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The Four Types of

Western Philosophy
Herman Johan Pietersen
The Four Types of
Western Philosophy

by

Herman Johan Pietersen

2015
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To all explorers of antinomies
THE FOUR TYPES OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
CONTENTS
Chapter 1. Fundamental approaches in human thought 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Ancient bifurcations 2
1.3 Modern thought 4
1.4 An integrated proposal 6
1.5 A spectrum of Western philosophies 10
1.6 Concluding remarks 11
Chapter 2. Speculative philosophies (Type I) 13
2.1 Plato 13
2.2 Kant 15
2.3 Popper 20
2.4 Legal naturalism 22
2.5 Formalist aesthetics 26
2.6 Rorty (Type I) 28
2.7 Pirsig (Type I) 30
Chapter 3. Scientific philosophies (Type II) 35
3.1 Aristotle 35
3.2 Hume 38
3.3 Lakatos 40
3.4 Legal positivism 42
3.5 Realist aesthetics 46
3.6 Rorty (Type II) 47
3.7 Pirsig (Type II) 49
Chapter 4. Narrative philosophies (Type III) 51
4.1 Protagoras 51
4.2 Nietzsche 53
4.3 Kuhn and Feyerabend 57
4.4 Legal pluralism 62
4.5 Expressionist aesthetics 67

iii
4.6 Rorty (Type III) 69
4.7 Pirsig (Type III) 72
Chapter 5: Pragmatic philosophies (Type IV) 75
5.1 Plato 75
5.2 Marx 77
5.3 Popper and Feyerabend 80
5.4 Critical Legal Studies Movement (CLSM) 81
5.5 Reformist aesthetics 82
5.6 Rorty (Type IV) 83
5.7 Pirsig (Type IV) 85
Chapter 6. Four types of Western philosophy in review 87
6.1 Type I philosophies 88
6.2 Type II philosophies 89
6.3 Type III philosophies 90
6.4 Type IV philosophies 91
6.5 Concluding comment 91

References 93
Bibliography 111

iv
PREFACE
The present work brings together the authors previous
writing on fundamental approaches in philosophical thought.
For this purpose the existing material were subjected to
minor revision and re-arranged according to each of four
main types of human thought. A new chapter was written to
provide a concluding review of the contents of the book.
The overall project started out as an experiment, a
philosophical hypothesis, and repeatedly received clear
evidentiary support across a global range of knowledge
disciplines, traditions and thinkers in the history of thought.
I thank our Creator for the life given to me, to continue to
pursue my dream even though in the end we merely see
through a glass darkly.
The search for fundamentals has been a most meaningful
and worthwhile part of my life - something which words can
never fully express. I am deeply grateful and can only hope
that the work will be of value to readers interested in the
topic.

Herman Johan Pietersen


Haenertsburg
South Africa
Herman.pietersen@ul.ac.za

v
CHAPTER 1
FUNDAMENTAL APPROACHES IN HUMAN
THOUGHT
1.1 Introduction
The history of thought shows a continuous and unfolding
succession of competing ideas and theories concerning,
especially, the nature of the true and the good.
The struggle between different ideas and systems of
thought arose from the very beginning. This is evidenced in,
for instance, Heraclitus rejection of the Pythagorean
obsession with number and Platos opposition to the Ionian
pre-occupation with matter.
Today, human thought is characterised by many
conceptualisations that seems to defy any meaningful overall
view. Many different approaches to the nature of truth and
reality have emerged over time, for example: rationalism,
positivism, realism, nominalism, humanism, utilitarianism,
empiricism, pragmatism, behaviourism, naturalism,
existentialism, and postmodernism.
The question is how to make sense of it all? In striving to
find answers to this question, it became clear that the issues
the ancients grappled with still provide an important starting
point for understanding the nature of the problem.
A consideration of different intellectual emphases that
continually surface in the history of thought, starting with the
Greeks, led to the insight, namely, that a number of axiomatic
and interrelated orientations towards knowledge of the world
and of human beings underlie and shape the human intellect
in its endeavours.
Taken together, these dispositions emanate from the same
source, namely, the human being. As the body cannot rid

1
itself of its shadow, so human thought cannot be rid of - but
is embedded in - prototypical ways of looking at and
experiencing the world.
The current endeavour is a project in meta-theory
application, and will focus on a range of prominent
philosophical thinkers and approaches.

1.2 Ancient bifurcations


It was a major event in the history of humanity when the
ancients moved away from being in a state of dependency on
powerful forces around them, which they could not fathom
and were in awe of, to the awakening of reason. For Plato all
things were confounded together until reason gave order.
This provided the spark that triggered independent thinking,
away from blindly obeying social custom and the gods of
tradition.
The Greek quest for natural origins changed in about 600
BCE from seeking answers to the question who is the cause of
everything (for which the Olympic pantheon, under the
leadership of Zeus, typically was the source of explanation),
to the question what non-personal, primary force or principle
is behind or in nature and existence.
Cornford 1 describes two traditions, the scientific and
mystical modes of thought, which existed in Greek religion
and which influenced the development of Greek philosophy.
In Homers mythological thought (at about 800 BCE) it was
still the rule by impersonal force of destiny or fate (Moira), in
which everything was assigned to its allotted position or
province. Eventually, the family of Olympian gods became
the dominant source of answers, but, in turn, had to make
room for Reason - the rule by impersonal necessity of law

2
and principle. As the historical record shows, the occurrence
of swings between subjectifying (personal) and objectifying
(impersonal) orientations of mind is an early phenomenon in
human thought.
Basic intellectual differences appear in mythology in the
kind of powers and functions ascribed to, especially, the
Greek gods Apollo and Dionysus. 2, 3 Apollo and Dionysus
were depicted as very different type of Gods, with the
exception that the ancients attributed powers of music, poetry
and the arts to both of them. Figure 1.1 illustrates some of
the contrasts.
Figure 1.1: Apollo and Dionysus as paradigmatic opposites
Apollo Dionysus
God of temple at Delphi God of temple at Delphi
Ruled by reason Ruled by emotions and will
Intellectual, spiritual Freedom and equality
Purity, radiance, and light Excitement of life and
growth
Self-restraint and discipline Self-indulgence and passion
God of intellect God of senses

The conflicting elements in the characterization of these


two major deities of the ancient Greek world points to a root
distinction in human thought. Apollo is depicted as the aloof
deity, the impersonal god of reason, principle and a
hierarchical order that is superior to and above desires of the
flesh. Dionysus shows just the opposite qualities: of rule by
the passions and will; of an unbridled celebration of the
senses and of the drive toward equality and freedom of
expression.

3
In the profiles of these mythical figures, the central
distinction between the impersonal and personal in human
thought emerges. Overall, Greek religion maintained the
dominance of Apollo (the God of law and order) over the
urges of the Dionysian in human nature, and of the rule of
the intellect over the senses. Yet, there was an intuitive
understanding that society had to accommodate both forces,
in order to avoid the tendency toward excess of each mode of
being, if left unopposed.
In the course of history, and despite continuing efforts by
the rational mind to subdue it, the Dionysian side of human
nature kept surfacing. From orgiastic festivals in ancient
Greece, to modern rock concerts, of which Woodstock (in
1969) is perhaps the iconic 20th century example; from the
temperamental and unruly steed (representing the passions) in
Platos parable of the charioteer, to Freuds modern
unveiling of the unconscious Id with its sexual libido - the
Dionysian drive refuses to be suppressed.

1.3 Modern thought


The scholarly literature of modern times shows that
bifurcated thought continues unabated. Kant, for instance,
aimed to provide a grand metaphysics of mind, yet he also
acknowledged the presence of different orientations in the
history of thought.
At the end of his main work 4 he provides his own
taxonomy that reflects basic divisions in human thought. He
distinguishes between intellectualists and nologists (Plato,
Leibnitz) on the one hand and sensualists and empiricists
(Epicurus, Aristotle, Locke) on the other. According to Kant,

4
the former strives to find truth and certainty in Reason, the
latter in Experience and sensuous objects.
Kant desired to enthrone Reason by giving the world a
comprehensive system of rational, pure, concepts of mind -
a master methodology of Reason that would: bring
Reason to perfect contentment 5
On the other side of the divide, and during the same
period, the poet-philosopher, Friedrich Schiller, eloquently
described the destructive effects of a one-sided, rational-
scientific approach to life. In Schiller the Dionysian
resentment against the soul-destroying characteristic of an
impersonal and mechanistic way of thought and life rises to
the surface: Like the analytical chemist, the philosopher can
only discover how things are combined by analyzing them,
only lay bare the workings of spontaneous Nature by
subjecting them to the torment of his own techniques? 6
His approach is a clear reflection of the romantic (Dionysian)
protest and reaction against an impersonal (Apollonian)
objectification of nature and human existence.
In the 20th century, the political philosopher Isaiah Berlin 7
distinguishes between formal and empirical categories of
thought in relation to human values and ethics. He echoes
Schillers distinction between sensuous and formal drives;
Kants sensualists and intellectualists and, prototypically,
Platos account (in the Sophist), of the everlasting battle
between the Giants (the friends of matter) and the Gods of
intellect (the friends of form).
For Bernstein 8 it is a struggle between "objectivism" and
"relativism"; between the basic conviction of the existence of
some permanent, a-historical truth or knowledge framework
and the equally basic view that all such thinking is relative to

5
the varied and changing nature of specific social and cultural
contexts.

1.4 An integrated proposal


The various intellectual tendencies, outlined in the previous
section, reflect different aspects or elements of what, at first
sight, seems to be two major streams in the history of
thought. This is conveniently summarized in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Some contrasts in human thought
Source #1 #2
Mythology Apollo: Dionysus:
(Greek) God of Intellect God of Senses
Impersonal (Logos) Personal (Mythos)
Order (hierarchy) Freedom (equality)
Plato Gods (form) Giants (matter)
Cornford Scientific tradition Mystical tradition
Kant Intellectualists Sensualists (Aristotle;
(Plato; Leibniz) Epicurus)
Schiller Faculty of Intellect Faculty of Feeling
Berlin Monists Pluralists
(hedgehogs) (foxes)
Utopianism Romanticism
Snow Scientific culture Literary culture

However, the list is potentially confusing if it is not borne


in mind that these classifications were generated by thinkers
and traditions of thought who themselves regarded the world
in different ways. They wore different spectacles, and
therefore adopted different approaches to truth and reality.
Kant, for instance, is the analytic philosopher who
favoured science and a universally applicable logic of mind.

6
Schiller, his contemporary, is the poet-philosopher who
anguished in moving and expressive language about the
destructive effect of an impersonal Kantian world of
scientific thought, with its cold logic, on the human spirit
and well-being.
The various elements may be reduced to a number of core
elements of thought, namely, the:
Impersonal (I It) vs Personal (I Thou)
Reason (ratio; logic) vs Meaning (will, feeling)
Form (abstract ideas) vs Matter (things/senses)
At the heart of these descriptions is the most fundamental
distinction of all, namely, what the ancients referred to as the
One and the Many - in its modern guise known as monism
and pluralism. This was regarded as an axiomatic and very
old truth already in the times of Socrates.
In Platos Philebus, Socrates enlightens his conversational
partner (Philebus) about the origin of this piece of wisdom,
which the ancient oral tradition passed on in the Greek
world, describing it as a divine gift from the gods. 9
From the above discussion, two intersecting kinds of
polarities may be derived, namely between Objectivist
(Apollonian) and Subjectivist (Dionysian) thought and between
Empyrean (Platos Gods; the super-sensible) and Empiricist
thought (Platos Giants; matter).
With reference to the Objectivist-Subjectivist distinction there
are, on the one hand, those thinkers and schools of thought
that prefer the truths arrived at by the workings of an
impersonal, calculating, mind or intellect (in answer to the
root question: what is this?). This is exemplified by Platos
episteme and known bias toward the immutable truths of logic
and mathematics. On the other, are the truths grounded in

7
values, will, and feeling, and in a personal and social context;
largely in response to the other enduring question, namely:
how should we live?
The Empyrean-Empiricist distinction, in turn, refers to two
basic approaches to the perennial ontological question,
namely, what is the nature of reality? Throughout the
history of thought, even before Platos formulation almost
two and a half millennia ago, answers to this question were
given by two different and enduring intellectual camps: the
friends of matter (Ionian materialism) and the friends of
form (Pythagorean idealism ).
The one group, the giants, exemplified by the Greek
Atomists, forever harks to the empirical truths of matter, the
sensible, so-called hard facts of nature. The other group, the
gods, is forever drawn to the transcendent and metaphysical
truths of forms, laws, and principles to an invisible and
super-sensible world beyond the human sensory apparatus.
Concerning the distinction between empyrean and
empiricist approaches, a modern historian of philosophy
aptly summarises it: whereas for Plato the best thought
was freed from sense experience altogether, for Aristotle it
remained rooted in sense experience. 11
The classic Western exemplars of objectivist thought are:
Plato, the empyrean theorist (conveniently designated as Type
I) and the quintessential empiricist thinker, Aristotle (Type
II). Types III and IV are best represented in Greek thought
by, respectively, Protagoras and the poetic-expressive,
subjectivist approach of Sophism, in general, and Plato, as
social theorist and reformer.
It is important to note that the proposed scheme of basic
orientations of mind does not imply that one particular

8
approach is necessarily better or worse than the other. They
should rather be seen as distinctive modalities or forces of
mind.
For each modality a cluster of typical descriptors has been
identified, as shown in Figure 1.3.
Although variations occur in the extent to which all
elements of each cluster apply to an individual or community
of thinkers and scholars, they are useful in characterizing the
different paradigms of thought. Collectively they do provide,
for each type, a more or less coherent meta-theoretical
profile. A more detailed discussion of the four paradigms of
human thought is provided elsewhere. 12, 13
Figure 1.3: The four modalities of mind
ARISTOTLE: Scientific PLATO: Metaphysical
Question: What is this? Question: What is behind?
Impersonal Impersonal
Description of life/world Essentials of life/world.
Reason (rationality) Reason (rationality)
Systematic-analytical Theoretical-integrative
Detailed explanation Broad understanding

PROTAGORAS: Narrative PLATO: Pragmatic


Question: What is the story? Question: What to do?
Personal Personal
To praise, tell inspiring To change, renew, life/world
stories OR to criticize, tell according to valued ideals
sad stories, Emphasizes values
Emphasizes values (humanism)
(humanism) Communal-engaged/
Personal-engaged / ideological
experiential Advocacy-general and
Poetic-particular and critical reformist

9
1.5 A spectrum of Western philosophies
The present work showcases various Western philosophies as
examples of the four main types of modalities of mind. The
selection is shown in Figure 1.4 below.
Fig. 1.4: A spectrum of Western philosophies
TYPE II MODALITY TYPE I MODALITY
Aristotle Plato
Hume Kant
Lakatos Popper
Legal Positivism Legal Naturalism
Realist Aesthetics Formalist Aesthetics
Rorty II Rorty I
Pirsig II Pirsig I

TYPE III MODALITY TYPE IV MODALITY


Protagoras Plato
Nietzsche Marx
Kuhn/Feyerabend Popper/Feyerabend
Legal Pluralism CLSM
Expressionist Aesthetics Reformist Aesthetics
Rorty III Rorty IV
Pirsig III Pirsig IV

Chapter two discusses various empyrean philosophies;


chapter three attend to scientific (realist) philosophies;
chapter four narrative-interpretive approaches, and chapter
five addresses pragmatic thought. Finally, chapter six briefly
reviews the four types of Western philosophy.

10
1.6 Concluding remarks
There is much, though uncoordinated, evidence in the history
of thought of the existence of archetypal orientations of the
mind. The theory that is briefly presented in the present
chapter proposes an encompassing perspective on the nature
and dynamics of these enduring inclinations of the mind.

