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1nc

T Education
Education means the structured system of schooling does not include school
infrastructure
Ngaka et al., Makerere University Centre for Lifelong Learning Coordinator, 12
[Willy, George Openjuru, Makerere University School of Distance and Lifelong Learning in the
College of Education and External Studies Dean, Robert Mazur, Iowa State University Professor
of Sociology, 2012, The International Journal of Diversity in Organizations, Exploring Formal and
Non-Formal Education Practices for Integrated and Diverse Learning Environments in Uganda,
http://www.soc.iastate.edu/staff/mazur/Formal%20%20Nonformal%20Education%20in/%20Ug
anda%20(condensed).pdf, p. 110, accessed: 7/2/17, KW]

Firstly, in our paper, we use the term formal education to refer to that type of
education which is structured, in some cases state supported, certified and follows a pre-
determined/written curriculum. Drawing from Coombs, Prosser, and Ahmed (1973), Baguma
and Okecho (2010, p. 2) further describe formal education as: the hierarchically structured,
chronologically graded educational system running from primary school through to University
and including, in addition to general academic studies, a variety of specialized programs and
institutions for full-time technical and professional training.

Violation: The affirmative creates work based learning programs that are
essentially adding gardens to schools. Dont allow them to say that they are a
curriculum addition because in CX they explicitly said that [CHECK WHAT THEY
SAY]. Additionally, 3/5s of their solvency evidence was about how making Commented [KW1]: You want them to say that they make
gardens
gardens would solve.

Reasons to Prefer:
Limits: allowing school infrastructure creates far too many school building
additions they create an unreasonably large case list that creates a hit or miss
game. Eliminating this expansion allows for a fair playing field between both
teams.
States CP
The fifty states and relevant sub-national territories should increase its funding
and regulation for elementary and secondary education by requiring that
schools receiving Career and Technical Education and/or Farm to School grants
incorporate school-based agricultural education and nutrition programming,
including, but not limited to: work based learning programs and curriculum for
agricultural science education.

Agricultural education should be handled at local level different needs for


different communities
LaRose, University of Florida Agricultural Education doctoral graduate student,
16
(Sarah, 3/14/16, The Agricultural Education Magazine. Teach Local: Incorporating the Local
Food Movement into Agricultural Education Curriculum. ProQuest, Accessed 6/30/17, GDI -
JMo)

Over the past ten years, the local food movement has gained signifcant traction in many com-
munities across the United States, attracting more consumers to learn about the source of their
food, and creating an opportunity for School-Based Agricultural Edu- cation to garner support
and com- munity involvement. Likewise, it also creates an opportunity for the local agricultural
education program to provide educational outreach to their local community. Since agricultural
education pro- grams should be designed to meet the needs of the local community (Talbert,
Vaughn, & Croom, 2005, p. 86), agriculture education in- structors should regularly evalu- ate
the needs of their community to determine if the agriculture ed- ucation program is indeed
meet- ing those demands. Agricultural education programs incorporating and addressing
aspects of the lo- cal food movement into their cur- riculum and programming have the
potential to gain new support and interest in supporting School- Based Agricultural Education
and FFA, as well as providing relevant learning opportunities for students preparing for careers
in agricul- ture.

States determine CTE programs now


Dortch, Congressional Analyst in Education Policy, 12
[Cassandria, 12-5-12, Congressional Research Service, Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical
Education Act of 2006: Background and Performance, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42863.pdf,
pg 14, Accessed 6-30-17, RK]
Perkins IV provides states considerable flexibility in implementing the funding. The act was
designed to increase state and local flexibility in providing services and activities designed to
develop, implement, and improve [CTE], including tech prep education. To a certain extent,
states can determine which CTE programs to implement and how to measure achievement.
Federalism
Educations the key issue for federalism the plan upsets the overall balance of
power
Roberts, Texas Public Policy Foundation, Executive, 17
[Kevin, February 07, 2017, Real Clear Education, States, Not the Feds, Should Lead Education
Reform,
http://www.realcleareducation.com/articles/2017/02/07/states_not_the_feds_should_lead_ed
ucation_reform__110115.html, accessed: 7/9/17, SK]

The era of Donald Trump offers conservative reformers opportunities they have not seen since the 1980s. The most significant are in
education, where the federal government has aggrandized its power, rendering states impotent. This overreach
comes at the expense of two things very dear to the nationour schoolchildren and our
understanding of shared power. Though the Trump administration will no doubt address the former problem, its means of doing so may very well exacerbate the
Too often, well-intentioned, conservative executives end up using federal power to heal the wounds
latter.

caused by the very same bludgeonfederal power. If President Trump is correct in his inaugural exhortation that now is the hour of action, then
statesnot federal bureaucratsneed to lead the charge on education policy. Among the many problems facing
American education, the most significant may be our schools and colleges utter failure to teach civic education. Two generations of American students have been taught precious little about the American
Founding or the Constitution, let alone the philosophical foundation of the American system of governmentfederalism. That notion of shared power between the federal government and states has, as a result,

How fitting, then, that Texaswhere the American spirit of independence, work ethic, freedom and a vibrant notion of state power is palpabletake the lead
withered.

in renewing federalism. And how fitting that it do so in the policy area where revitalized state
power is most needed: education. During the otherwise-bleak years of the previous administration, the Lone Star State has shined as a beacon of liberty, deregulation
and restrained government authority. Harkening to Justice Louis Brandeis's early-20th-century comment that states are the laboratories of democracy, Texas-based initiatives have sprouted across the nation.
It's no Texan braggadocio to observe that nationwide, efforts in tort reform, deregulation, tax reduction and criminal justice reform originated in Texas. The resulting Texas Model has become the blueprint for

our
leaders in dozens of states. And that is precisely how our system should work. Though we are all familiar with the legitimate claims based on state sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment,

Founders viewed those as mere baseline expectations. In the realm of public policy, they saw the states as taking the initiative, being so
bold and innovative that the federal government would have to serve as a check on themnot
the other way around, as the case has been in recent years. As the Obama administration would be the first to say, Texas has led those efforts to check federal power. That defensive
posture was necessaryand, for the Republic, crucial. But now Texas and other states must seize the field of education policy, exercising

their own power with bold policy initiatives. The timing for Texas policymakers is perfect. The state's biennial legislative session has just begun, and the
momentum for an education overhaul has never been stronger. At the National School Choice Week rally earlier this week, both Gov. Greg Abbott and Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick gave rousing, full-throated
endorsements of school choice reforms. There are obstacles, to be sure, but even the defenders of the status quo recognize that it's hard to defend the mediocrity of the status quo. Among the many school choice
vehicles, the most far-reachingfor Texas and the United Statesis an Education Savings Account (ESA). Built on the successes of early choice vehicles such as tax-credit scholarships, ESAs offer wider and easier
usage, removing the barriers to access that have been foisted on choice programs by opponents. Parents may use an ESA to pay for a host of education-related expenses, including private school tuition, tutoring,
special needs programs and books. In sum, an ESA gives parents an unprecedented means for customizing their childs educationthe exact opposite of the conveyor-belt, cookie-cutter approach that has become

modern American education. Though some reformers have advocated for federal ESAs, the inefficiency inherent
in the large federal bureaucracy begs for states to take the lead. Texas, the most populous state with a bent toward conservative, free-
market reforms, has a unique opportunity to show that states, as our Founders expected, can be at the forefront of policy innovation. There

could not be more at stake. Our children deserve an end to zip-code discrimination, which
dramatically limits their access to decent educational options. Furthermore, the civic health of
our American Republicin particular, the long-standing view that states, not the feds, would
leadhangs in the balance.
Federal action on education upsets the overall balance of federalism.
Lawson 13 Aaron Lawson, Associate at Edelson PC where his practice focuses on appeals and
complex motion practice, J.D. from UMich, Educational Federalism: A New Case for Reduced
Federal Involvement in K-12 Education, Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal,
Article 5, Volume 2013, Issue 2, Published in the summer of 2013,
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1333&context=elj

Every state constitution, in contrast with the Federal Constitution, contains some guarantee of
education.18 State courts split into two groups on how to give effect to these guarantees: (1) by
evaluating education policy under Equal Protection by declaring education a fundamental right
or by treating wealth as a suspect classification,19 or (2) by evaluating education policies under
a framework of educational adequacy.20 In either case, these clauses establish substantive
educational guarantees on the state level that do not exist at the federal level and provide the
courts with a role in ensuring the fulfillment of these guarantees.21 These clauses also help to
create a valuable political dynamic, which has inured to the benefit of children. As part of this
political dynamic, courts define the contours of these affirmative guarantees, and the legislature
fulfills its own constitutional duty by legislating between those boundaries.2

However, when the federal government legislates or regulates in a given field, it necessarily
constrains the ability of states to legislate in that same field.23 In the field of education, the
ability of courts to protect the rights of children is dependent on the ability of legislatures freely
to react to courts. As such, anything that constrains state legislatures also constrains state
courts and upsets this valuable political dynamic created by the interaction of state legislatures
and state courts. An expansive federal role in educational policymaking is normatively
undesirable when it threatens to interfere with this political dynamic. This dynamic receives
scant attention in the literature described above. However, mindfulness of this dynamic is
crucial to the proper placement of the educational policymaking and regulatory epicenter.

Constraints on state legislatures would not be as problematic if the federal government had
proven itself adept at guaranteeing adequate educational opportunity for all students. However,
RTTT and NCLB have, in some cases, proven remarkably unhelpful for poor and minority
students.24 These negative outcomes, of course, are not guaranteed. However, the fact that
federal involvement in education has produced undesirable outcomes for poor and minority
students should cause policymakers to reexamine whether it is most desirable for the federal
government to play such a significant role in education. This Comment argues that it is not.

IMPACT 1
Terror risk is high decentralizations key to solve Commented [SV2]: How in a centralized entity not
equipped to fight a decentralized entity? Isnt that what we
Mayer, visiting fellow at AEI, President @ Buckeye Institute for Public Policy, 16 have been doing for a while?

(Matt, Terrorisms dark clouds are gathering on the horizon,


https://www.aei.org/publication/terrorisms-dark-clouds-are-gathering-on-the-horizon/)

The terrorist threat is higher than ever. It is only going to get worse. Two trends occurring in the
Middle East foreshadow a worsening threat environment in the West. First, with the collapse of ISISs
dominance in Syria and Iraq, the foreign fighters who made their way to the Middle East are coming back.
Security entities in the West are doing all they can to prevent their return, but, given the numerous land and water entry points around the Mediterranean Sea and continued

Equally troubling is the presence in the West of


migrant flows within which they can hide, they simply cant stop every returning fighter.

frustrated fighters who wanted to travel to the Middle East to join ISIS, but couldnt find a way.
Estimates place the number of these radicalized individuals at more than 10,000 roughly 10 times the number of returning fighters. Combined with the million-plus migrants
(about whom we know very little) who poured into Europe over the last year, European security agencies are spread too thinly. Their ability to identify and monitor, let alone

stop, all of these individuals is weak, at best. The second trend is the re-emergence of al-Qaeda (not that it ever went away),
especially in Syria where an al-Qaeda affiliate has patiently established itself. In a shift toward the ISIS model, al-Qaeda has moved from focusing largely on spectacular,
catastrophic attacks on the West to calling on adherents to attack the West by whatever means. The Wests intelligence agencies have become very good at detecting and

the Federal
thwarting the former types of attacks, but simply arent constructed and resourced for an Uberized terrorism environment. In the United States,

Bureau of Investigation, with only 35,000 personnel, is grossly outmanned. Moreover, a


centralized entity is ill-equipped to fight a decentralized enemy. The only way to increase our
capabilities and odds of winning is to evolve our national security apparatus by decentralizing
elements to local law enforcement, which has a million badged officers and decades of
experience to contribute to the fight. First, with a growing volume of terrorist recruiting,
communications, planning and execution occurring behind encrypted technologies, substantially increasing
the use of human intelligence (HUMINT) being done by local law enforcement is vital. Given their years of
experience infiltrating organized crime, gangs and transnational networks, local law enforcement in our higher-risk cities possess the skill and

legal framework to monitor, surveil and go undercover when necessary. HUMINT will give us the
access undermined by the decline in signals intelligence due to encryption. Next, we cant
defeat terrorism without the help of Muslim communities. Most of the attacks over the last year involved suspicious precursor activities
witnessed by family, friends, neighbors or acquaintances. We must build inroads into the Muslim community to increase the

trust they have in law enforcement and open critical lines of communication. Doing so will
facilitate cooperation, as Muslim parents realize reaching out to law enforcement could get their wayward child help, not handcuffs or worse. We need to
build off-ramps before young Muslims are too far down the radicalization path. Last, we must reform our domestic intelligence enterprise to consolidate information and
intelligence activities in our states. Currently, in too many places, those activities are bifurcated into two different entities (FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces and DHS-funded
fusion centers) residing in physically separate locations. While sincere efforts are made to connect the two entities, it is axiomatic that separation and distinct operations

Terrorisms dark clouds are


increase the odds key data are not gathered and analyzed in one place. We cant keep failing to connect the dots.

gathering on the horizon. Our Constitution gives the federal government great powers to act to keep us safe. It also recognizes
the important role local law enforcement plays in our domestic security. We need a president who will bring both
pieces together to form a national security whole.

Terrorists will use nukes kills millions Commented [SV3]: Why havent we seen this impact yet?

