Oposa vs Factoran

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of intergenerational responsibility and intergenerational justice.
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the misappropriation
or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the countrys vital lifesupport systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth.

FACTS

A taxpayers class suit was filed by certain minors as represented by their parents against the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The complaint alleges
that the plaintiffs are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the countrys virgin tropical rainforests. Petitioner in their petition prays
that judgement be rendered:

1. Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements

The complaint starts off with these general averments

The Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000.00) hectares and is endowed
with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found
They are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time
immemorial
Scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the countrys land area
should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%)
for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses the distortion and disturbance of this balance
as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as:

(a) water shortages

(b) salinization of the water table
(c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity
(d) the endangering and extinction of the countrys unique, rare and varied flora and fauna
(e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities
(f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds
(g) recurrent spells of drought
(h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers,

(i) the flooding of lowlands and agricultural,

(k) the reduction of the earths capacity to process carbon dioxide gases

Complainant alleges that at the rate of deforestation as allowed by the DENR through the TLA, about 200,000hectars of
forest per year will be will be destroyed. And thus, violating complainants right to a balanced and healthful ecology as
guaranteed by sec 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.

Respondents assertions

(1) The plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and

(2) The issue raised by the plaintiff is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action

2. Whether or not the issue presented by plaintiffs is justiciable

APPLICABLE LAW

SEC 16 of ART II of the 1987 Constitution which states that, The state shall protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature

ARGUMENTS

By the Plaintiff:

1. That they have a cause of action.

 2. That there is abuse of discretion on the part of the DENR in issuing the TLAs that ultimately infringe on the right of
plaintiffs right to a healthful ecology.

By Respondent

1. That plaintiff has no cause of action.

2. The issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government.
3. The TLAs are protected by the non-impairment clause under the Constitution.

DECISION

1. The plaintiffs have a cause of action and the petition is granted.

2. Under Article III of the Constitution, the courts have the power to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Therefore, the courts of justice have the power to determine if indeed
there is abuse of discretion regarding the issuance of TLAs.
3. The timber license is not a contract, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.

Ysmael v. Deputy Executive Secretary

Facts: Soon after the change in government in 1986, petitioner sent a letter to the office of the president and to minister
Ernesto Maceda of the ministry of Natural Resources, seeking:

1. the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was canceled during the Marcos administration;

2. The revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to twin peaks development and realty corp. Without public bidding
and violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations and;

3. The issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take position of all logs found in the concession area.

Petitioner alleged that he entered into a timber license agreement with the DENR, wherein it was issued an exclusive
license to cut, collect any remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land located
in the municipality of Manddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990.

That on August 18, 1983 the Director of the Bureau of the forest development issued a memorandum order stopping all
logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces and canceling the logging concession of petitioner and nine
other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the minister of natural
resources.

That on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the bureau, requesting him to stop all logging operations
and to pull out logging missionaries and equipment in order to conserve remaining forest.

That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter addressed to then President
Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the bureaus directive, sighting a support thereof its contributions to
forest conservation and alleging that it was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging
operation, but no favorable action was taken on this letter.

That barely one year thereafter, approximately one half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA no. 87
was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corp. Under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 21,
2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or
license.

That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.

The MNR issued an order denying petitioners request. It ruled that a Timber License was not a contract within the due
process clause of the constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest and welfare so
demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires
whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the
provinces of Nueva Vizcaya, Nueva Ecija, Quirino and Ifugao reasoning that the ministry imposed the ban because it
realizes the great responsibility it bare in respect to forests. It considers itself the trusty thereof. This being the case, it has
to ensure the availability of forest resources not only for the present, but also for the future generations of Filipinos.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Meanwhile, MNR issued an administrative order lifting the logging ban in the province of Quirino. Petitioner then appealed
to the office of the President which however denied it on the ground of lack of merit. Ruled that the appeal of petitioner
was prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in the MNR. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Whether or not Timber License Agreements are contracts.

Ruling: No, it is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions in orders of administrative agencies have
upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These
decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a
court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent
authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.

As gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its
letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR, requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau
actions, these were already settled matter as as petitioner was concerned.

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rest the task of implementing the policy to develop and conserve the
countrys natural resources, have indicated an on going department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered
into, and permits all licenses issued, under the previous dispensation.

The on-going administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global concern over the
despoliation of forest lands and utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The
legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. The court takes judicial notice of the
profligate waste of the countrys forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna
peculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic social effects. The delicate balance
of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and energy
resources required by the people seriously depleted.

