3. Waiver during marriage, FC Art. 89 (1) cf.
NCC Art. 168
E. Absolute community of property (ACP)
1. When applicable, FC Arts. 75, 103 (3); 130 (3); 92 (3)
Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements,
agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal
partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any
other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when
the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute
community of property as established in this Code shall govern.
(119a)
Art. 130. (3) Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent
marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a
mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall
govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)
Art. 103. (3) Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent
marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a
mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall
govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community
property:
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who
has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits
as well as the income, if any, of such property. (201a)
2. Commencement, FC Art. 88
Art. 88. The absolute community of property between spouses
shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is
celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the
commencement of the community regime at any other time shall
be void. (145a)
Art. 89. (1) No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute
community of property during the marriage can be made except
in case of judicial separation of property.
Article 168. The wife may, by express authority of the husband
embodied in a public instrument, administer the conjugal
partnership property. (n)
4. Waiver after marriage, FC Art. 89 par. 2
Art. 89. (2) When the waiver takes place upon a judicial
separation of property, or after the marriage has been dissolved
or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument and
shall be recorded as provided in Article 77. The creditors of the
spouse who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind
the waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the
amount of their credits. (146a)
5. Suppletory rules: Co-ownership,
FC Art. 90; of NCC Arts. 484-501
Art. 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the
absolute community of property between the spouses in all
matters not provided for in this Chapter. (n)
TITLE III CO-OWNERSHIP
Article 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of
an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.
In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership
shall be governed by the provisions of this Title. (392)
Article 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well
as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective
interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be
void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved. (393a)
Article 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in
common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for
which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest
of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it
according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may
be changed by agreement, express or implied. (394a)
Article 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment. (n)
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall
thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the
separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty
spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree
to revive their former property regime.
The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in
the proper civil registries. (108a)
Article 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other
co-owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the
thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the
latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so
much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share
of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is
prejudicial to the co-ownership. (395a)
Article 489. Repairs for preservation may be made at the will of
one of the co-owners, but he must, if practicable, first notify his
co-owners of the necessity for such repairs. Expenses to improve
or embellish the thing shall be decided upon by a majority as
determined in article 492. (n)
Article 490. Whenever the different stories of a house belong to
different owners, if the titles of ownership do not specify the
terms under which they should contribute to the necessary
expenses and there exists no agreement on the subject, the
following rules shall be observed:
(1) The main and party walls, the roof and the other things used
in common, shall be preserved at the expense of all the owners
in proportion to the value of the story belonging to each;
(2) Each owner shall bear the cost of maintaining the floor of his
story; the floor of the entrance, front door, common yard and
sanitary works common to all, shall be maintained at the expense
of all the owners pro rata;
(3) The stairs from the entrance to the first story shall be
maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata, with the
exception of the owner of the ground floor; the stairs from the first
to the second story shall be preserved at the expense of all,
except the owner of the ground floor and the owner of the first
story; and so on successively. (396)
Article 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of
the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even
though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the
withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is
clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford
adequate relief. (397a)
Article 492. For the administration and better enjoyment of the
thing owned in common, the resolutions of the majority of the co-
owners shall be binding.
There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved by
the co-owners who represent the controlling interest in the object
of the co-ownership.
Should there be no majority, or should the resolution of the
majority be seriously prejudicial to those interested in the
property owned in common, the court, at the instance of an
interested party, shall order such measures as it may deem
proper, including the appointment of an administrator.
Whenever a part of the thing belongs exclusively to one of the
co-owners, and the remainder is owned in common, the
preceding provision shall apply only to the part owned in
common. (398)
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership. (399)
Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition
of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a
certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid.
This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall
not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against
his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)
Article 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding
article, the co-owners cannot demand a physical division of the
thing owned in common, when to do so would render it
unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. But the co-
ownership may be terminated in accordance with article 498.
(401a)
Article 496. Partition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. Partition shall be governed by
the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with this Code.
(402)
Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may
take part in the division of the thing owned in common and object
to its being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot
impugn any partition already executed, unless there has been
fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition
presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor
or assignor to maintain its validity. (403)
Article 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the
co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who
shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
distributed. (404)
Article 499. The partition of a thing owned in common shall not
prejudice third persons, who shall retain the rights of mortgage ,
servitude or any other real rights belonging to them before the
division was made. Personal rights pertaining to third persons
against the co-ownership shall also remain in force,
notwithstanding the partition. (405)
Article 500. Upon partition, there shall be a mutual accounting
for benefits received and reimbursements for expenses made.
Likewise, each co-owner shall pay for damages caused by
reason of his negligence or fraud. (n)
Article 501. Every co-owner shall, after partition, be liable for
defects of title and quality of the portion assigned to each of the
other co-owners. (n)

6. What constitutes ACP, FC Art. 91
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the
marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all
the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration
of the marriage or acquired thereafter. (197a)
(a) All property at time of marriage
(b) Property acquired subsequently
(c) Winnings from gambling,
FC Art. 95 cf. NCC Art. 164
Art. 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game
of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling,
whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the
loser and shall not be charged to the community but any
winnings therefrom shall form part of the community property.
(164a)
Article 164. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any
kind of gambling, betting or game, whether permitted or
prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser, and shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership. (1411a)
(d) Presumption of ACP, FC Art. 93 cf. NCC Art. 160
Art. 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to
belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of
those excluded therefrom. (160)
7. What is excluded from ACP, FC Arts. 92; 142
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community
property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by
either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any,
unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor
that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse.
However, jewelry shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who
has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits
as well as the income, if any, of such property. (201a)
Muller v. Muller, G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller
were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989.
Respondent Helmut purchased a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at
the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting
to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name
of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing,
drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of
properties before the RTC of Quezon City. The court granted said
petition. It also decreed the separation of properties between them
and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within
the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the
marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it
was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it
ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property
was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the decision of the RTC. It held that respondent merely
prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property,
and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered the
respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00
for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for
the construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to
reimbursement.
Ruling:
No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.
There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the
Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite a constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that
constitutional prohibition, he put the property under the name of his
Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the fundamental law bars
him to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity. It has been held that equity
as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done
indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
Beumer v. Amores, G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012
The Facts: Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national, married Avelina (Amores) on
March 29, 1980. Their marriage was declared a nullity by the RTC on
November 10, 2000 by reason of psychological incapacity, thus Willem filed a
petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership and distribution of properties
which he claimed were acquired during their marriage.
During trial, Willem testified that Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in
the name of Avelina, but it was purchased using funds he received from the
Dutch government as disability benefit, and Avelina had no sufficient income
to purchase the properties. On the other hand, Avelina alleged that except for
the two residential houses and Lots 1 and 2142, all the other lots were her
paraphernal properties and acquired thru her funds.
After trial the RTC disposed of the properties as follows: It awarded to Willem
several personal properties (tools and equipments), the two houses standing
on Lots 1 and 2142 were declared as co-owned by Willem and Avelina as
there was no prohibition on aliens owning buildings and houses and were
acquired during the marital union. On the other hand, all the lots covered by
several TCTs were declared paraphernal properties , though acquired during
the marriages, in view of the constitutional prohibition against aliens owning
real property in the
The Issue/s: WON Willem is entitled to the whole or at least one half of the
purchase price of the lots subject of the case.
The Courts ruling:
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he is well aware of the [above-
cited] constitutional prohibition3 and even asseverated that, because of such
prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latters
name. Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the
constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no
reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny
petitioners claim for reimbursement.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over
the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-
established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly6.
Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void,
vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at
all.7 Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code,8 petitioner cannot
have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money
he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an
illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds
them.9 Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional
transaction knowingly entered into.
Futile, too, is petitioners reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which
reads:
Abrenica v Abrenica, G.R. No. 180572, June 18, 2012
Facts: Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of individual
respondents, Attys. Danilo N. Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan, in the
Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan ("the firm").
In 1998, Respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) two cases against Petitioner regarding an alleged
refusal of Petitioner to return and transfer partnership funds
representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land in Lemery,
Batangas, and that they sought to recover from Peitioner the retainer
fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of
the cash advance he obtained in 1997.
On September 13, 2007, Petitioner Erlando filed an Urgent Omnibus
Motion, alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to
his children and Petitioner Joena. In addition, Erlando alleged that
the trial court still had to determine the manner of distribution of the
firms assets and the value of the levied properties. Lastly, he insisted
that the RTC still had to determine the issue of whether the Rule 41
appeal was the correct remedy.
On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim
alleging that she and her stepchildren owned a number of the
personal properties sought to be levied. She also insisted that she
owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as the house and lot
which formed part of the absolute community of property. She
likewise alleged that the real property, being a family home, and the
furniture and the utensils necessary for housekeeping having a
depreciated combined value of P 100,000 were exempt from
execution pursuant to Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, she sought their discharge and release and likewise the
immediate remittance to her of half of the proceeds, if any.
Petitioners elevated this case to SC, because they were allegedly
denied due process when the CA rejected their second attempt at the
annulment of the Decision of the RTC.
Erlando had been previously married to another woman but their
marriage was already dissolved. He was first married to a certain Ma.
Aline Lovejoy Padua on October 13, 1983. They had three children.
After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and Joena
got married on May 28, 1998. In her Affidavit, Joena alleged that she
represented her stepchildren; that the levied personal properties in
particular, a piano with a chair, computer equipment and a computer
table were owned by the latter.
Issue: WON Petitioner Joena had the right to the claim
Held: No. Petitioners may not defy the pronouncement of this Court
in G.R. No. 169420 by pursuing remedies that are no longer available
to them. Twice, the CA correctly ruled that the remedy of annulment
of judgment was no longer available to them, because they had
already filed an appeal under Rule 41. Due to their own actions, that
appeal was dismissed.
It must be emphasized that the RTC Decision became final and
executory through the fault of petitioners themselves when petitioner
Erlando (1) filed an appeal under Rule 41 instead of Rule 43; and (2)
filed a Petition for Review directly with the CA, without waiting for the
resolution by the RTC of the issues still pending before the trial court.
With regard to the allegation of petitioner Joena that her right to due
process was violated, it must be recalled that after she filed her
Affidavit of Third Party Claim on 13 September 2007 and petitioner
Erlando filed his Urgent Omnibus Motion raising the same issues
contained in that third-party claim, he subsequently filed two Motions
withdrawing his Urgent Omnibus Motion. Petitioner Joena,
meanwhile, no longer pursued her third-party claim or any other
remedy available to her. Her failure to act gives this Court the
impression that she was no longer interested in her case. Thus, it
was through her own fault that she was not able to ventilate her
claim.
In addition, two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when
Joena filed her Affidavit. As to Patrik Randel, parental authority over
him belongs to his parents. Absent any special power of attorney
authorizing Joena to represent Erlandos children, her claim cannot
be sustained.
Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles
purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the house and lot covered by
TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community regime.
However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the
community property the property acquired before the marriage of a
spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and
the fruits and the income, if any, of that property. Neither these two
vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.
8. Charges upon ACP, FC Art. 94
Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this
Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by
the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the
community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the
consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or
minor repairs, upon the community property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during
marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by
the family;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete
a professional or vocational course, or other activity for self-
improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in
favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive
purpose of commencing or completing a professional or
vocational course or other activity for self-improvement;
(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling
under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate
children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse
by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the
payment of which shall be considered as advances to be
deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of
the community; and
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is
found to be groundless.
If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing
liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties.
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111
3) On April 27, 1956, PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez
and Luzon Surety Co. to recover the amount of PhP4,577.95, in
interest, attorneys fees and other costs.
4) On August 8, 1957, Luzon Surety Co. instituted a third party
complaint against Chavez, Lacson and Garcia.
5) On September 17, 1958, a judgment was rendered ordering
Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to pay PNB in solidarity. The same
decision likewise ordered the third party defendants Chavez, Garcia
and Lacson to pay Luzon Surety Co. the amount to be paid to PNB.
6) On July 30, 1960, a writ of execution was issued against Garcia to
satisfy the claim of the petitioner. A writ of garnishment was soon
issued levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcia
spouses from their sugar plantation.
7) Spouses Garcia filed a suit for injunction and the trial court ruled in
favor of them.
Issue:
WON the CPG could be liable on an indemnity agreement executed
by the husband to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety
agreement
Held:
No. Decision appealed from was affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
Petitioner contends that Garcias transaction as a guarantor
through which he acquires the capacity of being trusted, adds to his
reputation and enhances his standing in the community. He can
thus secure money with which to carry on the purposes of their
conjugal partnership. While not entirely without basis, such argument
cannot prosper for it would negate what is expressly provided for
in Article 161.
In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under that
provision is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must
be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the spouses. There is none in this case.
While Garcia by thus signing the agreement may be said to
enhance his reputation, such benefit, even if hypothetically
accepted, is too remote and fanciful to come within the express
terms of the provision.
Gelano v. CA, 103 SCRA 90
Insular Sawmill, Inc. leased the paraphernal property of Guillermina
M. Gelano (wife) for P1.2K/month
November 19, 1947-December 26, 1950: Carlos Gelano (husband)
obtained cash advances of P25,950 on account of rentals
Aagreement: Insular Sawmill, Inc. could deduct the same from the
monthly rentals of the leased premises until the cash advances are
fully paid
Carlos Gelano was able to pay only P5,950.00 thereby leaving an
unpaid balance of P20,000.00 which he refused to pay
Guillermina M. Gelano refused to pay on the ground that said amount
was for the personal account of her husband asked for by, and given
to him, without her knowledge and consent and did not benefit the
family
May 4, 1948 to September 11, 1949: Spouses Gelanos purchased
lumber materials on credit leaving P946.46 unpaid
July 14, 1952: Joseph Tan Yoc Su, as accomdating party, executed a
joint and several promissory note with Carlos Gelano in favor of
China Banking Corporation bank in the amount of P8,000.00 payable
in 60 days to help renew the previous loan of the spouses the bank
collected P9,106.00 including interests by debiting the current
account of the corp.
Carlos only paid P5,000
Guillermina refused to pay on the ground that she had no knowledge
of such accomodation
May 29, 1959: Insular thru Atty. German Lee, filed a complaint for
collection against the spouses before the CFI
November 20, 1964: CFI favored Insular holding Carlos Gelano liable
August 23, 1973: held spouses jointly ad severally liable
ISSUE: W/N a corporation, whose corporate life had ceased by the
expiration of its term of existence, could still continue prosecuting and
defending suits after its dissolution and beyond the period of 3 years
provided for under Act No. 1459, otherwise known as the Corporation
law, to wind up its affairs, without having undertaken any step to
transfer its assets to a trustee or assignee.
HELD: YES. Petitioners contend that the obligations contracted by
petitioner Carlos Gelano from November 19, 1947 until August 18,
1950 (before the effectivity of the New Civil Code) and from
December 26, 1950 until July 14, 1952 (during the effectivity of the
New Civil Code) were his personal obligations, hence, petitioners
should not be held jointly and severally liable. As regards the said
issues, suffice it to say that with the findings of the Court of Appeals
that the obligation contracted by petitioner-husband Carlos Gelano
redounded to the benefit of the family, the inevitable conclusion is
that the conjugal property is liable for his debt, pursuant to paragraph
1, Article 1408, Civil Code of 1889 which provision incidentally can
still be found in paragraph 1, Article 161 of the New Civil Code. Only
the conjugal partnership is liable, not joint and several as erroneously
described by the Court of Appeals, the conjugal partnership being
only a single entity.
G-Tractors, Inc. v. CA, 135 SCRA 192
FACTS: Luis R. Narciso, legally married to Josefina Narciso, is a
businessman engaged in business as a producer and exporter of
Philippine mahogany logs and operates a logging concession at del
Gallego, Camarines Sur. G-Tractors, Inc. is a domestic corporation
engaged primarily in the business of leasing heavy equipments such
as tractors, bulldozers, and the like.
Luis entered into a Contract of Hire of Heavy Equipment with G-
Tractors under the terms of which the latter leased to the former
tractors for the purpose of constructing switchroads and hauling
felled trees at the jobsite of Narciso's logging concession at del
Gallego, Camarines Sur. The contract provided for payment of rental
for the use of said tractors. Luis Narciso failed to pay; G-Tractors
instituted an action urging Luis to pay a certain amount
(P155,410.25), representing the unpaid rentals. G-Tractors accepted
his offer for a compromise agreement, Luis failed to comply; Levy
was accordingly made by the City Sheriff of QC on certain personal
properties of the spouses at their residence in Quezon City. Auction
sale was held, and G-Tractors was awarded with the sale of such.
On February 12, 1975, the Sheriff of Quezon City made a levy on "all
rights, interest, title, participation which the defendant Luis R.
Narciso" may have over a parcel of residential land of the Registry of
Deeds of QC which parcel of land is allegedly the conjugal property
of the spouses Luis and Josefina. Sheriff sold at public auction to the
highest bidder for cash. Certificate of Sale was then issued to G-
Tractors as the highest bidder for P180,000.
On March 31, 1976, Josefina and Luis filed a complaint in CFI QC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal property of the spouses can be
held answerable for the debt of the husband
HELD: YES, the conjugal property of the spouses can be held
answerable for the debt of the husband. CAs decision reversed and
set aside
Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal
partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All the debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife,
also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind
the partnership
His account with petitioner G-Tractors, Inc. represents rentals for the
use of petitioner's tractors which he leased for the purpose of
constructing switchroads and hauling felled trees at the jobsite of the
logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur which is not his
exclusive property but that of his family. There is no doubt then that
his account with the petitioner was brought about in order to enhance
the productivity of said logging business, a commercial enterprise for
gain which he had the right to embark the conjugal partnership.
It is very clear, therefore, that the obligations were contracted in
connection with his legitimate business as a producer and exporter in
mahogany logs and certainly benefited the conjugal partnership.
The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and as
long as he believes he is doing right to his family, he should not be
made to suffer and answer alone. So that, if he incurs an
indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or
suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership must
equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he deliberately
acted to the prejudice of his family.
The sale at public auction belonging to the conjugal partnership of
gains of the Narcisos in order to satisfy the judgment debt of the
private respondent Luis R. Narciso was validly and legally made in
accordance with law.
(a) Family expenses cf. FC Arts. 100 (3),
121(5) and 94 (1), (4), (5)
Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall
not affect the regime of absolute community except that:
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate
property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support
of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and
use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during
the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;
Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this
Code on Support;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or
minor repairs, upon the community property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during
marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by
the family;
Francisco v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 177667, Sept. 17, 2008
In their desire to manifest their genuine concern for their
children, Cleodia and Ceamantha (P), Cleodualdo and Michele have
voluntarily agreed to herein set forth their obligations, rights and
responsibilities on matters relating to their children's support,
custody, visitation, as well as to the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains
ownership of the conjugal property consisting of a house
and lot shall be transferred by way of a deed of donation to Cleodia
and Ceamantha, as co-owners, when they reach nineteen (19) and
eighteen (18) years old with the following condition:
Cleodualdo shall retain usufructuary rights over the property until he
reaches the age of 65 years old, with the following rights and
responsibilities
Respondendt ordered Matrai and Michele to vacate the premises
leased to them and to pay back rentals, unpaid telephone bill, and
attorney's fees
Real property donated to Cleodia and Ceamantha were used as
payment
CA ruled that since Michele's obligation was not proven to be a
personal debt, it must be inferred that it is conjugal and redounded to
the benefit of the family, and hence, the property may be held
answerable for it
Issue(s): Whether or not the fact that the spouses waived their right
of ownership in favor of their children is valid
Held: Yes. RTC should not have ignored that TCT No. 167907 is in
the name of "Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to Michele U.
Francisco." Cleodualdo and Michele were married on June 12, 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. As such,
their property relations are governed by the Civil Code on conjugal
partnership of gains
it is clear that both Michele and Cleodualdo have waived their title to
and ownership of the house and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners.
The property should not have been levied and sold at execution sale
Respondents' bare allegation that petitioners lived with Michele on
the leased property is not sufficient to support the conclusion that the
judgment debt against Michele and Matrai in the ejectment suit
redounded to the benefit of the family of Michele and Cleodualdo and
petitioners
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases
things necessary for the support of the family, or when she borrows
money for that purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the
needed sum; when administration of the conjugal partnership is
transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband; or when the
wife gives moderate donations for charity.
(b) Debts of spouses, Art. 94 (2) and (3)
Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by
the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the
community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the
consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without
the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
been benefited;
(c) Subsidiary liabilities, Art. 94 (9)
Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:
(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling
under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate
children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse
by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the
payment of which shall be considered as advances to be
deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of
the community; and
Buado v. CA, G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009
Facts:1. Erlinda Nicol was held liable for damages for the crime of
slander against the spouses Roberto and Venus Ruado.
2. The court issued a writ of execution on her property but finding it
insufficient issued a levy on property which was carried out
by the sheriff despite the affidavit of third party claim by Arturo Fulo.
The conjugal property of Erlinda which was valued at Php
500,000 was auctioned, bided and won by the spouses Buado for
only Php 51,685.
3. A year after, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo filed a complaint for
annulment of certificate of sale and damages with
preliminary injunction against the spouse and the sheriff.
Issue: Could the conjugal property be levied for the personal
obligation of the wife?
Held: No. Under the CPG it cannot be held liable without any
advantage or benefit benefiting the conjugal partnership.
