(1971).

Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 19: 131-142

Models of the Psychic Apparatus

Samuel Abrams, M.D.
Robert S. Wallerstein in his introduction, "Model-Building and Model Use in Psychoanalysis," noted that during the
development of psychoanalytic theory model-building and use had played central roles both as nodal descriptive-explanatory
mechanisms and heuristic devices. In his view, the primary purpose of the panel was neither to review the historical development
of model-building nor to investigate and critically compare latter-day emendations, but rather to reassess the status and the
usefulness of models in present-day psychoanalysis. John Gedo would seek to integrate various existing useful and used models
within a developmental framework; Arnold Modell would discuss the question of the limitations of models of the psychic
apparatus from the perspective of the basic assumptions underlying psychoanalytic knowledge itself; and Samuel Abrams would
speak of the implications of various existing models for clinical technique by describing four differing clinical postures and their
roots in the various Freudian models. Following the three formal presentations, Charles Brenner would undertake the task of
opening the general discussion centering around the issues thus crystallized.
Wallerstein concluded by listing a number of assertions concerning models and their place in psychoanalysis which he
considered an agreed-upon framework within which the panel might proceed. These included the following: (1) Currently
operative models deal only with functions in conflict inasmuch as psychoanalysis has primarily addressed itself to the central
problems of motivation and conflict; hence, conflict-free operations are not encompassed by them. (2) Models are only heuristic
devices, scientific metaphors, or, in Freud's words, only "intellectual scaffolding." (3) Models may be misused: their application
may result in an oversimplification of exceedingly complex phenomena, or the models themselves may become reified. (4)
Finally, although models have been useful, their justification is not necessarily self-evident. Hence, the aim of this panel: to
reconsider the place of models and to discuss their range, usefulness, and limitations.

Held at the Spring Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, San Francisco, May, 1970. Chairman: Robert S. Wallerstein, M.D.
Submitted June 30, 1970
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Following this introduction, John Gedo presented his paper, "A Hierarchical Model of the Modes of Mental Functioning
Observed in Psychoanalysis," which, he said, was merely a brief summation of a comprehensive book he was currently writing
with Arnold Goldberg. Gedo reasserted the need for an internally consistent metapsychological framework to bring the clinical
theories derived from the data of psychoanalysis into some conceptual order. A thesis central to his recent work has been that the
clinical data of psychoanalysis can best be ordered into a series of hierarchically interrelated systems, all subsumed within a
developmental framework.
Specifying his superordinate model or schema, Gedo suggested that a typical and expectable unfolding of a series of parallel
developmental lines might be plotted along the horizontal axis of a rectangular co-ordinate graph, so that a maturational sequence
within these lines would be indicated in a left-to-right progression with the passage of time. Because portions of the personality,
however, did not participate in such a "left-to-right" progression, certain other expectable alterations might be indicated along the
vertical axis, e.g., a "change of function" modification, as when orality is transformed into the autonomous skill of the gourmet.
If a number of separate developmental lines encompassing varying functions were to be plotted, the enhanced complexity thus
created could be represented through layering. The horizontal and vertical modifications would not only show progressive
movements, but would suggest the potential for regressive shifts as well. In the hope that such a schema might be useful as a
nosological tool, Gedo explained that he and Goldberg had selected certain specific lines of development for plotting, with the
aim of facilitating a classificatory differentiation. The following nosological grouping might be utilized for delineation: (1)
Expectable functioning in adults; (2) Neurotic Character Disorders; (3) Narcissistic Personality Disorders; (4) Psychotic
Disorders; (5) Traumatic states; (6) Arrests in development.
In order to organize such entities within a useful schema, Gedo suggested plotting certain specific and necessary lines of
development. First, there would be those of the typical situation of danger as exemplified in Freud's "The Problem of Anxiety":
(1) The earliest danger, traumatic overstimulation; (2) the threat of the loss of the need-satisfying object and the loss of the
object's love; (3) fear of castration; (4) the danger of moral anxiety, which follows upon the establishment of the superego; (5)
and the danger of realistic external threats, which follows the consolidation of the repression-barrier.
A second major developmental line which Gedo viewed as essential for his nosologically useful schema was the function of
the development of the sense of reality which he outlined, once again, in a sequential series. Next, Gedo described other
necessary developmental lines; e.g., the line of development from dependency to emotional self-reliance and adult object
relationships, and he indicated the necessity for a developmental sequence encompassing object relationships as well.

