People v. Hon CA, Ting et al. GR. No. 161083 Aug.

3, 2010 626 SCRA 352

Leviste v. Hon. Alameda GR. No. 182677 Aug 3, 2010 626 SCRA 575

Tabujara v. People, Oct. 29, 2008

Ramos v. People July 13, 2010 625 SCRA 39

Flores v. Hon. Gonzales 626 SCRA 661 Aug 3, 2010

People v. Hon CA, Ting et al. GR. No. 161083 Aug. 3, 2010 626 SCRA 352

Facts:
A fire broke out inside the plant of Sanyoware Plastic Products Manufacturing Corporation
Investigations were conducted and the CIDG and IATF accused the following of Destructive Arson: a]
Samson Cua Ting b] Wilson Cua Ting c] Edward Yao d] Willy Tan e] Carol Ortega f] John Doe g] Peter
Doe
All of whom are employees of Sanyoware.
Petitioner submitted Sworn Statements, which were denied by the respondents in their Counter-
Affidavit
After preliminary investigation, the State Prosecutor issued a resolution recommending that an
information for Destructive Arson be filed
Prior to arraignment and before warrant of arrest could be issued, respondents filed: a] Motion to
Conduct Hearing to Determine Probable Cause and b] Hold in Abeyance the issuance of Warrant of
Arrest Pending Determination of Probable Cause
The RTC issued an Order dismissing the case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Accordingly, for lack of probable cause, the instant case is DISMISSED as ordained under Sec. 6,
Rule 112 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The RTC applied the equipoise rule in dismissing the case, because of its observation that the sworn
statements submitted by petitioner and respondents contained contradictory positions.
Petitioner filed a MFR, which was denied
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, which it denied; as well as the MFR was
denied
Respondents raised that certiorari does not lie considering that such special civil action is not and
cannot be a substitute for an appeal or for a lapsed appeal
Petitioner's main argument hinges on the propriety of the RTC's use of the equipoise rule in
dismissing the case which was affirmed by the CA; contending that the equipoise rule cannot be used
by the RTC merely after the filing of the information
Equipoise Rule - shall properly come into play when the parties have already concluded the
presentation of their respective evidence not at any prior time nor merely after the filing of
information

Issue: Whether or not the RTC acted within its jurisdiction when it dismissed the case on lack of
probable cause
Held: Yes (it acted within its jurisdiction).
In a petition for certiorari, the court must confine itself to the issue of whether or not respondent court
lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion.
It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and the preliminary investigation proper, which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable
cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation
proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged is the function of the investigating prosecutor.
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.
xxxx
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order of the accused had
already been arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case
of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the complaint or information.
As enunciated in Baltazar v. People, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with
the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information, or any
offense included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common
sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not,
a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands
more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction. The purpose of the
mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from
the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public
trial.
Based on the foregoing, the RTC acted within its jurisdiction when it dismissed the case on lack of
probable cause as the same is sanctioned under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
While petitioner mainly argues against the use of the equipoise rule, it cannot escape this Courts
attention that ultimately petitioner is asking this Court to resolve the propriety of the dismissal of the
case by the RTC, on the basis of the Information and the attached documents it had filed. This Court
however, will defer to the findings of fact of the RTC, which are accorded great weight and respect,
more so because the same were affirmed by the CA. In addition, it bears to stress that the instant
case is a petition for certiorari where questions of fact are not entertained.

Leviste v. Hon. Alameda

Facts:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with
homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The
private complainants-heirs of de las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of
the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter issued the Order granting the
motion by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the trial
court issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information for murder and directed the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate court.

Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not
guilty" for him. Prior to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex
Abundanti Cautela, which the trial court granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the crime of
murder is not strong. The trial court went on to try the petitioner under the Amended Information. Then,
the trial court found the petitioner guilty of homicide. From the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed
an appeal to the CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to the SC.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a
substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a
preliminary investigation.
2 Whether or not in cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, the remedy of preliminary
investigation belongs only to the accused.

Held:
1. Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The test as to
whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence
defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.

An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does
not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. here is no
substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are
conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.

What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder
after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion. Petitioner did
not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed
amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and
declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation.

2. No. The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation.
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of the public prosecutor The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a witness and
not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation of the case after the
information had been filed in court, the proper party for that being the public prosecutor who has the
control of the prosecution of the case.Thus, in cases where the private complainant is allowed to
intervene by counsel in the criminal action, and is granted the authority to prosecute, the private
complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for
reinvestigation.
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public prosecutor,
the permission or consent of the court must be secured. If after such re-investigation the prosecution
finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such
proposed course of action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the
court.
Once the trial court grants the prosecutions motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have
deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to
the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion wide and far reaching
regarding the disposition thereof, subject to the trial courts approval of the resulting proposed course
of action.