While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the countrys immediate financial
requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment
demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check further denudation of whatever remains of the
forest lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, Section 16 of Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution. A long line of cases established the basic
rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

Petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present case because he failed to file his
petition within a reasonable period.

In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least 3 years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the court attacking
the validity of the assailed bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its
inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its
delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring
the reversal of these orders will not lie.

A cursory reading of assailed orders issued by the public respondent Minister Maceda of the MNR, which were affirmed
by the Office of the President, will disclose public policy considerations which effectively forestall judicial interference in
the case at bar.

Timber license, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization
in this position of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the state to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter permanent of irrevocable
right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause.

Petition was dismissed.

 HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE
BELO HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO HENARES, petitioners,
vs.
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.

G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006

FACTS: Citing various statistics and studies on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines,
including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air
pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and related
environmental hazards. In asserting their right to clean air, petitioners challenged the court to issue a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas
(CNG) as alternative fuel.

Petitioners allege that the particulate matters complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying
in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions have caused detrimental effects on
health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. They also added that although much of the new power
generated in the country will use natural gas while a number of oil and coal-fired fuel stations are being phased-out, still
with the projected doubling of power generation over the next 10 years, and with the continuing high demand for motor
vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful emissions.

Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91 and 1994 showing that vehicular
emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases. To counter the
detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the use of CNG, which is considered as the cleanest
fossil fuel.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not petitioners have the personality to bring the present action.
(2) Whether or not the respondents can be compelled to require public utility vehicles to use compressed natural gas
through a writ of mandamus.

LAWS APPLICABLE:

(1) Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution

(2) Republic Act No. 8749 (Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999)
(3) Executive Order No. 290

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioners Solicitor General

Petitioners contend that respondents possess the
administrative and regulatory powers to implement
measures in accordance with the policies and
principles mandated by RA No. 8749, specifically
Section 2 and Section 21.
Petitioners contend that failure of the respondents
to recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs as
alternative fuel while air pollution brought about by
the emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the
environment and the people, is tantamount to
neglect in the performance of a duty which the law
enjoins.
The Solicitor General argued that the DENR is
tasked to implement RA 8749 and not the LTFRB
nor the DOTC.
The function of the DOTC is limited to
implementing the emission standards set forth in
Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only goes as
far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of
vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as
alternative engine fuel.

Petitioners also aver that other than the writ applied
for, they have no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Solicitor General explained that a writ of
mandamus is not the correct remedy, citing Section
3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides that the writ may be issued only to
command a tribunal, corporation, board or person
to do an act that is required to be done, when he or
it unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and
 enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

COURTS RULING:

(1) Yes. The petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court. The right to clean air not only is an issue
of paramount importance to petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also impressed with public
interest. The consequences of the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment due to
emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners. On these considerations, the legal
standing of the petitioners deserves recognition.

(2) No. The plain, speedy and adequate remedy sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding LTFRB
and DOTC to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. The petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable
legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for PUVs. It
would be more proper that the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex
environmental problems bared by the petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

Moreover, the instant petition has been mooted by the issuance of Executive Order No. 290, entitled
Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport. It implemented a program on the use of
CNG by public vehicles. The program recognized, among others, natural gas as a clean burning alternative fuel
for vehicle which has the potential to produce substantially lower pollutants.

Wherefore, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is dismissed for lack of merit.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS),VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO and BONIFACIO S.TUMBOKON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.

x----------------------x

CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION and PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
movants-intervenors.

x----------------------x
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, movant-intervenor.

G.R. No. 156052 February 13, 2008

FACTS:

After the court promulgated their decision in this case on March 7, 2007, the oil companies (Chevron Philippines
Inc., Petron Corporation, &Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation) and the Republic of the Philippines (represented by the
Department of Energy/ DOE), filed their respective motions for leave to intervene and for reconsideration of the decision.

In an original petition for mandamus, the petitioners (Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and
Bonifacio S. Tumbokon) sought to compel the respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (then mayor of the City of Manila) to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027. An ordinance which was enacted by the SangguniangPanlungsod of Manila, approved by
the respondent Mayor and became effective on December 28, 2001 after publication.

Section 1 of the said ordinance reclassified some areas describetherein from industrial to commercial. It also
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance (Sec. 3). Among the businesses situated in
the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies.

On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the DOE entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the
oil companies. The parties agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable
option. The MOU was ratified in Resolution No. 97 by the SangguniangPanlungsod and they declared that it will be
effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.On January 30, 2003, the validity of the aforementioned
resolution was extended to April 30, 2003 by Resolution No. 13 and the authority to issue special business permits to the
oil companies was vested to the Mayor of Manila.

On its March 7, 2007 decision, the court ruled that the respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local
Government Code (LGC) to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city," including Ordinance
No. 8027. Moreover, it held that they need not resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the
oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027
since the resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and
effect only until April 30, 2003. Hence, concluded that there was nothing that legally hindered respondent from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8027.

On April 11, 2007, oral arguments were conducted in Baguio City to hear petitioners, respondent and movants-
intervenors oil companies and DOE. The parties submitted to this Courts power to rule on the constitutionality and
validity of Ordinance No. 8027 despite the pendency of consolidated cases involving this issue in the RTC.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the oil companies (Chevron Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation, &Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation) and the Department of Energy (DOE) has the right to intervenve.
2. Whether or not Ordinance No. 8027 is valid and constitutional.

LAWS APPLICABLE:

Ordinance No. 8027

Local Government Code, Section 16
Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Section 25

ARGUMENTS:

On Intervention:

1. Movants-intervenor.

a. Oil companies assert that they have a legal interest in this case because the implementation of
Ordinance No. 8027 will directly affect their business and property rights.Moreover, their claimis that
they will need to spend billions of pesos if they are compelled to relocate their oil depots out of
Manila.

[T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties must be
in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either
gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties
to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated,
expensive and interminable. And this would be against the policy of the law. The words "an
interest in the subject" means a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded, one that would
put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint without the
establishment of which plaintiff could not recover.

b. Department of Energyalleges that its interest in this case is also direct and immediate as Ordinance No.
8027 encroaches upon its exclusive and national authority over matters affecting the oil industry.
It seeks to intervene in order to represent the interests of the members of the public who stand to
suffer if the Pandacan Terminals operations are discontinued.

On the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027:

1. Movants-intervenor.
Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and oppressive as it does not only regulate but also absolutely prohibits
them from conducting operations in the City of Manila.It is partial and discriminatory, and it is inconsistent with RA
7638 (Department of Energy Act of 1992) and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1998).

RULING:

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the intervention of the oil companies and the DOE should be allowed in
the interest of justice.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant
therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. The
pertinent rules are Sections 1 and 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, thus the following are the requisites for intervention of
a non-party:
(1) Legal interest
(a) in the matter in controversy; or
(b) in the success of either of the parties; or
against both parties; or
(d) person is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof;

(2) Intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of original parties;
(3) Intervenors rights may not be fully protected in a separate proceeding and
(g)The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.
 For both the oil companies and DOE, the last requirement is definitely absent, however, the court has recognized
exception to Section 2, Rule 19 in the interest of substantial justice that the rule on intervention, like all other rules of
procedure, is intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice.The Court considered
their intervention because it raised important issues that were not raised on the ruling before.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and validfor the following
reasons:

1. The City of Manila Has The Power To Enact Ordinance No. 8027. Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by
the SangguniangPanlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power. Police power is the plenary power
vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people. This power flows from the recognition that saluspopuliest
suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). While police power rests primarily with the national
legislature, such power may be delegated. The delegation of police power to local governments is existent in
Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause. In this case, the Sanggunianhas the power
to"reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city."

2. A Legitimate Exercise of Police Power. The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise of police
power. Local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if there must
be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of
promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare" of the residents of Manila.

The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban
Development of the City of Manila which recommended the approval of the ordinance:(1) the depot
facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products which include
petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among
others;(2) the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;(3) it is situated in a densely populated
place and near Malacaang Palace and(4) in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire
could spread to the neighboring communities.

The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of
Manila and not just of a particular class. In addition, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government in the exercise of police power. The interference
must be reasonable and not arbitrary hence the methods or means used to protect public health, morals,
safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.

3. Not Unfair, Oppressive or Confiscatory which amounts to Taking without Compensation. In the exercise of
police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of property interests to promote public welfare which involves no
compensable taking. Compensation is necessary only when the states power of eminent domain is exercised.
Property condemned under the exercise of police power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious
or forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not compensable.The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health
and safety from danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which interferes
with paramount rights of the public.In the regulation of the use of the property, nobody else acquires the use or
interest therein, hence there is no compensable taking. In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other
businesses situated in the affected area remain theirs. Only their use is restricted although they can be applied
to other profitable uses permitted in the commercial zone.

4. Ordinance No. 8027 is Not Partial and Discriminatory. The court reiterate that what the ordinance seeks to
prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will result from a terrorist attack. They also added that unlike the depot,
the surrounding community is not a high-value terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion occurring
in those areas would be nothing compared to the damage caused by a fire or explosion in the depot itself. In this
case, there is a substantial distinction. The enactment of the ordinance which provides for the cessation of the
operations of these terminals removes the threat they pose, therefore germane to its purpose. The classification is
not limited to the conditions existing when the ordinance was enacted but to future conditions as well. Finally, the
ordinance is applicable to all businesses and industries in the area it delineated.

