The parties respective versions of the factual antecedents are as follows:
Gervacio Blas de Chivi an existing obligation on said fishponds, namely, its lease in 1957 and
the duty to pay out of the rentals thereof an obligation to the Rehabilitation Finance Version of the Petitioner
Corporation RFC (Ibid., pp. 262-263.) Angelina Blas was given only a lot of 150 square meters Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint6 that on May 7, 1999, the Diazes, as
in Hulong Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, and Leony Blas, the sum of P300.00 (Ibid., p. 264.) represented by their daughter Comandante, through a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA),7 obtained from him a loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage Contract8 by way of second mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-
66049 and a Promissory Note10 payable within six months or up to November 7, 1999.
Comandante also issued to petitioner postdated checks to secure payment of said loan.
Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a valuable
consideration ofP600,000.00, which amount formed part of the abovementioned secured loan,
executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a
Real Property (Still Undivided),11 the pertinent portions of which read:
I, REINA D. COMANDANTE, of legal age, Filipino, married, with residence and postal address at
No. 6, Road 20, Project 8, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, for a valuable consideration
of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P600,000.00) which constitutes my legal obligation/loan
to Pedro M. Ferrer, likewise of legal age, Filipino, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, with residence
and postal address at No. 9, Lot 4, Puerto Rico Street, Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, by virtue of these presents, do hereby WAIVE, and/or REPUDIATE all my
hereditary rights and interests as a legitimate heir/daughter of Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda
G. Diaz in favor of said Pedro M. Ferrer, his heirs and assigns over a certain parcel of land
together with all the improvements found thereon and which property is more particularly
described as follows:
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887
xxxx
and which property is titled and registered in the name of my parents Alfredo T. Diaz and
Imelda G. Diaz, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT 6604 (82020) PR-18887.
(sgd.)
REINA D. COMANDANTE
Affiant
On the basis of said waiver, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim12 which he
caused to be annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 on May 26, 1999.
The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were
dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said respondents still failed and
refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on September 29, 1999 a Complaint 13 for
Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and
Comandante docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 and raffled to Branch 224 of RTC, Quezon
City.
Petitioner twice amended his complaint. First, by including as an alternative relief the Judicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage14 and, second, by impleading as additional defendants the Pangans as
the mortgaged property covered by TCT No. RT-6604 was already transferred under their
names in TCT No. N-209049. Petitioner prayed in his second amended complaint that all the
respondents be ordered to jointly and solidarily pay him the sum ofP1,118,228.00, exclusive of
interests, and/or for the judicial foreclosure of the property pursuant to the Real Estate
Mortgage Contract.
Version of the Respondents
In her Answer15 to petitioners original complaint, Comandante alleged that petitioner and his
wife were her fellow members in the Couples for Christ Movement. Sometime in 1998, she
sought the help of petitioner with regard to the mortgage with a bank of her parents lot
located at No. 6, Rd. 20, Project 8, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. RT-6604. She also
sought financial accommodations from the couple on several occasions which
totaledP500,000.00. Comandante, however, claimed that these loans were secured by chattel
mortgages over her taxi units in addition to several postdated checks she issued in favor of
petitioner.
As she could not practically comply with her obligation, petitioner and his wife, presented to
Comandante sometime in May 1998 a document denominated as Waiver of Hereditary Rights
and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) pertaining to a waiver of her hereditary
share over her parents abovementioned property. Purportedly, the execution of said waiver
was to secure Comandantes loan with the couple which at that time had already ballooned
to P600,000.00 due to interests.
A year later, the couple again required Comandante to sign the following documents: (1) a Real
Estate Mortgage Contract over her parents property; and, (2) an undated Promissory Note,
both corresponding to the amount ofP1,118,228.00, which petitioner claimed to be the total
amount of Comandantes monetary obligation to him exclusive of charges and interests.
Comandante alleged that she reminded petitioner that she was not the registered owner of the
subject property and that although her parents granted her SPA, same only pertains to her
authority to mortgage the property to banks and other financial institutions and not to
individuals. Petitioner nonetheless assured Comandante that the SPA was also applicable to
their transaction. As Comandante was still hesitant, petitioner and his wife threatened to
foreclose the formers taxi units and present the postdated checks she issued to the bank for
payment. For fear of losing her taxi units which were the only source of her livelihood,
Comandante was thus constrained to sign the mortgage agreement as well as the promissory
note. Petitioner, however, did not furnish her with copies of said documents on the pretext that
they still have to be notarized, but, as can be gleaned from the records, the documents were
never notarized. Moreover, Comandante claimed that the SPA alluded to by petitioner in his
complaint was not the same SPA under which she thought she derived the authority to execute
the mortgage contract.
Comandante likewise alleged that on September 29, 1999 at 10:00 o clock in the morning, she
executed an Affidavit of Repudiation/Revocation of Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests
Over A (Still Undivided) Real Property,16 which she caused to be annotated on the title of the
subject property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on the same day. Interestingly,
petitioner filed his complaint later that day too.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, Comandante asserted in her Answer to the
amended complaint17 that said complaint states no cause of action against her because the Real
Estate Mortgage Contract and the waiver referred to by petitioner in his complaint were not
duly, knowingly and validly executed by her; that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) is a useless document as its execution is prohibited by
Article 1347 of the Civil Code,18 hence, it cannot be the source of any right or obligation in
petitioners favor; that the Real Estate Mortgage was of doubtful validity as she executed the
same without valid authority from her parents; and, that the prayer for collection and/or
judicial foreclosure was irregular as petitioner cannot seek said remedies at the same time.
Apart from executing the affidavit of repudiation, Comandante also filed on October 4, 1999 a
Petition for Cancellation of Adverse Claim (P.E. 2468) Under The Memorandum of
Encumbrances of TCT No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-1888719 docketed as LRC Case No. Q-12009
(99) and raffled to Branch 220 of RTC, Quezon City. Petitioner who was impleaded as
respondent therein moved for the consolidation of said case 20 with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876.
On June 24, 2000, Branch 220 of RTC, Quezon City ordered the consolidation of LRC Case No. Q-
12009 (99) with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876. Accordingly, the records of the former case was
forwarded to Branch 224.