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Furthermore, he offered one involving
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narcissism and another involving the creation of self-organization. He noted that it was possible to attempt some integration
between the sequence of object relationships and the development of the self. Gedo concluded his proposed listing by suggesting
an ontogeny of defenses. He outlined these sequences in a way which partially co-ordinated the others. Thus, (1) initially there is
primal repression and the vicissitudes of instinct; (2) this is followed by the use of introjection and projection which follows, once
self- and object differentiation is established; (3) then there is disavowal or denial, which occurs between the nodal points of
self-object differentiation and the development of the formation of the superego; (4) next is repression proper, once the infantile
neurosis and castration anxiety is engaged; (5) and lastly there is "renunciation," i.e., a process without defensive efforts, which
takes place when the repression barrier is strong enough to permit a consolidation of the system, ego.
Recapitulating his position, Gedo said he hoped he had been able to demonstrate that the lines of development fall into
parallel phases and that each could be separated from the other by certain developmental nodal points. He noted that the
assignment of modality as typical for any given phase did not obviate its possible utilization in other phases as well. He listed the
phases: Phase I: birth to self-object cognitive differentiation; Phase II: from such differentiation to the essentially irreversible
unification of the self-system; Phase III: from this consolidation to the formation of the superego; Phase IV: from such formation
to the completion of the laying down of the repression barrier, or final differentiation of the system, ego; and Phase V: the era of
the fully developed psychic apparatus.
Gedo next turned to a graphic representation of these concepts. He pointed out that if the development lines were plotted and
viewed as a temporal record, they would create an epigenetic schema of expectable personality development. At that time,
however, if the diagram thus constructed were viewed as a series of possible modes of personality organization, a hierarchical
array of models of the mind would have been created, indicating a whole range of possible mental functioning from the most
regressive to the most mature. Furthermore, since a close interdependence of the various lines cited could be expected, cohesive
clusters of certain cardinal aspects of mental functioning would be graphically illustrated, with five modes of organization
distinguished from each other.
Gedo concluded his presentation by summarizing the five organized groupings thus outlined afresh, and suggested that a
different subsidiary model might be utilized to elucidate the details of each. For example, Freud's tripartite model could be
applicable to Phase IV conditions, the reflex-arc model would be suitable for the circumstances of Phase I, the topographic model
might characterize Phase V, whereas the modes of Phases II and III would call for subsidiary models organized around the
vicissitudes of the relationship between self and object.
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The second formal paper, "Freud's Model of the Psychic Apparatus and the Nature of Psychoanalytic Knowledge," was read
by Arnold Modell. A reexamination of models of the mind, Dr. Modell began, imposes two questions: the first encompasses the
contents of the models, especially in terms of their applicability and the pathways of necessary change. A second question, a
more fundamental one, encompasses the necessity to consider those underlying assumptions which are implicit in the construction
of such models; this entails an examination of the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge itself. The very acceptance of Freud's
model of the psychic apparatus may be a shibboleth which separates those who view psychoanalysis as a science from those who
view it basically as a humanistic enterprise with a logic quite different from the logic of science.
With regard to the first of his questions, Modell distinguished two kinds of models, one thought to be isomorphic with
reality, and a second, developed simply to organize or idealize experiences. Freud's models were of the second category; i.e.,
"scientific fictions not to be taken too seriously."
Modell noted that all model-building is necessarily influenced by the fundamental assumptions of those who construct the
model. Initially, Freud was attempting to emulate the science of physics. Especially influenced by the physicalistic school of
Helmholtz, he was moved to demonstrate general "laws" of psychic functioning, analogous to the established "laws" of the
physical sciences. Doubtless it was this which led him to attempt to incorporate Fechner's constancy principle, a general "law"
which has since received intensive and justifiable criticism. Modell noted a second serious difficulty in Freud's earliest model,
that described in Chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams. This is a model of the mind of a dreamer, and hence one not
applicable to the mind of one in active interaction with the environment. In his model, Freud represents the environment merely
as a recent unmodifiable memory, a stimulus contributing to the formation of a dream. No active alteration of the environment is
possible, since the dreamer is asleep. Ordinarily, however, quite a different situation exists. For example, in the psychoanalytic
situation, the affects of a patient are communicated to the analyst, whose affects, in turn, are communicated back to the patient. In
such circumstances, in contrast to his situation as a dreamer, the patient's affects may influence the analyst's, and hence serve to
modify the existing environment. The distinction between these two settings might best be categorized respectively as
perspectives of metapsychology (the dream situation) and process theory (the interpersonal situation). Modell recognized that
Freud's later tripartite model is not subject to this particular criticism insofar as it accounts for the organism and the influence of