5. Ordinance No. 8027 is Not Inconsistent with RA 7638 And RA 8479. Nothing in these statutes prohibits the
City of Manila from enacting ordinances in the exercise of its police power.DOE was given the power to establish
and administer programs for the exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation,
stockpiling, and storage of energy resources (Section 5 of RA 7638). Section 7 of the same, provides that the
DOE shall continue to encourage certain practices in the Industry which serve the public interest and are
intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of petroleum products. DOEs
regulatory power does not preclude LGUs from exercising their police power. The principle of local autonomy is
enshrined in and zealously protected under the Constitution. Article II, Section 25 provides that The State shall
ensure the autonomy of local governments.

In this case, it is evident that the oil companies are fighting for their right to property since they will lose billions of
pesos if they are forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life
enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the
state or LGUs exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals right to property, the former should prevail. Both
law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027.
 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay,
574 SCRA 661, December 18, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS:

Petitioners METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA), DEPARTMENT

OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS), DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (DOH),
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (DA), DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS (DPWH), DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM),
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG)

Respondents CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEN A, PAUL
DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN,
VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL
AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SAN-TIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA

On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup,
rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.

Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of
the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the
pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others: (1) RespondentsE constitutional right to life, health,
and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152); (3) The

Pollution Control Law (PD 984); (4) The Water Code
(PD 1067);

(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);

(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825); (7) The Marine
Pollution Law (PD 979);

(8) Executive Order No. 192;

(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969); (10) Civil Code
provisions on nuisance and human relations;

(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and

(12) International Law.

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the

Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion
reads:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed
defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and
restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact
recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are
directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by
devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and
restoration of the bay
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual
Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.

On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other
executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in
a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of
MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.

By a Decision of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC
in toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic
functions under existing laws.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up
Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents.

2. Whether or not the petitioners can be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

LAWS APPLICABLE:

1. Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 or Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

2. Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003)

3. Environment Code (PD 1152)

4. Executive Order No. (EO) 192 Providing for the Reorganization of the [DENR], Renaming it as the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and for Other Purposes.

5. Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275)

6. RA 6234 An Act Creating the [MWSS] and Dissolving the National Waterworks and

Sewerage Authority [NAWASA]; and for Other Purposes.

7. Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292)

8. Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550)

9. PD 601 or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974

10. PD 979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976

11. RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990

12. EO 513, Reorganizing the Philippine Ports Authority

13. Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279)

14. International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the
Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto.

15. PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines

16. Writ of Continuing Mandamus

ARGUMENT:

On the issue of the applicability of Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152

 PETITIONERS
Petitioners contend that Secs. 17 and 20 of the
Environment Code concern themselves only with
the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution
incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They
aver that the twin provisions would have to be read
alongside
RESPONDENTS
Respondents argue that petitioners
erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the
application of Sec. 20 to the containment, r e m o v a l , a
n d c l e a n u p o p e r a t i o n s f o r accidental spills only.
Contrary to petitioners posture, respondents assert
that Sec. 62(g),
the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec.
terms, cleanup operations and accidental spills, as
follows: 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec.

g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conduct ed in 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed covered only
rem oving t he pollut ant s discharged or spilled in water pollution accumulating from the day-to- day operations of
to restore it to pre-spill condition. businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of
pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other
hazardous substances in water that result from accidents
such as collisions and groundings.
Respondents emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a
delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational
scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among
Petitioners argue that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in
merely direct the government a g e n c i e s c o n c e r n relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.
e d t o u n d e r t a k e containment, removal, and
cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion
o r p o r t i o n s o f t h e b o d y o f w a t e r concerned.
To respondents, petitioners parochial view on
T h e y m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e application of said Sec.
environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading of
20 is limited only to w a t e r p o l l u t i o n i n c i d e n t s w h i c
their respective mandated roles, has contributed to
h a r e situations that presuppose the occurrence of
the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay.
specific, isolated pollution events requiring the
corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning
operations. They argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g)
requires cleanup operations to restore the body of
water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must
have been a specific incident of either intentional or
accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances,
as mentioned in Sec.

62(h).