For their part, the Diazes asserted that petitioner has no cause of action against them. They
claimed that they do not even know petitioner and that they did not execute any SPA in favor of
Comandante authorizing her to mortgage for the second time the subject property. They also
contested the due execution of the SPA as it was neither authenticated before the Philippine
Consulate in the United States nor notarized before a notary public in the State of New York
where the Diazes have been residing for 16 years. They claimed that they do not owe petitioner
anything. The Diazes also pointed out that the complaint merely refers to Comandantes
personal obligation to petitioner with which they had nothing to do. They thus prayed that the
complaint against them be dismissed.21
At the Pangans end, they alleged that they acquired the subject property by purchase in good
faith and for a consideration of P3,000,000.00 on November 11, 1999 from the Diazes through
the latters daughter Comandante who was clothed with SPA acknowledged before the Consul
of New York. The Pangans immediately took actual possession of the property without anyone
complaining or protesting. Soon thereafter, they were issued TCT No. N-209049 in lieu of TCT
No. RT-6604 which was cancelled. 22
However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being informed by petitioner that
the subject land had been mortgaged to him by the Diazes. Upon inquiry from Comandante, the
latter readily admitted that she has a personal loan with petitioner for which the mortgage of
the property in petitioners favor was executed. She admitted, though, that her parents were
not aware of such mortgage and that they did not authorize her to enter into such contract.
Comandante also informed the Pangans that the signatures of her parents appearing on the
SPA are fictitious and that it was petitioner who prepared such document.
As affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted that the annotation of petitioners adverse claim
on TCT No. RT-6604 cannot impair their rights as new owners of the subject property. They
claimed that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still
Undivided) upon which petitioners adverse claim is anchored cannot be the source of any
right or interest over the property considering that it is null and void under paragraph 2 of
Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the Pangans asserted that the Real Estate Mortgage Contract cannot bind them nor
in any way impair their ownership of subject property because it was not registered before the
Register of Deeds.23
All the respondents interposed their respective counterclaims and prayed for moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees in varying amounts.
After the parties have submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the Diazes filed on March 29,
2001 a Motion for Summary Judgment24 alleging that: first, since the documents alluded to by
petitioner in his complaint were defective, he was not entitled to any legal right or relief;
and, second, it was clear from the pleadings that it is Comandante who has an outstanding
obligation with petitioner which the latter never denied. With these, the Diazes believed that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact against them and, hence, they were entitled to
summary judgment.
On May 7, 2001, petitioner also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,25 claiming that his suit
against the respondents is meritorious and well-founded and that same is documented and
supported by law and jurisprudence. He averred that his adverse claim annotated at the back
of TCT No. RT-6604, which was carried over in TCT No. 209049 under the names of the
Pangans, is not merely anchored on the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante, but also on the Real Estate Mortgage
likewise executed by her in representation of her parents and in favor of petitioner. Petitioner
insisted that said adverse claim is not frivolous and invalid and is registrable under Section 70
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. In fact, the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City had already
determined the sufficiency and/or validity of such registration by annotating said claim, and
this, respondents failed to question. Petitioner further averred that even before the sale and
transfer to the Pangans of the subject property, the latter were already aware of the existence
of his adverse claim. In view of these, petitioner prayed that his Motion for Summary Judgment
be granted.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After the filing of the parties respective Oppositions to the said motions for summary
judgment, the trial court, in an Order dated May 31, 2001,26 deemed both motions for summary
judgment submitted for resolution. Quoting substantially petitioners allegations in his Motion
for Summary Judgment, it thereafter rendered on June 14, 2001 a Summary Judgment27 in
favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
and against defendants by:
a) ORDERING all defendants jointly and solidarily to pay plaintiff the sum of ONE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT
PESOS (P1,118,228.00) which is blood money of plaintiff;
b) ORDERING the Honorable Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City that the rights and
interest of the plaintiff over subject property be annotated at the back of T.C.T. No. N-
209049;
c) SENTENCING all defendants to pay plaintiffs expenses of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) and to pay the costs of suit.IT IS SO ORDERED.28
The Pangans, the Diazes, and Comandante appealed to the CA.29 The Pangans faulted the trial
court in holding them jointly and severally liable with the Diazes and Comandante for the
satisfaction of the latters personal obligation to petitioner in the total amount
of P1,118,228.00. The Diazes and Comandante, on the other hand, imputed error upon the trial
court in rendering summary judgment in favor of petitioner. They averred that assuming the
summary judgment was proper, the trial court should not have considered the Real Estate
Mortgage Contract and the Promissory Note as they were defective, as well as petitioners
frivolous and non-registrable adverse claim.
In its Decision30 dated December 12, 2003, the CA declared Comandantes waiver of hereditary
rights null and void. However, it found the Real Estate Mortgage executed by Comandante on
behalf of her parents as binding between the parties thereto.
As regards the Pangans, the CA ruled that the mortgage contract was not binding upon them as
they were purchasers in good faith and for value. The property was free from the mortgage
encumbrance of petitioner when they acquired it as they only came to know of the adverse
claim through petitioners phone call which came right after the formers acquisition of the
property. The CA further ruled that as Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights and interests
upon which petitioners adverse claim was based is a nullity, it could not be a source of any
right in his favor. Hence, the Pangans were not bound to take notice of such claim and are thus
not liable to petitioner.
Noticeably, the appellate court did not rule on the propriety of the issuance of the Summary
Judgment as raised by the Diazes and Comandante. In the ultimate, the CA merely modified the
assailed Summary Judgment of the trial court by excluding the Pangans among those solidarily
liable to petitioner, in effect affirming in all other respects the assailed summary judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 224 in Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
1. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses Diaz to jointly and
severally pay plaintiff the sum of Php 1,118, 228.00; and
2. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses Diaz to jointly and
severally pay plaintiff the amount of Php10,000.00 plus cost of suit.SO ORDERED. 31
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration32 having been denied by the CA in its
Resolution33 dated September 10, 2004, he now comes to us through this petition for review
on certiorari insisting that the Pangans should, together with the other respondents, be held
solidarily liable to him for the amount of P1,118,228.00.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner merely reiterates his contentions in the Motion for Summary Judgment he filed
before the trial court. He insists that his Adverse Claim annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-
6604 is not merely anchored on Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over
A Real Property (Still Undivided) but also on her being the attorney-in-fact of the Diazes when
she executed the mortgage contract in favor of petitioner. He avers that his adverse claim is not
frivolous or invalid and is registrable as the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City even allowed its
annotation. He also claims that even prior to the sale of subject property to the Pangans, the
latter already knew of his valid and existing adverse claim thereon and are, therefore, not
purchasers in good faith. Thus, petitioner maintains that the Pangans should be held, together
with the Diazes and Comandante, jointly and severally liable to him in the total amount
of P1,118,228.00.