Kroenig, Associate Professor and IR @ Georgetown, 14


(R. Davis Gibbons and Matthew Kroenig, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brent Scowcroft
Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council. The Next Nuclear War,
http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_The%20Next%20Nuclear%20War.pdf)
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, scholars, analysts, and politicians have focused on the nexus of nuclear weapons
and terrorism. In his closing statement at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, President Obama concluded, We've agreed that
nuclear terrorism is one of the most urgent and serious threats to global security.88 Though there has been some debate on how
seriously this threat should be taken,89 evidence indicates that terrorist organizations have both expressed
a desire for nuclear weapons and made attempts to buy or seize nuclear material. Declassified
documents from the United States suggest Osama bin Laden directed his associates to purchase
uranium.90 In addition, Chechnya-based separatist groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba in South Asia, and Aum Shinrikyo in
Japan have also expressed the desire for nuclear weapons in the past.91 Most analysts consider it unlikely that a
state would knowingly provide a terrorist group with a bomb, but it is conceivable that a group could steal one.
This fear is especially acute in the case of Pakistan, where an unstable government with a
growing nuclear arsenal exists in an area with many terrorist organizations. The government of Pakistan has taken steps
in recent years to allay these fears, yet reason for concern remains.92 A second means by which a terrorist group could
attain a nuclear capability is by obtaining fissile material and constructing its own crude nuclear
bomb. The main challenge for terrorist organizations seeking this capability is finding sufficient fissile material.
Approximately 8 kilograms of plutonium or 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is
necessary for a bomb. Since 9/11, the United States, Russia, the IAEA, and other partners have taken on a number of efforts to
decrease the risks of terrorists accessing nuclear material. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the 2005 Amendment to the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
the global stocks of HEU
Nuclear Terrorism all seek to increase global cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism. Overall,
and plutonium are decreasing, but the sheer volume of global fissile material makes this an on-
going challenge and the U.S. budget for these activities has recently been cut. Unlike nuclear-
armed states, it would be relatively difficult to deter terrorists from taking action.93 In other words, if
efforts to keep nuclear weapons out of terrorist hands ever fail, we may witness a nuclear
9/11.

IMAPCT 2
Progressive federalism is the basis for resistance to Trumps agenda.
Chemerinsky 17 Erwin Chemerinsky, Founding Dean, Distinguished Professor of Law, and
Raymond Pryke Professor of First Amendment Law at the University of California-Irvine School
of Law, Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, former Alston & Bird Professor of
Law and Political Science at Duke University, holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School, 2017
(Embracing Federalism, Take Carea scholarly legal blog, March 16th, Available Online at
https://takecareblog.com/blog/embracing-federalism, Accessed 06-14-2017)

It is time for progressives to embrace federalism and to use Supreme Court precedents
protecting states rights to fight against Trump administration policies. Throughout American
history, states rights have been used by conservatives to oppose progressive change. In the
early 19th century, those opposing abolition of slavery did so in the name of states rights. In
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Supreme Court struck down many progressive federal
laws, including the first federal statute restricting the use of child labor, on federalism grounds.
In the 1950s and 1960s, Southerners opposed desegregation by invoking states rights. In more
recent decades, the Supreme Court, in a series of ideologically split 5-4 decisions, used
federalism to strike down desirable federal laws, including provisions of the Violence Against
Women Act, the Brady Handgun Control Act, and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act.

But now, with the Trump administration taking far right positions on almost every issue, state
and local governments are a key hope. For example, President Donald Trumps threat to
withhold federal funds from sanctuary cities is coercion of local governments that violates
principles of federalism long advocated by the conservative justices on the Supreme Court.

A great deal of confusion exists over what it means for a city to declare itself to be a
sanctuary. It does not mean that a city will conceal or shelter undocumented immigrants
from detection. Instead, when a city says that it is a sanctuary, it means that the city will not
be an arm of federal immigration authorities. For example, a sanctuary city will not investigate,
arrest, or detain individuals on the basis of immigration status. Rather, the city will provide
services to all, regardless of immigration status, and generally will not turn over undocumented
individuals to federal immigration authorities.

There are compelling reasons for cities to adopt such policies. Victims of crime and witnesses to
crime will not come forward to the police if they fear deportation. Public health officials worry
that sick people, including those with communicable diseases, will not go for treatment if they
fear that it could lead to their deportation. Of course, their untreated communicable diseases
can spread to all of us. Education officials worry that parents will not send their children to
school if they think it might lead to deportation. Educating children, whether documented or
undocumented, is a moral obligation and obviously essential for society.

Nonetheless, President Trump issued an executive order on January 25, 2017, which threatens
sanctuary cities with loss of federal funds. But this violates the Tenth Amendment. The
Supreme Court has held that it is unconstitutional for Congress to commandeer state and local
governments and force them to administer federal mandates.

For example, in United States v. Printz, in 1997, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
provision of the federal Brady Handgun Control Act that required that state and local
governments do background checks before issuing permits for firearms. The Court, in an
opinion by Justice Scalia, said that such coercion violated principles of federalism and the Tenth
Amendment.

Nor may Congress do this by putting strings on grants to state and local governments. The
Supreme Court has said that such strings are constitutional only if the conditions are clearly
stated, relate to the purpose of the program, and are not unduly coercive. None of these
requirements are met by the Trump Executive Order. No federal statute conditions federal
funds on cities denying themselves sanctuary status. And most federal grants to local
governments have nothing to do with immigration.

But most of all, the Trump Executive Order is impermissibly coercive. In 2012, in National
Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court, 7-2, declared
unconstitutional the Medicaid provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
These provided that if a state accepted federal Medicaid funds, it had to provide coverage for
those within 133% of the federal poverty level. The federal government paid 100% of these
costs until 2019 and 90% thereafter. The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, declared
this unconstitutional as impermissibly coercing state governments in violation of the Tenth
Amendment. The Court referred to this as like a gun to the head of the states and as
dragooning them. The Trump Executive Order does exactly the same thing.

The federal government can use its agencies and agents to enforce federal immigration law
however it chooses. But it cannot turn local governments into enforcement arms of the federal
government. That is exactly what the Trump Executive Order does.

This is just one of many examples where principles of federalism must be used by progressives.
In the area of environmental law, it will be crucial for state governments to adopt stricter
pollution control laws in the face of the dismantling of federal environmental protections. Just
last week, Scott Pruitt, the head of the Environmental Protection Agency, once more denied any
link between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. It is clear that he and the Trump
administration will gut federal environmental regulations. But there long has been a principle
that states can have stricter environmental laws, so long as Congress does not explicitly preempt
this.

Another important area concerns decriminalization of marijuana. A number of states, including


California, have repealed laws that make it a crime to possess small amounts of this drug.
Attorney General Jeff Sessions has expressed opposition to these laws. But Congress cannot
force state governments to enact or enforce laws. A state does not need to have any law
prohibiting marijuana, or can have one with exceptions for possession for medical use or for
small amounts. To be sure, the federal government can enforce its own drug laws however it
wants, but it cannot compel state governments to do so.

States, of course, will vary enormously in their policies. But that, too, is what federalism and
states rights are about. Progressives should not be hesitant to use conservative decisions to
achieve desirable results. We will need all the tools we can find to fight over the next four
years.

Resisting Trumps agenda is essential to lower the risk of multiple existential


threats.
Baum 16 Seth Baum, Co-Founder and Executive Director of the Global Catastrophic Risk
Institute, Affiliate Researcher at the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions at
Columbia University, and Affiliate Scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies,
and a Research Scientist at Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, earned a Ph.D. in Geography
from Pennsylvania State University, an M.S. in Electrical Engineering from Northeastern
University, and a B.S. in Optics and a B.S. in Applied Mathematics from the University of
Rochester, 2016 (What Trump means for global catastrophic risk, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
December 9th, Available Online at http://thebulletin.org/what-trump-means-global-
catastrophic-risk10266, Accessed 07-09-2017, Lil_Arj)

In 1987, Donald Trump said he had an aggressive plan for the United States to partner with the
Soviet Union on nuclear non-proliferation. He was motivated by, among other things, an
encounter with Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafis former pilot, who convinced him that at
least some world leaders are too unstable to ever be trusted with nuclear weapons. Now, 30
years later, Trumpfollowing a presidential campaign marked by impulsive, combative
behaviorseems poised to become one of those unstable world leaders.

Global catastrophic risks are those that threaten the survival of human civilization. Of all the
implications a Trump presidency has for global catastrophic riskand there are manythe
prospect of him ordering the launch of the massive US nuclear arsenal is by far the most
worrisome. In the United States, the president has sole authority to launch atomic weapons. As
Bruce Blair recently argued in Politico, Trumps tendency toward erratic behavior, combined
with a mix of difficult geopolitical challenges ahead, mean the probability of a nuclear launch
order will be unusually high.
If Trump orders an unwarranted launch, then the only thing that could stop it would be
disobedience by launch personnelthough even this might not suffice, since the president
could simply replace them. Such disobedience has precedent, most notably in Vasili Arkhipov,
the Soviet submarine officer who refused to authorize a nuclear launch during the Cuban Missile
Crisis; Stanislav Petrov, the Soviet officer who refused to relay a warning (which turned out to be
a false alarm) of incoming US missiles; and James Schlesinger, the US defense secretary under
President Richard Nixon, who reportedly told Pentagon aides to check with him first if Nixon
began talking about launching nuclear weapons. Both Arkhipov and Petrov are now celebrated
as heroes for saving the world. Perhaps Schlesinger should be too, though his story has been
questioned. US personnel involved in nuclear weapons operations should take note of these
tales and reflect on how they might act in a nuclear crisis.

Risks and opportunities abroad. Aside from planning to either persuade or disobey the
president, the only way to avoid nuclear war is to try to avoid the sorts of crises that can prompt
nuclear launch. China and Russia, which both have large arsenals of long-range nuclear weapons
and tense relationships with the United States, are the primary candidates for a nuclear
conflagration with Washington. Already, Trump has increased tensions with China by taking a
phone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. China-Taiwan relations are very fragile, and
this sort of disruption could lead to a war that would drag in the United States.

Meanwhile, Trumps presidency could create some interesting opportunities to improve US


relations with Russia. The United States has long been too dismissive of Moscows very
legitimate security concerns regarding NATO expansion, missile defense, and other
encroachments. In stark defiance of US political convention, Trump speaks fondly of Russian
President Vladimir Putin, an authoritarian leader, and expresses little interest in supporting
NATO allies. The authoritarianism is a problem, but Trumps unconventional friendliness
nonetheless offers a valuable opportunity to rethink US-Russia relations for the better.

On the other hand, conciliatory overtures toward Russia could backfire. Without US pressure,
Russia could become aggressive, perhaps invading the Baltic states. Russia might gamble that
NATO wouldnt fight back, but if it was wrong, such an invasion could lead to nuclear war.
Additionally, Trumps pro-Russia stance could mean that Putin would no longer be able to use
anti-Americanism to shore up domestic support, which could lead to a dangerous political crisis.
If Putin fears a loss of power, he could turn to more aggressive military action in hopes of
bolstering his support. And if he were to lose power, particularly in a coup, there is no telling
what would happen to one of the worlds two largest nuclear arsenals. The best approach for
the United States is to rethink Russia-US relations while avoiding the sorts of military and
political crises that could escalate to nuclear war.

The war at home. Trump has been accused many times of authoritarian tendencies, not least
due to his praise for Putin. He also frequently defies democratic norms and institutions, for
instance by encouraging violence against opposition protesters during his presidential campaign,
and now via his business holdings, which create a real prospect he may violate the Constitutions
rule against accepting foreign bribes. Already, there are signs that Trump is profiting from his
newfound political position, for example with an end to project delays on a Trump Tower in
Buenos Aires. The US Constitution explicitly forbids the president from receiving foreign gifts,
known as emoluments.

What if, under President Trump, the US government itself becomes authoritarian? Such an
outcome might seem unfathomable, and to be sure, achieving authoritarian control would not
be as easy for Trump as starting a nuclear war. It would require compliance from a much larger
portion of government personnel and the publiccompliance that cannot be taken for granted.
Already, government officials are discussing how best to resist illegal and unethical moves from
the inside, and citizens are circulating expert advice on how to thwart creeping authoritarianism.

But the president-elect will take office at a time in which support for democracy may be
declining in the United States and other Western countries, as measured by survey data. And
polling shows that his supporters were more likely to have authoritarian inclinations than
supporters of other Republican or Democratic primary candidates. Moreover, his supporters
cheered some of his clearly authoritarian suggestions, like creating a registry for Muslims and
implying that through force of his own personality, he would achieve results where normal
elected officials fail.

An authoritarian US government would be a devastating force. In theory, dictatorships can be


benevolent, but throughout history, they have been responsible for some of the largest human
tragedies, with tens of millions dying due to their own governments in the Stalinist Soviet Union,
Nazi Germany, and Maoist China. Thanks to the miracles of modern technology, an authoritarian
United States could wield overwhelming military and intelligence capabilities to even more
disastrous effect.

Return to an old world order. Trump has suggested he might pull the United States back from
the post-World War II international order it helped build and appears to favor a pre-World War
II isolationist mercantilism that would have the United States look out for its unenlightened self-
interest and nothing more. This would mean retreating from alliances and attempts to promote
democracy abroad, and an embrace of economic protectionism at home.

Such a retreat from globalization would have important implications for catastrophic risk. The
post-World War II international system has proved remarkably stable and peaceful. Returning to
the pre-World War II system risks putting the world on course for another major war, this time
with deadlier weapons. International cooperation is also essential for addressing global issues
like climate change, infectious disease outbreaks, arms control, and the safe management of
emerging technologies.

On the other hand, the globalized economy can be fragile. Shocks in one place can cascade
around the world, and a bad enough shock could collapse the whole system, leaving behind few
communities that are able to support themselves. Globalization can also bring dangerous
concentrations of wealth and power. Nevertheless, complete rejection of globalization would be
a dangerous mistake.

Playing with climate dangers. Climate change will not wipe out human populations as quickly as
a nuclear bomb would, but it is wreaking slow-motion havoc that could ultimately be just as
devastating. Trump has been all over the map on the subject, variously supporting action to
reduce emissions and calling global warming a hoax. On December 5th he met with
environmental activist and former vice president Al Gore, giving some cause for hope, but later
the same week said he would appoint Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt, who denies the
science of climate change, to lead the Environmental Protection Agency. Trumps energy plan
calls for energy independence with development of both fossil fuels and renewables, as well as
less environmental regulation. If his energy policy puts more greenhouse gas into the
atmosphereas it may by increasing fossil fuel consumptionit will increase global
catastrophic risk.