11
CHAPTER 2
SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHIES (TYPE I)
2.1 Plato
Plato was the objectivist-empyrean thinker par excellence - the
theorist who produced the first encompassing theory of
knowing and being in Western thought, as presented in his
parables of the Divided Line, the Sun and the Cave. His was
the soaring mind that attempted to achieve the broadest,
most encompassing explanation of man and world.
For Plato the best thought was free from sense
experience, from the messy, variable, fluctuating nature of the
physical world, in an unrelenting search for the Logos, the
One, true source of real knowledge: the Form of Forms.
Despite the well known differences in their thought,
Aristotles approach in its own way acknowledges Platos
distinction between levels or degrees of truth or wisdom.
Platos theory of knowledge, as presented in his scheme of
the four states of certainty, in one way or the other keeps re-
appearing in later objectivist thought, notably in Kant, but
also in Augustine and Islamic philosophers, such as Al-
Farabi.
Platos mind (and Poppers as twentieth century example)
was concerned with knowledge of unchanging and unseen
(super-sensible) objects. His Forms, being unseen and
intelligible principles, resemble the laws of nature sought by
modern science, except that they are ideal patterns that
purportedly exist independent of mind. 1
The Platonic Socrates explanation to Glaucon shows his
strong metaphysical inclination: You must suppose, then...
that there are these two powers and that one of them is
supreme over everything in the intelligible order or region,

13
the other over everything in the visible region. 2 Platos
theory of knowledge is, therefore, metaphysics in the original
(pre-Aristotelian) sense, namely, being truly a knowledge or
science of first principles.
A key characteristic of Platos philosophy is his negative
view of and even derogation of the poets, musicians and
artists. This is consistent with proposition four of the meta-
theory, regarding the conflict between especially diagonally
opposite modes of thought, namely, of the metaphysicians
(mode I) versus the poets and artists (mode III), scientists
(mode II) versus the reformers/politicians (mode IV).
An interesting phenomenon is the literary excellence with
which Plato expounded his philosophy in his dialogues,
making him an exemplary figure in the subjectivist-empiricist
paradigm as well. However, throughout his writings the poets
and musicians are treated severely - including Homer, whom
he otherwise held in high regard. For Plato the arts are mere
imitations, thrice removed from the real truth of perfect
Form, and should not be allowed in the state (except on
Platonic-approved grounds).
In the Phaedrus Platos antagonism against the arts and
preference for the empyrean mode speaks unequivocally:
...But of the heaven which is above the heavens, what
earthly poet ever did or ever will sing worthily? There abides
the very being with which true knowledge is concerned; the
colourless, formless, intangible essence, visible only to mind,
the pilot of the soul. 3
Concerning music, Plato expresses himself as follows in
the Philebus: Music, for instance, is full of this empiricism;
for sounds are harmonized, not by measure, but by skilful
conjecture; the music of the flute is always trying to guess the

14
pitch of each vibrating note, and is therefore mixed up with
much that is doubtful and has little which is certain. 4
Being concerned with certain truth, Plato preferred using as
examples the quantitative arts such as arithmetic and
carpentering, in his dialogues.
In opposition to Thrasymachus firm belief that justice
(morality or right action) is the Interest of the Stronger 5
enforced by the ruling class in society, the Socratic Plato
unpacks a counter argument against Thrasymachus. He uses
as examples the special skills and social function of athletes,
doctors and ship captains, whose success (arte, or
excellence) does not depend on self-interest, but the interest
of others. Platos Socrates focuses on the general, overall,
truth of moral virtues, of justice or morality in itself, though
he never provides a definition of it.
Socrates wants to explore what justice or virtue is, in a
rational (objectivist) manner. He wishes to convince, not
persuade others of a personal opinion of it; not of what it
appears to be to someone or some party, nor of what is
commonly accepted in the polis by way of custom and
convention.

2.2 Kant
Immanuel Kant (1724 1804), published his Architectonic
of Reason, entitled Critique of Pure Reason, 6 and by all
accounts a masterpiece of German system building, when he
was almost sixty years old.
Awoken from his dogmatic slumbers by Humes
scepticism and empiricist orientation and realizing the
limitations of a Cartesian philosophy that never seems to
really get down to sense experience, Kants Critical

15
Philosophy essentially did two things. Firstly, it provided
what Western philosophy, in retrospect, at that time needed: a
convincing synthesis of rationalist and empiricist metaphysics.
Secondly, by limiting the possibility of certain knowledge to
the so-called space-time manifold, it provided a
philosophical justification for the sciences (of which Newton
was the leading light) and in the process eliminated the false
rationality of traditional metaphysics.
Kant intended to put metaphysics on a firmer footing. In
his demarcation of a possible metaphysics (Prolegomena, 1783)
7
he rules out the influence of both external experience
(physical knowledge) and internal experience (empirical
psychology) and concludes that metaphysics is therefore:
a priori knowledge, coming from pure Understanding and
pure Reason. 8 The metaphysics of the cognitions of the
mind is, of course, none other than Kants own philosophy,
seen in its entirety.
In addressing the question of how a science of
metaphysics is possible Kant proposes his entire Critical
philosophy (the whole range of a priori concepts, categories
of mind and sources of knowledge, which derives from the
Sensibility, Understanding and Reason) as eminently suited to
the task. He concludes that: Critique, therefore, and critique
alone, contains in itself the whole well-proved and well-tested
plan and even all the means required to accomplish
metaphysics, as a science; by other ways and means it is
impossible. 9
Kant holds that both physics and mathematics are in need
of metaphysical inquiry. This is similar to Aristotles
distinction and treatment of the same three sciences, which
he called the theoretical sciences, and of which metaphysics

16
was the highest or divine science. In Kants Critical
Philosophy, however, the dimension of God or a Divine
Being or Substance is effectively taken out of the knowledge
equation: And finally we must, according to a right maxim
of the philosophy of nature, refrain from all explanations of
the design of nature, drawn from the will of a Supreme
Being. 10
Although it is a metaphysical thought system, in the spirit
of the Enlightenment - in which Kant was a central figure -
this approach represents a clear break with Classical
metaphysics. This is exemplified by contrasting it with the
thought of Plato and Aristotle, for whom a divine entity (the
Good, a Demiurge, or an unmoved prime mover) was an
integral component.
Starting with Descartes and brought to a grand
methodological synthesis by Kant, Western thought is no
longer focused on a theory of everything. Instead, the more
modest concern is with theory of knowledge or
epistemology, or, what Kant in the Critique at the end
referred to as his Methodology of cognition or Reason. Kants
express purpose was to create the foundations of a new
science of metaphysics based entirely on pure reason, beyond
sense experience, so that: nothing will be left to future
generations except the task of illustrating and applying it
didactically. 11
Kants metaphysical system shows that he intended
reconciling the rationalism of Descartes with the empiricism
of Hume. The basic thrust of his thought was that nature
must conform to reason, in the manner of a witness who is
compelled to answer the questions of a judge, 12 or, as he
states: objects must conform to our cognition. 13 This

17
pre-supposes laws of thought that do not originate in
experience, and which, given human limitations, can only be
of phenomena 14 and not of the things in themselves
(noumena).
The aim is a revolutionary science of the metaphysics of
reason, namely: ...on the method to be followed, not a
system of the science itself. 15 Two kinds of knowledge are
identified: pure knowledge and empirical knowledge, and
empirical knowledge of the world is a combination of sense
impressions and the cognitions of pure reason. 16
The a priori principles of cognition (pure reason) provide
the indispensable requirement for making sense of the
empirical world, because, without it, no certainty in human
understanding is possible where one has to rely only on
varied and changing sense experience: For whence could our
experience itself acquire certainty, if all the rules on which it
depends were themselves empirical, and consequently
fortuitous? 17 The transcendental sphere of Reason is
therefore far superior to knowledge gained merely by sense
experience. For Kant this is vouchsafed by mathematics,
which: ...affords us a brilliant example, how far,
independently of all experience, we may carry our a priori
knowledge. 18
Three types of judgments (cognitions) are introduced:
analytical judgments, where the predicate B belongs to the
subject A; synthetical judgments (the judgments of experience)
where the predicate B does not form part of the subject A,
and a third category, namely, synthetical judgments a priori. 19
For Kant, thinking (judgment) and perceiving, though
linked, are distinctly separate mental processes. Thus, he
opposes both; rationalism because it assimilated all sense-

18
experience to innate ideas, and empiricism (Hume), because
it reduced all thinking to perceiving. 20
Kants theory of morals 21 is a continuation and
application of his empyrean system of thought. The grounds
of moral obligation, in order to be law-like and apply to
everyone, cannot be sought in: ...the nature of man or in the
circumstances in which he is placed, but sought a priori solely
in the concepts of pure reason. 22
The first principle of morality is that a human action must
be done from duty. 23 The second principle is that an action
based on duty is not moral because of any purpose to be
achieved by it, but solely based on the categorical
imperative, namely that: I should never act in such a way
that I could not will that my maxim should be a universal
law. 24
What ought to be done can never be based on anything
other than the command of an (a priori) independent reason:
For example, pure sincerity in friendship can be demanded
of every man, and this demand is not in the least diminished
if a sincere friend has never existed, because this duty, as duty
in general, prior to all experience, lies in the idea of a reason
which determines the will by a priori grounds. 25 Thus, the
universal laws of reason supersede any other grounds for
moral conduct, including the will. Kant also subjects God to
the categorical imperative: Even the Holy One of the
Gospel must be compared with our ideal of moral perfection
before He is recognized as such. 26
Lastly, moral imperatives are classified as either
hypothetical or categorical, the former in relation to practical
objectives and means and the latter in relation to objectively
necessary action, being: ...morality stripped of all admixture

19
of sensuous things and of every spurious adornment of
reward or self-love. 27

2.3 Popper
Regarded as one of the leading philosophers of the 20th
century, and a foundational presence in philosophy of
science, Karl Popper's theory of science is rooted in a purist
(empyrean) approach to knowledge.
He proposes a logical, deductive, hypothesis-testing
structure for the sciences as the only defensible way to
achieve truth. His philosophy is based on the premise that all
knowledge and scientific theories are flawed, that there is no
external criterion of truth, and posits the ideal of arriving at
the best possible, unflawed, scientific theory of phenomena
of interest to the scientist.
Verification by induction does not lead to objective truth
(any set of observations can always result in another
inductive solution to the same data), thus calling for a
different strategy.
With some similarity to the Socratic approach in Platos
dialogues, he proposes a principle of falsification, which is
designed to show up the mistakes in our theories. We can
never establish scientific certainty because all our theories
and ideas about phenomena are conjectures, Popper believes.
However, one can strive to attain objective truth by
deliberately searching for errors in theories, and so weed out
weaker ones, namely those that do not correspond as well
with the empirical evidence.
Popper rejects naive objectivism (namely, that there is an
absolute truth) as well as naive realism, as do probably most
modern thinkers and scientists, but his meta-type I

20
inclination shows up in his strong support for objective
knowledge provided by what he describes as the: logical
theory of truth. 28
He rejects what he calls 'philosophical absolutism,' but
accepts another form of absolutism that he calls 'fallibilistic
absolutism' 29 - an approach of truth by approximation that
tries to get rid of weaker theories by consistent application of
the falsification principle.
Experience or observation, although important for
providing the empirical component of scientific truth, can
never be the arbiter of truth. For Popper, the methodological
purist (meta-type I) and Kantian philosopher, all truth is
theory-laden; there is no Lockean empty mind (tabula rasa):
... It is a serious mistake...to believe that we can appeal to
anything like an authority of experience... 30
Popper's philosophy of Critical Rationalism posits the
following as some of the central characteristics of scientific
knowledge: 31
It begins with problems, practical as well as
theoretical;
It consists in the search for objectively true theories;
It is conjectural and the method of science is the
critical method: the method of the search for and the
elimination of errors in the service of truth.
Contrary to Kuhn, Popper favors an objectivist approach.
He makes this clear with his statement, inter alia, that: As a
philosopher...long ago I gave up as superfluous the search for
subjective certainty. The problem that interests me is that of
the objectively critical rational grounds for preferring one
theory to another, in the search for truth. 32

21
Popper's metaphysics consists of a three-world ontology,
namely, the world of physical things (world 1); the
experiences of human beings (world 2); and world 3, the
world of the objective products of the human mind. 33
Popper's strong empyrean orientation and the similarity of
his world 3 to Plato's intelligible realm' is evident: I assume
that there exist immaterial inhabitants of world 3, which are
real and very important... 34
Consistent with the characteristics of the type I meta-
orientation, Popper did not accept expressionism in art. 35
For Popper the individual scientist did not really figure as he
was more concerned with the social and public, or
macroscopic and impersonal, character of the scientific
method. 36

2.4 Legal naturalism


At the core of the naturalist paradigm in this discipline is the
classic conception of law as being founded in and ineluctably
linked to a transcendent, divine being.
In ancient Greek philosophy, the concepts truth (the
question: what is) and justice (the question: how should we
live) were considered by Socrates and Plato to be inextricable.
They were jointly regarded as the excellence of the soul, in
which virtue (arte, as representing both rational thought and
moral or just conduct) is its own reward. 37
Over the centuries leading figures in legal naturalism, such
as Aristotle, Aquinas, Justinian and, in the modern era,
Blackstone retained the concept of the divine origins of law
and justice - with its strong moral connotation - envisioning
God (in the Christian era) as the eternal Law-Giver from

22
which all natural laws (jus naturale) and human laws (jus civile)
emanate.
In the Law of Persons (Book I) the Institutes of Justinian
(535 CE) state the themes of classical legal naturalism:
Jurisprudence is the knowledge of things divine and human;
the science of the just and the unjust 38 and further on: The
laws of nature, which all nations observe alike, being
established by a divine providence, remain ever fixed and
immutable. 39
Justinians code is echoed more than twelve centuries later
in Blackstones re-affirmation of the immutable principles of
natural law, that the creator allows to be discovered by
human reason, namely: ...that we should live honestly,
should hurt nobody, and should render to everyone it's due,
40
and, further, that: Upon these two foundations, the law of
nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that
is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict
these. 41
It has to be noted that very early on in Western thought
the individuals right to life and self-interest was
acknowledged as well as being connected to the well-being of
the community (polis), in which, for Plato, justice meant
fulfilling ones proper role and duties.
Conry and Beck-Dudley 42 point out that by distinguishing
universal law (the law of nature which is everywhere the same
for everyone) from particular laws (laws created by human
communities for themselves) Aristotle laid down the basic
and enduring dualistic framework of law in the naturalist
tradition.
All in all, up until the Reformation and the period
thereafter, when religious splintering and regicide 43 led to the

23
loss of confidence in and erosion of the three foundational
elements of legal thought, namely revelation, reason and
governmental authority as a package deal, naturalism could
be considered the dominant paradigm of legal thought.
However, starting with the turn toward the empirical and
the emphasis on human reason of such 17th and 18th century
thinkers as Hobbes, 44 Locke, 45 and Bentham 46 - coupled
with advances in science, naturalism was eventually overtaken
by the growing and currently still dominant paradigm of
positivism, in which practical and applied reason increasingly
came to characterize legal thought.
In a post-Kantian Western world, religion has become
separated from the world of science - the world of Reason
and empirical phenomena. Yet, legal naturalism in its modern
appearance - without the component of divine justification of
all and every form of human conduct - is alive and well.
One of the leaders of legal naturalism, John Finnis,
describes the basic character of current natural law
jurisprudence as follows: the term 'natural law' refers to
the set of propositions picking out (1) basic human goods, (2)
general requirements of right choosing, and (3) the specific
moral norms deducible from those requirements as they bear
on particular basic goods. 47
Despite the severing of the link with a divine entity, which
is central to classical naturalism, there is persistent need to
retain a transcendent, higher level, element in the thought of
modern legal naturalists, which attests to the enduring
presence and influence of the empyrean mode of thought.
This is reflected in Finnis: For, if there are true principles
and norms of natural law, they are true independently of any
theories, opinions, doctrines, or traditions. 48

24
Given its explicit acknowledgement of the moral
dimension legal naturalism is reconcilable with the thesis: lex
iniusta non est lex (an unjust law is not law). For Finnis it is the
case that: In no way does the tradition of natural law shut its
eyes to the existence of unjust laws, or expel such laws from
the proper scope of legal or political theory. 49
Another prominent, though pragmatic-sounding, legal
naturalist (the procedural natural law theorist), Lon Fuller,
reiterates his faith in a natural law process: that may be
called the collaborative articulation of shared purposes. 50
For Kretzman the principle of choosing what is both true
and right is central to the meaning of law and convincing
indication that: Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, and
Aquinas are among those who would apply non est lex to
morally bad laws. 51 However, in the modern era the
jurisprudence of natural law has shifted away from a
foundation in metaphysics to a foundation in practical
reason. 52
A shortcoming of legal naturalism, one which almost
always characterizes objectivist-empyrean thought, is that it
tends to be too abstract and far removed from the exigencies
of everyday judicial decision-making, and therefore by its
nature - being concerned with ultimate human goods - not
very responsive to changing legal and social circumstances. 53
On the other hand, legal naturalism, or some form of it,
certainly has not disappeared from the scene. By way of
example, it is pointed out in relation to debates about the
American Constitution, that when one appeals to the ground
of a constitution one is thereby already entering into a
discussion about natural law. 54 Another example is the
preamble to the South African Constitution of 1996, which

25
ends with an appeal to the transcendent, namely: May God
protect our people -- Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika. Morena boloka setjhaba
sa heso. 55
In conclusion, it should be evident that legal naturalism,
with its tendency towards transcendent sources of law and its
foundational theorizing, which favours a universal set of
objective human goods or values, is a clear example of the
objectivist-empyrean mode of thought.