Petitioners contentions are untenable.
The Affidavit of Adverse Claim executed by petitioner reads in part:
xxxx
1. That I am the Recipient/Benefactor of compulsory heirs share over an undivided
certain parcel of land together with all the improvements found therein x x x as
evidenced by Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A Real Property,
executed by REINA D. COMANDANTE (a compulsory/legitimate heir of Sps. Alfredo T.
Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz), x x x.
2. That in order to protect my interest over said property as a Recipient/Benefactor,
for the registered owners/parents might dispose (of) and/or encumber the same in a
fraudulent manner without my knowledge and consent, for the owners duplicate title
was not surrendered to me, it is petitioned that this Affidavit of Adverse Claim be
ANNOTATED at the back of the said title particularly on the original copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is on file with the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City.
3. That I am executing this Affidavit in order to attest (to) the truth of the foregoing
facts and to petition the Honorable Registrar of Deeds, Quezon City, to annotate this
Affidavit of Adverse Claim at the back of the said title particularly the original copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is on file with the
said office, so that my interest as Recipient/Benefactor of the said property will be
protected especially the registered owner/parents, in a fraudulent manner might
dispose (of) and/or encumber the same without my knowledge and consent.
(Emphasis ours)
Clearly, petitioners Affidavit of Adverse Claim was based solely on the waiver of hereditary
interest executed by Comandante. This fact cannot be any clearer especially so when the
inscription of his adverse claim at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 reads as follows:
P.E. 2468/T-(82020)RT-6604 - - AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM - - Executed under oath by
PEDRO M. FERRER, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, claiming among others that they have a
claim, the interest over said property as Recipient/Benefactor, by virtue of a waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest over a real property x x x34 (Emphasis ours)
Therefore, there is no basis for petitioners assertion that the adverse claim was also anchored
on the mortgage contract allegedly executed by Comandante on behalf of her parents.
The questions next to be resolved are: Is Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights valid? Is
petitioners adverse claim based on such waiver likewise valid and effective?
We note at the outset that the validity of petitioners adverse claim should have been
determined by the trial court after the petition for cancellation of petitioners adverse claim
filed by Comandante was consolidated with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876.35 This is in consonance
with Section 70 of PD 1529 which provides:
Section 70. Adverse Claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to
the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no
other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing
setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to
the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner,
and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants residence,
and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to
registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective
for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the
party in interest: Provided, however, That after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on
the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of
First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court
shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of validity of such adverse claim, and shall render
judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the
registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing,
shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an
amount not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion.
Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the
Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect. (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to the third paragraph of the afore-quoted provision, it has been held that the validity
or efficaciousness of an adverse claim may only be determined by the Court upon petition by
an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and
make the proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And, it is only when such
claim is found unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled.36
As correctly pointed out by respondents, the records is bereft of any showing that the trial
court conducted any hearing on the matter. Instead, what the trial court did was to include this
material issue among those for which it has rendered its summary judgment as shown by the
following portion of the judgment:
x x x it will be NOTED that subject Adverse Claim annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887, and carried over to defendants-Sps. Pangans Title No.
N-20909, is not merely anchored on defendant Reina Comandantes "Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interest Over a Real Property" but also on her being the Attorney-In-Fact of the
previous registered owners/parents/defendants Sps. Alfredo and Imelda Diaz about the Real
Estate Mortgage Contract for a loan of P1,118,228.00 which is a blood money of the
plaintiff.Moreover, subject Adverse Claim in LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is NOT frivolous and
invalid and consequently, REGISTRABLE by virtue of Section 110 of the Land Registration Act
(now Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529). 37 (Emphasis ours)
It does not escape our attention that the trial court merely echoed the claim of petitioner that
his adverse claim subject of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is not frivolous, invalid and is
consequently registrable. We likewise lament the apparent lack of effort on the part of said
court to make even a short ratiocination as to how it came up with said conclusion. In fact,
what followed the above-quoted portion of the summary judgment are mere recitals of the
arguments raised by petitioner in his motion for summary judgment. And in the dispositive
portion, the trial court merely casually ordered that petitioners adverse claim be inscribed at
the back of the title of the Pangans. What is worse is that despite this glaring defect, the CA
manifestly overlooked the matter even if respondents vigorously raised the same before it.
Be that as it may, respondents efforts of pointing out this flaw, which we find significant, have
not gone to naught as will be hereinafter discussed.
All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante is null and void for being violative of
Article 1347 of the Civil Code, hence, petitioners adverse claim which was based upon such
waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any right or interest over the
property.
We agree with the respondents.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered
into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance
to be considered "future", the succession must not have been opened at the time of the
contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under
the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened.
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which
is purely hereditary in nature.38
In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandantes Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of
her parents properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect
to the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject
matter of Comandantes waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to
inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the
facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving
the formers future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioners favor.
In Taedo v. Court of Appeals,39 we invalidated the contract of sale between Lazaro Taedo and
therein private respondents since the subject matter thereof was a "one hectare of whatever
share the former shall have over Lot 191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac and
covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac." It constitutes a part of Taedos
future inheritance from his parents, which cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of
any obligation between the parties.
Guided by the above discussions, we similarly declare in this case that the Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor of
petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation
between them for being violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
Anent the validity and effectivity of petitioners adverse claim, it is provided in Section 70 of PD
1529, that it is necessary that the claimant has a right or interest in the registered land adverse
to the registered owner and that it must arise subsequent to registration. Here, as no right or
interest on the subject property flows from Comandantes invalid waiver of hereditary rights
upon petitioner, the latter is thus not entitled to the registration of his adverse claim.
Therefore, petitioners adverse claim is without any basis and must consequently be adjudged
invalid and ineffective and perforce be cancelled.
Albeit we have already resolved the issues raised by petitioner, we shall not stop here as the
Diazes and Comandante in their Comment40 call our attention to the failure of the CA to pass
upon the issue of the propriety of the issuance by the trial court of the Summary Judgment in
favor of petitioner despite the fact that they have raised this issue before the appellate court.
They argue that summary judgment is proper only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to
any material fact in the action. Thus, where the defendant presented defenses tendering factual
issue which call for presentation of evidence, as when he specifically denies the material
allegations in the complaint, summary judgment cannot be rendered.
The Diazes and Comandante then enumerate the genuine issues in the case which they claim
should have precluded the trial court from issuing a summary judgment in petitioners
favor. First, the execution of the SPA in favor of Comandante referred to by petitioner in his
complaint was never admitted by the Diazes. They assert that as such fact is disputed, trial
should have been conducted to determine the truth of the matter, same being a genuine issue.