Tabujara v. People, Oct. 29, 2008

Facts
The petitioner assails the February 24, 2004 decision of the CA in CAG R 6 3 2 8 0 d e n y i n g i t s
p e t i t i o n f o r r e v i e w a n d d i r e c t i n g t h e M T C o f Meycauayan, Bulacan, Br. II to
proceed with the trial of criminal cases nos.99-29031 and 99-29038 as well as the October 23, 2006
Resolution denyingthe motion for reconsideration. Petitioner insist that the orders of the courtshould
be annulled for having been issued with grave abuse of discretionbe cause the finding of
probable cause was based solely on the unseenstatement of Mauro de Lara who never
appeared during the preliminaryinvestigation.

Issue: Can the judge base his findings of probable cause on a statement of awitness whom he did not
personally examine under oath?

Ruling: No. It is constitutionally mandated that a warrant of arrest shall beissued only upon finding
of probable cause personally determined by the judge after the examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant andthe witnesses he/she may produce and particularly describing the
person tobe seized. In the case at bar, Judge Adriatico gravely abused his discretion inissuing the
assailed May 2, 2000 and July 4, 2000 orders finding probable cause to hold petitioner liable
for trial and to issue warrant of arrest becauseit was based solely in the statement of witness de Lara
whom Judge Adriaticodid not personally examine and under oath; neither did he asked
propoundquestions. He merely stated that in the assailed May 2, 2000 Or der, heoverlooked
that said statements of de Lara, nevertheless, without conductinga personal examination on said
witness, Judge Adriatico still found de Larasallegations sufficient to establish probable cause. Plainly,
this falls short of the requirement imposed by the Constitution.

Tabujara v. People, Oct. 29, 2008 (same case above)

FACTS:
Respondent Afable filed two criminal complaints against petitioners for Grave Coercion and
Trespass to Dwelling.
Petitioners denied the allegations against them arguing that they went to the house of Afable
to thresh out matters regarding some missing pieces of jewelry. (Afable is being charged with
estafa for having allegedly embezzled several pieces of jewelry from the Miladay Jewels Inc.)
[MTC] dismissed case for lack of probable cause holding that complaints are merely leverage
to the estafa case already filed against Afable by the Miladay Jewels Inc. wherein respondent
Atty. Tabujara III is its legal counsel; while respondent Dayrit is an officer.
On MR, Judge Adriatico issued an Order reversing his earlier findings of lack of probable
cause through the sworn allegation of witness Mauro V. De Lara, that was apparently
overlooked by said Judge, sufficient to establish a prima facie evidence or probable cause
against the accused.
Petitioners filed MR insisting that the alleged affidavit of De Lara on which the court a quo
based its findings of probable cause was hearsay because it was not sworn before Judge
Adriatico; that De Lara did not personally appear before the investigating judge during
preliminary investigation. MR Denied.
[RTC] Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction seeking to annul orders of the court a quo. RTC granted TRO and
enjoined the MTC from proceeding with the prosecution. Case was raffled where RTC denied
petition for annulment, finding probable cause.
[CA] Petitioners filed a Petition for Review asserting that the court a quo acted with grave
abuse of discretion; that the Order was void because it was issued by MTC while the TRO
issued by RTC was in force. CA denied petition on the ground that petitioners resorted to the
wrong mode of appeal; i.e., instead of an ordinary appeal, petitioners filed a petition for review.
In denying the petition for review under Section 1 Rule 42 of 1997 Rules of Court filed by
petitioners, CA stressed that they availed of the wrong mode of review in bringing the case to
it since the petitioners filed an original action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to the RTC,
the remedy availed of should have been an appeal under Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court.
MR denied hence instant petition. Petitioners insist that the Orders of the court a quo should
be annulled for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion because the finding of
probable cause was based solely on the unsworn statement of De Lara who never appeared
during the preliminary examination; that since De Lara never appeared before the
investigating judge, his statement was hearsay and cannot be used as basis for finding
probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest or to hold petitioners liable for trial.
HELD: CA erred in dismissing petitioners petition for review. While it is true that rules of procedure
are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, it nevertheless must not be met at
the expense of substantial justice. The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed
despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. The principle that rules of procedure are mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and that strict and rigid application of rules which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always
be avoided. In those rare cases to which we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there
always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice.

Rules must not be applied so rigidly as to override substantial justice. The CA should have looked
beyond the alleged technicalities to open the way for the resolution of the substantive issues in the
instance case. By dismissing the said Petition, the CA absolutely foreclosed the resolution of all the
substantive issues petitioners were repeatedly attempting to raise before the Court of Appeals.