2.5 Formalist Aesthetics


Plato was the first to introduce the idea of art as imitation,
but in a derogatory sense. For Plato, the poets, dramatists and
painters were mere imitators and creators of appearances,
thrice removed from real or objective truth, which for him
could only be found in the empyrean, super-sensible Form of
Beauty.
Platos thoughts on art are ambivalent, 56 showing little
tolerance for any art that does not conform to the highest
dictates of the State, namely, pure Reason and the moral
Good. However, in other places in the Phaedrus, 57 he is quite
appreciative of the divinely inspired abilities of the rhapsodes
(the performing artists, such as Phaedrus)
Yet, as Copleston 58 and Harrison-Barbet 59 point out,
overall Plato is consistent in his view that true art is to be
found in the universal Forms of wisdom and beauty, as
reflected in the formal patterns of mathematical symmetry
and measure. Copleston states: That Plato regarded beauty
as objectively real is beyond all question. Both in the Hippias
Major and in the Symposium it is assumed that all beautiful
things are beautiful in virtue of their participation in the
universal Beauty, Beauty itself. 60

26
What Plato regarded as unacceptable is art that is mostly a
manifestation of the lower, appetitive, levels of being.
In modern philosophy Kant is the other major thinker
who, in the objectivist-empyrean tradition inaugurated by
Plato, attempted to reconcile the subjective grounds of the
arts (as rooted in feelings of pleasure or displeasure) with a
postulated universal and disinterested (namely contemplative)
aesthetic judgment. For this purpose he, inter alia,
distinguished between judgment of the agreeable and
judgment of taste (the Aesthetic Judgment).
The Platonic roots of Kants philosophy of art are evident
in the following: In terms of the theory of taste the aesthetic
judgment implies that the object which is called beautiful
causes satisfaction without reference to desire, to the
appetitive faculty. 61
In contra-distinction to an Aristotelian (type II)
philosophy of arts, Kant (like Plato before him) is not
interested in providing methods and rules for artistic
education or appreciation, but in the universal and necessary
characteristics of the aesthetic judgment itself.
In recent times the Platonic-Kantian formalism is
represented by the theories of especially Bell and Fry, with
their concept of good art as being concerned with significant
form. Harrison-Barbet formulates as follows: What matters
is the way the elements of the composition are arranged and
interconnected. And by 'elements' is meant such features of
the work as colors, lines, shapes, and the ways they are
arranged and fused together in what is in fact a complex,
organic' unity. 62

27
2.6 Rorty (Type I)
What does Richard Rortys metaphysics, or grand narrative
as David Hall 63 refers to it, consists of?
Many subjectivist thinkers would probably say that this is a
self-defeating, self-contradictory question. For them,
metaphysics is a disease that others such as Platonists,
foundationalists and objectivist philosophers are guilty of and
suffer from, and that this is exactly what existentialist-
pragmatist philosophers have been trying to get rid of.
However, as pointed out elsewhere, 64 this does not mean
that there is no basic metaphysical or meta-theoretical striving
or inclination in human thought - and that includes
subjectivist or humanistic philosophers.
The key elements or meta-theoretical influences on
Rortys philosophy are, in no particular order, his Darwinism,
historicism, nominalism, pluralism, naturalism-empiricism,
voluntarism and an epistemology of truth by consensus or
agreement. These foundational elements are often so closely
enmeshed in Rortys writings, that it will be best illustrated by
selected extracts from his works.
In Essays on Heidegger and Others Rorty re-affirms his view
that: sentences are the only things that can be true or
false and that: Thinking of truth in this way helps us switch
over from a Cartesian-Kantian picture of intellectual progress
(as a better and better fit between mind and world) to a
Darwinian picture (as an increasing ability to shape the tools
needed to help the species survive, multiply, and transform
itself). 65
This shows Rortys evolutionist and historicist roots -
hence his pragmatist preference for truth as those changing
new linguistic expressions (vocabularies of descriptions) that

28
have survival value. In a paper at his website, he describes
himself as: ...a convinced holist, historicist, pragmatist, and
contextualist. 66
In an autobiographical chapter in his Philosophy and Social
Hope, Rorty reveals how his youthful Platonic vision of:
the place 'beyond hypotheses' where the full sunshine of
Truth irradiates the purified soul of the wise and good: an
Elysian field dotted with immaterial orchids. 67 became
shattered.
This led him to conclude that: There seemed to be
nothing like a neutral standpoint from which these alternative
first principles could be evaluated. But if there were no such
standpoint, then the whole idea of rational certainty', and the
whole Socratic-Platonic idea of replacing passion by reason,
seemed not to make much sense. 68
In A World without Substances or Essence he again
emphatically describes his meta-philosophy in relation to
other existentialist approaches: Various labels and slogans
are associated with this anti-essentialistic, anti-metaphysical
movement in various Western traditions. Among them are
pragmatism, existentialism, deconstructionism, holism,
process thought, poststructuralism, postmodernism, and
hermeneutics. Perhaps for merely patriotic reasons, my own
preferred term is pragmatism; among the slogans are
'Everything is a social construction' and 'All awareness is a
linguistic affair'. 69
Yet, on balance it would seem that Rorty, the disillusioned
Platonist, may not have entirely succeeded in getting
Platonism out of his system - as the not so hidden (Platonic)
love for broad theoretical classifications (his binary
descriptions) that shows up all along in his writings, indicate.

29
A confessional statement suggests that this is the case:
Those who, like me, were raised atheist and now find it
merely confusing to talk about God, nevertheless fluctuate
between moods in which we are content with utility and
moods in which we hanker after validity as well. 70

2.7 Pirsig (Type I)


Figure 2.1 presents Robert Pirsigs definition of the two types
of understanding, a duality he wishes to overcome: ...What
has become an urgent necessity is a way of looking at the
world that does violence to neither of these two kinds of
understanding and unites them into one. 71
Figure 2.1: Pirsigs Classical and Romantic understanding 72
Classical Romantic
World primarily as World primarily in terms of
underlying form. immediate appearance.
Concerned with the piles Primarily inspirational,
and the basis for sorting and imaginative, creative,
interrelating them. intuitive. Feelings rather
than facts predominate.
Directed toward the handful
of sand before the sorting
begins.

The unfolding of Pirsigs thought experiment, that


eventually led him in the first book to his conception of
Quality as mystical source of all, may briefly be recounted as
follows:
1. From the beginning, as young student who became
disaffected with a scientific method that (in his
opinion) merely generates endless cycles of

30
hypotheses, he felt driven to discover a theory of
everything (which he admitted in an interview with
Tim Adams); 73
2. He studied philosophy (the high country of the
mind) to determine where it would lead him; 74
3. As a result of classroom experiments, using student
essays, he formulated the thesis: ...though Quality
cannot be defined, you know what Quality is...; 75
4. He is confronted by the persistent question: if
everyone knows what quality is, why is there so much
disagreement about the concept?; 76
5. He uses his analytical knife to produce a new
bifurcation: classic Quality (squareness) and romantic
Quality (hip), but realizes that: His simple, neat,
beautiful, undefined Quality was starting to get
complex.; 77
6. He develops the insight that Quality is beyond both
classic and romantic understanding, neither outside
nor inside the mind, but a: ... third entity which is
independent of the two.; 78
7. He now defines the world as consisting of, mind,
matter, and Quality; 79
8. He eventually realizes that Quality cannot be
independent but is an event that is to be found:
...only in the relationship of the two with each
other...; 80
9. He concludes that the Quality event is the cause of
subjects and objects: ...The sun of quality," he wrote,
"does not revolve around the subjects and objects of
our existence. It does not just passively illuminate

31
them. It is not subordinate to them in any way. It has
created them. They are subordinate to it! 81
With these statements Pirsig is (though he denies it), in the
present authors view, reciting his own momentous re-
discovery of Platos vision of the highest good (the Form of
forms). It is described in the metaphor of the Cave as that
highest level of arte (excellence) outside the Cave, where one
(the Philosopher) turns to directly look at the sun to see the
Good, the ultimate reality.
It is, of course, only a metaphor, an intellectual reaching
out toward an ultimate, final truth. In the Republic, 82 Plato
describes it as follows: The thing he would be able to do last
would be to look directly at the sun itself, and gaze at it
without using reflections in water or any other medium [the
lower levels and forms of truth, less real], but as it is in itself.
In the second half of his first book, Zen and the art of
motorcycle maintenance, Pirsigs excitement at his discovery of
the true nature of the concept Quality, impels him forward
into a widening circle of associations and comparisons with
other concepts. These, he considers to be either synonyms or
subordinate elements of Quality.
The list below provides a number of examples:
1. Quality as a kind of: non-intellectual awareness..., a
pre-intellectual reality...; 83
2. Quality as: ...the parent, the source of all subjects
and objects. ; 84
3. The Quality he was teaching was not just a part of
reality, it was the whole thing.; 85
4. We invent earth and heavens, trees, stones and
oceans, gods, music, arts, language, philosophy,
engineering, civilization and science. We call these

32
analogues reality...But that which causes us to invent
the analogues is Quality.; 86
5. Hence, he concludes, Quality cannot be defined,
because if we do, something less than Quality is
defined. 87
A note on the last point above is deemed in order. Pirsigs
formulation is, in essence, similar to the negative way (via
negativa) of the mediaeval theologians. Replace Pirsigs term
Quality above with the term God and one has the classic
Mediaeval theological statement for the existence of the One
that cannot (and should not) be defined. The God of whom
no positive attributes can be stated, because otherwise it
would then anthropomorphize him and threaten the basic set
of premises (and belief) that God is undivided, irreducibly
One, eternal, incorporeal and unchangeable.
Pirsig then proceeds with his intellectual journey in the
following manner:
1. He admits becoming confused as to whether he has
ended up with a metaphysical or mystical entity. 88
And here Pirsig again finds himself dangling between
Logos and Mythos, between Objectivism and
Subjectivism. But, he avoids the issue by deciding that
because his definition of Quality is that it is
indefinable it, therefore: ...freed it from the rules of
metaphysics.; 89
2. Quality is the Tao; 90
3. Quality is the generator of the mythos; 91
4. Religion isn't invented by man. Men are invented by
religion.; 92
5. His Quality agrees closely with the Sophists: Man is
the measure of all things; 93

33
6. Quality! Virtue! Dharma! That is what the Sophists
were teaching! Not ethical relativism. Not pristine
virtue. But Arete. Excellence. Dharma! Before the
Church of Reason. Before substance. Before form.
Before mind and matter.; 94
7. Quality is identified with morality: if Quality is the
primary reality of the world then that means morality
is also the primary reality of the world; 95
8. The Metaphysics of Quality: subscribes to what is
called empiricism.; 96
9. The MOQ: does not insist on a single exclusive
truth 97 It follows the pragmatist credo that truth
is what is considered useful for the time being
until something better comes along.; 98
10. The MOQ: identifies religious mysticism with
Dynamic Quality.; 99
11. Finally, Pirsig defines Static and Dynamic Quality
as: ...the fundamental division of the world. 100

34
CHAPTER 3
SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHIES (TYPE II)
3.1 Aristotle
Aristotle may, in the modern sense, be regarded as the first
scientific philosopher among the ancient Greeks in the
Socratic era. Whereas Platos thought constantly dwelled in a
nether world of perfect forms, ideas and principles,
Aristotles works are replete with orderly, systematic
classification of the objects and phenomena of nature.
Aristotles empiricist orientation, and emphasis on the
truth provided by the senses, is predominant. This is
evidenced in:
His collection and analysis of many natural objects
and biological specimens (much of it brought to him
as a result of the conquests of Alexander the Great in
various parts of the world);
The basic division of various branches of inquiry
(theoretical, practical and productive sciences) and
also;
His identification of four basic causes (namely:
material; efficient; formal and final causes).
Aristotles aim was to generate precise, empirically
supported knowledge in the microscopic, rigorous style
characteristic of modern science.
His emphasis on empirical experience and his delight in
the senses, especially of sight, is prominent in the Metaphysics:
...most of all, the senses, makes us know and brings to light
many differences between things. With a view to action,
experience seems in no respect inferior to art, and men of
experience [practical competence] succeed even better than
those who have theory without experience. 1

35
For Aristotle, metaphysics is prior to both the sciences of
physics and mathematics that he identifies. It is the science of
first causes and principles: that which is desirable on its
own account and for the sake of knowing 2 It is also the
divine science, because: (1) God is thought to be among
the causes of all things and to be a first principle, and (2) such
a science either God alone can have, or God above all
others. 3
Aristotle addresses his Metaphysics 4 to an exposition of
various first principles, namely the modes of being: the
categories, or various predications of being, such as
substance, quality, quantity, relation; substance as both matter
and form; the four causes, and a principle of change -
potentiality becoming actuality.
Aristotle acknowledges the role and importance of and
places a high value on both the practical dimension (the
experience of particulars provided by the senses) and the
theoretical dimension (knowledge of first principles and
causes).
Interestingly, and similar to Plato, Aristotles legacy in this
regard finds reflection in later objectivist philosophy. Even
that sceptical thinker and avowed enemy of metaphysics,
David Hume, incorporates his own particular version of
Aristotles categories or modes of being into his system of the
empirical foundations of all sciences of human nature.
The key characteristics of Aristotles thought are: system
and empirical, which are reflected time and again in his
various works. In On Sense and the Sensible he shows his
taxonomic mindset, when he talks of making: ...a survey of
animals and all living things, in order to ascertain what

36
functions are peculiar, and what functions are common, to
them. 5
In the Physics he states: When the objects of an inquiry, in
any department, have principles, conditions, or elements, it is
through acquaintance with these that knowledge, that is to say
scientific knowledge, is attained. For, we do not think that we
know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary
conditions or first principles, and have carried our analysis as
far as its simplest elements. 6
In the Topics 7 he analyses the components of reason in
detailed fashion: from demonstrative reasoning (deductive
thought) to dialectical reasoning (inductive thought). Mere
description is not yet scientific knowledge, or as Aristotle
would say: the particulars of experience must be brought into
relation (incorporated into a tight system of verified
knowledge) according to principles (basic premises or
scientific theory in the modern sense).
In his influential Nicomachean Ethics 8 Aristotle states that
there cannot be a universal form of the good, as Plato held to
be at the pinnacle of his system, but that the good consists of
many, especially practical and empirical, aspects. He
formulates it as follows: things are called good in as many
senses as they are said to exist; for they are so called in the
category of Substance (e.g. God or mind) and in Quality (the
virtues) and in Quantity (what is moderate) and in Relation
(what is useful) and in Time (opportunity) and in Place
(habitat) and so on. Clearly, then, there cannot be a single
universal common to all cases, because it would be predicated
not in all the categories but in one only. 9
He declared his perplexity concerning Platonic talk of
justice or virtue as a thing-itself and states: We are studying

37
not to know what goodness is, but how to become good
men. 10
His system of ethics distinguishes between intellectual virtues
(wisdom, understanding and prudence) and moral virtues (the
practical virtues of liberality and temperance). The good for
Aristotle is happiness and activity of the soul according to
rational principle (the contemplative, intellectual virtues), as
well as due to instruction in the moral virtues, which: ...like
crafts, are acquired by practice and habituation. 11
An important principle of ethics for Aristotle is that right
conduct should conform to a mean (moderation) that avoids
deficiency or excess. Aristotles ethics incorporate both
theoretical (rational) and empirical (practical) dimensions of
existence, with one eye on ethical principles and the other on
best social practice. 12

3.2 Hume
David Hume (1711 1776), generally regarded as the leading
philosopher of (British) Empiricism, is known for his
aversion to classical metaphysics and to the Cartesian
philosophy of disembodied, innate ideas. Despite mixing
psychology with philosophy in his thought, he was a realist
thinker who admired science. His Treatise of Human Nature
proposes: a complete system of the sciences, built on a
foundation almost entirely new 13
In Humes philosophy all ideas derive from simple
impressions. Ideas are faint images of impressions and are
represented in thinking as direct copies of that which appear
in the senses. What is taken by rationalists and metaphysicians
as causes are simply the constant conjunction of
perceptions and for Hume is proof that: ...our impressions

38
are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions.
14

For the bottom-up empiricism of David Hume, there can


be no independent and self-sufficient ideas or cognitions. All
thought is ever so closely embedded in experience and the
senses. As he formulates it: To explain the ultimate causes of
our mental actions is impossible. It is sufficient if we can give
any satisfactory account of them from experience and
analogy. 15
He rejects the Cartesian rationalism that posited that the
mind was a substance, and the idea that: ...nothing came into
existence without a cause, 16 inter alia on the grounds that it is
based on the mistaken idea that facts could be deductively
demonstrated and that demonstrative reasoning is the only
kind of thinking. 17 Hume also separated matters of logic
(analytical propositions) and matters of fact (derived from
inductive inference) from matters of value (feelings and
sentiments about things). 18
For Hume, the essence of the mind is unknown, and its
powers can only be determined by way of careful observation
and experiment, such as in the natural sciences. He
emphasizes the view that: ...though we must endeavour to
render all our principles as universal as possible...it is still
certain we cannot go beyond experience. 19
His root principle is that all our ideas are derived from
sense impressions: ...our impressions are the causes of our
ideas, not our ideas of our impressionswe cannot form to
ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pineapple, without
having actually tasted it... 20 Substance, Descartes favourite
term for describing the contents of mind, is nothing but: ...a

39
collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination,
and have a particular name assigned them. 21
The movement of thought is from simple ideas to general
ideas to complex ideas, all rooted in sense-experience, none
having an existence as substance of mind on its own. We
also have no idea of the self or of a personal identity - there
is no sense impression of a self. Hume is adamant about
this: I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that
they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different
perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable
rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. 22 He
also accepts the basic realist stance that bodies exist
independently of mind or of perception. 23
Morality cannot be derived from pure, demonstrative
reason, but from sentiment, feeling and customary rules of
acceptable action and conduct in society. 24 He stresses the
importance of utility, as far as morality is concerned: Men
establish the laws of justice out of a concern for their own
and the public interest. 25
Hume is historically important for giving the empirical
component in human knowledge its rightful emphasis, even
though much of his philosophy is a combination of
speculative thought and introspectionist psychology.