Despite this, the trial court merely took the word of the plaintiff and assumed that said
document was indeed executed by them. Second, although Comandante acknowledges that she
has a personal obligation with petitioner, she nevertheless, did not admit that it was in the
amount of P1,118,228.00. Instead, she claims only the amount of P500,000.00 or P600,000.00
(if inclusive of interest) as her obligation. Moreover, the Diazes deny borrowing any money
from petitioner and neither did the Pangans owe him a single centavo. Thus, the true amount of
the obligation due the petitioner and how each of the respondents are responsible for such
amount are genuine issues which need formal presentation of evidence. Lastly, they aver that
the trial court ignored factual and material issues such as the lack of probative value of
Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights as well as of the SPA; the fact that Comandante
signed the mortgage contract and promissory note in her personal capacity; and, that all such
documents were prepared by petitioner who acted as a lawyer and the creditor of Comandante
at the same time.
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides for summary judgment, the pertinent provisions of
which are the following:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Section 2. Summary Judgment for the defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move
with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as
to all or any part thereof.
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days
before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits,
depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits,
depositions and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
As can be deduced from the above provisions, summary judgment is a procedural devise
resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings
on file show that there are no genuine issues of facts to be tried, the Rules of Court allows a
party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. That is, when the facts are not
in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the
material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is
not proper. A genuine issue is such fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.41
Here, we find the existence of genuine issues which removes the case from the coverage of
summary judgment. The variance in the allegations of the parties in their pleadings is evident.
Petitioner anchors his complaint for sum of money and/or judicial foreclosure on the alleged
real estate mortgage over the subject property allegedly entered into by Comandante in behalf
of her parents to secure payment of a loan amounting to P1,118,228.00. To support this claim,
petitioner attached to his complaint (1) the SPA alleged to have been executed by the Diazes;
(2) the Real Estate Mortgage Contract pertaining to the amount ofP1,118,228.00; and, (3) a
Promissory Note.
Comandante, in her Answer to petitioners Amended Complaint, assailed the validity and due
execution of the abovementioned documents. She asserted that the same were not duly,
knowingly and validly executed by her and that it was petitioner who prepared all of them.
Also, although she admitted owing petitioner, same was not an absolute admission as she
limited herself to an obligation amounting only to P600,000.00 inclusive of charges and
interests. She likewise claimed that such obligation is her personal obligation and not of her
parents.
The Diazes, for their part, also denied that they executed the SPA authorizing their daughter to
mortgage their property to petitioner as well as having any obligation to the latter.
Clearly, there are genuine issues in this case which require the presentation of evidence. For
one, it is necessary to ascertain in a full blown trial the validity and due execution of the SPA,
the Real Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Notes because the determination of the following
equally significant questions depends on them, to wit: (1) Are the Diazes obligated to
petitioner or is the obligation a purely personal obligation of Comandante? and, (2) Is the sum
of P1,118,228.00 as shown in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Note, the amount
which is really due the petitioner?
To stress, trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only
when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of
trial.42 From the foregoing, it is apparent that the trial court should have refrained from issuing
the summary judgment but instead proceeded to conduct a full blown trial of the case. In view
of this, the present case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and
proper disposition according to the rudiments of a regular trial on the merits and not through
an abbreviated termination of the case by summary judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 12, 2003 insofar as it excluded the respondents Spouses Bienvenido Pangan and
Elizabeth Pangan from among those solidarily liable to petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer,
is AFFIRMED. The inscription of the adverse claim of petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer on T.C.T.
No. N-209049 is hereby ordered CANCELLED. Insofar as its other aspects are concerned, the
assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.SO
ORDERED
G.R. No. 112483 October 8, 1999
ELOY IMPERIAL, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY,
CESAR VILLALON, JR., TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON, AUGUSTO VILLALON,
ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO VILLALON and ESTHER VILLALON,
Petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 31976 1, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City 2,
which rendered inofficious the donation made by Leoncio Imperial in favor of herein
petitioner, to the extent that it impairs the legitime of Victor Imperial, and ordering petitioner
to convey to herein private respondents, heirs of said Victor Imperial, that portion of the
donated land proportionate to Victor Imperial's legitime.
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 200, also known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of Albay. On
July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner
herein, who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots.
Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the contract's designation as one of
"Absolute Sale", the transaction was in fact a donation.1wphi1.nt
On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for
annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 1177, in the then Court
of First Instance of Albay, on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein into signing
the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement,
approved by the Court of First Instance of Albay on November 3, 1961 3, under which terms:
(1) Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated;
and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter portion of the donated land,
and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of
Leoncio's death, it was agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner
to defray burial costs.
On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died, leaving only
two heirs the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and an adopted son,
Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-
mentioned case, and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. On March 15, 1962, the
motion for execution was duly granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and without issue, survived only
by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four
years hence, or on September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children,
Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment
of the donation with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No. 7646.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the motion
to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for
further proceedings.
On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same case, Civil Case
No. 7646, for "Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession" with the
Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, seeking the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
affecting the above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the amended
complaint, it was alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking
undue advantage of the latter's physical weakness and mental unfitness, and that the
conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired the legitime of Victor Imperial,
their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest. 4
In his Answer, petitioner: (1) alleged that Leoncio had conveyed sufficient property to Victor to
cover his legitime, consisting of 563 hectares of agricultural land in Manito, Albay; (2)
reiterated the defense of res judicata, and (3) raised the additional defenses of prescription and
laches.
Plaintiff Cesar Villalon died on December 26, 1989, while the case was pending in the Regional
Trial Court, and was substituted in this action by his sons, namely, Antonio, Roberto, Augusto,
Ricardo and Cesar, Jr., all surnamed Villalon, and his widow, Esther H. Villalon.
The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime of Victor, on the basis of
its finding that at the time of Leoncio's death, he left no property other than the 32,837-square
meter parcel of land which he had donated to petitioner. The RTC went on further to state that
petitioner's allegation that other properties existed and were inherited by Victor was not
substantiated by the evidence. 5
The legitime of Victor was determined by the trial court in this manner:
Considering that the property donated is 32,837 square meters, one half of that or
16,418 square meters becomes the free portion of Leoncio which could be absorbed
in the donation to defendant. The other half, which is also 16,418 square meters is
where the legitime of the adopted son Victor Imperial has to be taken.
