*
G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.
_______________
* EN BANC.
699
700
702
703
704
705
must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and
of the people adopting it. The law, in its clear formulation cannot
give this tribunal the elbow-room for construction. Courts are
bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the
application of constitutional provisions according to their plain
terms and import have been considered in advance and accepted
as less intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by
countervailing advantages. The ponencia itself, in ruling as it
does, may unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review
and treading the dangerous waters of judicial legislation, and
more importantly, of a constitutional amendment. While, the
lament of herein petitioners is understandable, the remedy lies
not with this Court but with the people themselves through an
amendment of their work as and when better counsel prevails.
706
seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as
only those who vote for the winner are represented. To the extent
then that it assures parties or candidates a percentage of seats in
the legislature that reflects their public support, the party-list
system enables marginalized and underrepresented sectors (such
as, but not limited to, the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, and youth sectors) to obtain seats
in the House of Representatives. Otherwise, the party-list system
does not guarantee to these sectors seats in the legislature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission show that the party-list system is not
limited to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
referred to by petitioners, but that it is a type of proportional
representation intended to give voice to those who may not have the
necessary number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently
numerous to give them a seat nationwide.The deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list system is
not limited to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and the youth, but that
it is a type of proportional representation intended to give voice to
those who may not have the necessary number to win a seat in a
district but are sufficiently numerous to give them a seat
nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the debates on Art. VI, 5(1)(2)
to say that Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod
differed in their proposals as to the details of the party-list
system, both proponents worked within the framework that the
party-list system is for the marginalized as termed by Comm.
Villacorta and the underrepresented as termed by Comm.
Monsod, which he defined as those which are always third or
fourth place in each of the districts.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court cannot hold that the
partylist system is reserved for the labor, peasants, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth without
changing entirely the meaning of the Constitution which in fact
mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved seats system when it
provides in Art. IX, C, 6 that A free and open party system shall
be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people,
subject to the provisions of this Article.A problem was placed
before the Constitutional Commission that the existing winner-
take-all one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters
underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two
solutions were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list
system or proportional representation. The Constitutional
Commission chose the party-list system, This Court cannot hold
that the party-list system is reserved for the labor,
707
708
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the 1
Rales of
Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by
the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001.
This Resolution approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein
impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek
the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly
that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream
political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
_______________
709
_______________
2 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 40.
710
_______________
711
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the
parties to address the following issues:
_______________
712
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
_______________
16 See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 88.
17 See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organizations Memorandum, pp. 3-4;
Aksyon Demokratikos Memorandum, pp. 2-3; and MADs Memorandum,
pp. 3-6.
18 Rules and regulations governing the filing of a petition for
registration, a manifestation to participate, and the names of nominees
under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May
14, 2001 national and local elections.
19 OSGs Memorandum, pp. 6-14; rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151-159.
713
in the party-list
20
elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge may
be brought before this Court in a verified petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was
promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence,
no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a
prohibited pleading under 21Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had
filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration 22 and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. The Comelec, however, did not act on that
Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner
Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was
no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events
have proven the urgency of petitioners action; to this date,
the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition
before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because
the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule
that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other
plain, speedy
_______________
714
23
and adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is
available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies,
where the issue raised is one purely of law, 24where public
interest is involved, and in case of urgency. Indeed, the
instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and
with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the
composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional
issues on the party-list system, which this Court must
urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to formulate
guiding and controlling
25
constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules.
Finally, procedural requirements may be glossed over
to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves
the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought
to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari
26
is the only adequate and
speedy remedy available.
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
_______________
715
_______________
716
32
danao. This was also clear from the following
33
exchange
between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople:
_______________
717
x x xx x xx x x
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House
of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the
Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list
system.
x x xx x xx x x
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list
elections does not mean, however, that any political party
or any organization or group for that mattermay do so.
The requisite character of these parties or organizations
must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as
follows:
718
_______________
719
_______________
36 Infra.
720
_______________
721
_______________
722
_______________
723
45
Representatives through the simplest scheme possible.
Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who
have never gotten a foothold within itthose who cannot
otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need
the simplest scheme possible to do so. Conversely, it
would be illogical to open the system to those who have
long been within itthose privileged sectors that have long
dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more
vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory
open house, which by its nature allows outsiders to enter
the facilities. Obviously, the open house is for the benefit
of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can
enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In
the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the
outsiders who cannot get elected through regular
elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and
overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the
party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice
the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented,
contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The
party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the
underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool
to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system
to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that
flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion of the qualification of political
parties and other organizations under the party-list
system.