3.3 Lakatos
Although he was sympathetic to Popper's deductive
approach to scientific knowledge, Imre Lakatos nevertheless
eschewed the falsification principle as simply not a good
reflection of what really happens in science.
In rationalist-realist fashion and in an effort to reconcile
aspects of both Popper and Kuhn's philosophies, he

40
proposed his own, verification, approach of 'research
programs.' A research program consists of a hard core of
main hypotheses (conjectures) and a flexible outer belt of
secondary hypotheses and propositions that are more likely
to change and be modified over time in scientific
investigations.
In contrast with Popper's focus on logical purity in
scientific theories, Lakatos' research program contains:
...clusters of hypotheses, evaluated not by the refutation of
any one but rather by their ability to predict new
observations, and for rational reconstruction as a method for
understanding the history of theories... 26
In further contrast to Popper's approach, Lakatos opted
for an objectivist-empiricist scheme of scientific research
programs, 27 preserving logical rigor and adhering to a realist
conception of truth. 28
However, similar to Popper, Lakatos views the objectivity
of scientific theories as independent from individual human
minds - in other words, scientific theories should be
objectively and rationally true, not subjectively and inter-
subjectively as in Kuhn's approach. He also agrees with
Popper in regard to the theory-ladenness of truth and his
hypothesis-testing approach.
At the same time, Lakatos rejects what he perceives to be
Kuhn's drift toward scientific truth as irrational faith or belief
commitments. For Lakatos, as for Popper, this creates the
specter of not being able to separate science from pseudo-
science or subjectivity. This is known as the demarcation
problem.
Like Popper, his philosophy of science has the great
(Einsteins) scientific achievement and explanations for that

41
event, in mind - but for Popper's isolated, conjectural
statements and hypotheses he substitutes the research
program of clusters of hypotheses as recommended
approach for the sciences.
To summarize: Lakatos is the objectivist-empiricist
philosopher of science, viewing science as a process of
seeking rational confirmation of the predictive value of
research programs. He expresses thus: The time-honored
empirical criterion for a satisfactory theory was agreement
with the observed facts. Our empirical criterion for a series
of theories is that it should produce new facts. 29

3.4 Legal positivism


Legal positivism historically reflected the need - which gained
impetus during the 17th and 18th centuries as a result of the
wider impact of Newtonian science - to build, explicate and
apply a coherent system of legal principles, concepts and
processes suited to the variety of practical needs for justice in
society.
The development and growth of science provided a
strong stimulus to the legal community to codify English
common law into a uniform and intelligible system for
consistent and fair application by the Courts and jurists.
Within the present context, this school of jurisprudential
thought serves as prime example of the objectivist-empiricist
orientation to knowledge, albeit still situated within the
overall normative-regulatory (type IV), thrust of the legal
discipline at large.
Legal positivism is rooted in the empiricist and utilitarian
philosophies of, especially, Hobbes and Bentham. For these
thinkers, divine sources of law are subordinated to jus civile or

42
the positive law created by human reason in the service of
peace under the absolute control of powerful rulers (Hobbes
sovereigns), and to the primacy of the individual need for
happiness or pleasure (Benthams utility principle).
Hobbes in effect renders classical naturalism obsolete by
subordinating divine law to the positive legal measures of
conduct and decrees emanating from the will of the
sovereign: to him that hath the power of the sword, by
which men are compelled to observe them. 30
More than a century later Bentham continues the trend
and concludes that: It is plain, therefore, that, setting
revelation out of the question, no light can ever be thrown
upon the standard of right and wrong, by any thing that can
be said upon the question, what is God's will. 31
Whereas legal naturalism maintains the bond between law
and morality, one of the major characteristics of legal
positivism is that law and morality, is and ought, are now
clearly distinguished and referred to as the separability
thesis.
This is emphatically the position of what is regarded by
many as the leading legal theorist of the 20th century, H. L. A.
Hart. Although he admits, in the Postscript to his book
(thirty two years later), that some contingent connection may
from time to time exist between law and morality, Hart
steadfastly holds to the central positivist thesis that: there
are no necessary conceptual connections between the content
of law and morality; and hence morally iniquitous provisions
may be valid as legal rules or principles. 32
He therefore confirms his original stance toward lex iniusta
(in opposition to natural law), namely that: the assertion
that an unjust law is not a law has the same ring of

43
exaggeration and paradox, if not falsity, as statutes are not
laws or constitutional law is not law. 33
Positivist law is essentially about rules - an impersonal,
system of legal rules, analogous to a comprehensive, well-
tested and accepted scientific theory. An example is Harts
own system of primary and secondary legal rules, namely:
duty-imposing rules, power-conferring rules, rules of
recognition, rules of change, acceptance of rules, internal and
external points of view, internal and external statements, and
legal validity. 34
A number of different approaches exist within the
positivist paradigm, such as Harts Inclusive or soft Legal
Positivism and Razs Exclusive Legal Positivism. 35
A third approach is that of Dworkin, who in criticism of
Harts view of law as system of rules, introduces the idea of a
combination of binding principles and discretionary elements
with which to arrive at the best adjudication outcome in the
practical legal situation.
He indicates his positivist orientation, showing qualified
support for the separability thesis, with the view that:
Morality is a distinct, independent dimension of our
experience, and it exercises its own sovereignty. We cannot
argue ourselves free of it except by its own leave, except as it
were by making our peace with it. 36 Although Dworkins
approach to law and morality does not always seem to be
consistent, his basic objectivist stance is confirmed by
Reidinger. 37
It may be concluded that Dworkins philosophy of law
ties the conceptual/theoretical aspect (his binding
principles) much closer in with legal practice (adjudication).

44
He attempts to integrate legal theory and legal practice
more tightly together in a best possible justification of
adjudication practice. Yet, he does so from the objectivist
starting point of abstract (positivist) legal principles, which he
does not relinquish. This is reflected in his philosophical
methodology, namely the application of principles of logic to
legal language and concepts.
Another theory of jurisprudence in the positivist tradition
is the approach of legal formalism. The chief purpose of legal
formalism is to build a comprehensive and tight and seamless
body of legal principles, propositions and justificatory
structures that can be applied to legal practice in the manner
of a logical-deductive science like mathematics, but without
recourse to any non-legal disciplines such as philosophy or
social science. 38
Key elements of positivist law that indicates its systematic,
scientific (type II) character are: (a) reasoning by example and
precedent (the doctrine of precedence); (b) the application of
an abstract legal rule, according to a legal logic, to every
concrete factual legal situation (the seamless web doctrine);
and (c) the conception of every human social act as:
constituting either obedience to, or violation, or
application, of rules of law 39 (the command theory or
doctrine).
In conclusion, the objectivist-empiricist approach to law is
still dominant. Yet, partly in response to issues such as its
reputed lack of attention to unfair legal treatment in cases of
gender, minorities, race and cultural diversity, legal positivism
has come under attack from rival (subjectivist) schools of
jurisprudential thought.

45
3.5 Realist aesthetics
Aristotle accepted the view of art as imitation
(representation would be a less controversial term).
His Poetics 40 is an original example of the scientific-
explicatory mode of human understanding as applied to
aesthetics, showing a systematic and detailed treatment of the
various types of poetry, modes of construction and
performance guidelines, that reads like a modern academic
text.
For Aristotle, Beauty consists of an orderly and systematic
arrangement of parts (whether of an object or system of
ideas, such as the nature and elements of the tragedy in
poetry) that forms a whole characterized by magnitude and
symmetry. Copleston notes that: This should allow of a
doctrine of aesthetic contemplation and of the disinterested
character of such contemplation as stated by Kant and
Schopenhauer. 41
Another exponent of the empiricist approach to aesthetics
is David Hume. Humes realist view of the arts is that its rules
are grounded in experience and that there are no a priori,
immutable aesthetic laws.
For Hume beauty is based on perception and because
people differ in their perceptions in matters of taste they will
have different conceptions of what it is.
As a result of human fallibility (deficient or indelicate
sense organs in Humes terminology), the only true standard
of taste is that provided by general consent of those with
developed aesthetic sensibilities in nations over the ages. 42
Finally, the movements of Realism and Naturalism in art
are examples of the objectivist-empiricist (type II) realm:
Realism with its emphasis on telling or showing how it is in

46
nature and in the everyday lives of people; and Naturalism,
with its preference for depicting human conduct in its
unadorned (even sordid) state of biological and or social
determinism.

3.6 Rorty (Type II)


Richard Rorty adopts the same basic approach and on
numerous occasions states the view that his philosophy is not
about arguments (dialectical or discursive reasoning as in
analytical philosophy) but about interesting new vocabularies
of description.
It is not about Analysis - the correct application of the
rules of logic (or demonstrative reasoning as in Aristotle),
but about truth as relatively fleeting instances of inter-
subjective agreement.
Rortys philosophical writings are built upon and richly
reflect the analogical - poetical, metaphorical - mode of
thought and reasoning. Substantive sections of his writings
are examples of history-based arguments - in his case
primarily the use of ideas and descriptions from selected
authors, taken from the history of thought. This is done in
order to bolster his attack on Platonism and to justify his own
choice of philosophy, influenced by the thought of Dewey,
Sellars and others.
The type II mode in Rortys philosophy is that of the
analogical thinker who chooses, interprets and uses selected
pieces from the history of thought to provide force of reason
to his exposition. His writing is replete with binary
comparisons, of weighing up foundationalism against his
preferred, neo-pragmatist version of pluralism.

47
Thus Rorty argues, gives reasons for his utterances, he is
not just the strong poet and destructive critic of scientific
philosophy - despite his strained attempts at times to avoid
taking an argumentative stand, when he states that:
...edifying philosophers have to decry the very notion of
having a view, while avoiding having a view about having
views. 43
David Hall points to a perhaps neglected aspect of Rortys
thought, namely that it is thoroughly taxonomic, thus
providing further indication of Rorty the type II (scientific-
explicatory) thinker. Examples are his discussion of the two
roles of the philosopher, namely as the poly-pragmatic
Socratic intermediary, on the one hand and, on the other, as
the: the cultural overseer who knows everyone's common
ground - the Platonic philosopher-king who knows what
everybody else is really doing 44
In Consequences of Pragmatism, Rorty gives another indication
of the taxonomic tendency in his thought, when he expresses
the desire for a pluralist culture that supports and promotes
freedom and imaginative new opportunities for all as: a
culture in which neither the priests nor the physicists nor the
poets nor the Party were thought of as more rational, or
more scientific or deeper than one another. 45
The taxonomic Rorty appears again in Essays on Heidegger
and Others, where he discusses the influence of historical
figures: Three answers have been given, in our century, to
the question of how we should conceive of our relation to the
Western philosophical tradition, answers which are paralleled
by three conceptions of the aim of philosophizing. They are
the Husserlian (or 'scientistic') answer, the Heideggerian (or
poetic) answer and the pragmatist (or 'political') answer. 46

48
Lastly, and more explicitly theoretical, he declares: I can
now state my thesis. It is that the intellectuals of the West
have, since the Renaissance, progressed through three stages:
they have hoped for redemption first from God, then from
philosophy, and now from literature. 47
Rorty offers the following analysis of social science:
there are two distinct requirements for the vocabulary of
the social sciences: (1) It should contain descriptions of
situations which facilitate their prediction and control (2) It
should contain descriptions which help one decide what to
do. 48 Contrary to his avowed non-separation of is and
ought, Rorty here gives sanction to that very distinction.

3.7 Pirsig (Type II)


Pirsig indicates in the first book that he had been thoroughly
exposed to the scientific method (in other words, to
Squareness) in his career. He even worked for a number of
years writing technical manuals for computers, describing
himself as: a totally classic person, 49 a knower of
logic. 50
The objectivist-empiricist (scientific type II) dimension
in Pirsigs narrative is described in the first book with
reference to the nature and maintenance of a motorcycle. For
this purpose he provides an analysis or breakdown of the
hierarchy of elements of a motorcycle, as shown in Figure
3.1.

49
Figure 3.1: Subsystems of the motorcycle 51

MOTORCYCLE

COMPONENTS FUNCTIONS

POWER RUNNING ASSEMBLY


ASSEMB
He goes on LY to point out that: The true system, the real
system, is our present construction of systematic thought
itself, rationality itself 52

50
CHAPTER 4
NARRATIVE PHILOSOPHIES
4.1 Protagoras
Although there were a number of other Sophists in Socratic
Greece, such as Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus and
Thrasymachus, it is to Protagoras, as its foremost figure, that
one may turn in order to establish the Sophists views on
truth, reality and ethics.
Largely due to the writings of Plato and Aristotle, Sophists
have ever since received a bad reputation, yet they have made
important contributions as thinkers (in rhetoric and the
analysis of the meaning of words) and more prominently, as
teachers in the subjectivist tradition.
Three reasons for the development of Sophism are
provided:
The speculative theories of the Pre-Socratic
cosmologists, none of which could provide
satisfactory explanations;
The successes of rhetoric in debates in practical life
and in the law courts;
The endless disputes of philosophers which showed
the mutability of ideas and beliefs. 1
Against such a background it is not surprising that
scepticism and a relativistic approach to life gained
prominence, thereby facilitating the entrance of the Sophists
as professed experts (for a fee) on how to become good
citizens and effective speakers in the Assembly and law-
courts.
The thought of Protagoras (and Sophism) has a number
of distinguishing characteristics. He is the original source of a
pragmatic epistemology combined with an optimistic

51
humanism, namely, that: Man is the measure of all things. 2 It
may still serve as central principle for narrative-interpretive
thought.
Sophism also emphasised the primacy of experience and the
evidence of the senses from which understanding was to be
gained in a bottom up fashion, seeking: ...to amass a wide
store of particular observations and facts; they were
Encyclopaedists, Polymaths. 3
Protagoras was not a systematic thinker attempting to
build a great theoretical foundation, something which is
typical of type I and II realms of thought. He took just the
opposite view, namely, of rejecting any theory or belief that
was not firmly grounded in ordinary experience. His aim was
practical, not speculative, and focused on teaching others in
the skills and art of good living and good citizenship, thus:
political arte, in addressing the root subjectivist question,
namely, how should one live?
No ethical code or belief is regarded as truer than another,
but Protagoras and other Sophists advised their listeners and
pupils that certain forms of conduct, such as adhering to the
accepted ethical code of the community, are better than
unethical alternatives, such as going against the norms of
society and the rule of law.
Protagoras, as with other Sophists, was a nominalist, and
viewed human action as based on: experience alone and
dictated by nothing but expediency. Right and wrong,
wisdom, justice and goodness, were nothing but names. 4 In
contrast, the Platonic reality of a world of forms is not
acquired through the senses.
The readiness to participate in public debate and lecturing,
and in appearances at Olympiads, was another characteristic

52
of Protagoras, as he (and other Sophists): ...considered
themselves to be in the tradition of the poets and rhapsodes. 5
As successors to the poets, the Sophists included a focus on
the technical requirements as well as criticism of poetry in
their teaching. 6 In true narrative mode of thought,
Protagoras prefers to communicate his views in the form of a
story, rather than reasoned argument - thus favouring the
analogical over the logical.
As prototypical exemplar of the subjectivist-empiricist
paradigm of thought, Protagoras achieved distinction as
thinker and teacher - even Platos Socrates showed respect
for him.