A third-party claim must be filed by a person other than the judgment
debtor or his agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may
file a third-party claim. In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 59
(1989), which was later adopted in Spouses Ching v. Court of
Appeals, 423 SCRA 356 (2004) this Court held that the husband of
the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a stranger to the case
prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals, 347 SCRA 60
(2000), and Sy v. Discaya, 181 SCRA 378 (1990), the Court stated
that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of
execution was issued and is therefore justified in bringing an
independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over his
exclusive or paraphernal property.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature.
Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike
in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by
either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi- delict is chargeable to
the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of
the exclusive property of the debtor- spouse, the same advantage is
not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The
conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments
for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Parenthetically, by no stretch of
imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from
the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.
(d) Gambling losses, FC Art. 95
Art. 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game
of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling,
whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the
loser and shall not be charged to the community but any
winnings therefrom shall form part of the community property.
(164a)
(e) Other charges, Art. 94

9. Ownership, FC Arts. 90, 96 in rel. to NCC Art. 206
Art. 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the
absolute community of property between the spouses in all
matters not provided for in this Chapter. (n)
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the common properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
or both offerors. (206a)
Art. 206. The ownership, administration, possession and
enjoyment of the common property belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the courts shall settle the
difficulty.
10. Administration and enjoyment of ACP
(a) Joint Administration, FC Art. 96, 90
Yu Bun Guan v. Ong, 36 SCRA 559
FACTS * Paraphernal property refers to property over which the wife
has complete control. This property is not part Yu Bun Guan and
Ong are married since 1961 and lived together until she and her
children were abandoned by him in 1992, because of his incurable
promiscuity, volcanic temper, and other vicious vices.
In 1968, out of her personal funds, Ong purchased a parcel of land
(Rizal Property) from Aurora Seneris. Also, during their marriage,
they purchased a house and lot out of their conjugal funds.
Before their separation in 1992, she reluctantly agreed to execute a
Deed of Sale of the Rizal Property on the promise that Yu Bun Guan
would construct a commercial building for the benefit of the children.
He suggested that the property should be in his name alone so that
she would not be involved in any obligation. The consideration for the
sale was the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor their
children and the payment of the loan he obtained from Allied Bank.
However, when the Deed of Sale was executed in favor of Yu Bun
Guan, he did not pay the consideration of P200K, supposedly the
"ostensible" valuable consideration.
Because of this, the new title was issued in his name was not
delivered to him by Ong. Yu Bun Guan then filed for a Petition for
Replacement of the TCT, with an Affidavit of Loss attached. Ong, on
the other hand, executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and asked
that the sale be declared null and void .
RTC ruled in favor of Ong that the lot was her paraphernal property
since she purchased it with her personal funds. CA affirmed.
ISSUE
WON the lot in question was paraphernal property?
RATIO : YES. The property was the paraphernal had been issued in
her name; (2) petitioner had categorically admitted that the property
was in her name; (3) petitioner was estopped from claiming
otherwise, since he had signed the Deed of Absolute Sale that stated
that she was the absolute and registered owner; and (4) she had
paid the real property taxes. It was also sufficiently proven that she
had means to do so.
The testimony of petitioner as to the source of the money he had
supposedly used to purchase the property was at best vague and
unclear. At first he maintained that the money came from his own
personal funds. Then he said that it came from his mother; and next,
from his father.
There was no valid sale. It was completely simulated and hence, void
and without effect. The payment was not even made. It was executed
merely to facilitate the transfer of the property to Yu as stipulated in
their agreement that he would put up a building for his kids (which he
didnt do either).
(3) NO. The pari delicto principle as to contracts only applies when
there is an illegal contract. It does not apply with respect to inexistent
and void contracts. Only Yu is guilty in this case.
(4) NO. The sale was void and inexistent; therefore transferring the
title to its rightful owner is the right thing to do.
Dar v. Legasto, G.R. No. 143016, August 30, 2000
FACTS: Private respondent Nenita Co Bautista filed a case for
unlawful detainer against herein petitioners where they were sued as
Mr. and Mrs. in the said case.
Petitioners were found guilty of failure to comply with the Rule on
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping coz while petitioners Ronnie
Dar, Randy Angeles, Joy Constantino and Liberty Cruz signed the
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, their respective spouses did
not sign the same.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: since what is involved in the instant
case is their common rights and interest to abode under the the
system of absolute community of property, either of the spouses can
sign the petition. * Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8,
1994 applies to and governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent the
multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the same issues in
other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping.
ISSUE WON The signing of one of the spouses in the certification
substantially complies with the rule on certification of non-forum
shopping?
Held: YES. With respect to the contents of the certification which the
pleader may prepare, the rule of substantial compliance may be
availed of. While this section requires that it be strictly complied with,
it merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded
but it does not thereby prevent substantial compliance on this aspect
of its provisions under justifiable circumstances.5 Circular No. 28-91
was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedurewhich is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals should have taken into
consideration the fact that the petitioners were sued jointly, or as Mr.
and Mrs. over a property in which they have a common interest.
Such being the case, the signing of one of them in the certifica-tion
substantially complies with the rule on certification of nonforum
shopping.
(b) Sole administration
(1) incapacity, FC Art. 96 (2) no court order
Uy v. CA, 346 SCRA 246
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose.
Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as
sole administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to sell
the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his
functions. She further contest that such illness of the husband
necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in
Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled
in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article
124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the
rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that the petition made by her mother was essentially a
petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father.
As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on
summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing
special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring
procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing
on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes
under the heading on Separation in Fact Between Husband and
Wife contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing
mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her
daughter and son in law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed
the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a
cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor and
mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.
HELD:
SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings
does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is
incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial court
found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose
condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the
proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the
Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who assumes
sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a
guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property
as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the
procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial
guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC
further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an
opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due
process.
(2) separation in fact FC Art. 100 (3), 142
with court order, of separate property
Art. 100 (3). In the absence of sufficient community property, the
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper
petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to
administer or encumber any specific separate property of the
other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the
latter's share. (178a)
Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of
either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other
spouse:
(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;
(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;
(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries
with it civil interdiction; or
(4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in
hiding as an accused in a criminal case.
If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence,
conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint
a suitable person to be the administrator. (n)
(3) abandonment, FC Art. 101 with court
order
Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or
fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the
aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for
judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the absolute community, subject to such
precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or
she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning.
The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of
three months or has failed within the same period to give any
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling. (178a)
(5) pendency of legal separation proceeding,
FC 61 with court order
Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the
spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the
spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to
administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership
property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the
same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules
of Court. (104a)
 (c) Disposition and encumbrance,
FC Arts. 96-98
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the common properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
or both offerors. (206a)
Art. 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in
the community property. (n)
Art. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property
without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may,
without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from
the community property for charity or on occasions of family
rejoicing or family distress. (n)
Matthews v. Taylor, G.R. No. 164584, June 22, 2009
Facts: 1. Benjamin (British) and Joselyn (Fil) got married (1988).
2. During their marriage, they got several properties (allegedly using
Benjs money). One of which was the Boracay property where
allegedly again funds used were Benjs. This Bora property became a
tourist resort (named Admiral Ben Bow Inn).
3. Taylors had a falling out, separated and in 1992, Joselyn executed
an SPA authorizing Benj take over the property. He could
basically do whatever like sell, lease, etc.
4. In this same year, Joselyn entered into a lease agreement with
Matthews. Matthews then took possession of the property and
renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort
5. This was contested by Benj. He instituted an action for Declaration
of Nullity of Agreement of Lease against Matthews and
Joselyn. He said that the Agreement was null and void since it was
entered into by Joselyn without his consent.
6. Matthews claimed good faith in transacting with Joselyn. Since
Joselyn appeared to be the owner of the Boracay property, he
found it unnecessary to obtain the consent of Benjamin. Plus, it
appeared in the contract that Benjamin signed as a witness to
the contract, indicating his knowledge and conformity of the
transaction.
7. Both RTC and CA considered the Boracay property as community
property of Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the consent of the
spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving the
property. They in effect ruled against Matthews.
ISSUE: WON Benjamin was the actual owner of the property since
he provided the funds used in purchasing the same?
NO. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution states aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public
or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally
recognized exceptions.
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between
Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely
prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines.
Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in
the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership
thereto.
By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied
trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses
can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject
property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses.
11. Effect of separation de facto, FC Art. 100; 101; cf. FC Art.
239 - summary proceedings for court authority to dispose
Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not
affect the regime of absolute community except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live
therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other
is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a
summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate
property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of
the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and
use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a)
Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to
comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved
spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation
of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the
absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the
court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph
refer to marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she
has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three
months or has failed within the same period to give any information
as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have
no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a)
Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has
abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for
a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by
law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified
petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the
transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction
and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be
secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties
shall be submitted to and approved by the court. (n)

Noveras v. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014
Petitioner, and Leticia Noveras, Respondent were married in Quezon
City Phils. on Dec. 1988. They resided in California, USA and
eventually acquired US citizenship. They have 2 children. During
their marriage they acquired properties both in thw Phils. and in the
USA.
In Sept. 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with Estrelita
Martinez in Aurora Province. Upon learning that David had an extra-
marital affair, Leticia Uiled a petition for divorce with the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The divorce was
granted on June 2005 and the custody of the 2 children was granted
to Leticia as well as the couples properties in the USA.
On August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of
Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler Aurora. RTC rendered
judgement and David demanded that the conjugal partnership
properties (CPP) including their USA properties should all be
liquidated for equal distribution. But the RTC ruled, though it
regarded that the parties involved are US citizens having their
marriage DISSOLVED pursuant to the divorce decree, the doctrine of
Processual Presumption of Philippine law should still apply.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) modified the RTC decision and
directed the EQUAL DIVISION of the Philippine properties between
the spouses. David insists that CA should have recognized the
California Judgement which awarded the Philippine properties to him.
He asserts that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is
equivalent to UNJUST ENRICHMENT considering that she was
already granted all their US properties by the California Court. But
the CA ruling prevailed.
Held: WON the CA erred in ruling that properties should be equally
dividides
Held: The Court decided based on Separation in fact. Having
established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least
one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of
property should be granted.
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code
quoted above, must be for a valid cause and the spouse is deemed
to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal
dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not returning
is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse
failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts within the
period of three months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has
returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines,
as she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged
abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA
to visit her and their children until the relations between them
worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October 2004
when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a
petition for dissolution of marriage with the California court. Such turn
for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can
also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the
Philippines.19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial
separation of property was not tackled in the trial courts decision
because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation
of the absolute community of properties.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for
at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute
community of property should be granted.
12. Effect of abandonment, FC Arts. 101, 72, 239 damages,
rescission/nullity of a contract
Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to
the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger,
dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved
party may apply to the court for relief. (116a)
Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one
has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial
authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other
spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot
be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the
foregoing facts.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying
the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said
transaction and state the reason why the required consent
thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly
executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by
the court. (n)
Noveras v. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014
13. Causes for dissolution of ACP, FC Art. 99
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Articles 134 to 138. (175a)
(a) Death, FC Art. 103 cf. Rule 73, Sec. 12 ROC
Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the
community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially or
extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased
spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation
is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the
community property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory
regime of complete separation of property shall govern the
property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)
Heirs of Go v. Servacio, G.R. No. 157537, Sept. 7, 2011
Facts: On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of
land (17,140 SQM) to Protacio B. Go, Jr. Twenty three years later,
Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver,
whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go,
Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land
(the property). In 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of
Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners.
On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined
by Ritos wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the property (5,560 SQM)
to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio). On March 2, 2001, the petitioners
demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed
their demand. They sued Servacio and Rito for the annulment of the
sale of the property.
PETITIONERS: Following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property
became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property
between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void. Servacio and
Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property
because he had purchased it with his own money.
RTC s RULING: Affirmed the validity of the sale. However, declared
the property was the conjugal property and not the exclusive property
of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to
Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina). The participation of
Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of
the late Marta. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect
when the property was acquired, all property acquired by either
spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that
the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.
Issue: Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was void
for being made without prior liquidation?
RULING: No. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta
were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, their property relation was properly characterized as one of
conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Martas death
in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article
175 (1) of the Civil Code,15 and an implied ordinary co-ownership
ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect
to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a
liquidation following its liquidation. The ensuing implied ordinary co-
ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code,17 to wit:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in
respect of Martas share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet
assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share without an
actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or
by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract
quota in Martas share.18 Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his
undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and
dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-
owners.19 Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-
owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co- owners were thereby
effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of
Martas share.
(b) Legal separation, FC Arts. 63(2); 66
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following
effects:
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no
right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in
accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles
shall have the following consequences:
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall
thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the
separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty
spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree
to revive their former property regime.
The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in
the proper civil registries. (108a)
(c) Annulment and declaration of nullity,
FC Arts. 50 in rel. to FC Arts. 43 (2), 147, 148
Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and
(5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper
cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings
for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions
of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in
the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the
innocent spouse;
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his
or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and
owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith,
the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants,
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take
place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a)
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share
in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party
who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of
the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith. (144a)
(d) Judicial separation of property, FC Art. 134-138
Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be
voluntary or for sufficient cause. (190a)
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause
for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a
penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared
an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has
been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or
failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as
provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the
marriage settlements has abused that power; and
Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the
court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their
common properties.
All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal
partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the
spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing
thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors
and other persons with pecuniary interest. (191a)
Art. 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be
liquidated in conformity with this Code.
During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of
property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children. (192a)
Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the
conjugal partnership, the provisions on complete separation of
property shall apply. (191a)
Ugalde v. Ysasi, G.R. No. 130623, February 29, 2008
Facts: On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de
Ysasi (respondent) got married before Municipal Judge Remigio
Pea of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. On 1 March 1951,4 Rev.
Msgr. Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church wedding at the San
Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod City. Petitioner and respondent did
not execute any ante-nuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon
de Ysasi III.
Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in April 1957. On 26
May 1964, respondent allegedly contracted another marriage with
Victoria Eleanor Smith (Smith) before Judge Lucio M. Tanco of
Pasay City. Petitioner further alleged that respondent and Smith had
been acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to her
prejudice as the lawful wife. Petitioner alleged that she had been
defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal
properties.
Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains against respondent before the RTC of Negros Occidental.
Thereafter, respondent contended that he and the petitioner entered
into an agreement which provides that their conjugal partnership shall
be deemed dissolved. Pursuant to this, an Amicable Settlement was
submitted to the CFI of Negros Occidental.
CFI approved the Amicable Settlement.
Respondent likewise alleged that petitioner already obtained a
divorce from him before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner
then contracted a second marriage with Richard Galoway and upon
the latters death, she contracted a third marriage with Frank
Scholey.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of estoppel, laches,
and res judicata. Further, respondent alleged that their marriage was
void because it was executed without the benefit of a marriage
license.
The trial court ruled that there was no conjugal partnership of gains
and that since they entered into an amicable settlement which was
later on approved, the petitioner may no longer repudiate it.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the action for the dissolution of the CPG
should be dismissed.
Held: Yes. Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February
1951. Thus, the applicable law is the Civil Code(RA 386).
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property
results in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains:
Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The finality of the civil case approving the parties separation of
property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of
gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence,
when the trial court decided in the special proceeding, the conjugal
partnership between petitioner and respondent was already
dissolved.
Regarding the dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, the
existence of conjugal partnership of gains is predicated on a valid
marriage, which petitioner and respondent dont have due to the
absence of a marriage license. Petitioner and respondents marriage
was held on February 1951, and the applicable law was the Civil
Code. So when the RTC decided their case, the conjugal partnership
was already dissolved.
14. Effects of dissolution
(a) Liquidation procedure, FC 102
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of
each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be
paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second
paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses
shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community
shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally
between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division
was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has
been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For
purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in
accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits
shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of
the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority
of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of
seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the
court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the
court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said
children. (n)
Quiao v. Quiao, G. R. No. 176566, July 4, 2012
FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent)
contracted marriage in 1977. They had no separate properties prior
to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they produced
four children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal
separation for cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the
RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of
the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal
age), the three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is
the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally
between them subject to the respective legitimes of their children;
however, Brigidos share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance
to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was
granted by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to
the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification
asking the RTC to define Nets Profits Earned. In answer, the court
held that the phrase denotes the remainder of the properties of the
parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the
spouses and debts.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous
decision stating that NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in
accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However, it later
reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains
governs the couples property relations.
HELD: When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community,
the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties
of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those
excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common
mass of the couples properties. And when the couples marriage or
community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the
spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the
parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may
have originally owned.
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage,
an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the
absolute community and the exclusive properties of each; then the
debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the
absolute communitys assets and if the communitys properties are
insufficient, the separate properties of each of the couple will be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the
separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net
remainder of the absolute community is its net assets, which shall be
divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market
value at the time of its dissolution.
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the net profits requires that
we first find the market value of the properties at the time of the
communitys dissolution. From the totality of the market value of all
the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute
community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the
properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct the
market value of the properties at the time of marriage, which then
results to the net profits.
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case,
let us see what will happen if we apply Article 102:
(a) According to the trial courts finding of facts, both husband and
wife have no separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in
the list above are all part of the absolute community. And its market
value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute community
constitutes the market value at dissolution.
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally
separated, all the properties which remained will be liable for the
debts and obligations of the community. Such debts and obligations
will be subtracted from the market value at dissolution.
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from
the total assets of the absolute community constitutes the net
remainder or net asset. And from such net asset/remainder of the
petitioner and respondents remaining properties, the market value at
the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality
constitutes the net profits.
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and
nothing would be returned to each of them, what will be divided
equally between them is simply the net profits. However, in the
Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the
half-share of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use
Article 102 in the instant case (which should not be the case), nothing
is left to the petitioner since both parties entered into their marriage
without bringing with them any property.
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 03, 2015
FACTS: On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo
(Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with
Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the
conjugal partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and
psychological perversity.
RULING: NO.
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void
under Article 3610 of the Family Code, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article
147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.11 Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family Code
provides:
The decision became final, since no party appealed the judgment
annulling the marriage.
On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a
project of partition of their inventoried properties, and if they failed to
do so, a hearing will be held on the factual issues with regard to said
properties. Having failed to agree on a project of partition of their
conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the parties adduced
evidence in support of their respective stand.
On January 13, 2004, the trial court rendered the assailed Order6
stating that the properties declared by the parties belong to each one
of them on a 50-50 sharing.
xxx
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
xxx
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other,
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage
or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for Article
147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to
marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void, as in the instant case. The term "capacitated" in the
first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been
shown to have existed on the part of either Virginia or Deogracio.
They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife.
However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry should, therefore, be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the
parties will share on equal shares considering that Virginia failed to
prove that the properties were acquired solely on her own efforts.
We note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they
acquired the subject properties during the subsistence of their
marriage.17 The certificates of titles and tax declarations are not
sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under Article 116 of the
Family Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during the
marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are registered,
are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is
not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property
or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses only.
Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if
the property is "registered in the name of one or both of the
spouses."18 Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption,
said properties were obtained by the spouses' joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
Accordingly, the partition of the former spouses' properties on the
basis of co-ownership, as ordered by the RTC and the appellate
court, should be affirmed, and not on the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains.
 (b) For cause other than death,
FC 43 (2); FC 63(2); 147; 148
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in
the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the
innocent spouse;
(c) Termination due to death, FC 104
Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of
two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the
effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the
respective capital, fruits and income of each community shall be
determined upon such proof as may be considered according to
the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community
the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided
between the different communities in proportion to the capital
and duration of each. (189a)
Buenaventura v. CA, G.R. No. 127358, March 31, 2005
Facts: A and B married. A, the husband filed for a declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground that he and B, the wife, were
psychologically incapacitated. Trial Court declared the marriage void
but awarded B moral and exemplary damages. The retirement
benefits of A and the shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park were
ordered to be liquidated and partitioned equally among them based
on the liquidation, partition and distribution of the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains.
2) Whether or not the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41,
42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains applies to a
marriage declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
2) No. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a
bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles
41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, does not apply. Rather, the
general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void
ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated,
partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since, the
properties were acquired during the union of the parties, the same
would be covered by the co-ownership.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until
the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the
co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first
paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2),
(3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to
voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under
Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the
latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that
somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void
marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial
decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for
purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of
the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do
away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second
marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in
relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of
the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac
vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also
meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand,
between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment)
and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void
marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on
co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of
the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may
merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on
the family home, i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of
the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the
property regime of the spouses.
Dino v. Dino, G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
Facts: Alain Dino and Ma. Caridad Dino were childhood friends and
sweethearts who started living together in 1984, separated in 1994,
and lived together again in 1996. On January 14, 1998, they were
married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pinas City. On May 30,
2001, petitioner filed for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of the respondents psychological incapacity. Petitioner
alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love
and support to him, abandoned her responsibility to the family and
that she was unfaithful. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a
petition for divorce and was granted by the Superior Court of
California and that she married a certain Manuel Alcantara. Doctor
Tayag submitted a report establishing that the respondent was
suffering from Narcissitic Personality Disorder.