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the environment as well. In that model, the ego is defined as the portion of the mental apparatus which is subject to the
individual's own experience, a fact which distinguished it from the id. Modell noted that this distinction was to be blurred by
subsequent investigators who suggested that a part of the ego was in fact prestructured and biologically determined.
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Having dealt with the first of his two major questions, Modell turned to the second: an examination of the assumptions
underlying the construction of models in psychoanalysis. Man, he said, could be viewed as a phenomenon of nature, subject to
the same laws that influence all other natural phenomena. It is just such an assumption which is implicit in Freud's earliest
physicalistic model. From that point of view the mind is analogous to a machine with separate parts and functions. It lends itself
to study, as do neurophysiological data, with a clear separation between it and the observer; the process of observation itself is
assumed to have no significant effect on the phenomena under observation. However, Modell argued, the subject matter of
psychoanalysis also encompasses man as molded by civilization and not merely as part of nature. Furthermore, it is likely that the
products of culture do not have the same high degree of generalizability as do natural phenomena. Similarly, the relationship of
the observer to what is observed is also quite different.
In illustration of his view, Modell noted that Erikson's concept of identity and his theory of the life cycle entail a study of
man's created environment rather than a view of man as merely a part of nature. In addition, it is evident that psychosocial
processes directly influence our nosology. There are vast differences in those who have sought analytic treatment over the years
between the early flamboyant hysteric, who has all but disappeared, and the current group, whose conflicts appear to be chiefly in
the area of object relationships. If such changing patterns reflect broad psychohistorical processes, the assumption underlying the
model of the psychic apparatus, that one may generalize for the entire species, would have no relevance in this context.
Modell discussed the question of the observer's relationship to the observed phenomena. He noted that Freud himself had
acknowledged that the historical awareness of the observer influenced that which was observed. Hence, psychoanalysis shares a
perspective with history in the sense that it assigns meaning to what is observed by placing an observation into a given historical
context. The analyst must select from multiple possibilities; i.e., the patient's own life history, the analyst's past experience and
his life history, the analyst's continuing life situation, and the present stage of his own life cycle. All these influence the range of
his sensitivity. A model of the psychic apparatus based on an analogy with physiology, Modell argues, could not do justice to the
multiple influences arising from the diverse relationships between the observer and the observed.
Although he had noted earlier that there were some who regarded models of the mind as a shibboleth separating those who
view psychoanalysis as a science from those who view it as a fundamentally humanistic enterprise, Modell himself took the
position that psychoanalysis was a science, albeit a unique one. It was unique in the sense that it simultaneously studied
phenomena within both the biological and the historical-humanistic traditions. He concluded by noting that it was important to
distinguish these
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differing trends, and he suggested that models of the mental apparatus be restricted to only those phenomena having a high degree
of generalizability.
Samuel Abrams' paper, "Freudian Models and Clinical Stance," began with a brief dramatization of a typical clinical case
seminar. The presenting analyst described a particular session in which a patient's attitudes, verbal productions, recent and past
symptoms, and current feelings were all evident. Following this, four "colleagues," participants in the seminar, offered their
views of the material. The first analyst focused on the aggression in the patient and on its consequences. He suggested that it was
necessary to analyze the evident hostility to permit it to achieve more direct expression. A second analyst acknowledged the
manifest anger, but addressed himself to the latent unconscious sexuality. Citing evidence from within the hour, he went on to
suggest that interpretation (i.e., translation) of the sexuality into conscious awareness was necessary to promote analytic progress.
A third colleague felt the need to specify the sexual wishes in terms of psychosexual phases. In addition, he concentrated on the
transference, indicating the need for reconstruction of the infantile incestuous attachments through the medium of the
transference neurosis. The fourth analyst emphasized the issue of regression and the problem centering about structural
differentiation and object constancy. He thought that work in this area was necessary to permit a total developmental movement
in the treatment process.
Abrams suggested that these four stances reflect distinctive Freudian models of the mind: the entropic, the reflex arc, the
genetic or Darwinian, and the neural integration hierarchies of Hughlings Jackson. The entropic (or energic), Abrams noted, was
derived from Freud's interest in the concepts of energy build-up and release, a heritage of the nineteenth century physiologists.
He pointed out many theoretical ideas and clinical stratagems derived from this model; e.g., the laws of psychic energy and
certain maxims such as, "Depression is aggression turned round upon the self." The reflex arc or topographic model not
only emphasizes discharge, but adds the required direction. From the viewpoint of this model, psychopathology arises when there
are obstacles to energic disposal. It is the topographic construct that leads to that "ultimate pact" between every analyst and every
analysand: "If we only knew." The third model, the genetic or evolutionary, was influenced largely by the theories of Darwin