The proportion of the legitime of the legitimate child (including the adopted child) in
relation to the acknowledged natural child (defendant) is 10 is to 5[,] with the
acknowledged natural child getting 1/2 of the legitime of the legitimate (adopted)
child, in accordance with Art. 895 of the New Civil Code which provides:
The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of the
natural children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime of
each of the legitimate children or descendants.
From the 16,418 square meters left (after the free portion has been taken) plaintiffs
are therefore entitled to 10,940 square meters while defendant gets 5,420 square
meters. 6
The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years under Article
1141 of the Civil Code7, reckoned from March 15, 1962, when the writ of execution of the
compromise judgment in Civil Case 1177 was issued, and that the original complaint having
been filed in 1986, the action has not yet prescribed. In addition, the trial court regarded the
defense of prescription as having been waived, this not being one of the issues agreed upon at
pre-trial.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision of December 13, 1990 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Deed of Absolute Sale otherwise known as
Doc. No. 8; Book No. 14; Page No. 1; Series of 1951 of the Notarial file of Pompeyo B.
Calleja which is considered a donation, is hereby reduced proportionately insofar as it
affected the legitime of the late Victor Imperial, which share is inherited by the
plaintiffs herein, to the extent that plaintiffs are ordered to be given by defendant a
portion of 10,940 square meters thereof.
In order to avoid further conflict, the 10,940 share to be given to plaintiffs should
include the portion which they are presently occupying, by virtue of the extended
lease to their father Ricardo Villalon, where the bungalow in question stands.
The remaining portion to be given to plaintiffs may come from any other portion that
may be agreed upon by the parties, otherwise, this court will appoint a commissioner
to undertake the partition.
The other 21,897 square meters should go to the defendant as part of his legitime and
by virtue of the reduced donation.
No pronouncement as to damages as they were not sufficiently proved.SO
ORDERED. 8
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
Before us, petitioner questions the following findings of respondent court: (1) that there was
no res judicata, there being no identity of parties and cause of action between the instant case
and Civil Case No. 1177; (2) that private respondents had a right to question the donation; (3)
that private respondents' action is barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; and (4) that the
donation was inofficious and should be reduced.
It is an indispensable requirement in res judicata that there be, between the first and second
action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. 9 A perusal of the records
leads us to conclude that there is no identity of parties and of cause of action as between Civil
Case No. 1177 and Civil Case No. 7646. Civil Case No. 1177 was instituted by Leoncio in his
capacity as donor of the questioned donation. While it is true that upon his death, Victor was
substituted as plaintiff of the action, such does not alter the fact that Victor's participation in
the case was in representation of the interests of the original plaintiff, Leoncio. The purpose
behind the rule on substitution of parties is to ensure that the deceased party would continue
to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of the
estate 10, or his heir, as in this case, for which no court appointment is required. 11 Petitioner's
argument, therefore, that there is substantial identity between Leoncio and private
respondents, being heirs and successors-in-interest of Victor, is unavailing.
Moreover, Leoncio's cause of action as donor of the property was fraud, purportedly employed
upon him by petitioner in the execution of the donation. While the same circumstances of fraud
and deceit are alleged in private respondents' complaint, it also raises the additional ground of
inofficiousness of donation.
Contrary to petitioner's contentions, inofficiousness of donation does not, and could not, form
part of Leoncio's cause of action in Civil Case No. 1177. Inofficiousness as a cause of action may
arise only upon the death of the donor, as the value of the donation will then be contrasted
with the net value of the estate of the donor-deceased.12
Consequently, while in Civil Case No. 1177, Leoncio sought the revocation in full of the
donation on ground of fraud, the instant case actually has two alternative causes of action.
First, for fraud and deceit, under the same circumstances as alleged in Leoncio's complaint,
which seeks the annulment in full of the donation, and which the trial court correctly dismissed
because the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 1177 served as a ratification and waiver
on the part of Leoncio of whatever defects in voluntariness and consent may have been
attendant in the making of the donation. The second cause of action is the alleged
inofficiousness of the donation, resulting in the impairment of Victor's legitime, which seeks
the annulment, not of the entire donation, but only of that portion diminishing the
legitime. 13 It is on the basis of this second cause of action that private respondents prevailed in
the lower courts.
Petitioner next questions the right of private respondents to contest the donation. Petitioner
sources his argument from Article 772 of the Civil Code, thus:
Only those who at the time of the donor's death have a right to the legitime and their
heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of inofficious donations . . . .
As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it was only Victor who was
entitled to question the donation. However, instead of filing an action to contest the donation,
Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177 and even moved for execution
of the compromise judgment therein.
No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. It must be remembered
that at the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the compromise agreement has
already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the compromise
judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement.
More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of
inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051
of Civil Code:
The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument,
or by petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or
intestate proceedings.
Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the latter's death, his act of
moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation
of his legitime. He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the
reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor's heirs, upon his death, precluded
from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized under Article 772, and also in
Article 1053:
If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his right
shall be transmitted to his heirs.
Be that as it may, we find merit in petitioner's other assignment of errors. Having ascertained
this action as one for reduction of an inofficious donation, we cannot sustain the holding of
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the applicable prescriptive period is thirty
years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code. The sense of both courts that this case is a "real
action over an immovable" allots undue credence to private respondents' description of their
complaint, as one for "Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of
Property", which suggests the action to be, in part, a real action enforced by those with claim of
title over the disputed land.1wphi1.nt
Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of title.
In the recent case ofVizconde vs. Court of
Appeals 14, we declared that what is brought to collation is not the donated property itself, but
the value of the property at the time it was donated. The rationale for this is that the donation
is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value
or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.15
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an inofficious donation?
The Civil Code specifies the following instances of reduction or revocation of donations: (1)
four years, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; 16 (2)
four years, for non-compliance with conditions of the donation; 17 and (3) at any time during
the lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reserve
property for his or their support. 18 Interestingly, donations as in the instant case, 19 the
reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by
a particular prescriptive period, for which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of
prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be
brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year
prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under
Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864,
which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized that
the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly
so, since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes
may be determined.
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The action,
therefore, has long prescribed.