Issue: WON the Trial court erred when it ordered that a DECREE OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued after the
liquidation, partition and distribution of properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, 260 SCRA
221 (1996), that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,
such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present:
(1) The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
(2) They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
(3) Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article
50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void
ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against
Caroline T. Yu with the RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30,
2006 issued an order stating that Erics partial offer of evidence dated
April 18, 2006 would be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits
have been remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue
of the nullity of the marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September 12,
2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for resolution, considering
that the incidents on custody, support, and property relations
(incidental issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of
nullity of the parties marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of
nullity cannot be resolved without presentation of evidence for the
incidents on custody, support, and property relations. Eric added that
the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity can both
proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour of
Erics opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was
re-raffled to another branch presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While
the case was being tried by Judge Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an
Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the said judge of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as
codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case on the
declaration on nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of the
incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the
main cause of action is the declaration of nullity of the marriage and
the incidental issues are merely ancillary incidents thereto. Eric
moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-
Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Held: [I]t is very clear that what petitioner seeks to reconsider in the
Court's Order dated August 4, 2008 is the procedure regarding the
reception of evidence on the issues of property relations, custody and
support. He opposes the fact that the main issue on declaration of
nullity is submitted for decision when he has not yet presented
evidence on the issues on property relations, custody and support.
Considering that what he seeks to set aside is the procedural aspect
of the instant case, i.e., the reception of evidence which is a matter of
procedure, there is no question that it is A.M. 02-11-[10]-SC which
should be followed and not the procedures provided in Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code. While it is true that the Family Code is a
substantive law and rule of procedure cannot alter a substantive law,
the provisions laid in Articles 50 and 51 relative to the liquidation and
dissolution of properties are by nature procedural, thus there are no
substantive rights which may be prejudiced or any vested rights that
may be impaired.
In fact, the Supreme Court in a number of cases has even held that
there are some provisions of the Family Code which are procedural
in nature, such as Article[s] 185 and 50 of the Family Code which
may be given retroactive effect to pending suits. Adopting such
rationale in the instant case, if the Court is to adopt the procedures
laid down in A.M. No. 02-11-[10]-SC, no vested or substantive right
will be impaired on the part of the petitioner or the respondent. Even
Section 17 of A.M. No. 02-11-[10]-SC allows the reception of
evidence to a commissioner in matters involving property relation's of
the spouses.
15. For marriages before FC, FC 104 cf Art. 103 (3)
Delizo v. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216
Nicolas Delizo married Rosa Villasfer in 1981. She died in
1907.
He remarried. The second marriage with Dorotea de
Ocampo lasted 46 years (1911-1957) until Nicolas death.
The act of partition was filed by Nicolas two children from
his first marriage, and the heirs of his other deceased child (also from
the first marriage).
Lower court divided the properties in the following way:
a. 3 children of first marriage
b. Dorotea
c. children of both marriage (divided in 13 parts)
CA: Point of contention was Caanawan lands in Nueva
Ecija. Other lands belong to second marriage
No proof property owned by second marriage
Testimony of Dorotea not persuasive
Moises Patricio places acquisition sometime after the revolution:
Rosa was still alive at this time
LC: conjugal partnership of first marriage transformed into co-
ownership by Nicolas and his children, thus fruits belong to co-
ownership.
CA disagrees with LC: HOWEVER, IT WAS DOROTEA AND
NICOLAS WHO CULTIVATED THE LAND, HENCE THE FRUITS OF
THE LAND SHOULD GO TO THE SECOND MARRIAGE
Dorotea elevated case to SC. According to her, Canaawan
properties were not part of first marriages CPG as lands were
homesteads. First marriage had possessory rights, but second
marriage had exclusive right over it as it was during the second
marriage that it was registered pursuant to Act 926.
Issue:
To which CPG does the Caanawan lands belong to (1st or 2nd
marriage)?
16. Support during ACP liquidation
F. Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Belcodero v. CA, 227 SCRA 303
Facts: This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of
land acquired by a husband while living with a paramour and after
having deserted his lawful wife and children. The property had been
bought by the husband on installment basis prior to the effectivity of
the Civil Code of 1950 but the final deed, as well as the questioned
conveyance by him to his common law spouse, has ensued during
the latter Codes regime. Now, of course, we have to likewise take
note of the new Family Code which took effect on 03 August 1988.
The prpoerty was acquired by Alayo then transferred title to the name
of the second wife. Alayo Bosing died and left the property to his
paramour turned second wife (first marriage still subsisting). First wife
petitioned.
Held: Art. 160 states that All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Given in the case that
Alayo Bosing had legal impediment because his marriage with
Juliana is subsisting, his property cannot be governed by Art 144.
(On Co-ownership of common-law relationship) but by Art. 160.
Therefore, the RTC ordered a deed of reconveyance in favor of
Juliana and her three children with Alayo Bosing, and the CA
correctly affirmed this decision pursuant to Art. 160, the contested
property is under conjugal partnership of deceased and Juliana.
Sps. Estonina v. CA, G.R. No. 111547, January 27, 1997
Facts: Lot C is owned by Santiago Garcia who died on October 2,
1967. In 1973, Trinidad Estonina was granted the land TCT No. 1975
by CFI. It was also mentioned there that Trinidad covered all rights
that Consuela Garcia may have.
- Children of the first wife, Adela, executed a sale transferring unto
Atayan spouses 4/10 of their share in the land TCT T-82229.
- Children of the 2nd wife, Consuelo Garcia, also sold 4/10 of the
land to the Atayan spouses.
- Estrella Garcia (the widow of his son) also sold 1/10 to Spouses
Atayan. Estonina then bought the land in a public auction which was
opposed by Consuelo Garcia.
TCT 82229 was cancelled and T-99961 was issued in favor of
Trinidad Estonina.
- Spouses Atayan pleaded that the auction be declared null and void.
- RTC rendered a decision that the said land was gained by
Consuelo and Santiago during the marriage, hence presumed to be
conjugal.
- CA however said it was not conjugal.
HELD: The presumption in Art. 160 that all property of the marriage
belongs to the conjugal property applies only when there is proof
that the property was acquired during the marriage .The mere fact
that the title was issued when the spouses were already married is
not sufficient proof of conjugality especially where there was no proof
as to when the property was acquired. The land as correctly found
out in the findings of the CA was acquired by Santiago from his
deceased mother and formed part of a large tract of land which was
divided among Santiago and his sisters.
Quiao v. Quiao, G. R. No. 176566, July 4, 2012
FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent)
contracted marriage in 1977. They had no separate properties prior
to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they produced
four children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal
separation for cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the
RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of
the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal
age), the three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is
the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally
between them subject to the respective legitimes of their children;
however, Brigidos share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance
to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was
granted by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to
the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification
asking the RTC to define Nets Profits Earned. In answer, the court
held that the phrase denotes the remainder of the properties of the
parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the
spouses and debts.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous
decision stating that NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in
accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However, it later
reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains
governs the couples property relations.
HELD: When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community,
the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties
of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those
excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common
mass of the couples properties. And when the couples marriage or
community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the
spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the
parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may
have originally owned.
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage,
an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the
absolute community and the exclusive properties of each; then the
debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the
absolute communitys assets and if the communitys properties are
insufficient, the separate properties of each of the couple will be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the
separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net
remainder of the absolute community is its net assets, which shall be
divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market
value at the time of its dissolution.
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the net profits requires that
we first find the market value of the properties at the time of the
communitys dissolution. From the totality of the market value of all
the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute
community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the
properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct the
market value of the properties at the time of marriage, which then
results to the net profits.
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case,
let us see what will happen if we apply Article 102:
(a) According to the trial courts finding of facts, both husband and
wife have no separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in
the list above are all part of the absolute community. And its market
value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute community
constitutes the market value at dissolution.
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally
separated, all the properties which remained will be liable for the
debts and obligations of the community. Such debts and obligations
will be subtracted from the market value at dissolution.
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from
the total assets of the absolute community constitutes the net
remainder or net asset. And from such net asset/remainder of the
petitioner and respondents remaining properties, the market value at
the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality
constitutes the net profits.
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and
nothing would be returned to each of them, what will be divided
equally between them is simply the net profits. However, in the
Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the
half-share of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use
Article 102 in the instant case (which should not be the case), nothing
is left to the petitioner since both parties entered into their marriage
without bringing with them any property.
Orpiano v. Tomas, G.R. No. 178611, January 14, 2013
Facts: Petitioner Estrella Aduan Orpiano (Estrella) is the widow of
Alejandro Orpiano (Alejandro). Part of their conjugal estate is an
809.5-square meter lot in Quezon City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-23468 (the lot). In 1979 Estrella was
declared an absent spouse, and Alejandro was granted the authority
to sell the lot. On March 19, 1996, Alejandro sold the lot on
installment basis to the Tomas Spouses (respondents), the very
same day a title was issued in the name of the Tomas Spouses.
They had until December to complete paying for the land. On Oct 28,
1996 Alejandro filed a case at the QC RTC, seeking collection of the
amount unpaid by the Tomas spouses, with damages. While the
case was still pending Alejandro passed away, his heirs, including
Estrella were substituted in his stead in the case. Estrella moved to
amend the complaint to one for annulment of sale and cancellation of
title, but the court denied her motion. She moved to be dropped as a
party plantiff but was also denied.
On June 11, 2005 Estrella filed a case for annulment of sale and
cancellation of title against the Tomas Spouses, claiming the
declaration of absence and Alejandros authority to sell the lot are
null and void. The Tomas spouses prayed for the dismissal thereof
on the ground of forum shopping. RTC ruled in favour of the Tomas
spouses and dismissed the annulment (of sale) case. CA affirmed
the decision.
ISSUES: Whether there was forum shopping
HELD/RATIO: YES. Although the Court believes that Estrella was not
prompted by a desire to trifle with judicial processes, and was acting
in good faith in initiating the annulment case, still the said case
should be dismissed because it produces the same effect which the
rule on forum shopping was fashioned to preclude. If the collection
case is not dismissed and it, together with the annulment case,
proceeds to finality, not only do we have a possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered; an unfair situation, as envisioned by the
Tomas spouses, might arise where after having paid the balance of
the price as ordered by the collection court, the cancellation of the
TCT and return of the property could be decreed by the annulment
court.
Court says thatthe absence of the consent of one (spouse to a sale)
renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.
However while Estrella is raring to file the annulment case, she has
to first cause the dismissal of the collection case because she was by
necessity substituted therein by virtue of her being Alejandros heir;
but the collection court nonetheless blocked all her attempts toward
such end. There exists a just cause for her to be dropped as party
plaintiff in the collection case so that she may institute and maintain
the annulment case without violating the rule against forum shopping.
Estrella had the right to maintain the annulment case as a measure
of protecting her conjugal share (but the issue of whether the sale
should be annulled is a different matter altogether). Despite all these
reasons, Estrella is still not allowed to take prodecural short cuts.
To repeat, the absence of the consent of one spouse to a sale
renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.
1. When CPG commences and applies
(a) Marriages under Family Code,
FC 107 cf. FC 88, FC 89
Art. 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply
to conjugal partnership of gains. (n)
Art. 88. The absolute community of property between spouses
shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is
celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the
commencement of the community regime at any other time shall
be void. (145a)
Art. 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute
community of property during the marriage can be made except
in case of judicial separation of property.
When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of
property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled,
the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be
recorded as provided in Article 77. The creditors of the spouse
who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the
waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount
of their credits. (146a)
(b) Marriages before FC, FC 105(2) of FC 256
Art. 105 (2) The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to
conjugal partnerships of gains already established between
spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.
Castro v. Miat, 397 SCRA 271
FACTS: Moises and Concordia Miat are spouses who bore two
children, Romeo and Alexander. During their marriage, Moises
bought pieces of lands, one in Paranaque and one in Paco, the latter
on installment basis. Upon Concordias death, her husband, now a
widower, originally intended his two properties for his offspring but
recanted later on when he came back for good from Dubai, claiming
the Paranaque property for himself and leaving the one in Paco to his
sons. Both of his sons agreed.
The two boys and their families proceeded to live in the said
property. However, Alexander eventually left for personal reasons
and made arrangements with his brother regarding his share. Life
was pretty much normal until Romeo heard from his godmother, Mrs.
Rosalina that his father was planning to sell to her son, Virgilio
Castro, herein petitioner, the Paco property. She also told him that
she herself had already given a down payment of P30000 for it.
Confronting Moises, he told his sons that he would be forced to sell
the property because he mortgaged it when he came to some dire
financial situation
Eventually, the sale was finalized between Moises and Virgilio
though the title of the property was with Romeo, on the assurance
that Moises would be able to retrieve it from his son. The proceeds
then went to Moises and his other son, Alexander. Romeo, on the
other hand, didnt get any. Thus, he filed the case to nullify the sale
and to compel his father and brother to convey the property to him,
as well as damages.
One of the contentions of Virgilio Castro is that Paco property is a
capital property of Moises and not a conjugal one, as the final
installment was made after Moises wifes death.
Thus, the RTC ruled in favor of Romeo as much as the share was
concerned but stated that the sale was valid. The CA, however,
reversed the decision, stating that the sale was not valid; thus, this
petition.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
(1) WON Paco property is conjugal or capital.
Although petitioners allege that property was paid for by Moises and
at the time it was paid, his wife had long been dead, the SC
disagrees on the grounds of the new Civil Code (which was
applicable because marriage was celebrated before FC):
Art 153 (1) -
The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses; x x x.
Records show that property was acquired by onerous title during the
marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly conjugal property.
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It
provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does not
require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in
which the property was acquired does not appear.
In the case at bar (as opposed to petitioners reliance on Lorenzo v.
Nicolas), Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during
their marriage Moises did not bring it into their marriage, hence it
has to be considered as conjugal.
(2) WON valid oral partition between Moises and his sons involving
the said property is valid.
Yes. The validity of the agreement is apparent in (a) latter of the
father to his sons (the one which stated that he didnt favor any of his
sons), (b) the testimony (see above) of Moises brother, Ceferino,
and the oral agreement between the brothers to divide the property
between themselves (attested to by extended Family members).
We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo and Alexander is
not covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is enforceable for two
reasons. Firstly, Alexander accepted the six thousand (P6,000.00)
pesos given by Romeo as downpayment for the purchase of his
share in the Paco property.
Secondly, Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat and Pedro
Miranda, who testified regarding the sale of Alexanders share to
Romeo, were intensely questioned by petitioners counsel.
(c) When applicable, FC 105 of FC 74-76, 107, 88, 89
Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage
settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall
govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in
this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses
before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)
Art. 74. The property relationship between husband and wife
shall be governed in the following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;
(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
(3) By the local custom. (118)
Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements,
agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal
partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any
other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when
the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute
community of property as established in this Code shall govern.
(119a)
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements
may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the
marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135
and 136. (121)
(d) Suppletory rules, FC 108 cf. NCC 1767-1768
Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules
on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what
is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their
marriage settlements. (147a)
Art. 1767. By the contract of partnership two or more persons
bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a
common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among
themselves.
Two or more persons may also form a partnership for the
exercise of a profession. (1665a)
Art. 1768. The partnership has a judicial personality separate and
distinct from that of each of the partners, even in case of failure
to comply with the requirements of Article 1772, first paragraph.
(n)
 2. What is included in the CPG,
FC Art. 106, 117, 115, 118, 119, 120
Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the
husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds,
products, fruits and income from their separate properties and
those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or
by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both
spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise
agreed in the marriage settlements. (142a)
Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of
either or both of the spouses;
(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during
the marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits
from the exclusive property of each spouse;
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the
law awards to the finder or owner of the property where the
treasure is found;
(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or
hunting;
(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in
excess of the number of each kind brought to the marriage by
either spouse; and
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from
gambling or betting. However, losses therefrom shall be borne
exclusively by the loser-spouse. (153a, 154a, 155, 159)
Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities,
usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on
gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each
case. (n)
Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from
exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from
conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership
was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if
such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case,
any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both
spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon
liquidation of the partnership. (n)
Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period
of time belongs to one of the spouses, the sums which may be
collected during the marriage in partial payments or by
installments on the principal shall be the exclusive property of the
spouse. However, interests falling due during the marriage on the
principal shall belong to the conjugal partnership. (156a, 157a)
Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or
adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses at the
expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either
or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to
the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules:
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal
partnership and any resulting increase in value are more than the
value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire
property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement;
otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the
owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of
the improvement.
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be
vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at the time
of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. (158a)
Titan v. David, G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010
Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were
married on March 25, 1957. In 1970, the spouses acquired a lot located at
White Plains, Quezon City. In 1976, the spouses separated, and no longer
communicated with each other. March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha
had previously sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation (Titan) with
which the previous title registered in the Register of Deeds was replaced.
March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaintfor Annulment of Contract against
Titan CC. Manuel alleged that the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan
was without his knowledge therefore void. He prayed that the Deed of Sale be
invalidated, that the property be returned to the spouses with a new title be
issued in their names.
Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value
because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) by Manuel which
authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the spouses.
Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature purporting
to be his was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the
property. Subsequently, Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaintwhich was granted by the trial court. Thus, on October 15, 1996,
Manuel filed an Amended Complaint. Martha failed to file an answer so she
was declared in default.
HELD: The property is part of the spouses conjugal partnership.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, the law in force at the time of the celebration
of the marriage between Martha and Manuel in 1957, provides:
Article 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife.
Article 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense
of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only
one of the spouses;
also in FC Art. 117.
xxxx
Article 116 of the Family Code is even more unequivocal in that "[a]ll property
acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved."
We are not persuaded by Titans arguments that the property was Marthas
exclusive property because Manuel failed to present before the RTC any
proof of his income in 1970. In consonance with our ruling in Spouses Castro
v. Miat,22 Manuel was not required to prove that the property was acquired
with funds of the partnership. Rather, the presumption applies even when the
manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.23 Here, we find
that Titan failed to overturn the presumption that the property, purchased
during the spouses marriage, was part of the conjugal partnership.
In the absence of Manuels consent, the Deed of Sale is void.
Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale
to Titan required the consent of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code
expressly provides that "the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership". Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code ordains that "(t)he wife
cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent, except in
cases provided by law". (now Art 124 of FC)
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
The Special Power of Attorney purportedly signed by Manuel is spurious and
void.
Imani v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 187023, Nov. 17, 2010.
Facts: On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a
Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), with Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves
Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr.,
and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound
themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo
Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos
(P6, 000,000.00).
Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45,
respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes signed
by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its
loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI,
but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit
against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 15717.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
Metrobank.
The dispositive portion of the (1) Under the First Cause of Action, the
sum of P175,451.48 plus the stipulated interest, penalty charges and
bank charges from March 1, 1984 and until the whole amount is fully
paid; (2) Under the Second Cause of Action, the sum of P92,158.85
plus the stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank charges from
February 24, 1985, and until the whole amount is fully paid; (3) The
sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount due under
the First and Second Cause of Action; and (4) Ordering the
defendants to pay the costs of suit and expenses of litigation.
HELD: Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be
conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who
invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine
qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership.31 Thus, the time when the property was acquired is
material.32
However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove
that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage.
Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove
said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to
the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate
when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal
was acquired.
Similarly, the certificate of title could not support petitioners
assertion. As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was
registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina
Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different
acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing.
Dewara v. Lamela, GR 179010, April 11, 2011
- Eduardo Dewara and Elenita Dewara married before the FC took
effect, separated in fact because Elenita worked in California,
Eduardo in Bacolod
-1985 Eduardo, while driving jeep, hit Lamela, who filed and won a
case ofbserious physical injuries against Eduardo
Court ordered Eduardo to pay 62k as civil indemnity and 10k as
moral damages
-Eduardo could not pay so the sheriff levied a parcel of land
registered under Elenitas name, which was bought by Lamela at a
public auction
- Elenitas attorney-in-fact claimed that land was paraphernal
property of Elenita and could not be used to pay for personal
liabilities of her husband
- Respondents claim that property was conjugal as it was bought
using Eduardos money, Elenita being a simple housewife
at the time of purchase of the land
- RTC declared property as paraphernal and ruled in favor of the
petitioner, tracing the ownership of the property to Elenitas
grandfather, Exequiel Magallanes, and was sold to her by her father
and her aunt for a much lower price, indicating that it
was a donation to Elenita alone
- CA reversed the decision, claiming that Eduardo and Elenita
acquired the property during their marriage
HELD: (to reiterate) All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of
the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption. The
separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without judicial
approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership
applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired
does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential
requirement for the presumption to arise.
There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by
spouses Elenita and Eduardo during their marriage. It is also
undisputed that their marital relations are governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains, since they were married before the enactment
of the Family Code and they did not execute any prenuptial
agreement as to their property relations. Thus, the legal presumption
of the conjugal nature of the property applies to the lot in question.
The presumption that the property is conjugal property may be
rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical, and convincing
evidencethere must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one
of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party
asserting it.
However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is the
conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, it does not
necessarily follow that it may automatically be levied upon in an
execution to answer for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of
one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations may be charged
against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same
were contracted for, or the debts and obligations should have
redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Fines and
pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband or the wife, as a
rule, may not be charged to the partnership. However, if the spouse
who is bound should have no exclusive property or if the property
should be insufficient, the fines and indemnities may be enforced
upon the partnership assets only after the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered.