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and Lamarck. The attention to transference is one element which emerges from this. As he had done with the others, Abrams
indicated theoretical and clinical consequences deriving from this viewpoint. Finally, he outlined the Jacksonian concepts
implicit in Freud's model of hierarchically placed structures. Regressive and progressive processes are emphasized in such a
model, with certain resultant theoretical implications and clinical posturings.
Abrams concluded by acknowledging the value, but noting the potential limitations of all models. Specifically, he
highlighted the danger of clinicians' clinging to certain models and stances even after their heuristic function had
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passed, possibly because of tradition, current vogue, or the lure of illusory success. He cautioned that under such circumstances
models could become simply "fetishistic fascinations."
Charles Brenner, initiating the general discussion, thought that in view of the differences among the three papers, it would be
preferable to discuss each of them in turn, rather than attempt any synthesis. He suggested that the hierarchical model Gedo
created is an excellent start in an appropriate direction. It serves to illuminate those problems which presently exist in our
attempts at classifying and diagnosing. Our ordinary nosology still rests too much on both the description of symptoms and the
progress and course of the varying disorders. The approach offered by Gedo and Goldberg, on the other hand, is specifically
psychoanalytic and parallels Anna Freud's work in the field of the disorders of childhood. Brenner acknowledged that he himself
had approached the problem of diagnostic assessment in quite a similar fashion for some time. Although he expressed agreement
with the basic conceptual formulation, he did note that certain areas of difference exist. For example, he was not convinced that
mental functioning and development are divisible into precisely the five phases outlined.
Brenner thought Modell's paper dealt with more than the mere question of psychoanalytic models and theories. He believed
that Modell was suggesting that we should not be "exclusively" scientific in approaching our data, that we must be "humanistic"
as well. Brenner considered such an idea unsupported by observable facts. Modell's conceptual offering seemed to rest on the
idea that science is equivalent to physics. People with such an attitude, Brenner argued, often contain in their definition of
"humanism" an implication that man is a special creature, something different in essence from the rest of nature. He noted that
modern science is very new, largely a development of the past 350 years, having replaced religious cosmologies in which man
invariably held a special place in the universe. "Humanism," as a philosophy with an approach distinct from science, is often an
attempt to regain that special place; although "humanism," as an ethical idea, is not unscientific in either theory or practice. To
the degree that it is used as an antonym for science, however, it probably represents an expression of a yearning for the lost
consolation of religions. Concerning Modell's emphasis on history, Brenner commented that it, too, is a scientific endeavor,
despite the fact that historians of the past were often simply story-tellers or perhaps patriotic deceivers, basically untrained in any
scientific methods. For his part, he could not believe that any class of phenomena ought to be approached in any way other than
scientific.
Brenner considered incontestable Abrams' conclusion concerning the dangers of the misuse of models. He understood the
paper as suggesting that as clinicians, our approach should not be one-sided; that a competent analyst entertains many possible
explanations, without limiting himself to any basic posture. Moreover, such an analyst recognizes that different stances may not
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be mutually exclusive, just as different aspects of psychoanalytic theory are not mutually contradictory. Implicit in all this,
Brenner noted, is the view that an experienced and knowledgeable analyst does have a way of deciding what is important and
useful, although such a decision arises from a host of conscious and unconscious factors. Addressing himself to the clinical
specifics described by Abrams, Brenner believed there was not sufficient evidence to support any of the basic postures offered.
Hence, it was necessary to keep them all in mind. He suggested that to feel certain which of these factors was of primary
importance would be an example of the sort of posturing against which we have been warned. Similarly, it would be erroneous to
feel that analyzing, interpreting, reconstructing, or a focus on the analytic process are activities which are in any sense mutually
exclusive. For someone to hold such an opinion would suggest that he was indeed a victim of "fetishistic fascination."
George Wiedeman believed that a structural model, in which structure is defined by function, represents a contradiction in
terms. Such a model makes it difficult for us to communicate with other sciences. There are aspects of structure of an inhibitory
nature, for example, which, in fact, are determinants of observed functions. He hoped for some discussion concerning the
problems implicit in such a contradiction. He argued for a model based on systems theory which could be characterized by its
psychic organization and its history. In such a model, functions might be subdivided into reversible short-range ones involved in
everyday behavior on the one hand, and irreversible long-range behavioral manifestations on the other. Such a model would be
acceptable to other sciences and might lead to an integration with modern information and systems theories.
Gustav Bychowski addressed his remarks primarily to some of Modell's comments, which he challenged. Scientific
endeavor, he said, according to the philosopher Windelband, may be divided into the nomothetic and ideographic. Included
within the first category would be those sciences, such as the natural sciences, which aim to establish laws and which may be
distinguished from those which are concerned with the images of individuals, such as the historical and humanistic sciences.