As for the trial court's holding that the defense of prescription had been waived, it not being
one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial, suffice it to say that while the terms of the pre-trial
order bind the parties as to the matters to be taken up in trial, it would be the height of
injustice for us to adhere to this technicality when the fact of prescription is manifest in the
pleadings of the parties, as well as the findings of fact of the lower courts. 20
A perusal of the factual antecedents reveals that not only has prescription set in, private
respondents are also guilty of estoppel by laches. It may be recalled that Leoncio died on
January 8, 1962. Fifteen years later, Victor died, leaving as his sole heir Ricardo Villalon, who
also died four years later. While Victor was alive, he gave no indication of any interest to
contest the donation of his deceased father. As we have discussed earlier, the fact that he
actively participated in Civil Case No. 1177 did not amount to a renunciation of his inheritance
and does not preclude him from bringing an action to claim his legitime. These are matters that
Victor could not possibly be unaware of, considering that he is a lawyer 21. Ricardo Villalon was
even a lessee of a portion of the donated property, and could have instituted the action as sole
heir of his natural son, or at the very least, raised the matter of legitime by way of counterclaim
in an ejectment case 22 filed against him by petitioner in 1979. Neither does it help private
respondents' cause that five years have elapsed since the death of Ricardo in 1981 before they
filed their complaint with the RTC.
Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting
a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined to assert it. 23 We find the
necessity for the application of the principle of estoppel by laches in this case, in order to avoid
an injustice.
A final word on collation of donations. We observe that after finding the donation to be
inofficious because Leoncio had no other property at the time of his death, the RTC computed
the legitime of Victor based on the area of the donated property. Hence, in its dispositive
portion, it awarded a portion of the property to private respondents as Victor's legitime. This
was upheld by the Court of Appeals.
Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1) the net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value of all
donations subject to collation would be added to it. 24
Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the property itself, which
is brought to collation. Consequently, even when the donation is found inofficious and reduced
to the extent that it impaired Victor's legitime, private respondents will not receive a
corresponding share in the property donated. Thus, in this case where the collatable property
is an immovable, what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as possible, in property
of the same nature, class and quality; 25 (2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value of the
impaired legitime in cash or marketable securities; 26 or (3) in the absence of cash or securities
in the estate, so much of such other property as may be necessary, to be sold in public
auction. 27
We believe this worth mentioning, even as we grant the petition on grounds of prescription
and laches.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 31976, affirming in
toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 7646, is reversed and set aside. No
costs.1wphi1.ntSO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as
Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO,
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order
that has become final and executory still be given effect? This is the issue that arose from the
following antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes.
The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in
1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he
died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and testament. In 1981,
the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents did not
appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void."
The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes
Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and
testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors
Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the
late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be
liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate
and other taxes due to the government. 1
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since
she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married
to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court
of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within the extended
period
granted. 2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding
entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of
execution was issued by the lower court to implement the final and executory Order.
Consequently, private respondents filed several motions including a motion to compel
petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the
properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the TCT's, private
respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their
names. Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and
executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ
of execution, on the ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in
character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the
distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private
respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed
Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private
respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the two assailed
orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly
designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court of Appeals
upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of
Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late Alejandro and
to maintain thestatus quo or lease of the premises thereon to third parties. 3 Private
respondents opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate
since she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be
disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30,
1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment
made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside
decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts
and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will,
albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. 4
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of
the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will
became final and the question determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised
anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due execution of
the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character ofres judicata and cannot again
be brought into question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being for once and
forever closed. 5 Such final order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its
extrinsic validity and due execution. 6
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the
will sought to be probated, 7 particularly on three aspects:
n whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
n compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
n the testamentary capacity of the testator; 8
n and the due execution of the last will and testament. 9
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of
sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and
was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and
not a forgery, 10 that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not
expressly prohibited by law from making a will. 11
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised
even after the will has been authenticated. 12 Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an
extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was
validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful
heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, 13 the
unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the
courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically
void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court
which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but
that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before
the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the
remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies
despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have
fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been declared
that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments
of courts must at some point of time fixed by law 14 become final otherwise there will be no
end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium the very object of which the courts
were constituted was to put an end to controversies. 15 To fulfill this purpose and to do so
speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the
slothful. 16 The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence, 17 which circumstances do not
concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will,
as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and
executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only
heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the
testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the
probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation
otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered that forum
shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved adversely by some other
court. 18 It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should
be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still be
set aside by the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues that "an order merely
declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the basis of
execution to require delivery of shares from one person to another particularly when no
project of partition has been filed." 19 The trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order
that petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate
children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the will. But it should be noted
that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses be distributed
according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order of
intestate distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the
same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights
that testacy is preferred to intestacy. 20 But before there could be testate distribution, the will
must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased
testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that
the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give
Nemo praesumitur donare. 21 No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and
unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is
extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is
extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the
provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had
ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were
void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties
of his late spouse, whom he described as his "only beloved wife", is not a valid reason to
reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging
exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given
effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in
the void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in the intestate proceedings for
the settlement of his and that of his late spouse's estate.
Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she
was not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138774 March 8, 2001
REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL, vs. AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO,
May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a
simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children?
The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals1 declaring void the deed of sale of two parcels of land conveyed to petitioners who are
illegitimate children of the deceased to the exclusion of respondent, his sole legitimate
daughter.
The facts2 are:
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio
Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common
law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children.
Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land, situated in
Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When
Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the
certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida
Pascual.
After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990,3 Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half
sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983. After
verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina
Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a "Kasulatan sa
Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco
and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-
59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.4
On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against
petitioners for annulment of sale with damages.5 She alleged that the signature of her late
father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a
forgery.
In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of
the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint. The dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the law applicable thereon,
the Court hereby renders judgment:
"a) sustaining the validity of the "Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan" (Exh."G") executed
on 15 August 1993 by the late Gregorio Francisco in favor of the defendants;
"b) affirming the validity of the Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-59.585 (Exh. "I")
issued to defendant Regina Francisco and No. T-59.386 (Exh. "H") issued to defendant
Zenaida Pascual; and
"c) dismissing the complaint as well as the defendants' counterclaim for damages and
attorney's fees for lack of merit." 6
In time7, respondent Alfonso appealed to the Court of Appeals.8
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
reversing that of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 21, 1994 of the court a quo is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and another rendered as follows:
"1. The Kasulatan Sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983 (Exhibit "G") is declared
null and void from the beginning and TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T-59-586 (M), both
of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) in the names of Regina
Francisco and Zenaida Pascual, respectively, are annulled and cancelled;
"2. The Register of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) is ordered to cancel the
aforementioned TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T-59.586 (M) and to reinstate Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-132740 and T-117160 both in the name of Gregorio
Francisco.