4.2 Nietzsche
In a highly passionate and poetical manner and thrusting
toward a philosophy of self-overcoming and of the trans-
valuation of all values, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 1900), the
un-masker par excellence, attacks all objectivist-empyrean
thought.
According to Kaufmann 7 Nietzsche wants to pose small,
single, questions. Yet, he goes on to explain the will to -
power as Nietzsches conception of: a universal feature of
the human constitution, whose fictions must be considered
necessary (for man) because they are not subjective: they
leave no leeway for individual differences between one mans
thinking and anothers. 8
What started with the Greek emancipation of Reason and
reached its zenith with the supremacy of Reason, in the
architectonic intellectual system of Kant, eventually became,
in the approaches of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, a vehement
reaction against any supposedly self-sufficient, impersonal

53
rationality. 20th century thought and life attest to the influence
of these philosopher-poets - the precursors of what became
known as existentialism-humanism.
Nietzsche had high regard for the moral relativism and
subjectivism of the Greek Sophists, who, in his mind, had a
better understanding of human nature, because: they
postulate the first truth that a morality-in-itself, a good-in-
itself do not exist, that it is a swindle to talk of truth in this
field. 9
In typical narrative-interpretive mode, Nietzsche presents
- more often masks - his thought in a large variety of
aphorisms, by way of statements, observations, critical
remarks, psychological insights and, generally, scathing and
emotive commentary. Kaufmann observes of Nietzsches
thought that: We are confronted with a pluralistic universe
in which each aphorism is itself a microcosmequally
relevant to ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of history, theory of
value, psychology, and perhaps half a dozen other fields. 10
For Nietzsche, any system or edifice of ideas (typical of
objectivist thought), especially those that pretend or propose
to be the final, once-for-all or last word, is anathema. He
formulates it succinctly: the will to a system is a lack of
integrity. 11 He was especially critical of Kant, the foremost
intellectual system-builder of modern philosophy, about
whom he remarks (in reference to Kants favourite choice of
title for many of his works) that: Even the great Chinaman
of Konigsberg was only a great critic. 12
The Will to Power is Nietzsches central conception of
what it is that acts as driving force in human nature hence
his impatience with thinkers and philosophers who lack the
self-awareness, who do not realize that, at bottom, all truth is

54
perspective 13 - all truth-seeking is personal. For Nietzsche all
objectivist philosophers are prejudiced and, in a typical
unmasking fashion, he points out that: Behind all logic
too and its apparent autonomy their stand evaluations, in
plainer terms physiological demands for the preservation of a
certain species of life. 14
Nietzsches main target, which he pursued relentlessly as
the self-described philosopher with a hammer, is Platonic
thought, especially its manifestation in metaphysics and
religion - hence his well-known statement that:
Christianity is Platonism for the people 15
Objectivist-empyrean thinkers typically regard the senses
and will as either unreliable or inferior compared to the
certainty of logical thought and the concepts of pure reason
(Descartes; Kant). In contrast, Nietzsche enthused about
willing as a plurality of sensation and feeling that also
included thinking: in every act of will there is a
commanding thought and do not imagine that this thought
can be separated from the willing, as though will would then
remain over! 16
As a nominalist, Nietzsche warns against treating cause
and effect as if they were material things - they are merely
convenient fictions and conceptualizations to aid mutual
understanding: It is we alone who have fabricated causes,
succession, reciprocity, relativity, compulsion, number, law,
freedom, motive, purpose 17
Nietzsches thought is essentially two-fold. It consists,
firstly, of repeated and devastating critiques of objectivist
thought with its pretence of attaining a purified, static, truth,
and, secondly, of a passionate promotion and celebration of
life as the Will to Power.

55
He had an acute sense of the all-permeating influence, and
pressures to conform, of culture, and its customary
assumptions and norms, and the risk he therefore was taking
in daring to move outside of its encompassing frame of
existence and thought. He acknowledges this in a revealing
passage: To recognize untruth as a condition of life, that,
to be sure, means to resist customary value-sentiments in a
dangerous fashion; and a philosophy which ventures to do so
places itself, by that act alone, beyond good and evil. 18
Nietzsche idolized individualism: the independent, lofty
and creative spirit who dares to be different; the individual
who can move beyond the herd instinct or herd morality of
subservience to Platonic imperatives, religious or otherwise.
It eventually led him to conclude, against herd mentality,
that: All truly noble morality grows out of triumphant
self-affirmation. 19 He expresses it in inimitable manner, as
follows: He shall be the greatest who can be the most
solitary, the most concealed, the most divergent, the man
beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, the
superabundant of will; this shall be called greatness: the ability
to be as manifold as whole, as vast as full. 20
Finally, a basic thread in Nietzsches thought, even before
he developed his concept of the Will to Power, was his pre-
occupation with the moral (subjectivist) dimension of life. He
was, at a young age, disaffected by the Platonic kind of
morality that existed in European culture, against which he
reacted strongly. He describes how, already in his early teens,
when he wrote his first piece on ethics: I was exercised by
the problem of evil [deciding]to give the honor to God,
as is only just, and make him the father of evil. 21

56
4.3 Kuhn and Feyerabend
Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions 22 undoubtedly
shook the philosophy of science and other scholarly
communities in the second half of the 20th century.
In terms of the meta-theoretical approach followed in the
present work, the whole tone and emphasis of Kuhn's (type
III) exposition is in marked contrast to the impersonal and
abstracted form of theorizing found in the work of Lakatos,
and especially Popper.
In sharp contrast to the preference for deductive
theorizing by Popper and Lakatos, Kuhn's methodology for
arriving at his socio-historical conception of science, as well
as his explanation of how he came to be interested in the
history of science, reflects a radically different approach.
Kuhn is a thinker in the Aristotelian mould. Similar to
Aristotle's process of data collection and reporting in the
Politeia, on the actual details of a variety of political systems
and forms of government from which he developed his own
philosophy of politics - Kuhn conducted a range of
interviews with prominent scientists and scholars, before
formulating his theory of paradigms.
The opening lines of Structure establish the main theme of
Kuhn's philosophy of science: History, if viewed as a
repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could
produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by
which we are now possessed. 23
This is followed by a statement that shows Kuhn to be
the critical, unmasking thinker in the subjectivist-empiricist
tradition: This essay attempts to show that we have been
misled by them [the sanitized textbooks of science] in
fundamental ways. Its aim is a sketch of the quite different

57
concept of science that can emerge from the historical record
of the research activity itself. 24
There can be little doubt about what Kuhn mainly
intended and succeeded in doing, namely: debunking and
overturning the typical, nave, account of science as a fully
rational undertaking that unfolds in a cumulative and linear
fashion.
Kuhn is concerned with the ways in which different
schools of thought (in both the natural and social sciences)
view scientific truth, hence his choice of the term paradigm
to refer to these different knowledge traditions within the
various sciences.
His subjectivist orientation comes to the fore when he
states: Observation and experience can and must drastically
restrict the range of admissible scientific belief, else there
would be no science. But they cannot alone determine a
particular body of such belief. An apparently arbitrary
element, compounded of personal and historical accident, is
always a formative ingredient of the beliefs espoused by a
given scientific community at a given time. 25
He favors an interpretive approach, admitting that:
...many of my generalizations are about the sociology or
social psychology of scientists... 26 But his very next
statement reflects a much debated ambivalence in his
philosophy, when he immediately harks back to the
rationalist tradition with the words: ...yet at least a few of my
conclusions belong traditionally to logic or epistemology. 27
This points to a problematic aspect of his thought that is
reflected in his public rejection 28, 29 of the social
constructivist approach to scientific knowledge.

58
Kuhn's debate with Popper 30 gives abundant evidence of
how philosophically far apart these two figures were. The title
of Kuhn's address states the difference in philosophical
outlook between them succinctly: Logic of discovery
[Popper] or psychology of research [Kuhn]? 31
Interestingly, Andresen 32 reports that Kuhn enjoyed
reading Freud, even confessing that his own psychoanalysis
sharpened his skill as historian. This contrasts with Popper
and Lakatos, who rejected what they viewed as the pseudo-
sciences of Marx and Freud.
Even more pronounced than Thomas Kuhn is Paul
Feyerabends subjectivist approach. He is the story-teller and
critic of other philosophies of science, who deliberately
wanted to shock.
Formerly an admirer of Karl Popper's philosophy, Paul
Feyerabend made a radical break with Popperian orthodoxy,
proposing and propagating an anarchistic ('everything goes')
philosophy of science.
Rorty 33 mentions that Feyerabend already made the
historicist turn in his writings in the early 1950s. Yet, he
remained a loyal participant in the field (maintaining cordial
relations with, especially, Lakatos), all the while supporting
the scientific fallibilist and realist convictions of the others,
because: it makes very good sense. 34
He later turned toward advocacy (the meta-type IV
mode), calling for the democratization of science as just
another co-equivalent tradition of knowledge and thought in
society.
His main thesis, contra Popper, Lakatos and Kuhn, is that:
...the events, procedures and results that constitute the
sciences have no common structure... 35 For Feyerabend a

59
theory of science using: ...Reason or Rationality may impress
outsiders - but it is much too crude an instrument for the
people on the spot, that is, for scientists facing some concrete
research problem. 36
Key features of Feyerabend's pragmatic (meta-type III)
conception of science are as follows: 37
Science is an essentially anarchic enterprise.
Theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and
more likely to encourage programs than its law-and-
order alternatives;
Proliferation of theories is beneficial for science,
while uniformity impairs its critical power.
Uniformity endangers the free development of the
individual;
Neither science nor rationality serves as universal
measures of excellence. They are particular traditions,
unaware of their historical grounding;
The distinction between a context of discovery and a
context of justification, norms and facts,
observational terms and theoretical terms must be
abandoned. None of these distinctions plays a role in
scientific practice. Popper's critical rationalism fails
for the same reasons;
Interests, forces, propaganda and brainwashing
techniques play a much greater role than is commonly
believed in the growth of our knowledge and in the
growth of science;
There is only one principle that can be defended
under all circumstances and in all stages of human
development. It is the principle: anything goes.

60
Similar to the neo-pragmatism of Richard Rorty,
Feyerabend's philosophy of science is essentially a narrative
philosophy. Its modus operandi is intellectual re-description
based on recourse to events and examples in the history of
science.
As in the case of Rorty, Feyerabend is deliberately critical,
provocative and aim to deconstruct in his case of the purist
(foundationalist) picture of science painted by Popper and, to
lesser extent, Lakatos.
Feyerabend follows a pluralist approach to knowledge
development that goes beyond Kuhn's historicist cycles.
Kuhn still wants to hold on to a rational-logical structure of
thought, even though his socio-psychological explanation of
the growth of knowledge contradicts the standard conception
of science as a purely objective-logical endeavor. For
Feyerabend knowledge development is thoroughly
unpredictable in terms of clear procedures and processes -
there is no standard structure.
On the charge of relativism (any position or argument is
as good or bad as any other), Feyerabend's response seems to
vacillate between praise and rejection: ...I say that relativism
gives an excellent account of the relation between dogmatic
world-views but is only a first step towards an understanding
of live traditions ... relativism is as much of a chimera as
absolutism (the idea that there exists an objective truth), its
cantankerous twin. 38 Yet, he comes out in strong support of
Kuhn's rejection of the social constructivist program in the
sociology of science, depicting it in anti-relativist terms as:
...absurd: an example of deconstruction gone mad. 39
In interviews with Parascandalo and Hosle, 40
Feyerabend's personal and emotive style, typical of the

61
subjectivist modality, is unmistakable. He reveals his distaste
for philosophers: ...who started talking about the sciences
without really knowing much about them 41 and
unapologetically states that: ...if I can argue something or tell
a story, I do so. If I can say something softly or a little more
wickedly, I prefer to do so... 42
Feyerabend is the deconstructionist philosopher of
science; the proponent of what he describes as intercultural
poetry, 43 and the enemy of any scientific and philosophical
one-upmanship. For him, a scientific philosophy that makes
generalized abstractions (such as that of Karl Popper) about
what scientists do is: sheer fairy tale. 44
When confronted in an interview 45 with the question
about his (seemingly contradictory) respect for Plato, the
proto-typical objectivist-empyrean thinker, Feyerabend
points to Plato's literary excellence, as well as the fact that
Plato in his dialogues always ends with a return to mythos - the
poetical-narrative form of the meta-type III.
Lastly, it should be noted in passing that Popper, the
objectivist philosopher of science, could also be the emotive
critic. According to Janiks analysis: ...Popper was a bundle
of contradictions: a champion of criticism and openness but
with a penchant for vituperative denunciation of those he
criticized, anxious to demythologize culture heroes past and
present - Plato, Hegel, Marx, Wittgenstein... 46

4.4 Legal pluralism


Legal pluralism comprises a cluster of related approaches
such as legal realism, legal pragmatism, legal expressivism and
postmodernist influences. The common denominator is its
subjectivist-empiricist orientation and preference for the

62
contextual and historically unfolding accounts of law in the
experiential-interpretive mode of understanding.
Another characteristic of this paradigm is its critical-
poetical or unmasking approach. This is reflected in what
George refers to as the debunking project of the legal
realism movement that started in the 1930s and 40s. 47
Pluralist thinkers and legal theorists will be inclined to agree
with William James characterization of the system-building,
logical approach of objectivists as: a kind of marble
temple shining on a hill. 48 On matters of law James
expresses his own pragmatic view succinctly: Truth grafts
itself on previous truth, modifying it in the process, just as
idiom grafts itself on previous idiom, and law on previous
law. Given previous law and a novel case and the judge will
twist them into fresh law. 49
Oliver Wendell Holmes writings served as catalyst for the
rise of the legal realist (or anti-positivist) movement in the
United States of America during the first half of the 20th
century. However, his theorizing, despite being essentially
pragmatic, shows a mixture of objectivist and subjectivist
tendencies.
In The Path of the Law he starts with a utilitarian
description of law as concerned with little more than: the
prediction of the incidence of the public force through the
instrumentality of the courts. 50
He also describes the legal process as a rational activity
aimed at keeping out dramatic elements in order to achieve
some sort of factual purification of a case, in the scientific
(type II) mode of legal positivism. This is clearly stated in his
aim, namely: to generalize them [legal predictions] into a
thoroughly connected system eliminating as it does all the

63
dramatic elements with which his client's story has clothed it,
and retaining only the facts of legal import, up to the final
analyses and abstract universals of theoretic jurisprudence. 51
Further on in Path he expresses the wish to banish every
word of morals out of the legal lexicon, yet simultaneously
acknowledge the messy and unpredictable socio-political
realities - hence: normative, moral openness - of much legal
decision-making. He phrases it as follows: Behind the
logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and
importance of competing legislative grounds, often an
inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the
very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. 52
Finally, he ends his essay with a plea for what can be
depicted as the legal naturalists desire for a universal law:
The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those
which give it universal interest. It is through them that you
not only become a great master in your calling, but connect
your subject with the universe and catch an echo of the
infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the
universal law. 53 In view of these difficulties in Holmes
jurisprudence, Weinberg depicts him as amoral. 54
A leading legal pragmatist today is Judge Richard Posner,
who wishes to open-up law to the influence of new, non-legal
ideas such as applying economic principles to law.
In the Problems of Jurisprudence 55 he distinguishes between
what he describes as the two radically different schools of
legalists, such as Socrates, Blackstone, Langdell, Hart and
Dworkin, and the sceptics, like himself and such historical
luminaries as Thrasymachus (of might is right fame in
Platos Republic), James I, Hobbes, Bentham and Holmes.

64
Posners classification may serve as another example and
reminder of the enduring presence of different intellectual
and philosophical temperaments. In this case it is between
the type II jurisprudence of legal objectivists (Posners
legalists) and the type III jurisprudence of legal subjectivists
(Posners sceptics and pragmatists and realists).
On the matter of lex iniusta and the Nuremberg trials his
approach is pragmatic, stating that the question: ...whether
the Nuremberg judgments were lawful is meaningless. Rather
than beat our heads against the wall we should consider the
pragmatic question whether punishing the Nazi leaders using
the forms of law was a sensible way to proceed. I think it
was. 56
Posners Pragmatist Manifesto 57 may serve as an intellectual
credo for the type III modality in general. For this reason its
main points are briefly re-stated, as follows:
There is no such thing as legal reasoning. Lawyers
and judges answer legal questions through the use of
simple logic and the various methods of practical
reasoning that everyday thinkers use;
The justification (akin to scientific justification) of
legal decisions - the demonstration that a decision is
correct - often is impossible;
Difficult legal cases can rarely be decided objectively
if objectivity is taken to mean more than
reasonableness;
Large changes in law often come about as a result of
a non- rational process akin to conversion;
Law is an activity rather than a concept or a group of
concepts;

65
The essence of interpretive decision-making is
considering the consequences of alternative decisions.
There are no logically correct interpretations;
interpretation is not a logical process;
There are no overarching concepts of Justice that
our legal system can seize upon to give direction to
the enterprise;
Law is functional [instrumental, utilitarian], not
expressive or symbolic either in aspiration or - so far
as yet appears - in effect The law is not interested
in the soul or even the mind. It has adopted a
severely behaviorist concept of human activity as
sufficient to its ends and tractable to its means.
Hence, for those that strongly identify with Posners
credo, law is a pragmatic (type III) affair; not a legal temple
shining on the hill (type II or positivist jurisprudence); nor a
pie in the sky of Platonic ultimate legal Forms or highest
human values as legal goods (legal naturalism).
For subjectivist thinkers legal and moral decisions cannot
be separated. An objective legal science in their view is either
a sham (a pretentious claim to some legal Archimedean
knowledge position), or the invidious attempts by an
entrenched legal power elite to impose their ideas of law and
justice on the rest of society.
Legal expressivists and legal realists hold that no jurist or
judge can make a legal decision without being influenced by a
host of non-legal factors such as the judges own
psychological needs and preferences, class bias, and external
political, social and economic conditions.
Conry and Beck-Dudley 58 points out that any factual
situation is open to varying interpretations and that judges

66
can therefore not be strictly bound to legal precedent.
Patterson, in turn, prefers a post-modern account of
understanding that focuses on rules derived from practice,
and an epistemology based on pragmatism and the criterion
of warranted assertion. 59
Whereas jurisprudence in the objectivist tradition tries to
establish legal concepts and frameworks applicable to all legal
systems, subjectivist legal thinkers use an interpretive
methodology embedded in a particular legal culture and
social context. 60 De Carmona argues that current, supposedly
neutral and objective, legal theory is inadequate because it
does not incorporate cultural diversity. She proposes a radical
change in legal concepts so that it can better reflect elements
such as creative justice, truth as perspective, and a judicial
process appropriate to a multicultural world. 61
Binder and Weisberg, 62 in their turn, presents a picture of
legal practitioners as literary artists and innovators whose
distinguishing competence seem to lie more in their
rhetorical ability and skills of persuasion than in conventional
legal ability.
Lastly, major proponents of legal expressivism, Anderson
and Pildes, 63 explain the approach, in a nutshell, as the task
of law and morality to care for the expressive dimensions -
the purposes, values and attitudes - of individuals and
collectives.

