Paul Weithman
Rawls says in Political Liberalism that the focus of an overlapping consensus is [more
likely to be] a class of liberal conceptions than a single one. In conceding that
members of the well-ordered society are unlikely to live up to justice as fairness,
Rawls would seem to have conceded that they are also unlikely to live autonomously.
This is exactly the conclusion some commentators have drawn. I contend that the
likelihood of reasonable pluralism about justice does not have the implication
for Rawlss project that it is said to have: political autonomy remains available
even when such pluralism obtains.
One of the aims of John Rawlss work was to identify conditions a society
must satisfy if its members are to live justly. Another was the Kantian aim
of identifying conditions a society must satisfy if its citizens are to live
freely. In the bulk of his writingmost obviously in A Theory of Justice and
his Dewey LecturesRawls pursued the second aim by pursuing the first:
he argued that citizens of a society well ordered by justice as fairness would
live freely by living justly. The form of freedom they would enjoy would be
autonomy, for the principles of justice from which they would act would
be principles they would give themselves.
The stability arguments of A Theory of Justice exploited the fact that
in a well-ordered society, living autonomously and living justly come to
the same thing. For Rawls assumed that members of a well-ordered soci-
ety would all have a rational desire to express their nature as free and
equal moral persons. He argued that they could do that by acting from
* I presented previous versions of this article to the Stanford Political Theory Work-
shop and to a symposium on the 25th anniversary of Political Liberalism organized by the
Jean Beer Blumenfeld Center for Ethics at Georgia State University. I am especially grateful
to Eamann Callan, Rainer Frst, Michael Friedman, Gerald Gaus, Rob Reich, Henry Rich-
ardson, Debra Satz, Christopher Shields, John Skorupski, Chad Van Schoelandt, and two
anonymous reviewers for Ethics for their helpful comments on earlier versions.
95
1. This paragraph summarizes the arguments of John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 501 and 503.
2. Crudely put, the Rawls of A Theory of Justice had argued that in the well-ordered so-
ciety, there is a stabilizing desirethe desire to express ones naturewhich is common to
everyones conception of the good. The later Rawls reverses the order of the quantifiers,
arguing that everyones conception of the good includes some stabilizing desires, desires
that may differ from conception to conception.
3. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 164.
4. See, e.g., Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Politics of Hope (Cambridge, MA: Riverside,
1962), 9293.
5. Rawls states the fundamental problem of political liberalism thus: How is it possi-
ble that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens pro-
foundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical and moral
doctrines? (Political Liberalism, xxxix).
6. Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract (New York: Oxford University Press,
2009), 256. Gerald Gaus locates Rawls in the tradition of what he calls public reason lib-
eralism. The central tenet of that tradition is that principles of justice, laws, and policies
must be justifiable to those upon whom they are enforced. To justify them is to show those
subject to them that there are good reasons to comply with them. When subjects are pro-
vided with such reasons, and when they recognize those reasons as good ones, the compli-
ance that results is free rather than coerced. Indeed, Gaus thinks that it is autonomous; see
Gerald F. Gaus and Kevin Vallier, The Role of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified
Polity: The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry and Political Institutions, Philosophy
and Social Criticism 35 (2009): 5176, 52. But Gaus thinks that admitting the possibility of
reasonable pluralism about justice leaves Rawls unable to justify the enforcement of his
principles. The upshot of Gauss reading therefore seems to be the same as the upshot of
Freemans: that Rawls has to give up on autonomy.
7. Gerald Gaus says that admitting the possibility of reasonable pluralism about justice
casts Rawlss theory into disarray. Gerald Gaus, Is Public Reason a Normalization Proj-
ect?, http://www.gaus.biz/PublicReasonNormalization.pdf, 5.
8. The quoted phrase in the section heading is from Rawls, Political Liberalism, 77,
where it serves as the title of essay II, sec. 6.
I believe that this difficult passage can be mined for the conditions of full
autonomy as Rawls understands it. I enumerate those conditions in the
next section. In this section, I take up the question to which Rawls gives
a perfunctory answer in the first sentence of the passage, that of who re-
alizes full autonomy. For as will emerge in Section III, it is only by seeing
who realizes full autonomy that we can see how some of its conditions are
satisfied.
