Grio vs.

COMELEC

G.R. No. 105120 September 2, 1992

FACTS:

Grio and his LDP political party filed a certiorari case against COMELEC in relation to the May 11, 1992
election. Grio is a candidate for Governor of Iloilo where the sub-province of Guimaras is located. LGC
of 1991 took effect requiring the conversion of existing sub-provinces into regular provinces, and
Guimaras is one such sub-provinces, upon approval by majority of votes cast in a plebiscite. The
plebiscite favored the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province but petitioner questioned the
COMELEC that ballots should have contained spaces to allow voting for Gov, Vice Gov and members of
the Sanggunian of Iloilo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a complete failure of election in Guimaras.

HELD:

The court held that COMELEC was under mistaken presumption that under the LGC of 1991, whether or
not the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified by the people in plebiscite, the
President will appoint provincial officials. However, the voters favored for the conversion of Guimaras
into a regular province so there was need to undo what COMELEC has done in plebiscite. There ballots in
Guimaras should have contained spaces for Gov and Vice Gov. etc. but SC has now considered the case
moot and academic since majority voted in the affirmative for the conversion of Guimaras.

Power Of COA (Administrative Law): Rodolfo S. De Jesus, Et Al. vs. Commission on Audit G.R. No.
149154, June 10, 2003

Power Of COA

Rodolfo S. De Jesus, Et Al. vs. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 149154, June 10, 2003

Facts:

The Board of Directors (BOD) of the Catbalogan Water District granted to themselves RATA, rice
allowance, productivity incentive, anniversary, and year-end bonus and cash gifts, as authorized by
Resolution No. 313 of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). The COA disallowed and ordered
the refund of these allowances as they are not allowed by P.D. No. 198, the Provincial Water Utilities Act
of 1973.

Issue:

Whether COA is vested with authority to disallow release of allowance not authorized by law even if
authorized by the LWUA.
Held:

Art. IX, Sec. 2 D of the Constitution mandates the COA to audit all the government agencies, including
government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) with original charters. The COA is vested with
authority to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds. A Water District is a GOCC
with a special charter since it is created pursuant to special law, PD 198. The COA can disallow
allowances not authorized by law, even if authorized by the LWUA.
Considering that the disallowed allowances were received in good faith, without knowledge that
payment had no legal basis, the allowances need not to be refunded.

Administrative Law Case: Smart Communications, Inc. Et Al. vs. National Telecommunications
Commission (Ntc) G.R. 151908, August 12, 2003

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE & QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS; RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION;WHEN APPLICABLE

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ET AL. V. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC)

G.R. 151908, August 12, 2003

Facts: The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which promulgated rules and regulations on the billing
of telecommunications services. Petitioners filed with the RTC a petition to declare the circular as
unconstitutional. A motion to dismiss was filed by the NTC on the ground of petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss but on certiorari, the CA reversed RTC.

Held: 1. Administrative bodies had (a) quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and (b) quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules
and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute
and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. To be valid, such rules and regulations
must conform to, and be consistent with, the provisions of enabling statute.
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact
to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by
law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial.
2. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative body
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the judicial power as defined by the Constitution which
is the duty of the Courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there haw been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. The NTC circular was issued pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. Hence,
the action must be filed directly with the regular courts without requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
3. Where the act of administrative agency was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function,
exhaustion of administrative remedy is required, before going to court.
4. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-
judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the same must be referred
to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This
doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. In such
case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its
view.

Administrative Case: JOSE C. MIRANDA vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 154098. July 27, 2005.
JOSE C. MIRANDA vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 154098. July 27, 2005.

Good Faith - - Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
FACTS:
The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, under
preventive suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to 25 January 1998 for alleged violations of
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees. Subsequently, then Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman. Vice Mayor Navarro contended that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of
usurpation of authority or official functions. Mayor Miranda asserted that he reassumed office on the
advice of his lawyer and in good faith. He also averred that, on the day he reassumed office, he received
a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to vacate his office and he
immediately complied with the same. Notably, Mayor Mirandas counter-affidavit also stated that he
left the mayoralty post after coercion by the Philippine National Police.
ISSUE:
Whether or not good faith may be invoked by the petitioner.

HELD:
The court is not a bit persuaded by the posture of the petitioner that he reassumed office under an
honest belief that he was no longer under preventive suspension. Petitioners pretense cannot stand
scrutiny. Petitioners own affidavit states.Petitioners excuse for violating the order of preventive
suspension is too flimsy to merit even a side-glance. He alleged that he merely followed the advice of his
lawyer. If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect for the rule of law, they should have assailed
the validity of the order of suspension in court instead of taking the law into their own hands.

ELECTION LAW: MIRIAM DEFENSORSANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)

Facts:
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992 election. In her
Motion on the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August of
the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the
pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.

The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and protestee to submit
their respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her election as
a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on the 30th of June in the year
1995.

Held:
YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or considered
withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of
the duties and functions thereof.

The protestant abandoned her determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved in the
matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.

Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of
uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial
political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.

Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if after the
completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since
DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer
intends to do so.

Election Law Case: Garvida vs Sale, Jr, COMELEC, etal

(Age Limit in Sangguniang Kabataan Candidacy)
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER
DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.

(Age Limit in Sangguniang Kabataan Candidacy)

Facts:
On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and
Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a
decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her
registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers
appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The presiding judge of the Regional
Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with
petitioner.
On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman,
Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In
a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial
Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her
age. Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set
aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run.
On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent's votes of
76. In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election
Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was
filed on May 27, 1996.
On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the
position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was
"without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested
party." On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang
Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one
of the elected officials of the Pederasyon.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner exceeded the age requirement to run as chairman in Sanggunian
Kabataan?

Held:
The petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over
the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and
is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
The court discuss the one-year cycle of successive years in construing Section 428 of the Local
Government Code Providing that certain elective officials should not be more than 21 years of age
on the day of their election, The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more
than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of
years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365
days each. One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the
365th day after his birth -- the last day of the year. In computing years, the first year is reached
after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day
cycle begins. On the 365th day of the second cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle
goes on and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day
cycle. This means on his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire span of 21 365-day cycles.
After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year begins. The day after the 365th day is the
first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the 365th day.
The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It
means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year
because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not
equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does not state that
the candidate be less than 22 years on election day.
Petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she
was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21
years, 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old.
Petitioner may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner
was over the age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code
and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate
for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.