4.5 Expressionist aesthetics


In contrast to the impersonal approaches of objectivist
aesthetics, Expressionism (and related developments such as
impressionism and surrealism) is concerned with the power

67
and ability of art to communicate feelings and sentiment, in
the subjectivist-empiricist (type III) paradigm.
This type of aesthetics, associated with names such as
Croce and Collingwood, regards art as engagement - a
deliberate and imaginative exploration of the individual,
personal and emotional, not with some abstracted and
metaphysical conception of Beauty.
The impressionists interest: is not a detailed
'photographic' depiction of real things as such, but
immediate, fleeting appearances. 64 For impressionists and
expressionists, like van Gogh, the artists purpose is not to
give a realistic or merely naturalistic account (representation)
of things, but for objects: to serve as a medium for the
expression of the artist's feelings or passions, and as a means
by which nature itself can be 'spiritualized'. 65
Both Surrealism and Dadaism represent a protest in art
against the establishment and against rationality: Surrealism in
reaction to and by exploration of dark, even absurd, images
conjured up by the Freudian psychology of the unconscious,
and Dadaism initially as an anti-war protest movement.
The reason given for this development is that: artists
were disgusted and chagrined by European society's inability
to deal with contemporary problems. Structured society was
viewed as meaningless and inconsequential. Absurdist art was
created to express a mocking disregard for rationality. 66
Among philosophers Nietzsche serves as example of a
highly individualist and passionate approach to art and
aesthetics in the Romantic tradition. His artists sense of truth
differs in that: he does not wish to be deprived of the
glittering, profound interpretations of life and guards against
simple and sober methods and results. 67

68
Typical of the subjectivist approach, Nietzsche denies any
grand or lofty meaning for aesthetic beauty, expressing it
thus: The beautiful in itself is not even a concept, merely a
phrase. In the beautiful man sets up himself as the standard
of perfection; in select cases he worships himself in it. 68
In sum: subjectivist-empiricist aesthetics (type III) is
essentially associated with the Romanticist movement, in
which the freedom of self-expression is primary. 69

4.6 Rorty (Type III)


Although Rortys later thought tend to be more ideological,
focusing on the promotion of his liberalist political vision for
society, there is agreement among writers such as Bernstein
and Hall, that his work since Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
reflects that of the narrative philosopher or poetical-critical
thinker.
It is a role that he himself identifies as that of the strong
poet, who deliberately misreads others in order to generate
interesting and edifying new vocabularies of description.
His primary impact is as an archetypal critic and debunker
of established intellectual dogmas in the Platonic mould. A
colleague of Rorty, Richard Bernstein acknowledges that
Rorty: had effectively exposed the artificiality, narrowness,
and arrogant pretensions of analytic philosophyand opened
the way for discussion of important cultural issues long
neglected by professional philosophers. 70
Richard Rorty is a good example of a philosopher working
in the subjectivist-empiricist meta-theoretical mode - the
advocate of a blooming variety of vocabularies.
His express purpose with his main work (Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature) is to: to undermine the readers

69
confidence in the mind as something about which one
should have a philosophical view, in knowledge as
something about which there ought to be a theory and
which has foundations, and in philosophy as it has been
conceived since Kant. 71
Rorty seems to dread the idea of hierarchy and system; of
a deterministic Authority, of a Final Vocabulary; of a nothing-
but (Kuhnian) normal discourse; of Foundations and a
resting place for all knowledge endeavours. He phrases as
follows: The fear of science, of scientism, of naturalism,
ofbeing turned by too much knowledge into a thing rather
than a person, is the fear that all discourse will become
normal discourse. That is, it is the fear that there will be
objectively true or false answers to every question. 72
A key element of Rortys meta-narrative, the common
denominator of humanistic philosophers and intellectuals, is
the fear of the impersonal- of being treated as object rather
than as a person. It points to the home-ground of the poet-
romanticist, the critiquing but eulogizing storyteller, of
passion expressed in thought. For this type of thinker the
vibrancy of being, of kaleidoscopic variety, of the here-and-
now (James stream of consciousness'), of experiencing self,
others and life is more important than, in Rortian terms,
getting it right. Familiar examples in philosophy are the
ancient Sophists, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Santayana, Ortega
and Sartre.
In Consequences of Pragmatism Rorty expresses his opposition
to what he experiences as the impersonality of objectivist
thought as follows: To accept the contingency of starting-
points is to accept our inheritance from, and our conversation
with, our fellow-humans as our only source of guidance. 73

70
By the time of his Essays on Heidegger and Others Rortys
tone became more stridently Nietzschean the strong poet
in full swing. Humanistic intellectuals, for whom Rorty at
times seemed to act as unofficial spokesperson (amidst the
voices of Foucault, Derrida and others) are described by him
as having a preference for the poetical and activist roles:
They would like their work to be continuous either with
literature on the one hand or with politics on the other. 74
Rortys turning away from mainstream analytic philosophy
is expressed in the following words: If we ever have the
courage to drop the scientistic model of philosophy without
falling back into a desire for holiness (as Heidegger did), then,
no matter how dark the time, we shall no longer turn to the
philosophers for rescue as our ancestors turned to the priests.
We shall turn instead to the poets and the engineers, the
people who produce startling new projects for achieving the
greatest happiness of the greatest number. 75
Congruent with the characteristics of the type III modality
of mind, there is also the eulogizing Rorty who sings the
praises of other pragmatist luminaries such as Dewey, Sellars,
Quine and Davidson and especially of Thomas Kuhns The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. For Rorty: Kuhn was one of
the most influential philosophers of our century because he
did as much as anyone else - even Wittgenstein - to get this
useful [anti-foundationalist] work done. 76
To summarise: in the ongoing and so-called culture war
between scientistic and humanistic tendencies among
scholars, scientists and intellectuals Richard Rorty has
thoroughly established himself as a foremost figure and voice
for the latter approach. Hall formulates it as follows: ...the
destiny of philosophy in the modern period has involved an

71
erratic vacillation between the literary and the scientific
enterprises as models of philosophic discourse. Rorty's
preference is clearly for the literary, poetic model. 77

4.7 Pirsig (Type III)


In this dimension (the subjectivist-empiricist or type III mode
of thought), Pirsig is clearly more at home.
In a manner typical of the critic (but also the praise-
singer) he has various comments on the problems and issues
of Western civilization and the domination of the Cartesian
mind-set.
He is critical, in general, of what may be referred to as the
Western establishment. On the other hand he also sings the
praises of the romantic (humanistic) side of people and
culture.
The following summarizes his thoughts and expressions,
in this regard:
1. As a result of his own disillusions with science, as a
young student, Pirsig does not have flattering remarks
about it. There is a major flaw in scientific reason; it is
nihilistic and subject to what one may describe as
Pirsigs law of proliferating hypotheses; 78
2. Science is also depicted as: ...the major producer of
social chaos; 79
3. He goes even further and blames social crises on:
a genetic defect within the nature of reason
itself.; 80
4. The whole structure and historical development of
reason is indicted, as the single most important cause
of the modern problems of humanity: handed
down to us from ancient times, [it] is no longer

72
adequate. It begins to be seen for what it really is -
emotionally hollow, aesthetically meaningless and
spiritually empty. 81
On the positive side he has the following comments:
1. a real understanding of Quality captures the
System, tames it, and puts it to work for one's own
personal use, while leaving one completely free to
fulfil his inner destiny. 82
2. Finally, Quality is about caring, about: internal and
external aspects of the same thing. 83

73
CHAPTER 5
PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHIES
5.1 Plato
Plato proposed a theory of society according to which the
Greek city-state could be reformed and turned into a perfect
community; a state (polis) where the good or happiness of the
whole could be achieved according to a strict demarcation of
the social positions, roles and duties of each class of citizens.
Main elements of Platos theory of the perfect (pure)
society are as follows:
It premises two originating principles of society:
mutual dependence (because individuals have many
needs and cannot be self-sufficient on their own) and
the limitations of individual talent and ability;
The best structure for society derives from the
existence of three types of individual, namely: lovers
of gain (the appetitive motive or desire for gain, best
represented by the class of producers and merchants);
lovers of honour (the Auxiliaries, with military
responsibilities), and the lovers of wisdom (the
philosopher-rulers or Guardians);
For the good of the community (happiness for the
whole), all members (Guardians, Auxiliaries, and
others) must be compelled to perform their duties as
laid down; thus there will arise a noble order and
each class will receive its proportion or proper share
of happiness;
Following the principle that friends have all things in
common, no private property or possession - of
home, women or children, is allowed - everything is
shared;

75
No innovation in gymnastic and musical activities is
allowed - they must be preserved in their original
form;
All education and military pursuits are to be in
common, with the best philosophers and bravest
warriors serving as Rulers or Kings;
There are five forms of government, of which rule by
the aristocracy (the royals) is best, namely: the royal;
timocratical; oligarchical; democratical and the
tyrannical.
In the Seventh Letter 1 Plato gives an informative account of
his active engagement as political reformer and of his trials
and tribulations as philosopher-consultant to King Dion of
Syracuse.
He tells the story of how, initially as youthful member of
the Athenian aristocracy, he developed a strong desire to
follow a political career. However, as a result of events such
as the cruelty of the Thirty Tyrants (which included some of
his relatives), who tried to implicate Socrates in a planned
execution, as well as the eventual condemnation to death by
poisoning of his friend Socrates, by Athens, Plato became
disillusioned with such a career option.
The misgovernment that he saw around him was
depressing and finally he came to the conclusion that: there
will be no cessation of evils for the sons of men, till either
those who are pursuing a right and true philosophy receive
sovereign power in the States, or those in power in the States
by some dispensation of providence become true
philosophers. 2
Yet, given his continued but stunted political ambitions as
well as desire to see a reformed Greek society, he could not

76
refuse the opportunity to practice what he preached, when
Dion (ruler of Syracuse in Italy) invited him to court.
As so often happen to consultants and confidants of
powerful figures in society and its institutions, it turned out
that Platos presence was used for purposes of manipulation.
In this case there was a plot to overthrow a tyranny - which
gravely endangered his safety whilst in Syracuse (where he for
a period was confined to quarters against his will). He
eventually escaped, but later felt persuaded to visit Dion for a
second time, again without success and again he had to be
rescued by friends, who sailed him back to Athens. All this,
he confessed, because he did not want to acquire the
reputation of being: ...solely a mere man of words... 3
From the above account of Platos ideal society and his
own (albeit failed) attempts at political reform, his substantive
engagement in the subjectivist-empyrean (type IV) mode of
thought, as well as in political praxis, is evident.
Finally, Karl Popper provides an incisive and scathing
analysis of what he regarded as Platos totalitarian justice. He
plausibly argues that Platos purist political programme aimed
at arresting all change; was unworkable and went against the
grain of a humanitarian political dispensation (of the kind that
Popper himself favoured, namely modern liberal democracy).
In the modern interpretation, it cannot be denied that Plato
had an authoritarian and deterministic programme of reform
in mind for the Greek city-states, especially Athens.

5.2 Marx
Karl Marx (1818 1883) desired to transform the world in a
revolutionary manner, into a classless society. His ideology of

77
Communism had wide impact and serves as example of the
subjectivist-empyrean orientation in modern thought.
His social theory is based on, but a reversal of, the
Hegelian dialectic of ideas. Whereas for Hegel the real is the
rational, and the rational is the real, Marxs revolutionary
proposal was to start with the economic dimension of life
(and so turning Hegelianism on its feet), hence the concept of
dialectical materialism. For Marx, thought is to be taken:
as images of real things instead of regarding real things as
images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. 4
The Communist Manifesto, which in many parts of the world
became a religious document, contains Marxs doctrine and
ideas for bringing about a social revolution.
In pragmatic fashion, for Marx it was more important to
change history than understanding it. As he famously stated:
Philosophers have only given different interpretations of
the world; the important thing is to make it different. 5 It is
noted that his prediction of the collapse of capitalism did not
materialize. 6
Main elements of Marxs ideology of Communism are as
follows: 7
History is governed by inner general laws;
Nothing exists outside nature and man - the higher
beings our religious fantasies have created are only the
fantastic reflection of our own essence;
Life is not determined by consciousness, but
consciousness by life;
The history of all hitherto existing society is the
history of class struggles;

78
The existence of classes is only bound up with
particular, historic phases in the development of
production;
Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into
two great hostile camps, into two great classes:
Bourgeoisie and Proletariat;
The class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship
of the proletariat;
This dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition
to the abolition of all classes and to classless society;
The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as
that of all the other proletarian parties: formation of
the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the
bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by
the proletariat;
The proletariat will use its political supremacy to
wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to
centralize all instruments of production in the hands
of the State, namely, of the proletariat organized as
the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive
forces as rapidly as possible;
In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes
and class antagonisms, there shall be an association, in
which the free development of each is the condition
for the free development of all;
The theory of Communism may be summed up in the
single sentence: Abolition of private property;
The ruling classes tremble at a Communistic
revolutionthe proletarians have nothing to lose but
their chains. They have a world to win.
A key component of Marxs system is the self-alienation

79
resulting from capitalist oppression of the working class,
which can only be overcome if private property is abolished.
When this happens: at last the whole man, the non-
divided man, will exist. Human ethics will take the place of
class ethics, and a genuine humanism will reign. 8
Finally, in an interview with him in 1871, Marx re-iterated
the basic aim of the Communist movement, namely: The
economical emancipation of the working class by the
conquest of political power [and] the use of that political
power to the attainment of social ends. It is necessary that
our aims should be thus comprehensive to include every form
of working-class activity, 9 and: that means they must
transform society. 10

5.3 Popper and Feyerabend


Karl Popper, like his intellectual forebear Plato, of which he
is very critical, also engaged in the reformist mode
characteristic of the subjectivist-empyrean (type IV) realm of
thought.
Popper's writings (as Kuhn also observes) are throughout
soaked in what can be described as constant moralizing.
Almost every sentence reflects either thinly veiled or direct
exhortation, appeal, proposal, or hint about how scientists
and philosophers of science should go about their task, about
the 'right' attitude and approach toward scientific knowledge.
Some examples of Poppers promotional style of
expression are:
I shall first suggest that a dose of Tarski's theory of
truth stiffened perhaps by my own theory of getting
nearer to the truth, may go a long way towards curing
this malady [relativism]; 11

80
...critical rationalism - and critical empiricism which
I advocate -- can be regarded as an attempt to carry
further Kant's critical philosophy...; 12
Problems connected with the meaning or the
definition of words, are unimportant. Indeed, these
purely verbal problems are tiresome: they should be
avoided at all costs. 13
Although Feyerabend's writings and distinctive style places
him in the narrative-interpretive realm of thought, he later
on, especially with his Science in a Free Society, 14 adopted a
strong ideological approach.
His declared aim was: ...to remove obstacles intellectuals
and specialists create for traditions different from their own
and to prepare the removal of the specialists (the scientists)
themselves from the life centers of society. 15
The political Feyerabend is also discussed by Benvenuto,
who writes that: Feyerabend's 'radical propaganda' sought a
double emancipation: of scientists from epistemologists, and
of citizens from scientists. 16

5.4 Critical Legal Studies Movement (CLSM)


The Critical Legal Studies movement, besides sharing the
approach of legal realism, goes further and advocates the
overturning of the hierarchical structures of society and of
the law as legal instrument that maintains and reinforces that
hierarchical domination and oppression.
The CLS movement of thought in jurisprudence is
oriented toward radical change in the subjectivist-empyrean
mode. For this school of thought knowledge must lead to
action if it is to be of any use in achieving valued legal and
moral ideals in society.