At the beginning of the passage, Rawls says that it is citizens of a well-
ordered society who are fully autonomous (emphasis added). Context
makes clear that Rawls is contrasting citizens, who are fully autonomous,
with parties in the original position, who are rationally autonomous. He is
not contrasting citizens with resident aliens or illegal immigrants, since
everyone in the well-ordered society is assumed to be a citizen. That means
that everyone in the well-ordered society can achieve full autonomy. Why,
then, does Rawls say that it is achieved by citizens specifically rather than
by persons or by members of the well-ordered society?
Rawlss word choice serves both as a reminder that members of a
well-ordered society can be viewed under a variety of descriptions and
as an assertion that they realize full autonomy only under the description
of them as citizens rather than as members of private associations or as
adherents of their religious or moral views. Citizens, considered as such,
have two moral powers: the capacity for a sense of justice and the capac-
ity to form and advance a conception of the good.10 They also have sta-
tus: they are self-authenticating sources of valid claims.11 Their status
does not depend on the particular good they choose to advance, on their
native endowments, or on the circumstances into which they were born.
When Rawls implies in the second sentence that citizens achieve full
autonomy in their conduct (emphasis added), I take him to imply that
they realize it just in their conduct as citizensthat is, just in their exer-
cise of their two defining capacities, independent of their view of the
good. And so I read the first and second sentences of the passage as to-
gether laying down a constraint on the predication of full autonomy: we
9. Ibid., 7778.
10. Ibid., xlvi.
11. Ibid., 33.
is realized outside political life narrowly construed. Unfortunately, Rawls does not connect
his discussion of the two kinds of autonomy in Reply to Habermas with his discussions of
full autonomy earlier in Political Liberalism. But if we take public and private autonomy to be
two components of full autonomy, then full autonomy must be realized in a wider range of
activity than the narrow view allows. I am grateful to Henry S. Richardson for drawing my
attention to these important passages.
When I introduced the long passage from Political Liberalism at the be-
ginning of the previous section, I said it could be mined for the condi-
tions of full autonomy. For reasons of space I shall not engage in the
sentence-by-sentence exegesis that would be needed to show exactly how
the conditions can be unearthed from that passage. Instead, I shall simply
list the seven conditions I believe the passage contains, saying just enough
about each to set up the argument to come.
The reason there is no loss of fidelity to the texts is that the Rawls of A
Theory of Justice and the Rawls who wrote the passage quoted at the begin-
ning of the previous section would not have thought that there was a
meaningful difference between CSL and CSL0 . But we shall see that there
is a difference once Rawls concedes the possibility of reasonable pluralism
about justice. I shall contend that Rawls would have appreciated that dif-
This condition might not seem very demanding, but I take enjoy and
protections to impose significant constraints. In Section IV.E we shall
see how demanding those constraints are.
17. In this and the previous sentence, I draw on John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 13536; see also 169.
18. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 176.
19. Ibid., 318; Rawls, Political Liberalism, lvlvi.
Whether citizens satisfy this condition would seem to depend on the con-
tent of their comprehensive doctrines. Rawls wants to leave open the pos-
sibility that some comprehensive doctrines which take part in an overlap-
ping consensus hold that normative authority is ultimately based on natural
law or on some other prior moral order. With a bit more detail we can take
Joan, whom I introduced in Section I, to exemplify this possibility.
Joan may treat principles of justice as regulative. But if she thinks
they are precepts of or implications of a natural or divine law, then the rea-
sons she takes herself to have for treating them as regulative will reflect
that. She will think that their authority is justified by the prior normative
authority of God or of the natural law. In that case, she does not seem to
be fully autonomous because she does not satisfy the second conjunct of
Rg. If I am right that Rawlss Kantian aim remained important to him af-
ter his turn to political liberalism, then it would be troubling if partici-
pants in an overlapping consensus like Joan were prevented from living
fully autonomous lives by their comprehensive doctrines. The challenge
is to show how Rawls can avoid that conclusion.
In Section I, we saw that full autonomy is realized by members of the
well-ordered society in their role as citizens. It is therefore in that capacity
that they satisfy the conditions of full autonomy which apply to them, in-
cluding Rg. So to see how Joan can satisfy the second conjunct of Rg, we
have to see how Joanin her role as a citizencan take the collective
self-legislation of principles of justice to justify their authority.