"3. Defendants-appellees Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual jointly and solidarily
are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Alfonso the amount of P5,000.00 as moral
damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
"4. The counterclaim of defendants-appellees is dismissed for lack of merit.
"Costs of suit against said defendants-appellees." 9
Hence, this petition.10
The main issue raised is whether the Supreme Court may review the factual findings of the
appellate court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of
Appeals under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to review of pure errors of law.
It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a
showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly
erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.11
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial evidence are conclusive
and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court,12 unless the case falls under
any of the recognized exceptions to the rule.13
Petitioner has failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions.14
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals because:
First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale.
Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and Regina
Francisco did not have any source of income in 1983, when they bought the property, until the
time when Felicitas testified in 1991.15
As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in operating a
canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to
Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto.
Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not withdraw
money from her bank account at the Rural Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the
property. She had personal savings other than those deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings
from the RTW for three years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club. 16
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net
income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from the deceased for
P15,000.00.17 She had no other source of income.
We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or that
earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash for the land.
The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to
whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property was bought
below or above its supposed market value. They could not even present a single witness to
the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price.
Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence,
null and void.18
Second: Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code19 provisions
insofar as the transaction affected respondent's legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when
the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code.
Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his illegitimate
daughters20 at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent
respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his
death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the
property.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
"The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were
the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in
her father's estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate
child.21
The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or intestate
proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share
in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R.
CV No. 48545 is AFFIRMED, in toto.No costs.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix,
vs. MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ,
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio
Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez;
his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while
the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for
substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his
widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the
estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:
INVENTARIO
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te
rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen
la Escolta, Manila............................................................. P500,000.00
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos
parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones
de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00
por accion ................................................................................8,347.00
Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones
de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en
liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90
Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust
Co.............................................................................................. 2,350.73
TOTAL.............................................................. P512,976.97
MENOS:
Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-
tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00
VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
A.En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menores de edad,
residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos de su sobrino D. Jose
 Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su
defecto, con sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la finca Santa
Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios nombrados, en atencion a
que dicha propiedad fue creacion del querido padre del otorgante y por ser aquellos
continuadores del apellido Ramirez,
B.Y en usufructo a saber:
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da. Marcelle
Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General Gallieni No. 33, Seine Francia, con
sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski, de Palma de
Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,
b.Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombrada Da. Wanda
de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan Pablo Jankowski,
de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la mitad restante, a favor de su
sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida St. Ermita, Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas, las
usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios, podran en
cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes objeto delegado, sin intervencion
alguna de los titulares fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of
the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio"
in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto
Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged
with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of
Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for
vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in
favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are
invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the
provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not
related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of
the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of
Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution;
and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta)
Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to
give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its
order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full
ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed,
under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall
be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the
deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no burden,
encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably
so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the
testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred
for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and
which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share
in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's
intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor
Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so that he
may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code.
And that there are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or
compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino,
"Although the Code enumerates four classes, there are really only two principal classes of
substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The others are merely variations of these
two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or
heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish,
or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall
comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has
otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir
instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second
heir the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided
such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted,
and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at
time of the death of the testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the legacies of
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus
respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The appellants
question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in
connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow Marcelle However,
this question has become moot because as We have ruled above, the widow is not entitled to
any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with
Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v.
Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the
testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the testator. But dying before the
testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to
accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar
substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their
claim that it is void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda,
the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution
"provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
 Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or
transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction.
From this point of view, there can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the
substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman,
however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present Code has
obviously followed this interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go
beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly
indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first
heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of
the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the
fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as
required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator
contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the
properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and
the naked owners." (Brief, p. 26.)
3. The usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is
void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession.
We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private
lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying
money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct,
albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title
to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed
as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked
ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement
as to costs.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2277 December 29, 1950
MONICO CONCEPCION, vs. PACIENCIA STA. ANA,
An action was instituted by Monico Concepcion vs. Paciencia Sta. Ana to annul the sale made by
the late Perpetua Concepcion, sister of the plaintiff, of three parcels of land with the
improvements thereon to the defendant. The complaint alleges, among others, that the plaintiff
is the only surviving legitimate brother of Perpetua Concepcion, who died on or about January
28, 1948, without issue and without leaving any will; that in her life time or on about June 29,
1945, said Perpetua Concepcion, in connivance with the defendant and with intent to defraud
the plaintiff, sold and conveyed three parcels of land for a false and fictitious consideration to
the defendant, who secured transfer certificates of title of said lands issued under her name;
and that the defendant has been in possession of the properties sold since the death of
Perpetua Concepcion, thereby causing damages to the plaintiff in the amount of not less than
two hundred (P200) pesos.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause
of action, because the deceased being the owner of the properties sold had the right to enjoy
and dispose of them without further limitation than those established by law.
The Court of First Instance of Manila granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the
complaint on the ground that "the plaintiff is not a party to the deed of sale executed by
Perpetua Concepcion in favor of the defendant. Even in the assumption that the consideration
of the contract is fictitious, the plaintiff has no right of action against the defendant. Under
article 1302 of the Civil Code, "the action to annul a contract may be brought by any person
principally or subsidiarily bound thereby." The plaintiff is not bound by the deed of sale
executed by the deceased in favor of the defendant. He has no obligation under the deed."
Plaintiff appealed from the order of the court dismissing his complaint, and now assigns as
erroneous the order appealed from on the following grounds: (1) that a simulated or fictitious
sale for a fictitious or false consideration is null and void per se or non-existence, hence it
cannot transfer ownership; and (2) that according to article 1302 of the same code, "the action
to annul a contract may be brought by a person principally or subsidiarily bound thereby," and
as under article 1257 of the Civil Code "contracts shall be binding only upon the parties who
make them and their heirs," the plaintiff as heir of the deceased contracting party can bring
action to annul the contract of sale under consideration.
(1) The plaintiff's contention that a simulated or fictitious contract of sale with a false
consideration is null and voidper se, or is a contrato inexistente, not merely a contrato nulo, is
not correct. Article 1276 of the Civil Code 1expressly provides that "the statement of a false
consideration in contract shall be ground for annulment," and article 1301 of the same code
provided for the limitation of actions for annulment of a contract.