81
In addition, the CLS movement depends on
developments in the social sciences such as sociology,
anthropology, and other disciplines that study power,
position, and wealth. 17
For the CLS movement, the reconstruction of the social
order for equality and freedom is to be accomplished by
some super-liberal state consisting of individuals forming a
true democracy. The whole body of law must be replaced, in
revolutionary fashion, so that the current hierarchy and
structures of legal power and prestige can be dismantled, to
make way for the envisaged new super-democracy. 18

5.5 Reformist aesthetics


The fourth meta-paradigm in aesthetics concerns the
involvement of art in society, in the reformist and
promotional mode (type IV).
For Plato, only art that fit in with and support the noble
ideal of a fully rational society (polis) would be acceptable. 19
Ideological and reformist aesthetics primarily consider
good art as that which serves a distinct social, political and
cultural role or function (hence the adoption of the term
Reformist for present purposes).
Harrison-Barbet points out that for many Marxist thinkers
the arts only real value are in serving the cause of the socio-
economic revolution: Some writers, Tolstoy for example,
have argued that for a work of art to be regarded as such it
must communicate feelings of universal brotherhood; it must
bind men together. 20
Bleiker, in turn, regards the painter and political
commentator as both being interpreters engaged in forms of
representation: By self-consciously addressing the issue of

82
representation, a work of art thus has the potential to create
the preconditions for social change, by tearing observers out
of their context, and yet relating them back to their overall
existence. 21
Art, being intrinsically bound to culture, has the potential
to reveal lack of social harmony; or, as in protest art,
showing the evils of culture. 22
That art is never really free from its cultural and political
context is highlighted by Jenkins in Neo-Marxist phraseology:
...the importance of high art in the construction of a
hegemonic consensus necessary to legitimate global
capitalism is obvious. 23

5.6 Rorty (Type IV)


Interspersed with the predominantly poetical-critical strain in
Rortys thought, is his missionary (political, type IV)
inclination - his concern with having voice, with proposing
solutions.
Despite his talk about inter-subjective agreement and
edification as communitarian and revelatory ideals, for
educating the youth, Rorty wishes to maintain a separation
between public and private spheres. His solution for the
former is a liberal democracy that encourages social hope,
for the latter it is the private pleasure of self-creation.
However, and in conformity with the individualistic focus
of type III thinkers, he seems to favour the private utopia
alternative. Witness, for instance, his statement that: The
point of a liberal society is not to invent or create anything,
but simply to make it as easy as possible for people to achieve
their wildly different private ends without hurting each
other. 24 The emphasis is on a society that facilitates

83
development and growth of its citizens - and not on citizens
as members of Society whose purpose in life should be to
serve and contribute to the (Platonic) ideals of the State.
Rorty is at root still the strong poet - the deconstructive
thinker - not the activist. He speaks about and to fellow
intellectuals not with the aim to win public office or lead a
transformation of society, but as an avuncular elder statesman
and defender of the humanistic faith among literary
intellectuals.
Although favouring stimulation and development of the
individual imagination (as opposed to succumbing to a
culture of obedience and the search for deep truths about
reality), Rorty can be the idealist and social utopian, as when
he praises the: the search for a single utopian form of
political life--the Good Global Society. 25
On the whole, from the earlier and more circumscribed
therapeutic goal of advocating an alternative to Platonist
philosophy, to (especially in his later work) turning his
attention to the promotion of a philosophy of social hope
(his leftist, liberal democracy), the reformist aim is a
distinctive element of Rortys narrative philosophy.
In the opening lines of one of his more recent works
(Philosophy and Social Hope) Rorty perhaps most succinctly
shares with us the main tenets of his subjectivist concern with
how we should live. In the Preface he pulls together two
main threads appearing throughout in his writing, when he
says: Most of what I have written in the last decade consists
of attempts to tie in my social hopes - hopes for a global,
cosmopolitan, democratic, egalitarian, classless, casteless
society - with my antagonism towards Platonism. 26

84
His subjectivist concern with agreement and action, and
not truth itself, is shown as follows: we
pragmatistscannot regard truth as a goal of inquiry. The
purpose of inquiry is to achieve agreement among human
beings about what to do, to bring about consensus on the
ends to be achieved and the means to be used to achieve
those ends. 27

5.7 Pirsig (Type IV)


As mentioned, Pirsig is rather short on solutions for the
quandary faced by humanity today. However, he does
provide a few pointers, as indicated below:
1. The key is better Quality. Governments should:
change in response to Quality; 28
2. There should be no window-dressing of classic
understanding with romantic prettiness, but:
classic and romantic understanding should be
united at a basic level; 29
3. It is high time that natures order be better
understood and furthered by: re-assimilating those
passions which were originally fled from; 30
4. Peace of mind is what counts in the end. It is
necessary in order to unify classic and romantic
Quality: to cultivate an inner quietness, a peace of
mind so that goodness can shine through.; 31
5. Peace of mind is divided into physical quietness,
mental quietness and value quietness which is a
situation where: one has no wandering desires at
all but simply performs the acts of his life without
desire 32
In sum, what is required, according to Pirsig, is a new

85
spiritual reality in which: the ugliness and the loneliness
and the spiritual blankness of dualistic technological reason
would become illogical. 33

86
CHAPTER 6
THE FOUR TYPES OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
IN REVIEW
Chapter 1 briefly introduced the nature and characteristics of
four fundamental orientations or modalities of mind in
human thought. These, prototypical, ways of making sense of
life and world goes back as far as recorded history. It runs
through all human intellectual endeavours - ancient and
modern and has been found 1, 2 to underlie the contents of
a wide range of scholarly disciplines and schools of thought
(Western as well as Eastern).
The purpose of the book is to provide evidence of the
existence of the four types of thought in a number of
divergent philosophical ideas and systems. These include the
seminal figures of Plato, Aristotle, Protagoras, Nietzsche,
Marx, Kant, Hume, as well as selections from philosophy of
science (Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn, Feyerabend), philosophy of
law, philosophy of art and the philosophies of Richard Rorty
and Robert Pirsig (see Figure 6.1 below).
Being a selection, not every kind of philosophy, of which
there is a large variety, could be included for analysis.
Figure 6.1: The four types of philosophy in perspective
Type II TYPE II TYPE I
(Science) Aristotle Plato
Hume Kant
Lakatos Popper
Legal Positivism Legal Naturalism
Realist Aesthetics Formalist Aesthetics
Rorty II Rorty I
Pirsig II Pirsig I

87
TYPE III TYPE IV
Protagoras Plato
Nietzsche Marx
Kuhn/Feyerabend Popper/Feyerabend
Legal Pluralism CLSM
Expressionist Reformist
Aesthetics Aesthetics
Rorty III Rorty IV
Pirsig III Pirsig IV

Type III Type IV


(Literature, (Politics; Religion)
Poetry)

6.1 Type I philosophies


The thinkers and schools of thought that typify this modality
of mind are, essentially, all metaphysicians (speculative
philosophers), or at least metaphysically-inclined. The arch-
exemplar of empyrean philosophy in the Western tradition is,
of course, Plato with his world of super-sensible entities
(Forms) that are supposedly more real than the particulars of
sense-experience.
More than two millennia later Immanuel Kant followed in
his footsteps with his empyrean, a priori, concepts of pure
reason which cannot be derived from the empirical
phenomena of the world.
In 20th century philosophy of science, Karl Popper serves as
the Platonic thinker par excellence. With his three-world
system of knowledge, he assumes that the immaterial entities
of what he designates as world 3, provides the highest form

88
of knowledge; more real than concrete experience, and
therefore (in his view) more important.
The school of legal naturalism in philosophy of law, as
well as the formalist school of art in aesthetics, are similarly
Platonic forms of thought. There is a persistent need to retain
a transcendent element in the thought of modern legal
naturalists, which attests to the enduring influence of the
empyrean mode of thought. Formalist philosophy of art, in
turn, is concerned with the universal form of beauty; the
perfect, Platonic, form.
Even though he is a leading modern exemplar of Neo-
pragmatism in the type III mode, Richard Rorty also has his
metaphysical moments. This is manifested in his love for
broad (Platonic) theoretical classifications and his frequent
use of binary descriptions in his works. Another writer in the
postmodern tradition is Robert Pirsig, who, with his
metaphysics of quality became quite obsessed with finding a
conceptual ultimate beyond the Cartesian subject-object
dichotomy.

6.2 Type II philosophies


Aristotle is the major figure in Western empiricist, hence,
scientific, thought. In Raphaels famous School of Athens,
Aristotle walks next to Plato the difference being that
Aristotle points to earth, whereas Platos arm is raised toward
the heavens.
Aristotle is the realist thinker, whose ideas and system of
thought has been the main influence on European and
Western thought (including theological thought). Contrary to
Plato, he emphasized the empirical world of sense-

89
experience, as evidenced, for instance, by his many biological
studies.
David Humes aversion to metaphysics (type I mode) is
well-known. For the bottom-up empiricism of Hume, there
can be no independent and self-sufficient ideas or cognitions
(as with Descartes). All thought is ever so closely embedded
in experience and the senses.
In philosophy of science Imre Lakatos is the influential
exemplar of a realist (type II) approach to knowledge. For
him the empirical criterion for a series of theories is that it
should produce new facts.
The current, still dominant, school of legal positivism
follows a scientific approach and serves as prime example of
the objectivist-empiricist orientation to knowledge. Legal
positivism is rooted in the empiricist and utilitarian
philosophies of, especially, Hobbes and Bentham.
The realist approach in aesthetics wishes to portray art as
being concerned with showing how things really are in its
factual existence. In the philosophies of Rorty and Pirsig one
also finds an empiricist element, though in an under-
emphasized manner.

6.3 Type III philosophies


Here we find anti-metaphysical thinkers in the subjectivist-
empiricist tradition of philosophy. They go by many names
(e.g., Sophists, existentialists, pragmatists) but all share a
distaste in, if not active revolt against, Platonism and what is
often referred to as foundationalism. Nietzsche, for
example, is well-known for his rejection of metaphysics -
describing Christianity as Platonism for the people.

90
Protagoras is an ancient exemplar of the type III
(narrative-interpretive) stance toward truth and reality, and
often associated with relativism: what is true for you, is true
for you - what is true for me is true for me.
The narrative bent of thought is, as the discussion in
chapter 4 shows, also characteristics of Kuhn and
Feyerabends philosophy of science; the school of
expressionism in aesthetics, and, especially, of the thought of
Rorty and Pirsig.

6.4 Type IV philosophies


These philosophies are concerned with bringing about change
in the world and human society. In other words they have
to a greater or lesser extent a clear political thrust.
This is evidenced in: Platos ideal for the Greek city-state;
Marxs revolution of the proletariat to achieve a classless
society; Poppers moralizing to scientists; Feyerabends
relegation of science to being just another element in society;
the Critical Legal Studies Movements aim to create a super-
liberal state; Rortys liberalist political vision for society, and
Pirsig dreams of a new spiritual reality.

6.5 Concluding comment


The present analysis leaves little doubt as to the existence and
operation of fundamentally different orientations of mind in
philosophical thought. This has been so even in antiquity.
No philosopher can get away from certain root intellectual
stances or points of departure. It underlies their thinking, and
reflects often unspoken assumptions about the nature of the
true, the real and the good.

91
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Kant, I. (1934/1787). Critique of Pure Reason, translated J. M.
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5
Ibid., p483.
6
Schiller, F. (1967/1793). On the Aesthetic Education of Man,
translated E.M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby. London:
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7
Berlin, I. (1978). Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays.
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8
Bernstein, R.J. (1983). Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science,
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9
Plato, (360 BCE). Philebus, Translated by Benjamin Jowett,
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10
Plato, (1987). The Republic. translated H.D.P. Lee. England:
Penguin Books.
11
Jones, W.T. (1970). The Classical Mind: A History of Western
Philosophy. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. p243.
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Pietersen, H. J. (2011). The Four Types of Knowing
Metaphysical, Scientific, Narrative and Pragmatic: A Meta-
Epistemology of Mind, New York: Edwin Mellen Press.
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Pietersen, H. J. (2014). The Four Archetypal Orientations of the
Mind: Foundational, Experiential, Organizational and Actional.
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Chapter 2: Speculative philosophies (I)
1
Plato, (1987). The Republic. translated H.D.P. Lee. England:
Penguin Books, p306.
2
Ibid., p312.
3
Plato, (360 BCE) Phaedrus. Translated by Benjamin Jowett,
p27 [http://classics.mit.edu/Help/permissions.html].
4
Plato, (360 BCE) Philebus. Translated by Benjamin Jowett,
p8 [http://classics.mit.edu/Help/permissions.html].
5
Plato, (1987). The Republic. Translated H.D.P. Lee, England:
Penguin Books, p74.
6
Kant, I. (1934/1787). Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by J.
M. D. Meiklejohn, London: Dent.
7
Kant, I. (1783). Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics.
Copyright 1997, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu), Based on
Paul Carus's 1902 translation.
8
Ibid., p12.
9
Ibid., p119/120.
10
Ibid., p83.
11
Kant, I. (1934/1787). Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by J.
M. D. Meiklejohn, London: Dent, p6.
12
Ibid., p10.
13
Ibid., p12.
14
Ibid., p13.
15
Ibid., p14.
16
Ibid., p25.
17
Ibid., p27.
18
Ibid., p29.
19
Ibid., p30.
20
Ibid., p27.
21
Kant, I. (1959/1785). Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.
Translated by Lewis White Beck, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill

94
Educational Publishing.
22
Ibid., p5.
23
Ibid., p9.
24
Ibid., p18.
25
Ibid., p24.
26
Ibid., p25.
27
Ibid., p44.
28
Popper, K. (1992/1945). The Open Society and its Enemies
Volume II: Hegel and Marx. London: Routledge, p378.
29
Ibid., p7.
30
Ibid., p388.
31
Popper, K. (1996). In search of a better world. London:
Routledge, pp.3 6.
32
Ibid., p5.
33
Ibid., p7.
34
Ibid., p9.
35
Heyt, F.D. (1999). Popper's Vienna: A Contribution to the
History of the Ideas of Critical Rationalism. Innovation: The
European Journal of Social Sciences. 12 (4), pp. 525 - 542.
36
Ibid.,
37
Plato, (1987). The Republic. Translated by H.D.P. Lee.
London: Penguin, p34.
38
Justinian. (535 CE). The Institutes of Justinian, Oliver J.
Thatcher, ed., The Library of Original Sources (Milwaukee:
University Research Extension Co., 1907), Vol. III: The
Roman World, pp.100-166. Scanned in and modernized by
Dr. Jerome S. Arkenberg, Dept. of History, Cal. State
Fullerton. Source: Medieval Sourcebook - (c) Paul Halsall.
June 1998. [halsall@murray.fordham.edu].
39
Ibid.,

95
40
Blackstone, W. (1758). Commentaries on the Laws of England.
[http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/blackstone/introa.ht
m#2], p40.
41
ibid., p42.
42
Conry, E.J. and Beck-Dudley, C. L. (1996). Meta-
jurisprudence: A paradigm for legal studies, American Business
Law Journal, Vol. 33 (4), p691.
43
Ibid.,
44
Hobbes, T. (1640). The Elements of Law Natural and Politic.
Gutenberg Project, E-text.
45
Locke, J. (1690). The Second Treatise of Civil Government.
Gutenberg Project E-text.
46
Bentham, J. (1781). Principles of Morals and Legislation.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1996, James Fieser
(jfieser@utm.edu).
47
Finnis, J. (Ed) (1991). Natural Law: Volume I. England:
Dartmouth, pxi.
48
Ibid., pxi.
49
Finnis, J. (Ed) (1991). Natural Law: Volume II. England:
Dartmouth, pxiv.
50
Fuller, Lon. L. (1991). Human purpose and natural law, In
Finnis, J. (Ed) (1991). Natural Law: Volume I. England:
Dartmouth, p8.
51
Kretzmann, N. (1991). Lex iniusta non est lex: Laws on trial
in Aquinas court of conscience, in Finnis, J. (Ed) 1991.
Natural Law: Volume II. England: Dartmouth, p113.
52
Koterski, J. W. (2000). On the New Natural Law Theory,
Modern Age, Vol. 42, (4), p417.
53
Alschuler, A.W. (1996). Rediscovering Blackstone, University
of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 145, (1), pp.1-55.

96
54
Arkes, H. (1999). Liberalism and the law, New Criterion, Vol.
17, (5), pp.4-17.
55
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. (1996).
[http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/
96preamble].
56
Plato, (360 BCE) The Republic. Book X, Translated by
Benjamin Jowett.
[http://classics.mit.edu/Help/permissions.html]
57
Plato, (360 BCE) Phaedrus. Translated by Benjamin Jowett.
[http://classics.mit.edu/Help/permissions.html]
58
Copleston, F. C. (1946). A History of Philosophy. Volume I:
Greece and Rome. London: Search Press.
59
Harrison-Barbet, A. (1991). Mastering Philosophy. England:
McMillan.
60
Copleston, F C. (1946). A History of Philosophy. Volume I:
Greece and Rome. London: Search Press, p253.
61
Copleston, F. C. (1960). A History of Philosophy, Volume VI,
Modern Philosophy: from the French Enlightenment to Kant. New
York: Doubleday, p257.
62
Harrison-Barbet, A. (1991). Mastering Philosophy. England:
McMillan, p291.
63
Bernstein, R. J. (1990). Rorty's liberal utopia, Social Research,
Vol. 57, (1), p31.
64
Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford,
London: Blackwell, p7.
65
Ibid., p388.
66
Rorty, R. (1982). Consequences of Pragmatism. New York:
Harvester, p166.
67
Rorty, R. (1991). Essays on Heidegger and Others. New York:
Cambridge University Press, p24.
68
Ibid., p26.