In this case, it is just and proper that Ronnie be compensated for the
serious physical injuries he suffered. It should be remembered that
even though the vehicle that hit Ronnie was registered in the name of
Elenita, she was not made a party in the said criminal case. Thus,
she may not be compelled to answer for Eduardos liability.
Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership property may be held
accountable for it since Eduardo has no property in his name. The
payment of indemnity adjudged by the RTC of Bacolod City in
Criminal Case No. 7155 in favor of Ronnie may be enforced against
the partnership assets of spouses Elenita and Eduardo after the
responsibilities enumerated under Article 161 of the Civil Code have
been covered. This remedy is provided for under Article 163 of the
Civil Code, viz.:
Art. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife
before the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them
be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before the marriage, and that of fines and indemnities imposed
upon them, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 have been covered, if the
spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should
be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership
such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purposes above-mentioned.
Lim v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 183918. January 15, 2014
Facts: Petitioner Francisco Lim executed an SPA in favor of his
brother Franco to mortgage his share in a property in order to secure
a loan. This first loan extended by BDO in 1989 was fully paid by
Franco in 1992. However in 1996, Franco and their mother obtained
another loan over the same property which they failed to pay.
Respondent Bank tried to foreclose the property due to the non-
payment of the loan. Petitioner thus tried to get a TRO and for the
foreclosure and to secure a cancellation of the SPA executed in favor
of his brother. Petitioner alleged that he did not authorize Franco to
mortgage the subject property to respondent and that his signatures
in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Surety Agreement were forged.
Lastly, he insists that respondent should have been alerted by the
fact that the mortgage contract was executed without the consent of
his wife. The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. It ruled
that petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that
he did not participate in the execution of the mortgage contract giving
rise to the presumption that his signature was forged.
The CA reversed the RTC Decision. It ruled that petitioners mere
allegation that his signature in the mortgage contract was forged is
not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the
notarized document.
Held: The absence of his wifes signature on the mortgage contract
also has no bearing in this case.
We are not unaware that all property of the marriage is presumed to
be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the
husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the
fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the
wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required before a
conjugal property may be mortgaged. However, we find it iniquitous
to apply the foregoing presumption especially since the nature of the
mortgaged property was never raised as an issue before the RTC,
the CA, and even before this Court. In fact, petitioner never alleged in
his Complaint that the said property was conjugal in nature. Hence,
respondent had no opportunity to rebut the said presumption.
"Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife."
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of
the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title
that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she
was already a widow. When the property is registered in the name of
a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was
acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property
belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the
name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are
involved.
3. What is excluded from CPG, FC 109
Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each
spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous
title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by
exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses;
and
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or
of the husband. (148a)
(a) Brought as exclusive property, FC 109(1)
Laperal v. Katigbak, 10 SCRA 493
FACTS: Spouses Ramon Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw were married
in 1938 and neither of them had brought properties unto the
marriage. Ramon's occupation was that of Asst. Atty. of the Bank of
the Phil. Islands wherein his monthly salary P200.00. TThe property
in question was registered in the name of "Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak,
married to Ramon Katigbak" only two years after marriage. The court
is led to believe that, as Evelina declares, her mother Pura Villanueva
was the one that had bought property for her and had placed it only
in her name. Ramon Katigbak, in the same year 1939, that is, long
before the spouses had come to the parting of ways, made a
manifestation that he had no interest in the properties.
Spouses Laperals instituted a case for recovery of a sum of money
against spouses Katigbak (husband) and Kalaw (wife). Trial court
found for the Laperals. About a month after this decision was
rendered, Kalaw filed a complaint against her husband Katigbak, for
"judicial separation of property and separate administration".
The Laperals instituted another complaint seeking among other
things, annulment of the proceedings for "judicial separation of
property and separate administration," to enforce the judgment on the
fruits of Kalaw's paraphernal property, and to secure a ruling
declaring the real property as conjugal property of Katigbak and
Kalaw. TC and, later on, SC dismissed the complaint.
HELD: There is no denying that all properties acquired during the
marriage are, by law, presumed conjugal. (Art. 160, Civil Code) The
presumption, however, is not conclusive but merely rebuttable, for
the same law is un equivocal that it exists only "unless it be proved
that it (the property) belongs exclusively to the husband or the wife."
And, examining the records and evidence in this suit, We hold that
this is a case where the presumption has been sufficiently and
convincingly disproven.
It should be further noted that the husband in the aforecited case,
apart from relying on the presumption established by the Civil Code,
sought to show the conjugal nature of the disputed property by
presenting a number of documentary evidence. He exhibited, for
instance, "certified copies of reports on file in the City Assessor's
Office showing that the land was assessed in his name; a certified
copy of an inspector's report in which the name of the husband
appears as the owner; and, a tax declaration made in November,
1905, relating to the property in dispute, in the name of the husband."
Yet, even then, this Court declined to give effect to the presumption
as the wife's evidence to the contrary were more preponderant. In the
present case, on the other hand, We note that other than invoking the
presumption, the burden of denying the evidence so presented was
shifted to the appellant. In this latter task, the appellant failed
completely.
In the case before Us now for review, the deed to the disputed land is
in the name of the wife. At the time of its purchase, the property was
already of such substantial value as admittedly, the husband, by
himself could not have afforded to buy, considering that singular
source of income then was his P200.00 a month salary from a Manila
Bank. As in the Casiano case, supra, the defendant herein testified,
and was believe by the trial court, that the purchase price was furnish
by her mother so she could buy the property for herself. Furthermore,
it was established during the trial that it was a practice of defendant's
parents to so provide their children with money to purchase realties
for themselves.
These facts, quite obviously, more than measure up to the
circumstances obtaining in the two cases previous cited wherein We
held the conjugal presumption to have been rebutted.
Francisco v. CA, G.R. No. 102330, Nov. 25, 1998
Facts: Petitioner, the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio
Francisco by his second marriage since 1962, filed a suit for
damages and for annulment of general power of attorney authorizing
Conchita Evangelista (Eusebios daughter in his first marriage) to
administer the house and lot together with the apartments allegedly
acquired by petitioner and Eusebio during their conjugal partnership.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents due
to petitioners failure to adduce proof that said properties were
acquired during the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or
that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the lower
court ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and
that he has the capacity to administer them. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
HELD: Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife. However, the party who invokes this presumption must first
prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the
marriage.[12] Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition
sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership.[13] The party who asserts this presumption
must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption
refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not
operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired.[14] Moreover, this presumption in favor of
conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing
evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one
of the spouses.[15]
In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that
the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during
her marriage with Eusebio.
Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to
his second marriage is inconsequential. The property should be
regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law, pursuant to
Article 148[16] of the New Civil Code.
Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the
marriage, and brought to the marriage, is considered his or her
separate property.[17] Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to
properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either
spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or
donation.[18] Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebios acquisition
by succession of the land took place during his second marriage, the
land would still be his exclusive property because it was acquired by
him, during the marriage, by lucrative title.[19]
Tan v. Andrade, G.R. No. 171904, Aug 7, 2013
Facts: Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the registered owner of four
parcels of which she mortgaged to one Simon Diu, who foreclosed on
the same. When the redemption period was about to expire, Rosario
sought the assistance of Bobby Tan who agreed to redeem the
subject properties. Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and
her son, Proceso as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Proceso executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding to Bobby his
interests over the properties. The Deed of Assignment was signed by
Henry, one of Rosarios sons, as instrumental witness. Bobby
extended an Option to Buy the subject properties to Proceso, giving
the latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the
properties for the sum of P310,000. When Proceso failed to purchase
them, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the properties, and the
TCTs were issued in his name.
On October 7, 1997, Rosarios children, including Proceso and
Henry, filed a complaint for reconveyance and annulment of deeds
and damages against Bobby before the RTC. They alleged that the
initial transaction between Rosario and Bobby was actually an
equitable mortgage which was entered into to secure Rosarios
indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed that since the subject
properties were inherited by them from their father, the subject
properties were conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to
dispose of their respective shares.
The RTC dimissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA upheld the trial
courts ruling.
HELD: Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160
of the Civil Code38 which states that [a]ll property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. For this
presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must, however,
preliminarily prove that the property was indeed acquired during the
marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane
In this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario
and her husband was terminated upon the latters death on August 7,
197843 while the transfer certificates of title over the subject
properties were issued on September 28, 1979 and solely in the
name of Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino.44
Other than their bare allegation, no evidence was adduced by the
Andrades to establish that the subject properties were procured
during the coverture of their parents or that the same were bought
with conjugal funds. Moreover, Rosarios declaration that she is the
absolute owner of the disputed parcels of land in the subject deed of
sale45 was not disputed by her son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to
the same. Hence, by virtue of these incidents, the Court upholds the
RTCs finding46 that the subject properties were exclusive or sole
properties of Rosario.
(b) Acquired by gratuitous title during marriage,
FC 109 (2) of FC 113, FC 115
Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title;
Art. 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and
with designation of determinate shares, shall pertain to the donee-
spouses as his or her own exclusive property, and in the absence of
designation, share and share alike, without prejudice to the right of
accretion when proper. (150a)
Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs
and similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on gratuitous or
onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each case. (n)
Veloso v. Martinez, 28 Phil 255
Facts: Plaintiff commenced an action to recover of the defendant the
possession of a certain parcel of land together with the sum of P125
per month.
- Defendant answered and filed a counterclaim for services rendered
by the deceased to the plaintiff and recovery of certain jewelry
alleged to be in the possession in the plaintiff.
- The jewels in question before the possession of the same was
given to the plaintiff, belonged to the defendant personally and that
she had inherited the same from her mother.
- Defendant Lucia is the widow of Domingo Franco and after the
death of her husband she was appointed as the adminsitratrix.
- A short time before the death of Domingo he borrowed from plaintiff
money and gave as security the jewelry.
Issue: whether or not jewelry is conjugal property
Held: - It was contended that the jewelry was never delivered to
Plaintiff. It was shown that the key to the box where the jewelry was
kept remained with the deceased.
- Defendant now denies that she knew that her husband had pawned
her jewels or that she promised to redeem the same by paying the
amount due.
- Record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property
of the wife acquired from her mother. It is part of her paraphernal
property. As such she exercised dominion over the same.
- She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until
and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary
public, with the intent that the husband might administer it properly.
(Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she
had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for
any purpose.
Berciles v. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53, cf. FC 115
-Judge Pascual G. Berciles died on August 21, 1979, age 66. He
had GSIS pension for serving in the government for 36 yrs, of which
26 yrs were in judiciary. He was also entitled to other benefits from
his employer as well as return of the premium paid to GSIS. Such
benefits are now being claimed by 2 families
Iluminada Ponce of Ilocos Sur and her four children: filed an
application for survivors benefit as the legal spouse and legitimate
children of the late judge.
The other set of claimants are Flor Fuentebella and her 4 children:
filing their families claim through a letter.
The matter of these 2 conflicting claims was resolved as an
Administrative Matter. Based on this, the Court Administrator sent a
memorandum to GSIS to hold retirement papers of the late judge
until the payment of other benefits from employer are settled and that
an investigator is going to be assigned to determine the respective
claims of the supposed heirs.
Records of the retirement section of the administrative office of the
court showed that GSIS already approved the claim of Iluminada and
her children and that the check representing retirement gratuity has
been remitted to the Budget and Finance Office of the Court.
On February 4, 1981, Atty Cecilia Berciles, daughter in law
of deceased, together with Iluminada, submitted to the Court
Investigator additional documents to support their claim and the
following recommendation:
o (1) that the death benefit of the deceased be awarded to
Iluminada, to whom the deceased had been living with up to the time
of his death,
o (2) That the claim of Flor be denied for 2 reasons: (a) she
has not established her legitimate relationship with deceased, and (b)
she was not living with deceased at the time of his death as required
by rules and regulations of PD 626 (the legitimate spouse living with
the employee at the time of the employees death).
Flor did not submit any evidence of their filiation to the late judge in
spite of the telegram sent to them on February 5, 1981. The letter
submitted by Rhoda Berciles on behalf of her mother Flor on Oct 19,
1979 had no leg to stand on. There was not marriage contract or
certification from the Local Civil Registrar certifying that the deceased
was actually married to the late judge. The documents are mere
scrap of papers unworthy of credence since they did not prove any
family filiation.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Flor and her children are entitled to the
GSIS retirement benefit of the late Judge Pascual Berciles.
HELD: No.
1) The birth certificate of Pascual Voltaire Berciles, alleged
acknowledged natural child, is not signed by the late judge. It is ruled
that he did not intervene (i.e. there was no voluntary
acknowledgement on his part) and the mere putting of his name by
the mother or doctor is null and void.
2) The birth certificates of Maria, Mercy and Rhoda were also
had no intervention. Birth certificates, to evidence acknowledgement,
must under Section 5 of Act 3753, bear the signature under oath of
the acknowledging parents.
3) The sworn statement of Coronacion Berciles, sister in law
of the late judge, that her and her husband lived with the judge and
his wife Flor during the Japanese Occupation, was no proof that
there was filiation of the children of Flor with the late judge.
4) The pictures of Flor, judge and the children do not prove
family filiation. At most, the show the picture of a family without the
sanction of marriage.
5) The letter of the late judge to Mercy, her daughter with
Flor, indicating that its only her mother Flor and no other woman
deserve scant consideration since the late judge could not be
expected to admit there was another family. Moreso, the typewritten
letter signed by the father is not an authentic writing.
6) The testimony of Flor is self-serving; the testimony of
Concepcion Gonzales of her presence during the marriage of Flor
and Pascual, is deficient because she is blind; and the affidavit of
Judge Rafael Lavente being present in the wedding of Flor and
Pascual was repudiated.
7) Flor had been living abroad since 1972 and Iluminada and
the deceased have been living together at the time of the death of the
judge.
GSIS disposition of the retirement benefit (based on Republic Act
910) of late Judge Pascual G. Berciles was erroneous. GSIS granted
77/134 to surviving spouse, 10/134 to 4 legitimate children, 5/134 to
acknowledge natural child, and 4/134 to 3 illegitimate children. The
court ruled that GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion for
considering Pascual Voltaire Berciles as acknowledged nature child,
and Maria, Mercy and Rhoda as illegitimate children without
substantial evidence through competent and admissible proof of
acknowledgement of filiation by the late judge.
Iluminada and her children are the lawful heirs entitled to the
distribution of benefits and will be distributed in accordance with the
law on intestate and succession. Article 966 of the New Civil Code
states that: If a widow or widower and legitimate children of
descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in succession the
same share as that of each of the children. The court ruled to
divide the GSIS pension equally to 5 heirs (Iluminada and her 4
children) and one half of the retirement premium of P9,700 (being
conjugal) to Iluminada with the remaining half divided into 5
(Iluminada and her 4 children).
(c) Acquired by redemption/exchange,
FC 109(3), NCC 1601, 1619
Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each
spouse:
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by
exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses;
and
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of
the partition. (1035a)
Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs
if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donee
should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be
reduced as inofficious. (1036)
Plata v. Yatco, 12 SCRA 718
Facts: 1954 Amalia Plata (petitioner), who was single at the time,
purchased a parcel of land in Caloocan Rizal
February 13, 1958 petitioner sold the property to Celso Saldaa
September 24 1958 Saldaa resold the property to Plata, who was
now married to Gaudencio Begosa
On the same date, Plata mortgaged the property to Cesarea
Villanueva in consideration of a loan of P3,000.
- Platas husband, Begosa, signed the mortgage as a co-mortgator
April 12, 1960 For failure to pay the mortgage, the property was
extrajudicially foreclosed to the mortgagee as the highest bidder
Subsequently, respondent Villanueva sued Gaudencio Begosa
alone for illegal detainer and obtained final judgment against him in
the court of first instance
A writ of execution was duly issued, but Plata resisted all efforts to
eject her from the property claiming ownership of the said property
Upon motion of the judgment creditors, the court cited both Plata
and Begosa for contempt for refusing to vacate the said property
Issue: WON petitioner, Amalia Plata, is bound by the detainer
judgment against Goudencio Begosa.
Held/Ratio: NO. The respondents Villanueva could not ignore the
paraphernal character of the property in question, which had been
unquestionably acquired by Plata while still single. The subsequent
conveyance thereof to Celso Saldaa, and the reconveyance of her
several months afterward of the same property, did not transform it
from paraphernal to conjugal property, there being no proof that the
money paid to Saldaa came from common or conjugal funds.
Although Gaudencio Begosa signed the mortgage as a co-
mortgagor, by itself alone, that circumstance would not suffice to
convert the land into conjugal property, considering that it was
paraphernal in origin.
Since the property was paraphernal, and the creditors and
purchasers were aware of it, the fact being clearly spread on the land
records, it is plain that Plata's possession, therefore, was not derived
from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment against the
husband alone cannot bind nor affect the wife's possession of her
paraphernal, which by law she holds and administers independently,
and which she may even encumber or alienate without his knowledge
or consent.
(d) Purchased with exclusive money,
FC 109(4); of FC 118-119
Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each
spouse:
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or
of the husband. (148a)
Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from
exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from
conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership
was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if
such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case,
any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both
spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon
liquidation of the partnership. (n)
Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period
of time belongs to one of the spouses, the sums which may be
collected during the marriage in partial payments or by
installments on the principal shall be the exclusive property of the
spouse. However, interests falling due during the marriage on the
principal shall belong to the conjugal partnership. (156a, 157a)
(e) Properties of parents
Laurena v. CA, G.R. No. 159220, September 22, 2008
Facts: Darlene Laurena (petitioner) and Jesse Laurena
(respondent) were married on December 1983.
1993- Darlene filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against
respondent. Petitioner alleged respondent gave priority to the needs
of his parents, would come home past midnight and even tried to
convert her to his religion. Jesse stopped support since 1990 and
abandoned the conjugal home and stopped supporting the children.
Petitioner prayed for dissolution of CPG, custody of children and
support of 25k monthly.
1997- RTC denied the petition for nullity but dissolving the CPG and
declaring that all properties are conjugal. CA affirmed with
modification ruling of RTC. CA rejected the argument of respondent
that CPG must not be dissolved because marriage was not declared
null and void. CA excluded other properties that are not conjugal in
nature because it belonged to the respondent's parents.
ISSUE: WON properties excluded by the CA are conjugal?
HELD: No. CA is correct is exluding properties that are registered in
the name of respondent's parents. CA excluded ancestral house and
lot in Batangas.
The property at Batangas, although "sold" to respondent are still his
parents because it was proven that it was merely an accommodation
so that Darlene can acquire loan at the BSP using properties as
collateral. The gas station was managed by Jesse as atty in fact of
his mother.
Duplex house however is conjugal as there is no proof to provide
otherwise that it was obtained through the income of Jeddah Caltex
Station.
4. Administration of exclusive property
(a) By the spouse-owner, FC 110
Art. 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession,
administration and enjoyment of their exclusive properties.
Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the
administration of his or her exclusive property to the other by
means of a public instrument, which shall be recorded in the
registry of property of the place the property is located. (137a,
168a, 169a)
(b) By the other spouse,
FC 110(2); FC 142, 75, 227
Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of
either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other
spouse:
(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;
(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;
(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries
with it civil interdiction; or
(4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in
hiding as an accused in a criminal case.
If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence,
conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint
a suitable person to be the administrator. (n)
Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements,
agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal
partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any
other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when
the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute
community of property as established in this Code shall govern.
(119a)
Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration
of any of their properties to an unemancipated child, the net
proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child
shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not
less than that which the owner would have paid if the
administrator were a stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire
proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus give in
whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime.
(322a)
Veloso v. Martinez, 28 Phil 255, supra
Held: In view of the fact, however, that the record shows that the
jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from
her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume
that they constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such
paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same. (Article
1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and management of
the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband,
before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might
administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in
the record that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in
any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not be
deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her consent,
and without compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code above
cited.
Manotok Realty v. CA, 149 SCRA 372
Facts: MANOTOK REALTY, INC. V COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Felipe Madlangawa, respondent claims that he has been
occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de Tambunting de Legarda
Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being obtained from Andres
Ladores, then an overseer of the subdivision, with the understanding
that the respondent would eventually buy the lot.
- The owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate,
including her paraphernal properties covering the lot occupied by the
respondent were placed under custodia legis.
- Vicente Legarda, husband of Tambunting received the deposit of
respondent amounting to P1,500 for the lot
- Respondent had a remaining balance of P5,700 which he did not
pay or was unable to pay because the heirs of Tambunting could not
settle their differences.
- Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of
the estate and the respondent remained in possession of the lot in
question.
- Petitioner Manotok Realty, Inc. became the successful and vendee
of the Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision pursuant to the deeds of
sale executed in its favor by the Philippine Trust Company, as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda.
The lot in dispute was one of those covered by the sale. The Deed of
Sale provided for terms and conditions.
- Petitioner caused the publication of several notices in the Manila
Times and the Taliba advising the occupants to vacate their
respective premises, otherwise, court action with damages would
follow. This includes respondent among others who refused to vacate
the lots
- Trial Court dismissed the petitioner's action. CA ruled that the only
right remaining to the petitioner is to enforce the collection of the
balance because accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of its
predecessor (Don Vicente Legarda).
ISSUE: Whether Don Vicente Legarda could validly dispose of the
paraphernal property?
DECISION: NO. Decision of CA is reversed and set aside
RATIO: The record does not show that Don Vicente Legarda was
the administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara
Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be said
that the sale which was entered into by the private respondent and
Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the death of Clara
Tambunting and was entered into by the Don Vicente on behalf of
Clara Tambunting but was only consummated after her death.
Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly disposed of
the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of the paraphernal
properties of Dona Clara Tambunting.
Art. 136 NCC. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal
property.
Art. 137 NCC. The wife shall have the administration of the
paraphernal property, unless she delivers the same to the husband
by means of a public instrument empowering him to administer it.
In this case, the public instrument shall be recorded in the Registry of
Property. As for the movables, the husband shall give adequate
security.
The Court concluded that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and
the private respondent is void ab initio, the former being neither an
owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such being the case,
the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification by the Philippine
Trust Company or the probate court.
After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the
estate of Dona Clara Tambunting, he should have applied before the
probate court for authority to sell the disputed property in favor of the
private respondent. If the probate court approved the request, then
Don Vicente Legarda would have been able to execute a valid deed
of sale in favor of the respondent. But Don Vicente Legarda had no
effort to comply with the above-quoted rule of procedure nor on that
of the respondent to protect his interests or to pay the balance of the
installments to the court appointed administrator.
Ong v. CA, 204 SCRA 297
1961- Ramon Ong filed a complaint against Arsenio Camino to annul
action sale of a parcel of land allegedly owned conjugally by Ramon
and Teodoro Ong.
Said auction was done bec. of judgment rendered in favor of
Francisco Boix, ordering Teodora Ong to pay the former 2.8l.
Teodora Ong had her own logging business. The loan from Francisco
Boix was secured by her for the same. Teodora defaulted, Boix sued
her and won. Sherriff Arsenio Camino levied on the property under
the sole name of Teodora Ong in a tax declaration.
RTC denied motion of Ramon. CA affirmed decision of RTC.
ISSUE: WON auction sale of the property in dispute is null and void
because of its conjugal nature which the wife cannot legally bind?
HELD: No. The lot is paraphernal. The mere use of the surname of
the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property is not
sufficient proof to hold that said property was acquired during the
marriage and is therefore conjugal.
It is not properly proved that the property was acquired during the
marriage. PNB v CA "When the property is registered in the name of
the spouse and there is no showing as to when the property was
acquired by said spouse, there is an indication that the property
belongs exclusively to said spouse".
Further, even if the property is conjugal, it may still be levied upon
since the profits of the business of the wife redounds to the benefit of
the family.
5. Encumbrance/disposition of exclusive property
FC 111-112, of FC 236, amended by RA 6809
See R.A. No. 10572, amending FC 111
Art. 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or
otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property, without the
consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate
with regard to the same. (n)
Art. 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse
administered by the other automatically terminates the
administration over such property and the proceeds of the
alienation shall be turned over to the owner-spouse. (n)
Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental
authority over the person and property of the child who shall then
be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. (412a)
Amended: Art. 111. Either spouse may mortgage, encumber,
alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property.
Wong et al. v. IAC 200 SCRA 792
Facts: Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had
3 children however, even during the early years of their marriage, the
spouses had been most of the time living separately. During the
marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of
land in Angeles from his father using the money borrowed from an
officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement
with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the former pieces of
jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the same
within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value.
Katrina issued in September 1972, check of P55,000 which was
dishonored due to lack of funds. The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky
Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina
and her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was
only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then
a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles
City all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson.
2 of the lots were sold at public auction to Juanito Santos and the
other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such redemption,
Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision including the
writ and levy of execution.
ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband
can be satisfied through the conjugal property.
HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into
the business deal with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with
the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into
such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage
with unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay
the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership
in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the
husband and even though they had been living separately. A wife
may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things
necessary for support of the family. The writ of execution cannot be
issued against Romarico and the execution of judgments extends
only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The conjugal
properties cannot answer for Katrinas obligations as she exclusively
incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor they did
redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence
submitted that the administration of the partnership had been
transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said obligations were
incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as
Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong
may still execute the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.
6. What constitutes CPG
(a) Definition, FC 106
Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the
husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds,
products, fruits and income from their separate properties and
those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or
by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both
spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise
agreed in the marriage settlements. (142a)
(b) Presumption of CPG, FC 116
Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered
in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved. (160a)
Dewara v. Lamela, G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011
Facts: - Eduardo Dewara and Elenita Dewara married before the FC
took effect, separated in fact because Elenita worked in California,
Eduardo in Bacolod
-1985 Eduardo, while driving jeep, hit Lamela, who filed and won a
case ofbserious physical injuries against Eduardo
Court ordered Eduardo to pay 62k as civil indemnity and 10k as
moral damages
-Eduardo could not pay so the sheriff levied a parcel of land
registered under Elenitas name, which was bought by Lamela at a
public auction
- Elenitas attorney-in-fact claimed that land was paraphernal
property of Elenita and could not be used to pay for personal
liabilities of her husband
- Respondents claim that property was conjugal as it was bought
using Eduardos money, Elenita being a simple housewife
at the time of purchase of the land
- RTC declared property as paraphernal and ruled in favor of the
petitioner, tracing the ownership of the property to Elenitas
grandfather, Exequiel Magallanes, and was sold to her by her father
and her aunt for a much lower price, indicating that it
was a donation to Elenita alone
- CA reversed the decision, claiming that Eduardo and Elenita
acquired the property during their marriage
HELD: All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife.[21] Registration in the name of the
husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption.[22] The
separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without judicial
approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal nature.[23] Moreover, the presumption of conjugal
ownership applies even when the manner in which the property was
acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an
essential requirement for the presumption to arise.[24]
There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by
spouses Elenita and Eduardo during their marriage. It is also
undisputed that their marital relations are governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains, since they were married before the enactment
of the Family Code and they did not execute any prenuptial
agreement as to their property relations. Thus, the legal presumption
of the conjugal nature of the property applies to the lot in question.
The presumption that the property is conjugal property may be
rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical, and convincing
evidencethere must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one
of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party
asserting it.
De La Pena v. Avila, G.R. No. 187490, Feb. 8, 2012
Facts: May 1996- Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila a loan in the
sum of 250k which was payable on or before July 7, 1996. Antonia
mortgaged the property.
1997- Antonia executed Deed of Sale over the property in favor of
Gemma Avila for 600k. Avila became the owner of the property.
November 1997- Gemma used the said property as collateral in favor
of Far East bank to secure loan of 1.2M.
March 1998- Antonia filed Affidavit of Adverse Claim, stating that she
was the lawful owner of the property in the name of Gemma and that
the Deed of Abs. Sale between her and Gemma was simulated.
Gemma failed to pay the loan. Far East caused for the foreclosure of
the property, it was auction and Far East bought it as the highest
bidder.
May 1998- Antonia filed annulment of deed of sale against Gemma
stating as ground that the sale was not consented by her husband
Antegono who had already died.
RTC found property to be conjugal in nature and the DOAS issued
for Gemma was void. CA reversed the decision. The property was
paraphernal in nature for failure of Antonia to properly present
evidence.
HELD: Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership, proof of
acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.[31]
In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals,[32] this Court
categorically ruled as follows:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove
that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage.
Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove
said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to
the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate
when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal
was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is
rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there
must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses.[33]
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article
160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Peas did not even come close to
proving that the subject property was acquired during the marriage
between Antonia and Antegono. Beyond Antonias bare and
uncorroborated assertion that the property was purchased when she
was already married,[34] the record is bereft of any evidence from
which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained.
When queried about the matter during his cross-examination, even
Alvin admitted that his sole basis for saying that the property was
owned by his parents was Antonias unilateral pronouncement to the
effect.[35] Considering that the presumption of conjugality does not
operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired,[36] we find that the CA cannot be faulted for
ruling that the realty in litigation was Antonias exclusive property.
Quiao v. Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012
HELD: Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the
operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386)
and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property
relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. Article 119 of the
Civil Code provides: Art. 119. The future spouses may in the
marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of
property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other
regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same
are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
(c) What are included in CPG, FC 117, 115,
118, 119, 120 Memorize!
Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of
either or both of the spouses;
(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during
the marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits
from the exclusive property of each spouse;
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the
law awards to the finder or owner of the property where the
treasure is found;
(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or
hunting;
(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in
excess of the number of each kind brought to the marriage by
either spouse; and
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from
gambling or betting. However, losses therefrom shall be borne
exclusively by the loser-spouse. (153a, 154a, 155, 159)
Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities,
usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on
gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each
case. (n)
Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period
of time belongs to one of the spouses, the sums which may be
collected during the marriage in partial payments or by
installments on the principal shall be the exclusive property of the
spouse. However, interests falling due during the marriage on the
principal shall belong to the conjugal partnership. (156a, 157a)
Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or
adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses at the
expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either
or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to
the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules:
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal
partnership and any resulting increase in value are more than the
value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire
property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement;
otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the
owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of
the improvement.
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be
vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at the time
of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. (158a)
Villanueva v. CA, 427 SCRA 439
1. Eusebia is the legal wife of Nicolas having been married to the
latter on October 7, 1926.
2. Out of the said marriage they begot 5 children. During their
marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements.
3. Nicolas is also a co-owner of a parcel of land which he inherited
from his parents as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares.
4. In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his family and cohabited with
Pacita wherein Procopio is their illegitimate son.
5. Nicolas then was the only person who received the income of the
properties. Pacita from the time she lived in concubinage with
Nicolas, has no occupation and had no properties of her own.
6. Nicolas suffered stroke and cannot talk and walk anymore.
7. Natividad knew of Nicolas physical condition visited him at the
hospital. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present,
Procopio, the illegitimate son was the one who receives the income
from the said properties.
8. Natividad went to Procopio to discuss about the properties. And
the latter replied that it is not yet time to talk about the said matter.
9. Eusebia filed a complaint against her husband Nicolas, Pacita and
Procopio. She sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita
several properties claiming that said properties are conjugal
properties with Nicolas.
10. Eusebia died in 1996.
Issue: WoN the subject properties are conjugal
Held: YES. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships
govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if
they were married before the effectivity of Family Code.[17]
Article 105[18] of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family
Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the
Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if
the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is
that they are conjugal.
B Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired
during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under
Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal
properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. The burden is on petitioners to
prove that the subject properties are not conjugal. The presumption
in Article 116, which subsists unless the contrary is proved, stands
as an obstacle to any claim the petitioners may have. The burden of
proving that a property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on the
party asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and
convincing.[26] Petitioners failed to meet this standard.
3. The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for
a long period, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage.[33]Otherwise, the law would be giving a stamp of approval
to an act that is both illegal and immoral. What petitioners fail to
grasp is that Nicolas and Pacitas cohabitation cannot work to the
detriment of Eusebia, the legal spouse. The marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was
already living with Pacita. Hence, all property acquired from 7
October 1926, the date of Nicolas and Eusebias marriage, until 23
November 1996, the date of Eusebias death, are still presumed
conjugal. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that any of the
subject properties was acquired outside or beyond this period.
Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154
Mendoza v. Reyes and CA
GR No. L-31618, August 17, 1983 Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Facts:
1961: Wife sold 2 parcels of land while her husband was absent
attending his farm in Pampanga. They were living separately and not
in speaking terms.
Ponciano filed complaint with CFI Rizal for the annulment of a DoS
of 2 parcels of land with improvements, executed by his wife as
vendor, and Spouses Mendoza as vendees.
o Lands are conjugal properties sold without his knowledge or
consent
o CFI declared lands as exclusive and paraphernal properties of wife
CA reversed CFI
Issue: WoN properties in question are conjugal properties of
Ponciano and Julia
Held: he applicable provision of law is Article 153 of the Civil Code
which provides:
ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage
at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for
the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
xxx xxx xxx
The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must also be
overcome by one who contends that the disputed property is
paraphernal Article 160 provides:
ART. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife.
The presumption is a strong one. As stated in Camia de Reyes v.
Reyes de Ilano (63 Phil. 629, 639), "it is sufficient to prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage in order that the same
may be deemed conjugal property." And in Laluan v. Malpaya (65
SCRA 494, 504) we stated, "proof of acquisition of the property in
dispute during the marriage suffices to render the statutory
presumption operative."
There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by
onerous title during the marriage.
Aguete v. PNB, G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011
FACTS: Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed acomplaint for
annulment against PNB before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Jose Ros previously obtained a loan in the amount of P115,000.00
from PNB and as security, a real estate mortgage over a parcel of
land with TCT. No. T-9646 was executed. Upon maturity, the loan
remained unpaid and an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the
mortgaged property was instituted by PNB. After the lapse of a year,
the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB.
Estrella Aguete, claiming she had no knowledge of the said loan nor
the mortgage constituted on the land which is part of their conjugal
property, contested the transactions and filed for an annulment of the
proceedings. She interposed in her defense that the signatures
affixed on the documents were forged and that the proceeds of the
loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
RTC ruled for the spouses, stating that Aguete may during their
marriage and within ten years from the transaction mentioned, may
ask the court for an annulment of the case. On notice of appeal by
PNB, Court of Appeals reversed this ruling and found for PNB,
stating that forgery was concluded without adequate proof. It also
found that the loan was used in the expansion of the family business.
HELD: The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the appellate
court.
Art 153, 160, 161
The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage.
The subject property is thus considered part of the conjugal
partnership of gains. The pertinent articles of the Civil Code provide:
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property
without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the
husband do so, then the contract is voidable.17 Article 173 of the
Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros encumbrance of the
subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that
the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will
be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.
In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court
and rule that Aguete gave her consent to Ros encumbrance of the
subject property.
The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a
notary public, hence they are public documents.
(d) If property bought by installments,
FC Art. 118
Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from
exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from
conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership
was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if
such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case,
any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both
spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon
liquidation of the partnership. (n)
Jovellanos v. CA, G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992
Facts: Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a lease and
conditional sale agreement of a property. At that time, Daniel
Jovellanos was still married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three
children, the petitioners herein. Leonor Dizon died on January 2,
1959. On May 30, 1967, Daniel married private respondent Annette
H. Jovellanos.On January 8, 1975, with the lease amounts having
been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of
absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein
petitioners (children from 1st wife) the lot and bungalow. On
September 8, 1985, Daniel Jovellanos died.
Second wife (respondent) Annette H. Jovellanos claimed that the
property was acquired by Daniel while their marriage was still
subsisting, by virtue of the deed of absolute sale dated January 8,
1975, and thus formed part of the conjugal partnership of the second
marriage. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the property
was acquired by their parents during the existence of the first
marriage under their lease and conditional sale agreement with
Philamlife of September 2, 1955.
ISSUE: Whether the property belongs to the conjugal partnership of
the first or the second marriage
HELD: The property belongs to the second marriage.
The contract entered into by Daniel and Philamlife is specifically
denominated as a "Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement" with a
lease period of twenty years. During the twenty-year period, Daniel
had only the right of possession over the property. The lessor
transfers merely the temporary use and enjoyment of the thing
leased. Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, however,
the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the
price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect.
The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those established by law, and,
under the contract, Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not possess or
enjoy such rights of ownership. The deed of absolute sale was
executed in 1975 by Philamlife, only after full payment of the rentals.
Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was
vested in Daniel Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already
married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged
to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife.
The lower courts correctly ordered that reimbursements should be
made to the children of the first marriage in line with the pertinent
provision of Article 118 of the Family Code that "any amount
advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be
reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the
partnership."
(e) Credits due, FC 119
Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period
of time belongs to one of the spouses, the sums which may be
collected during the marriage in partial payments or by
installments on the principal shall be the exclusive property of the
spouse. However, interests falling due during the marriage on the
principal shall belong to the conjugal partnership. (156a, 157a)
(f) Improvements on CPG property, FC 120
Munoz, Jr. v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010
Facts: Respondent-spouses mortgaged a residential lot (which the
wife inherited) to the GSIS to secure a housing loan (200k).
Thereafter, they used the money loaned to construct a residential
house on said lot.
It is alleged that MUNOZ granted the spouses a 600k loan, which the
latter used to pay the debt to GSIS. The balance of the loan (400k)
will be delivered by MUNOS upon surrender of the title over the
property and an affidavit of waiver of rights (over the property) to be
executed by the husband. While the spouses were able to turn over
the title, no affidavit was signed by the husband. Consequently,
MUNOZ refused to give the 400k balance of the loan and since the
spouses could no longer return the 200k (which was already paid to
GSIS), MUNOZ kept the title over the property and subsequently,
caused the issuance of a new one in his own name.
The spouses then filed a case for the annulment of the purported
sale of the property in favor of MUNOZ. The RTC ruled that the
property was the wifes exclusive paraphernal property (since she
inherited it from her father) and as such, the sale is valid even without
the husbands consent.
The CA reversed and ruled that while the property was originally
exclusive paraphernal property of the wife, it became conjugal
property when it was used as a collateral for a housing loan that was
paid through conjugal funds. Hence, the sale is void.
HELD: As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the
Civil Code, provides the solution in determining the ownership of the
improvements that are made on the separate property of the
spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or
efforts of either or both spouses. Under this provision, when the cost
of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than
the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire
property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of
the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said
property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse,
likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.[41]
In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the
GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions. From April 6, 1989[42]
to April 30, 1992,[43] Eliseo paid about P60,755.76,[44] not the entire
amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest, since the petitioner
advanced the P176,445.27[45] paid by Erlinda to cancel the
mortgage in 1992. Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS
housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the
residential lot is considerably more than the P60,755.76 amount paid
by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions.
Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal
property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the petitioner; the
written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. The
NBI finding that Eliseos signatures in the special power of attorney
and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.
Padilla v. Padilla, October 4, 1943
Facts: Narciso Padilla and Concepcion Paterno (had big
contribution to the conjugal-house, jewels) were married.
Narciso died. Having no children, he executed a will giving his
whole estate to his mother, Isabel Bibby vda. De Padilla. 7 pieces of
the real estate are in controversy since the remaining 10 were left by
Narciso as part of the conjugal partnership
Concepcion filed a petition praying that her paraphernal property be
segregated from the inventoried estate and delivered to her; that she
be given of the conjugal partnership property and that the
usufructuary right over of the portion pertaining to the heir
CFI ordered that certain pieces of real estate property , jewelry and
cash were paraphernal and as such should be delivered to
Concepcion
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties in question are conjugal owing
to the improvements made which came from conjugal funds; whether
or not improvements made on the paraphernal properties could be
reimbursed to the wife
HELD: Art. 1404 (2) of the Spanish Code provides that the
improvements made on the separate property of the spouses through
advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either
the husband or wife, belong to the conjugal partnership.
Based on the above provision, the ownership of the land is retained
by the wife until she is paid the value of the lot, as a result of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Mere construction of a
building from common funds does not automatically convey the
ownership of the wifes land to the conjugal partnership.
Subsequently, the conjugal partnership is not bound to pay any rent
during the occupation of the wifes land. Before the payment of the
value of land is made from the common funds, all the increase or
decrease in its value must be for her benefit or loss and she can only
demand payment after the conjugal partnership is liquidated.
Furthermore, the wife should not be allowed to demand payment of
the lot during the marriage and before liquidation because this would
disturb the husbands management of the conjugal partnership.
Applying Art. 1386 of the Spanish Code which reads, the personal
obligations of the husband cannot be enforced against the fruits of
the paraphernal property, unless it is proven that they redounded to
the benefit of the family, said amount cannot be applied to the
conjugal partnership and should be paid by the husband alone.
While it is true that under Art. 1408, all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband during the marriage are chargeable to
against the conjugal partnership, Art. 1386 is an exception and
exempts the fruits of the paraphernal property from the payment of
the personal obligations of the husband unless there is proof that the
redounded to the benefit of the family. In this case, it clearly did not
and as a result, they should be taken from the husbands funds.
If the conjugal partnership assets are derived almost entirely, if not
entirely, from the fruits of the paraphernal property.
Padilla v. Paterno, December 26, 1961
Narciso Padilla died, leaving a childless widow Concepcion
Paterno, whom he had married in 1912. In his last will, Narciso
declared his mother, Isabel Bibby vda De Padilla as universal heiress
Paterno filed a civil case for the delivery of her paraphernal property
with reimbursements and indemnities as well as of the conjugal
property as her share, as she is the surviving spouse.
The court declared certain personal and real properties as
paraphernal. Other realties, although originally paraphernal, were
considered part of the conjugal assets. Padilla contested; the RTC
partially granted her claim.
SC upheld the same despite Padillas appeals. The same year,
Paterno died and was survived by her testate heirs and legatees
RTC judge approved the majority of the commissioners report
except that he declared: 1. Lot on J. Luna St. was conjugal; 2. The
usufruct of the widow shall be constituted on the 1/3 estate
Vda. De Padilla submitted an accounting of the credit balances of
the estate for the years 1951-1953 but objected to the accounting of
the fruits of the properties declared as paraphernal because 1. Said
properties were actually conjugal, subject only to paraphernal claims
and; 2. Their income belonged to the conjugal estate and had been
periodically divided between Padilla and Paternos estate
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties included in the estate
are paraphernal in character and that all their income belongs to
widow Paterno
HELD: Paterno is the sole owner of those properties that never
became conjugal since the conjugal improvements on the subject
properties were destroyed before they could be reimbursed to the
widow Paterno. Paterno is also the sole owner of all their income
that accured during their administration by Vda. De Padilla until they
were finally delivered to the estate of Paterno minus the
administration expenses incurred by Vda. De Padilla with respect to
these properties.