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Bychowski noted that psychoanalysis attempts to live up to both definitions of science, working with the Gestalt of individuals,
but involved simultaneously with the concrete endeavor of establishing valid laws. It is, after all, he concluded, the approach to
data which characterizes any endeavor as "scientific."
Following these brief remarks, Wallerstein, turned his attention to questions submitted by the members of the audience. One
unidentified questioner wondered if Gedo had not blurred the distinction between metapsychology and models. Wallerstein
himself raised a question about the validity of Gedo's use of the ontogeny of the defense organization. Specifically, he asked
about the defense mechanism of reaction formation, which, according to Gedo's developmental model, is presumed to be a
concomitant of the
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anal stage, yet is a complex defense, incorporating as a component, repression which supposedly arises from the later phallic
stage. How could such data be reconciled with Gedo's model?
Gedo chose first to reply to a question implied in Brenner's critique concerning the validity of the chosen phase-groupings.
He remarked that the schema was created to help distinguish the nosology with which he had begun. He did feel that the five
phases described were appropriate in terms of the six specific clusters of functions detectable clinically. He allowed that if
another set of conditions were chosen, the phases doubtlessly would have appeared differently. These statements served to
emphasize his view that the hierarchical model is not a literal "thing," but simply an example of the application of a principle to a
set of constructs. Turning to the question of the relationship between models and metapsychology, Gedo felt that the viewpoints
of metapsychology and the concepts of models of the mind are entirely separate conceptual tools. Finally, concerning the
specifics of the developmental sequence of the defense organization, Gedo agreed that it was appropriate to raise such questions
as the place of reaction formation; this and other related issues will in fact be met in the forthcoming book. He concurred with
Wallerstein's point that the schema as presented requires a theory of reaction formation divorced from the prior utilization of
repression.
Wallerstein next addressed some comments and questions to Modell. Wallerstein had earlier drawn attention to a quotation
by Home1 concerning scientific and humanistic enterprises which suggested that the logic of the method of the humanities was
radically different from that of the sciences. Home had distinguished between "interpretation" and "explanation." Science asks
"how" and receives an answer in terms of causes, thus creating an explanation. A humanistic study asks "why," receives answers
in terms of reasons or interpretations; thus, a study of the meaning of behavior was not a pursuit of explanations, since meanings
are not facts. Wallerstein wondered how closely this stood to Modell's view. Leonard Epstein wanted to know whether the
Sandler-Joffe model2 was not in fact applicable for both normal functioning and conflict situations. Another questioner took
exception to Modell's comments that Freud had said his models ought not to be taken "too seriously." The questioner wondered if
what Freud meant was that models, after all, really did serve a serious heuristic purpose, although they ought not be concretized
or reified. And finally, Wallerstein expressed his disagreement with Modell's statement that the model of the psychic apparatus
was not relevant to psychohistorical phenomena. He believed that psychoanalysis had two perspectives, the generalizable law
and the unraveling of idiosyncratic paths. He thought it preferable that we articulate and