97
69
Rorty, R. (1999). Philosophy and Social Hope. London:
Penguin, p189.
70
Hall, D. L. (1994). Richard Rorty: Prophet and Poet of the New
Pragmatism. New York: State University of New York Press,
p21.
71
Pirsig, RM (1983/1974) Zen and the art of motorcycle
maintenance: An inquiry into values. London: Corgi, p76.
72
Ibid., pp.66-76.
73
Adams, T. (2006). Zen and the art of Robert Pirsig.Interview by
The Observer with Robert Pirsig, November 19.
74
Pirsig, RM (1983/1974) Zen and the art of motorcycle
maintenance: An inquiry into values. London: Corgi, p122.
75
Ibid., p201.
76
Ibid., p230.
77
Ibid., p230/1.
78
Ibid., p231.
79
Ibid., p232.
80
Ibid., p233.
81
Ibid., p234.
82
Plato. The Republic, (1987, 2nd Edition), Translated, H D. P.
Lee, England: Penguin, p319.
83
Pirsig, RM (1983/1974) Zen and the art of motorcycle
maintenance: An inquiry into values. London: Corgi, p241.
84
Ibid., p241.
85
Ibid., p243.
86
Ibid., p245.
87
Ibid., p245.
88
Ibid., p245.
89
Ibid., p246.
90
Ibid., p248.
91
Ibid., p345.

98
92
Ibid., p345.
93
Ibid., p368.
94
Ibid., p371.
95
Pirsig, RM (1991) Lila: An inquiry into morals. London:
Corgi, p119.
96
Ibid., p121.
97
Ibid., p122.
98
Ibid., p122.
99
Ibid., p434.
100
Ibid., p146.

Chapter 3: Scientific philosophies (II)


1
Aristotle, (350 BCE). Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross,
p1 [http://classics.mit.edu/Help/permissions.html].
2
Ibid., p1.
3
Ibid., p1.
4
Ibid.,
5
Aristotle, (350 BCE). On Sense and the Sensible, Translated by
J. I. Beare, p1
[http://classics.mit.edu/Help/permissions.html].
6
Aristotle, (350 BCE). Physics. Translated by R. P. Hardie and
R. K. Gaye, p1
[http://classics.mit.edu/Help/permissions.html].
7
Aristotle, (350 BCE). Topics. Translated by W. A. Pickard.
Cambridge [http://classics.mit.edu/Help/permissions.html].
8
Aristotle, (350 BCE). Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by J. A.
K. Thomson, revised by H Tredennick, with introduction and
bibliography by J Barnes (1976), UK: Penguin.
9
Ibid., p70.
10
Ibid., p93.
11
Ibid., p73.

99
12
Ibid., p91.
13
Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an
Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into
Moral Subjects, Book I: Of the Understanding. Edited with
introduction by D G C McNabb (1967), London: Collins
Sons, p41.
14
Ibid., p49.
15
Ibid., p67.
16
McNabb, D. G. C. (1967). Introduction, in Hume, D.
1739. A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce
the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects, Book I:
Of the Understanding. Edited by D. G. C. McNabb (1967),
London: Collins Sons, p9.
17
Ibid., p10.
18
Ibid., p26.
19
Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an
Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into
Moral Subjects, Book I: Of the Understanding. Edited with
introduction by D G C McNabb (1967), London: Collins
Sons, p42.
20
Ibid., p49.
21
Ibid., p60.
22
Ibid., p302.
23
Copleston, F. (1959). A History of Philosophy, Volume V:
Modern Philosophy. New York: Doubleday, p293.
24
Ibid., p330.
25
Ibid., p338.
26
Long, J. (1998). Lakatos in Hungary, Philosophy of the Social
Sciences. Vol. 28 (2), pp.244 - 312.
27
Kresge, S. (1996). Feyerabend unbound, Philosophy of the
Social Sciences. Vol. 26 (2), pp.293 - 304.

100
28
Miner, R.(1998). Lakatos and MacIntyre on
incommensurability and the rationality of theory-change.
Philosophy of Science, 20th World Congress of Philosophy.
29
Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of
scientific research Programs, in Lakatos, I and A. Musgrave
(Ed) 1997 (1970). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.
Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, p5.
30
Hobbes, T. (1640). The Elements of Law Natural and Politic.
Gutenberg Project, E-text, p109.
31
Bentham, J. (1781). Principles of Morals and Legislation.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1996, James Fieser
(jfieser@utm.edu), p13.
32
Hart, H. L. A. (1994/1961). The Concept of Law. London:
Oxford University Press, p268.
33
Ibid., p8.
34
Ibid., p240.
35
Coleman, J.L. (2001). The Practice of Principle. Yale Law
School, Oxford University Press. [http://www.ssrn.com].
36
Dworkin, R. (1996). Objectivity and Truth: Youd better
believe it, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 25 (2), p45.
37
Reidinger, P. (2000). The Fundamentalist, ABA Journal,
Vol. 86, pp.90-91.
38
Weinrib, E.J. (1993). The jurisprudence of legal formalism,
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 16 (3), pp.583
596.
39
Conry, E.J. and Beck-Dudley, C. L. (1996). Meta-
jurisprudence: A paradigm for legal studies, American Business
Law Journal, Vol. 33 (4), pp.691 755.
40
Aristotle, (350 BCE) Poetics. Translated by S. H. Butcher.
Project Gutenberg e-text.

101
41
Copleston, F. C. (1946). A History of Philosophy, Volume I:
Greece and Rome. London: Search Press, p359.
42
Hume, David. (1760). Of the Standard of Taste. Modern
History Sourcebook, Paul Halsall, August 1998,
[halsall@murray.fordham.edu]
43
Rorty, R. (1990). Foucault/Dewey/Nietzsche, Raritan, Vol.
9 Issue 4, p6.
44
Rorty, R. (2000). The decline of redemptive truth and the rise of a
literary culture, Richard Rorty Homepage, p20.
45
Rorty, R. (1999). Philosophy and Social Hope. London:
Penguin, pxii.
46
Ibid., pxxv.
47
Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford,
London: Blackwell, p371.
48
Hall, D. L. (1994). Richard Rorty: Prophet and Poet of the New
Pragmatism. New York: State University of New York Press,
p317.
49
Pirsig, RM (1983/1974) Zen and the art of motorcycle
maintenance: An inquiry into values. London: Corgi p69.
50
Ibid., p80.
51
Ibid., p92.
52
Ibid., p94.

Chapter 4: Narrative philosophies


1
Guthrie, W.K.C. (1971). The Sophists. London: Cambridge
University Press, p51.
2
Hussey, E. (1972). The Pre-Socratics. London: Duckworth,
p109.
3
Copleston, F. (1946). A History of Philosophy, Volume I: Greece
and Rome. London: Search Press, p82.

102
4
Guthrie, W. K. C. (1989/1950). The Greek Philosophers.
London: University Press, p71.
5
Guthrie, W.K.C. (1971). The Sophists. London: Cambridge
University Press, p42.
6
Ibid., p45.
7
Kaufmann, W. (1974). Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist,
Antichrist. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p204.
8
Ibid., p205.
9
Nietzsche, F. (1967). The Will to Power. Translation by W.
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, New York: Random House,
p233.
10
Kaufmann, W. (1974). Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist,
Antichrist. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p75.
11
Ibid., p80.
12
Nietzsche, F. (1990). Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a
Philosophy of the Future. Translated by R J Hollingdale,
introduction by M Tanner, London: Penguin, p141.
13
Ibid., p32.
14
Ibid., p35.
15
Ibid., p32.
16
Ibid., p48.
17
Ibid., p51.
18
Ibid., p36.
19
Golffing, F. (1956). Friedrich Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy
and the Genealogy of Morals. New York: Doubleday, p170.
20
Nietzsche, F. (1990). Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a
Philosophy of the Future. Translated by R J Hollingdale,
introduction by M Tanner, London: Penguin, p144.
21
Golffing, F. (1956). Friedrich Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy
and the Genealogy of Morals. New York: Doubleday, p151.

103
22
Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions.
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Vol. 2 (2), Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
23
Ibid., p1
24
Ibid., p1.
25
Ibid., p4.
26
Ibid., p8.
27
Ibid., p8.
28
De Gennis, P.G. (2001). The Road since Structure and
Thomas Kuhn. Physics Today. Vol. 54, (3), pp.53-55.
29
McGrew, T. (1994). Scientific progress, relativism, and self-
refutation. EJAP, Vol. 2 (2).
[http://ejap.louisiana.edu/EJAP/1994.may/mcgrew.html]
30
Kuhn, T. (1970). Logic of Discovery or Psychology of
Research? in Lakatos, I and A. Musgrave (Ed) (1997/1970).
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: University of
Cambridge Press.
31
Ibid., p1.
32
Andresen, J. (1999). Crisis and Kuhn. ISIS: Journal of the
History of Science in Society, Vol. 90, pp.43-68.
33
Rorty, R. (1995) Untruth and consequences, New Republic,
Vol. 213 (5), pp.32 37.
34
Parascondalo, R and Hosle, V. (1995). Three interviews
with Paul K. Feyerabend, Telos, Issue 102, p139.
35
Feyerabend, P.K. (1993). Against Method. 3rd Edition.
London: Verso, p1.
36
Ibid., p1.
37
Ibid., p5 19.
38
Ibid., p268.
39
Ibid., p271.

104
40
Parascondalo, R and Hosle, V. (1995). Three interviews
with Paul K. Feyerabend, Telos, Issue 102, pp.115-149.
41
Feyerabend, P.K. (1993). Against Method. 3rd Edition.
London: Verso, p1.
42
Ibid., p6.
43
Ibid., p33.
44
Ibid., p44.
45
Parascondalo, R and Hosle, V. (1995). Three interviews
with Paul K. Feyerabend, Telos, Issue 102, pp.115-149.
46
Janik, A. (2002). Karl Popper -- The Formative Years,
1902-1945. Central European History. Vol. 35 (4), p613.
47
George, R.P. (2001). What Is Law? A Century of
Arguments, First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion & Public
Life, Issue 112, pp.23-30.
48
James, W. (1907). Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old
Ways of Thinking. New York: Longman Green, p13.
49
Ibid., p124.
50
Holmes, O.W. (1897). The Path of the Law. Project
Gutenberg E-text, p1.
51
Ibid., p2.
52
Ibid., p10.
53
Ibid., p25.
54
Weinberg, L. (1997). Holmes' failure, Michigan Law Review,
Vol. 96 (3), pp.691- 724.
55
Posner, R. (1990). The Problems of Jurisprudence. Harvard
University Press: Cambridge, England, p25.
56
Ibid., p229.
57
Ibid., pp.454-467.
58
Conry, E.J. and Beck-Dudley, C. L. (1996). Meta-
jurisprudence: A paradigm for legal studies, American Business
Law Journal, Vol. 33 (4), pp.691 755.

105
59
Kress, K. (1997). Modern jurisprudence, postmodern
jurisprudence, and truth, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 95 (6),
pp.1871-1927.
60
Ibid.,
61
De Carmona, A.J.B. (1998). Toward a post-modern theory
of law, 20th World Congress of Philosophy.
62
Binder, G. and Weisberg, R. T. (1999). Literary criticisms of
law, Princeton University Press. Social Science Electronic
Publishing, Inc.
63
Anderson, E.S. and Pildes, R. H. (2000). Expressive
theories of law: A general restatement, University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, Vol. 148, (5), pp.1503-1576.
64
Harrison-Barbet, A. (1991). Mastering philosophy. England:
McMillan, p288.
65
Ibid., p290.
66
Hinrichs, B. (1995). Chaos and cosmos: The search for
meaning in modern art, Humanist, Vol. 55, (2), p25.
67
Hollingdale, R.J. (1977). A Nietzsche reader. England:
Penguin, p126.
68
Ibid., p145.
69
Baldick, C. (1991). Romanticism, Concise Oxford Dictionary of
Literary Terms. New York: Oxford University Press.
70
Rorty, R. (1982). Consequences of Pragmatism. New York:
Harvester, p31.
71
Rorty, R. (1991). Essays on Heidegger and Others. New York:
Cambridge University Press, p9.
72
Rorty, R. (2000). The decline of redemptive truth and the rise of a
literary culture, Richard Rorty Homepage, p3.
73
Rorty, R. (1982). Consequences of Pragmatism. New York:
Harvester, p197.

106
74
Hall, D. L. (1994). Richard Rorty: Prophet and Poet of the New
Pragmatism. New York: State University of New York Press.
75
Pietersen, H..J. (2003). A review of metaphysics: Part II,
The Examined Life, Vol. 4 (15).
76
Rorty, R. (1991). Essays on Heidegger and Others. New York:
Cambridge University Press, p3.
77
Rorty, R. (2000). The decline of redemptive truth and the rise of a
literary culture, Richard Rorty Homepage, p16.
78
Pirsig, RM (1983/1974) Zen and the art of motorcycle
maintenance: An inquiry into values. London: Corgi. p108.
79
Ibid., p109.
80
Ibid., p110.
81
Ibid., p110.
82
Ibid., p217.
83
Ibid., p269.

Chapter 5: Pragmatic philosophies


1
Plato, (360 BCE). The Seventh Letter. Translated by J.
Harward, p3.
[http://classics.mit.edu/Help/permissions.html],
2
Ibid., p6.
3
Popper, K.R. (1995/1945). The Open Society and its Enemies,
Volume I: The spell of Plato. London: Routledge, p86.
4
Marx, K. (1888). Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical
German Philosophy. Marx & Engels Internet Archive
(www.marxists.org), 2001, p30.
5
Taylor A. J. P. (1967). Introduction, in K. Marx and F.
Engels. 1848. The Communist Manifesto. Translated by R.J.
Hollingdale, England: Penguin, p27.
6
Ibid., p42.

107
7
Marx, K. and F. Engels. (1848). The Communist Manifesto.
Translated by R J Hollingdale, Introduction by A. J. P. Taylor.
1967. England: Penguin.
8
Marx, K. (1844). The German Ideology. Marx & Engels
Internet Archive (www.marxists.org), 2001.
9
Landor, R. (1871). Interview with Karl Marx, Head of
LInternationale revolt of labor against capital The two
faces of LInternationale transformation of society its
progress in the United States, New York World, July 18, 1871;
reprinted Woodhull & Claflin's Weekly, August 12, 1871 ,
London, July 3, transcribed by zodiac@io.org, p5.
10
Ibid., p7.
11
Popper, K. (1992/1945). The Open Society and its Enemies
Volume II: Hegel and Marx. London: Routledge, p369.
12
Ibid., p48.
13
Ibid., p49.
14
Feyerabend, P.K. (1982). Science in a Free Society. London:
Verso.
15
Ibid., p7.
16
Benvenuto, S. (1995). Paul K. Feyerabend (1924-1994) -
search for abundance. Telos. Vol.102, p108.
17
Conry, E.J. and Beck-Dudley, C. L. (1996). Meta-
jurisprudence: A paradigm for legal studies, American Business
Law Journal, Vol. 33 (4), pp.691 755.
18
Woodard, C. (1986). Toward a Super Liberal State, New
York Times, November 23, section 7, p27.
19
Plato, (360 BCE). The Republic. Book X, Translated by
Benjamin Jowett.
[http://classics.mit.edu/Help/permissions.html]
20
Harrison-Barbet, A. (1991). Mastering Philosophy. England:
McMillan, p297.

108
21
Bleiker, R. (2001). Editors introduction: The politics of
visual art, Social Alternatives, Vol. 20, (4), p5.
22
Carrier, D. (1997). Art criticism and the death of Marxism,
Leonardo, Vol. 30, (3), pp.241 246.
23
Jenkins, B. (1999). The low politics of high art, Alternatives:
Social Transformation & Humane Governance, Vol. 24, (2), p194.
24
Rorty, R. (1999). Philosophy and Social Hope. London:
Penguin; p9.
25
Ibid., p48.
26
Ibid., p163.
27
Pirsig, RM (1991) Lila: An inquiry into morals. London: Corgi,
p278.
28
Ibid., p287.
29
Ibid., p287.
30
Ibid., p288.
31
Ibid., p288 and 289.
32
Ibid., p352.
33
Pirsig, RM (1983/1974) Zen and the art of motorcycle
maintenance: An inquiry into values. London: Corgi, p75.

Chapter 6: The four types of philosophy in review


1
Pietersen, H. J. (2011). The Four Types of Knowing
Metaphysical, Scientific,Narrative and Pragmatic: A Meta-
Epistemology of Mind, New York: Edwin Mellen Press.
2
Pietersen, H. J. (2014). The Four Archetypal Orientations of the
Mind: Foundational, Experiential, Organizational and Actional.
New York: Edwin Mellen Press.

109
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119
Four fundamental and interrelated intellectual
orientations were found to characterize the thought
of a global range of thinkers, disciplines, and cultures
(Western, Eastern and African). This volume consists
of a review of the four types in Western philosophy.

Professor Pietersen has made contributions to


philosophy, theology, sociology, psychology,
jurisprudence, and business and human resource
management.

He is the author of: The Four Types of Knowing


Metaphysical, Scientific, Narrative and Pragmatic: A Meta-
epistemology of Mind (2011) and The Four Archetypal
Orientations of the Mind: Foundational, Experiential,
Organizational and Actional (2014), both published by
Edwin Mellen, New York.

ISBN: 978-1-86922-614-5