When practical principles have authority over our deliberations in-
sofar as we occupy a particular role, the considerations that justify their
for roughly the same reasons she seemed unable to satisfy the second
conjunct of Rg. She believes in a prior and independent moral order,
22. In Reply to Habermas, Rawls famously identifies three kinds of justification; see
Rawls, Political Liberalism, 38587. It may be thought that the kind of justification I have said
Joan must have if she is to satisfy Rg should find a place in that schema. But it cannot fit
into that schema, since the schema distinguishes kinds of justification that can be had
by a political conception of justice as a whole, and not by the authority of their first prin-
ciples. Moreover, Rawls does not say that these three kinds of justification are all the kinds
of justification there are. He merely implies that they are all the kinds he needs to identify
to answer the question he has in view: that of how the concepts of justification and stability
for the right reasons fit together. The kind of justification I have discussed here does not
need to fit into the schema of Reply to Habermas since it bears on a very different ques-
tion, that of how full autonomy is possible.
23. This may not seem like an assurance problem properly so called. I argue that it is
in Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawlss Political Turn (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 32731.
24. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 39.
25. Ibid., lilii.
26. Rawls could have dealt with the possibility of such cases by forbidding themthat
is, by forbidding citizens to introduce comprehensive doctrine in the first place. So the ar-
gument for the in due course clause also depends on the assumption that such a prohi-
bition would make the public reason conditions implausibly restrictive.
27. I explore this in Paul Weithman, Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9596 and 11112.
A. A Preliminary
Full autonomy in a society characterized by pluralism about justice might
be thought impossible by definition. For full autonomy is, by the mean-
ing of full, possible only for members of societies which are well or-
dered.28 And a well-ordered society is one in which (1) everyone accepts
and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, and (2) the
basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to sat-
isfy these principles.29 Since a society characterized by reasonable plu-
ralism about justice cannot satisfy conditions (1) and (2), it seems to fol-
low that citizens of that society cannot be fully autonomous.
But basic social institutions could, at any given time, satisfy the de-
mands of one conception or another, though which conception is satis-
fied could change over time. Indeed, since Rawls seems to allow that a
mixture of conceptions counts as a conception,30 it seems that basic in-
stitutions always satisfy the demands of a conception of justice, so that
For CSL0 says that the fundamental terms of the well-ordered society are
those that citizens would give themselves, not those that citizens could
give themselves. And since CSL0 is a necessary condition of full auton-
omy, citizens cannot live fully autonomous lives in a society whose first
principles of justice fail to satisfy it.
The failure of the principles to satisfy CSL0 would have a cascading
effect. Citizens who recognize that the principles fail to satisfy it might still
satisfy the first conjunct of the regulation condition,
But they would be unable to satisfy its second conjunct, since that con-
junct refers to the fact that the terms would be collectively self-legislated
and principles which fail to satisfy CSL0 would not be. Even if the prin-
ciples of the winning conception do satisfy CSL0 , reasonable pluralism
about justice ensures that there will be citizens of the well-ordered society
who believe they do not because they think that the principles of some
33. See ibid., 77 n. 19 and accompanying text.
36. Any liberal conception would arguably satisfy the fundamental interests of the
parties in the original position, since Rawls says that the parties have a fundamental inter-
est in liberty and in the means to make fair use of it (Theory of Justice, 493).
37. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xlviii.
or to strengthen L3 so that it requires the difference principle. Thus, the question whether
parties to the choice would give themselves L1L3 is really the question whether a set of
principles weaker at one or more of the three places would do.
I think that it is clear that the answer is no. Weakening L1 by removing an entry from
the list of rights and liberties that receive protection would decrease citizens freedom.
Weakening L2 would raise the likelihood that the liberty and equality of some could be
compromised by trading off their liberties for an alleged increase in the greater good.
Weakening L3 would violate equality by leaving some unable to enjoy their liberty. So
L1L3 are just the highest-order constraints members of the well-ordered society would give
themselves.
I said at the outset that I take one of Rawlss central aims to be the Kantian
one of showing how freedom can be had in political society. I have ar-
gued, contrary to the charge some critics have leveled, that the kind of
freedom Rawls privilegeswhat he called full autonomycan be achieved
in a society with an overlapping consensus on a family of liberal political
conceptions of justice. It can be achieved because the seven conditions of
full autonomy that I have identified can all be satisfied in that society. I
have suggested at a couple of places that Political Liberalism has the ap-
pearance of an ongoing project. The argument offered here is meant to
54. For an especially sobering assessment of the conditions under which large eco-
nomic inequalities can be reduced, see Walter Scheidel, The Great Leveler: Violence and the
History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2017).
55. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxxix.