LAZATIN V CAMPOS

Facts:

Margarita de Asis died, leaving a holographic will providing for a legacy of cash, jewelry, and
stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a
son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato
Lazatin.

During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the bank which either she or
respondent Nora de Leon (adopted daughter) could open. 5 days after her death, Nora opened the
safety deposit box and removed its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers and those
of her sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to her mother. Nora
claims that she opened the safety deposit box in good faith, believing that it was held jointly by
her and her deceased mother.

Respondents filed a petition to probate (establish the validity) the will. After having learned that
the safety box was opened, petitioner's son, Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a motion in the probate court,
claiming that the deceased had executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate and
demanding its production.

Petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to intervene in the estate of
Margarita de Asis as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin
(brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin), the petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr.
Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified to state that petitioner
was adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis.

During the hearing, Renato presented no decree of adoption in his favor. Instead, he attempted to
prove, over private respondents' objections, that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his
parents; he had been supported by them until their death; formerly he was known as "Renato
Lazatin" but was compelled to change his surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased spouses
refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife; that at first, he and his wife stayed at
the residence of Engracio de Asis, father of Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to
the Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased spouses, where they
continuously resided up to the present.

Photographs were also intended to be presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph of Irma Veloso
where she addressed herself as sister of petitioner; photograph of deceased Margarita de Asis and
petitioner when he was a boy; document showing that petitioners real name is "Renato Lazatin."

Respondent court first reserved its ruling when petitioner could not present evidence on the issue
of his alleged legal adoption, respondent court discontinued the hearing and gave the parties time
to file memoranda on the question of the admissibility of the evidence sought to be introduced by
petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not renato has established his status as an adopted child.

Held:
 NO.

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding which creates between two persons a relationship similar
to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the
court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid
in this jurisdiction. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by
the person claiming its existence.

On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its
non-existence. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the
statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his
parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption.

Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were
actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument.

The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order
may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.

As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the former existence of the adoption paper
and its subsequent loss or destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first been
established that such adoption paper really existed and was lost.

DOCTRINE:

1. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem 2 which creates between two persons a relationship
similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 3 Only an adoption made through the
court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this
jurisdiction. 4 It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. 5 To establish the relation,
the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. 6 The
fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence.
The destruction by fire of a public building in which the adoption papers would have been filed if existent
does not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is the destruction of the records of an adoption
proceeding to be presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a
presumption of its non-existence. 7 Where, under the provisions of the statute, an adoption is effected by a
court order, the records of such court constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be
established. 8

3. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be
substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a
child to establish such adoption. 9 Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that
he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided
with the deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not sufficient
to establish the fact of adoption.10 Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated,
recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, recognized and referred to one like
petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of the child. 11 Withal, the attempts of
petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory
presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of petitioner's evidence is rather to establish his
status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an adopted child which status of an admitted illegitimate child
was the very basis of his petitioner for intervention in the estate proceedings of the late Dr. Lazatin, as
above stated. (Supra, at page 3 hereof)

4. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually
lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish
the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution;
loss; contents; although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. 16 The
sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the
judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case. 17 As earlier pointed
out, petitioner failed to establish the former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss or
destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first beer. established that such adoption
paper really existed and was lost. This is indispensable. 18 If adoption was really made, the records thereof
should have existed and the same presented at the hearing or subsequent thereto or a reasonable
explanation of loss or destruction thereof, if that be the case, adduced. 19

Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child does not justify the
conclusion that petitioner had been in fact judicially adopted by the spouses nor does it constitute
admissible proof of adoption.

5. A child by adoption cannot inherit from the parent creditor. by adoption unless the act of adoption has
been done in strict accord with the statue. Until this is done, no rights are acquired by the child and
neither the supposed adopting parent or adopted child could be bound thereby. 21 The burden of proof in
establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. He must prove compliance with the
statutes relating to adoption in the jurisdiction where the adoption occurred. 22 A fortiori if no hereditary
interest in the estate can be gained by a claimant who failed to submit proof thereof, whether the will is
probated or not, intervention should be denied as it would merely result in unnecessary
complication. 23 To succeed, a child must be ligitimate, legitimated, adopted, acknowledged illegitimate
natural child or natural child by legal fiction or recognized spurious child. 24