In support of his contention that the contract of sale under consideration being a fictitious
contract or contract with a false consideration is null per se or non-existent, plaintiff quotes
Manresa's comment on article 1274 to 1277, Vol. 8, p. 623, which says: "Recognizing this
analogy, it was held by the Supreme Court of Spain that a fictitious contract, or contract
entered into with false consideration does not confer any right or produce any legal effect,
citing the judgments of the Supreme Court of Spain of October 31, 1865, of March 21, 1884, and
of November 23, 1877." Appellant's conclusion is not correct. By stating that contracts with
false consideration confer no right and produce no legal effect, Manresa does not mean to say
that they are null and void per se or non-existent as contradistinguished from annullable, for
the effects of both non-existent and annullable contracts that have been annulled are the same:
they confer no right and produce no legal effect. What Manresa says on page 700 of the same
volume, commenting on article 1301, is the following: "The expression of a false cause or
consideration in the contract does not make it non-existent, and it shall only be a ground for an
action for nullity as provided by article 1276 and confirmed by article 1301 of the Civil Code.
There are some who consider this somewhat confused under the Code; for us it is very clear,
for the code repeatedly provides that the effect of a false consideration is limited to making the
contract voidable, and we have already pointed out that in this particular, our Civil Code has
deviated deliberately from the French Code, which includes indistinctly in one and the same
provision contracts without consideration and contracts in which the consideration is illicit or
false."
In the case of De Belen vs. Collector of Customs and Sheriff of Manila (46 Phil. 241), this court, the forced heir of his legitime. The judgment purported to hold that the proper action would
through Mr. Justice Street, said that "The distinction between entire absence of contract have been an action to rescind conformity with what we indicated in commenting on article
(inexistencia) and the situation requiring an action of rescission or nullity is fully expounded by 1291, and declared that 'even forced heirs who accept an inheritance under the benefit of
Manresa in his comment on article 1300 of the Civil Code (q.v.)." inventory are within the rule 2 of article 1806, that denies to the guilty party the right to
(2) As to the appellant's second and last contention, under the law action to annul a contract recover anything he may have given, or to enforce the performance of any undertaking in his
entered into with all the requisites mentioned in article 1261 whenever they are tainted with favor, when the other party has nothing to do with the illicit consideration; a doctrine laid
the vice which invalidate them in accordance with law, may be brought, not only by any person down in the judgment of July 4, 1896.'"
principally bound or who made them, but also by his heir to whom the right and obligation The reason why a forced heir has the right to institute an action of rescission is that the right to
arising from the contract are transmitted. Hence if no such rights, actions or obligations have the legitime is similar to a credit of a creditor. As the same Spanish author correctly states in
been transmitted to the heir, the latter can not bring an action to annul the contract in commenting on article 1291 of the Civil Code: "The rights of a forced heir to the legitime are
representation of the contracting party who made it. In Wolfson vs. Estate of Martinez, 20 Phil., undoubtedly similar to a credit of a creditor in so far as the rights to the legitime may be
340, this Supreme Court quoted with approval the judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain of defeated by fraudulent contracts, and are superior to the will of those bound to respect them.
April 18, 1901, in which it was held that "he who is not a party to a contract, or an assignee In its judgment of October 28, 1897, the Supreme Court of Spain held that the forced heirs
thereunder, or does not represent those who took part therein, has under articles 1257 and instituted as such by their father to the latter's testament have the undeniable right to institute
1302 of the Civil Code no legal capacity to challenge the validity of such contract." And an action to annul contracts entered into by the father to their prejudice. As it is seen the action
in Irlanda vs. Pitargue (22 Phil. 383) we held that "the testamentary or legal heir continues in is called action of nullity, but it is rather an action of rescission taking into account the purpose
law as the juridical personality of his predecessor in interest, who transmit to him from the for which it is instituted and the confusion of ideas that has prevailed in this matter. The
moment of his death such of his rights, actions and obligations as are not extinguished doctrine we shall expound in commenting on articles 1302 and 1306 will confirm what we
thereby."lawphil.net have just stated." (Manresa Codigo Civil, 4th edition, Vol. 8, pp. 667 and 668.)
The question to be resolved is, therefore, whether the deceased Perpetua Concepcion has Therefore, as the plaintiff in the present case, not being a forced heir of the late Perpetua
transmitted to the plaintiff any right arising from the contract under consideration in order Concepcion, can not institute an action to annul under article 1300 or to rescind under article
that he can bring an action to annul the sale voluntarily made by her to the defendant with a 1291 (3) of the Civil Code the contract under consideration entered into by the deceased with
false consideration. the defendant.
We are of the opinion and so hold, that the late Perpetua Concepcion has not transmitted to the In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed with costs against the
plaintiff any right arising from the contract of conveyance or sale of her lands to the defendant, appellant. So ordered.
and therefore the plaintiff cannot file an action to annul such contract as representative of the
deceased.
According to the complaint, the deceased, in connivance with the defendant and with intent to
defraud the plaintiff, (that is, in order not to leave the properties above mentioned upon her
death to the plaintiff) sold and conveyed them to the latter, for a false and fictitious
consideration. It is, therefore obvious, that the conveyance or sale of said properties to the
defendant was voluntarily made by the deceased to said defendant. As the deceased had no
forced heir, she was free to dispose of all her properties as absolute owner thereof, without
further limitation than those established by law, and the right to dispose of a thing involves the
right to give or to convey it to another without any consideration. The only limitation
established by law on her right to convey said properties to the defendant without any
consideration is, that she could not dispose of or transfer her property to another in fraud of
her creditors. And this court, in Solis vs. Chua Pua Hermanos (50 Phil. 636), through Mr. Justice
Street, held that "a voluntary conveyance, without any consideration whatever, is prima
facie good as between the parties, and such an instrument can not be declared fraudulent as
against creditors in the absence of proof, that there was at the time of the execution of the
conveyance a creditor who could be defrauded by the conveyance, 27 C. J., 470."
Even a forced heir of the deceased Perpetua Concepcion would have no right to institute as
representative of the decedent, an action of nullity of a contract made by the decedent to
defraud his creditors, because such a contract being considered illicit under article 1306 of the
Civil Code, Perpetua Concepcion herself had no right of action to annul it and recover the
properties she had conveyed to the defendant. But the forced heir could in such case bring an
action to rescind the contract under article 1291 (3) of the Civil Code. Manresa in his
comments on articles 1305 and 1306 of the Civil Code (4th edition, volume 8, pp. 717, 718),
says: "As to heirs, it is interesting that the judgment of May 6, 1902, of the Supreme Court of
Spain which denied a forced heir the right to institute an action to annul contracts considered a
illicit, for having been entered into by his predecessor in interest for the purpose of depriving