PEOPLE VS. RELOVA [149 SCRA 292; G.R. NO.

L-45129; 6 MAR 1987]

Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information
for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police
together with personnel of BatangasElectric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the premises of
the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city
government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings ofelectric
current consumption in the plants electric meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery
when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed against
Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage
and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The
Assistant fiscals claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices
without the approval and necessary authority from theCity Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the
second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against
Mr.Opulencia.

Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas
on the ground of theft of electricity punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code.

Held: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights
give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The first would be that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the second
sentence states that If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act. In the case at bar,
it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if the offensescharged are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance
and the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal
under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was
acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.

G.R. No. L-42925 January 31, 1977

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RICARDO D. GALANO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, and GREGORIO SANTOS, respondents.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Hugo Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr. and Trial Attorney Blesila O. Quintillan for petitioner.
Juanito M. Romano for respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J:
The Court sets aside the respondent judge's orders dismissing the information for estafa against respondent accused, since the offense charged clearly has not
prescribed. The complaint filed with the Batangas court which expressly alleged commission of the offense within the municipality and which pended for twelve years
(the accused having jumped bail and evaded rearrest for nine years) and which was eventually dismissed by said court for lack of territorial jurisdiction as a result of
the proof adduced before it properly interrupted and tolled the prescription period. Respondent judge failed, in ruling otherwise, to apply the settled rule that the
jurisdiction of a court is determined in criminal cases by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof. The case is ordered remanded
for determination with the utmost dispatch, since this case has already been pending for fifteen years owing to respondent accused's deplorable tactics. The
undisputed factual background of the case is succinctly stated by then Acting Solicitor General, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,
thus:
1. On October 2,1962, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed in the municipal court of Batangas, Batangas (now City Court of Batangas City) against the accused-
respondent Gregorio Santos by complainant, Juanito Limbo, ...
2. Gregorio Santos was arrested to answer for the above charge, and upon his arrest, posted a bail bond for his provisional liberty. The accused was thereafter
arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Then, the case was heard on its merits. However, on September 16, 1964, the accused jumped bail. As a result, his
bail bond was forfeited and the case against him archived by the municipal court of Batangas, Batangas.
3. It was not until September 14, 1973, about nine years later, when the accused was re-arrested, and the trial of the said case resumed.
4. On October 21, 1974, while the said case was pending trial, private respondent Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Batangas
court did not have territorial jurisdiction over the case, the evidence showing that the crime was committed in Manila.
5. Finding the motion meritorious, the Batangas City Court issued an order dated November 5, 1974, dismissing the case against Gregorio Santos for lack of territorial
jurisdiction over the crime charged ...
6. On November 14, 1974, the complainant Juanito B. Limbo refiled the same case against Gregorio Santos in the Fiscal's Office of Manila. A preliminary investigation
was conducted. On July 29, 1975, the corresponding information was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 22397, ...
7. On November 12, 1975 the accused Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss criminal Case No. 22397 on the grounds of prescription and double jeopardy.
8. The prosecuting fiscal filed his opposition to said motion on December 2, 1975, to which the accused filed a rejoinder on December 5, 1975.
9. On December 8, 1975, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, presided over by the Honorable Ricardo D. Galano, issued an order dismissing Criminal
Case No. 22397 on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed, ... The prosecution moved for the reconsideration of said order but this was denied
by the lower court by order of January 7, 1976. ...
10. From the said Order of dismissal, the City Fiscal of Manila offenses provides: interposed an appeal by certiorari to this Honorable Court on January 24, 1976. On
March 3, 1976, this honorable Court issued the Resolution of March 3, 1976 requiring the Solicitor General to file the petition for review within fifteen days from
receipt thereof ...
The People avers in the petition 1 that respondent judge "dismissing criminal Case No. 22397 despite the provisions of Article l of the Revised Penal Code, which
clearly indicate that the offense charged has not prescribed" and "in not considering the prevailing jurisprudence indicating non-prescription of the offense charged,
and in holding that the case ofPeople v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494, does not apply to the case at bar."
The petition is patently meritorious and must be granted.
I. The offense of estafa for which respondent accused stands charged clearly has not prescribed.
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or by their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information and shall commence to run again when the proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. ...
The offense was committed on or about September 16, 1962 when respondent failed to account for and instead misappropriated to his own use the sum of
P8,704.00 representing the net proceeds (minus his commission) of 272 booklets of sweepstakes tickets that had been entrusted to him be the complainant, who
promptly filed on October 2, 1962 plainly within the ten-year prescriptive period the criminal complaint against respondent accused in the Municipal Court of
Batangas, Batangas. The prescriptive period was thereupon interrupted.
After his plea of not guilty and during the trial, respondent accused jumped bail in September, 1964 and evaded rearrest for nine years until September, 1973 and the
trial was resumed. When the Batangas court in its Order of November 5, 1974 upon respondent's motion dismissed the complaint "for lack of jurisdiction" since
the evidence(of both prosecution and accused) showed that all elements of the crime were committed in Manila (and not in Batangas), 2 the proceedings therein
terminated without conviction or acquittal of respondent accused and it was only then that the prescriptive period (which was interrupted during the pendency of
the case in the Batangas court) commenced to run again.
When the City Fiscal of Manila upon complainant's instance refiled on July 29, 1975 the same case against respondent accused in the Manila court of first instance,
(after having conducted a preliminary investigation), it is clear that not even a year of the ten-year prescriptive period had been consumed.
Respondent accused intent on thwarting his prosecution filed anew a motion to dismiss the information on grounds of prescription and double jeopardy. There is
manifestly no jeopardy, because he was not acquitted by the Batangas court which on the basis of the evidence could neither convict him because it was thereby
shown to have no jurisdiction over the offense.
But respondent judge gravely erred in sustaining the ground of prescription, ruling that there was no interruption of the prescriptive period during the pendency of
the case in the Batangas court because "(T)he proceedings contemplated by Article 91 are proceedings which are valid and before a competent court. If they are void
from the beginning because the court has no territorial jurisdiction of the offense charged, it is as if no proceedings were held thereat. If this is so, then the warrant
or order of arrest as well as the bail given by the accused for his provisional liberty is of no effect. Inevitably, there can be no jumping bail to speak of and there are no
proceedings to be interrupted."
This is plain error for "Settled is the rule ... that the jurisdiction of a court is determined in criminal cases by theallegations of the complaint or information and not by
the result of proof." 4
It follows clearly that the Batangas court was vested with lawful jurisdiction over the criminal complaint filed with it which expressly alleged that the offense was
committed "in the Municipality of Batangas, province of Batangas" and that the proceedings therein were valid and before a competent court, (including the arrest
warrant, the grant of bail and forfeiture thereof upon the accused's jumping of bail), until the same court issued its November. 1974 order dismissing the Case and
declaring itself without territorial jurisdiction on the basis of the evidence presented to it by both prosecution and the accused.
It follows just as clearly that the prescriptive period was interrupted and tolled during the 12-year pendency of the proceedings before the Batangas Court (for nine
years of which respondent accused had jumped bail and evaded re-arrest).
II. Respondent judge gravely erred in dismissing the information on the ground of prescription and disregarding the controlling case of People vs. Olarte. 5
In the second People vs. Olarte case, 6 the Court clarified precisely for the guidance of bench and bar that the true doctrine is that the filing of the compliant in the
municipal court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary investigation (where the offense charged is beyond its jurisdiction to try the case on the merits)
should, and does interrupt the period of prescription, as follows:
Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that there are two lines of decisions following differing criteria in determining whether prescription of
crimes has been interrupted. One line of precedents holds that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace (or municipal judge) does interrupt the course
of the prescriptive term: (People vs. Olarte, L-131027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil.
588, 590.) Another series of decisions declares that to produce interruption the complaint or information must have been filed in the proper court that has
jurisdiction to try the case on its merits:People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and after mature consideration
has arrived at the conclusion that thetrue doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decision holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal
Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription 'shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information' without distinguishing whether
the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuation already represents the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust
to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part
to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. 7
Respondent judge in his dismissal order correctly cited the rationale for statutory prescriptions, inter alia, that "the delay in instituting the proceedings not only
causes expenses to the State, but exposes public justice to peril, for it weakens oral evidence due to the lapse of the natural period of duration of memory if not to
anything, else. And it is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt and that statutes enforcing that promptitude should be maintained, they being not
merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon its subalterns, to exact vigilant activity and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be
obtained. 8
But respondent judge fell into grave error in not applying the controlling case of Olarte on his misconception that there had been no valid complaint filed with a
competent court in Batangas contrary to what has already been held hereinabove that the express allegations of the complaint that the offense was committed in
Batangas vested the Batangas court with lawful jurisdiction until its dismissal order twelve years later for lack of jurisdiction as a result of the proof presented before
it during the tiral (and in not taking into account that the delay was not at all due to the State but to respondent accused himself who jumped bail and escaped tile
law for nine [9] years and who apparently has made no effort all this time to make good the amount the to complainant or any part thereof).
Since the record with transcript of the testimonial evidence in the Batangas court is complete (and shows that the trial was continued on August 2, 1974 to
September 10, 1974 while respondent accused was testifying on the witness stand but that he instead filed his motion to dismiss of October 14, 1974 which granted
by the Batangas court for lack of territorial jurisdiction) and this case had already been pending for almost 15 years, all the evidence already taken by the Batangas
court as recorded in the minutes and transcript shall be deemed reproduced upon remand of the case to the Manila court which is hereby ordered to receive only the
remaining evidence of the respondent accused and such rebuttal evidence as the parties may have and thereafter resolve the case with the utmost dispatch.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge's dismissal orders of December 8, 1975 and January 7, 1976 are hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to respondent judge or
whoever presides Branch XIII of the Manila court of first instance for continuation of the trial (with reproduction of the evidence in the Batangas city court in Criminal
Case No. 532 thereof, entitled "People vs. Gregorio Santos") in line with the directives in the preceding paragraph. Respondent judge or the judge presiding his court
is further ordered to report to this Court the action taken hereon within a period of ninety (90) days from promulgation of this decision. In view of the many years
that the criminal case has been pending, this decision is declared immediately executory upon promulgation.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES = plaintiff-appellant, AURELIO BALISACAN = defendant-appellee

This is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of acquittal.
FACTS: Defendant-appellee Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. The information alleged that on December 3, 1964, in Nueva Era,
Ilocos Norte, the accused assaulted and stabbed to death Leonicio Bulaoat.
The accused, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of guilty. At his counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances.
The accused testified that he stabbed Bulaoat in self-defense because the latter was strangling him. He further stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the
police after the incident.
The court a quo rendered a decision acquitting the accused on the basis of his testimony. Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE: WON the instant appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy
RULING: It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. In the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of
guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony,
therefore as the court a quo recognized in its decision had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new
on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at
the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.
Furthermore, as aforestated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to
rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null
and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of former
jeopardy.
It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the trial judge below already gave credence to the testimony of the accused. In fairness to the
prosecution, without in any way doubting the integrity of said trial judge, We deem it proper to remand this case to the court a quo for further proceedings under
another judge of the same court, in one of the two other branches of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is remanded to the court for further proceedings under another judge of said court, that is,
for plea by the defendant, trial with presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the defense, and judgment thereafter.

Bill of Rights
Ivler vs. San Pedro
G.R. No. 172716November 17, 2010
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two
separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponces vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of
public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of
proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioners motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

ISSUES:

1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and

2. Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband.

RULING:

The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as
the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article
365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken
chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.

These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted
belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty
shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept
of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of
this ruling.

G.R. No. 176389 January 18, 2011

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO
BIONG, Appellants.
RESOLUTION
ABAD, J.:
On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano,
Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the
prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision;
decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses."1
But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article
III, that:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. x x x
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for
this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused
for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the
accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:2
[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm the
government with a potent instrument of oppression. The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict
an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. Societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal
trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest
in the enforcement of criminal laws.3
Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the
accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.4
Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. For instance, he avers
that the Court "must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and there is no grave abuse of discretion in the treatment of witnesses and the evidence."5But
he has not specified the violations of due process or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. His claim that "the highly
questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with serious doubts the validity of the decision"6 is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from
personal perception.
Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan7 as authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case. But
the government proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was "dictated, coerced and
scripted."8 It was a sham trial. Here, however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. He has made out no case that the
Court held a phony deliberation in this case such that the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited
themselves did not really go through the process.
Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Courts appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses credibility. He ascribes
grave error on the Courts finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words,
private complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as
it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et als conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be disturbed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit complainant Lauro G. Vizcondes motion for reconsideration dated December 28, 2010.
For essentially the same reason, the Court DENIES the motions for leave to intervene of Fr. Robert P. Reyes, Sister Mary John R. Mananzan, Bishop Evangelio L.
Mercado, and Dante L.A. Jimenez, representing the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and of former Vice President Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.

G.R. No. 177960 January 29, 2009

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner,
vs.
PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE SY and DEXIE DURAN, Respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari of the Decision2 dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution3 dated 25 April 2007 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
01179 entitled, Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R. Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan and Jeffrey Reso Dayap.
The case had its origins in the filing of an Information4 on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging herein petitioner
Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. The pertinent portion of the
information reads:
That at about 11:55 oclock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent manner a 10-wheeler cargo truck with
plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded with sacks of coconut shell, registered in the name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental,
thereby hitting an automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong who was with two female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran
and Elvie Sy, thus causing the instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R. Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and extensive
damage to the above-mentioned Colt Galant which is registered in the name of Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St., Dumaguete City, to the damage of the heirs
of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-mentioned.
An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.5
On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a motion for leave of court to file an amended information.6 They
sought to add the allegation of abandonment of the victims by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck abandoned the victims, at a time when said
[Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still alive inside the car; he was only extracted from the car by the by-standers."7
On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the motion to amend the information be considered withdrawn.8 On
21 January 2003, the MTC granted the withdrawal and the motion to amend was considered withdrawn.9
Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the prosecution. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner sought leave to file a
demurrer to evidence which was granted. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence10 dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecutions failure to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment11 dated 25 April 2005.
In the Order12 dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that the evidence
presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in the Information. Pertinent portions of the order state:
An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the same with the evidence presented by the prosecution would reveal that the evidence
presented has not established said allegations. The facts and circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not been proven. It is elementary in the rules of
evidence that a party must prove his own affirmative allegations.
xxxx
Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was the accused who committed the crime as charged. Its witnesses have never identified the
accused as the one who has committed the crime. The prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused who committed the crime or asked
questions which would have proved the elements of the crime. The prosecution did not even establish if indeed it was the accused who was driving the truck at the
time of the incident. The Court simply cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime has been committed and that the accused is the person responsible
for it. There was no evidence on the allegation of the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was offered in evidence. The alleged less
serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were not also proven as no medical certificate was presented to state the same nor was a doctor
presented to establish such injuries. The alleged damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not established in any manner as no witness ever testified on this aspect and
no documentary evidence was also presented to state the damage. The prosecution therefore failed to establish if indeed it was the accused who was responsible for
the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, including the damage to the Colt Galant. The mother of the victim testified only on
the expenses she incurred and the shock she and her family have suffered as a result of the incident. But sad to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused
who committed the crime and be held responsible for it. This Court could only say that the prosecution has practically bungled this case from its inception.
xxxx
The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the prosecutions [evidence] conclusively show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant] to the lane of
vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the proximate cause of the accident. The court again is inclined to agree with this argument of the defense. It has looked carefully into
the sketch of the accident as indicated in the police blotter and can only conclude that the logical explanation of the accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of
vehicle 2, thus hitting the latters inner fender and tires. Exhibit "7" which is a picture of vehicle 2 shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1s
ramming into the rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of vehicle 2 to be cut, its tires busted and pulled out together with their axle. The cutting
of the differential guide cause[d] the entire housing connecting the tires to the truck body to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and swerve towards
the lane of vehicle 1. It was this accident that caused the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent act of the accused.
xxxx
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two thingsthe fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the
accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove these two things.
When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of the accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted and the accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The bail bond
posted for his temporary liberty is also hereby cancelled and ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized representative.
SO ORDERED.13
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,14 alleging that the MTCs dismissal of the case was done without considering the evidence
adduced by the prosecution. Respondents added that the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil liability of the accused in spite of the evidence presented. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Negros Oriental, Br. 32.
In the order15 dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further proceedings on the civil
aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTCs recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that it failed to consider the evidence
presented by the prosecution. The records also demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, except that the defense no longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to the accuseds demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed
under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the accuseds civil liability, especially since the judgment of acquittal did not include a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and
resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on accuseds acquittal is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin or its
successor for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.16
Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but these were denied for lack of merit in the order 17 dated 12 September 2005.
Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court subsequently rendered
the assailed decision and resolution. The Court of Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties damaged, the criminal case falls under
the jurisdiction of the RTC and the proceedings before the MTC are
null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos v. Garcia)18which ruled that in complex crimes involving reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries and damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case is determined by the fine
imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless imprudence, not by the corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged. It also found
support in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure, which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts
in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.00. As there was no proof of the total value
of the property damaged and respondents were claiming the amount ofP1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the case falls within the RTCs jurisdiction. The dispositive
portion of the Decision dated 17 August 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region, Branch 32, Negros
Oriental for proper disposition of the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision,20 arguing that jurisdiction over the case is determined by the allegations in the information,
and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis of the RTCs jurisdiction over the case.
However, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution dated 25 April 2007. 21 It reiterated that it is the RTC that has
proper jurisdiction considering that the information alleged a willful, unlawful, felonious killing as well as abandonment of the victims.
In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for reckless imprudence, owing to the enactment of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,22 which confers jurisdiction to first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence. He asserts that
the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information alleging abandonment. Respondents are
also faulted for challenging the MTCs order acquitting petitioner through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.
The petition has merit. It should be granted.
The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction over the offense charged pertained to the RTC.
Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the Information dated 29 December 2004 charging petitioner only with the complex crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals however declared in its decision that
petitioner should have been charged with the same offense but aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the victims. It appears from the records however
that respondents attempt to amend the information by charging the aggravated offense was unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutors
motion to withdraw their motion to amend the information. The information filed before the trial court had remained unamended.23Thus, petitioner is deemed to
have been charged only with the offense alleged in the original Information without any aggravating circumstance.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless imprudence, commits any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave
felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period toprision correccional in its medium period. When such reckless imprudence the use of a motor
vehicle, resulting in the death of a person attended the same article imposes upon the defendant the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property, a complex crime.
Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed.24 Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through
negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).25 Thus,
the penalty imposable upon petitioner, were he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum
period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years).
Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the
action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.26 When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang
129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for
civil liability. It explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It
follows that criminal cases for reckless
imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly,
therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal case.27 Consequently, the MTC of
Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.
As the records show, the MTC granted petitioners demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer
to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of
the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,
tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."28 Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to
place the accused in double jeopardy.29 But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but
only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only
legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.30
Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing to
consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC
correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTCs conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in the
order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also show that the MTC correctly followed the
procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.
The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case of the matter of civil liability for the reception of evidence.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the RTC in directing a
similar remand to the MTC.
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares
that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted. 31 However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist32 or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.33
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court
also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.34 This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not
yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should
do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on
the civil aspect of the case.35
A scrutiny of the MTCs decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the findings that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioners civil liability has been extinguished by his acquittal. It should
be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime had been committed and that accused was the person
responsible for it. It added that the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime as charged since its witnesses never identified
petitioner as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is the damage
to the rear portion of the truck caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck and not the reckless driving of the truck by
petitioner, clearly establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence. Consequently, there is no more need to remand the case to the trial court for
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case, since petitioners acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 16 May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No. 3016-04 granting the Demurrer
to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the offense charged therein is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE v. DOMINGO
August 3, 2012 Leave a comment
PEOPLE v. DOMINGO
March 2, 2009 (G.R. No. 184343)
PARTIES:
Plaintiff-Appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Accused-Appellant: JESUS DOMINGO
FACTS:
The Court of Appeals found appellant Jesus Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, attempted murder, frustrated murder, and frustrated homicide.
On or about the 29th day of March 2000, complainant and her children were sleeping inside their house when Domingo when she was awakened when the accused
entered their kitchen armed with a screwdriver and a kitchen knife. He stabbed the complainant and her children. Raquel Indon, complainant, pleaded the appellant
to spare her daughter but teh appellant answered Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na. Two of her children died.
Five years passed, the defense counsel said that nine days prior the commission of the crime, appellant suffered sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and nervousness.
Occasionally, a voice would tell him to kill. Appellant averred that when he regained his memory, one week had already passed since the incidents, and he was
already detained. They submitted a psychiatric evaluation, and psychological examination as evidence that appellant suffered from Schizophrenia, a mental disorder
characterized by the presence of delusions and or hallucinations, disorganized speech and behavior, poor impulse control and low frustration tolerance. The doctor
could not find out when the appellant started to suffer this illness, but the symptoms of Schizophrenia which were manifested by the patient indicated that he
suffered from the illness six months before the Center examined the appellant. The counsel of the appellant raised the defense of insanity of the appellant.

ISSUE: WON the appellant is exempt from criminal liability on the ground of insanity.
HELD:
No, the defense of insanity is unmeritorious. Insanity exempts the accused only when the finding of mental disorder refers to appellants state of mind immediately
before or at the very moment of the commission of the crime. This was not the case in the issue at bar, what was presented was proof of appellants mental disorder
that existed five years after the incident, but not at the time the crimes were committed. The RTC also considered it crucial that appellant had the presence of mind
to respond to Raquel Indons pleas that her daughters be spared by saying, Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na.
Even assuming that nine days prior the crime the appellant was hearing voices ordering him to kill people, while suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot
be equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes that all acts are voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts are
done unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that
he or she was insane immediately before or at the moment the crime was committed.

G.R. No. L-69374 March 16, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO (BERTING) ALMARIO, HECTOR & ZENON SAMONTE, ISAGANI SACOP, BRUNO ABLAO and FRANCISCO BALDEMECA, defendants. ALBERTO (BERTING)
ALMARIO, defendant- appellant.

heirs of the deceased P 30,000.00 as indemnity and P 10,000.00 as moral damages.

[G.R. No. 127444. September 13, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TIRSO D. C. VELASCO in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 88, Quezon City, and HONORATO
GALVEZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 154954

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, Jr., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA,
ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA,
MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO
SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

G.R. No. 155101

FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner, v. MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, Jr., and ANSELMO ADRIANO,
Respondents.

SERENO, J.:

FACTS:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity
(Aquila Fraternity).

The neophytes, including victim, Lenny Villa, were subjected to initiation rites. After the second day of initiation rites has ended, accused non-resident or alumni
fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it
sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny
could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating
dinner. They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as
they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his
clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced
dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans.

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in
its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. While the
Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal
died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.

G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People

Petitioner Dizon sets forth two main issues first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present evidence;
and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused.

G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the
accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries. According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no conspiracy to
commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical
injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victims death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide,
pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona

Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused
failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original
records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court.

ISSUES:

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People: whether or not the death of Villareal extinguished his criminal liability

G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People: whether or not DIzon was deprived of due process

G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals: whether or not the CA erred in convicting accused of the lesser offense of slight physical injuries instead of homicide

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona): whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case for violation of the accuseds right to speedy trial

HELD:

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

Criminal Law- how criminal liability is extinguished

In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal
liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal penalties" refers to the service of personal or
imprisonment penalties, while the term "pecuniarypenalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs, including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense
complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto). However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is
recoverable through a separate civil action.

Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly
arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.

G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)

Political Law- The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself.

Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel" This constitutional
right includes the right to present evidence in ones defense, as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.

The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary,
it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial
evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five
hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for
Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process.

In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of
the consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to
attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)

Political Law- right to speedy trial is violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.

We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their
right to speedy trial.

While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold
that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case.

The absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to
comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that as early as
September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the
case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated
December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that even
until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion
to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion.

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a
quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to
set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity
whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon.

From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is
nothing in the records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall
be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)

Political Law- No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through
a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, a verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in
the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.

This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the
following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due
process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial; or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.

The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.
We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.

The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa in finding that the four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA,
because of "the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required. The reliance on
Penesa was utterly misplaced.

On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings
of fact. According to the court, the four accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such initiation rites on the person
of Villa. It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the "multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered from
the initiation rites. Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment heaped on Lenny Villa was serious in nature, it was patently erroneous for the court
to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended.
Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts
are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings.
From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should
redound to all those who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body
caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson,
Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the
Petition.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, G.R. No. 171513

Petitioner,
- versus -

HON. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-

DE CASTRO, HON. DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA and HON. EFREN N.
DE LA CRUZ, in their official capacities
as Presiding Justice and Associate Justices,
respectively, of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan, and NIERNA S. DOLLER,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------x

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 190963

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

FIRST DIVISION OF THE Promulgated:

SANDIGANBAYAN and ARNOLD
JAMES M. YSIDORO,
Respondents. February 6, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions assailing the rulings of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27963, entitled People of the Philippines v. Arnold James M.
Ysidoro.

G.R. No. 171513 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) filed by petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro to annul the
resolutions, dated July 6, 2005[1] and January 25, 2006,[2] of the Sandiganbayan granting the Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite.

G.R. No. 190963, on the other hand, is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by the People of the Philippines through the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(People) to annul and set aside the decision,[3] dated October 1, 2009, and the resolution,[4] dated December 9, 2009, of the Sandiganbayan which acquitted Ysidoro
for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts), as amended.

The Antecedents
Ysidoro, as Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte, was charged before the Sandiganbayan, with the following information:

That during the period from June 2001 to December 2001 or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Leyte, Province of Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of [the] Honorable Court, above-named accused, ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte,
in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, withhold and fail to give to Nierna S. Doller, Municipal Social Welfare and Development Officer (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, without any legal
basis, her RATA for the months of August, September, October, November and December, all in the year 2001, in the total amount of TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE PESOS (P22,125.00), Philippine Currency, and her Productivity Pay in the year 2000, in the amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00),
Philippine Currency, and despite demands made upon accused to release and pay her the amount of P22,125.00 and P2,000.00, accused failed to do so, thus accused
in the course of the performance of his official functions had deprived the complainant of her RATA and Productivity Pay, to the damage and injury of Nierna S. Doller
and detriment of public service.[5]

Ysidoro filed an omnibus motion to quash the information and, in the alternative, for judicial determination of probable cause,[6] which were both denied by the
Sandiganbayan. In due course, Ysidoro was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty.

The Sandiganbayan Preventively Suspends Ysidoro

On motion of the prosecution,[7] the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Ysidoro for ninety (90) days in accordance with Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, which states:

Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for
any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.

Ysidoro filed a motion for reconsideration, and questioned the necessity and the duration of the preventive suspension. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the
motion for reconsideration, ruling that -

Clearly, by well established jurisprudence, the provision of Section 13, Republic Act 3019 make[s] it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend, for a period not
exceeding ninety (90) days, any public officer who has been validly charged with a violation of Republic Act 3019, as amended or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code or any offense involving fraud upon government of public funds or property.[8]

Ysidoro assailed the validity of these Sandiganbayan rulings in his petition (G.R. No. 171513) before the Court. Meanwhile, trial on the merits in the principal case
continued before the Sandiganbayan. The prosecution and the defense presented their respective evidence.

The prosecution presented Nierna S. Doller as its sole witness. According to Doller, she is the Municipal Social Welfare Development Officer of Leyte. She claimed that
Ysidoro ordered her name to be deleted in the payroll because her husband transferred his political affiliation and sided with Ysidoros opponent. After her name was
deleted from the payroll, Doller did not receive her representation and transportation allowance (RATA) for the period of August 2001 to December 2001. Doller also
related that she failed to receive her productivity bonus for the year 2000 (notwithstanding her performance rating of VS) because Ysidoro failed to sign her
Performance Evaluation Report. Doller asserted that she made several attempts to claim her RATA and productivity bonus, and made representations with Ysidoro,
but he did not act on her requests. Doller related thather family failed to meet their financial obligations as a result of Ysidoros actions.

To corroborate Dollers testimony, the prosecution presented documentary evidence in the form of disbursement vouchers, request for obligation of allotment,
letters, excerpts from the police blotter, memorandum, telegram, certification, order, resolution, and the decision of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman absolving
her of the charges.[9]

On the other hand, the defense presented seven (7) witnesses,[10] including Ysidoro, and documentary evidence. The defense showed that the withholding of Dollers
RATA was due to the investigation conducted by the Office of the Mayor on the anomalies allegedly committed by Doller. For this reason, Ysidoro ordered the
padlocking of Dollers office, and ordered Doller and her staff to hold office at the Office of the Mayor for the close monitoring and evaluation of their functions. Doller
was also prohibited from outside travel without Ysidoros approval.

The Sandiganbayan Acquits Ysidoro

In a decision dated October 1, 2009,[11] the Sandiganbayan acquitted Ysidoro and held that the second element of the offense that there be malice, ill-motive or bad
faith was not present. The Sandiganbayan pronounced:

This Court acknowledges the fact that Doller was entitled to RATA. However, the antecedent facts and circumstances did not show any indicia of bad faith on the part
of [Ysidoro] in withholding the release of Dollers RATA.

In fact, this Court believes that [Ysidoro] acted in good faith and in honest belief that Doller was not entitled to her RATA based on the opinion of the COA resident
Auditor and Section 317 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual.

It may be an erroneous interpretation of the law, nonetheless, [Ysidoros] reliance to the same was a clear basis of good faith on his part in withholding Dollers RATA.

With regard to the Productivity Incentive Bonus, Doller was aware that the non-submission of the Performance Evaluation Form is a ground for an employees non-
eligibility to receive the Productivity Incentive Bonus:

a) Employees disqualification for performance-based personnel actions which would require the rating for the given period such as promotion, training or scholarship
grants, and productivity incentive bonus if the failure of the submission of the report form is the fault of the employees.

Doller even admitted in her testimonies that she failed to submit her Performance Evaluation Report to [Ysidoro] for signature.

There being no malice, ill-motive or taint of bad faith, [Ysidoro] had the legal basis to withhold Dollers RATA and Productivity pay. [12] (italics supplied)

In a resolution dated December 9, 2009,[13] the Sandiganbayan denied the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, reasoning that -

It must be stressed that this Court acquitted [Ysidoro] for two reasons: firstly, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving that accused Ysidoro acted in
bad faith as stated in paragraph 1 above; and secondly, the exculpatory proof of good faith xxx.

Needless to state, paragraph 1 alone would be enough ground for the acquittal of accused Ysidoro. Hence, the COA Resident Auditor need not be presented in court
to prove that [Ysidoro] acted in good faith. This is based on the legal precept that when the prosecution fails to discharge its burden, an accused need not even offer
evidence in his behalf.[14] (italics supplied)

Supervening events occurred after the filing of Ysidoros petition which rendered the issue in G.R. No. 171513 i.e., the propriety of his preventive suspension moot and
academic. First, Ysidoro is no longer the incumbent Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte as his term of office expired in 2007. Second, the prosecution completed its
presentation of evidence and had rested its case before the Sandiganbayan. And third, the Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting Ysidoro of the crime charged.

In light of these events, what is left to resolve is the petition for certiorari filed by the People on the validity of the judgment acquitting Ysidoro of the criminal charge.

The Peoples Petition

The People posits that the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 have been duly established by the evidence, in that:
First. [Ysidoro] was the Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte when he ordered the deletion of private complainants name in the payroll for RATA and productivity pay.

Second. He caused undue injury to [Doller] when he ordered the withholding of her RATA and productivity pay. It is noteworthy that complainant was the only official
in the municipality who did not receive her RATA and productivity pay even if the same were already included in the budget for that year. x x x

Consequently, [Doller] testified that her family suffered actual and moral damages due to the withholding of her benefits namely: a) the disconnection of electricity in
their residence; x x x b) demand letters from their creditors; x x x c) her son was dropped from school because they were not able to pay for his final exams; x x x d)
[h]er children did not want to go to school anymore because they were embarrassed that collectors were running after them.

Third. Accused clearly acted in evident bad faith as he used his position to deprive [Doller] of her RATA and productivity pay for the period mentioned to harass her
due to the transfer of political affiliation of her husband.[15] (emphasis supplied)

The People argues[16] that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion, and exceeded its, or acted without, jurisdiction in not finding Ysidoro in bad faith when he
withheld Dollers RATA and deprived her of her productivity bonus. The Sandiganbayan failed to take into account that: first, the Commission on Audit (COA) resident
auditor was never presented in court; second, the documentary evidence showed that Doller continuously discharged the functions of her office even if she had been
prevented from outside travel by Ysidoro; third, Ysidoro refused to release Dollers RATA and productivity bonus notwithstanding the dismissal by the Ombudsman of
the cases against her for alleged anomalies committed in office; and fourth, Ysidoro caused Dollers name to be dropped from the payroll without justifiable cause,
and he refused to sign the disbursement vouchers and the request for obligation of allotment so that Doller could claim her RATA and her productivity bonus.

In the same manner, the People asserts that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that Doller was not eligible to receive the productivity
bonus for her failure to submit her Performance Evaluation Report. The Sandiganbayan disregarded the evidence showing the strained relationship and the
maneuverings made by Ysidoro so that he could deny her this incentive.

In his Comment,[17] Ysidoro prays for the dismissal of the petition for procedural and substantive infirmities. First, he claims that the petition was filed out of time
considering the belated filing of the Peoples motion for reconsideration before the Sandiganbayan. He argues that by reason of the late filing of the motion for
reconsideration, the present petition was filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period. Ysidoro also argues that the 60-day reglementary period should have been
counted from the Peoples receipt of the Sandiganbayans decision since no motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed. Second, Ysidoro claims that the
Sandiganbayans ruling was in accord with the evidence and the prosecution was not denied due process to properly avail of the remedy of a writ of certiorari.
And third, Ysidoro insists that he can no longer be prosecuted for the same criminal charge without violating the rule against double jeopardy.

The Issue Raised

The ultimate issue to be resolved is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its, or acted without, jurisdiction when it acquitted
Ysidoro of the crime charged.

The Courts Ruling

We first resolve the preliminary issue raised by Ysidoro on the timeliness of the Peoples petition for certiorari. The records show that the motion for reconsideration
was filed by the People before the Sandiganbayan on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to file the motion which fell on October 16, 2009, a
Friday. Although the date originally appearing in the notice of hearing on the motion was September 22, 2009 (which later on was corrected to October 22, 2009), the
error in designating the month was unmistakably obvious considering the date when the motion was filed. In any case, the error cannot detract from the
circumstance that the motion for reconsideration was filed within the 15-day reglementary period. We consider, too, that Ysidoro was not deprived of due process
and was given the opportunity to be heard on the motion. Accordingly, the above error cannot be considered fatal to the right of the People to file its motion for
reconsideration. The counting of the 60-day reglementary period within which to file the petition for certiorari will be reckoned from the receipt of the People of the
denial of its motion for reconsideration, or on December 10, 2009. As the last day of the 60-day reglementary period fell on February 8, 2010, the petition which was
filed on February 5, 2010 was filed on time.
Nevertheless, we dismiss the petitions for being procedurally and substantially infirm.
A Review of a Judgment of Acquittal

Generally, the Rules provides three (3) procedural remedies in order for a party to appeal a decision of a trial court in a criminal case before this Court. The first is by
ordinary appeal under Section 3, Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The second is by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules. And the third is by filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Each procedural remedy is unique and provides for a different mode of review. In
addition, each procedural remedy may only be availed of depending on the nature of the judgment sought to be reviewed.
A review by ordinary appeal resolves factual and legal issues. Issues which have not been properly raised by the parties but are, nevertheless, material in the
resolution of the case are also resolved in this mode of review. In contrast, a review on certiorari under a Rule 45 petition is generally limited to the review of legal
issues; the Court only resolves questions of law which have been properly raised by the parties during the appeal and in the petition. Under this mode, the Court
determines whether a proper application of the law was made in a given set of facts. A Rule 65 review, on the other hand, is strictly confined to the determination of
the propriety of the trial courts jurisdiction whether it has jurisdiction over the case and if so, whether the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been attended by
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

While an assailed judgment elevated by way of ordinary appeal or a Rule 45 petition is considered an intrinsically valid, albeit erroneous, judgment, a judgment
assailed under Rule 65 is characterized as an invalid judgment because of defect in the trial courts authority to rule. Also, an ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition
tackle errors committed by the trial court in the appreciation of the evidence and/or the application of law. In contrast, a Rule 65 petition resolves jurisdictional
errors committed in the proceedings in the principal case. In other words, errors of judgment are the proper subjects of an ordinary appeal and in a Rule 45 petition;
errors of jurisdiction are addressed in a Rule 65 petition.

As applied to judgments rendered in criminal cases, unlike a review via a Rule 65 petition, only judgments of conviction can be reviewed in an ordinary appeal or a
Rule 45 petition. As we explained in People v. Nazareno,[18] the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy proscribes appeals of judgments of
acquittal through the remedies of ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition, thus:

The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial would be
unfair if the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise
barred because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendants culpability; after failing to persuade the court to
enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not
only the defendants already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial
consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State. Unfairness and prejudice would
necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendants guilt while strengthening any
weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the governments power and resources are once again employed against the defendants individual
means. That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and
conscience.[19] (emphases supplied)

However, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition, predicated on two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of
acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and where the prosecution had been deprived of due process.[20] The rule against double jeopardy
does not apply in these instances because a Rule 65 petition does not involve a review of facts and law on the merits in the manner done in an appeal.
In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not examine and assess the evidence of the parties nor weigh the probative value of the evidence.[21] It does not include
an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation of the evidence.[22] A review under Rule 65 only asks the question of whether there has been a validly rendered
decision, not the question of whether the decision is legally correct.[23]In other words, the focus of the review is to determine whether the judgment is per se void on
jurisdictional grounds.[24]
Applying these legal concepts to this case, we find that while the People was procedurally correct in filing its petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petition does
not raise any jurisdictional error committed by the Sandiganbayan. On the contrary, what is clear is the obvious attempt by the People to have the evidence in the
case reviewed by the Court under the guise of a Rule 65 petition. This much can be deduced by examining the petition itself which does not allege any bias, partiality
or bad faith committed by the Sandiganbayan in its proceedings. The petition does not also raise any denial of the Peoples due process in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan.

We observe, too, that the grounds relied in the petition relate to factual errors of judgment which are more appropriate in an ordinary appeal rather than in a Rule 65
petition. The grounds cited in the petition call for the Courts own appreciation of the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan on the sufficiency of the Peoples evidence
in proving the element of bad faith, and the sufficiency of the evidence denying productivity bonus to Doller.

The Merits of the Case

Our consideration of the imputed errors fails to establish grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Sandiganbayan. As a
rule, misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the level of
grave abuse of discretion.[25] That an abuse itself must be grave must be amply demonstrated since the jurisdiction of the court, no less, will be affected. [26] We have
previously held that the mere fact, too, that a court erroneously decides a case does not necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction.[27]

Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in this wise:

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[28]

Under this definition, the People bears the burden of convincingly demonstrating that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in the appreciation of the
evidence. We find that the People failed in this regard.

We find no indication from the records that the Sandiganbayan acted arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically in arriving at its verdict of acquittal. The settled rule is
that conviction ensues only if every element of the crime was alleged and proved.[29] In this case, Ysidoro was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan for two reasons: first,
his bad faith (an element of the crime charged) was not sufficiently proven by the prosecution evidence; and second, there was exculpatory evidence of his good
faith.

As bad faith is a state of mind, the prosecution must present evidence of the overt acts or omissions committed by Ysidoro showing that he deliberately intended to
do wrong or cause damage to Doller by withholding her RATA. However, save from the testimony of Doller of the strained relationship between her and Ysidoro, no
other evidence was presented to support Ysidoros bad faith against her. We note that Doller even disproved Ysidoros bad faith when she admitted that several cases
had been actually filed against her before the Office of the Ombudsman. It bears stressing that these purported anomalies were allegedly committed in office which
Ysidoro cited to justify the withholding of Dollers RATA.

The records also show other acts that tend to negate Ysidoros bad faith under the circumstances. First, the investigation of the alleged anomalies by Ysidoro was
corroborated by the physical transfer of Doller and her subordinates to the Office of the Mayor and the prohibition against outside travel imposed on
Doller. Second, the existence of the Ombudsmans cases against Doller. And third, Ysidoros act of seeking an opinion from the COA Auditor on the proper
interpretation of Section 317 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual before he withheld the RATA. This section provides:

An official/employee who was wrongly removed or prevented from performing his duties is entitled to back salaries but not RATA. The rationale for the grant of RATA
is to provide the official concerned additional fund to meet necessary expenses incidental to and connected with the exercise or the discharge of the functions of an
office. If he is out of office, [voluntarily] or involuntarily, it necessarily follows that the functions of the office remain undischarged (COA, Dec. 1602, October 23,
1990). And if the duties of the office are not discharged, the official does not and is not supposed to incur expenses. There being no expenses incurred[,] there is
nothing to be reimbursed (COA, Dec. 2121 dated June 28, 1979).[30]

Although the above provision was erroneously interpreted by Ysidoro and the COA Auditor, the totality of the evidence, to our mind, provides sufficient grounds to
create reasonable doubt on Ysidoros bad faith. As we have held before, bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence but imputes a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong or a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent, or ill-will to partake the nature of
fraud.[31] An erroneous interpretation of a provision of law, absent any showing of some dishonest or wrongful purpose, does not constitute and does not necessarily
amount to bad faith.[32]

Similarly, we find no inference of bad faith when Doller failed to receive the productivity bonus. Doller does not dispute that the receipt of the productivity bonus was
premised on the submission by the employee of his/her Performance Evaluation Report. In this case, Doller admitted that she did not submit her Performance
Evaluation Report; hence, she could not have reasonably expected to receive any productivity bonus. Further, we cannot agree with her self-serving claim that it was
Ysidoros refusal that led to her failure to receive her productivity bonus given that no other hard evidence supported this claim. We certainly cannot rely on Dollers
assertion of the alleged statement made by one Leo Apacible (Ysidoros secretary) who was not presented in court. The alleged statement made by Leo Apacible
that the mayor will get angry with him and he might be laid off,[33] in addition to being hearsay, did not even establish the actual existence of an order from Ysidoro or
of his alleged maneuverings to deprive Doller of her RATA and productivity bonus.

In light of these considerations, we resolve to dismiss the Peoples petition. We cannot review a verdict of acquittal which does not impute or show any jurisdictional
error committed by the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to:

1. DISMISS the petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 171513, filed by Arnold James M. Ysidoro for being moot and academic.

2. DISMISS the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 190963, filed by the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, for lack of
merit.
This is a petition for review on
certiorari
assailing the Resolution of theSandiganbayan granting the Demurrer to Evidence led by respondents Aristeo E. Atienza and Rodrigo D. Manongsong, which
eectively dismissed Criminal Case No.26678 for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
People v. AtienzaGr No. 171671, June 18, 2012 Peralta,
J.:

FACTS: Respondents Aristeo E. Atienza, then Municipal Mayor of Puerto Galera,Oriental Mindoro, Engr. Rodrigo D. Manongsong, then Municipal Engineer ofPuerto
Galera and Crispin M. Egarque, a police ocer stationed in Puerto Galera, were charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
. The Information alleged that the above-namedaccused conspired with each other to destroy, demolish, and dismantle theriprap/fence of the new Hondura Beach
Resort owned by complainant Evoralocated at Hondura, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, causing undue injury tocomplainant. Upon arraignment, respondents
pleaded not guilty to the crimecharged against them. The prosecution presented its witnesses who gavetestimonies pointing to the alleged acts of the accused
herein. Mayor Atienza andEngr. Manongsong led a Demurrer to Evidence (Motion to Acquit), anchored onthe credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution which
was granted by theSandiganbayan on the ground that not all the elements of the crime charged wereestablished by the prosecution, particularly the element of
manifest partiality onthe part of respondents. The Sandiganbayan held that the evidence adduced didnot show that the respondents favored other persons who were
similarly situated with the private complainant. Hence, this Petition for Review.ISSUE: (1) Did the Court commit an error in denying the people due process when
itresolved issues not raised by respondents in their demurrer to evidence, without aording the prosecution an opportunity to be heard thereon.(2) Has double
jeopardy set in? RULING: NO. Respondents are charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA3019, which has the following essential elements:1. The accused must be a
public ocer dischargingadministrative, judicial or ocial functions;2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faithor gross inexcusable negligence;
and3. His action caused any undue injury to any party,including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benets, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions. In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the Demurrer to Evidenceon the ground that the prosecution failed to establish the second
element of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The second element provides the dierent modes by which the crime may becommitted, that is, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or grossinexcusable negligence. In
Uriarte v. People
, this Court explained that Section 3 (e) ofRA 3019 may be committed either by
dolo,
as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by
culpa
,

as when the accused committed grossinexcusable negligence. There is manifest partiality when there is a clear, notorious,or plain inclination or predilection to
favor one side or person rather than another.Evident bad faith connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patentlyfraudulent and dishonest purpose to
do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing forsome perverse motive or ill will. Evident bad faith contemplates a state of mind

armatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill willor for ulterior purposes. Gross inexcusable negligence refers to
negligencecharacterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in asituation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally, with conscious indierence to consequences insofar as other persons may be aected. As aptly concluded by the Sandiganbayan in the assailed
resolution, thesecond element of the crime as charged was not suciently established by theprosecution.
Manifest partiality
was not present in this case. The evidence adduceddid not show that accused-movants favored other persons who were similarly situated with the private
complainant. Moreover, contrary to petitioners contention, the prosecution was notdenied due process. The prosecution participated in all the proceedings
beforethe court
a

quo
and has led numerous pleadings and oppositions to themotions led by respondent. In fact, the prosecution has already rested its caseand submitted its evidence
when the demurrer was led. Where the opportunityto be heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and theparty can present its side or
defend its interests in due course, there is nodenial of procedural due process. What is repugnant to due process is thedenial of the opportunity to be heard, which is
not present here. (2) Yes. The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sucient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the
court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his
express consent. Allare attendant in the present case: (1) the Information led before the Sandiganbayanin Criminal Case No. 26678 against respondents were
sucient in form andsubstance to sustain a conviction; (2) the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction overCriminal Case No. 26678; (3) respondents were arraigned and
entered their respectivepleas of not guilty; and (4) the Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No. 26678 ona Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that not all the
elements of the oense ascharge exist in the case at bar, which amounts to an acquittal from which no appealcan be had. In criminal cases, the grant of demurrer is
tantamount to an acquittaland the dismissal order may not be appealed because this would place the accused indouble jeopardy. Although the dismissal order is not
subject to appeal, it is stillreviewable but only through
certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham, thus,rendering the assailed judgment void.
The burden is on the petitioner to clearlydemonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as todeprive it of its very power to
dispense justice. In the present case, no suchcircumstances exist to warrant a departure from the general rule and reverse thendings of the Sandiganbayan.

JOSEPH C. CEREZO, VS G.R. No. 185230

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
JULIET YANEZA, PABLO ABUNDA, JR., and VICENTE AFULUGENCIA,

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul the July 11, 2008 Decision[1] and the November 4, 2008 Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99088, which reversed and set aside the October 24, 2006[3] and the February 26, 2007[4] Orders of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 92.

The RTC Orders revived Criminal Case No. Q-03-115490, entitled People of the Philippines v. Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., Oscar Mapalo and Vicente
Afulugencia, after the same was dismissed in an earlier Order.

The Facts

On September 12, 2002, petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against respondents Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia
(respondents), as well as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo).[5]

Finding probable cause to indict respondents,[6] the Quezon City Prosecutors Office (OP-QC) filed the corresponding Information against them on February 18, 2003
before the RTC.[7]

Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecutions Evidence before the OP-QC.[8]

In its resolution dated November 20, 2003, the OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and recommended the withdrawal of the Information.[9] Consequently, a Motion to
Dismiss and Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC on December 3, 2003. During the intervening period, specifically on November 24, 2003, respondents
were arraigned. All of them entered a not guilty plea.[10]

In deference to the prosecutors last resolution, the RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed in its Order dated March 17, 2004, viz.:

Settled is the rule that the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the Public Prosecutor who is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the
discharge of this function. Being vested with such power, he can reconsider his own resolution if he finds that there is reasonable ground to do so. x x x.

More so, the Court cannot interfere with the Public Prosecutors discretion to determine probable cause or the propriety of pursuing or not a criminal case when the
case is not yet filed in Court, as a general rule. However, if the same criminal case has been filed in Court already, the Public Prosecutor can still interfere with it
subject to the approval of the Court. In the case of Republic vs. Sunga, et al., the Supreme Court held that while it has been settled in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul
that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed after the complaint or information has been filed in court, nonetheless any
motion of the offended party for the dismissal of the criminal case, even if without objection of the accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal and only
after hearing should the court exercise its exclusive authority to dismiss or continue with the prosecution of the case. The Court, therefore, after hearing and
conferring with the fiscal, can dismiss the case if convinced that there is [no] reason to continue with the prosecution [of] the same. As in this case, the Court finds
merit [in] the motion of the Public Prosecutor.[11]
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the November 20, 2003 OP-QC resolution has not yet attained finality, considering
that the same was the subject of a Petition for Review filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).[12] The RTC deferred action on the said motion to await the
resolution of the DOJ.[13]

On June 26, 2006, the Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution reversing and setting aside the OP-QCs November 20, 2003 resolution, and directing the latter
to refile the earlier Information for libel.[14]
On October 24, 2006, the RTC issued its first assailed Order granting petitioners motion for reconsideration, conformably with the resolution of the DOJ Secretary,
thus:

Considering the findings of the Department of Justice reversing the resolution of the City Prosecutor, the Court gives favorable action to the Motion for
Reconsideration. In the same manner as discussed in arriving at its assailed order dated 17 March 2004, the Court gives more leeway to the Public Prosecutor in
determining whether it has to continue or stop prosecuting a case. While the City Prosecutor has previously decided not to pursue further the case, the Secretary of
Justice, however, through its resolution on the Petition for Review did not agree with him.

The Court disagrees with the argument raised by the accused that double jeopardy sets in to the picture. The order of dismissal as well as the withdrawal of the
Information was not yet final because of the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration. The Court[,] therefore, can still set aside its order. Moreover, there is no
refiling of the case nor the filing of a new one. The case filed remains the same and the order of dismissal was merely vacated because the Court finds the Motion for
Reconsideration meritorious.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion for Reconsideration meritorious, the Order dated 17 March 2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.
Let the arraignment of accused Oscar Mapalo and pre-trial [of] the other accused be set on 06 December 2006 at 8:30 in the morning.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied in the RTCs second assailed Order dated February 26, 2007. [16]
Relentless, respondents elevated their predicament to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, arguing in the main that the RTC
Orders violated their constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Ruling of the CA

The appellate court found the RTC to have gravely abused its discretion in ordering the reinstatement of the case. The CA annulled the impugned RTC Orders, ruling
that all the elements of double jeopardy exist. There was a valid Information sufficient in form and substance filed before a court of competent jurisdiction to which
respondents had pleaded, and that the termination of the case was not expressly consented to by respondents; hence, the same could not be revived or refiled
without transgressing respondents right against double jeopardy.

The CA further found that the DOJ Secretary improperly took cognizance of the Petition for Review because DOJ Department Order No. 223 mandates that no appeal
shall be entertained if the accused has already been arraigned or, if the arraignment took place during the pendency of the appeal, the same shall be dismissed.[17]

Petitioner interposed the instant appeal when his motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied.[18]

The Issues

Petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:

a. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was Double Jeopardy, specifically on the alleged existence of the requisites to constitute Double
Jeopardy;
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to consider the fact that there was NO refiling of the case nor the filing of a new one in arriving [at] its conclusion that
Double Jeopardy sets in to the picture;
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was 1.) a valid termination of the case on the basis of the Order of the Trial Court dated 17 March 2004,
and allegedly 2.) without the express consent of the respondents.[19]

The assigned errors will be subsumed into this issue:

Whether there was a valid termination of the case so as to usher in the impregnable wall of double jeopardy.

Our Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to
dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice.[20] It
is the courts bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the
motion.[21] While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.

In this case, it is obvious from the March 17, 2004 Order of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge failed to make his own determination of whether
or not there was a prima facie case to hold respondents for trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. The RTC judge
blindly relied on the manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor when he should have been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to
Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution appeared to be uncertain, undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict respondents.

The same holds true with respect to the October 24, 2006 Order, which reinstated the case. The RTC judge failed to make a separate evaluation and merely awaited
the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. This is evident from the general tenor of the Order and highlighted in the following portion thereof:

As discussed during the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Court will resolve it depending on the outcome of the Petition for Review. Considering the
findings of the Department of Justice reversing the resolution of the City Prosecutor, the Court gives favorable action to the Motion for Reconsideration.[22]

By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to
perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated the complainants right to due process. They
were void, had no legal standing, and produced no effect whatsoever.[23]

This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of the case to determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently
resolve the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information anew.

It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a
valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.[24]
Since we have held that the March 17, 2004 Order granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then respondents were not
acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the conviction and acquittal of the accused, or
the dismissal of the case without the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and the assailed July 11, 2008 Decision and the November 4, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 99088, and the October 24, 2006 and the February 26, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92, are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Quezon City RTC, Branch 92, for evaluation on whether probable cause exists to hold respondents for trial.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174504
Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN PEREZ, JJ.
(THIRD DIVISION) AND
MANUEL G. BARCENAS, Promulgated:
Respondents. March 21, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The dismissal order arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double
jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

This is a Petition for Certiorari which seeks to nullify the Sandiganbayans July 26, 2006 Resolution[1] which granted private respondents demurrer to evidence.

Factual Antecedents

On May 21, 2004, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445[2] before the Sandiganbayan. The Information
reads

That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused MANUEL G. BARCENAS, a high-ranking public officer, being a Vice-Mayor of Toledo City, and committing the offense in
relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
PESOS (P61,765.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by
law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances ofP61,765.00, Philippine
Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.[3]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 27990 and raffled to the Third Division. On October 20, 2004, private respondent was arraigned for which he pleaded not
guilty. The prosecution presented its lone witness, Manolo Tulibao Villad, Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditor. Thereafter, the prosecution filed its formal offer
of evidence and rested its case.

On April 20, 2006, private respondent filed a motion[4] for leave to file demurrer to evidence. On June 16, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution[5] granting the
motion. On June 30, 2006, private respondent filed his demurrer[6] to evidence.

Sandiganbayans Ruling

On July 26 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Resolution, viz:

WE find the demurrer to evidence well taken.

The testimony of the prosecutions lone witness City Auditor Manolo Tulibao confirming his Report (Exhibit D) that the accused had indeed liquidated his cash
advances did not help the prosecution but rather weakened its cause of action against the accused. At the time this case was filed in Court, the accused had already
liquidated his cash advances subject matter hereof in the total amount of P61,765.00. Hence, We find the element of damages wanting in this case.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted and this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.[7]

Issue

Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in giving due course to and eventually granting the
demurrer to evidence.[8]

Petitioners Arguments

Petitioner contends that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the offense defined and penalized under Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445: (1) the private
respondent, an accountable officer, received cash advances in the total amount of P120,000.00 to defray the expenses of the Public Assistance Committee and
Committee on Police Matters covering the period January-March 1993, (2) the purpose of the cash advance has been served, (3) the private respondent settled his
cash advances only in March 1996, (4) the city auditor sent a demand letter to the private respondent to settle the cash advance within 72 hours from receipt
thereof, and (5) the private respondent received said letter on December 22, 1995 but failed to liquidate the same within the aforestated period.

Although it concedes that the private respondent eventually settled the subject cash advances sometime in March 1996, petitioner theorizes that damage is not one
of the elements of the offense charged. Hence, the settlement of the cash advance would not exonerate the private respondent but only mitigate his criminal
liability. Otherwise, the purpose of the law would be rendered futile since accountable officers can easily make cash advances and liquidate the same beyond the
period prescribed by law without being penalized for doing so.

Finally, petitioner argues that double jeopardy does not lie in this case because the order of dismissal was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

Private Respondents Arguments

Private respondent counters that the grant of a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to an acquittal from which the prosecution cannot appeal as it would place the
accused in double jeopardy. Further, assuming that the Sandiganbayan erroneously granted the demurrer, this would, at most, constitute an error of judgment and
not an error of jurisdiction. Thus, certiorari does not lie to correct the grant of the demurrer to evidence by the Sandiganbayan.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.

An order of dismissal arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence has the effect of an acquittal unless the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer[9] is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be appealed because this would place the accused in
double jeopardy.[10]Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[11] For the
writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void.[12] The burden is on the petitioner to clearly
demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.[13]

In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the government suffered any
damage from private respondents non-liquidation of the subject cash advance because it was later shown, as admitted by the prosecutions witness, that private
respondent liquidated the same albeit belatedly.

Sections 89 and 128 of P.D. No. 1445 provide

SECTION 89. Limitations on Cash Advance. No cash advance shall be given unless for a legally authorized specific purpose. A cash advance shall be reported on and
liquidated as soon as the purpose for which it was given has been served. No additional cash advance shall be allowed to any official or employee unless the
previous cash advance given to him is first settled or a proper accounting thereof is made.

SECTION 128. Penal Provision. Any violation of the provisions of Sections 67, 68, 89, 106, and 108 of this Code or any regulation issued by the Commission [on Audit]
implementing these sections, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos or by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both such fine and
imprisonment in the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, COA Circular No. 90-331[14] or the Rules and Regulations on the Granting, Utilization and Liquidation of Cash Advances which implemented Section
89 of P.D. No. 1445 pertinently provided

5. LIQUIDATION OF CASH ADVANCES

5.1 The AO (Accountable Officer) shall liquidate his cash advance as follows:

5.1.1 Salaries, Wages, etc. - within 5 days after each 15 day/ end of the month pay period.

5.1.2 Petty Operating Expenses and Field Operating Expenses - within 20 days after the end of the year; subject to replenishment during the year.

5.1.3 Foreign Travel - within 60 days after return to the Philippines.

Failure of the AO to liquidate his cash advance within the prescribed period shall constitute a valid cause for the withholding of his salary.

xxxx

5.7 When a cash advance is no longer needed or has not been used for a period of two (2) months, it must be returned to or deposited immediately with the
collecting officer.

5.8 All cash advances shall be fully liquidated at the end of each year. Except for petty cash fund, the AO shall refund any unexpended balance to the
Cashier/Collecting Officer who will issue the necessary official receipt.

xxxx

9. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COA AUDITOR

xxxx

9.6 Upon failure of the AO to liquidate his cash advance within one month for AOs within the station and three months for AOs outside the station from date of grant
of the cash advance, the Auditor shall issue a letter demanding liquidation or explanation for non-liquidation.
9.7 If 30 days have elapsed after the demand letter is served and no liquidation or explanation is received, or the explanation received is not
satisfactory, the Auditor shall advise the head of the agency to cause or order the withholding of the payment of any money due the AO. The amount withheld shall
be applied to his (AO's) accountability. The AO shall likewise be held criminally liable for failure to settle his accounts.[15] (Emphasis supplied.)

As can be seen, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, actual damage to the government arising from the non-liquidation of the cash advance is not an
essential element of the offense punished under the second sentence of Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 as implemented by COA Circular No. 90-331. Instead, the mere
failure to timely liquidate the cash advance is the gravamen of the offense. Verily, the law seeks to compel the accountable officer, by penal provision, to promptly
render an account of the funds which he has received by reason of his office.[16]
Nonetheless, even if the Sandiganbayan proceeded from an erroneous interpretation of the law and its implementing rules, the error committed was an error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction. Petitioner failed to establish that the dismissal order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion such as the denial of the
prosecutions right to due process or the conduct of a sham trial. In fine, the error committed by the Sandiganbayan is of such a nature that can no longer be rectified
on appeal by the prosecution because it would place the accused in double jeopardy.[17]

In United States v. Kilayko,[18] the accused was charged with a violation under Section 12 of the Chattel Mortgage Law[19] which prohibited the mortgagor from selling
the mortgaged property without the consent of the mortgagee while the debt secured remained outstanding. The accused was arraigned for which he pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, he moved to dismiss the Information. After the prosecution and defense entered into a stipulation of facts, the trial court dismissed the case. On
appeal by the prosecution to this Court, we acknowledged that the trial court erred in interpreting Section 12 when it ruled that the subsequent payment of the
secured debt extinguished the accuseds criminal liability arising from the unlawful sale of the mortgaged property. Nonetheless, we ruled that the judgment
dismissing the Information, although based upon an erroneous interpretation of the law, was in effect a judgment on the merits from which no appeal lay on the part
of the prosecution as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.[20]

In another case, People v. City Court of Silay,[21] after the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution to this Court, we were of the view that the
dismissal order was erroneous and resulted to a miscarriage of justice. However, we ruled that such error cannot be corrected because double jeopardy had already
set in:

In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge against them was one on the merits of the case which is to be distinguished from other
dismissals at the instance of the accused. All the elements of double jeopardy are here present, to wit: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction of the crime charged, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the prosecution had rested
its case, amounting to the acquittal of the accused. The dismissal being one on the merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double jeopardy cannot
be invoked.
It is clear to Us that the dismissal of the criminal case against the private respondents was erroneous.
As correctly stated in the Comment of the Acting Solicitor General, the accused were not charged with substitution of genuine tarjetas with false ones. The basis for
the accusation was that the accused entered false statements as to the weight of the sugar cane loaded in certain cane cars in tarjetas which were submitted to the
laboratory section of the company. The act of making a false entry in the tarjetas is undoubtedly an act of falsification of a private document, the accused having
made untruthful statements in a narration of facts which they were under obligation to accomplish as part of their duties - Ernesto de la Paz, as overseer of Hda.
Malisbog, and the other accused as scalers of the offended party, the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, thereby causing damage to the latter.

However erroneous the order of respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order, to paraphrase Justice Alex Reyes in People vs.
Nieto, 103 Phil. 1133, such error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy.[22]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-52016 May 13, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SEVERINO DUERO, Accused whose death sentence is under automatic review.

AQUINO, J.:1wph1.t
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dated April 17, 1979, convicting Severino Duero of robbery with homicide, sentencing
him to death and ordering him to pay the heirs of Fausta Duero an indemnity of fifteen thousand pesos and the sum of two thousand pesos which he took from her
(Criminal Case No. 8860).
The issue is whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused of robbery with homicide on the basis of his oral confession to the police station commander that
he committed that offense but which confession was repudiated by him on the witness stand and which was taken during custodial interrogation when the accused
was not informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel, as required by section 20, Article IV of the Constitution.
There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti or the commission of robbery with homicide.
In the evening of Sunday, October 24, 1976, Fausta Condino Vda. de Duero, an octogenarian housekeeper living alone, was feloniously killed in her house located at
Barrio Banguit, Cabatuan, Iloilo (Exh. A).
She sustained two gaping wounds on the right cheek, two gaping wounds on the neck, another gaping wound on the right shoulder and a bruise on the cheek. A piece
of wire, which was used to strangle her was tied around her neck (Exh. A). A scythe was sticking in her neck (Letter "B" in Sketch, p. 4, Record).
Regarded as fatal by the examining physician was the wound in the neck which pierced the jugular vein and which was connected with the other wound in the neck
and the shoulder wound (14 tsn June 16, 1978).
The gruesome crime was discovered in the afternoon of the following day, October 25, by Rodolfo Prevendido, the barangay captain. On noticing that the windows of
the old woman's house had not been opened in the morning, he suspected that there was something amiss. He asked Doroteo Olmos, the grandson of the old
woman, to peep through the bedroom window.
When Olmos informed Prevendido that the old woman's things were scattered in the bedroom, he requested Olmos to inform his uncle, Salvador Duero, a son of the
old woman, to come to the house (p. 8, Record).
Salvador entered the house through the bedroom window and saw his mother's lifeless and bloodied body near the kitchen with a wire coiled around her neck and a
scythe stuck in it. He found that money and pieces of jewelry were missing (p. 7, Record). A mallet was found on the floor near the victim's body.
The police and the rural health physician were notified. Patrolmen Tranquilino 0. Tormon, Jr. and Cesar Moneva repaired to the scene of the crime. From the fact that
cooked rice and viands were found on the stove, Tormon concluded that the crime was committed at supper time on the preceding night (p. 11, Record).
No eyewitness testified as to the commission of the offense. The principal evidence of the prosecution is the testimony of Lieutenant Tomas C. Lujan, the chief of
police of Cabatuan.
Lujan declared that Severino voluntarily confessed to him that he (Severino) committed the robbery with homicide but Severino refused to sign a confession.
Severino implicated Rufino Macaya of Lambunao, Iloilo. Lujan an and his men brought Severino to Macaya's house. Lujan an found that Macaya had nothing to do
with the crime.
Lujan further testified that Severino said that the money stolen from the old woman was in Severino's house at Sitio Rizal allowed Barrio Banguit. Lujan and his men
went to Severino's house. They did not find the stolen money.
Lujan was not the only police officer who heard Severino Duero's confession. Patrolman Rolando N. Alag, a member of the arresting team that picked up Duero and
brought him at Lujan, stated in his sworn statement before the mayor that Duero admitted that he took part in the robbery with homicide, that his companions were
Macaya and a certain Junior (whose parents were Severino's godparents) and that it was he (Severino) who induced the commission of the crime (p. 9, Record).
Alag further swore that after Macaya denied any participation in the commission of the crime, Severino Duero admitted sole responsibility for it and confessed that
he took three thousand pesos after hitting Fausta Duero on the head with a mallet strangling her with a piece of wire and hacking her with a scythe (p. 9, Record).
According to Alag Severino said that the robbery with homicide was committed on momentary impulse after Fausta Duero, who had plenty of money, refused to lend
him fifty pesos (Back of page 9, Record).
Alag confirmed his sworn statement at the preliminary examination when the municipal judge interrogated him. Alag said that Severino Duero made his confession in
the course of their conversation on the way to the police station and not by reason of a formal investigation (p. 22, Record).
Alag clarified that, according to Severino, he had to kill Fausta Duero because the old woman recognized him as the intruder (p. 22, Record).
Patrolman Rufino Tormon. another member of the arresting team, corroborated in his swam statement Alag's declaration as to Severino Duero's confession. Tormon
declared at the preliminary examination that Severino Duero knew that Fausta Duero had money because, according to Severino, Fausta's daughter Maurine repaid
to Fausta the sum of one thousand one hundred pesos (which amount Fausta had not yet deposited in the bank), another person named Alag Duero paid to Fausta
her debt and Fausta had ten sacks of palay (pp. 10 and 14, Record),
Tormon said that Severino met Fausta at a store in the morning of October 23, 1976 (the day before the crime was committed). Fausta was willing to lend Severino
one hundred fifty pesos (p. 14, Record).
Buenaventura Hudieras, the barangay captain of Barrio Pamulogan, which adjoins Barrio Banguit where the old woman resided, declared in his sworn statement that
in the evening of October 26 (two days after the commission of the crime) he was drinking liquor (biti-biti) with Severino Duero in the house of Valentino Pambo,
Hudieras' brother-in-law. On that occasion, Severino told Hudieras that Fausta Duero was killed by clubbing her with a mallet choking her with a piece of wire and
hacking her with a scythe (p. 6, Record).
Hudieras stated that when he remarked that the best thing to do was to kill the killer of Fausta Duero, Severino behaved in an unnatural manner and said that
Hudieras could testify that he saw daily Severino harvesting palay ("Si 'To boy nga dya, baryo kapitan dya, sarang makatestigos nga adlaw-adlaw doon takon
nagapanggarab") (p. 6, Record).
Hudieras confirmed his affidavit at the preliminary examination. He said that his suspicion was that Severino Duero killed Fausta Duero (p. 16, Record).
The sworn statements of Alag, Tormon and Hudieras and others were the basis of the criminal complaint for robbery with homicide filed by Lieutenant Lujan an in the
municipal court against Severino Duero. They did not testify at the trial most probably because Lujan himself, the station commander, took the witness stand to give
evidence on the same oral confession allegedly made by Severino to the police.
To reinforce and render credible Lujan's testimony on Duero's oral confession of guilt, Tranquilino Duero, a second cousin of the accused, testified that at about five
o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1976, he met the accused in Barrio Tabucan which is about two kilometers away from the old woman's house in Barrio
Banguit, In the course of their conversation, Severino allegedly revealed to Tranquilino that he (Severino) would rob his owaoor grandmother, Fausta Duero.
Tranquilino said to Severino: "Are you an Idiot?"
In answer, Severino explained that Fausta Duero would not even lend him ten pesos or a ganta of rice, a fact known to one Roman Sipaya. The next day when
Tranquilino learned from Severino that the old woman was killed, it occurred to Tranquilino that Severino was responsible for the killing (2-3 tsn March 10, 1978).
Another prosecution witness, Jose Montao, testified that about six o'clock in the evening of October 24, 1976, when he passed by the house of Fausta Duero, he saw
Severino Duero near the stairs of the house.
Severino was calling the old woman. Montao was just about three meters away from Severino when Montao passed by him (6 tsn April 21, 1978). Montao's
house was about one hundred meters away from Fausta's house. He was going to watch television in his uncle's house.
Montao had known Severino Duero for about four years. He was on friendly terms with Severino. The latter used to gather mangoes for him. Montao was positive
that Severino killed the old woman (6 tsn April 21, 1978).
Another prosecution witness, Wilfredo Cenizal (Senesal), also a resident of Barrio Pamulogan, testified that at six-thirty in the morning of October 25, 1976 or about
ten hours after the commission of the crime, Cenizal had a conversation with Severino Duero.
Severino spontaneously revealed to Cenizal that he (Severino) helped his grandmother (owao, the colloquial term for grandmother) who was "held up by the bandit"
and that her money amounting to two thousand pesos was taken from her. Severino recounted to Cenizal that the old woman was struck in the head with a hammer
and wounded with a scythe.
Cenizal's testimony was a confirmation of his affidavit taken on October 30, 1976 by a policeman wherein he stated that, according to Severino, the old woman was
killed by striking her with a mallet strangling her with a piece of wire and wounding her with a scythe and that the money taken from the old woman was in a purse
(buon-buon) placed in a bamboo basket (tabungos) (p. 5, Record). Cenizal confirmed his affidavit at the preliminary examination (p. 17, Record).
The circumstantial evidence summarized above shows that the prosecution had a strong case against Severino Duero in spite of the absence of the testimony of an
eyewitness. During the trial no objection was interposed by the defense to the evidence on Duero's oral confession.
Indeed, the trial court on the basis of such evidence found Severino guilty of robbery with homicide beyond reasonable doubt. He did not appeal from the trial court's
decision.
But the trouble is that at the trial Severino repudiated his alleged oral confession and even claimed that he was maltreated by the police. Lujan in his rebuttal
testimony denied the maltreatment.) Severino said that the victim was "the wife of my grandfather", meaning that "the husband of Fausta Duero (the victim) was the
grandfather of Severino Duero" (28 and 37 tsn January 5, 1979).
As alibi, Severino testified that he was in his house when the crime was perpetrated. His wife Salvacion, his neighbor Adriano Lopez and his friends, the spouses
Rufino Macaya and Erlinda Macaya, confirmed his alibi.
Severino Duero's counsel de oficio in this Court contends that the trial court erred in admitting the oral testimony on Severino Duero's oral confession, in giving
credence to the testimonies of Lujan, Cenizal, Montao and Tranquilino Duero, in finding that robbery with homicide was committed and in not sustaining Severino's
alibi.
The Solicitor General agrees with the counsel de oficio's contention that Severino's oral confession is inadmissible in evidence by reason of Article IV of the
Constitution which provides: 1wph1.t
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be admissible in evidence.
All the foregoing provisions are new except the first sentence, regarding the right against self-incrimination (nemo tenetur seipsum accusare), which is the only
provision found in section 18 of the Bill of Rights of the 1935 Constitution, now revised or expanded in section 20 (See article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and
Republic Act No. 85-1 as to the right of the accused, who is in police custody, to confer and communicate at anytime with his counsel.)
If this case were to be decided under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court's judgment of conviction could be affirmed. But we have to decide it under the rule in the
1973 Constitution as to a confession obtained while the confessant is under police custody. And that rule applies squarely to this case (Magtoto vs. Manguera,
Simeon vs. Villaluz and People vs. Isnani L37201-02, L-37424 and L-38929, March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4.)
Inasmuch as the prosecution in this case failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have
counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence.
After discarding Lujan's testimony on Duero's oral confession, the rest of the prosecution's circumstantial evidence against him is not adequate for his conviction. His
acquittal follows as a matter of course.
The new provisions in section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution were adopted from the ruling in Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2nd 694 ("an
earthquake in the world of law enforcement") which specifies the following procedural safeguards for in-custody interrogation of accused persons: 1wph1.t
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.
The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering
any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
As restated by Chief Justice Warren in the Miranda case, the following procedure should be adhered to:
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain
silent. 1wph1.t
For those unaware of the privilege the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise.
More important, such a warning is an absolute pre-requisite in overcome the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. ... .
Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it. ... .
The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning
is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. ... .
An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While such request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a lawyer
does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings we here
delineate have been given. The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be the person who most. needs counsel. ... .
If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the
basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney. ... .
In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult
with an attorney, but also that if lie is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. ... .
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at anytime prior to or during questioning, that he wishes
to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. ... . If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must
respect his decision to remain silent. ... .
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. ... .
An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. ... .
The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the
admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.
In the Miranda case, the Federal Supreme Court made it clear that what is prohibited is the "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self- incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights."
The State's right to prosecute criminals may be a great right but, as Lord Chancellor Sankey observed, it is not permissible "to do a great right by doing a little wrong".
The Miranda ruling does not mean that the police should stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime. It does not affect
volunteered statements of guilt by persons not in police custody.
At the risk of repetitiousness we reproduce hereunder Chief Justice Warren's summary of the procedural safeguards for persons in police custody where the
interrogation is regarded as the commencement already of the trial or adversarly system: 1wph1.t
He (the accused) must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer
questions or make a statement.
But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against
him.
The above procedure was not followed by the police in this case. Hence, Severino Duero's oral confession is inadmissible in evidence. Without that confession, the
prosecution's other evidence is not sufficient to establish Duero's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is acquitted. He should be released immediately unless he is being detained for another offense. Costs de
oficio.
[G.R. No. 128540. April 15, 1998]
EDUARDO CUISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of Appeals order requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision sentencing the
accused to imprisonment even if, earlier, the same decision has been promulgated in regard only to the payment of the modified civil indemnity arising from the
same criminal act. Otherwise stated, the promulgation of only one part of the decision, i.e., the liability for civil indemnity, is not a bar to the subsequent
promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability.
The Case
This is the gist of this Courts resolution of the petition for review on certiorari , assailing the November 5, 1996 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-GR SP No.
41096. The dispositive portion of the said Decision, which set aside the April 12, 1996 Resolution[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch
39,[4] reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated April 12, 1996 of the respondent Judge is hereby SET ASIDE and he is ordered to set anew the promulgation
of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of conviction and sentencing the accused to serve imprisonment for the duration stated in the decision
of the said respondent Court dated February 7, 1989. The order for the payment of the civil liabilities has been promulgated earlier.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The RTC Resolution, set aside by the Court of Appeals, disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the Urgent Motion to Set Aside Promulgation filed by the accused thru counsel, is
meritorious and accordingly, the same is hereby granted.
The Facts
The undisputed facts of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are reproduced below:
On February 7, 1989, respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 39) rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3553 and L-
3554, the dispositive portion of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide, beyond reasonable doubt and therefore sentences
him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day of [p]rision [m]ayor as [m]inimum to 12 years and 1 day of [r]eclusion [t]emporal as [m]aximum, for each offense,
with the accessories provided by law and to pay the costs. Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P30,000.00 and the heirs of
Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification that the civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00. The dispositive portion
of said Decision of this Court dated July 30, 1991 reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the joint decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED by ordering accused Eduardo Cuison to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the
amount of P50,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The accused elevated the decision on a petition for review docketed as G.R. Nos. 108985-86 but the Supreme Court denied the said petition on December 1, 1993.
The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Br. 39) for promulgation of the decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated [on April 4,
1995] the decision of [the Court of Appeals] only with respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence service
of his sentence.
Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II reported the matter to the Solicitor General and requested that a motion for clarification be filed with this Court to clarify
the decision dated July 30, 1991. On July 7, 1995, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Clarify Decision. On August 17, 1995, [the Court of Appeals] rendered a
Resolution which states in pertinent portions thereof:
In the dispositive portion of this Courts decision, We simply modified the appealed decision of the court a quo in one respect only - the increase of the indemnity to
be paid by the appellant to the heirs of the victims from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 as ruled in various cases including that cited in Our decision, People vs. Sison, 189
SCRA 643, 646.
In view of the foregoing, it is ineluctable that the penalty imposed by the lower court was not touched on at all by this Court especially in the light of [o]ur
[o]bservation in the said decision, as follows:
After a careful review of the evidence on records, this Court entertains no doubt as to the participation of the accused-appellant in the shooting of Sapigao and Rulo
Castro. The court a quohas expressed the following findings in its decision, to which findings this Court accords the great weight and respect such findings of the trial
court are entitled to:
Conspiracy . . . was proven by the following circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
The following circumstances showing the sequence of events, the mode or manner in which the offenses were perpetrated taken together indicated that the
assailants cooperated and helped each other in the attainment of the same aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21) (CA Decision, pp. 14-16; Rollo, pp. 127-129)
Acting on the afore-cited motion to clarify decision, this Court hereby declares that this Court had affirmed the decision of the court a quo with regard to the penalty
of imprisonment imposed in the said trial courts decision.
Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the decision anew. The accused, however, filed a Motion to Set Aside Promulgation on the following grounds:
1. That the judgment in said case was already promulgated on 4 April 1995 and therefore there is nothing to promulgate anymore.
2. To pursue with [sic] the scheduled promulgation will violate the accuseds constitutional right against jeopardy.
In a Resolution dated April 12, 1996, the respondent Judge granted the aforestated motion holding:
Now, the question is: May the resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals promulgated on 17 August 1995 which clarified the dispositive portion of its original
decision, be considered as an amendment, alteration or modification of the decision? Here, we must not forget the basic rule that in the execution of the judgment, it
is the dispositive portion of the decision which controls. We cannot also forget that, as already mentioned above, we have already promulgated the said decision by
reading to the accused the dispositive portion, and that to the best of our knowledge, he had already complied therewith by paying the damages which were
awarded. It may be relevant at this point in time, to cite the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Heirs of George Bofill vs. Court of Appeals, 237
SCRA 393 that
Had the Court of Appeals been more accurate and precise in quoting data from the records, it would have arrived at the right conclusion
The Honorable Court of Appeals cited the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Partola-Jo vs. CA, 216 SCRA 692, that:
Where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of the decision, the Supreme Court may clarify such ambiguity by an
amendment even after the judgment has become final. (emphasis supplied)
The above decision is in consonance with the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Buan vs. Court of Appeal, et al., 235 SCRA 424 wherein the
Supreme Court said:
x x x Thus the respondent Court stated, it is undisputed that the Decision of the Court of Appeals x x x had become final and executory. Taken in this light the
respondent court apparently did not err in leaving the issue unresolved, a final decision being unreviewable and conclusive.
But judging from the facts presented by this case, it is beyond doubt that serious injustice will be committed if strict adherence to procedural rules were to be
followed. It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the
rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend its operation. (emphasis supplied)
It would seem from the above pronouncements of the Honorable Supreme Court therefore, that it may suspend the operation of the rules of procedure by virtue of
its rule-making power. Certainly if the Honorable Supreme Court has the power to promulgate the Rules of Court, then it has the power to suspend its operation in
order to promote substantial justice. Unquestionably, however, the Honorable Court of Appeals does not have that rule[-] making authority. Therefore it may not
suspend the operation of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the above discussion refers to civil cases. Will the same doctrines apply to criminal cases as in the cases before us? The accused thru his counsels raised
the issues of the effect of a promulgation already once made arguing in the process that another promulgation can no longer be legally feasible if the constitutional
right of the accused against double jeopardy will not be violated.
We are not unmindful of the injunction upon lower courts, which the Honorable Supreme Court has imposed, i.e., to accept with modesty the orders and decisions of
the appellate courts. However, we feel that we must equate this with another injunction, that trial judges must keep abreast with the jurisprudence or run the risk of
being found to be grossly ignorant of the law. In short, this Court finds itself in the horns of a dilemma. Since the very jurisprudential authority relied upon by the
Honorable [Court] of Appeals refers to the power of the Supreme Court to clarify an ambiguity, may not this Court therefore conclude that the Honorable Court of
Appeals does not have the power to clarify the dispositive portion of the decision which has not only become final, but has already been previously promulgated?
Finally, it appears to this Court that there is validity to the observation made by counsel for the accused in paragraph 4 of their motion which we quote:
4. It appears, therefore, that there is nothing to promulgate as the same had already been promulgated on April 4, 1995. Besides, there is, likewise, nothing to
promulgate in the Court of Appeals Resolution dated February 2, 1996 and much less in the alluded August 17, 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Indeed, the said Resolution did not authorize nor did it direct this Court to re-promulgate the Decision.
On June 28, 1996, the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, filed [before the Court of Appeals a] petition
for certiorari and mandamus contending that the respondent Judge seriously erred and gravely abused his discretion in refusing to execute the penalty of
imprisonment in spite [the Court of Appeals] Decision of July 30, 1991 and Resolution of August 17, 1995. He prays that the Order dated April 12, 1996 of respondent
Judge be nullified and the penalty of imprisonment rendered against the accused be enforced.[6]
Ruling of the Appellate Court
In ruling for the People, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this way:
Obviously, respondent Judge was of the belief that the penalty of imprisonment was not affirmed by [the Court of Appeals] although it increased the civil liability
from P30,000.00 toP50,000.00. He failed to recognize the fact that the only modification made by [the Court of Appeals] on the decision [was] to increase the civil
liability, which would not have been imposed if the accused was not found guilty of the charge. Had he looked carefully into the text of the decision he would have
found that [the Court of Appeals] affirmed the decision of conviction, as borne out by the following portions of said decision:
After a careful review of the evidence on record, this Court entertains no doubt as to the participation of the accused-appellant in the shooting of Sapigao and Rulo
Castro.The Court a quo has expressed the following findings in its decision, to which findings this Court accords the great weight and respect such findings of the trial
court are entitled to:
Conspiracy ... was proven by the following circumstances:
1. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen together occupying the same table with Sgt. Bustarde and Sgt. Castro drinking beer at the terrace upon the arrival of Leo Petete
and his companions;
2. They left the terrace of the Tropical Hut about 10 to 15 minutes after the arrival of Rulo Castro, Rafael Sapigao, Leo Petete and Agardo Reyes and boarded the same
yellow car owned and driven by accused Eduardo Cuison.
3. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen by Ronald Ligayo, a resident of Poblacion, Bugallon, Pangasinan, a disinterested witness in the evening of May 27, 1986 infront
(sic) of the house of said accused Eduardo Cuison in Poblacion, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Accused Eduardo Cuison alighted from his car, proceeded to his house and after
coming out of his house was seen holding a 45 (sic) caliber and a carbine pistol. Eduardo Cuison called for his brother Warling to whom he handed the carbine pistol
and received by the latter.
Eduardo Cuison sent Domy Cuison to call for Bot Cuison. When Bot Cuison arrived, he, Warling, Domy, Eduardo Cuison and two others inside the car proceeded
towards the north. Obviously, these two were Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Bustarde.
4. Upon arrival of accused Eduardo Cuison, Bot Cuison, Warling Cuison, Domy Cuison, Sgt. Bustarde and Sgt. Castro at the driveway of the Tropical Hut on board the
car of accused Eduardo Cuison, each of them with the use of their respective firearms simultaneously fired several shots in the air;
5. Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Bustarde pulled and poked their guns to [sic] Sapigao. Then Sgt. Castro fired the fatal shot to [sic] Sapigao;
6. After Sapigao fell down, Sgt. Castro, Warling Cuison, Eduardo Cuison, Bot and Domy Cuison turned at [sic] Sapigao obviously to see to it and make sure Sapigao was
already dead;
7. After ascertaining that Sapigao was shot dead, accused Eduardo Cuison called for Rulo Castro to come outside the restaurant and when Rulo Castro emerged at the
door, accused Eduardo Cuison, Warling Cuison, Bot Cuison, Domy Cuison and Sgt. Bustarde simultaneously pointed their guns and shot at Rulo Castro hitting the
latter;
8. Accused Eduardo Cuison and Warling Cuison are brothers and uncles of Bot and Domy Cuison. Eduardo Cuison being a kagawad enjoyed moral influence upon his
brother Warling and his two nephews Bot and Domy;
9. Sgts. Bustarde and Castro and Kagawad Cuison knew each other before the incident;
10.After shooting the victims to death, the accused Cuisons went away from the scene of the crime on board the same car.
The following circumstances showing the sequence of events, the mode o[r] manner in which the offenses were perpetrated taken together indicated that the
assailants cooperated and helped each other in the attainment of the same aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21)
As held by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Colman, et al. 55 O.G. 2392 (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 88 ed., Vol. 2, p. 560),
Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and
circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be accomplished. If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of
the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them for concerted means is proved (People vs.
Colman, et. al., 55 O.G. 2393).
In the appealed decision, the trial court had ordered the accused-appellant to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao [in] the amount of P30,000.00 and to [sic] the
heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00 (Decision, p. 24). In accordance with the new policy of the Supreme Court on this matter, the above-specified
amount ofP30,000.00 should be increased to P50,000.00 (People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646).
It is absurd to conclude that [the Court of Appeals] increased the civil liability in accordance with new rulings of the Supreme Court without finding that the accused
[was] guilty of the offense of homicide. Thus, the promulgation of the civil liability only and omission of the criminal liability is an error.
Furthermore, [the Court of Appeals] has clarified the ambiguity in the dispositive portion through its Resolution dated August 17, 1995 which categorically stated that
the court affirmed the decision of the respondent court with respect to the penalty of imprisonment imposed upon the accused.
This clarification is not an amendment, modification, correction or alteration to an already final decision. It is conceded that such cannot be done anymore. The Court
of Appeals simply stated in categorical terms what it obviously meant in its decision - - that the conviction of the accused is affirmed with the modification that the
civil liability is increased. The dispositive portion of the decision may not have used the exact words but a reading of the decision can lead to no other conclusion.
It certainly would be ridiculous to allow the accused to go scot-free after paying the heirs the civil indemnity imposed by the Court for his participation in the act of
killing the two (2) victims in these cases, because of a wrong interpretation of a decision.[7]'
Hence, this appeal.[8]
The Issues
In this appeal, Petitioner Eduardo Cuison raises the following assignment of errors:
I. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the Solicitor General failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of
the extraordinary writ of certiorari .
II. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the Solicitor General failed to show the existence of the elements for the
issuance of a Writ of Mandamus.
III. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the promulgation of April 4, 1995 cannot be modified, over objection of
the accused.
IV. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the filing of the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus dated June 28,
1995 by the Solicitor General violates the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy.
V. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in deciding as it did and in denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration.[9]
Simply put, petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether the writs of certiorari and mandamus were properly issued by the Court of Appeals, and (2) whether
petitioners right against double jeopardy was violated.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is utterly unmeritorious.
First Issue: Certiorari and Mandamus Justified
A petition for certiorari is allowed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board
or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[10] Grave
abuse of discretion x x x implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[11]
Petitioner points out that the solicitor generals petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals failed to show grave abuse of discretion in the
assailed April 12, 1996 Resolution of the trial court. In the said Resolution, the trial court declined to order the incarceration of petitioner and, thus, effectively
refused to promulgate the August 17, 1995 CA Decision which, in turn, clarified that the CAs earlier Decision dated July 30, 1991 merely increased the amount of
indemnity but did not delete the penalty of imprisonment. In justifying its said Order, the trial court insisted that it had already promulgated the July 30, 1991 CA
Decision when it ordered petitioner to pay the increased amount of indemnity. Petitioner argues that the trial courts Order, far from being whimsical, capricious or
malevolent, [was] valid and substantial, to say the least, and the impugned [R]esolution was issued after a careful deliberation and weighing of the facts, issues and
points of applicable law.[12]
We disagree. While its language may have been a little faulty, it is still quite obvious that the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts Decision convicting Petitioner
Eduardo Cuison of double homicide. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision, therefore, cannot be construed to mean that the appellate court merely imposed an
indemnity and deleted the penalty of imprisonment. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision in no way communicated that the appealed Decision of
the trial court was modified only in regard to the amount of indemnity. Nowhere could it be gleaned that the penalty of imprisonment was deleted. In fact, the CA
Decision and the entire records of this case contain no legal or factual basis for acquitting petitioner or dismissing the criminal cases against him.
In granting petitioners motion, the trial court judge capriciously and arbitrarily decided not to promulgate the Court of Appeals July 30, 1991 Decision.[13] He had no
discretion to refuse; his refusal was thus a glaring transgression of his jurisdiction.
We must also emphasize that we dismissed the petition questioning the Court of Appeals July 30, 1991 Decision, thereby affirming the conviction of petitioner. The
trial courts assailed April 12, 1996 Resolution was therefore tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court of the land affirming the
judgment of conviction of respondent Court and unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion.[14]
Manifestly erroneous then is the trial judges justification that he has previously promulgated the Court of Appeals Decision on April 4, 1995. As already stated, the
penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals was imprisonment plus a higher amount of civil indemnity. In ordering only the payment of the indemnity, the trial court
failed to execute the CA Decision in its entirety.Notwithstanding the subsequent CA Decision clarifying -- and this Courts dismissal of the petition questioning -- the
said earlier CA Decision, the trial court still adamantly refused to do so.The persistent refusal of the trial court is a clear display of grave abuse of discretion.
We find misleading the claim of petitioner that the Court of Appeals itself acknowledged that the latters July 30, 1991 Decision was ambiguous and obscure.[15] Such
claim is bereft of factual basis. Nowhere in its Resolution[16] did the CA so describe its previous Decision. It merely restated the import of its July 30, 1991
Decision. Evidently, this was either misunderstood or distorted by the trial court, which stated that it is ineluctable that the penalty imposed by the lower court was
not touched on at all by [the Court of Appeals] x x x.[17]
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for issuing a writ of mandamus, in view of the trial courts refusal to perform its ministerial duty of promulgating
the appellate courts Decision in its entirety. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus is warranted [w]hen any tribunal, corporation,
board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x
x. [18] Obedience to a superior courts order is a ministerial duty of lower courts.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals was improper, because the People had not filed a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order.[19] This contention is bereft of merit. A motion for reconsideration need not precede a petition for certiorari where
the questioned resolution was a patent nullity, as in this case.[20]
Second Issue: Promulgation of Conviction
Not Barred by Double Jeopardy
Petitioner submits that the trial courts promulgation of the CA Decision on April 4, 1995 cannot be set aside and a second promulgation be ordered[21] because to do
so would contravene the prohibition against double jeopardy.[22] He contends that the judgment as promulgated on April 4, 1995 has become final[23] and that courts
have thus lost jurisdiction over the case.[24]
To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven:
x x x (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a
frustration thereof (citations omitted).
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered;
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (citation omitted).[25]
Petitioner contends that the promulgation by Judge Ramos on April 4, 1995 of the Respondent Courts decision of June 30, 1991 by reading its dispositive portion has
effectively terminated the criminal cases against the petitioner x x x.[26] In other words, petitioner claims that the first jeopardy attached at that point.
The Court is not persuaded. As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity. [27] Hence, a decision in such case disposes of both
the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.
As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In
excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996
Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void.[28] Since the criminal cases have not yet been
terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.[29]
We must stress that Respondent Courts questioned Decision did not modify or amend its July 30, 1991 Decision. It merely ordered the promulgation of the judgment
of conviction and the full execution of the penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner.
Cases Cited Not Applicable
People vs. Hernando, Ramos vs. Hodges and Republic vs. Court of Appeals, cited by petitioner, are not applicable because they refer either to the lower courts
proceeding that is not void or to errors of judgment, not to lack or excess or abuse of jurisdiction. Thus, in People vs. Hernando,[30] the Court ruled that the questioned
proceedings of the court a quo were not an absolute nullity as to render the judgment of acquittal null and void, considering that the prosecution was not denied due
process. In Ramos vs. Hodges[31] the Court found that the trial judges erroneous conclusion merely constituted errors of fact or of law, and not of jurisdiction. Lastly,
in Republic vs. Court of Appeals[32] the Court held that the lower court committed merely an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as there was no clear
showing [that it] exercised its power in [an] arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that its act was so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
Epilogue
This Court takes this occasion to remind members of the bench to be precise in their ponencias, most especially in the dispositions thereof. Accuracy and clarity in
substance and in language are revered objectives in decision-making.
Having said that, we also lament the trial courts convoluted attempt at sophistry, which obviously enabled the petitioner to delay the service of his imprisonment and
to unnecessarily clog the dockets of this Court and of the Court of Appeals. His Honors expressed desire to accept with modesty the orders and decisions of the
appellate court was, in truth and in fact, merely a sarcastic prelude to his veiled rejection of the superior courts order modifying his earlier decision. His sophomoric
justification of his refusal to obey for fear of being found to be grossly ignorant of the law does not deserve one whit of sympathy from this Court. Lady Justice may be
blindfolded but she is neither blind nor naive. She can distinguish chicanery from wisdom, fallacious argument from common sense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner.
EOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G. R. No. L-61356-57