For all global catastrophic risks, it is important to remember that the US president is hardly the
only important actor. Trumps election shifts the landscape of risks and opportunities, but does
not change the fact that each of us can help keep humanity safe. His election also offers an
important reminder that outlier events sometimes happen. Just because election-winning
politicians have been of a particular mold in the past, doesnt mean the same kind of leaders will
continue to win. Likewise, just because we have avoided global catastrophe so far doesnt mean
we will continue to do so.
Settler Colonialism
settler colonialism is preserved through historical narratives modern forms of
education reproduce settler ideologies that seek to erase indigenous culture
Calderon 14 [Dolores, University of Utah, 7.28.14, Educational Studies A Journal of the
American Educational Studies Association, Uncovering Settler Grammars in Curriculum,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00131946.2014.926904, p.331-332 Accessed
7.5.17 CT @ GDI]

This analysis demonstrates that to make space for decolonizing approaches in education that take earnestly
the continued occupation of Indigenous territories (Champagne 2005a, 2005b) by settler societies we must
account for how settler colonialism is maintainedespecially through systems of schooling that
have been one of the most important tools of the ongoing settler-colonial project. I conclude my analysis of
social studies curriculum with a discussion of the Allotment Act because it strongly reflects the disconnect between the

contemporary dilemmas faced by American Indian communities and the larger miseducation of
non-Indian society regarding Indigenous issues. Allotment and fractionation, however, can also be a point of
departure for actually moving toward decolonial understandings of the way
textbooks/curriculum participate in a settler-colonial project. For instance, the Indian Land Tenure Foundationsa
community-based organization serving American Indian nations and people in the recovery and control of their rightful homelands (Indian Land Tenure Foundation [ILTF]
2013)curriculum centers these very issues. These standards both review American Indian traditional land values and uses while offering standards that focus on the history of
American Indian land tenure and its contemporary status (ILTF 2013). Concretely, nearly two-thirds of American Indian lands in the United States were lost as a result of the
Allotment Act. Today the effects of the Allotment Act are substantial through the process of land loss and fractionation (Shoemaker 2003). Although over 60 million acres of the

lands remain within contemporary reservation boundaries,


surplus land was sold to non-Indians as a result of allotment, these

which provide unique challenges to tribal land management and governance, and self-
determination generally (ILTF 2013). This represents only a portion of the contemporary challenges caused by allotment, only one such
policy instituted by the federal government that continues to have lasting negative
consequences in Indian Country. I insist here that this is the type of learning all students need to
be exposed to. However, such strategies are cautionary approaches, at best. Offering these standards
without attending to the decolonizing moves that decenter settler subjectivities ultimately allow
dominant settler ideologies to remain. Connecting such historical narratives to contemporary
realities for non-Indian students is not a challenging task. What is challenging is that most mainstream
educators remain ignorant of the realities of Indigenous communities, which is, I argue, an
inevitable outcome of settler ideologies that work to erase and reconstruct Indianness to
maintain settler futurity. As an educator that teaches non-Indian students about the American Indian experience, common feedback I receive from students
is I did not know! which leads most students to a reassessment on the status of American Indian peoples as sovereign nations. Though I do not challenge settler identities, it is
a move in the direction toward attempting decolonizing pedagogies. As such, this work might be more appropriately contextualized as anticolonial, as it does not decolonize but
rather moves students to question common settler colonial tropes that erase the complexity of Indianness. Thus, the framework I sketch here is not an exhaustive overview of

If we are truly
settler colonialism in the United States. What I offer provides a scaffold for understanding settler grammars, particularly in education.

interested in decolonizing work, we must attend to the context of coloniality that we find
ourselves inin this case, a settler colonial society. Doing the real work of decolonization
requires that we first identify how settler grammars continue to be an ongoing project and
importantly so in educational contexts. As my analysis of settler grammar and their ongoing work in textbooks and curriculum demonstrates,
part of doing decolonial work, not as a metaphor, requires that we identify and engage the bleeding-
through of ongoing settler processes. I see textbooks as one prominent example among many in US schools that are actively perpetuating settler
grammars and as one practical place to engage in concrete decolonial work. Decolonizing work demands that we resurrect the thread of Indianness that is foundational to
settler colonialism. Indeed, this work points to the challenge that confronting students with the reality of American Indian specificities is unsettling (Tuck and Yang 2013). Future
work should look at how communities, teachers, and students can collectively confront settler grammars and begin to move away from metaphors and into concrete antisettler
practice, exemplified by the movements of tribal nations at the borders of the United States and Canada active resistance to the Keystone Pipeline and other extractive
industries.
under settler society agriculture serves as a means of stealing indigenous lands
this removes the ability for native communities to be independent of the
state and settler society
Wolfe 6 [Patrick, 12.21.06, Australia Freelance Historian,Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 8
p.387-409, Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240, Accessed 7.6.17 CT @ GDI]

Of itself, however, modernity cannot explain the insatiable dynamic whereby settler colonialism always
needs more land. The answer that springs most readily to mind is agriculture, though it is not necessarily
the only one. The whole range of primary sectors can motivate the project. In addition to agriculture,

therefore, we should think in terms of forestry, fishing, pastoralism and mining (the last straw for the
Cherokee was the discovery of gold on their land). With the exception of agriculture, however (and, for some peoples, pastoralism),

none of these is sufficient in itself. You cannot eat lumber or gold; fishing for the world market requires canneries. Moreover, sooner
or later, miners move on, while forests and fish become exhausted or need to be farmed. Agriculture not only supports the other

sectors. It is inherently sedentary and, therefore, permanent. In contrast to extractive industries, Commented [SV4]: Explain the link pls
which rely on what just happens to be there, agriculture is a rational means/end calculus that is geared to
How does the akt solve this
vouchsafing its own reproduction, generating capital that projects into a future where it repeats
itself (hence the farmers dread of being reduced to eating seed stock). Moreover, as John Locke never tired of pointing out, agriculture
supports a larger population than non-sedentary modes of production.39 In settler-colonial
terms, this enables a population to be expanded by continuing immigration at the expense of
native lands and livelihoods. The inequities, contradictions and pogroms of metropolitan society ensure a recurrent
supply of fresh immigrants especially, as noted, from among the landless. In this way, individual motivations dovetail
with the global markets imperative for expansion. Through its ceaseless expansion, agriculture (including, for this
purpose, commercial pastoralism) progressively eats into Indigenous territory, a primitive accumulation that turns native flora

and fauna into a dwindling resource and curtails the reproduction of Indigenous modes of production. In the

event, Indigenous people are either rendered dependent on the introduced economy or reduced

to the stock-raids that provide the classic pretext for colonial death-squads.

deliberate miseducation is central to settler domination and white supremacy


it establishes knowledge systems that create mode of domination that shapes
society settler society maintains myths of legitimacy that are focused on Commented [SV5]:

valuing the white body and dehumanizing the non-white body its the root
cause of all exploitation
Seawright 14 [Gardner Seawright, University of Utah, Education, Cultural, and Society Commented [SV6]: how do we link to this
Department, Doctoral Candidate, (2014) Settler Traditions of Place: Making Explicit the Commented [SV7R6]:
Epistemological Legacy of White Supremacy and Settler Colonialism for Place-Based Education,
Educational Studies, pg. 564-566, accessed 7.5.2017]//TRossow

Charles Mills (1998) suggests that white


supremacy can be seen as a sociopolitical system, and a particular
mode of domination, with its special norms for allocating benefits and burdens, rights and
duties; its own ideology; and an internal, at least semi-autonomous logic that influences law,
culture, and consciousness, and as a conception that encompasses de facto as well as de jure white privilege and refers more broadly
to the European domination of the planet that has left us with the racialized distributions of economic,

political, and cultural power that we have today (98). Central to this white supremacy is a
particular conception of the rational social actor who is driven toward ownership and the
domination of nature, subsequently including a unique understanding of personhood in relation
to nature. Mills explains the parameters of Western societys rational social actor in his discussions of the operative herrenvolk ethic. The
herrenvolk, or master race ethic, is part of the epistemic package associated with white supremacy, which facilitates the

cognitive and moral economy psychically required for conquest, colonization, and
enslavement (Mills 1997, 18). To properly situate this ethic, the social epistemology that serves as its
foundation must be briefly explained. The white social epistemology is part of a social contract
dictating the norms and regulations at the foundation of dominant society. In the case of the United States,
the social contract is infused with intersecting forms of domination and social control
(patriarchy, white supremacy, heteronormativity, human supremacy, citizenship and civility;
Mills 1997; Pateman 1988; Pateman and Mills 2007). The social contract in question contains within it the social

technologies for the epistemic normalization of socially constructed hierarchies, as well as the
impetus for dominant society to reinvest, reproduce, and valorize the status quo. Put simply, the
social contract endeavors to teach people how to be oppress and how to be the oppressed. ors

Western schooling is implicated in the propagation of this substantive ignorance, a violent


knowledge system, as was noted by Du Bois (2003/1920) as well as contemporary scholars (Cajete 1994, 1999; Calderon, 2010, 2014; Outlaw
2007; Sullivan 2007). Lucious Outlaw Jr. (2007) argues that ensuring the dominance of this knowledge system is part

of the centuries-long determined efforts expended by settler-colonists-become-imperialist-


capitalist white racial supremacists to ensure that successive generations of white children
would be nurtured systematically with both knowledge and ignorance to grow into confirmed,
practicing racial supremacist white adults. And second, successive generations of childrenBlack,
Brown, Yellow, Red, mixedwould be miseducated to be racially inferior adults subordinate to
white adults and children. (197; emphasis in original) The perpetuation of racial domination and a state of
colonization requires a deliberate miseducation of children across subject positions in
accordance with sanctioned legitimate knowledge (Mills 1997; Outlaw, 2007; Sullivan 2007). This schooled miseducation
is part of what Linda Martn Alcoff (2007) calls myth maintenance. Alcoff argues that contemporary racialized society is in a

constant state of myth maintenance due to a desire to perceive its actions (a continued history
of violent colonization and imperialism) as moral, or at least excusable. This myth maintenance
facilitates the continued valorization of white bodies and white actions and the
dehumanization of bodies marked as non-white. Integral to the maintenance of white
supremacy is the permanence of these justificatory systems of knowledge production that not
only create valorizing narratives for racial hierarchies, and human exploitation, but ecological
exploitation as well. This myth maintenance also continues the rampant exploitation of non-human animals. Martusewicz et al. (2011)
explain in EcoJustice Education that [r]acism rests on, and depends upon anthropocentrism (158). The racial and gender hiearchization of society is
predicated on assumptions of humanness. Slavery and the expropriation of Indigenous lands were validated through a perception of non-white peoples
as animals. Thus, in order to successfully inferiorize and subjugate a group of people based on their likeness to animals, we must first have a deeply
entrenched belief that animals, and in fact all of nature, is inferior to humans (Martusewicz et al., 2011, 158). Place,
as an educational
point of departure, could allow for a critical engagement with the complex and intertwining
components of domination that are foundational to settler traditions of place.
the pursuit of universal education directly coincided with the exclusion of Commented [SV8]: where do we do that in our aff???

native culture the settler used language and schooling to preserve white life
and eliminate native life this biopolitical control is central to the structure of
settler colonial society
Iyengar 14 [Malathi Michelle, University of California San Diego, 2014, Decolonization:
Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 3, No. 2, 2014, pp. 33-59, Not mere abstractions:
Language policies and language ideologies in U.S. settler colonialism,
http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/view/19559/17835, Accessed 7.5.17 CT @ GDI]

If we think about the biopolitics and necropolitics at work in the construction of U.S. settler colonial
society during the nineteenth century, we see that the actors involved understood very well the connections
between language and life. The expanding settler state sought to increase white life and
eliminate Native life, and many of the policies enacted towards this increase and this elimination worked via language. The common
school movement the biopolitical project of establishing tuition-free schools for all white
children in the United States is a prime example. The advent of public schooling was a patchwork affair, with different
states and municipalities establishing publicly-funded schools at different times. Nevertheless, historians of education pinpoint the

1830s as the beginning of the Common School Era, the period of widespread implementation of publicly-funded
schooling in America. The successful mobilization to provide free education, consisting primarily of literacy instruction,

for all white children, thus coincided temporally with a number of other significant events related to language,
education, the social construction of race, and the theft of Indigenous land. In 1824, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs was established within the War Department. In 1828 Andrew Jackson was elected president, and in 1830 he passed the Indian Removal Act.
Beginning in 1831, a slew of laws took effect in various states making it illegal for Black peoples to read and write. Also in 1831, George Gaines,
appointed by Secretary of War Lewis Cass, oversaw the first phase of the Choctaw removal, the beginning of the Trail of Tears. 1832 was the Seminole
removal, 1834 the Creek removal, 1837 the Chickasaw removal and the appointment of Horace Mann, Father of the Common School Movement, as
the first Secretary of the Board of Education of Massachusetts. In 1838 Mann founded the Common School Journal and the Cherokee were removed
the period described by
from the Southeast on a death march to Oklahoma, the culmination of the Trail of Tears. My point here is that

historians as the Common School Era was also a crucial phase in the development of white
supremacist settler society, with language and education play key roles in the process of ing

consolidating the categories of whiteness (i.e. human-ness), blackness (i.e. non-human-ness, or, in the words of Dennis
Childs, an anthropology of metaphysical deficit), and Indian-ness (i.e. primitiveness, savageness, and necessary eliminability).3 It was no

coincidence that the drive to universalize literacy among whites, through the establishment of tax-

supported schools, took place simultaneously with the drive to eliminate literacy among Blacks,
and the drive to eliminate Indians altogether. Written language was one of the most important
technologies arguably the most important technology of the era; hence, a white supremacist society built
upon a material production-base of Black enslavement and Indian removal had perforce to
make this technology the universal property of whites, and keep it out of the hands of Black peoples, while pushing
Indians out of the picture entirely. Here we see language in this case, written language being called in to fortify the distinction between the white
and the black, the human and the non-human. Similarly, as I will discuss in greater detail later, language
was at the center of
settler societys ideological project of separating the human from the Savage Indian. For now, we might
simply note that it was in 1834 that the bilingual Cherokee Phoenix the official newspaper of the Cherokee Nation, printed both in Cherokee (using
Sequoyas syllabary) and in English was attacked by the Georgia Guard, the offices sacked and the printing press destroyed a prelude to the
Cherokee Trail of Tears, which would take place just a few years later. In short, the
white common school movement, the
crackdown on Black literacy, and the genocidal Jacksonian Indian Removal actions constituted
simultaneous and mutually-enabling processes. The white common school movement was fundamentally multilingual in character. Prior to the common school movement, private
and parochial schools already offered instruction in and through a variety of European languages, with German being the most widespread (Feinberg, 2002; Ramsey, 2010; Toth, 1990). Since the common schools largely continued the practices of these already-
existing private schools, it makes sense that [b]ilingual education became a staple of the common school experience in man y regions (Ramsey, 2010, p. 2). In some cases, the establishment of public schools simply meant that the state and/or municipality
began financing local private schools, which then became accessible to all of the local children instead of just to those who se families could pay. Thus, with the advent of the common school era, some of the German-English private and parochial schools (for
example) were simply turned into public schools per receiving state funding and ceasing to charge tuition and continued to implement the same bilingual curricula they had been using all along. As a result, as Carolyn Toth (1990) notes, many of the early public
schools became de facto German or GermanEnglish schools, by virtue of the fact that all the children living in the area were German, and the same teacher who had taught in the parochial or neighborhood school was kept on when the school fell under state
supervision (p. 35). In cases where the establishment of public schooling entailed the construction of new schools and the hiring of new teachers, local communities largely decided what type of education they wanted these new schools to provide which means
they also decided in which language(s) the education should be provided. Whether by default, as in rural ethnic enclaves, or by design, as in large cities where non-English ethnic groups lobbied for public education in their languages, settler societys early public
schools often became institutions for maintaining the linguistic and cultural heritages of ethnic communities (Toth, 1990, p. 2).
the expansion of sovereignty is based in an ontological securing of life as
infinite futurist progression of desire this is placed in opposition against the
ever-shifting notion of savagery and backwardness the only result of this
framing is endless violence against indigenous bodies
Schotten 16 (C. Heike, Massachusets University PoliSci Associate Professor, Queering
Sovereignty, Decolonizing Desire. Mills College. Carnegie Hall, Oakland, California. 4 March
2016. Spatializing Sovereignty organized by The Society for Radical Geography, Spatial
Theory, and Everyday Life. Conference Presentation.
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/84081898. 8:07 - 19:56 Transcribed by Tabatha R. at
rev.com) *we do not endorse gendered language