On the Issue of Mandamus

PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS
Petitioners claim that the duty MMDAs duty to take Respondents counter that the statutory command is
measures and maintain adequate solid waste and clear and that petitioners duty to comply with and act
liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy according to the clear mandate of the law does not
evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part require the exercise of discretion. As it is a ministerial
of the agency concerned. As the exercise involves duty, it can be compelled by mandamus.
discretion, it cannot be compelled by mandamus.

COURTS RULING:

On the issue of the

applicability of Sections 17
and 20 of PD 1152

Respondents are correct.

Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the
containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec.
17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to
a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. This section, to stress, commands concerned
government agencies, when appropriate, to take such measures as may be
necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is
not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

The complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to
clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly
invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD

1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific
pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is
at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program
of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application
rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents.

Different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates, they must perform
their basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. The era of delays, procrastination, and
ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before
the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. We are disturbed by petitionersE hiding behind two untenable claims: (1)
that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a
discretionary duty.

On the Issue of Mandamus

The cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay can be compelled by mandamus. Generally, the writ of

mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty.

Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to
direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other. The writ of mandamus lies to require the
execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment. It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple,
definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.

Petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such
duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may
entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this
conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions
relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are
precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.

Note: On Continuing Mandamus

It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under
them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning
up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline
describes as continuing mandamus the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives
with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference.
 G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and JOEL D. MUYCO,
Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau, respondents.

FACTS:

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her legislative powers. EO
No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development
and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR
Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration,
development, and utilization of mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all
existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitutionshall be converted
into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. and Administrative Order
No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years
from the effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and
sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an
organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing
their validity and constitutionality before this Court.

ISSUES: Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

LAWS APPLICABLE:

1. Philippine Constitution, Article 12, Section 1

2. Philippine Constitution, Article 12, Section 2
ARGUMENTS:

1. Petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. mainly contends that respondent Secretary of DENR issued both
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279. On
the assumption that the questioned administrative orders do not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279,
petitioner contends that both orders violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Article III, Section 10 of the
1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining agreements and
automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from its effectivity date.

2. Continental Marble Corporation, thru its President, Felipe A. David, sought to intervenein this case alleging that
because of the temporary order issued by the Court , the DENR, Regional Office No. 3 in San Fernando, Pampanga
refused to renew its Mines Temporary Permit after it expired on July 31, 1991. Claiming that its rights and interests are
prejudicially affected by the implementation of DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, it joined petitioner herein in
seeking to annul Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 and prayed that the DENR, Regional Office No. 3 be ordered to
issue a Mines Temporary Permit in its favor to enable it to operate during the pendency of the suit.

3. Petitioner maintains that respondent DENR Secretary cannot provide guidelines such as Administrative Order Nos. 57
and 82 which are inconsistent with the provisions of Executive Order No. 279 because both Executive Order Nos. 211 and
279 merely reiterated the acceptance and registration of declarations of location and all other kinds of mining applications
by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, until
Congress opts to modify or alter the same.

COURT RULING:

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the
acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development,
and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license,
concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of
the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order
No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463,
as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing
law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides,
thus: Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their
implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive
Order, shall continue in force and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the
State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations
through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power
in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying
and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public
interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order
No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 163509, December 6, 2006

PICOP RESOURCES, INC.,Petitioner, - versus - BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES CORPORATION, and THE
MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD,Respondents.

FACTS:
In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI) entered into a Mines Operating
Agreement with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the
exploration, development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCIs eighteen (18) mining claims located in Agusan
del Sur. Then later, Banahaw applied for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines
pursuant to the said agreement and on April 29, 1988, Banahaw was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it to
extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims in which such permit was renewed thrice by the
Bureau of Mines.

Since a portion of Banahaw Minings mining claims was located in petitioner PICOPs logging concession in
Agusandel Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual
recognition of each others right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access or right of
way to its mining claims.In 1991, Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production
Sharing Agreements (MPSA).
While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and
interests over thirty-seven (37) mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation
(Base Metals). The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well as
those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI. CMMCI then immediately approved the assignment made
by Banahaw Mining in favorof private respondent Base Metals and recognizing the latter as the new operator of its claims.
On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Minings pending MPSA applications
with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional documents in support of the application.
Area clearances from the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were
submitted, as required.
On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga Regional
Office No. XIII an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent Base Metals. Upon submission of their
respective position papers, the Panel Arbitrator issued an Order, setting aside the Base Metals MPSA Applications. The
private respondent filed Notice of Appeal with public respondent Mine Adjudication Board (MAB) in which it rendered the
assailed decision setting aside the Panel Arbitrators order.The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB, ruling
that the Presidential Warranty of September 25, 1968 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed
the timber license granted to PICOP and warranted the latters peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its
concession areas. It was only given upon the request of the Board of Investments to establish the boundaries of PICOPs
timber license agreement. The Presidential Warranty did not convert PICOPs timber license into a contract because it did
not create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of PICOP. Thus, the non-impairment clause finds no
application.