September 30, 1986

-versus-

FELICISIMO JARA, REYMUNDO VERGARA

and ROBERTO BERNADAS,
Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

We are, once again, constrained to take a hard look into the sufficiency of extra-judicial confessions as the sole basis for the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death. The three appellants were all sentenced to death in Criminal Case No. 2564 for Robbery with Homicide. In the companion case of parricide, one was
sentenced to another death penalty while the two other appellants received sentences ranging from 12 to 20 years of imprisonment. Our task is made difficult by the
fact that the crimes were specially ruthless and barbarous in their commission. No less than the counsel for the appellants states that the people of Puerto Princesa
are no strangers to crime and that the frequency of criminal acts in their city has somehow benumbed the sensibilities of its citizens. Yet, the discovery on June 9,
1978 of the brutally and badly bashed corpses of two well-known and loved women of their community was still shocking to their senses.
There is the added factor that the police officers who investigated the crime and secured the confessions seemed so certain that indeed the three appellants are the
malefactors. The confessions are convincing in their details. The trial court noted that "both victims were assaulted and killed with the might and fury of one really
who had harbored so long a grudge and hate" and only Felicisimo Jara had that kind of ill-will against his estranged wife and her female companion. Moreover, Jara, a
recidivist for the crime of homicide, was characterized as an experienced killer. There must be many residents of Puerto Princesa who are thus, convinced about the
correct solution of the crime. And perhaps, the appellants could have been the killers.cralaw
The function of this Court, however, is not to indulge in surmises or probabilities. The issue before Us is whether or not the evidence of guilt is admissible under the
standards fixed by the Constitution and, if the quantum of proof which We are allowed by the Constitution to consider, establishes guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.cralaw
The decision of the former Court of First Instance of Palawan, 7th Judicial District, Branch 1 in the consolidated cases of "People of the Philippines versus Felicisimo
Jara, et al." [Criminal Case No. 2564] for Robbery with Homicide; and "People of the Philippines vs. Felicisimo Jara, et al." [Criminal Case No. 2565] for Parricide is
involved in this automatic review. All the three accused in Criminal Case No. 2564 were sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death, to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased Amparo Bantigue in the sum of Pl,000.00, the amount stolen, and the sum of P12,000.00. In Criminal Case No. 2565, for the
killing of Luisa Jara, accused Felicisimo Jara was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and meted out the maximum penalty of death while
the two other accused were found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve [12] years of prision mayor as minimum, to twenty
[20] years of reclusion temporal as maximum. All the accused were ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Luisa Jara in the sum of P12,000.00.cralaw
The Information for the crime of Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No. 2564 reads as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of June, 1978, about 1:30 o'clock in the morning, at Malvar St., Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and
treachery, after gaining entrance to the house thru the window, an opening not intended for entrance or egress, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously strike with a hammer, Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, hitting her on the vital parts of her body and stabbed with a scissor while she was soundly sleeping in her
bedroom with one, Luisa Jara, thereby causing her instantaneous death as a result thereof, and that after killing Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, accused in conspiracy with
each other, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, took, stole and carried away a piggy bank and a buddha bank containing money in the
amount of not more than P200.00, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, in the total amount of Twelve Thousand Two Hundred
Pesos [P12,200.00], Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW and committed with aggravating circumstances of Recidivism with respect to accused Felicisimo Jara, the latter having been previously convicted
of the crime of homicide in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and the aggravating circumstance against all the accused that the crime was committed with
treachery, in the dwelling of the offended party, in the nighttime, and with respect to accused Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas, for having participated in
the commission of the crime in consideration of a prize or reward.

In Criminal Case No. 2565, the Information charged the accused as follows:
That on or about June 9, 1978, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning, at Malvar St., Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike several times, with a hammer one, Luisa Jara, who is the lawfully wedded wife of accused Felicisimo Jara, and
thereafter, stabbed her with a scissor in her chest and abdomen, while the latter was soundly sleeping with one, Amparo Vda. de Bantigue, resulting to the
instantaneous death of said Luisa Jara, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Luisa Jara in the amount of Twelve Thousand [P12,000.00] Pesos, Philippine
Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW and committed with the aggravating circumstances of recidivism with respect to accused Felicisimo Jara, the latter having been previously
convicted of the crime of Homicide in the CFI of Iloilo, and the aggravating circumstance against all the accused, namely: [1] that the crime was committed in the
dwelling of the offended party, [2] in the nighttime, [3] and treachery; and the aggravating circumstance against accused Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas of
having participated in the commission of the crime in consideration of a prize or reward.

All the accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. On motion by the prosecution and the defense, the court a quo ordered a joint trial of the two cases which
arose from one incident and where the witnesses are the same. The facts according to the prosecution are as follows:
At about 6:00 o'clock in the early morning of June 9, 1978, the waitresses at Alvin's Canteen situated in Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, wondered why their
employer, the deceased Amparo Bantigue, did not answer when they called at her door that morning [p. 7, T.S.N., March 21, 1979]. They went to the kitchen and
peeped through a hole. They saw Amparo and Luisa Jara seemingly asleep. They again went to the door and knocked but still no answer came. The waitresses called
one of Luisa Jara's waitresses at Aileen's canteen next door. Becoming apprehensive, they went back to the kitchen for a second look. They discovered the following:
Amparo and Luisa were both lying in bed; Luisa was dressed only in her underwear and there was dried blood in one of her hands; Amparo, seemingly asleep, lay
beside her [pp. 9-11, T.S.N., March 21, 1979]. Finally, they decided to inform Luisa's daughter, Minerva, about their apprehension. When they met Minerva at the
public market, she tearfully accompanied them back to Amparo's room. When no one answered their knocking, Minerva kicked open the door. [pp. 11-12, T.S.N.,
March 21, 1979]. Inside, they found the two women dead from wounds inflicted on their persons [p. 13, T.S.N., March 21, 1979].cralaw
The husband of Luisa, appellant Felicisimo Jara, then entered the room and saw the condition of the victims [p. 15, T.S.N., March 21, 1979]. Inside the room, several
ceramic piggy banks belonging to Amparo containing coins estimated in the amount of P1,000.00 were missing [p. 43, T.S.N., February 6, 1979]. Scattered underneath
the window of Amparo's bedroom were coins and bits and pieces of what used to be ceramic piggy banks [Exh. "F"; pp. 17-20, T.S.N., Feb. 6, 1979]. Later, two
suspects in the killing, appellants Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas, were apprehended [pp. 59-60, T.S.N., March 19, 1979]. After investigation, they
confessed their guilt to the Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary in Palawan and other police investigators [pp. 26-31, TS.N., May 28, 1979]. They also
positively identified appellant Felicisimo Jara as the mastermind who had plotted the killing and who promised them a fee of P1,000.00 each for their participation
[Exhibits "O" and "N"]. Before the City Fiscal and First Assistant City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa City, respectively, appellants Vergara and Bernadas subscribed and swore
to their extra-judicial statements wherein they narrated their role and that of Felicisimo Jara in the killing [see Exhibits "O" and "N"].cralaw
Thereafter, the killing was reenacted before the military authorities and the public, with appellants Vergara and Bernadas participating [p. 14, T.S.N., July 19,
1979].cralaw
The autopsy reports [Exhibits "A" and "C"] submitted by Dr. Rufino Ynzon, the City Health Officer of Puerto Princesa on the examination of the cadavers of the
deceased victims indicate that death in both cases resulted from "hemorrhage, intra-cranial secondary to multiple comminuted-depressed fracture of the cranial
bones." Amparo Bantigue's wounds were described as follows:
POST MORTEM FINDINGS
1. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 1 l/4 inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone located at the forehead, right,
upper portion.
2. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 1 1/3 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone located at the forehead,
central portion.
3. Wound, macerated, roughly circular in shape, about 1 1/5 inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone located at the forehead,
medially to the left eyebrow.
4. Wound, macerated, roughly triangular in shape with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone located above the left eyebrow.
5. Wound, macerated, elongated with fracture of the alveolar bone, located at the upper lip, central portion.
6. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 31/2 inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone with brain tissue coming out located at
the left parieto temporal region.
7. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 21/2 inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone located at the left temporal region,
anterior portion.
8. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left face.
9. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the right temporal
region.
10. Wound, macerated, elongated, about 2 inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone located at the right face.
11. Wound, stabbed, about an inch in length at the right chest, between the 3rd and 4th intercostal space, penetrating the thoracic cavity involving the right lung.
12. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the chest, central portion, penetrating the sternum, then thoracic cavity piercing the right auricle, heart.
13. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the right upper abdomen penetrating the abdominal cavity involving the liver and stomach. [Exhibit "A"].
CAUSE OF DEATH: HEMORRHAGE INTRA-CRANIAL SEC. TO MULTIPLE COMMINUTED-DEPRESSED FRACTURE OF THE CRANIAL BONES.

On the other hand, Luisa Jara suffered from the following wounds:
POST MORTEM FINDINGS
1. Wound,macerated,roughly circular in shape,about 1 1/2 inches in diameter with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bones, located at the right
frontal region.
2. Wound, macerated, with a letter T shape, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the central portion of
the frontal region.
3. Wound, macerated, roughly triangular in shape, about 1 1/2 inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the right side
of the nose.
4. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape, about 1 inch in length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left eyebrow,
lateral portion.
5. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left lateral portion
of the forehead.
6. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the parietal region,
left.
7. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape about 1 inch in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the temporal region,
left.
8. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape, about 11/2 inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the temporal
region, left.
9. Wound, macerated, roughly stellate in shape, about 2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left mandibular
region.
10. Wound, macerated, roughly oval in shape, about 1 l/2 inches in length, with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the left face.
11. Wound,incised,about l 3/4 inches in length, located at the left upper portion of neck, left side.
12. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape, about 3 inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the right
temporal region.
13. Contusion with hematoma, circular in shape, located laterally from the right eyebrow.
14. Wound, macerated, roughly elongated in shape about 2 inches in length with depressed-comminuted fracture of the underlying bone, located at the occipital
region, upper portion.
15. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the chest, central portion penetrating inside the thoracic cavity involving heart and lung.
16. Wound, stabbed, about 1 inch in length, located at the level of typhoid process penetrating the thoracic cavity involving the right lung, lower lobe. [Exhibit "C"].
CAUSE OF DEATH: HEMORRHAGE, INTRA-CRANIAL SEC. TO MULTIPLE COMMINUTED-DEPRESSED FRACTURE OF THE CRANIAL BONES.