As to the above properties, their conversion from paraphernal to
conjugal assets should be deemed to retroact to the time the
conjugal buildings were first constructed thereon or at the very latest,
to the time immediately before the death of Narciso A. Padilla that
ended the conjugal partnership. They can not be considered to have
become conjugal property only as of the time their values were paid
to the estate of the widow Concepcion Paterno because by that time
the conjugal partnership no longer existed and it could not acquire
the ownership of said properties. The acquisition by the partnership
of these properties was, under the 1943 decision, subject to the
suspensive condition that their values would be reimbursed to the
widow at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership; once paid, the
effects of the fulfillment of the condition should be deemed to retroact
to the date the obligation was constituted (Art. 1187, New Civil
Code). As a consequence, all the fruits of these properties, after the
dissolution of the partnership by the death of the husband, until final
partition, logically belonged to the universal heir of said husband (his
mother Isabel Bibby) and to the surviving widow in co-ownership,
share and share alike. As there has been periodical equal distribution
between these two parties of the current income of the estate, there
is no need for the executrix-appellant to make any new accounting
for the fruits of these properties.
Coungco v. Flores, 82 Phil. 284
Held: Under article 361, Civil Code, which is the general rule on
accession, the owner of the land becomes the owner of the
improvements after payment of the value of said improvements. The
land is the principal and the improvements are the accessory, and
the latter therefore belong to the owner of the principal (articles 353,
358, Civil Code). Article 1404, paragraph 2, Civil Code, however, is
admittedly an exception to articles 358 and 361, Civil Code
Under the specific provision of article 1404, paragraph 2, Civil Code,
the building constructed by the partnership is the principal and the lot
of either spouse is the accessory. Hence the lot, which is the
accessory, follows the ownership of the principal, which is the
conjugal partnership property, and the spouse owning the lot is only
entitled to the payment of its value
Ordinarily the improvements do not increase in value with time, but
on the contrary they greatly depreciate in value. The conjugal
partnership, therefore, would not benefit by any increase in value of
the property, because any such increase would really be due to the
lot. The value of property may increase or decrease from the time of
constructing the buildings. If it decreases, the loss would be suffered
by the conjugal partnership. If it increases, the benefit should also
inure or accrue to the conjugal partnership and not to one spouse
alone. The increase is not to be enjoyed by one spouse alone,
because said increase is conjugal, and both spouses share in the
increase by an equal one-half.
7. Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this
Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by
the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of
them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or
minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during
the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete
a professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in
favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive
purpose of commencing or completing a professional or
vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is
found to groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing
liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties. (161a)
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as
they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon
them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either
spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities
imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children
of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article
have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of
the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged
for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned. (163a)
Mariano v. CA, 174 SCRA 59
Facts: The proceedings originated from a suit filed by Esther
Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano in the Court of First Instance at
Caloocan City, for recovery of the value of ladies' ready made
dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter.
Judgement was ruled in favor of Sanchez. Pending approval of the
record on appeal, Lourdes Mariano filed a motion for the immediate
execution of the judgment which the Court granted. 10 In virtue of the
writ of execution which afterwards issued in due course, the sheriff
garnished the sum of P 11,000.00 from Veritas Insurance Company,
and levied on real and personal property belonging to the conjugal
partnership of Esther Sanchez and her husband, Daniel Sanchez.
Daniel Sanchez, Esthers husband, filed a complaint for annulment of
the execution in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City in his
capacity as administrator of the conjugal partnership. QC Court ruled
to desist the sheriff from auctioning the property. CA ordered the QC
C from interfering but sooned dismissed her petition, hence this case.
ISSUE: WON Daniel Sanchez can file a case
HELD: In the case at bar, the husband of the judgment debtor cannot
be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against
his wife. In any case, whether by intervention in the court issuing the
writ, or by separate action, it is unavailing for either Esther Sanchez
or her husband, Daniel, to seek preclusion of the enforcement of the
writ of possession against their conjugal assets. For it being
established, as aforestated, that Esther had engaged in business
with her husband's consent, and the income derived therefrom had
been expended, in part at least, for the support of her family, the
liability of the conjugal assets to respond for the wife's obligations in
the premises cannot be disputed.
Ayala v. CA, 286 SCRA 272
Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00
loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation
(AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security
agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly
and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM
failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and
Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests.
Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution.
Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance
and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on
3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses
filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did
not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA
issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving
way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal
properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only
bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the
husband alone is considered for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership and is it chargeable.
HELD: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and
benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the
debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a
personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the
fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity.
Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching
as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the
money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or
services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for
the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan
contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is
certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not
embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not
be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the
benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a
benefit for the family may have resulted when the guarantee was in
favor of Chings employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of
shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated
in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the
loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself.
Ching v. CA, 423 SCRA 356
Facts: Alfredo Ching was the Vice President of Philippine Blooming
Mills Company, PBMC obtained a loan with Allied Bank, wherein AC
executed a continuing guarantee with the bank binding himself to
jointly and severally guarantee the loan. PBMC defaulted. A
collection for sum of money was filed against PBMC and AC wherein
a preliminary attachment was issued against the 100,000 shares
owned by H in Citycorp Investment Co. Encarnacion Ching, wife of
Alfredo, contends that since the shares were purchased with conjugal
funds, and that the loan did not contribute to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, it should be released.
Issue: Whether or not the shares should be released.
Ruling: Yes. For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that
should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that
some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a
conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain
alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New
Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well
being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the
power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial
stability of the conjugal partnership.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal
partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-
husbands act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI.
The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the
PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be
inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into
an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal
partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was
burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal
partnership.[63]
Homeowners v. Dailo, G.R. No. 153802, Mar.11, 2005
Facts: Miguela and Marcelino were married on August 8, 1967.
During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot. In
1993, Miarcelino executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of
Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from
petitioner Homeowners Saving and Loan Bank to be secured by the
spouses house and lot. Upon maturity, the loan remained
outstanding and the property was extra judicially foreclosed and sold
to the petitioner as the highest bidder. Marcelino subsequently died
and Muguela discovered the sale and mortgage constituted on the
subject property.
Issue: Whether or not the conjugal partnership (CP) is liable for the
payment of the loan obtained by the late H.
Held: No. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of
conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) governed the relations between
H and W as they were married prior to the adoption of the Family
Code. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the
absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse,
any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be
void. The rules on co-ownership do not apply to the property relations
of H and W even in a suppletory manner.
The regime of CPG is a special type of partnership. Unlike in
absolute community of property where the rules on co-ownership
apply in a suppletory manner, the CP shall be governed by the rules
on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in the chapter on CPG or by the spouses in
their marriage settlements.
The CP is not liable. Under article 121 section 3 of the Family Code,
the CP shall be liable for debts and obligations contracted by the
other spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have been benefited; However, it must be clearly shown
that the loan obtained redounded to the benefit of the family. In this
case, there was nothing from the records to compel a finding that the
loan obtained redounded to the benefit of the family. Whether or not
payment of the principal obligation on the mortgage should be made
by the conjugal partnership.
Ando v. Campo, G.R. No. 184007, February 16, 2011
Facts: Petitioner was the president of PACSI, an independent labor
contractor. Respondents were hired by PACSI as pilers or haulers.
They filed a case for illegal dismissal and some money claims with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
The Labor Arbiter ruled in respondents favor. To answer for the
monetary award, NLRC issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of
Personal Property over the property in the name of Paquito V. Ando
x x x married to Erlinda S. Ando.
Petitioner then filed an action for prohibition and damages with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Petitioner claimed that the property
belonged to him and his wife, not to the corporation, and, hence,
could not be subject of the execution sale. The RTC denied
petitioners prayer for a TRO, holding that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The CA affirmed the RTC
Order.
HELD: There is no doubt in our mind that petitioners complaint is a
third- party claim within the cognizance of the NLRC. Petitioner may
indeed be considered a third party in relation to the property subject
of the execution vis--vis the Labor Arbiters decision. There is no
question that the property belongs to petitioner and his wife, and not
to the corporation. It can be said that the property belongs to the
conjugal partnership, not to petitioner alone. Thus, the property
belongs to a third party, i.e., the conjugal partnership. At the very
least, the Court can consider that petitioners wife is a third party
within contemplation of the law.
The TCT[28] of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs to
petitioner and his wife. Thus, even if we consider petitioner as an
agent of the corporation and, therefore, not a stranger to the case
such that the provision on third-party claims will not apply to him, the
property was registered not only in the name of petitioner but also of
his wife. She stands to lose the property subject of execution without
ever being a party to the case. This will be tantamount to deprivation
of property without due process.
(a) With consent
G-Tractors v. CA, 135 SCRA 192 (supra)
FACTS: Luis R. Narciso, legally married to Josefina Narciso, is a
businessman engaged in business as a producer and exporter of
Philippine mahogany logs and operates a logging concession at del
Gallego, Camarines Sur. G-Tractors, Inc. is a domestic corporation
engaged primarily in the business of leasing heavy equipments such
as tractors, bulldozers, and the like.
Luis entered into a Contract of Hire of Heavy Equipment with G-
Tractors under the terms of which the latter leased to the former. The
contract provided for payment of rental for the use of said tractors.
Luis Narciso failed to pay; G-Tractors instituted an action urging Luis
to pay a certain amount (P155,410.25), representing the unpaid
rentals. G-Tractors accepted his offer for a compromise agreement,
Luis failed to comply; Levy was accordingly made by the City Sheriff
of QC on certain personal properties of the spouses at their
residence in Quezon City. Auction sale was held, and G-Tractors was
awarded with the sale of such.
On February 12, 1975, the Sheriff of Quezon City made a levy on "all
rights, interest, title, participation which the defendant Luis R.
Narciso" may have over a parcel of residential land of the Registry of
Deeds of QC which parcel of land is allegedly the conjugal property
of the spouses Luis and Josefina. Sheriff sold at public auction to the
highest bidder for cash. Certificate of Sale was then issued to G-
Tractors as the highest bidder for P180,000.On March 31, 1976,
Josefina and Luis filed a complaint in CFI QC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal property of the spouses can be
held answerable for the debt of the husband
HELD: YES, the conjugal property of the spouses can be held
answerable for the debt of the husband. CAs decision reversed and
set aside
Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal
partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All the debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife,
also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind
the partnership
His account with petitioner G-Tractors, Inc. represents rentals for the
use of petitioner's tractors which he leased for the purpose of
constructing switchroads and hauling felled trees at the jobsite of the
logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur which is not his
exclusive property but that of his family. There is no doubt then that
his account with the petitioner was brought about in order to enhance
the productivity of said logging business, a commercial enterprise for
gain which he had the right to embark the conjugal partnership.
It is very clear, therefore, that the obligations were contracted in
connection with his legitimate business as a producer and exporter in
mahogany logs and certainly benefited the conjugal partnership.
The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and as
long as he believes he is doing right to his family, he should not be
made to suffer and answer alone. So that, if he incurs an
indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or
suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership must
equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he deliberately
acted to the prejudice of his family.
Ong v. CA, 204 SCRA 297
Facts: The record shows that on November 16, 1961, Ramon C. Ong
filed a complaint against defendants Arsenio Camino as Deputy
Sheriff of Camarines Norte and Francisco Boix, to annul the auction
sale of a parcel of land, allegedly owners conjugally by plaintiff and
his former wife Teodora B. Ong, awarded in favor of Boix, as highest
bidder, in an auction sale conducted.
The other argument advanced by the petitioner is that the subject
property is really conjugal which the wife in the case at bar could not
legally bind, and considering that the indebtedness was contracted
by the wife only, the levy of the subject property not owned
exclusively by the wife owned jointly with the husband is improper.
Petitioner stresses heavily on the fact that since the surname "Ong"
(which is the surname of the husband Ramon C. Ong) was carried by
Teodora in the aforesaid declaration, that indicates that the subject
property was acquired during the marriage. By reason thereof, the
property in dispute is presumed to be owned jointly by both spouses.
ISSUE: The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax
declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof that said
property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal.
It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in
the wife's name, but the house built thereon was declared in the
name of the spouses. Furthermore, even assuming for the sake of
argument that the property in dispute is conjugal, the same may still
be held liable for the debts of the wife in this case.
Under Art. 117 of the Civil Code, the wife may engage in business
although the husband may object (but subject to certain conditions).
It is clear from the records that the wife was engaged in the logging
business with the husband's knowledge and apparently without any
objection on his part. The acts of the husband show that he gave his
implied consent to the wife's engagement in business.
After all, whatever profits are earned by the wife from her business
go to the conjugal partnership. It would only be just and equitable that
the obligations contracted by the wife in connection with her business
may also be chargeable not only against her paraphernal property
but also against the conjugal property of the spouses.
Ayala Investment v. CA, G.R. No. 118305, Feb. 12, 1998, supra
HELD: Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that
the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of
the family.
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan
is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is
certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of
administration for the benefit of the family.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another
person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as
falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit
of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a
contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish
benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Security Bank v. Mar Tiera Corp., G.R. No. 143382, Nov. 29, 2006
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C.
Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with
petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company. Petitioner approved the
application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent
corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by
individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and
Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with
respondent corporation for the payment of the loan.
Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it
suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner
filed a complaint against respondent corp and individual respondents.
RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of
respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez including
the conjugal house and lot of the spouses but it found that it did not
redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the
attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.
Petitioner appealed to CA. It affirmed RTC decision. Petitioned to SC.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an
indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a
third party
HELD: No. SC upheld the CA. Under Article 161(1) of the CC, the
conjugal partnership is liable for all debts and obligations contracted
by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another
person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor,
the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family.
In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement
between petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the
benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity
agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the
obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the
latters benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It
failed to discharge that burden.
Aguete v. PNB, G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011
FACTS: Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed acomplaint for
annulment against PNB before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Jose Ros previously obtained a loan in the amount of P115,000.00
from PNB and as security, a real estate mortgage over a parcel of
land with TCT. No. T-9646 was executed. Upon maturity, the loan
remained unpaid and an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the
mortgaged property was instituted by PNB. After the lapse of a year,
the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB.
Estrella Aguete, claiming she had no knowledge of the said loan nor
the mortgage constituted on the land which is part of their conjugal
property, contested the transactions and filed for an annulment of the
proceedings. She interposed in her defense that the signatures
affixed on the documents were forged and that the proceeds of the
loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
RTC ruled for the spouses, stating that Aguete may during their
marriage and within ten years from the transaction mentioned, may
ask the court for an annulment of the case. On notice of appeal by
PNB, Court of Appeals reversed this ruling and found for PNB,
stating that forgery was concluded without adequate proof. It also
found that the loan was used in the expansion of the family business.
HELD: The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the appellate
court.
Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of
the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.26]
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property
without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the
husband do so, then the contract is voidable.17 Article 173 of the
Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros encumbrance of the
subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that
the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will
be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.
In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court
and rule that Aguete gave her consent to Ros encumbrance of the
subject property.
The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a
notary public, hence they are public documents.
(b) Without consent
Costuna v. Domondon, 180 SCRA 333
Facts: Spouses Amadeo and Estela Costuna acquired three parcels
of land during their marriage.
Amadeo went to Samar and never came back to his wife.
Amadeo filed a petition for the partition of properties, with the
Juvenile Domestic and Relations Court. Because he failed to get
Estelas consent to the partition despite repeated demands/requests,
Amadeo was constrained to sell half of the undetermined portion of
the conjugal property, without the wifes consent. It was sold to
Laureana Domondon. Amadeo died. Estela instituted a special
proceeding for the allowance of Amadeos Will. However, Domondon
opposed it, claiming that half of the conjugal property was already
sold to her by Amadeo prior to his death. The probate court did not
rule on this, but it allowed the will.
Domondon filed a case with the RTC to compel Estela to comply with
the Deed of Sale executed by Amadeo before his death, that is, to
convey to Domondon the properties already sold to her. The RTC
ruled in favour of Domondon. Estela appealed to the CA, but the CA
ruled the same. Ergo, the present case. Estela argues that the sale of
the half of the conjugal properties (not yet determined what
properties because the Court was not able to proceed with the
partition due to lack of Estelas consent) was prejudicial to her rights
as sole heir of Amadeo and as spouse.
HELD: (a) The sale is declared valid and (b) yes, the CPG is liable.
As a general rule, the other spouses consent is necessary. However,
in this case, the consent of Estela was unreasonably withheld by her.
The Court is constrained to relax the application of the law, and
consider the sale falling within the legal exceptions to the general
rule. The Court cannot overlook the vital fact that Amadeo executed a
last will and testament designating Estela as his sole heir. In this
connection, we find merit in Damondon's assertion that no other
motive could be attributed to Estela but her greed.
NCC 161 (now FC 121) provides that the conjugal partnership shall
be liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally
bind the partnership.
In this case, the shares of Amadeo was sold by him to cover the
hospitalization, medical and other expenses necessary for his
survival. He was old and gravely ill. His other relatives in Samar are
also not that well in financial resources.
The health and well-being of both or either of the spouses would
undeniably redound to the benefit of their conjugal partnership. The
advancement of the interests of the conjugal partnership depends in
great measure on the soundness of the body and mind of the
partners. The cost of the hospitalization of Amadeo is chargeable to
the CPG, it being to the benefit of their conjugal partnership.
Carlos v. Abelardo, 380 SCRA 361
Petitioner Honorario L. Carlos averred in his complaint filed on
October 13, 1994 that in October 1989, respondent Manuel T.
Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached
him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for
the purchase of a house and lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street,
Executive Heights Village, Paranaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioner then issued a check to Pura Vallejo, seller of the property,
Thereafter, respondent Abelardo expressed violent resistance to
petitioners inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various
death threats against Petitioner Carlos.
On August 24, 1994, Petitioner Carlos made a formal demand for the
payment of the amount of US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to
comply with their obligation.
Thus, on October 13, 1994, Petitioner Carlos filed a complaint for
collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and
his wife before the RTC of Valenzuela. In the complaint, petitioner
asked for the payment of the US$25,000.00 or P625,000.00.
Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of Petitioner Carlos.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject
amount was indeed loaned by petitioner to respondent and his wife.
CA found that the amount of US$25,000.00 was
respondents share in the profits of H.L. Carlos Construction.
HELD: Yes. RATIO:
The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to
Article 121 of the Family Code. As gleaned from the records, the
following facts are undisputed: (1) therewas a check in the amount of
US$25,000.00 issued by petitioner; (2) this amount was received by
respondent and his wife and given to certain Pura Vallejo for the full
payment of a house and lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street,
Executive Heights Village, Paranaque, Metro Manila; (3) this house
and lot became the conjugal dwelling of respondent and his wife; and
(4) respondents wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan
but which respondent did not sign.
Respondent failed to substantiate his claim that he is entitled to the
profits and income of the corporation. There was no showing that
respondent was a stockholder of H.L. Carlos Construction. His name
does not appear in the Articles of Incorporation as well as the
Organizational Profile of said company either as stockholder or
officer. Not being a stockholder, he cannot be entitled to the profits or
income of said corporation. Neither did respondent prove that he was
an employee or an agent so as to be entitled to salaries or
commissions from the salaries or commissions from the corp.
Respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment
executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to
the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house
and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his
family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of
respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily
liable for such loan together with his wife.
Villanueva v. Chiong, G.R. No. 59889, June 5, 2008
Facts: Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married
sometime in January 1960 but have been separated in fact since
1975. During their marriage, they acquired Lot situated at Poblacion,
Dipolog City.
Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the
lot to petitioners forP8,000, payable in installments. Thereafter,
Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store, a
shop, and a house thereon. Shortly after their last installment
payment on December 13, 1986 petitioners demanded from
respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera,
however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
Respondent Elisera filed with the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of
Title with Damages. Also, petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint
for Specific Performance with Damages. Respondent Florentino
executed the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale n favor of petitioners.
The RTC annulled the deed of absolute sale and ordered petitioners
to vacate the lot and remove all improvements. The RTC likewise
dismissed but ordered Florentino to return to petitioners the
consideration of the sale with interest.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision: Hence, this
appeal before the Supreme Court.
Held: Petitioners' contention that the lot belongs exclusively to
Florentino because of his separation in fact from his wife, Elisera, at
the time of sale dissolved their property relations, is bereft of merit.
Respondents' separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature
of the lot nor prejudiced Elisera's interest over it.
Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between
husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the
conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. Likewise,
under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property acquired by the
spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership of gains, unless
it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Petitioners' mere insistence as to the lot's supposed exclusive nature
is insufficient to overcome such presumption when taken against all
the evidence for respondents. On the basis alone of the certificate of
title, it cannot be presumed that the lot was acquired during the
marriage and that it is conjugal property since it was registered "in
the name of Florentino Chiong, Filipino, of legal age, married to
Elisera Chiong... ." But Elisera also presented a real property tax
declaration acknowledging her and Florentino as owners of the lot. In
addition, Florentino and Elisera categorically declared in the
Memorandum of Agreement they executed that the lot is a conjugal
property Moreover, the conjugal nature of the lot was admitted by
Florentino in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1992, where
he declared his capacity to sell as a co-owner of the subject lot.