ISSUES:
Whether or not PICOP is raising new issues in the instant petition?
Whether or not the concession area of the PICOP is closed to mining activities?

LAWs APPLICABLE:
Presidential Decree 705
Republic Act 7942
Republic Act 7586
DENR Memorandum Order No. 03-98
DENR Memorandum Order No. 96-40

ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners Arguments: PICOP asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining operations as these are within the
Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest reserve established under Proclamation No. 369. To allow mining over a forest or forest
reserve would allegedly be tantamount to changing the classification of the land from forest to mineral land in violation of
Sec. 4, Art. XII of the Constitution and Sec. 1 of RA 3092. Also alleged by petitioner that blocks A, B, and C in Agusan-
Surigao-Davao forest reserve were surveyed as permanent forest blocks under RA 3092 wherein these areas cover
PICOPs PTLA No. 47 and later became IFMA No. 35. The said areas were set aside as wilderness under Sec. 5(a) of RA
7586.
The petitioner also alleged that under DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 96-40 implementing RA 7942, an
exploration permit must be secured before mining operations in government reservations may be undertaken. There being
no exploration permit issued to Banahaw Mining or appended to its MPSA, the MAB and the Court of Appeals should not
have reinstated its application. The Presidential Warranty, citing the case of PICOP Resources, Inc. vs Hon. Heherson T.
Alvarez, allegedly not a mere confirmation of PICOPs timber license but a commitment on the part of the Government
that in consideration of PICOPs investment in the wood-processing business, the Government will assure the availability
of the supply of raw materials at levels adequate to meet projected utilization requirements. Thus, reinstatement of the
MPSA in Base Metal mining activities would impaired the peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of the
petitioner in its concession areas.

Respondents Arguments: It is the contention of the OSG and Base Metals that PICOPs argument that the area
covered by the MPSA is classified as permanent forest and therefore closed to mining activities was raised for the first
time in PICOPs motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.Base Metals contends that PICOP never made any
reference to land classification or the exclusion of the contested area from exploration and mining activities except in the
motion for reconsideration it filed with the Court of Appeals. The Office of Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of MAB,
likewise argued that raising a new issues, such as the classification of the contested area, is offensive to due process and
should not be allowed.
PICOP also allegedly misquoted Sec. 19 of RA 7942 by placing a comma between the words watershed and
forest thereby giving an altogether different and misleading interpretation of the cited provision. The cited provision, in
fact, states that for an area to be closed to mining applications, the same must be a watershed forest reserve duly
identified and proclaimed by the President of the Philippines. In this case, no presidential proclamation exists setting aside
the contested area as such. Also the OSG pointed out that mining operation are legally permissible over PICOPs
concession areas as RA 7942 does not totally prohibits mining operations over forest reserves. OSG maintains that
pursuant to the States policy of multiple land use, R.A. No. 7942 provides for appropriate measures for a harmonized
utilization of the forest resources and compensation for whatever damage done to the property of the surface owner or
concessionaire as a consequence of mining operations.
Base Metals further notes that Presidential Decree No. 705 wherein the Presidential Warranty was issued,
requires notice to PICOP rather than consent before any mining activity can be commenced in the latters concession
areas.

RULING:
First issue: Upon examination, it reveals that the allegation made by the respondents that the petitioner raised new issues
in the instant is not entirely true. In its Adverse Claim and/or Opposition filed with the MGB Panel of Arbitrators, PICOP
already raised the argument that the area applied for by Base Metals is classified as a permanent forest
determined to be needed for forest purposes pursuant to par. 6, Sec. 3 of PD 705, as amended.It is true though that
PICOP expounded on the applicability of RA 3092, RA 7586, and RA 7942 for the first time in its motion for
reconsideration of the Appellate Courts Decision and motion for reconsideration that PICOP argued that the area covered
by PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35 are permanent forest lands covered by RA 7586 which cannot be entered for mining
purposes except upon reclassification through the law enacted by Congress.
The Court hold that that the so-called new issues raised by PICOP are well within the issues framed by
the parties in the proceedings a quo. Thus, they are not, strictly speaking, being raised for the first time on
appeal.Besides, Base Metals and the OSG have been given ample opportunity, by way of the pleadings filed with this
Court, to respond to PICOPs arguments.