Felicisimo Jara denied the charge that he was the one who killed his wife, Luisa, together with her friend, Amparo Bantigue. He interposed alibi as a defense and
testified that at the time the killings took place at Alvin's Canteen at Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, he was fast asleep with his grandchildren at his
stepdaughter's house in Pineda Subdivision. The other accused, Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas, retracted their respective extra-judicial confessions
admitting their participation in the crimes charged and identifying their mastermind as the accused Jara during proceedings before the Inquest Fiscal. They contested
the admissibility of the extra-judicial confessions and the subsequent re-enactment of the crime on the ground that their participations in these occasions were not
free and voluntary and were without the benefit of counsel.
The court below ruled that the extra-judicial confessions of the accused Bernadas and Vergara [Exhibits "N" and "O", respectively], together with the proof of corpus
delicti of the Special Crime of Robbery with Homicide established the guilt of the accused beyond moral certainty. In their brief, the accused-appellants contended
that the court a quo erred:
I.
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE UTTER ABSENCE OF ANY KIND OF EVIDENCE, DIRECT OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL.
II.
IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS REYMUNDO VERGARA AND ROBERTO BERNADAS, WHICH WERE TAKEN THRU
FORCE AND WITHOUT BENEFIT OF COUNSEL.
III.
IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS REYMUNDO VERGARA AND ROBERTO BERNADAS AGAINST THEIRCO-ACCUSED,
APPELLANT FELICISIMO JARA.
IV.
IN FINDING THE PRESENCE OF CONSPIRACY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF THEREOF.
V.
IN ALLOWING THE PLAYING OF AN ALLEGED TAPED CONFESSION.
VI.
IN ADMITTING THE PICTURES, EXHS. "T" TO "T- 23", WHICH WERE NEVER PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.
All these assigned errors boil down to the issue of whether or not there is sufficient evidence as borne by the records to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.cralaw
Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

There is no dispute that the confessions in these cases were obtained in the absence of counsel. According to the records, there was a waiver by the accused-
appellants of their right to counsel.
Was the waiver valid?
We are constrained to answer this question in the negative.cralaw
Before the extrajudicial confession of appellant Bernadas was reduced to writing, Pfc. Henry E. Pulga, in the presence of four other police officers, made the
following "Pasubali" followed by the answer, "Opo":
PASUBALI: Ikaw ay nasa ilalim ng isang pagsisiyasat at dahil dito ay ipinababatid namin sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan na sa ilalim ng ating Bagong Saligang Batas
ay ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng isang manananggol o abogado ayon sa sarili mong pili mayroon ka ring karapatan na hindi maaaring piliting sumagot sa
anumang itatanong sa iyo sa alinmang Hukuman sa Pilipinas. Nauunawaan mo ba ang lahat ng mga ipinaliwanag namin sa iyo ngayon?
SAGOT: Opo.
Likewise, in the case of the accused Vergara, the foreword of his signed sworn statement reads:
TANONG: Marunong po ba kayong sumulat bumasa ng tagalog at umunawa ng wikang tagalog na siya nating gagamitin sa pagsisiyasat na ito?
SAGOT: Nakakaunawa po ako at nakakabasa pero sa pagsulat ay hindi masyado.
PALIWANAG: Kung gayon po ay ipinababatid ko sa inyo ang inyong karapatan na kayo ay maaaring manatiling tahimik kung inyong nais, magbigay o tumangging
magbigay ng inyong salaysay, maaari din na kayo ay sumangguni muna sa isang abogado kung nais ninyo at ang lahat po ng inyong sasabihin ay maaaring gamiting
pabor o laban sa inyo sa anumang Hukuman dito sa ating kapuluan ngayong alam na ninyo ang ilan sa inyong karapatan kayo po ba naman ay handa na ngayong
magsalaysay kahit na kayo ay wala pang abogadong kaharap na siyang mangangalaga sa inyong karapatan at lahat po ng inyong sasabihin ay pawang katutuhanan
lamang
SAGOT: Opo.
[SGD.] REYMUNDO VERGARA DELA CRUZ
PATUNAY: Ako si Reymundo Vergara dela Cruz ay nagsasaad na ipinaalam sa akin ang aking karapatang manatiling tahimik, kung aking nanaisin, na ang lahat na
aking sasabihin ay maaaring gamiting pabor o laban sa akin at nalaman ko rin na ako ay maaaring kumuha ng sarili kong abogado na siyang nangangalaga ng aking
karapatan na kung hindi ko kayang kumuha ay bibigyan ako ng pamahalaan.
Nauunawaan ko ang mga karapatang ito, handa at kusang loob akong nagbibigay ng aking salaysay ngayon, sa tanong at sagot na paraan. Hindi ko na kailangan
ang tulong ng isang abogado, nauunawaan ko ang aking ginagawa, walang pananakot, pananakit, pangako, pabuya o anuman na ginawa sa akin upang ako ay
magsalaysay. Ito ay sarili kong kagustuhan.
[SGD.] REYMUNDO VERGARA DELA CRUZ
This stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police
investigators either automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired,
punctilious, fixed, and artificially stated style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a
spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the
prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession
and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this
case.cralaw
The records sustain the appellants' contention that their extra-judicial confessions bear clear earmarks of illegality and improbability. The Solicitor General gives the
following arguments for voluntariness:
An extra-judicial confession is generally presumed to have been voluntarily executed [People v. Castaeda, 93 SCRA 56]. The confessant carries the burden of
convincing the trial judge that his admissions are involuntary or untrue [People v. Ramos, 94 SCRA 842]. The trial court, in this case, was not convinced that the
extrajudicial confessions of appellants were made involuntarily. Consider the following reasons for the court's refusal to lend credence to appellants' claim:
[1] Apart from appellants' self-serving claim, no other evidence on record supports the allegation of involuntariness [People v. Villa, 93 SCRA 716].
[2] On the contrary, several prosecution witnesses testified that the confessions were voluntarily given.
[3] Appellants' oral and written confessions given at various times to several investigating authorities, not to mention the public re-enactment of the crime itself, did
not vary and they revealed details only the assailants could have possibly known [People v. Ty Sui Wong, 83 SCRA 125; People v. Bautista y Aquino, 92 SCRA 465].
[4] Appellants' confessions were corroborated by the existence of corpus delictiestablished by independent evidence [People v. Francisco, 93 SCRA 351].
[5] The claim of coercion cannot prevail over the testimony of the subscribing fiscal that said confession was voluntary [People v. Caramonte, 94 SCRA 150].
The People v. Castaeda ruling applies to a crime committed before the Bill of Rights was amended to include Section 20 on the right to remain silent and to counsel
and to be informed of such right. The presumption that "no one would declare anything against himself unless such declarations were true" assumes that such
declarations are given freely and voluntarily. The new Constitution, in expressly adopting the so-called Miranda v. Arizona [384 U.S. 436] rule, has reversed the
presumption. The prosecution must now prove that an extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given, instead of relying on a presumption and requiring the accused
to offset it. There would have been no need to amend the centuries-old provisions of the Bill of Rights and to expressly add the interdiction that "no force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him [the person being investigated]" if the framers intended Us to continue
applying the pre-1973 or pre-amendment presumptions.
Miranda v. Arizona, in explaining the rule which the U.S. Supreme Court adopted, states:
While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused
person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial
character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner and to entrap him into fatal
contradictions, which is so painfully evident made the [continental] system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition.

It is natural and to be expected that the police officers who secured the confessions in these cases should testify that the statements were voluntarily given.
However, the records show that the interrogations were conductedincommunicado in a police-dominated atmosphere. When appellant Bernadas gave his confession,
his companions in the room were five police officers. The only people with Vergara when he confessed were also police investigators. We quote some more passages
from Miranda:
Again, We stress that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented. As we have stated before, "Since Chambers v.
Florida, 309, US 227 [84 L ed 716, 60 S Ct 472], this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the
only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 US 199, 206, 4 L ed 2d 242, 247, 80 S Ct 274 (1960). Interrogation still takes place in
privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms. A valuable source of
information about present police practices, however, may be found in various police manuals and texts which document procedures employed with success in the
past, and which recommend various other effective tactics. These texts are used by law enforcement agencies themselves as guides. It should be noted that these
texts professedly present the most enlightened and effective means presently used to obtain statements through custodial interrogation. By considering these texts
and other data, it is possible to describe procedures observed and noted around the country.
The officers are told by the manuals that the "principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy - being alone with the person under
interrogation." The efficacy of this tactic has been explained as follows:
If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the investigator's office or at least in a room of his own choice. The subject should be deprived of every
psychological advantage. In his own home, he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his
indiscretions or criminal behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and other friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his own
office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces of the law.
To highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings, the manuals instruct the police to display an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt and from outward
appearance to maintain only an interest in confirming certain details. The guilt of the subject is to be posited as a fact. The interrogator should direct his comments
toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than court failure by asking the subject whether he did it. Like other men, perhaps the subject has a
bad family life, had an unhappy childhood, had too much to drink, had an unrequited desire for women. The officers are instructed to minimize the moral seriousness
of the offense, to cast blame on the victim or on society. These tactics are designed to put the subject in a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of
what the police purport to know already - that he is guilty. Explanations to the contrary are dismissed and discouraged.
The texts thus stress that the major qualities an interrogator should possess are patience and perseverance. One writer describes the efficacy of these characteristics
in this manner:
In the preceding paragraphs, emphasis has been placed on kindness and stratagems. The investigator will, however, encounter many situations where the sheer
weight of his personality will be the deciding factor. Where emotional appeals and tricks are employed to no avail, he must rely on an oppressive atmosphere of
dogged persistence. He must interrogate steadily and without relent, leaving the subject no prospect of sure cease. He must dominate his subject and overwhelm him
with his inexorable will to obtain the truth. He should interrogate for a spell of several hours, pausing only for the subject's necessities in acknowledgment of the
need to avoid a charge of duress that can be technically substantiated. In a serious case, the interrogation may continue for days, with the required intervals for food
and sleep, but without respite from the atmosphere of domination. It is possible in this way to induce the subject to talk without resorting to duress or coercion. The
method should be used only when the guilt of the subject appears highly probable. [384 US at pp. 448-451].

The cited police manuals state that the above methods should be used only when the guilt of the subject appears highly probable. As earlier stated, the investigators
in the cases now before Us appear to have been convinced that the accused-appellants were the culprits. Nonetheless, the evils ofincommunicado interrogations
without adequate safeguards to insure voluntariness could still result in the conviction of innocent persons. More important, what the Constitution commands must
be obeyed even at the risk of letting even hardened criminals mix once more with the law-abiding world.
As to the re-enactment, the extra-judicial-confessions served as a script for what was to follow. Pictures re-enacting a crime which are based on an inadmissible
confession are themselves inadmissible. There are other factors to be considered in these cases. Vergara and Barnadas had been detained for more than two [2]
weeks before they decided to give "voluntary" confessions. We doubt if it was two weeks of soul-searching and introspection alone which led them to confess. There
must have been other persuasions.cralaw
There were two sensational murder cases in Palawan which preceded the killings now before Us. The PC Command and the Integrated National Police were under
pressure to "solve" these additional sensational killings. The counsel for appellants mentions a factor not refuted by the appellee in its brief, namely:
LT. COL. SABAS IMBONG, SGT. EUGENIO ENRIQUEZ, PFC HENRY PULGA and CPL. ADOLFO JAGMIS all are connected with the Provincial Constabulary Command which
investigated the case, prematurely publicized the solution of the case with the alleged "extra-judicial confessions" of two [2] accused, but who were rebuffed when
the two [2] accused, upon the first opportunity to do so in public, which was the preliminary investigation, recanted and retracted their alleged "extra-judicial
confessions" as they were taken with the use of force, violence, and intimidation, was prepared by the investigators themselves, and without benefit of
counsel.cralaw
All are comrades in-arms of Pat. Mamerto Bantigue, who is the son of the deceased Amparo Bantigue. Pat. Bantigue was implicated in several coercion and physical
injuries cases filed with the City Court by persons who had been physically attacked and violated by him in connection with the murder of his mother. Likewise, he
evaded justice by escaping from the law after murdering a companion of accused Jara and attempting to kill the latter. He remains at large.cralaw
A PC Sergeant, Oscar Ponce de Leon, assigned at the PC Medical Dispensary, testified that he treated Roberto Bernadas for cigarette burns and Reymundo Vergara for
a wound at the tip of his right hand. While the medicine he applied was only merthiolate, the possibility cannot be discounted that in addition to the psychological
effect of incommunicado questioning, lighted cigarettes and other means of persuasion which leave physical marks, were also utilized to secure the
confessions.cralaw
Accused Reymundo Vergara was given an opportunity to go scot free by turning state witness. He refused. Apart from their extra-judicial confessions, no other
evidence to implicate Bernadas and Vergara as perpetrators of the killing was introduced by the prosecution. Since these confessions are inadmissible in evidence,
the two appellants have to be acquitted.cralaw
The strongest evidence against Felicisimo Jara are the extra-judicial confessions of his two co-accused. Bernadas and Vergara point to Jara as the one who
bludgeoned the two victims with a hammer and then used a pair of scissors in inflicting the stab wounds. He was also alleged to have offered them P1,000.00 each if
they would help him in the killing of his wife. However, since the confessions of Bernadas and Vergara are inadmissible against them, with more reason can they not
be used against Jara.cralaw
Apart from the above extra-judicial confessions, other circumstantial evidence was presented to support a verdict of conviction. Would such evidence in the absence
of the extra-judicial confessions be sufficient to overturn the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused Jara? Evidence attesting to the fact that accused Jara
and his wife had not been in good terms for about three years before the killings was presented. They used to quarrel with each other and they had not been sleeping
together since the deceased Luisa Jara slept at Alvin's Canteen together with the other deceased, Amparo Bantigue. Godofredo Anasis nephew of Luisa Jara, testified
that his aunt was a "tomboy" and that she and Amparo Bantigue lived together as "husband and wife." The two went to the movies together. The relationship of the
two women angered Felicisimo Jara and was a cause of their frequent quarrels. He resented not only his wife but also her woman companion.cralaw
The testimony on the fact of Luisa Jara and Amparo Bantigue sleeping together is corroborated by the fact that they were bludgeoned to death while sleeping on one
bed and their bodies discovered on that same bed. At the Aileen's Canteen managed by the deceased Luisa, accused Felicisimo Jara did the cooking and whenever he
committed even the slightest mistakes, his wife scolded and cursed him, treating him as though he were only one of the servants of the restaurant. [T.S.N., May 31,
1979, pp. 1821-1830]. The records are replete with testimony to show that Felicisimo Jara had reason to hate his wife enough to kill her and her companion.cralaw
The lower court, in its decision, stated that the nature and the number of wounds, reflected in the autopsy reports, convincingly show that only a person who had
harbored so much hate and resentment could have inflicted such multiple fatal blows. It opined that accused Jara is the only person who would have sufficient
motive to wish the death of the deceased for he had not been treated well as a husband by his wife.cralaw
During the investigation at the scene of the crime, blood stains were found splattered in the trousers and shirt worn by accused Jara. His eyeglasses were also
smeared with blood. When asked to explain the presence of said blood stains, accused Jara told the police that before he learned about the killing, he was with his
stepdaughter Minerva Jimenez in the public market dressing chickens. [T.S.N., May 28, 1979, pp. 397-398]. He also said in his testimony in open court that when he
saw his wife lying dead on the bed, he approached her and hugged her in his effort to wake her up. [T.S.N., September 30, 1980, p. 1230]. After a laboratory
examination of the eyeglasses [Exhibit "I"], trousers [Exhibit "J"], and shirt [Exhibit "K"], the NBI biologist verified in her report that the blood stains were not chicken
blood but human blood [Exhibit "L"]. The blood stains found in accused Jara's trousers formed certain identical circular patterns, a splattering of blood which,
according to the NBI biologist, could be caused by an instrument like that of a hammner. Such circular patterns will only occur at the time of the impact of the
instrument, the very moment it hits the victim. He further explained that there was no possibility of the splattering of blood if the victim died hours before because
blood starts to coagulate or clog, 15 minutes after the wound is caused. [T.S.N., March 19, 1979, pp. 227; 244; 248-250]. The blood of the deceased victims in the
case at bar had already coagulated in the morning of June 9, 1978, when accused Jara claimed that the blood stains on his shirt were smudged when he hugged his
wife.cralaw
The NBI biologist, whose findings were later signed by the Chief of the Forensic Chemistry Division, testified that human blood was found on the eyeglasses of
appellant Jara, on the front side lower portion of the left leg of the trousers, at the left buttocks of the pants and the back portion near the trousers, and smudged
human blood stains on the appellant's T-shirt. The human blood stains were Type B. A failure to get evidence on the blood types of the two victims keeps this second
circumstantial evidence, together with the clear motive, from being well-nigh conclusive. However, it is still strong evidence in the chain of circumstances pointing to
Jara as the killer of his wife.cralaw
Another circumstance is the cover-up attempt by Jara. He lied about the blood on his clothes and eyeglasses. He falsely claimed that the blood came from the
chickens he had been slaughtering for the market. There is no explanation about the source and cause of the human blood stains splattered all over him.cralaw
There is no question that appellant Jara was at the scene of the crime. Upon the discovery of the bodies and the forcible opening of the door, Jara was with the
group. He went through the motions of embracing his wife although the observers noted that even in death, there was no love lost between husband and wife. One
of the waitresses at the Alvin's Canteen who saw accused Jara's reaction as he entered the room where the victims lay dead observed that he shed no tears and his
face did not show any indication of sorrow. [T.S.N., March 21, 1979, pp. 373-374].cralaw
The hammer used in the killing is an instrument with which appellant Jara is familiar. It was proven during the trial of the case that the hammer with the letter "A" on
its handle which was one of the instruments used in the perpetration of the crime, belonged to Luisa Jara who had kept it at Aileen's Canteen where her husband,
appellant Jara helped as cook.cralaw
Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides:
Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
[a] There is more than one circumstance;
[b] The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
[c] The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. [See People v. Duero, 136 SCRA 515].

Circumstantial evidence, as a basis for conviction of a crime, should be acted on and weighed with great caution, particularly where the crime is heinous and the
penalty is death, as in the instant cases. In determining the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to support a conviction, each case is to be determined on its own
peculiar circumstances and all of the facts and circumstances are to be considered together as a whole, and, when so considered, may be sufficient to support a
conviction, although one or more of the facts taken separately would not be sufficient for this purpose. [23 CJS p. 555]. No general rule has been formulated as to the
quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice for any case, but that matters not. For all that is required is that the circumstances proved must be consistent
with each other, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. [People v.
Contante, 12 SCRA 653].
The requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are present in this case. The aforementioned circumstances constitute an unbroken chain
leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the guilt of the accused Jara beyond reasonable doubt [See US v. Villos, 6 Phil. 510; People v. Subano,
73 Phil. 692]. Mere denials of the accused as to his participation in the crime are only self-serving negative evidence which cannot outweigh circumstantial evidence
clearly establishing his active participation in the crime.cralaw
The defense of alibi given by the accused Jara is weak. Aside from himself, the only person who vouched for his presence at some place away from the scene of the
crime was his stepdaughter from whom he had sought abode. Hence, the alibi is made more dubious considering that no other credible persons were presented who
would, in the natural order of things, be best situated to support the tendered alibi [People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94, citing People v. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336; People v.
Bagasala, 39 SCRA 236; People v. Carino, 55 SCRA 516]. More importantly, the defense of alibi cannot prosper because it is not enough to prove that defendant was
somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must, likewise, demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at
that time. [People v. Alcantara, 33 SCRA 812]. Such proof is wanting in this case.cralaw
The killing of Amparo Bantigue was marked by treachery and evident premeditation. The trial court noted recidivism insofar as Felicisimo Jara, previously convicted of
Homicide, was concemed, together with dwelling and nighttime. However, the supposed robbery of the piggy bank and Buddha bank is proved only by the extra-
judicial statements found inadmissible. The offense against Bantigue was simple Murder. Insofar as the Parricide case is concerned against accused Jara, the lower
court did not err in finding guilt as having been established beyond reasonable doubt.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is modified as follows:
In Crim. Case No. 2564, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are acquitted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused Jara is
convicted of the crime of Murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of death
In Crim. Case No. 2565, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are likewise acquitted of the crime of Homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused Jara is
convicted of the crime of Parricide and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
Considering, however, that the accused Jara is now over 70 years of age, the penalty of death is lowered to reclusion perpetua.
In both cases, accused Jara is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Amparo Bantigue and Luisa Jara in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos [P30,000.00],
respectively.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-57184-85 November 14, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUGENIA ABANO, ELISEO CABAA alias LUCIO CABAA and PABLO CABAA alias TEOFILO CABAA,defendants-appellants.