Ravina v. Villa-Abrille, G.R. No. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009
Facts: Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa
Abrille are husband and wife. Spouses acquired a 555-square meter
parcel of land (LOT 7) located in Davao City. Said lot is adjacent to a
parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and
which is registered solely in his name.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a
house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot. Pedro got a mistress and began to
neglect his family. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the
two lots to herein petitioners Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified
the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the
house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent.
While Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in
school, Pedro together with armed members of the (CAFGU) began
transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.
Respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for
Annulment of Sale, against Pedro and herein petitioners (the
Ravinas). Petitioners assert that the subject lot was the exclusive
property of Pedro having been acquired by him through barter or
exchange. They allege that the subject lot was acquired by Pedro
with the proceeds of the sale of one of his exclusive properties.
Held: Lot 7 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and
Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject
property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption
of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said
presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively
owned by Pedro.
Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been
constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even
obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is
governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a
disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the
husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses inability, the
authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family Code.
The alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property
by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the
husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal
property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but
without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement,
such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five
(5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the
husband to institute the case.
Fuentes v. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010
Facts: On Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter
lot in Zambales from his mother, Sabina.. Six years later in 1988,
Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Manuel and Leticia
Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who would
prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale. Since
Tarciano and Rosario had been estranged spouses already and the
latter was already living in Manila and the former still in Zamboanga,
the lawyer said that he saw and notarized Rosarios affidavit
manifesting her consent to the sale in one of his trips to Manila.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a
case to annul the sale and to reconvey the property on the ground
that the sale was void absent the consent of Rosario and her
signature was a mere forgery
The RTC ruled in favour of the Fuenteses because of prescription of
4 years but the CA decided otherwise. The CA concluded that the
property relation between Tarciano and Rosario was governed by
Conjugal Partnership of Gains as it was celebrated under the Civil
Code. Under such law, an action for annulment of sale on the ground
of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the wife during the
marriage within the 10 years of the 1989 sale.
ISSUE: WON the sale of the conjugal property is still valid absent the
consent of Rosario (her signature being forged).
RULING: No. the sale of the conjugal property is invalid. Absent the
consent of the other spouse, there can be no disposition or
encumbrance on conjugal property.
The CA erred in the applying the provisions of the Civil Code
because the Family Code already took effect at the time the sale
was made. The latter stated that the law should apply to marriages
whose CPG property regime was established under the Civil Code
without prejudice to rights already conferred upon.
Nevertheless, the action by the children does not fall outside the
prescription period may it be under the Civil Code (which was 10
years from the discovery of the fraud) or under the Family Code
(wherein Art. 124 did not mention any prescription period)
Since the couple had already been estranged for 30 years and the
wife has not at all participated in the giving of consent, the sale was
invalid. Art. 124. States that x x x In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other pouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. xxx
(c) Personal debts, FC 122, RPC 108
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as
they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon
them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either
spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities
imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children
of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article
have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of
the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged
for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned. (163a)
People v. Lagrimas, 29 SCRA 153 [L-25355, Aug. 28, 1969]
Froilan Lagrimas was charged for the murder of Pelagio Cagro.
Thereafter, the heirs of Cagro filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment on the property of the accused, which
was granted.
Lagrimas was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusin perpetua and to indemnify the appellants.
The lower court issued a writ of execution to cover the civil
indemnity. A levy was had on 11 parcels of land declared for tax
purposes in the name of the accused and the sale thereof at public
auction was scheduled.
However, the wife of the accused, Mercedes Lagrimas, filed a
petition to quash the said attachment contending that the property
belonged to the
conjugal partnership and could not be held liable for pecuniary
indemnity the husband was required to pay. Her petition was granted.
Another judge set aside the said order. But upon Mercedes filing a
motion for reconsideration, a third judge revived the original order,
declaring such attachment and the writ of execution thereafter issued
null and void. Hence, this case.
HELD: Yes. Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or
wife may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have been covered, if the
spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should
be insufficient; xxx.
It is quite plain, therefore, that the period during which such a
liability may be enforced presupposes that the conjugal partnership is
still existing for the law speaks of partnership assets. That upon
complying with the responsibilities enumerated in article 161, the
fines and indemnities imposed upon a party of the conjugal
partnership will be satisfied.
If the appealed order were to be upheld, Froilan would be in effect
exempt therefrom and the heirs of the offended party being made to
suffer still further; that for a transgression of the law by either
husband or wife, the rest of the family may be made to bear burdens
of an extremely onerous character.
Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012
Facts: Petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others
were accused of murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and
another person was found guilty and was sentenced to the penalty of
death and to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally
for civil indemnity and damages. Upon motion for execution by the
heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ,
resulting in the levy of real properties registered
in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy
and a notice of sale on execution were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets,
not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
Held: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged
to the partnership.
The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses
may be enforced against the partnership assets if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no
exclusive property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity
that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced
against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in
Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
(d) winnings from gambling, FC 123
Art. 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game
of chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of
gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne
by the loser and shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the conjugal
partnership property. (164a)
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon
them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either
spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities
imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children
of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article
have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of
the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged
for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned. (163a)
8. Ownership, administration and enjoyment
(a) Joint administration, FC 124 cf. FC 96, 142
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision. .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the common properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouseIn the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. (206a)
Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of
either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse:
(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;
(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;
(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it
civil interdiction; or
(4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding
as an accused in a criminal case.
If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence,
conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a
suitable person to be the administrator. (n)
Guiang v. CA, 291 SCRA 372
Facts: Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Corpuz and
while she was in Manila seeking employment, her husband sold to
the petitioners-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang one half of
their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their residence and the lot on
which it stood. Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent gathered her
children and went back to the subject property. Petitioners filed a
complaint for trespassing. Later, there was an amicable settlement
between the parties. Feeling that she had the shorer end of the
bargain, respondent filed an Amended Complaint against her
husband and petitioners. The said Complaint sought the declaration
of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of
private respondent and her husband, null and void.
Held: Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil
Code, the trial court adroitly explained the amendatory effect of the
above provision in this wise:
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void.
It becomes still clearer if we compare the same with the equivalent
provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166 of the
Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.
The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and
void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to
annul the said alienation or encumbrance.
Roxas v. CA, 198 SCRA 541 [1991]
Facts: Petitioner Melania Roxas ("Melania") is married to Antonio
Roxas ("Antonio"), although they are already estranged and living
separately. Melania discovered that Antonio leased to Respondent
Antonio Cayetano ("Mr. Cayetano") their conjugal lot in Novaliches
without her knowledge and consent.
Thus, Melanie filed a case before the RTC praying for the annulment
of the contract of lease between Antonio and Mr. Cayetano.
Mr. Cayetano moved to dismiss the complaint on the sole ground that
the complaint states no cause of action. The RTC Judge resolved
said Motion by dismissing Melania's complaint.
ISSUE: W/N a husband, may legally enter into a long-term contract of
lease involving conjugal real property without the consent of the wife.
Ruling: No. (Case remanded to the RTC by the SC)
Even if the husband is administrator of the conjugal partnership,
administration does not include acts of ownership. For while the
husband can administer the conjugal assets unhampered, he cannot
alienate or encumber the conjugal realty.
Thus, the joinder of the wife, although unnecessary for an oral lease
of conjugal realty which does not exceed one year in duration, is
required in a lease of conjugal realty for a period of more than one
year, such a lease being considered a conveyance and encumbrance
within the provisions of the Civil Code requiring the joinder of the wife
in the instrument by which real property is conveyed or encumbered
(See also 41 C.J.S., p. 1149). In case the wife's consent is not
secured by the husband as required by law, the wife has the remedy
of filing an action for the annulment of the contract. Art. 173 of the
Civil Code states "the wife may, during the marriage and within ten
years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her
consent, when such consent is required. . . .
In the case at bar, the allegation in paragraph 2 of the complaint
indicates that petitioner's estranged husband, defendant Antonio S.
Roxas had entered into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M.
Cayetano without her marital consent being secured as required by
law under Art. 166 of the Civil Code. Petitioner, therefore, has a
cause of action under Art. 173 to file a case for annulment of the
contract of lease entered into without her consent. Petitioner has a
cause of action not only against her husband but also against the
lessee, Antonio M. Cayetano, who is a party to the contract of lease.
Docena v. Lapesura, 355 SCRA 658
Facts: Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for the
recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses,
Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The spouses claimed ownership of the
land based on the occupation since time immemorial. The petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in issuing orders and
that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition. CA dismissed the
petition on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day
period provided in the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and that the
certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by
only one of the petitioners.
Held: Under the NCC, the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership.31 In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the
wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor.32
The husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action
without being joined by the wife. 33 Corollarily, the husband alone
may execute the necessary certificate of non-forum shopping to
accompany the pleading. The husband as the statutory administrator
of the conjugal property could have filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition34 alone, without the concurrence of the wife.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property
belongs to the husband and the wife jointly.However, unlike an act of
alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
required, joint management or administration does not require that
the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly
exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention
of the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the
Family Code. It is believed that even under the provisions of the
Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued
against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being
joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum
shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect.
More important, the signing petitioner here made the certification in
his behalf and that of his wife. The husband may reasonably be
presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his
wife of any action or claim similar to the petition for certiorari and
prohibition given the notices and legal processes involved in a legal
proceeding involving real property. We also see no justifiable reason
why he may not lawfully undertake together with his wife to inform the
court of any similar action or proceeding which may be filed. If
anybody may repudiate the certification or undertaking for having
been incorrectly made, it is the wife who may conceivably do so.
In view of the circumstances of this case, namely, the property
involved is a conjugal property, the petition questioning the writ of
demolition thereof originated from an action for recovery brought
against the spouses, and is clearly intended for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and the wife, as pointed out in the Motion for
Alinas v. Alinas, G.R. No. 158040, April 14, 2008
Facts:
Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) separated
sometime in 1982.
They left behind two lots, lot A with a bodega standing on it and lot B
with petitioners' house (Spouses Onesiforo).
Petitioner Onesiforo and respondent Victor are brothers. Petitioners
allege that they entrusted their properties to Victor and Elena Alinas
(respondent spouses) with the agreement that any income from
rentals of the properties should be remitted to the Social Security
System (SSS) and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City (RBO), as
such rentals were believed sufficient to pay off petitioners' loans with
said institutions.
Lot A with the bodega was mortgaged as security for the loan
obtained from the RBO, while Lot B with the house was mortgaged to
the SSS. There is a notarized document presented indicating that
petitioners acknowlege that his brother used his money to redeem
the proporty (Lot A) thereby transferring ownership to him.
Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their two lots were
already titled in the name of respondent spouses.
Issue(s): Whether or not the sale of Lot B to the respondent spouses
is valid, considering that the petitioner-husband executed the sale
w/o the consent of his wife
Held:
Sale of Lot B to respondent spouses is void
Ratio Decidendi:
Although petitioners were married before the enactment of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, the sale in question occurred in
1989. Thus, their property relations are governed by Chapter IV on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code.
Thus, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence,
the sale of petitioners' conjugal property made by petitioner
Onesiforo without the consent of his wife is void
Respondent spouses were well aware that Lot B is a conjugal
property of petitioners. They also knew that the disposition being
made by Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife, as they knew
that petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents do not bear
the signature of petitioner Rosario
the bodega was leased out by respondent spouses only beginning
January of 1990 when ownership had been transferred to them.
Hence, any rentals earned from the lease of said bodega rightfully
belongs to respondent spouses.
Respondent spouses, having knowledge of the flaw in their mode of
acquisition, are deemed to be possessors in bad faith under Article
52628 of the Civil Code. However, they have a right to be refunded
for necessary expenses on the property (e.g. repairs)
Aggabao v. Parulan, G.R. No. 165803, Sept. 1, 2010
Facts: In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K.Atanacio offered 2
lots located in Paraaque to the petitioners. On February 2, 1991, the
petitioners met up with Elena Parulan at the site of the property and
showed them the following documents: (a.) Owners original copy of
the TCT of the 2 lots; etc. The petitioners paid P200,000.00 as
earnest money for which Elena executed a handwritten Receipt
On February 4, 1991, the petitioners, accompanied by the broker,
went to the Office of the Register of Deeds to verify the TCTs shown
by Elena. There they discovered that one of the lots had been
encumbered to Banco Filipino, but that the encumbrance had been
cancelled due to the full payment of the obligation. They noticed that
the loan was effected through and SPA executed by Dionisio in favor
of Elena. The other lot on the other hand had an annotation of an
existing mortgage in favor of Los Baos Rural Bank, with the same
SPA with a court order authorizing Elena to mortgage the lot to
secure the loan.
There, they met with Atty. Zarate, related that the bank had asked for
the court order because the lot involved was conjugal property.
Following their verification, the petitioners delivered P130,000.00 as
additional down payment on February 4, 1991; and P650,000.00 to
the Los Baos Rural Bank on February 12, 1991, which then
released the owners duplicate copy of TCT to them.
On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of
P700,000.00 to Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their
favor. However, Elena did not turn over the owners duplicate copy of
the TCT but assured she would.
In due time, the petitioners learned that the duplicate owners copy of
TCT had been all along in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan,
who appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio
authorizing him to sell both lots. At Atanacios instance, the
petitioners met on March 25, 1991 with Atty. Parulan at the Manila
Peninsula. They recalled that Atty. Parulan smugly demanded
P800,000.00 in exchange for the duplicate owners copy of TCT,
because Atty. Parulan represented the current value of the property
to be P1.5 million. As a counter-offer, however, they tendered
P250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan declined, giving them only until
April 5, 1991 to decide. Hearing nothing more from the petitioners,
Atty. Parulan decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed
him that they had already fully paid to Elena.
Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced
an action (Civil Case No. 91-1005 entitled Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr.,
represented by Jeremy Z. Parulan, as attorney in fact, v. Ma. Elena
Parulan, Sps. Rex and Coney Aggabao), praying for the declaration
of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and
the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof.
In turn, the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for
specific performance with damages against the respondents. Both
cases were consolidated for trial and judgment in the RTC.
On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in
Makati City annulled the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of
the petitioners covering two parcels of registered land the
respondents owned for want of the written consent of respondent
husband Dionisio Parulan, Jr. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the
Family Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property
executed without the consent of Dionisio?
HELD: The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3,
1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is,
therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any
alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the
effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family
Code.
Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not
include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict
ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an
authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only
be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of
the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878). Specifically, the
apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, was
limited to the sale of the property in question, and did not include or
extend to the power to administer the property.
Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction executed sans
the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void;
hence, ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be
ratified. On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale
was a continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that
Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was
withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last
sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code
makes this clear, stating that in the absence of the other spouses
consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(b) Sole administration
(1) Incapacity, FC 124, 127, 253
Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall
not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live
therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be
supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the
other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in
a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and
use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.
(178a)
Art. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall
likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51,
69, 73, 96, 124 and 127, insofar as they are applicable. (n)
Uy v. CA, [G.R. No. 109557, Nov. 29, 2000] supra
Facts: Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him
comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be
allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be
authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically
incapacitated to discharge his functions. She further contest that
such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would require
her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet
such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such
decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings
thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that the petition made by her mother was essentially a
petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father.
As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on
summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing
special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring
procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing
on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes
under the heading on Separation in Fact Between Husband and
Wife contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing
mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her
daughter and son in law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed
the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a
cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor and
mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.
HELD: SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary
proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-consenting
spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case,
trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a
comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract.
Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding
under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who
assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and
duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell
real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe
the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial
guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC
further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an
opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due
process.
(2) Separation in fact,
FC 100 (3), 127(3)
Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall
not affect the regime of absolute community except that:
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate
property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support
of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and
use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.
(178a)
Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall
not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that:
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and
use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.
(178a)
(3) Abandonment, FC 101, 128
Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or
fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the
aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for
judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the absolute community, subject to such
precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or
she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning.
The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of
three months or has failed within the same period to give any
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling. (178a)
Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or
fails to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the
aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for
judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to
such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or
she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning.
The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of
three months or has failed within the same period to give any
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling. (167a, 191a)
(4) Pendency of legal separation
proceedings, FC 61
Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the
spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the
spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to
administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership
property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the
same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules
of Court. (104a)
Sabalones v. CA, 230 SCRA 79
Facts: As an ambassador petitioner Samson Sabalones was
assigned to different countries and as such, he left the administration
of their conjugal properties to his wife Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones
1985 Sabalones retired as ambassador to live in the Philippines but
did not return to his family. In 1989, he filed judicial authorization to
sell their Greenhills property. He alleged that he was 68 yrs old, very
sick and living alone with no income.
Remedies opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for
legal separation. She alleged that the Greenhills property was
occupied by her and their 6 children and they were dependent on the
rentals of their other properties. She also informed the court that
despite Sabalones retirement, he did not return to his legitimate
family and instead maintained a separate residence with Thelma
Cumareng and their 3 children. Remedios prayed for a decree of

legal separation and liquidation of their conjugal properties, with
forfeiture of her husbands share. Also prayed for preventing the
Sabalones from disturbing the tenants in the Forbes Park property
and disposing any of the conjugal properties.
After trial, Judge Mariano Umali found that the petitioner had indeed
contracted a bigamous marriage on October 5, 1981 with Thelma
Cumareng. The court, then, decreed the legal separation of
Sabalones and Remedios , forfeiture of his share in the conjugal
properties and non-entitlement to support.
Pendente lite, Remedios filed a motion for issuance of a write of
preliminary injunction preventing Sabalones from interfering in the
administration of their properties. Petitioner opposed motion
April 7, 1992 CA granted the preliminary injunction
HELD: While the law does indeed grant the spouses joint
administration over conjugal properties under Art. 124 FC, Art. 61 of
the same code is to be applied in the instant case since the legal
separation case filed by the wife is still pending.
Pending the appointment of an administrator over the conjugal
assets, CA was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her
administration pursuant to Art. 61 FC. This provision states that after
a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in
the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint
either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the
administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has
been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial
court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and
thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation
was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in
favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under
challenge.
The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to
preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the
relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the
plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit.
Otherwise, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue
doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus
make ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards
in favor of the plaintiff.
(c) Disposition and encumbrance,
FC 124-125; FC 97, 121 (8), NCC 1145 (1)
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the
wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from
the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (165a)
Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property
without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without
the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal
partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or
family distress. (174a)
Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under
Articles 134 to 138. (175a)
Art. 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the
community property. (n)
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of
their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of
commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other
activity for self-improvement; and
Art. 1145. The following actions must be commenced within six
years:
(1) Upon an oral contract;
Cheeseman v. IAC, 193 SCRA 93
Facts: Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married
on 1970 but have been separated since 1981.
In 1974, a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights was
executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered
land and the house thereon in favor of Criselda P. Cheesman, of
legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman.
Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the
transfer being made only to his wife.
Thereafterand again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman
and also without any protest by himtax declarations for the property
purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman and
Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of said
property, leasing it to tenants.
Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without
the knowledge or consent of Thomas Cheesman.
On July 31, 1981, Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the CFI at
Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying
for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had
been executed w/o his knowledge and consent
RTC found 1) the evidence on record satisfactorily overcame the
disputable presumption in Article 160 of the Civil Codethat all
property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership
2), said legal presumption in Article 160 could not apply inasmuch as
the husband-plaintiff is an American citizen and therefore disqualified
under the Constitution to acquire and own real properties; and
3) that the exercise by Criselda of exclusive acts of dominion with the
knowledge of her husband had led . . . Estelita Padilla to believe that
the properties were the exclusive properties of Criselda Cheesman
and therefore, Thomas Cheesman was, under Article 1473 of the
Civil Code, estopped to impugn the transfer to Estelita Padilla.
IAC upheld the ruling
HELD: An order of a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) granting a petition for relief under Rule 38 is interlocutory and
is not appealable
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential
land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that,
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
30 Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with
knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention
that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired
no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in
attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to
him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by
his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property.
An equally decisive consideration is that Estelita Padilla is a
purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court
having found that Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe
the property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife, freely
disposable by her without his consent or intervention.
Frenzel v. Catito, G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003
Facts: Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of
German descent. He was so enamored with Ederlina that he bought
her numerous properties such as house and lot in Quezon City and in
Davao City. He also put up a beauty parlor business in the name of
Ederlina. Alfred was unaware that Ederlina was married until her
spouse Klaus Muller wrote a letter to Alfred begging the latter to
leave her wife alone.
When Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina
had not been able to secure a divorce from Klaus. The latter could
charge her for bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who himself
was still married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to live
separately from Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her.
On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlinas father, complaining
that Ederlina had taken all his life savings and because of this, he
was virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito family of
acquiring for themselves the properties he had purchased with his
own money. He demanded the return of all the amounts that Ederlina
and her family had stolen and turn over all the properties acquired by
him and Ederlina during their coverture.
Held: Lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may
be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to
acquire or hold private lands or lands of the public domain. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they have also been
disqualified from acquiring private lands.[51]
Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were
entered into by him as the real vendee, the said transactions are in
violation of the Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio.[52] A
contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void
and vests no rights and creates no obligations.