Second Issue: The contention of PICOP that the concession area within Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest reserve
established under Proclamation No. 369 and is closed to mining application pursuant to Section 19 (a), (d) and (f) of RA
7942 must fail.
Firstly, assuming that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA is a government reservation, defined as
proclaimed reserved lands for specific purposes other than mineral reservations, such does not necessarily preclude
mining activities in the area. Sec. 15(b) of DAO96-40 provides that government reservations may be opened for mining
applications upon prior written clearance by the government agency having jurisdiction over such reservation. Sec. 6 of
RA7942 also provides that mining operations in reserved lands other than mineral reservations maybe undertaken by the
DENR, subject to certain limitations.
Secondly, RA 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all forest reserves but only those proclaimed as
watershed forest reserves. There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA has been
proclaimed as watershed forest reserves.
DENR Memorandum Order No. 03-98, which provides the guidelines in the issuance of area status and clearance
or consent for mining applications pursuant to RA 7942, provides that timber or forest lands, military and other
government reservations, forest reservations, forest reserves other than critical watershed forest reserves, and existing
DENR Project Areas within timber or forest lands, reservations and reserves, among others, are open to mining
applications subject to area status and clearance.
Thirdly, PICOP failed to present any evidence that the area covered by the MPSA is a protected wilderness area
designated as an initial component of the NIPAS pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or
executive order as required by RA 7586.
And lastly, the Court does not subscribe withPICOPs argument that the Presidential Warranty is a contract
protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution. The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a
contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. The OSGs position is correct when it says that it is merely a
collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOPs rights under its timber license. Since timber license is not a contract,
Section 10 of Article III of the Constitution cannot be invoked.
 DENR v. MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, G.R. NO. 167707, October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY, et al. v DENR, G.R. NO. 173775

FACTS:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their
occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming that of the Reginal Trial Court in Malibu, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief
filed by respodents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second
is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 issued by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

G.R. No. 167707

The DENR conducted and approved on April 14, 1976, a survey that identified several lots occupied and claimed by
inhabitants. On November 10, 1978, then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay as
tourist zones and marine reserve under the administration of Philippine Tourism Authority. The President issued PTA
Circular 3-82 to implement Proclamation 1801. Claimants Mayor Yap argued since Boracay was classified as tourist zone
it is susceptible of private ownership and under CA 141 or the Public Land Act they had the right to have their lts
registered through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles. The Office of the Solicitor General argued that Boracay was an
unclassified land of public domain and forms part of the mass land classified as public forest and not subject to
disposition pursuant to Sec 3(a) of PD 705 or Revised Forestry Code and that possession of claimants cannot ripen into
ownership as Boracay has not been classified as alienable and disposable.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation 1064
classifying Boracay into 400 hectares or reserve forest and 628.96 hectares of agricultural alienable and disposable land.
Claimants Dr. Sacay, et al. argued that Proc. 1064 infringed their prior rights over portions of Boracay where they have
been in continued possession since time immemorial and invested billions of pesos in developing the island. The Office
of the Solicitor General argued that Boracay is an unclassified public forest pursuant to Sec 3(a) of PD 705, therefore
inalienable and cannot be subject to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Island of Boracay forms part of the public domain under the Regalian Doctrine?
2. Whether or not private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No 167707 and petitioners-claimants
in G.R No. 173775) have the right to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title?

Laws Applicable

Proclamation No. 1064

Proclamation No. 1801
Presidential Decree No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code
Act No. 926 (1st Public Land Act)
Philippine Bill of 1902
1935, 1973, 1987 Constitution
Act No. 2874 (2nd Public Land Act)
Commonwealth Act No. 141
PTA Circular No. 3-82

Arguments:

G.R. No. 167707

Respodents-claimats alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure
titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since
time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.

Respodents-claimats posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond
commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG
countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified
as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section3(a) of PD. No. 705.

The OSG maintained that respondent-claimants reliance on PD 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their
right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA. 141 and PD 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classifies
as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
 G.R. No. 173775

Petiioner-claimants alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They
have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They also invested billions
of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally reowned first class resorts on their lots.

Petitioner-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being
classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 926. Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioner-claimantsdo not have the vested rights over their occupied portions
in the island. Boracay is and unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD 705. Being public forest, the
claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only
the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable lands. There is need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

Private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R No. 173775) rely on three
laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippines Bill of 1902 in relation
to Act No. 926, later amended and/pr superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; (b) Proclamation No. 1801 issued by
then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

RULING:

Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 dated May 22, 2006 issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Boracay Island was an
unclassified land of the public domain. Under the Regalian Doctrine all lands of the public domain belong to the State and
all lands appearing to be not within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. All lands not acquired from the
government by purchase or by grant belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. Pursuant to Section3 (a)
of PD No. 705, Boracay is an unclassified public forest land hence, inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. It is further held that it is only the executive department through the President who has the
authority to reclassify lands of public domain into alienable and disposable lands by a positive act such as Proclamation
1064. With the passing however, of Proclamation 1064, it classified the island into 400 hectares as reserved forest land
and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land that is alienable and disposable.