FERNAN, J.:
Before Us on automatic review is the decision of the Cebu-Bohol Circuit Criminal Court in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-XIV-2147 and CCC-XIV-2148, which found Eugenia
Abano guilty of the crimes of parricide and murder, and Eliseo and Teofilo, both surnamed Cabana, of two murders. Two death penalties were imposed on each of the
accused.
The information dated May 7, 1980 in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-2147 for parricide and murder alleges:
That on or about the 7th day of February, 1980 at 11:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, in Sitio Tunga, Barangay Cantuod, Municipality of Balamban, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Eugenia Abano, then united in lawful wedlock with Agripino Abano,
and conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with Eliseo Cabana alias Lucio Cabana and Pablo Cabana alias Teofilo Cabana, armed with sharp
bladed weapons, with evident premeditation and treachery and in consideration of a prize or reward for the accomplishment of their criminal purposes, with
deliberate intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab the said Agripino Abano with the weapons aforecited thereby
inflicting upon the latter multiple wounds on the vital parts of the body which injuries caused, as a consequence, the instantaneous death of the victim.
In addition to the above qualifying circumstances, the offense was committed with the aid of armed men; superior strength and arms; nighttime; in consideration of
the prize or reward and perpetrated in the dwelling of the victim.
Except for the difference in the name of the accused, the absence of the allegation on the accused's relationship to the victim and the fact that Bienvenida Cumad is
Identified as the victim, the information for murder in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-2148 is also dated May 7, 1980 and couched in basically the same language.
The prosecution's version of the crimes is as follows:
Eugenia Tolero Abano and Agripino Abano were married in 1948. 1 At the time of the commission of the crimes in February, 1980, they had been separated for three
years. Eugenia, who was then 57 years old, stayed in the conjugal home in Cumbado, Balamban, Cebu with two of their children, one of whom was mentally
incapacitated. To support her dependents, Eugenia worked as copra-maker earning eight pesos a day.
Agripino, 55 years old, lived with another woman, 50-year old widow Bienvenida Cumad, at the Abanos' hut some 400 meters away from the conjugal home. Only a
bridge separated the Abanos' conjugal home from the hut which was actually located in Tunga, Cantuod, Balamban, Cebu.
Behind Eugenia's house was another hut which used to be a pig pen. Elevated from the ground by about two feet, only a sack served as its door. It was occupied by
Rodolfo Abano, a son of Eugenia and Agripino, and his family.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of February 7, 1980, Rodolfo's wife, Concordia, saw Eugenia partaking of supper with Eliseo Cabana and Teofilo Cabana at the
former's house. Concordia knew Eliseo and Teofilo because they were medicine men or quack doctors who frequented Cumbado to treat sick persons.
Just before midnight or at around 11:30 o'clock that night, Concordia was sleeping near the door of their hut, with her four children lying between her and her
husband, when she was awakened by someone pulling her hair. As the hut was lighted by a kerosene lamp, she recognized the man pulling her hair to be Eliseo. With
Eliseo was his son, Teofilo. Eliseo was standing on the ground but he was able to reach for her hair use of her position near the door.
Eliseo tried to cover her mouth and cautioned her not to make any noise. Afraid of what he might do to her with the bolo [pinuti] she noticed he was carrying,
Concordia jumped out of the hut. Eliseo then ordered her to accompany him to her father-in-law, Agripino. Along the way, Eliseo and Teofilo instructed her to tell
Agripino that his son Rodolfo [Concordia's husband] was suffering from a stomach ache and that he should be brought to a doctor.
Upon reaching Agripino's hut, Concordia called him saying, "Tay, Tay, wake up, bring Rudy to the doctor because he is suffering stomach ache." 2 Agripino answered
by asking her why Rudy had stomach ache. Concordia told him that Rudy had eaten something raw.
Eliseo then dragged Concordia towards the road, pointed the bolo at her and said, "You run now, but do not tell your husband about this because if you will tell him I
win kill your husband and all the members of your family." 3Concordia ran and hid for some time under the big stove between Eugenia's house and her hut before
proceeding home.
Delia Cumad, the 15-year-old daughter of Bienvenida, who was then sleeping in one of the two rooms of Agripino's hut was likewise awakened by Concordia's voice.
She heard Concordia telling Agripino that Rudy was sick because he ate something raw. Then she noticed Agripino pass by her on his way to the hut's door. When
Agripino was already downstairs, Delia heard an impact the sound of which resembled that of the hacking of a banana trunk. 4 Then she heard Agripino calling out,
"Day, help Day, I am hacked." Delia tried to prevent her mother Bienvenida from going down the hut but the latter persisted. Bienvenida brought along a kerosene
lamp. Because she was afraid, Delia did not even try to peep through the window to see what was happening. Neither did she hear Bienvenida and Agripino mention
any names while they were outside the hut. 5
Almost an hour later, Delia came down the hut. She looked for Agripino and Bienvenida but failed to find them. Scared, she ran to the house of Rosario Montero. On
the way, Delia met Rudy and Concordia Abano. Rudy asked her where she was going. Delia replied that she was going to the house of Rosario Montero. She did not
tell them what happened to Agripino and Bienvenida.
As it was too quiet in Rosario's house, Delia proceeded to the house of Pesing Baynas to whom she related what had transpired at their hut. Pesing accompanied her
back to their hut. Four meters from that hut, they found the lifeless body of Bienvenida.
Rodolfo Abano was awakened by his mother Eugenia at around midnight. She asked him to transport Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana to Matab-ang, Toledo City in his
motorized tricycle. When Rodolfo said that he would rather transport them in the morning, Eugenia told him that Eliseo and Teofilo were in a hurry.
At that time, Concordia was feeding her baby but she accompanied Rodolfo to the garage to get the motorized tricycle. It was on the way to the garage that they met
Delia Cumad.
From the garage, Rodolfo went back to his hut where, after Concordia had alighted from the tricycle, Eugenia boarded it. Near her house, Eugenia got off and Eliseo
and Teofilo boarded the tricycle. As he was ferrying them to Matab-ang, Rodolfo noticed that they were carrying a piece of sack that was rolled over a two-feet-long
object. From Matab-ang, Rodolfo went back to Cantuod. There he met Bernie Verdeflor who told him that his father and his common-law wife were dead.
Bienvenida D. Cumad died of cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to shock and hemorrhage due to multiple wounds on the neck [head], trunk and extremities." 6 In
the medico-legal necropsy report, she is Identified as Bienvenida Delfin Abano.7 Actually, her maiden name was Bienvenida Mancia Delfin but she was mistaken for
the legal wife of Agripino by Doctor Ladislao V. Diola, Jr. who conducted the autopsy on the two victims. 8
Bienvenida sustained an avulsion which penetrated her skull and four lacerated wounds in the anterior portion of the neck, the right lumbar region, the right iliac
region and the right wrist. The inferior vena cava on both sides of her neck and the left carotid arteries were lacerated. 9
Agripino Albano also died of "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to shock and hemorrhage due to multiple wounds on the head, trunk and extremeties." 10 He
sustained twelve lacerated wounds and an abrasion on the head and neck, and twenty-one lacerated wounds, five stab wounds and an avulsion in his trunk and
extremities. He had a half-moon fracture in his cranium extending from the left to the right temporal bone and other fractures in his orbital and ethmoidal bones,
third cervical vertebra, seventh rib and left elbow joint. He also suffered a subarachnoidal hemorrhage of the brain, and laceration in his upper lobe left lung, middle
lobe right lung, septum, right ventricle and right kidney. 11
In the course of the investigation conducted by the police, Delia Cumad, Rodolfo Abano, Concordia Abano, Eugenia Abano, Eliseo Cabana and Pablo [Teofilo] Cabana
were interrogated. Significantly, only the interrogations of Rodolfo and Delia were reduced to writing. 12
In his sworn statement, 13 Rodolfo narrated that at about twelve noon of February 9, 1980, his mother, Eugenia, revealed to him that she hired Eliseo and Pablo
[Teofilo] Cabana to kill Agripino and his common-law wife.
Because of that statement, Vicente S. Cabahug, the substation commander of the Balamban Police Force, interrogated Eugenia. At the trial court, Cabahug related
how he investigated Eugenia. He testified thus:
Q. After the revelation of Rodolfo Abano that it was her mother who hired the other two accused to kill the deceased Agripino Abano and Bienvenida Cumad, what
else did you do?
A. After the revelation of the said Rodolfo Abano of the killing of the father and the common-law wife, I investigated Eugenia Abano as she was made to stay around,
then at about 11:00 o'clock on February 11 in the morning, 1980, she admitted and confirmed the revelation of her son, Rodolfo Abano.
COURT [To the witness]:
Q. But what did she admit?
A. She admitted and she narrated to me that she even burst into tears telling me of the agony that she suffered for the last three years her husband was living in the
house with a girl aside from her and they were living 200 meters away where she lives and she confided and confessed that she was forced to hire the two accused,
these Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana to kill her husband and common-law wife. 14
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. VELOSO:
Q. According to you, Eugenia Abano admitted hiring the present two accused who appeared to be father and son.
A. Yes.
Q. Now. You asked her what was the prize or reward?
A. Yes, I asked her.
Q. What did she say?
A. According to Eugenia Abano she told the two accused, Teofilo and Eliseo Cabana that the consideration was the proceeds of the passenger tricycle that she was
going to sell after the killing of her husband and the paramour.
Q. In other words, she promised to pay the consideration after the act of killing has already taken place?
A. Yes.
Q. Did she tell you what guarantee she issued in order that the father and son Cabanas would really execute the act?
A. She did not give any guarantee.
Q. So that was only the promise?
A. According to her only the promise. 15
According to Cabahug, he reduced Eugenia's statement in writing but he did not bring his notes in court because they were "just more or less [a] scratch." 16
On the strength of those confessions, Cabahug filed on February 11, 1980, a complaint for parricide with murder and double murder against Eugenia and "Eliseo Doe
and Pablo Doe" before the municipal circuit court of Balamban-Asturias. Said complaint was amended three times: first, to fill in the full names of Eliseo and Teofilo;
second, to include "Cording Abano" as one of the accused; and third, to reflect Concordia's full name.
On February 14, 1980, the municipal circuit judge issued a warrant for the arrest of Eugenia, Concordia, Eliseo and "Pablo." 17 Eugenia and Concordia voluntarily
surrendered to the police. 18 Eliseo was arrested in Toledo City while he and his wife were selling mangoes. 19 He led the arresting officers to Pinamungahan, Cebu,
where his son Teofilo [Pablo] was also arrested. 20 After their arrest Eliseo and Teofilo were interrogated by Cabahug thus:
Q. Having arrested both Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana, did you investigate them?
A. No. Because we brought along with us Eliseo Cabana to Pinamungahan and put him in jail when we went up the mountain to arrest Eliseo [sic] Cabana. When
Teofilo Cabana arrived after his arrest we confronted [sic] them to the Pinamungahan Police Station. When they were confronted by us they admitted that they were
the ones who killed Agripino Abano and Bienvenida Cumad. Eliseo Cabana admitted that he was the one who killed Agripino Abano while the other one, Teofilo
Cabana admitted that he was the one who killed Bienvenida Cumad.
Q. Who was present when you interrogated Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana?
A. We were plenty. We have T/Sgt. Paddy. Baron, Pat. Kiyamko, Pat. Cabanero, then we have Pat. Leonor Dagohoy of the Pinamungahan Police Station and Antonio
Mahinay also of the Pinamungahan Police Station were present when we confronted Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana at the Pinamungahan Police Station
Q. In your investigation of the accused Eliseo Cabana and Teofilo Cabana did you come to know what weapons were used by them in the commission of the crime?
A. We asked them the weapon that they used.
Q. What was their answer?
A. Eliseo Cabana said he used a bolo, locally known as pinuti and Teofilo Cabana admitted also that he used a bolo, locally known as pinuti. 21
The municipal circuit judge set the preliminary investigation of the case on February 9, 1980. On that date, all the accused appeared in court but they were not
assisted by counsel. Eugenia and Concordia manifested that they wanted the investigation postponed to February 28. Notwithstanding, the investigating judge
assigned one Atty. Sarmiento as counsel for Concordia who was thereafter investigated. 22
Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana waived their right to present evidence in the preliminary investigation. Eugenia also waived her right to further preliminary
investigation. 23 Those waivers were the subject of two orders both dated February 28, 1980. 24
At the continuation of the investigation on March 4, 1980, Atty. Cosme Montesclaros, who "appeared for the accused" but who was actually appearing only for
Concordia, presented Eugenia as a witness. She testified that on February 3, 1980, she forged an agreement with Eliseo and Teofilo to kin Agripino and Bienvenida as
she herself could not "do it" because she is a woman and that on the night of February 7, she was with Eliseo and Teofilo when they threatened and pulled the hair of
Concordia although she did not proceed to the latter's hut. 25
In view of Eugenia's admissions, Atty. Montesclaros moved to dismiss the charge against Concordia on the ground that she was threatened at that time. 26 Said
counsel then filed a memorandum in support of said motion to dismiss. 27 The prosecution opposed it alleging that Concordia's defense of duress was incredible and
fabricated because she was a "principal by direct participation and indispensable cooperation." 28
Nevertheless, on March 13, 1980, the investigating judge issued an order discharging Concordia as an accused and forwarding the records of the case to the Court of
First Instance for trial on the merits. In ordering Concordia's discharge the investigating judge noted that she was a mother of four children the youngest of whom
was still being breastfed for which reason she should not be made "to undergo the travails of confinement in jail pending termination" of the case for humanitarian
considerations. 29
Thereafter, the assistant provincial fiscal filed the two informations quoted and mentioned earlier. At their arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty. 30
They interposed alibi as their defense. Eugenia testified that on February 7, 1980, she was making copra in Singing, Balamban until 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon when
she returned home. She did not entertain any visitors and was in bed at 8:00 o'clock. She was awakened at 4:00 o'clock the following morning by Rodolfo who
informed her that his Papa had been killed. 31
Eugenia narrated that when she asked Rodolfo who killed his father, Rodolfo answered that he did not know. She told him to report the killing to the municipal
authorities but she herself was detained and investigated by the police on suspicion that she "caused the death" of her husband. 32 On her detention and
investigation, Eugenia testified thus:
COURT [To witness]:
Q. You were detained ahead of Concordia Abano?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. COURT. Proceed.
A. ATTY. DE LA VICTORIA
Q. How about your co-accused , did you see them in that detention cell where you and Concordia Abano were detained?
A. Yes, after they were arrested.
Q. By the way, where did the police actually place you?
A. In the office of the Chief of Police.
Q. Do you mean to say you were not actually placed inside the cell?
A. That is right.
Q. Concordia Abano testified before this Court that sometime on February 14, 1980 you confided to her that you were the one who instigated the two accused to kill
your husband in consideration of a reward in concept of the proceeds of the motorcycle which was in the possession of your husband, what can you say to that?
A. That is not true.
Q. What is the truth then?
A. I never told Concordia that I was the one who instigated the two accused to kill my husband and give them rewards out of the proceeds of the motorcycle in the
possession of my husband because I do not have possession of the motorcycle. After my husband lived with another woman he brought the motorcycle and it was my
son who drove that motorcycle in conducting passengers.
Q. Who is that son?
Q. Rodolfo Abano.
A. Rodolfo Abano testified that on February 9, 1980 he went to your house and there you confessed to him that you were the one who induced the two accused in
consideration of a reward to kill your husband and his paramour, what can you say to this testimony?
Q. That is not true.
A. What is the truth?
Q. I did not tell him that I instigated the killing of my husband. I never had any ire against my husband.
A. Do you know Lt. Vicente Cabahug
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Lt. Cabahug testified that you told him that you were the one who induced the two other accused to kin your husband and his paramour in consideration of a
reward, what can you say about this?
Q. It was Vicente Cabahug who told me to admit everything so that my daughter-in-law will not be implicated and that I will not be included in the case, instead I will
be made a witness for the prosecution
A. Can you give any reason why Concordia Abano and Rudy Abano would testify against you in these cases?
Q. Yes, sir, it is because the police had requested Rudy to ask me to admit so that Concordia will be dropped from the case because she has many children and I will
not be included and instead I will be made a witness.
COURT [To witness]:
Q. Do you mean to say that you admit the crime only for this reason?
A. I was compelled to tell statements against myself because the Chief of Police told me that I will not be included in this case. 33
Eugenia acknowledged that she had a lawyer during the preliminary investigation but her lawyer, Atty. Rafael de la Victoria, was absent during its continuation on
March 4, 1981. She testified further:
Q. Do you know the reason why the Court proceeded with the preliminary investigation in the absence of your lawyer?
FISCAL
The witness is incompetent.
COURT
May answer.
WITNESS-
A. Yes, I know.
ATTY. DE LA VICTORIA
Q. What was the purpose?
A. So that Concordia Abano will be released.
Q. Were you able to testify in that preliminary investigation which was conducted on March 4, 1980 by the Municipal Court of Balamban?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who presented you there since you were not represented by a lawyer?
A. They forced me to testify so that Concordia will be released.
Q. Who forced you?
A. The Chief of Police.
Q. Can you tell the court what have you testified in that proceeding.?
A. I testified there against myself because I cannot bear looking at my grandchildren, the children of Concordia Abano who were small and who were in jail with
Concordia and who were crying all the time and Concordia requested me to own everything in this case so she will be released.
Q. What was the result of that hearing on preliminary investigation on March 4, 1980?
A. Concordia was released,
COURT [To witness]:
Q. You said that you were unable to bear the sight of your grandchildren in jail and so you managed to have Concordia Abano released, what did you testify to in the
preliminary investigation that caused Concordia Abano to be released?
A. I testified there that I was the one who ordered because I was confused that time.
Q. Order to what?
A. I was the one who ordered the killing.
Q. Whom?
A. My husband.
Q. What was your reason for being confused. That is not a reason for ordering the killing?
A. I was confused of the sorrows I felt that I was suspected of ordering the killing of my husband. I did not do it.
Q. Did you not state for the reason of the killing the fact that your husband was living with another woman?
A. That is not true, because, although my husband was living with that woman for three years I never did anything against him because I have no ill-reefing against my
husband.
ATTY. DE LA VICTORIA
I want to make of record that the witness is crying in the course of her testimony on that point.
COURT
Make it of record. 34
On cross-examination, Eugenia disclosed that she allowed Agripino and Bienvenida to live in their conjugal hut on the land of
Mendoza which she and Agripino used to till as tenants therein, because Agripino was "brave" and he used to box and maltreat her whenever she expressed her
objection to Agripino's cohabitation with Bienvenida. Eugenia surmised that it was his paramour who induced her husband to maltreat her so that she would die and
Agripino and Bienvenida would Eugenia also admitted that she knew be free to live together. 35 Eliseo and "Pablo" Cabana because as quack doctors, they treated the
children of Rodolfo. 36
According to Eugenia, she voluntarily went to the municipal building on February 11, 1980 to seek protection after she heard rumors that Agripino's brothers and
sisters were threatening to kill her. 37 In the municipal building, Rodolfo requested her to admit the crimes so that his wife could be released and then, he apologized
to her for the statements against her that he had given the police. 38 Eugenia insisted that she admitted participation in the crimes because of the request of her
son. 39
To establish the whereabouts of Eliseo Cabana when the crimes were committed, the defense presented in court his wife, Patricia. She testified that on the night of
February 7, her husband was at home in Bairan, Toledo City and that when she woke up at 4:00 o'clock in the morning, Eliseo was still asleep. 40 She stated that her
husband did not use Lucio as an alias because he was known as either Li or Eli among his friends and neighbors. 41
Eliseo himself admitted that he was familiarly known as Eli. 42 He was a farmer who was also engaged in mending pots and pans and in making handles or scabbards
of bolos. He denied being a quack doctor. 43
After he and his son Teofilo were arrested on February 14, 1980 in Toledo City and Pinamungahan, respectively, they were detained at the Balamban jail, where they
were handcuffed the whole night. When their handcuffs were removed in the morning, a policeman told them that two deaths had occurred in Cantuod and, with a
gun pointed at them, that policeman told them to admit the killings otherwise he would break their heads. Eliseo was not able to say a thing but he took cover behind
a cemented wall. Later, a policeman named Boy Rosario told them to affix their thumbmarks to a document the contents of which were not read to them. 44
It was Rodolfo Abano or Rudy who categorically told them to admit having perpetrated the killings and to produce two bolos so they could be exonerated. 45 One of
the bolos thus presented was owned by Ambrosio Pilapil. 46 Eliseo told the police about it and the latter took it from Pilapil sometime in February, 1980. Pilapil had
delivered it to Eliseo in order that a scabbard could be made for it and Eliseo returned it to Pilapil on February 25, 1980. 47
The other bolo, Exhibit B, was recovered in Eliseo's house by the police. According to Eliseo, Rudy Abano left it with him early in the morning of February 8, 1980 with
the intention of bartering it with one chicken which Rudy needed for his daughter's birthday. 48
Eliseo expressed his belief that Rodolfo and Concordia Abano were involved in the killings but that they pointed to other persons indiscriminately so that they could
extricate themselves from the charges. 49 Although he admitted having been convicted of homicide in another case, Eliseo denied involvement in the murders of
Agripino and Bienvenida. 50
For his part, Teofilo Cabana, a farmer and coconut-gatherer, testified that on February 7 and 8, 1980, he was in his house in Binabag, Pinamungahan, Cebu. 51 He
denied having participated in the murders of Agripino and Bienvenida. 52 He stated that he did not use Pablo as an alias and labelled as lies the prosecution's
allegation that he and his father were quack doctors.
Special counsel Gabriel Trocio, Jr. testified that on February 27, 1980, he administered the oath of Rodolfo Abano who retracted his statement implicating his own
mother. In his sworn retraction, Rodolfo stated that he was forced to make said statement because he wanted his wife to be released as he and his wife were in a
"difficult and bitter situation" inasmuch as his pregnant wife had to breastfeed their youngest child in jail. 53
Defense counsel Rafael de la Victoria testified that on February 18, 1980, Rodolfo Abano sought the help of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office in behalf of his wife
and mother. 54 He asserted that contrary to Rodolfo's allegation, the latter voluntarily executed his affidavit of retraction. 55 According to Atty. De la Victoria, he filed
before the investigating judge a motion to postpone the preliminary investigation on February 28, 1980 to March 6, 1980 56 but it was not acted upon. When he
learned that Eugenia confessed during the continuation of the preliminary investigation on March 4, 1980 while he, as her counsel could not appear in court, Atty. De
la Victoria confronted Eugenia who told him that she was "constrained" to make self-incriminating statements during that hearing. 57 Consequently, on March 8,
1980, Eugenio executed a sworn statement professing innocence of the crimes charged against her and stating that she made self-incriminating statements because
of her confused mind and her pity for Concordia whom she wanted released from jail because she was breastfeeding a child and her other children were all crying
inside the jail. 58
The prosecution did not present any rebuttal witnesses.
On January 27, 1981, the lower court rendered the decision under consideration. The lower court stated that the "web of circumstantial evidence" produced "beyond
all doubt, complete proof of the guilt" of Eugenia Abano as principal by inducement and Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana as principals by direct and actual participation. 59 It
considered as "evidence of high caliber and of great persuasive value" Eugenia's confession which, it believed, "was not extracted from her under custodial
interrogation by police
authorities." 60
In the instant mandatory review, Eugenia Abano, through her counsel de oficio, contends that the lower court erred in: [a] appreciating against her, her alleged verbal
extrajudicial confession and her inculpatory statements during the preliminary investigation on March 4, 1980 after she had waived her right to such investigation, in
the absence of her counsel and without her being informed of her rights under Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution, and [b] failing to acquit her in both cases on
the ground that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
For Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana, the same counsel de oficio avers that the lower court erred in: [a] appreciating against them their alleged extrajudicial confession and
that of their co-accused, Eugenia Abano, as well as the latter's confession during the preliminary investigation; [b] giving fun faith and credit to the testimony of
Concordia Abano and [c] failing to acquit the accused on grounds of reasonable doubt.
In view of the absence of eyewitnesses to the killings, the confessions of the accused are of great importance in the disposition of these cases. Understandably, the
appellant's assignments of errors are focused on the issue of whether the rights of the accused had been properly protected when they made self-incriminating
statements. The Constitutional provision involved states thus:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. [Art. IV]
As the confessions in question were taken during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution" the aforequoted constitutional provision is applicable in this case. 61
In People vs. Duero, G.R. No. 52016, May 13, 1981, 104 SCRA 379, this Court discussed extensively the procedural safeguards for in-custody interrogation of accused
persons. In that case, wherein no eyewitnesses testified to the brutal killing of an octogenarian, the chief of police, corroborated by the sworn statements of two
other policemen, testified that the accused voluntarily confessed to the killing. In ruling against the admissibility of the alleged oral confession, this Court stressed the
fact that the prosecution failed to prove that before the accused made his alleged oral confession, he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel
as there was no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights. The Duero ruling is applicable in this case.
While Eugenia Abano was free to go home from February 8, 1980 when she was first "invited" for questioning by Chief of Police Cabahug until the time she confessed
on February 11, 1980, she was in fact in the custody of the police notwithstanding Cabahug's assertion that she was "not exactly placed in jail." 62
Concededly, Cabahug informed Eugenia that she needed a lawyer. But there is no proof that Cabahug offered to secure one of her at the instance of the State
especially after she had manifested that she could not afford to hire her own counsel. 63 Cabahug's omission to make such offer is a grave one. It rendered her alleged
confession inadmissible. 64
Similarly, there is no evidence that Eugenia was informed of her right to remain silent. Neither is there proof that she had voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
waived that right. 65
Moreover, as the unchallenged testimony of Eugenia reveals, she made the confession because the chief of police promised that she would "not be included in the
case" as she would be discharged as a prosecution witness. Considering her emotional and mental state at that time, that promise must have overcome Eugenia's
better judgment. It became a factor which contributed to the inadmissibility of her confession. 66
Chief of police Cabahug's uncorroborated testimony on the confessions of Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana is likewise bereft of indications that he had observed the
procedural safeguards mandated by the Constitution to which the Cabanas are entitled as a matter of right. In fact, from Eliseo's unrebutted testimony, use of threats
to extract their alleged confessions is evident. 67
We agree with the Solicitor General that the municipal judge who conducted the preliminary investigation need not apprise Eugenia of the nature and gravity of the
charges against her and the consequences of her admission thereof when she appeared as witness for Concordia Abano. During that investigation, all that was
needed was for the investigating judge to remind her that she was under oath and that she should "ten the truth and nothing but the truth."
But the Solicitor General overlooked an aspect in the presentation of Eugenia as her daughter-in-law's witness which cannot pass the test of fundamental fairness.
She was presented as such witness after she had waived her right to preliminary investigation and at a time when she was unassisted by counsel. As it were, Eugenia,
an unschooled copra-maker, was left to fend for herself in a proceeding wherein she herself was the accused.
What added gall to her bitter predicament was the fact that she was presented as a witness to forestall the further detention of her daughter-in-law and insure the
latter's discharge as her co-accused only to find herself in the precarious situation of answering questions the implications of which may have been beyond her
comprehension. Ironically, the investigating judge cited "human considerations" as a reason for discharging Concordia as an accused, unmindful of the fact that in
allowing Eugenia to incriminate herself, he was trampling on her rights as an accused.
As this Court enunciated in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, L-29169, August 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663, 680 and inBermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil. 483, 488, the rule against
self-incrimination positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction." In the Chavez case, we express the view that the rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial
The situation would have been different had Eugenia been assisted by counsel during the preliminary investigation For the- she could have availed herself of legal
advice on when to refrain from answering incriminating questions.
We consider the absence of Eugenia's counsel when she appeared as witness during the preliminary investigation as an irreparable damage which rendered
inadmissible her alleged confession.
The inadmissibility in evidence of the accused's extrajudicial confession, notwithstanding, We find the "web of circumstantial evidence" which the trial court found
sufficient for conviction, to have remained unimpaired. Under Section 5 of Rule 133, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: [a] there is more than one
circumstance; [b] the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and [c] the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt. These requirements have been satisfied in the case at bar.
Concordia testified that she saw Eugenia Abano with her co-accused, Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana, taking supper together at the former's house hours before the
commission of the crimes; that Eliseo and Teofilo forced her [Concordia] to accompany them to Agripino's hut and in order to draw Agripino out of said hut,
instructed her to say that her husband Rodolfo needed to be brought to a doctor because of a stomach ache; and that after she returned to her hut, Eugenia woke
Rodolfo to ask him to bring Eliseo and Teofilo in his motorized tricycle to Matab-ang, Toledo City. This testimony was not rebutted, but in fact corroborated in part by
Delia Cumad, who testified to hearing Concordia calling to Agripino to bring Rodolfo to a doctor as he was suffering from a stomach ache; and by Rodolfo himself,
who testified to his being roused from sleep by his mother Eugenia with the request to bring the Cabanas to Matab-ang, Toledo City. Noteworthy is the fact that her
request came shortly after the victims were hacked to death as it was while Rodolfo and Concordia were on their way to get the tricycle from the garage that they
met Delia, who was then on her way to a neighbor's house to seek help.
Rodolfo testified that from the garage, he went back to his hut, where after Concordia had alighted from the tricycle, Eugenia, boarded it up to a place near the
latter's hut where she got off and the Cabanas in turn boarded it. Rodolfo likewise stated that he noticed the Cabanas carrying a piece of sack rolled over a two-foot
object.
The events narrated by Concordia, Delia and Rodolfo constitute an unbroken chain of natural and rational circumstances, which corroborate each other and point
beyond reasonable doubt to the complicity of the accused in the crimes.
The defense attempted to discredit Concordia by turning the tables on her. No reason nor motive was however proferred why Concordia would commit the crimes or
why she would falsely accuse her own mother-in-law and the Cabanas, who were virtual strangers and against whom she held no grudge, of crimes so grave. On the
other hand, among the persons implicated, it was Eugenia Abano who had the motive to order the killing of her husband and his paramour. Her initial protestation
that she harbored no ill-feelings toward her husband and his common-law wife was totally negated by her very own testimony that Agripino used to box and maltreat
her every time she objected to his cohabitation with Bienvenida and the suspicion she expressed that it was Bienvenida who induced her husband to maltreat her so
that she would die and they would be free to live together. Because her husband was "brave" she could not do anything openly about the situation and she merely
kept her resentment concealed within her. Human nature as it is, the tendency is for pent-up emotions to grow and magnify, rather than diminish and disappear,
particularly where the cause thereof is constantly present, as in the case at bar, and it is not uncommon in the realm of human experience for such emotions to burst
and translate themselves into violence-thus, the so-called crimes of passion.
The Court sympathizes with the most pitiful plight of Eugenia Abano. How she must have suffered during the three years that her husband lived with his paramour.
The wound in her heart, occasioned by the separation, never had a chance to heal, but was kept raw and bleeding by the brazen and cruel behavior of her husband
maintaining a love nest so near the abandoned wife. Four hundred meters in an urban area may seem a long distance, but not so in a rural community where the
next-door neighbor may be housed at an even greater distance. It is indeed in cases like this, that the bounden duty of the court to apply the law becomes a painful
task and the maxim "dura lex, sed lex" makes its full impact felt. In view of the exceptional circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the Court recommends
executive clemency for accused-appellant Eugenia Abano.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Cebu-Bohol Circuit Criminal Court in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-XIV-2147 and CCC-XIV-2148, is hereby affirmed with the modification
that the civil indemnities for the heirs of the deceased Agripino Abano and the heirs of the deceased Bienvenida Cumad are hereby increased to P30,000.00 each. For
lack of necessary votes, the two death penalties imposed on each of the accused are hereby commuted to reclusion perpetua. Let copies of this decision be furnished
the Minister of Justice.