The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it
leaves the parties where it finds them.[55] Under Article 1412 of the
New Civil Code, the petitioner cannot have the subject properties
deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for
the purchase thereof
Ravina v. Villa-Abrille, G.R. No. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009 supra
Facts: Facts: Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro
Villa Abrille are husband and wife. Spouses acquired a 555-square
meter parcel of land (LOT 7) located in Davao City. Said lot is
adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still
single and which is registered solely in his name.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a
house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot. Pedro got a mistress and began to
neglect his family. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the
two lots to herein petitioners Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified
the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the
house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent.
While Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in
school, Pedro together with armed members of the (CAFGU) began
transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.
Respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for
Annulment of Sale, against Pedro and herein petitioners (the
Ravinas). Petitioners assert that the subject lot was the exclusive
property of Pedro having been acquired by him through barter or
exchange. They allege that the subject lot was acquired by Pedro
with the proceeds of the sale of one of his exclusive properties.
Held: Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property
concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,
is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a
disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the
husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses inability, the
authority of the court.
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10)
years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to
the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of
the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent
of the wife is null and void.
Siochi v. Gozon, G.R. No. 169900, March 18, 2010
FACTS: Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter.
The property involved in this case is a 30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon
which is registered in the name of Alfredo. The property regime of the
couple is conjugal partnership of gains.
Elvira filed for legal separation. While the legal separation case was
still pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement with Mario who paid
P5 million in earnest money and took possession of the property.
Title still with notice of lis pendens.
Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved and
liquidated. Alfredo, the guilty spouse, did not receive his share in the
net profits, which instead went to their daughter, Winifred. Cavite
RTC ruled land in Malabon as conjugal property.
Alfred executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favour of
Winifred. Malabon RTC issued new TCT in the name of Winifred
without annotating the agreement between Alfredo and Mario Siochi,
nor the notice of lis pendens filed by Elvira, the wife. Then, through
an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her father, Alfred, to sell the lot.
Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional Realty for P18 million. A TCT was
issued to Inter-Dimensional Realty.
Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property was in Malabon) to
Annul donation to Winifred, Annul the Sale to Inter-Dimensional, and
to remove notice of lis pendens over title of land.
Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell between
Mario and Alfredo and declared void the sale by Alfredo and Winifred
to Inter-Dimensional. However, Court of Appeals said agreement
between Mario and Alfredo is void because (1) it was entered into
without the consent of Elvira, Alfredos wife; and, (2) Alfredos
undivided share has been forfeited in favour of Winifred by the grant
of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. (Note these reasons given by
the CA.)
ISSUES: (1) Was the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid?
Mario argues that even if the sale to Mario was done without the
consent of Elvira, the sale should be treated as a continuing offer
which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse
before the offer is withdrawn. Mario alleges that Elviras conduct
showed her acquiescence to the sale.
SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and
Alfredo as void. Under Art 124 of the Family Code, if one of the
spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers, however do not include the
power to dispose or encumber the properties which require a court
order or the written consent of the other spouse. The agreement is
void in its entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The
Court however said that the CA erred in saying that the undivided
share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred. As regards
Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which
may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is
withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by
Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the
offer was already withdrawn.
The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his
share in the conjugal property as a result of the grant of legal
separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal separation) in
relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of subsequent marriage)
provides that the guilty spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in
the net profits of the property. The Court said, Clearly, what is
forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal
partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal
partnership property. Thus, as regards this point, the CA erred.
Fuentes v. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010, supra
Facts: On Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter
lot in Zambales from his mother, Sabina.. Six years later in 1988,
Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Manuel and Leticia
Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who would
prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale. Since
Tarciano and Rosario had been estranged spouses already and the
latter was already living in Manila and the former still in Zamboanga,
the lawyer said that he saw and notarized Rosarios affidavit
manifesting her consent to the sale in one of his trips to Manila.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a
case to annul the sale and to reconvey the property on the ground
that the sale was void absent the consent of Rosario and her
signature was a mere forgery
The RTC ruled in favour of the Fuenteses because of prescription of
4 years but the CA decided otherwise. The CA concluded that the
property relation between Tarciano and Rosario was governed by
Conjugal Partnership of Gains as it was celebrated under the Civil
Code. Under such law, an action for annulment of sale on the ground
of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the wife during the
marriage within the 10 years of the 1989 sale.
ISSUE: WON the sale of the conjugal property is still valid absent the
consent of Rosario (her signature being forged).
RULING: In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of
the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who
gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of the real property. It
simply provides that without the other spouses written consent or a
court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Under the
provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent
contract has no force and effect from the very beginning.
Aguete v. PNB, G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011, supra
Facts: Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed acomplaint for
annulment against PNB before the CFI Riza;.
Jose Ros previously obtained a loan in the amount of P115,000.00
from PNB and as security, a real estate mortgage over a parcel of
land with TCT. No. T-9646 was executed. Upon maturity, the loan
remained unpaid and an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the
mortgaged property was instituted by PNB. After the lapse of a year,
the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB.
Estrella Aguete, claiming she had no knowledge of the said loan nor
the mortgage constituted on the land which is part of their conjugal
property, contested the transactions and filed for an annulment of the
proceedings. She interposed in her defense that the signatures
affixed on the documents were forged and that the proceeds of the
loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
RTC ruled for the spouses, stating that Aguete may during their
marriage and within ten years from the transaction mentioned, may
ask the court for an annulment of the case. On notice of appeal by
PNB, Court of Appeals reversed this ruling and found for PNB,
stating that forgery was concluded without adequate proof. It also
found that the loan was used in the expansion of the family business.
HELD: The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real
property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should
the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Article 173 of the
Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros encumbrance of the
subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that
the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will
be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.
In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court
and rule that Aguete gave her consent to Ros encumbrance of the
subject property.
The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a
notary public, hence they are public documents. Every instrument
duly acknowledged and certified as provided by law may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved.
Flores v. Lindo, G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011
Facts: In October 1995, Edna Lindo obtained a loan amounting to
P400k from Arturo Flores. To secure the loan, Edna executed a deed
of real estate mortgage on a property which is however part of the
conjugal property (it was both in her name and her husbands name
Enrico Lindo). Only Edna signed the deed. But in November 1995,
Enrico executed a special power of attorney authorizing Edna to
mortgage the property.
Edna was not able to pay the loan despite repeated demands from
Flores. Flores then filed an action to foreclose the mortgage.
The trial court (RTC Manila, Branch 33) ruled that the action for
foreclosure cannot prosper because it appears that there was no
valid mortgage between Edna and Flores. Edna mortgaged the
property without the consent of her husband and the special power of
attorney executed by Enrico a month after the execution of the deed
did not cure the defect. The trial court however ruled that Flores can
instead file a personal action (collection suit) against Edna.
Eventually, Flores filed a suit for collection of sum of money against
Edna and Enrico (raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 42). The Lindo
spouses filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The
trial court denied the motion. The spouses then filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The CA ruled in favor of the spouses. It ruled that when Flores filed
an action for the foreclosure of the mortgage, he had abandoned the
remedy of filing a personal action to collect the indebtedness. These
remedies are mutually exclusive.
HELD: Both the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93
misapplied the rules.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
xxx
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly.
xxx
In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
xxx
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without the written
consent of the other spouse.
I children. During their marriage they acquired properties both in thw
n this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power of
Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the
SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the
continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making
the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
9. Effect of separation de facto, FC 127,
FC 100 cf. FC 239
Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not
affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein,
without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is
required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary
proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use
the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a)
Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not
affect the regime of absolute community except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein,
without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is
required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary
proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate
property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the
family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary
proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any
specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or
proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a)
Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has
abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a
transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but
such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may
be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the
transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and
state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In
any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted
to and approved by the court. (n)
Noveras v Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014, supra
David Noveras, Petitioner, and Leticia Noveras, Respondent were
married in Quezon City Phils. on Dec. 1988. They resided in
California, USA and eventually acquired US citizenship. They have 2
Phils. and in the USA.
In Sept. 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with Estrelita
Martinez in Aurora Province. Upon learning that David had an extra-
marital affair, Leticia Uiled a petition for divorce with the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The divorce was
granted on June 2005 and the custody of the 2 children was granted
to Leticia as well as the couples properties in the USA.
On August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of
Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler Aurora. RTC rendered
judgement and David demanded that the conjugal partnership
properties (CPP) including their USA properties should all be
liquidated for equal distribution. But the RTC ruled, though it
regarded that the parties involved are US citizens having their
marriage DISSOLVED pursuant to the divorce decree, the doctrine of
Processual Presumption of Philippine law should still apply.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) modified the RTC decision and
directed the EQUAL DIVISION of the Philippine properties between
the spouses. David insists that CA should have recognized the
California Judgement which awarded the Philippine properties to him.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in
evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as
the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the
parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus
erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
HELD: With respect to their property relations, the trial court first
classified their property regime as absolute community of property
because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the
solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family
Code. Having established that Leticia and David had actually
separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of
absolute community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community
property automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as
stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code.
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds
of the Sampaloc property.1wphi1 While both claimed to have
contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear
showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed
to have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not
entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
10. Effect of abandonment, FC 128 cf. FC 101
Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or
fails to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the
aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for
judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to
such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or
she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning.
The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of
three months or has failed within the same period to give any
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling. (167a, 191a)
Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or
fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the
aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for
judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the absolute community, subject to such
precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or
she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning.
The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of
three months or has failed within the same period to give any
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling. (178a)
Partosa-Jo v. CA, G.R. No. 82606, Dec. 18, 1992, supra
Facts: FACTS: The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of
Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter admitted to have
cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a
complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal
property in addition to an earlier action for support which was
consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the
complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of
conjugal property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed
rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property
was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that
separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil
Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose
was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial
period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They
never agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned to him
but the latter refused to accept her.
Held: Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the
avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without
just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for
ones family although able to do so. There must be absolute
cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of
perpetual separation. This idea is clearly expressed in the above-
quoted provision, which states that a spouse is deemed to have
abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling
without any intention of returning.
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had
already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their
conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from
Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo
demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their
conjugal relationship.
The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the
private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to
constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of
their conjugal property. The private respondent has not established
any just cause for his refusal to comply with his obligations to his wife
as a dutiful husband.
It is these properties that should now be divided between him and the
petitioner, on the assumption that they were acquired during
coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half. As the private
respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division must include such
properties properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may
have been registered in the name of other persons in violation of the
Anti-Dummy Law.
Noveras v. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014, supra
 11. Dissolution of CPG, FC 126
Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Articles 134 to 138. (175a)
(a) Death, FC 126 (1), 130
Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the
conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either
judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of
the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period
no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving
the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage
shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory
regime of complete separation of property shall govern the
property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)
Heirs of Go v. Servacio, G.R. No. 157537, Sept. 7, 2011, supra
Facts: On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of
land (17,140 SQM) to Protacio B. Go, Jr. Twenty three years later,
Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver,
whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go,
Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land
(the property). In 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of
Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners.
On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined
by Ritos wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the property (5,560 SQM)
to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio). On March 2, 2001, the petitioners
demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed
their demand. They sued Servacio and Rito for the annulment of the
sale of the property.
PETITIONERS: Following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property
became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property
between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void. Servacio and
Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property
because he had purchased it with his own money.
RTC s RULING: Affirmed the validity of the sale. However, declared
the property was the conjugal property and not the exclusive property
of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to
Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina). The participation of
Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of
the late Marta. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect
when the property was acquired, all property acquired by either
spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that
the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.
Issue: Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was void
for being made without prior liquidation?
RULING: No. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta
were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, their property relation was properly characterized as one of
conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Martas death
in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article
175 (1) of the Civil Code,15 and an implied ordinary co-ownership
ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect
to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a
liquidation following its liquidation. The ensuing implied ordinary co-
ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code,17 to wit:
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in
respect of Martas share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet
assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share without an
actual partition of theproperty being first done either by agreement or
by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract
quota in Martas share.18 Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his
undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and
dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-
owners.19 Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-
owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co- owners were thereby
effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of
Martas share.
(b) Legal separation, FC 63 (2), FC 66
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following
effects:
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no
right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in
accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles
shall have the following consequences:
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall
thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the
separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty
spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree
to revive their former property regime.
The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in
the proper civil registries. (108a)
(c) Annulment and declaration of nullity,
FC 50 in relation to FC 43 (2)
Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to
marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for
liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 102 and 129.

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in
the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the
innocent spouse;
(d) Judicial separation of property,
FC 134-138
Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be
voluntary or for sufficient cause. (190a)
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause
for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a
penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared
an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has
been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or
failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as
provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the
marriage settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been
separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly
improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the
presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of
judicial separation of property. (191a)
Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the
court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their
common properties.
All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal
partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the
spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing
thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors
and other persons with pecuniary interest. (191a)
Art. 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be
liquidated in conformity with this Code.
During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of
property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children. (192a)
Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the
conjugal partnership, the provisions on complete separation of
property shall apply. (191a)
Ugalde v. Ysasi, G.R. No. 130623, February 29, 2008
Facts: On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de
Ysasi (respondent) got married.On 1 March 1951,4 Rev. Msgr.
Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church wedding in Bacolod City.
Petitioner and respondent did not execute any ante-nuptial
agreement. They had a son named Jon de Ysasi III.
Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in April 1957. On 26
May 1964, respondent allegedly contracted another marriage with
Victoria Smith (Smith) before Judge Lucio M. Tanco of Pasay City.
Petitioner further alleged that J and Smith had been acquiring and
disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as the
lawful wife. She alleged that she had been defrauded of rental
income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties.
Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains against respondent before the RTC of Negros Occidental.
Thereafter, respondent contended that he and the petitioner entered
into an agreement which provides that their conjugal partnership shall
be deemed dissolved. Pursuant to this, an Amicable Settlement was
submitted to the CFI of Negros Occidental.
CFI approved the Amicable Settlement.
Respondent likewise alleged that petitioner already obtained a
divorce from her before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then
contracted a second marriage with Richard Galoway and upon the
latters death, she contracted a third marriage with Frank Scholey.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of estoppel, laches,
and res judicata.
The trial court ruled that there was no conjugal partnership of gains
and that since they entered into an amicable settlement which was
later on approved, the petitioner may no longer repudiate it.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the action for the dissolution of the CPG
should be dismissed.
Held: Yes. Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February
1951. Thus, the applicable law is the Civil Code(RA 386).
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property
results in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains:
The finality of the civil case approving the parties separation of
property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of
gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence,
when the trial court decided in the special proceeding, the conjugal
partnership between petitioner and respondent was already
dissolved.
Lavadia v Heirs of Luna, G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014, supra
Facts: Luna and Eugenia initially married in a civil ceremony, and
later in a church ceremony. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his
marriage with Eugenia in the Dominican Republic. On the same date,
Luna contracted another marriage, this time with Soledad.
Thereafter, Luna and Soledad returned to the Philippines and lived
together as husband and wife until 1987.
In 1977, Luna organized a new law firm, LUPSICON. LUPSICON
through Luna purchased the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma
Condominium Project, to be used as their law office. In 1992,
LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned
by the partners. After his death, his share in the condominium unit
including the law books, office furniture and equipment found therein
were taken over by Gregorio Luna, his son from the first marriage.
This became the subject of the
complaint filed by Soledad against the heirs of Luna. The complaint
alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the
existence of the marriage between Luna and Soledad, and that
Soledad became co-owner of said properties.
Held: Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not
entered into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on
September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains governed their property relations.
Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements
agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife. The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until
terminated for any of various causes of termination enumerated in
Article 175 of the Civil Code
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did
not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains.
The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still
required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code.
Noveras v Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014
12. Effects of dissolution, FC 129
Tarrosa v. De Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009
FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and
PHHC entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase of
a lot. On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. Following
the full payment of the cost price for the lot, PHHC executed, on June
22, 1970, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Subsequently,
Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and husband
Felix Rio Tarrosa, petitioners herein. The Deed of Sale dated
January 12, 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent and
signature of Anita. In 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale. Danilo
and Vilma (children of Bonifacio) filed a Notice of Adverse Claim
before the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to protect their rights
over the subject property, as well as, a reconveyance suit.
The sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the
partnership is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere
expectancy. Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only
sold his portion of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still
theoretically void, for the right of the husband or the wife to one-half
of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. As a matter of fairness and equity, the share of
Bonifacio after the liquidation of the partnership should be liable to
reimburse the amount paid by the Tarrosas.
Cabreza v. Cabreza, G.R. No. 171260, Sept. 11, 2009
Facts: Jan 2001, RTC of Pasig declared marriage between Ceferino
(petitioner) and Amparo (respondent) as null and void and ordered
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Petitioner
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of BJD Holdings Corp
involving the conjugal dwelling. Petitioner asked the RTC to
authorized him to signed in behalf of the respondent and order the
occupants to vacate the property.
Respondent countered by filling a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the
Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate, arguing that (1) the parties
had another conjugal lot apart from the conjugal dwelling; and (2)
under Article 129 of the Family Code,4 the conjugal dwelling should
be adjudicated to her as the spouse, with whom four of the five
Cabreza children were staying.
HELD: CA erred in giving merit to the respondents argument.
We also take time to stress that the Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of the Deed of Sale cannot prosper, because, like the Petition
to nullify the Writ of Possession, it effectively seeks the modification
of an already final Order of RTC Br. 70. In view of this Courts
consistent ruling that Amparo cannot be allowed to impugn the
already final Order of RTC Br. 70 directing the sale of the conjugal
dwelling, we deny the prayer for preliminary injunction to hold in
abeyance the implementation of the Notice to Vacate

HELD: The subject property is the conjugal property of Bonifacio and

Anita. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it
is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. For
the presumption to arise, it is not even necessary to prove that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership.

In the case at bar, the title to the property in question only passed to
Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970.
This full payment was made more than two (2) years after his
marriage to Anita. Since, the property was acquired during the
existence of the marriage, the ownership is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership.
 (a) Liquidation procedure, FC 129
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime,
the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive
properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of
personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited
to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her
exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of
his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been
vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be
paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said
assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses
shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever
source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit
of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous
event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if
any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall
constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between
husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has
been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in
this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the
lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by
the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority
of the common children choose to remain. Children below the
age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother,
unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such
majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best
interests of said children. (181a, 182a, 183a, 184a, 185a)
Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012, supra
Held: On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership
Regime, we make it clear that Article 102(4) of the Family Code
applies in the instant case for purposes only of defining net profit. As
earlier explained, the definition of net profits in Article 102(4) of the
Family Code applies to both the absolute community regime and
conjugal partnership regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2)
of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of
gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife
place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.[76] From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has
his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect
a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.[77]
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the
Family Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation
of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of
gains is dissolved, to wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
..
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the
liquidation of the properties of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately
listing the couple's conjugal properties and their separate
properties.[78] In the instant case, the trial court found that the couple
has no separate properties when they married.[79] Rather, the trial
court identified the conjugal properties.
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal
partnership during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the
assets of the conjugal partnership;[81] and if the community is
enriched at the expense of the separate properties of either spouse,
a restitution of the value of such properties to their respective owners
shall be made.[82]
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the
debts of the conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of
each of the spouses shall be paid from their respective separate
properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its
debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate properties
shall be solidarily liable.[83]
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the
husband and of the wife shall be returned to each of them.[84] In the
instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that
the spouses have no separate properties,[85] there is nothing to
return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part
of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the
above-listed properties should be divided equally between the
spouses and/or their respective heirs.[86] However, since the trial
court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net
profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we
be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime,
because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in
the guilty party's favor.
Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014, supra
HELD: The records reveal that Nonatoand Barridos marriage had
been declared void for psychological incapacity under Article 3610 of
the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal
partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article
12911 provides for the
procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime,
Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the
spouses property relations.
Noveras v. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014, supra
 (b) Cause other than death,
FC 129; FC 43(2), FC 63(2)
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in
the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the
innocent spouse;
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following
effects:
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no
right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in
accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
(c) Termination due to death;
FC 130, cf. FC 104
Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the
conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either
judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of
the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period
no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving
the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage
shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory
regime of complete separation of property shall govern the
property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)
Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of
two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the
effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the
respective capital, fruits and income of each community shall be
determined upon such proof as may be considered according to
the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community
the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided
between the different communities in proportion to the capital
and duration of each. (189a)
13. For marriages before FC, FC 131
Art. 131. Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same
person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out
simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each
partnership shall be determined upon such proof as may be
considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt
as to which partnership the existing properties belong, the same
shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion
to the capital and duration of each. (189a)
14. Applicability of Rules of Court, FC 132
Art. 132. The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of
deceased persons shall be observed in the appraisal and sale of
property of the conjugal partnership, and other matters which are
not expressly determined in this Chapter. (187a)
15. Support during CPG liquidation, FC 133
Art. 133. From the common mass of property support shall be
given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the
liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to
them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount
received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining
to them. (188a)
Santero v. CFI, 153 SCRA 728
Held: The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the
New Rules of Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code reading
as follows:
Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing and medical attendance, according tothe social
position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be
supported until he completes his education or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given
to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of
the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered;
but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support
which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or
married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the
determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the
Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the
surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the
private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all
surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their
shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the
provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving
spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the
liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be
impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a
procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse,"
the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses
who are the mothers of the children here).