1 Home, H. J. (1966), The concept of mind. Int. J. of Psycho-Anal., 47:43-49.

2 Sandler, J. and Joffe, W. (1966) Towards a basic psychoanalytic model. Int. J. of Psycho-Anal., 50:79-90.
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integrate these rather than find ourselves in the position of viewing them as parallel tracks that, albeit covering the same ground,
never meet.
In reply, Modell elected first to address some remarks to Brenner's critique. He reasserted his own view of himself as a
scientist; he had hoped to avoid the polarization of the "quasi-religious" and the "hard-headed." He was impressed with the point
raised by Home; however, he was not in agreement with the idea that because psychoanalysis deals with the problem of meaning,
it is a humanistic and not a scientific enterprise. Nevertheless, he thought our field could make a significant contribution to the
current revolution in philosophy. Attempting to define his position more clearly, Modell noted that the work of Erikson still
remained insufficiently integrated with psychoanalytic knowledge. There are, for example, two concepts of "identity." First,
there is an early "body ego" sense of identity, a concept which fits in well with the hypothesis of the psychic apparatus. Second,
there is an identity within a specific cultural setting which is not adequately dealt with in our models. Whereas Modell did not
feel that these concepts were on parallel planes, he saw the necessity for approaching clinical material now from one standpoint
and now from the other. He elected to defer the question of the Sandler-Joffe model at this time.
Dr. I. Rosen, of Topeka, wondered if the concept of repetition compulsion could find a place in Abrams' consideration of
models. Emmanuel Windholz inquired about comparisons with the basic model of Sandler-Joffe especially from the viewpoints
of hierarchy, principles of mental functioning, and relationships to other models. And finally, Wallerstein himself, asked if the