[G.R. No. 130514. June 17, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABUNDIO TOLENTINO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
This case is before us for the automatic review[1] of the decision[2] of 19 May 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Macabebe, Pampanga, Branch 55, in Criminal
Case No. 96-1763, in view of the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant Abundio Tolentino (hereafter TOLENTINO).
TOLENTINO was charged with the crime of rape in an information[3] which reads:
That during the period from May 1, 1995 to July 1995, in Masantol, Pampanga, and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ABUNDIO TOLENTINO,
step father of nine (9) year old Rachelle Parco, the former being the common-law spouse of the latter's mother, Teresa David, by taking advantage of his moral
ascendancy over Rachel Parco, then eight (8) years old, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously thru force and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of
the said minor Rachel Parco, against her will and consent.
The facts as synthesized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in the Appellee's Brief,[4] which we hereby quote and adopt as our own for being fully in accord
with the transcript of stenographic notes of witnesses, are as follows:
On May 1, 1995, at past noon, Rachelle Parco, 8 years old, was inside one of the two bedrooms at the second floor of the house of her grandmother, which was
located at San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga (TSN, January 22, 1997). Rachelle was arranging the clothes while in the room (Ibid, p. 7).
Suddenly, Abundio Tolentino, the stepfather of Rachelle Parco, entered the same room and closed the door (Ibid). Abundio Tolentino ordered Rachelle Parco to stand
up and lie down on the bed (Ibid, pp. 7-8). When Rachelle Parco was already on the bed, Abundio Tolentino removed his short pants and the short pants of Rachelle
Parco (Ibid, p. 8).
Abundio Tolentino placed his sex organ on Rachelle Parco's genitals and bumped (binubundol-bundol) hers with his (Ibid). At that moment, Rachelle Parco remained
silent, because she was afraid and did not know what Abundio Tolentino was doing to her (Ibid, pp. 8-9). Abundio Tolentino's carnal act lasted only for three minutes,
because Rachelle Parco's brother knocked at the door and ask money from Abundio (Ibid, p. 9). Abundio Tolentino told Rachelle's brother to ask money from Lola
Iding (ibid). Thereafter, Abundio Tolentino put on his short pants and hers and went down the house (Ibid).
Abundio Tolentino repeatedly did the same thing to Rachelle Parco at least three to four times a week in May, June, and July 1995 (Ibid, pp. 11-12). Rachelle Parco
was overc[o]me by fear that she did not tell anyone about what Abundio Tolentino was doing to her.
When the family [of] Rachelle Parco transferred residence to Taguig, because Masantol became flooded, it was then that Rachelle Parco mustered enough courage to
tell her mother, Maria Teresa David, about Abundio Tolentino's bestial behavior (Ibid, pp. 12-13). Upon learning her daughter's sad flight, Maria Teresa David
accompanied her on May 20, 1996, to the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila, to file a complaint against Abundio Tolentino (TSN, February 10, 1997, p. 14).
The victim, Rachelle Parco (hereafter RACHELLE) was likewise subjected to a physical examination, the result of which revealed that she was still a virgin and that her
hymen was still intact and its orifice was 0.5 cm. in diameter "as to preclude complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection
without producing any genital injury.[5]
In his defense, TOLENTINO interposed alibi, claiming that it was impossible for him to be in Masantol on 1 May 1995 because as a taxi driver he would come home to
Masantol every Sunday only, which was his rest day. He also claimed that the incident was a concoction of Cecille Yabut, the grandmother of RACHELLE, as she was
opposed to his relationship with her daughter Ma. Teresa David.[6]
On 19 May 1997, the trial court rendered judgment convicting TOLENTINO of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and indemnify
RACHELLE in the sum of P100,000.
In his Appellant's Brief, TOLENTINO submits this lone assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT OF HEREIN ACCUSED APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
First, TOLENTINO raises the issue of Jurisdiction of the trial court. He maintains that the alleged rape was committed in Taguig, Metro Manila, and hence the trial
court had no jurisdiction thereon. We are not persuaded. RACHELLE testified that she was sexually abused by TOLENTINO in their residence in Barangay San Nicolas,
Masantol, Pampanga.[7]
TOLENTINO likewise asserts that the prosecution failed to prove with moral certainty that rape had been committed because the physical examination disclosed no
genital or extragenital injuries on RACHELLE; her hymen was intact, and the orifice was so small as to preclude penetration by an average-size adult Filipino male
organ in full erection without producing any genital injury. If there had been penetration as claimed by RACHELLE, there would have been injuries to her genitals,
considering her age and the number of times the incident allegedly took place. RACHELLE's testimony in the vernacular that binundul-bundol ang kanyang ari by
TOLENTINO does not conclusively prove that rape was committed, to the exclusion of other offenses, in light of the aforesaid medical findings; besides, that
testimony is subject to different interpretations and will not lead to the conclusion that TOLENTINO's intent was to have carnal knowledge of her.
Lastly, TOLENTINO faults the trial court in not considering that the incident was concocted by his mother-in-law, who was against his relationship with her daughter,
the victims mother.
In its Appellees Brief, the OSG supports the appealed judgment and asks us to affirm the death penalty imposed by the trial court.
Rape is committed even with the slightest penetration of the woman's sex organ. It is enough that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ within the labia of
the pudendum of the female organ.Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of hymen, suffices to warrant a
conviction for rape. Thus, a finding that the victim's hymen is intact and has no sign of laceration does not negate a finding that rape was committed.[8]
Pertinent portions of the findings[9] of Dr. Armie M. Soreta-Uniel, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, are as follows:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and labia minora, coaptated. Fourchette, tense, vertibular mocusa, pinkish. Hymen, short, thin, intact. Hymenal orifice, measures
0.5 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls and Rugosities cannot be reached by the examining finger.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the body of the subject at the time of the examination.
2. Hymen, intact and its orifice small (0.5 cm. in diameter) as to preclude complete penetration by an average-sized, Adult, Filipino male organ in full erection without
producing any genital injury.
In light of these findings of the medico-legal officer, a rigorous scrutiny of the testimony of RACHELLE must perforce be made to determine whether there was
evidence of the entrance of TOLENTINO's male organ within the labia of the pudendum or the lips of the vagina of RACHELLE, without necessarily reaching either the
orifice or the hymen. The following is RACHELLE's testimony:
Q You said that on May 1, 1995, your were inside this room. What were you doing then?
A I was folding clothes, sir.
Q While you were folding clothes, what happened next?
A Abundio Tolentino entered the room, sir.
Q Where did he enter the room?
A in the place where I was situated, sir.
Q Did he pass through a window or through the door of the room?
A He entered through the door, sir.
Q After Tolentino entered the room, what happened next?
A When he entered the room, he closed the door, sir.
Q After he closed the door, what did Abundio Tolentino do, if he did anything?
A He told me to stand up.
Q What did you tell him?
A I did not tell him anything. I just stood up.
Q Did you stand?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then what happened?
A Then he told me to lie down on the bed.
Q What happened next?
A He removed his shorts, sir.
Q And then what happened?
A He removed my shorts also, sir.
Q When Abundio Tolentino removed his shorts as well as yours, what transpired next?
A He placed his sex organ to my sex organ, sir.
Atty. Gutierrez:
May we request that the words used by the witness, binubundul-bundol ang kanyang ari be placed on the records, your Honor.
Court:
Granted.
Pros. Datu:
Will you please explain what you mean by the word binubundul-bundol?
A He was trying to force his sex organ into mine, sir.
Q How long did that take?
A Around three (3) minutes, sir.
Q What did you do, if you did anything, when the accused was forcing his sex organ into yours?
A I did not do anything, sir. I remain[ed] silent.
Q Why did you remain silent?
A I was afraid, sir.
Q Why were you afraid?
A Because I did not know what he was doing.
Q What was your reaction when Abundio Tolentino was trying to force his sex organ into yours?
A I was just looking at our aparador and remaining [sic] silent.
Q You said that the accused was doing this to you in a span of 3 minutes. What happened next?
A My brother knocked at the door, Sir.
Q What is the name of your brother?
A Mariel D. Parco, sir.
Q When Mariel Parco knocked at the door, what happened next?
A He was asking for some money from Abundio Tolentino, sir.
Q Do you mean to say, Mariel was able to enter that room?
A No, sir, he was just near the door.
Q And what happened next?
A Abundio Tolentino told my brother to ask money from Lola Iding.
Q What happened next?
A Before he went down, he put on my shorts and also his shorts.[10]
There was nothing from RACHELLE's testimony that proved that TOLENTINO's penis reached the labia of the pudendum of RACHELLE's vagina. As translated, she only
said: "He placed his sex organ to my sex organ, sir." This was the translation of the word binubundul-bundol. And when asked to explain what she meant by it, she
answered: He was trying to force his sex organ into mine, sir.
The prosecution did not ask her the appropriate questions to get some more important details that would demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt that
TOLENTINO's penis reached the labia of the pudendum or the lips of RACHELLE's vagina. It should have, for instance, asked whether TOLENTINO's penis was firm and
erect or whether RACHELLE's legs were spread apart to bring us to the logical conclusion that, indeed, TOLENTINO's penis was not flabby and had the capacity to
directly hit the labia of the pudendum or the lips of RACHELLE's vagina. There is paucity of evidence that the slightest penetration ever took place. Consequently,
TOLENTINO can only be liable for attempted rape.
Under the law[11] there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In this case, there is no doubt at all that
TOLENTINO had commenced the commission of the crime of rape by (1) directing RACHELLE to lie down, (2) removing his shorts and hers, and (3) "trying to force his
sex organ into" RACHELLE's sex organ. But there is no conclusive evidence of the penetration, however slight, of RACHELLE's sex organ. The penetration was an
essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, in the absence of a convincing evidence thereof, TOLENTINO should be given the benefit of the doubt and can
be convicted of attempted rape only.
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony." In this case, the penalty for the rape if it had been consummated would have been death, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. No. 7659, since RACHELLE was eight years old and TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of RACHELLE's mother. The last paragraph thereof
provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
The information specifically alleges that RACHELLE was eight years old when the crime was committed and TOLENTINO was "the stepfather... being the common-law
spouse of [RACHELLE's] mother, Teresa David." That allegation is inaccurate. TOLENTINO was not RACHELLE's step-father, for that relationship presupposes a
legitimate relationship, i.e., he should have been legally married to Teresa David. A step-father is the husband of one's mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to
that of which the person spoken of is the offspring;[12] or, a stepdaughter is a daughter of one's spouse by a previous marriage or the daughter of one of the spouses
by a former a marriage.[13] Nevertheless, since the information specifically alleges that TOLENTINO was the common-law-spouse of RACHELLE's mother and that
RACHELLE was under eighteen years of age, we shall appreciate these special qualifying circumstances.
We disagree with the contention of the OSG that "relationship" is an aggravating circumstance in this case[14] in that TOLENTINO was the step-father of RACHELLE. In
the first place, as stated earlier, TOLENTINO was not the step-father of RACHELLE. Second, the alternative circumstance of relationship can be considered only "when
the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the
offender.[15] RACHELLE does not fit in any of the enumeration. At any rate, the circumstance that TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of RACHELLE's mother,
together with the fact that RACHELLE was eight years old when the rape was committed, has already served as a special qualifying circumstance in this case.
TOLENTINO's allegation of ulterior motive cannot be sustained. We cannot believe that the grandmother would expose her granddaughter RACHELLE, a young and
innocent girl, to the humiliation and stigma of a rape trial just to stop the relationship between TOLENTINO and her daughter, the mother of RACHELLE. There is, as
well, no showing whatsoever that RACHELLE allowed herself to be manipulated by her grandmother to tell a lie just to satisfy the wishes of the
latter. Granting arguendo that TOLENTINO and RACHELLE's grandmother did not get along well, we do not see how RACHELLE would be able to concoct a story of
rape, risk public censure, and expose herself to the rigors and embarrassment of a public trial if her motive had been other than to secure justice.[16]
Besides, against RACHELLE's positive testimony, TOLENTINO had nothing to offer but denial and alibi. Settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than
negative testimony.[17] Equally settled is that alibi is a weak defense, for it is easy to concoct and fabricate. It cannot prevail over, and is worthless in the face of, the
positive identification by a credible witness that the accused committed the crime.[18] RACHELLE positively identified TOLENTINO as her rapist.
The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal, which is the penalty lower by two degrees that death. However, with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, TOLENTINO may be sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment penalty whose minimum shall be within the range
of prision mayor and whose maximum shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
And now on the damages which may be awarded to RACHELLE. There have been new developments in jurisprudential law on the matter. In People v. Prades,[19] we
ruled that irrespective of proof thereof, the victim of consummated rape is entitled to moral damages of P50,000. In People v. Victor,[20] we also increased to P75,000
the indemnity in rape cases if the penalty of death is to be imposed.
The trial court awarded P100,000 as indemnity. Clearly, the award finds no support in the law and in our decisions. Since TOLENTINO is found guilty of attempted
rape only, an indemnity of P50,000 and moral damages of P25,000 are in order.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the appealed decision of 19 May 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, Branch 55, in
Criminal Case No. 961763-M. As modified, accused-appellant ABUNDIO TOLENTINO is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of attempted
rape, under Article 335, in relation to Article 51, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; and, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment penalty ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay the victim RACHELLE PARCO the sums of P50,000 as indemnity and P25,000 as moral damages.