Okay so in the state of nature, which Hobbes defines as a place where there's no security, there is, in Edelman's terms, no
future. This is true not only because we are responsible solely for our own survival, an endeavor we cannot possibly succeed at on our own, but it is
also because given this radical insecurity, we are incapable of imagining any other moment or time

than now. Hobbes himself acknowledges there is no "accounting of time" in the state of nature, which of course makes sense; in a
condition of perpetual war, the future is unimaginable because it is so tenuous. As well, the past becomes
effectively irrelevant, hence the institution of sovereignty in Hobbes' version secures our physical preservation

and Im arguing that it does so by bringing temporality itself into existence and producing a future. Okay, so

that's the first point. The second point is that, in this act, the sovereign establishes the very meaning and

content of life itself. For understood temporally, there is a way in which there is no distinction between life and death in the state of nature,
in so far as there is no way to tell present from future. The state of nature's enduring present entails that life there is a

kind of limbo-like existence, a suspension of living or perpetual near-death experience wherein


we can never be certain of anything. This may be why it is so important to Hobbes to establish the
commonwealth in the first place: Not simply to preserve life, as he explicitly suggests, but actually more primarily
to definitively demarcate life as life and differentiate it from death. I mean, there's a normative enterprise going
on here, right? Indeed, although the sovereign is the beacon of peace, war and death are just as must a

byproduct of the institution of sovereignty as life and peace are. So what I take from this is that sovereignty, in short, is
the definitive bio-political regime, in so far as it constitutes and determines life as such, distinguishing it from

what only becomes subsequently recognizable as death. The third point is that sovereignty institutes
this life-death distinction via a moralized logic that relegates life to the domain of civilization
and value, and death to the domain of savagery and nihilism. This becomes clear in the conflicted and confusing
ways Hobbes characterizes the state of nature as simultaneously a time, a place, and a condition. Now as I just argued that the state of nature is a time
like if it is an era or an epoch it's a time with no time, a moment that is completely timeless, an era lacking any dynamism or principle of change. If
the state of nature is instead a condition, which he also claims, he is clear that it is one of savagery, writing "It may peradventure be thought there
never was such a time nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so over all the world, but there are many places where they live
so now," and he cites as an example, "the savage people in many places of America." Bolstering the view that the state of nature is a story about
humanity's pre-history, Hobbes here rehearses the enlightenment trope of indigenous peoples as European humanity's ancestors and/or pre-modern
childhood. Savagery
is, therefore, associated with solid temporality, timelessness, and the failure of forward
movement or progress. Conclusively, when referencing a geographical location, the state of nature is America, and the 17th-century
European notion of the new world, an empty land ripe for exploration and conquest. These specifications of the state of nature in Hobbes make clear
that establishment of sovereignty imposes a clear distinction not simply between peace and war,
life and death, but also between modernity and backwardness, civilization and savagery. Each of
these categorical pairs functions as a surrogate for the others. Taken together, they suggest the deep implications of
the categories of life and death with colonization and conquest for European politics and
political theory. The fourth point is that the commonwealth, or sovereign or sovereignty, can't actually solve the
problem Hobbes says it does. So if there's no state and we're all going to murder each other, the solution is obviously a
really big bad, coercive state, right? And that's going to solve the problem? It can't solve the problem, and that's
because it can't solve the problem of desire, which has futurism built into it very structure. s

Hobbes actually gets short shrift as a psychologist. He actually talks quite a bit about desire and affect. So desire, according to Hobbes, is a voluntary

motion of the body, whose aim, regardless of object, is attainment possession, consumption, enjoyment. Yet this

attainment poses a dilemma, for as he says, the aim of desire is "not to enjoy once only and for one instant of

time, but to assure forever the way of one's future desire." According to Hobbes, in other words, desire seeks
perpetuity of enjoyment. It aims at a consumption that can never fully completed. The fifth point
we're almost done is that Hobbes asserts, therefore, that human beings are perpetual power-seekers, not because

we want more and more, but because we want to preserve what we have now forever. His claim is
that mere maintenance of the present requires accumulation, undertaking a perpetual reference

to an unknown future. Thus, even despite the security from physical violence the sovereign
provides, he cannot alleviate the anxiety that runs apace with desire. Everything we do today is undertaken for
the sake of a future, which, if we're successful, will be no different from the present. But the sovereign can't guarantee that, right? Sixth then, and
finally, this means that Hobbes' colonial story of the emergence of life and death from the state of nature is based on an
underlying logic of
desire that explains why settler colonial societies transform into expansionist security states. Hobbes'
understanding of desire and its dilemmas elaborates George W. Bush's doctrine of preemptive

warfare, the logic of Israeli self-defense in the face of so-called "existential threats," and the
rationale behind stand-your-ground laws that exonerated the murderer of Trayvon Martin. The
fact of this logic's hegemony in economics and political science as rational-choice theory or in

international relations as Big R Realism make clear that futurist temporality is the unquestioned
philosophical foundation of the U.S. economic and political order , as well as the obviously imperial investments
of these economic disciplines. In short, it is the temporalization of desire itself that explains both the settler

colonial foundations of survival, life and the value of life, as well as its transformation into an
expansionist imperial project. Okay, that was part one. Part two: settlement and the global war on terror. So how does this reading
of Hobbes through Edelman help us understand the emergence of empire? Lorenzo Veracini has argued that settler colonialism is distinct from other
types of colonialism in so far as it seeks to erase itself as settler colonialism. Following Patrick Wolf's argument that settler colonialism pursues a logic of
elimination, whereby settlers seek to replace the native and indigenize themselves post-facto, Veracini argues
that because it aims at the elimination of the native, settlercolonization necessarily aims at its own elimination. The
truly successful settler colonial project, then, would therefore efface the native entirely, whether
through genocide or assimilation or some other form of disappearance, the politics of recognition as Glen Coulthard has recently argued. Unless

and until elimination is accomplished, settler states will engage in all sort of contortions, both
political and ideological, to obscure the native in order to naturalize the conquest. Veracini represents
this future of settler colonialism as either conceptually embedded its definition or else as a kind of bad faith on settlers' part, potentially implying that a
guilty conscience somehow seeks to ward off complicity with conquest. I think that Edelman's understanding of futurism,
however, helps explicate just how and why this anxious, reiterative, and reactionary veiling
impulse is definitive of bio-political sovereignty. Hobbes' narratization of the drive of the state of nature is, like any other
narratization of the drive, an imposition and thus an explicitly ideological move that serves a particular political agenda. It is the specifically

futurist character of this imposition that destines it for failure and thus explains its anxious and recursive
structure. Edelman regards this narrative movement toward a viable political future as
fundamentally fantasmatic, not to mention conservative and ideological. Futurism, in other words
and these are his words "perpetuates the fantasy of meaning's eventual realization," a realization that

is by definition impossible, in so far as it is always only ever to come. Right? That's what the future
is: It's beyond our grasp, it's always just out of reach. Built into Hobbes' understanding of desire, in other words, is the
failed tautology of futurism, which as Edelman instructs, is fundamentally and futilely political. My contention is that this constitutive

failure of futurism can be understood as the dynamic content of conquest in settler societies,
as the original civilizationist imposition of temporality, an act that explains their subsequent
transmogrification into expansionist security states. So, rather than face the violence that
brought peace and life itself into being, Hobbes instead naturalizes this founding act by declaring it to
be a "general inclination of all mankind" to engage in what he calls a "perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death." In
other words, he both institutes life and pushes it forward via a futurist narrativization of the drive
into an insatiable, cumulative desire. Yet while desire may push us ever forward, ever beyond
the initial moment of settlement, it cannot erase that settlement or relieve settlers' sovereignty of conquest.
This is neither because of settler colonialist theoretical definition nor because settlers secretly feel guilty, but rather because the
impossibility of fulfilling futurism's fantastical promises requires some other way of meeting
the needs it manufactures if settler sovereignty is to maintain itself and it polity in tact. Settler societies
resort to any number of destructive forms of managing futurism failing, from transfer and 's

removal to outright extermination through war, massacre, starvation, and disease. Yet this
anxious reiterative activity is wholly predicable from an Edelmanian perspective and
ineliminable from the structure of settler sovereignty because the futurist narrativization of the
drive has rendered settlers beholden to an unsustainable temporality that must produce queerness
or death in order to continue to produce meaning, survival, and civilization for itself. Settler

sovereignty, thus, cannot do without the death native it brings into being. The native as death must exist in order to

purchase life and survival for the settler. And yet, as Veracini and Wolf argue, the native cannot exist if the Commented [SV9]: how do u do this
settler is to indigenize herself as native to the land she has expropriated, hence the production of new enemies,
new queers, new deathly threats to settlement and its civilization and its way of life. The settler
colonial foundation of bio-political sovereignty gives way to an expansionist imperial security state that
finds new enemies abroad and new obstacles to its endless expansion, thereby solving, albeit
only ever partially and temporarily, the problem of futurist failure that constituted settlement to begin with.

settler society attempts to internalize colonial norms within indigenous people


that relegates them to permanent subjects of imperial rule the result is
psycho-existential suffering legal approaches fail and just create further
elimination of indigenous history vote negative to endorse a decolonial praxis
of revolutionary violence an affirmative strategy of psychotherapy that Commented [SV10]: Whats the mechanism/model of your
alt?
rejects the assimilative lure of the colonial state in favor of self-affirmation (Alt should be reduced to something everyone can
Coulthard, 14 [Glen Coulthard University of British Columbia, Department of Political Science, understand )

Associate Professor, (PhD University of Victoria) is a member of the Yellowknives Dene First
Nation and an associate professor in the First Nations and Indigenous Studies Program and the
Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, 2014, Red Skin, White Does the alt solve for its impacts?
-Where does it say that
Masks, pg. 131-149, accessed 5.2.2017]//TRossow *we do not endorse gendered language -Does it attempt to solve all cases of settler colonialism
In the second half of The Politics of Recognition Taylor identifies Fanons classic The Wretched of the Earth as one of the first texts to elicit the role
that misrecognition plays in propping up relations of domination.29 By extension Fanons analysis in The Wretched of the Earth is also used to support
one of the central political arguments underlying Taylors analysis, namely, his call for the cultural recognition of sub-state groups that have suffered at What does the alt look like?
the hands of a hegemonic political power. Although Taylor acknowledges that Fanon advocated violent
struggle as the primary How does it interact with the aff?
means of overcoming the psychoexistential complexes instilled in colonial subjects by
misrecognition, he nonetheless insists that Fanons argument is applicable to contemporary debates surrounding

the politics of difference more generally.30 Below I want to challenge Taylors use of Fanon in this context: not by disputing Taylors
assertion that Fanons work constitutes an important theorization of the ways in which the subjectivities of the oppressed can be deformed by mis- or
nonrecognition, but rather by contesting his assumption that a more accommodating, liberal regime of mutual recognition might be capable of
addressing the power relations typical of those between Indigenous peoples and settler states. Interestingly, Fanon posed a similar challenge in his
earlier work, Black Skin, White Masks. Fanons concern with the relationship between human freedom and equality in relations of recognition
represents a central and reoccurring theme in Black Skin, White Masks.31 As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, it was there that Fanon
convincingly argued that the
long-term stability of a colonial system of governance relies as much on the
internalization of the forms of racist recognition imposed or bestowed on the Indigenous
population by the colonial state and society as it does on brute force. For Fanon, then, the longevity of
a colonial social formation depends, to a significant degree, on its capacity to transform the colonized
population into subjects of imperial rule. Here Fanon anticipates at least one aspect of the well-known work of French Marxist
philosopher Louis Althusser, who would later argue that the reproduction of capitalist relations of production rests on the recognition function of
ideology, namely, the ability of a states ideological apparatus to interpellate individuals as subjects of class rule.32 For Fanon, colonialism operates
in a similarly dual-structured manner: it includes not only the interrelations of objective historical conditions but also human attitudes to these
conditions.33 Fanon argued that
it was the interplay between the structural/objective and
recognitive/subjective features of colonialism that ensured its hegemony over time. With respect to the
subjective dimension, Black Skin, White Masks painstakingly outlines the myriad ways in which those attitudes conducive to colonial rule are
cultivated among the colonized through the unequal exchange of institutionalized and interpersonal patterns of recognition between the colonial
society and the Indigenous population. In effect, Fanon showed how, over
time, colonized populations tend to internalize
the derogatory images imposed on them by their colonial masters, and how as a result of this
process, these images, along with the structural relations with which they are entwined, come
to be recognized (or at least endured) as more or less natural.34 This point is made agonizingly clear in arguably the most famous passage
from Black Skin, White Masks where Fanon shares an alienating encounter on the streets of Paris with a little white child. Look, a Negro! Fanon recalled the child saying, Moma, see the Negro! Im frightened!
frightened!35 At that moment the imposition of the childs racist gaze sealed Fanon into a crushing objecthood, fixing him like a chemical solution is fixed by a dye.36 He found himself temporarily
accepting that he was indeed the subject of the childs call: It was true, it amused me, thought Fanon.37 But then I subjected myself to an objective examination, I discovered my blackness, my ethnic
characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects.38 Far from assuring Fanons humanity, the others recognition imprisoned him in an externally
determined and devalued conception of himself. Instead of being acknowledged as a man among men, he was reduced to an object [among] other objects.39 Left as is, Fanons insights into the ultimately
subjectifying nature of colonial recognition appear to square nicely with Taylors work. For example, although Fanon never uses the term himself, he appears to be mapping the debilitating effects associated with