Judge Adriatico gravely abused his discretion in issuing the Orders finding probable cause to hold
petitioners liable for trial and to issue warrants of arrest because it was based solely on the
statement of witness without conducting a personal examination on said witness or propounding
searching questions, and still found De Laras allegations sufficient to establish probable cause. This
falls short of the requirements imposed by the Constitution (Sec 2., Art. III 1987 Constitution) and in
violation of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Executive Judge Manalastas of RTC issued a
TRO enjoining the court a quo from conducting further proceedings but in contravention of said TRO,
the court a quo issued its Order on even date ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest.
Considering that the said Order was issued during the effectivity of the TRO, the same is considered
of no effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. CAs decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. MTC is
DIRECTED to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 9929037 and 9929038 for lack of probable cause and to
quash the warrants of arrest against petitioners for having been irregularly and precipitously issued.

NOTES:
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.x x x
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court.x x x [T]he judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an
examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

Ramos v. People July 13, 2010

Principles:
Withdrawal of Information. It bears emphasizing that when the trial court grants a motion of the public
prosecutor to withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or
to deny the said motion, it does so not out of compliance to or defiance of the directive of the
Secretary of Justice, but in sound and faithful exercise of its judicial prerogative. The trial court is the
best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The prior determination of probable cause
by the trial court does not in any way bar a contrary finding upon reassessment of the evidence
presented before it. In this case, the Supreme Court agreed with the reasons of the trial for granting
the motion for the withdrawal of the Information.
Flores v. Hon. Gonzales 626 SCRA 661 Aug 3, 2010
Petitioner Flores filed a complaint-affidavit against private respondent Eugene Lim for estafa before
the City Prosecutor of Cebu City. The complaint alleged that Lim tricked Flores and the other EMIs
incorporators (Flores, et al.) to purchase two compact processing equipments, CP15 and CP14.
Flores executed an agreement to purchase only a CP15. After the execution of the sales contract
and due to some delay in the delivery of the CP15, Lim, through insidious words anddeliberate bad
faith, was able to convince Flores, et al. to purchase instead an unused but later model of the
compact processing equipment, CP14, for 1,466,000.00 or 60,106,000.00, with the assurance that
Lim could effect the cancellation of the purchase for the CP15. Flores, et al. agreed and purchased
the CP14, using their funds allotted for the CP15. Later, however, Lim told them that the purchase of
the CP15 could not be cancelled. Out of fear of lawsuits and acting upon the advice of Lim, Flores, et
al. raised the necessary funds through bank loans to pay for the CP15. Upon further investigation,
they learned that the purchase price of the CP14 was only 908,140.00 or 38,174,618.16. Lim filed
his counter-affidavit denying all the accusations against him. Among others, he insisted that the
CP14 was actually priced at 60,106,000.00.

After further exchange of pleadings and the case was submitted for resolution, the City Prosecutor of
Cebu City issued a Resolution dated January 16, 2005 dismissing the complaint for lack of probable
cause. The motion for reconsideration filed by Flores was denied in a Resolution dated June 2, 2005.
On July 12, 2005, Flores filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice questioning the
January 16, 2005 and the June 2, 2005 Resolutions. Lim opposed this petition. In a Resolution dated
March 2, 2006, the Secretary of Justice dismissed the petition on the ground that there was no
showing of any reversible error on the part of the handling prosecutors, and for Flores failure to
append several documents to his petition.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE COULD RULE IN A

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE VALIDITY, WEIGHT, ADMISSIBILITY, AND MERITS OF
PARTIES DEFENSES, EVIDENCE, AND ACCUSATION?

Held: These matters are best addressed to the MTCC, where they will be thoroughly ventilated and
threshed out in the resolution of Lims motion for reconsideration of the MTCC June 20, 2007
Resolution, and eventually, if the trial court denies the motion, during the trial on the merits before it.

We wish to point out that, notwithstanding the pendency of the Information before the MTCC,
especially considering the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of his May 31, 2006 Resolution, a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, anchored on the alleged grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of Secretary of Justice, was an
available remedy to Flores as an aggrieved party. In the petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals
is not being asked to cause the dismissal of the case in the trial court, but only to resolve the issue of
whether the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion in either affirming or reversing
the finding of probable cause against the accused. But still the rule standsthe decision whether to
dismiss the case or not rests on the sound discretion of the trial court where the Information was filed.
As jurisdiction was already acquired by the MTCC, this jurisdiction is not lost despite a resolution by
the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case, notwithstanding the
deferment or suspension of the arraignment of the accused and further proceedings, and not even if
the Secretary of Justice is affirmed by the higher courts.