_______________
724
Refutation of the
Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues,
Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are
anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of
the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional
construction, however, is that the primary source from
which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the
language of the provision itself. The presumption is that
the words in which the constitutional provisions are
46
46
couched express the objective sought to be attained. In
other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the
meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should
resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and
interpretation, such as the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed
light on and ascertain the 47
true intent or purpose of the
provision being construed.
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice
Mendoza, this Court 48
stated in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary that the debates and proceedings of
the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to
arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of
the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face The
_______________
725
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
726
_______________
49 Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997. See also Santiago v.
Guingona, 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314
SCRA 603, September 16, 1999; Garcia v. HRET, 312 SCRA 353, August
12, 1999.
50 Veterans Federation Party, et al v. Comelec, et al., GR No. 136781,
October 6, 2000, 342 SCRA 244.
51 See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 278, February 18, 1999;
Inciong, Jr. v. CA, 257 SCRA 578, June 26, 1996; Palomado v. NLRC, 257
SCRA 680, June 28, 1996; Heirs of the Late Teodoro Guaring,
727
_______________
Jr. v. CA, 269 SCRA 283, March 7, 1997; Sebreo v. Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, 270 SCRA 360, March 24, 1997; PCGG v. Cojuangco,
Jr., 302 SCRA 217, January 27, 1999.
728
_______________
729
_______________
730
_______________
60 See 2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261 (o),
BP 881.
731
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the
law: to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental
social justice principle that those who have less in life
should have more in law. The party-list system is one such
tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives
the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine
power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced,
and even to those in the underground, that change is
possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their
limbo and seize the opportunity.
_______________
732
VITUG, J.:
734
735
_______________
737
738
739
_______________
740
_______________
8 See the plenary deliberations (2nd reading) of House Bill No. 3043.
9 Section 15, R.A. 7941.
10 Ibid.
11 Whitman vs. Oxford National Bank, 176 US 559, 44 L. Ed. 587, 20
Set. 477.
12 People ex rel. Snowball vs. Pendegast, 96 Cal. 289 St. 126, 110 NE
485.
741
SEPARATE OPINION
The Facts
Petitioner Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party (OFW for
short) is the political agency of the Overseas Filipino
Workers Movement, a non-stock and non-profit
organization. On the other hand, petitioner Bayan Muna is
a political party representing peasants, workers, women,
the youth, and other marginalized sectors. Both were
accredited by the Commission on Elections in connection
with the election for party-list representatives on May 14,
2001.
Petitioners brought these suitsin G.R. No. 147589, for
certiorari and, in G.R. No. 147613, for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamusfor the purpose of seeking the
annulment of the registration of the following parties
classified as political parties and
organizations/coalitions by the Commission on Elections:
Political Parties:
742
Organizations/Coalitions:
(JEEP),
743
_______________
744
The Issues
The issues in these cases actually come down to the
following:
Discussion
I.
While it is true that petitioner Bayan Muna has filed
petitions for the disqualification of respondents, the fact is
that when the petitions in these cases were filed on April
16 and 17, 2001, the elections were just a month away, and
there was doubt whether a resolution of the petitions for
disqualifications was forthcoming. In fact, up to the time of
the elections on May 14, 2001, the cases were still
unresolved. Petitioners, therefore, had no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
within the meaning of Rule 65, 1-2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and were justified in resorting to the
extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus.
From another point of view, there is no need for
petitioners to await formal resolution of their petitions as
the COMELEC had already indicated in press statements
its stand that parties, organizations, or coalitions, whether
or not representing marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, could participate in the elec-
745
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 745
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
II.
At the core of the controversy in these cases is the following
provision of the Constitution:
746
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
_______________
3 Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land
Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596, 627 (1957).
747
_______________
749
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 749
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
MR. MONSOD. . . .
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the
proposal for the party list system is not synonymous with that of
the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks
to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the
members of the sectors. . . . In effect, a sectoral representation in
the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have
reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who
would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem
of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9,
the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students,
professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and other
similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified
here as sectoral representatives to be represented in this
Commission. The problem we had in
_______________
750
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
_______________
751
....
_______________
_______________
753
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 753
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
_______________
13 Id. at 255.
14 Id. at 258.
754
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
would be allowed only for two terms and only with respect
to one-half of the seats allocated for party-list
representatives. Commissioner Aquino proposed instead
the following amendment of 5:
_______________
755
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 755
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
_______________
756
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
757
VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001 757
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
III.
On the other hand, the majority states:
_______________
758
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
760
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on
Elections
o0o
761