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four differing postures and their latent models suggested by Abrams, were after all merely restatements of the basic
metapsychological perspectives.
Abrams replied to the last question first. He noted, as had Gedo earlier, that there were significant differences between
models and metapsychology. Deferring the question of the Sandler-Joffe model, Abrams chose instead to comment on the
dissonances which he felt had emerged so far in the general discussion. These were in part, he suggested, "cognitive"
dissonances. Brenner, for example, had brought a fifth man into the fictionalized seminar, an ideal analyst who could accept the
notion that for the moment he didn't know. Abrams noted that one common quality which had linked the other four was an
intolerance for uncertainty or ambiguity, a cognitive trait which could adversely influence analytic work. Problems might arise,
for example, when there was a cognitive congruence between analyst and analysand, resulting in a positive clinical effect at the
expense of the kind of analytic influence we ordinarily have in mind. The "different logics" which had been alluded to by others
might also be encompassed in this view of cognitive dissonances. Abrams concluded by noting that the models he described
contained both synthetic and reductionistic attitudes; as for the repetition compulsion, he felt it was one reductionist heuristic
concept which might fit into any model or theory which leaned on such attitudes.
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Wallerstein then offered the last question from the floor. It was so general a question that he had saved it for the "generalist,"
Brenner. Howard Shevrin asked what place a study of the rules of inference could have in establishing the value of different
models and in limiting their proliferation, and what place the study of rules by which inferences from different models might be
tested has in model-building. In short, he wondered "was it possible to build constraints into model-building so as not to be in a
position of having a fire sale on old models every few years?"
Brenner said he knew no way of doing so and even doubted if it were advisable. Rather, he felt that it was important to
encourage theorizing and imaginative speculations in any scientific enterprise, along with, however, the capacity for
self-criticism. He noted that it is necessary to recognize that the organization of scientific data derives only partly from the body
of data itself, for theorizing is a creative act involving drives, conflicts, childhood experiences, etc. Naturally, it is important to be
as precise as possible concerning the criteria utilized to validate a specific intervention in any particular case; however, no
satisfactory set of rules of inference exists, either in psychoanalysis or in any other field of science, for that matter. The only
generalization Brenner was prepared to propose at the present was this: If facts contradict theory, it is necessary to change theory.
Wallerstein then called upon Gedo who had prepared some concluding remarks. Gedo took note of those who had suggested
that our models were limited to data concerning functions in conflict. He felt that this need be so only if models were constructed
from that viewpoint; ordinarily, psychoanalysts elect to do so because their observable data accrues from the analytic situation
which, for the most part, reflects conflict situations. Even as things stood, however, Gedo noted that a considerable body of data
concerning autonomous functions had evolved and could be encompassed in some psychoanalytic models. In fact, the schema he
had proposed permitted the plotting of conflict-free functions along the vertical axis of its diagram.
As for Modell's point of view, Gedo took exception to the opinion that models could not be records of historical possibilities.
In his thinking, it is the reifying term, "apparatus," which impairs the integration of psychohistorical data; the term, and not the
basic tool of model-building, should be eliminated.
Next, Gedo turned to Abrams' clinical example. He suggested that the confusion resulting from inevitable divergences might
be overcome by the application of systems theory. Thus, the problem illustrated could be subsumed under the "principle of
equifinality," which holds that the same final result may be obtained by following a number of alternate possible pathways. Gedo
recalled that he and Goldberg had shown this in their Hierarchical Model by the technique of layering. Although in essential
accord with the issues proposed by Abrams, Gedo noted differences in vocabulary. He also took exception to the equating of the
Topographic with the Reflex Arc
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Model. He felt this was unwarranted and derived from Freud's switch in metaphors in Chapter VII of his Dream book from the
neurological reflex arc to a compound optical instrument. Gedo concluded by expressing the view that a dichotomy between
science and humanism was not necessary. What was reflected was a deviation of science from its humanistic roots. Furthermore,
he felt that it was possible to utilize a model combining scientific rigor and the outlook derived from a historical perspective, even
though the methods of validating the conclusions of scientists and historians might be quite different.
- 142 -

Article Citation [Who Cited This?]

Abrams, S. (1971). Models of the Psychic Apparatus. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 19: 131-142

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