the imposition of the


misrecognition in the sense that Taylor uses the term. Indeed, Black Skin, White Masks is littered with passages highlighting the innumerable ways in which

settlers gaze can inflict damage on Indigenous societies at both the individual and collective
levels. Taylor is more or less explicit about his debt to Fanon in this respect too. Since 1492, he writes with The Wretched of the Earth in
mind, Europeans have projected an image of [the colonized] as somehow inferior, uncivilized,

and through the force of conquest have been able to impose this image on the conquered.40 Even
with these similarities, however, I believe that a close reading of Black Skin, White Masks renders problematic Taylors approach in several interrelated
and crucial respects. The
first problem has to do with its failure to adequately confront the dual
structure of colonialism itself. Fanon insisted, for example, that a colonial configuration of power could be
transformed only if attacked at both levels of operation: the objective and the subjective.41 This
point is made at the outset of Black Skin, White Masks and reverberates throughout all of Fanons work. As indicated in his introduction, although a
significant amount of Black Skin, White Masks would highlight and explore the psychological terrain of colonialism, this would not be
done in a manner decoupled from an analysis of its structural or material foundations. Indeed, Fanon
claimed that there will be an authentic disalienation of the colonized subject only to the degree to

which things, in the most materialistic meaning of the word, [are] returned to their proper
places.42 Hence the term sociodiagnostic for Fanons project: If there is an inferiority complex, it is the outcome of a double process . . .
primarily economic; [and] subsequently the internalization . . . of his inferiority. 43 In Fanon, colonial-capitalist exploitation and domination is correctly
situated alongside misrecognition and alienation as foundational sources of colonial injustice. The Negro problem, writes Fanon, does not resolve
itself into the problem of Negroes living among white men but rather of Negroes being exploited, enslaved, despised by a colonialist, capitalist society
that is only accidentally white.44 Lately a number of scholars have taken aim at the contribution of recognition theorists like Taylor on analogous
grounds: that their work offers little insight into how to address the more overtly structural and/or economic features of social oppression.48 We have
also been told that this lack of insight has contributed to a shift in the terrain of contemporary political
thought and practice more generallyfrom redistribution to recognition, to use Nancy Frasers
formulation. According to Fraser, whereas proponents of redistribution tend to highlight and confront

injustices in the economic sphere, advocates of the newer politics of recognition tend to focus
on and attack injustices in the cultural realm. On the redistribution front, proposed remedies for injustice range between
affirmative strategies, like the administration of welfare, to more transformative methods, like the transformation of the capitalist mode of
production itself. In contrast, strategies aimed at injustices associated with misrecognition tend to focus on cultural and symbolic change. Again, this
could involve affirmative approaches, such as the recognition and reaffirmation of previously disparaged identities, or these strategies could adopt a
more transformative form, such as the deconstruction of dominant patterns of representation in ways that would change everyones social
identities.49 I think that Fanons work, which anticipates the recognition/redistribution debate by half a century, highlights several key shortcomings
in the approaches of both Taylor and Fraser. Taylors
approach is insufficient insofar as it tends to, at its best,
address the political economy of colonialism in a strictly affirmative manner: through
reformist state redistribution schemes like granting certain cultural rights and concessions to
Aboriginal communities via selfgovernment and land claims packages. Although this approach
may alter the intensity of some of the effects of colonial-capitalist exploitation and domination,
it does little to address their generative structures, in this case a capitalist economy
constituted by racial and gender hierarchies and the colonial state. When his work is at its weakest, however,
Taylor tends to focus on the recognition end of the spectrum too much, and as a result leaves uninterrogated colonialisms

deep-seated structural features. Richard J. F. Day has succinctly framed the problem this way: Although Taylors recognition
model allows for diversity of culture within a particular state by admitting the possibility of

multiple national identifications, it is less permissive with regard to polity and economy . . . in
assuming that any subaltern group that is granted [recognition] will thereby acquire a
subordinate articulation with a capitalist state.50 Seen from this angle, Taylors theory leaves one of the two operative
levels of colonial power identified by Fanon untouched. This line of criticism is well worn and can be traced back to at least the work of early Karl Marx.
As such, I doubt that many would be surprised that Taylors variant of liberalism as liberalism fails to confront the structural or
economic aspects of colonialism at its generative roots. To my mind, however, this shortcoming in Taylors approach is
particularly surprising given the fact that, although many Indigenous leaders and communities today tend to

instrumentally couch their claims in reformist terms, this has not always been the case: indeed,
historically, Indigenous demands for cultural recognition have often been expressed in ways that
have explicitly called into question the dominating nature of capitalist social relations and the
state form.51 And the same can be said of a growing number of todays most prominent
Indigenous scholars and activists.52 Mohawk political scientist Taiaiake Alfred, for example, has repeatedly argued that the goal
of any traditionally rooted self-determination struggle ought to be to protect that which
constitutes the heart and soul of [I]ndigenous nations: a set of values that challenge the
homogenizing force of Western liberalism and free-market capitalism; that honor the
autonomy of individual conscience, non-coercive authority, and the deep interconnection
between human beings and other elements of creation.53 For Alfred, this vision is not only embodied in the
practical philosophies and ethical systems of many of North Americas Indigenous societies, but also flows from a realization that

capitalist economics and liberal delusions of progress have historically served as the engines
of colonial aggression and injustice itself.54 My point here is that an approach that is explicitly oriented
around dialog and listening ought to be more sensitive to the claims and challenges emanating
from these dissenting Indigenous voices.55 However, if Taylors account pays insufficient attention to the clearly structural and
economic realm of domination, then Frasers does so from the opposite angle. In order to avoid what she sees as the pitfalls associated with the politics
of recognitions latent essentialism and displacement of questions of distributive justice, Fraser proposes a means of integrating struggles for
recognition with those of redistribution without subordinating one to the other. To this end, Fraser suggests that instead
of
understanding recognition as the revaluation of cultural or group-specific identity, and
misrecognition as the disparagement of such identity and its consequent effects on the
subjectivities of minorities, recognition and misrecognition should be conceived of in terms of
the institutionalized patterns of value that affect ones ability to participate as a peer in social
life. To view recognition in this manner, writes Fraser, is to treat it as an issue of social status.
at the expe nse of addre ss ing t wo of the most pertinent features of injustices re lated to mis- or nonrecognit ion in colonia l contexts. F irst, when a pplied to I ndige nous strugg les for recognition, Fraser s status mode l re sts on the proble mat ic background asumpt s ion t hat the settler state constit utes a legit imate fra me work within which I ndigenous people s might be more just ly included, or from which they could be further excluded. H ere Fraser, like Tay lor, leaves intact two features of colonia l domination that I ndig enous ass ertions of nat ionhood ca ll into quest ion: t he leg itimacy of the s ettler state s c la im to sovere ignty over I ndig
56 Although Fraser s status mode l a llows her t o curta il some of the pr oble ms s he attributes to ide ntity politics, it doe s so

enous people a nd the ir terr itor ies on the one hand, and t he nor mat ive status of the state-form as an appropriate mode of g overnance on the other. 57 I ndeed, at one point in her we ll-known exchange with Axe l Honneth, Fraser hints at her theory s weak ness in this er gard. While discuss ing the work of Will Kymlicka, Fraser admits that her status mode l may not be as s uited to s ituat ions whe re c la ims for recognit ion contest a current
distribut ion of state s overeig nty. Where Kymlicka s approach is ta ilore d to de mands forrecog nition in mult inat iona l soc ieties, Fraser s pr oject, we are told, seeks to address s uch de mands in polyethnic polit ieslike the Unite d States. 58 The proble m with this caveat, however, is that it is pre mised on a misrecognit ion of its own: na mey,l that as a state founded on the dis pos sesse d territ ories of prev ious ly s elf-deter mining but now colonized I ndigenous nations, the Unite d States is a mult inat iona l state in much the way that Ca nada is.My second concern is this: if many of t oday s most volat le i polit ical c onflicts do include subjective or psycholog ical dime ns ions to the m in the way that Fraser admit s (and Taylor a dn Fanon describe), then I fear her a ppr oach, which atte mpts to e sche wa direct engage me nt with this a spect of s ocia l oppre sson, i risks leaving a n important contr ibut ing dynamic to ide ntity-re lated for ms of dominat ion unchecked. By av oiding this psycholog iz ing te nde ncy within the polit ics of recogn it ion, Fraser cla ims to have located what is
wrong with misrecognit ion in socia l re lations a nd not individua l or interpersonal psychology. This is preferable, we are t old, becaus e when misrecognit ion is iden t ifie d wit h interna l dist ortions in the structure of the conscious nes s of the oppresse d, it is but a short ste p to bla ming th
e v ictim. 59 This does not have to be the case. Fanon, for example, was una mbig uous with respect to locating t he cause of the infe rior ity complex of coloniz ed subjects in the colonia l s ocia l structure. 60 The pr oble m, however, is t hat a ny psycholog ica l pr oblems t hat e nsue, a lt houg h soc ially constitute d, can take on a life of the ir own, and thus need to be dea lt with indepe ndent ly andin accordance with the ir own specific log ics. As ment ioned prev ious ly, Fanon wa s ins iste nt that a change in t he soc ia l struct ure would not guarantee a chang e in the subjectiv it ies of the oppres sed. Stated s imply, if Fanon s ins ight into the inter depe ndentyet se mi- autonomous nature of the two facets of colonia l power is correct, then dumping a ll our efforts int o a llev iat ing the insti t utiona l or
structural impediments to partic ipatory par ity ( whet her redistr ibutive or recog nit ive) may not do anything to undercut the de bilitating forms of unfreedom re lated to misrecognit ion in the tradit iona l s ense. 61 This brings us t o t he second key pr oble m with Tay lor s the ory when applied to colonia lcontexts. I have a lrea dy s uggested that Tay lor s libera lrecog nition appr
oach is incapable of curbing t he da mages wrought wit hin and aga inst I ndige nous communitie s by the structures of state and cap ita l, but what a bout his t heory of recognition? Does it suffer the sa me fate vis--vis t he forms of power that it seeks t o undercut? As noted in the previous section, under ly ing Taylor s the ory is t he assumpt ion that the flour is hing of I ndige nous pe oples as distinct and se lf-determining ent ities is s ignif icantly de pendent on the ir be ing afforde d cultura l recognit ion and inst itutiona l accommodat ion
by the sett ler stat e apparatus. What makes this appr oach both s o intr iguing and so proble mat ic, however, is that Fano n, whom Tay lor us es to make his case, argued aga inst a
similar pres umption in the penult imate chapter of Black Sk in, White Masks. More over, like Tay lor, Fa non did so with referenceto Hege l s master /s lave parable. T here Fanon argued that the dia lectical progress ion to reciprocity in re lat ions of recognition is frequent ly undermined in colonial s ituations by the fact that, unlike the subjugated s lave in Heg el s Phe nomenology of Spirit, many colonized s ociet ies no longer have to strugg le for the ir freedo m and inde pendence. I t is often negot iated, achieve d throug h const itut ional a mendment, or s imply declare d by the s ettler state an d best owed upon the I ndige nous populat ion in the form of politica l rig hts. Whatever the method, in these circumstances the colonize d, steeped in t he ines sent ia lity of serv itude, are set free by [the] master. 62 One day the White Ma ster, wit hout confct, li recogniz e[s] the Negro s lave. 63 As such, they do not have t o lay down the ir live s to prove the ir certainty of be ing in
the way that Hege l ins iste d. 64 T he upheava l of for ma lfree dom and independe nce t hus reaches the
colonized from without: The black ma n [is] acted upon. Va lues t hat [are] not . . . created by his actions, va lue s t hat [ar e] not . . . born of t he systolic t ideof his blood, [da nce] in a hued whir l around him. The upheaval [does] not make a difference in the Negro. He [goes] from oneway of life to anothe r, but not from one life t o a nother. 65 T here are a number of important is sue s underly ing Fa non s concer n here. T he first involve s t he re lations hip he dra ws bet wee n strugg le and the disa lienat ion of the colonized s ubject. For Fa non itis through strugg le and conflict (and for t he later Fa non, v iole nt struggle and conflict) that imper ial subjects come to be idr of the arsena l of complexes dr iven into the core of the ir be ing throug h the colonia l process. 66 I will have more to say a boutthis as pect of Fanon s thought be low, but for now I s imply wa nt t o f lag the fact that strugg le serves as the me diat ing forc thr e ough which the colonize d come to s hed their colonia l ident it ies, thus restor ing t hem to the ir proper places. 67 I n contexts wh ere r ecognition is

the colonized may


conferred without strugg le or conf lict, this funda menta l se lf-transformat ionor as Lou T urner ha s put it, this inner different iation at the leve l of the colonized s be ingca nnot occur, thus foreclos ing the rea lizat ion of free dom. Hence Fanon s cla im that the colonized s imply go from one way oflife to another, but not from one life to a nother; the str ucture of domination is modif ied, but the s ubject pos it ion of t he colonized re ma ins unchange dthey become ema ncipated s laves. 68 T he second important point t o note is that whe nFanon speaks of a lack of strugg le in the decolonization move ment s of his day, he does no
t mea n t o suggest that the colonized in these contexts s imply rema ined pass ive recipients of colonia l pract ices. He readily dmits,
a for exa mple, that from t ime to t ime

indeed fight for Liberty and Justice. However, when this fight is carried out in a manner that does
not pose a foundational break with the background structures of colonial power as suchwhich,
for Fanon, will always invoke struggle and conflictthen the best the colonized can hope for is white liberty and

white justice; that is, values secreted by [their] masters.69 Without conflict and struggle the
terms of recognition tend to remain in the possession of those in power to bestow on their
inferiors in ways that they deem appropriate.70 Note the double level of subjection here: without
transformative struggle constituting an integral aspect of anticolonial praxis the Indigenous
population will not only remain subjects of imperial rule insofar as they have not gone through a
process of purging the psycho-existential complexes battered into them over the course of their
colonial experiencea process of strategic desubjectificationbut they will also remain so in that
the Indigenous society will tend to come to see the forms of structurally limited and constrained
recognition conferred to them by their colonial masters as their own: that is, the colonized will
begin to identify with white liberty and white justice. As Fanon would later phrase it in The Wretched of the Earth,
these values eventually seep into the colonized and subtly structure and limit the possibility of
their freedom.71 Either way, for Fanon, the colonized will have failed to reestablish themselves as truly
self-determining: as creators of the terms, values, and conditions by which they are to be
recognized.72 My third concern with Taylors politics of recognition involves a misguided sociological assumption that undergirds his
appropriation of Hegels notion of mutual recognition. As noted in the previous section, at the heart of Hegels master/slave dialectic is the idea that
both parties engaged in the struggle for recognition are dependent on the others acknowledgment for their freedom and self-worth. Moreover, Hegel
asserts that this dependency is even more crucial for the master in the relationship, for unlike the
slave [they are] he or she is unable to achieve independence and objective self-certainty
through the object of his or her own labor. Mutual dependency thus appears to be the
background condition that ensures the dialectic progress towards reciprocity. This is why Taylor claims,
with reference to Hegel, that the struggle for recognition can only find one satisfactory solution, and that

is a regime of reciprocal recognition among equals.73 However, as Fanons work reminds us, the problem with
this formulation is that when applied to actual struggles for recognition between hegemonic and
subaltern communities the mutual character of dependency rarely exists. This observation is made in a lengthy footnote in
Black Skin, White Masks where Fanon claims to have shown how the colonial master basically differs from the master depicted in Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit. For Hegel there is reciprocity, but in the
colonies the master laughs at the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is not recognition but work.74 To my mind this is one of the most crucial passages in Black Skin, White Masks for it
outlines in precise terms what is wrong with the recognition paradigm when abstracted from the face-to-face encounter in Hegels dialectic and applied to colonial situations. Although the issue here is an obvious
one, it has nonetheless been critically overlooked in the contemporary recognition literature: in relations of domination that exist between nation-states and the sub-state national groups that they incorporate

the colonial state


into their territorial and jurisdictional boundaries, there is no mutual dependency in terms of a need or desire for recognition.75 In these contexts, the masterthat is,

and state societydoes not require recognition from the previously self-determining
communities upon which its territorial, economic, and social infrastructure is constituted. What
it needs is land, labor, and resources.76 Thus, rather than leading to a condition of reciprocity the
dialectic either breaks down with the explicit nonrecognition of the equal status of the colonized
population, or with the strategic domestication of the terms of recognition leaving the
foundation of the colonial relationship relatively undisturbed.77 Anyone familiar with the power dynamics that
structure the Aboriginal rights movement in Canada should immediately see the applicability of Fanons insights here. Indeed, one need not

expend much effort to elicit the countless ways in which the liberal discourse of recognition has
been limited and constrained by the state, the courts, corporate interests, and policy makers
in ways that have helped preserve the colonial status quo
courts have secured an unprecedented degree of protection for certain cultura l practices within t he state, they have noneth e le ss repeate dly refused to cha llenge the rac ist orig in of Ca nada s as sumed s overe ign author ity over I ndigenous peoples and t he ir terr itor ie s. The politica l and economic ra mifi
. With respect to the la w, for example, over the last thirty years theSupreme Court of Canada has cons iste ntly refuse d to recognize Abor ig ina l pe oples e qua l and se lf-determining status bas ed on its a dhere nce to lega l pr ecedent founded on the white s upremac ist myth that I ndigenous societiewere

cations of rece nt Abor igina l rig hts jur is prude nce have been c lear-cut. I n De lgamuuk w v. Br itish Columbia it wa s dec lared that any res idua l Abor ig ina l r ights that may have s urvive d the unilatera l as sertion of Cr own sovere ig nty could be infr inged upon by thefedera l and prov inc ia lg overnments s o long as t his act ion could be s hown t o further a compe lling and substant ia l leg islat iveobjective t hat is cons iste nt wit h t he spec ia l fiduciary re lationship betwe en the Crown and the [A]borig ina l peoples. What s ubs
s too pr imitive to bear polit ci al r ights when they f irst encountered Eur opean powers. 78 Thus, even though the

tant ia l objectives might just ify infr inge ment? According to the court, v irtua lly any exploitative e conomic venture, inc ludingthe deve lopme nt of agr iculture, forestry, mining, and hydroe lectr ic power, the general economic development of the inter ior of
Brit is h Columbia, protection of the e nvir onment or e ndangere d species, a nd the building of infrastructure and t he settleme ntof fore ig n populat ions t o support those a ims. 79 So today it a ppears, much as it did in Fanon s day, that colonia l powers will only ecognizr e t he collective rig hts and ident it ies of I ndigenous people s insofar as this recognit ion does not thr ow into quest ion t he background legal, polit ical, and economic frame work of the colonia l re lat ionship itse lf. 80 But the above example s confir m onlyone as pect of Fanon s insig ht into the pr oble m of r ecognition in colonia lcontexts: na me ly, the limitat ions this approach run s up aga inst when pitted aga inst t hese overt ly structura l express ions of dominat ion. Are his crit ic is ms and concerns equally re leva nt to the subject ive or psycho-affective features of conte mporary colonia l power? With re spect t o t he forms of racist recog nition rdiven into the psyches of I ndige nous pe oples thr ough the inst itutions of the state, church, schools, and media, a nd by racistindividua ls within t he domina nt society, the
ans wer is clear ly yes. Count le ss studies, novels, and a utobiogra phical narratives hav
e out line d, in pa inful detail, how thes e express ions have sa ddle d indiv iduals wit h low se lf-esteem, depres s ion, a lcohol and drug abuse, and violent be haviors directed both inward aga inst the se lf and outwar d t oward others. 81 S imilar ly conv inc ing argumentshave been made concerning the limite d for ms of recognit ion a nd accommodation offered to I ndigenous communit ies by the state.For exa mple, Ta ia iake Alfred s work unpacks the ways in which t he state inst itut iona l a nd discurs ive f ie lds within a nd aga ins t which I ndigenous dema nds for recognit ion ar e made a nd adjudicated can come to shape t he se lf-understa ndings of the I ndige nous c la ima nts involved. T he pr oble m for Alfred is that these f ie lds are by no means neutra l: the y are pr ofoundly hierarchica l and as suchhave the ability to asymmetr ically govern how I ndigenous s ubjects think and act not only in relat ion to the recognit ion cla imat hand, but a lso in re lat ion to the mse lves, to others, and the land. This is

the dominance of the legal approach to self-determination has over time helped produce
what I take Alfred to mean when he suggests, echoingFanon, that

a class of Aboriginal citizens whose rights and identities have become defined more in
relation to the colonial state and its legal apparatus than the history and traditions of
Indigenous nations themselves. Similarly, strategies that have sought independence via capitalist
economic development have already facilitated the creation of an emergent Aboriginal
bourgeoisie whose thirst for profit has come to outweigh their ancestral obligations to the land
and to others. Whatever the method, the point here is that these strategies threaten to erode the most
egalitarian, nonauthoritarian, and sustainable characteristics of traditional Indigenous cultural
practices and forms of social organization. 82 Self-Recognition and Anticolonial Empowerment The argument sketched to this point is bleak in its implications. Indeed, left as is, it would appear that recognition inevitably leads to subjection, and

as such much of what Indigenous peoples have sought over the last forty years to secure their freedom has in practice cunningly assured its opposite. Interpreted this way, my line of argument appears to adhere to an outdated conception of power, one in which postcolonial critics, often reacting against the likes of Fanon and others, have worked so
diligently to refute. The implication of this view is that Indigenous subjects are always being interpellated by recognition, being constructed by colonial discourse, or being assimilated by colonial power structures.83 As a result, resistance to this totalizing power is often portrayed as an inherently reactionary, zero-sum project. To the degree that Fanon
can be implicated in espousing such a totalizing view of colonial power, it has been suggested that he was unable to escape the Manichean logic so essential in propping up relations of colonial domination to begin with.84 I want to defend Fanon, at least partially, from the charge that he advocated such a devastating view of power. However, in order to
assess the degree to which Fanon anticipates and accounts for this general line of criticism, we must unpack his theory of anticolonial agency and empowerment. As argued throughout the preceding pages, Fanon did not attribute much emancipatory potential to Hegels politics of recognition when applied to colonial situations. Yet this is not to say that
he rejected the recognition paradigm entirely. As we have seen, like Hegel and Taylor, Fanon ascribed to the notion that relations of recognition are constitutive of subjectivity and that, when unequal, they can foreclose the realization of human freedom. On the latter point, however, he was deeply skeptical as to whether the mutuality envisioned by

the pathway to self-


Hegel was achievable in the conditions indicative of contemporary colonialism. But if Fanon did not see freedom as naturally emanating from the slave being granted recognition from his or her master, where, if at all, did it originate?85 In effect, Fanon claimed that

determination instead lay in a quasi-Nietzschean form of personal and collective self-affirmation.86 Rather
than remaining dependent on their oppressors for their freedom and self-worth, Fanon recognized that
the colonized must instead struggle to work through their alienation/subjection against the
objectifying gaze and assimilative lure of colonial recognition. According to Fanon, it is this self-initiated
process that triggers a change of fundamental importance in the colonizeds psycho-affective
equilibrium.87 According to this view, the colonized must initiate the process of decolonization by first
recognizing themselves as free, dignified, and distinct contributors to humanity. Unlike Nietzsche,
however, Fanon equated this process of self-recognition with the praxis undertaken by the slave in Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit, which Fanon saw
as illustrating the necessity on the part of the oppressed to turn away from their otheroriented master-dependency, and to instead struggle for
freedom on their own terms and in accordance with their own values.88 I would also argue that this is why Fanon, although critical of the at times
bourgeois and essentialist character of certain works within the negritude tradition, nonetheless saw the project as necessary.89 Fanon was attuned to
ways in which the individual and collective revaluation of black culture and identity could serve as a source of pride and empowerment, and if
approached critically and directed appropriately, could help jolt the colonized into an actional existence, as opposed to a reactional one
characterized by ressentiment.90 As Robert Young notes in the context of Third World decolonization, it was
this initial process of collective self-affirmation that led many colonized populations to
develop a distinctive postcolonial epistemology and ontology which enabled them to begin
to conceive of and construct alternatives to the colonial project itself.91 I would argue that
Fanons call in Black Skin, White Masks for a simultaneous turn inward and away from the master, far from
espousing a rigidly binaristic Manichean view of power relations, instead reflects a profound understanding of the

complexity involved in contests over recognition in colonial and racialized environments. Unlike
Hegels life-and-death struggle between two opposing forces, Fanon added a multidimensional racial/cultural aspect to the dialectic, thereby
underscoring the multifarious web of recognition relations that are at work in constructing identities and establishing (or undermining) the conditions
necessary for human freedom and flourishing. Fanon showed that the power dynamics in which identities are formed and deformed were nothing like
the hegemon/subaltern binary depicted by Hegel. In an anticipatory way, then, Fanons insight can also be said to challenge the overly negative and all-
subjectifying view of interpellation that would plague Althussers theory of ideology more than a decade later. For Althusser, the process of
interpellation always took the form of a fundamental misrecognition that served to produce within individuals the specific characteristics and
desires that commit them to the very actions that are required of them by their [subordinate] class position.92 Fanons
innovation was
that he showed how similar recognitive processes worked to call forth and empower
individuals within communities of resistance.93 This is not to say, of course, that Fanon was able to completely escape the
Manicheism delirium that he was so astute at diagnosing.94 Those familiar with the legacy of Fanons later work, for example, know that the
actional existence that he saw self-recognition initiating in Black Skin, White Masks would in The Wretched of the Earth take the form of a direct and
violent engagement with the colonial society and its institutional structure. At
the very moment [the colonized come to]
discover their humanity, wrote Fanon, they must begin to sharpen their weapons to secure its
victory.95 In Fanons later work, violence would come to serve as a kind of psychotherapy of the
oppressed, offering a primary form of agency through which the subject moves from non-
being to being, from object to subject.96 In this sense, the practice of revolutionary violence, rather
than the affirmative recognition of the other, offered the most effective means to transform
the subjectivities of the colonized, as well as to topple the social structure that produced
colonized subjects to begin with. Turning Our Backs on Colonial Power? Before concluding this chapter, I want to briefly address an
important counterargument to the position I am advocating here, especially regarding the call to selectively turn away from engaging the discourses
and structures of settler-colonial power with the aim of transforming these sites from within. Dale Turner offers such an argument in his book This Is
Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy, in which he advances the claim that if Indigenous peoples want the relationship between
themselves and the Canadian state to be informed by their distinct worldviews, then they will have to engage the states legal and political discourses
in more effective ways.97 Underlying Turners theoretical intervention is the assumption that colonial
relations of power operate
primarily by excluding the perspectives of Indigenous peoples from the discursive and
institutional sites that give their rights content. Assuming this is true, then it would indeed appear that critically undermining colonialism requires that Indigenous peoples find more effective ways of participating in the Canadian legal and political practices that determine the meaning of Aboriginal rights.98 For

Turner, one of the preconditions for establishing a postcolonial relationship is the development of an intellectual community of Indigenous word warriors capable of engaging the legal and political discourses of the state. According to Turner, because it is an unfortunate but unavoidable fact that the rights of Indigenous peoples will for the foreseeable future be largely interpreted by non-Indigenous judges and policy makers within non-Indigenous institutions, it is imperative that Indigenous communities develop the
capacity to effectively interject our unique perspectives into the conceptual spaces where our rights are framed. It is on this last point that Turner claims to distinguish his approach from the work of Indigenous intellectuals like Patricia Monture and Taiaiake Alfred. Turner claims that the problem with the decolonial strategies developed by these scholars is that they fail to propose a means of effecting positive change within the very legal and political structures that currently hold a monopoly on the power to determine the
scope and content of our rights. According to Turner, by focusing too heavily on tactics that would see us turn our backs on the institutions of colonial power, these Indigenous scholars do not provide the tools required to protect us against the unilateral construction of our rights by settler-state institutions. For Turner, it is through an ethics of participation that Indigenous peoples can better hope to shape the legal and political relationship so that it respects Indigenous world views.99 The efficacy of Turners intervention
rests on a crucial theoretical assumption reflected in his texts quasi-Foucauldian use of the term discourse. I say quasi-Foucauldian because when he refers to the discursive practices of word warriors he assumes that these pack the power necessary to transform the legal and political discourses of the state into something more amenable to Indigenous languages of political thought. Here Turner assumes that the counterdiscourses that word warriors interject into the fiel d of Canadian law and politics have the capacity to
shape and govern the ways in which Aboriginal rights are reasoned about and acted on. The problem, however, is that Turner is less willing to attribute the same degree of power to the legal and political discourses of the state. This is what I mean when I claim that his use of the concept is quasi-Foucauldian. When Turner speaks of the legal and political discourses of the state, he spends little time discussing the assimilative power that these potentially hold in relation to the word warriors that are to engage them. Indeed, the
only place he does briefly mention this is at the end of his final chapter, when he writes: For an indigenous person the problem of assimilation is always close at hand. The anxiety generated by moving between intellectual cultures is real, and many indigenous intellectuals find it easier to become part of mainstream culture. This kind of assimilation will always exist, and it may not always be a bad thing for indigenous peoples as a whole. It becomes dangerous when indigenous intellectuals become subsumed or appropriated by

there is little discussion of how Indigenous peoples might curb the risks of
the dominant culture yet continue to act as if they were word warriors.100 Here we reach a limit in Turners argument:

interpellation as they seek to interpolate the much more powerful discursive economy of the
Canadian legal and political system. Although Turner repeatedly suggests that part of the answer to this problem lies in the ability of word warriors to
remain grounded in the thought and practices of their communities, in the end he spends little time discussing what this might entail in practice.
Further, while Turner is right to pay attention to discursive forms of power, his analysis eclipses the role that nondiscursive configurations play in
reproducing colonial relations. My concern here is that the
problem with the legal and political discourses of the
state is not only that they enjoy hegemonic status vis--vis Indigenous discourses, but that they
are also backed by and hopelessly entwined with the economic, political, and military might of
the state itself. This means that Indigenous peoples must be able to account for these material
relations as well, which would require an exploration of theories and practices that move
beyond liberal and ideational forms of discursive transformation. While I recognize that this might be beyond the
scope of Turners investigation, I think that speaking to the diversity of forms of decolonial practice would have made his case more convincing. One of
the important insights of Fanons critiqueof the politics of recognition is that it provides us with theoretical
tools that enable us to determine the relative transformability of certain fields of colonial power
over others. These tools subsequently put us in a better position to critically assess which
strategies hold the most promise, and which others are more susceptible to failure. Conclusion In
retrospect, Fanon appears to have overstated the cleansing value he attributed to anticolonial
violence.101 Indeed, one could argue that many Algerians have yet to fully recover from the legacy left from
the eight years of carnage and brutality that constituted Algerias war of independence with
France. Nor was the Front de Libration Nationales (FLN) revolutionary seizure of the Algerian state apparatus enough to stave off what Fanon
would call the curse of [national] independence: namely, the subjection of the newly liberated people and territories to the tyranny of the market
and a postindependence class of bourgeois national elites.102 But if Fanon ultimately overstated violences role as the perfect mediation through
which the colonized come to liberate themselves from both the structural and psycho-affective features of colonial domination that he identified so
masterfully, then what is the relevance of his work here and now?103 In this chapter I have suggested that Fanons
insights into the
subjectifying nature of colonial recognition are as applicable today to the liberal politics of
recognition as they were when he first formulated his critique of Hegels master/slave relation. I have also
suggested that Fanons dual-structured conception of colonial power still captures the subtle (and not

so subtle) ways in which a system of settler-state domination that does not sustain itself
exclusively by force is reproduced over time. As Taiaiake Alfred argues, under these postmodern imperial conditions
oppression has become increasingly invisible; [it is] no longer constituted in conventional terms

of military occupation, onerous taxation burdens, blatant land thefts, etc., but rather through a
fluid confluence of politics, economics, psychology and culture.104 But if the dispersal and
effects of colonial and state power are now so diffuse, how is one to transform or resist them?
Here I believe that Fanons work remains insightful. In that all important footnote in Black Skin, White Masks where Fanon claimed to show how the
condition of the slave in the Phenomenology of Spirit differed from those in the colonies, he suggested that Hegel provided a partial answer: that
those struggling against colonialism must turn away from the colonial state and society and
instead find in their own decolonial praxis the source of their liberation. Today this process will
and must continue to involve some form of critical individual and collective self-recognition on
the part of Indigenous societies, not only in an instrumental sense like Fanon seemed to have envisioned it, but with the
understanding that our cultural practices have much to offer regarding the establishment of
relationships within and between peoples and the natural world built on principles of reciprocity
and respectful coexistence. Also, the empowerment that is derived from this critically self-
affirmative and self-transformative ethics of desubjectification must be cautiously directed away
from the assimilative lure of the statist politics of recognition, and instead be fashioned toward
our own on-the-ground struggles of freedom. As the feminist, antiracist theorist bell hooks explains, such a project would
minimally require that we stop being so preoccupied with looking to that Other for recognition; instead we should be recognizing

ourselves and [then seeking to] make contact with all who would engage us in a constructive
manner.105 In my concluding chapter I flesh-out what such a politics might look like in the present; a politics that is less oriented
around attaining a definitive form of affirmative recognition from the settler state and society,
and more about critically reevaluating, reconstructing, and redeploying Indigenous cultural
forms in ways that seek to prefigure, alongside those with similar ethical commitments, radical
alternatives to the structural and psycho-affective facets of colonial domination discussed
above. However, before I can commence with this concluding part of my project, Fanons critique of recognition must first be evaluated against the
politics of recognition as it has played out in the empirical context of Indigenousstate relations in Canada. Providing such an evaluation will be my
focus in the next three chapters.

we are not a resistance of state authority but rather a refusal the difference is
key modern politics use a dualism of resistance and power this skirts the
question of the settler states very legitimacy in the face of state domination
you should affirm our pursuit of alternative modes of being
Ferguson 15 [Kennan, co-editor of Theory & Event, 2015, Theory Event, Refusing Settler
Colonialism: Simpsons Mohawk Interruptus, Volume: 18, Issue 4 page 1,
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/595847,accessed 7/6/17, JYH]

Resistance as a political strategy proves unsatisfying, but often seems to be the only trope
available to contemporary political theory. Theorists find resistance in movements from
Occupy to protests against racialized police brutality, and often imply that all political
engagement must, at some deep level, be about resisting. But the individual and collective
aptitudes for politics are more capacious than that. And so others have begun to examine
modes of political behavior which operate along other lines. Paying attention to affect has been one method;
focusing on quotidian life, another; so has been interrogating the distinction between the human and the nonhuman; and a fourth could be called
investigating practices of intensification. Each of these approaches denies the dualism between resistance and
power, finding other channels in which politics takes place. Audra Simpson, in her analysis of American Indian
relations to the settler state, adds another philosophical concept to this list of alternatives to resistance: refusal. Refusal, in her

rendition, operates very differently from resistance. As a weapon of the weak, resistance can
reinscribe weakness as an identifying formulation of identity. Theorists from Friedrich Nietzsche to William
Connolly to Wendy Brown have noted the replication of superiority and inferiority in such a dynamic. Refusal, on the other hand,

interrupts the smooth operation of power, denying presumed authority and remaking ignored
narratives. Historically, it is empirical; strategically, it is oppositional; psychically, it is
enjoyable (106). Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States, makes an extended argument for this political approach,
both as a way of understanding Native relations with the U.S. and Canadian governments, and as a model for further forms of political action. Put
simply, refusal does not take authority as a given. Where resistance looks for lacuna and
interruptions in the constancy of power, refusal denies its very legitimacy. This might emerge
from emphasizing alternative forms of legitimacy, for example the legal structures of the
Mohawk people, or it may draw on practices which predate and thus do not depend on state
formations. Where the modern nation-state insists on its own totalizing reality, those who refuse deny its authority and its domination. Where
the state claims a monopoly on violence, those who refuse deny its universality and capacity . Where the state claims to

determine what laws, treaties, and norms should be followed and which should be ignored,
those who refuse turn to history, international law, and documentation not merely to resist,
but to insist on alternative rationalities and legitimacies. This is not a safe approach, of course.
Where resistance incurs compulsion and persuasion, refusal can be met with outrage and
incomprehension. How dare a small group reject the wisdom and success of settler colonialism?
Such refusal throws into doubt the entire system of North American rectitude, majoritarian representational democracy, and

constitutional justice. It implies, even states outright, that a political system founded upon the systematic delegitmation and elimination of
a resident population with ethically and legally recognized rights to their land never can be a just one. The procedures of refusal, Simpson shows,
requires a legal response to contain those who refuse, a move that then incites settler anxiety about the containability of Indian bodies and practices
(128). Capitalist
settler states prefer resistance, which can be negotiated or recognized. Thus the
historical attempt to refigure the Native American as just another racial or cultural
minority, one whose grievances have more to do with an exclusion from mainstream
American and Canadian life than anything else. Of course Indians can be equal, liberal
individuals in a democratic country, the state suggests; once racism and the social ills of poverty
and addiction are solved, Indians will become just like everyone else. Note, Simpson points out, what is elided in
such a move: the history of colonial appropriation of land, the destruction of native languages and collective practices, and the legal status of Indian
peoples as sovereign nations. Positioning
Native peoples as liberal individuals has been the logic of
genocide for hundreds of years. The only proper response to this is a refusal of such a logic.
What does such refusal look like in practice? At its most basic level, it insists upon the historical
truth of Indian belonging and indigeneity in the face of a state power which would overlay its
own political categorizations in an attempt to remake the world. Audra Simpson disembarks from a bus at the
international border crossing south of Montreal, and presents her status card. How long will she be visiting the United States, and shouldnt she have a
green card, she is asked. No, she replies, she is an Indian. But she is visiting the United States, the authoritative and aggressive border agent insists. No,
she was born south of the US border, she explains. Well, then, you are an American. No, I am not, I am a Mohawk Simpson replies. As she is walking
away, the agent insists: You are an American! Simpson yells back I am a Mohawk (117-119). Notice, as Simpson does, that the agent is insisting not
on legalisms or legitimacy, but on a fundamental ontological fixity. And Simpson, simply, is having none of it. Or take a recent political engagement
which similarly (and more publically) exemplifies the politics of refusal. In
2010, the Iroquois Nationals Lacrosse Team
landed at Heathrow on their way to play in the World Lacrosse League Championship in
Manchester. The entire team carried Haudenosaunee passports, signed by the chiefs of the
Iroquois Confederacy. Denied entrance into England, they produced copious evidence of treaties signed between the British Crown and the
Confederacy, agreements which had never been reversed or superseded. The Iroquois (or, more properly, Kanienkeh:ka) did not agree to be made
Canadian or American; instead, they insisted on their own national identity, reinforcing it with documentation (27). In doing
so, they made
the game of lacrosse (which contemporary press accounts gleefully pointed out was created by
the Iroquois) into a sign of a radically contemporary failure to remember the past, to honor
those treaties by the present United Kingdom (182-183). This refusal circulated a reminder to
the nation-state system of its settler colonial past, present, and future. In the disciplinary matrix of
contemporary higher education, Simpson is an anthropologist, so her book emphasizes many of the usual tools of the trade: interviews, lived
experience, questions of sampling. But to this she brings her own politics of ethnographic refusal (22). Anthropology all of the social sciences, really
presume totality, claiming that each exemplary case, each model, and each data point leads to a fuller, more complete understanding of the
underlying truth of a social reality. Simpson refuses this social ontology, arguing that the experience of any person, and any people, sheds light upon
large histories and structures of control, but still has its own logic and substantive basis. Humans, in their lived lives, are critique. A true ethnography
should speak to the moments of refusal inherent to every kind of human existence; each
"case" exists in an emergent and
historically sophisticated way. Simpson's approach to the practices of social sciences is itself an act of refusal. She has written a book
which speaks to a wide range of theoretical approaches, one which undercuts the presumptions of state privilege and universalist history while at the
same time highlighting distinctive and alternative geographies of identity and affective belonging. Rather than merely a book of and for anthropology,
then, Mohawk Interruptus calls upon its reader to
rethink action and collectivity through a different modality
than the current political registers presume. Refusal, both as a political theoretical concept
and as a quotidian shared practice, may allow a continued, powerful, and even potentially
joyful relationship to state power.
Ag lit
1. Small Farming Turn - Agribusiness is collapsing biodiversity now -
only a shift towards family farming solves
*multiple warrants - monocultures, pesticides, diets
*A2 - industrial farms key to food

Kravitz, Food journalist, 16


[Melissa, writer in New York City who writes about food and culture for First We Feast,
Thrillist, Elite Daily, Edible, and other publications, internally cites American Farmland
Trust, a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit that promotes environmentally sound farming
practices, Severine von Tscharner Fleming, founder of the Greenhorns, a non-profit group
working to support a new generation of young farmers, a 2012 United Nations report, "Food
and Agriculture: The Future of Sustainability, and the US Department of Agriculture., 10-
12-16, Alternet, The Many Ways Farmer's Markets and Small Family Farms Are Essential to
Our Future, http://www.alternet.org/food/why-farmers-markets-are-critical-food-
security-environment-and-public-health, accessed 6.27.2017]//TRossow
Ending food insecurity may be as easy as supporting your local farmers market. In
advance of World Food Dayon October 16, American Farmland Trust, a Washington, D.C.-
based nonprofit that promotes environmentally sound farming practices, named its top
farmers markets in the nation, many of which are based in warmer southern states like
Florida and Virginia. But no matter what region you live in, farmers markets and small
farms are essential to community health.
Small family farms have been shown to be the most effective, per acre, at ecological
stewardship, biodiversity and production of nutrition, said Severine von Tscharner
Fleming, founder of the Greenhorns, a non-profit group working to support a new
generation of young farmers. Small family farms employ more workers, supporting the
local economy and rural prosperity and can adapt and change with the market demands
or shifts in climate," she argues.
Rather than massive monoculture farms, which may vend millions of pounds of corn to be
turned into animal feed or sugary cereal, smaller farms grow a variety of productsand its
in the farmers best interest to treat their land sustainably (i.e., not decimate the soil with
toxic pesticides and fertilizers), as well as treat their animals with respect and
compassion.
While factory farms may produce a higher quantity of food, the "more is better" logic is not
particularly relevant to our public health concernsor our economy. The current more
production orientation is so outdated and unresponsive to our current needs that it is
causing its own problems, particularly for our environment and natural resources,
according to a 2012 United Nations report, "Food and Agriculture: The Future of
Sustainability." The report suggests a significant investment in small- and medium-sized
farms to improve the overall health and viability of our food system worldwide.
By not using massive industrial farming and irrigation equipment, small farms better
maintain the quality of our soil, air and water, which, from a public health standpoint, is
pretty essential to our daily well-being. In contrast, explained von Tscharner Fleming, "large
scale agribusiness landscapes not only degrade soil and water quality in the short term,
reducing the biological health of the soil ecosystem, but also make them much more
vulnerable to disease and drought, to crisis and collapse."
Moreover, small farmers can have closer connections to particular needs of a community
and "have an investment in community health," said Juliet Sims, program manager at the
Prevention Institute, a community health nonprofit based in Oakland, California. "We see
support for small and mid-size farmers to engage in sustainable food production as a critical
component of a sustainable food system that allows us to be food secure in the future."
The USDAs most recent Scientific Report of the Dietary Guidelines Advisorycommittee
emphasizes the importance of fresh, unprocessed whole foods in American diets. "A diet
higher in plant-based foods, such as vegetables, fruits, whole grains, legumes, nuts, and
seeds, and lower in calories and animal-based foods is more health-promoting and is
associated with less environmental impact than is the current U.S. diet, the report states.
The key to reducing greenhouse gases and improving our overall health with better food
options? You guessed it: Small farms. In its 100-plus pages of research, the USDA reiterates
the importance of local agriculture to improve long-term food security. Access to sufficient,
nutritious, and safe food is an essential element of food security, the report states. A
sustainable diet ensures this access for both the current population and future.
And this isnt just a research theorysupporting local agriculture works.
Farmers markets and farm stands can really improve the diets of community members
who are food insecure, Sims said. For example, in 2015 the California Nutrition Incentives
Act created financial incentives for CalFresh (the equivalent of SNAP benefits) to match
dollars spent on produce at farmers markets. Every CalFresh dollar spent on produce earns
a matching dollar to spend on produce, which has dramatically increased peoples intake of
fruits and vegetables, often produced more sustainably and locally, Sims explained. In
Davis, the Market Match program has increased farmers market purchases by almost 300
percent, building the local economy while simultaneously improving the health of the
community.
Those not part of CalFresh or SNAP programs can support local agriculture by shopping at
farmers markets, or subscribing to CSAs and local farm cooperatives. Even people in urban
settings can get in on small farm purchasing, with services like FreshDirect delivering CSA
boxes directly to New York City stoops. Sites like Overstock have also started delivering
locally grown produce, and countless local initiatives by region bring the farmers market
online and make it easier than ever to support local farms.
"We need to protect our remaining small farms, as teaching facilities, as places for ecological
education and recreation, as reserves of biodiversity and rare animal breeds, as
functional farm systems as a buffer against urban growth, said von Tscharner Fleming.
2. Status quo solves Agriculture courses expanding now
Pannoni, U.S. News education digital producer, 14
[Alexandra, 3-31-14, US News, Agriculture Education Blooms in Urban, Rural High
Schools, https://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/high-school-
notes/2014/03/31/agriculture-education-blooms-in-urban-rural-high-schools, accessed
6.27.2017]//TRossow
No longer just about cows and plows, the modern agriculture industry encompasses
subsectors such as urban forestry and agricultural biotechnology, which includes the
genetic engineering of crops. As the industry has grown, so has the interest in teaching
teens more about it. About 15 percent of the U.S. workforce is employed in agriculture-
related careers, according to the American Farm Bureau Federation, and more than 54,000
jobs for college graduates in the agricultural, food and renewable natural resources sectors
are expected to be created annually from 2010-2015, according to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. In addition to many career opportunities in the field, agriculture classes allow
students to practice real applications of math, science and English concepts, and is among
the reasons why high schools are embracing agriculture education, says Jay Jackman,
executive director of the National Association of Agricultural Educators. Agriculture classes
can help students who may have a difficult time understanding theories and concepts in a
traditional math or science class, Jackman says. "You put them in an agriculture class and
you teach them photosynthesis, for example, in the context of agricultural crops and the
science becomes real to them," he says. Agriculture education programs are sprouting up in
high schools across the U.S., particularly in suburban and urban areas, Jackman says.
Vincent High School in Milwaukee reinstated its agriculture education program last year;
the program was eliminated in the 1990s because of funding problems, says Gail Kraus, an
agriculture outreach specialist who works with the school. Agriculture education will
eventually become the focus of the school akin to a magnet school, Kraus says. Career
opportunities were one of the reasons why the program was reintroduced. "This region has
a high concentration of food science careers," she says. The first class that students take at
the school is about urban agriculture; topics include urban soil, urban gardening and
greenhouses. Kraus says that although some students are initially uninterested, once they
get to experience the interactive aspects of the class, like working in the greenhouse or bee
aviary, they tend to become more receptive. "A lot of them come down and get into the
greenhouse and say, 'Oh my gosh, this is in the school?'" she says. Despite its rural location,
agriculture classes at Morris Area High School, in Morris, Minn., were not very popular
when Natasha Mortenson, an agriculture teacher, started teaching at the school 13 years
ago. During her first year teaching at the school, agriculture classes suffered from low
enrollment and Mortenson recalls that only a few students in the graduating class planned
to pursue agriculture-related careers. Today, agriculture classes are popular at the school;
Mortenson teaches 10 different classes each year. The hands-on aspects of classes keep
students interested, Mortenson says. In an agriculture processing class students learned
how to cut hog carcasses; they also made sausage and jerky. "Just seeing a carcass come in
and being able to identify that food system, it makes them excited about it," she says.
Conventional farming practices are covered in the curriculum, but Mortenson says that it
can be a difficult field for students to get into because of the high price of land, among other
reasons. So she teaches her students about sustainable farming, such as producing free-
range eggs or chickens, popular products that can be farmed on a relatively small piece of
land. In addition to agriculture processing and animal science courses, students can take
classes such as woods and welding, horticulture and food chemistry, among others.
Mortenson says about a third of graduating students are now interested in pursuing
agriculture-related careers. "It's not just the food part of it, it's not just the farming part of it,
but everything that supports the agriculture industry is a part of agriculture," she says. "It's
like a big web of jobs. There are very few jobs that don't relate back to agriculture."

3. Aff cant solve food shortage Surplus already exists, plan doesnt
combat distribution issues.
Schiller, Fast Company, Staff Writer and Reporter, 16
(Ben, 8-16-16, Fast Company, The Real Reason Theres World Hunger: Food Waste, Not
Food Shortages, https://www.fastcompany.com/3062692/the-real-reason-theres-world-
hunger-food-waste-not-food-shortages, accessed 7-2-17, VB)
Most people assume hunger exists in poor communities because theres not enough food.
But thats usually the lesser problem. Really, its just about getting food to the people who
need it.
The problem of undernourishment and hidden hunger around the globe is a distribution
problem rather than a production one, says an important new paper on global food waste
published in Environmental Science & Technology.
A systematic study, from the Potsdam Institute, says we wasted 510 kilocalories per person
per day in 2010, up from 310 kilocalories in 1965. Generally, societies are getting much
better at producing food: theres 20% more food available than the global population
strictly needs. Most places, even undernourished places, have a raw surplus of food. The
problem is, one third of production is either not used productively, or its not used to feed
the worlds underfed.
Undernourishment may prevail in a country with food surplus due to income inequality
and poverty, resulting in disparity in food security within the country, the paper says. For
example, India has a nominal food surplus of 210 kcal/per person/day, yet it has the second
highest number of undernourished people in the world.

4. No solvency for food security climate, soil, and water issues


overwhelm
Andenoro, et al., University of Florida Agricultural Education and
Communication professor & Challenge 2050 Director, 16
[Anthony, 2016, American Association for Agricultural Education, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
FOR AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION NATIONAL RESEARCH AGENDA 2016-2020,
http://aaaeonline.org/resources/Documents/AAAE_National_Research_Agenda_2016-
2020.pdf, page 58, Date accessed 6-28-17, RK]
To meet the needs of 9.725 billion people in 2050, we will need to increase our agricultural
production by 70% (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012). However, our current rate of
consumption far exceeds our current rate of production. This is happening for three
reasons: (a) climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of weather resulting in
increased loss of crops internationally; (b) soil degradation and desertification is occurring
at an alarming rate due to overgrazing, pollution, intensification of agricultural practices;
and (c) water is a critical resource, which has been severely mismanaged and continues to
become more scarce due to droughts and overconsumption (Brown, 2012). These problems
must be addressed to produce healthy, nutritious, and sustainable food, reduce food
insecurity, and mitigate the obesity epidemic for our growing population.
Food Justice
Urban agriculture education more difficult than rural agriculture education -
difficulty relating to content
Henry, Purdue University Office of Multicultural Programs graduate research
assistant, et al, 14
(Kesha A., Brian Allen Talbert, Purdue University College of Agriculture Department of Youth
Development and Agricultural Education Professor, Pamala V. Morris, Purdue University College
of Agriculture Assistant Dean/Director of the Office of Multicultural Programs, 2014, Journal of
Agricultural Education, Agricultural Education in an Urban Charter School: Perspectives and
Challenges. Volume 55 issue 2, http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1122353.pdf, p. 97, Accessed
6/28/17, GDI - JMo)

C1: Participants recognized teaching agricultural education is different based on whether the
program was in a rural or urban school. Mrs. James, the agriculture teacher, indicated
encountering more challenges teaching agricultural education classes in an urban versus rural
school. She noted agricultural education courses and activities were interesting for urban
students, but they had difficulty relating to content and activities. In contrast, rural students
typically have personal agricultural experience and generally have agricultural related activities
in their communities providing needed familiarity to the subject matter. She noted:

In the urban setting it is more challenging because its not a natural flow to the kids...at the rural
school its all around them, it was kind of second nature to them.... Most of the students were
involved in farming either they had a farm at their family home or they work for a farmer during
summer months, so it was more of an easy transition and an easy flow for them....But here at
the urban school its more of a challenge because agriculture is not all around them and they
dont realize what it all entails so you have to go back to the basics and back all the way to
square one so you have to break things down more for them....

[Note: Ellipses in original]


Solvency
1. Schools say no testing focus is preferred this is their own 1AC author
Doerfert, Texas Tech University Agricultural Communications Associate Chair &
Professor, 11
[Doerfert, D. L. (Ed.) (2011). American Association for Agricultural Education, National research
agenda: American Association for Agricultural Educations research priority areas for 2011-
2015,
http://aaaeonline.org/resources/Documents/AAAE%20National%20Research%20Agenda.pdf, p.
13-4 Accessed 6.28.2017]//TRossow

Because of the high stakes testing emphasis from the No Child Left Behind legislation, many
public schools have closed their doors to outside influences. Many administrators are so
consumed with improving test scores that they resort to more of the same types of delivery,
and alternative and effective means to achieve those goals are not considered (Franklin,
Haverland, & Elliot, 2006). Therefore, even effective agricultural literacy programs such as Ag in
the Classroom are not allowed in the schools because of the perceived notion that the program
wont aid in improving students test scores. However, such programs engage more senses in
the teaching process, and the authentic delivery of the material results in retention of key
scientific, math, and other principles. Studies demonstrate that test scores improve when
teachers teach using the world around them as the context (Elliot, 1999; Jepsen, Pastor, & Elliot,
2007). The emergence of social media technologies, message formats, and strategies will also
have an influence on public and policy maker understanding about agriculture and natural
resources. Research is only beginning to reveal the impact of social media and its potential to
inform and persuade the user towards desired thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors. Additional
research will expose the potential of these digital technologies and strategies in realizing a
citizenry capable of making agriculture-related informed decisions.

2. 21st Century skills development is prerequisite to solve modern


agriculture
Stripling, University of Tennessee Department of Agricultural Leadership,
Education and Communications Assistant Professor and Ricketts, Tennessee
State University Department of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences
Professor, 16
[Christopher, John, 2016, American Association for Agricultural Education, AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION FOR AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION NATIONAL RESEARCH AGENDA 2016-2020,
http://aaaeonline.org/resources/Documents/AAAE_National_Research_Agenda_2016-2020.pdf,
page 30-31, Date accessed 6-28-17, RK]
In addition to global competency, the modern workplace requires workers to have broad
cognitive and affective skills (National Research Council, 2011), and as a result, employers are
demanding employees have soft skills, often referred to as 21st century skills, upon entering the
workforce (National Research Council, 2012). Furthermore, the National Research Councils
(2009, 2012) reports entitled, Transforming Agricultural Education for a Changing World and
Education for Life and Work: Developing Transferable Knowledge and Skills in the 21st Century
called for the development of 21st century skills among U.S. students. Agricultural education
must determine the most effective means for incorporating and assessing soft skills
development (National Research Council, 2009) in both formal and nonformal settings.

Addressing the complex economic, social, and environmental challenges related to agriculture is
dependent upon our ability to prepare a sufficient scientific and professional workforce that
understands the multidisciplinary nature of agriculture and is diverse, globally competent, and
possesses 21st century skills.