For a private person or claimant to apply for confirmation of imperfect title under CA 141, two requisites must be complied:
1. Open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of claimant or his predecessor-in-interest under
a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945, and 2. The land is classified as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain. Claimants in these cases failed to prove the requisites required therefore both
petitions were dismissed.

The SC in its One Last Note said:

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the island to private
ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the island partially
into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to
protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation
is as important as economic progress. To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion
and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as
destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control.

MATEO CARINO VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. 2869 MARCH 25, 1907
FACTS:

In February 23, 1904, MATEO CARINO ,anIgorot, filed a claim before the Court of Land Regisrtartion praying that he be
granted a title to a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are , and 13 centares, in the town of Baguio, Province of
Benguet. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot
customs. And that in 1901, Carino filed a claim under the Mortgage Law.

After trial , and the hearing of documentary and oral proof , the Court of Land Registration rendered its judgment in these
terms: Therefore the court finds that Carino and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively and adversely any part
of the said property prior to the date on which Carino constructed a house now there that is to say , for the years 1897
and 1898, and Carino held possession for some years afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title.
Both petitions are dismissed and the property in question is adjudged to be public land.

MateoCarino sought relief to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo Carino will be granted a title to a parcel of land he claimed to be his and his
predecessors?

RULING: The law applicable here is the REGALIAN DOCTRINE -which was first introduced in the Philippines through
the Law of the Indies and Royal Cedulas- The Doctrine states that : ALL LANDS that were not acquired from the
government , either by purchase or by public grant, belong to the public domain.

The parcel of land being contested here was not part of the lands disposed off during the Spanish Era. The last
disposition made by the Spanish government was in 1894. The lands disposed in 1894 did not include the land being
claimed by Cario hence, said land is presumed to belong to the State.His claim of title under the mortgage law is only
possessory. He must wait for twenty yearsof uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public and adverse,from the
date of its inscription, for him to claim a title of ownership to lapse before such can ripen to ownership.

It is true that the American Government (which was then ruling the Philippines at the time of this case) provided that
prescription may favor a land claimant but only in instances where the Spanish Government has allowed the claimant to
cultivate an unappropriated land. There was no showing that Cario or his predecessors in interest were allowed to
cultivate said land (title of egresion or title of composicion). In short, Cario or his predecessors in interest failed to show
that they were able to comply with the legal requisites for them to acquire title. Their failure to register their title during the
Spanish Era ,reverted a privately held land back to public.

The Supreme Court Affirmed the ruling of the lower court, in finding that the lands in question belong to the Government
because Mateo Cario was not able to prove and establish his ownership and possession of the said land which he
claimed as his since time immemorial.

Note:

Cario appealed to the US Supreme Court and they reversed the Phil. Supreme Court Ruling in:

Carino v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands

No. 72 Argued January 13, 1909; Decided February 23, 1909
212 U.S. 449

The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by the inhabitants, and under
the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit
of the inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with certain
ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by Spanish law.The Organic Act of the
Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those
safeguards to all.

Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years, and against the government
which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act.
Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition
by the United States, and one occupying land in the Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of
Paris is entitled to the continued possession thereof.
7 Phil. 132 reversed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 135385

December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, respondents.

HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN,
BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T.
ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES,
DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO
D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON,
BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T.
PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY,
LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON,
ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY
SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO
CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO
VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN,
OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO
H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES,
FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO
DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA,
FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR.,
JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L.
MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father
CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID,
represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA,
EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-
PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation
of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. In compliance, respondents
Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency
created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they
defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated
Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants
ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

Subsequently, many motions to intervene has been filed coming from different sectors praying for the dismissal of the
petition to declare some provisions of RA 8371 (IPRA) unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not some provisions of RA 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA) are unconstitutional?

LAWS APPLICABLE:

Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution

Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
RA 8371 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997

ARGUMENTS:

1. Petitioners view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples. They argue that IPRA and its implementing rules will amount to an unlawful
 deprivation of the State's ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources, in violation of the regalian doctrine of the Constitution.

2. In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. In compliance, respondents
Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government
agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the
Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of
merit.

3. Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral
lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of
private landowners.

4. In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on
the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.

5. Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive departments under Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution.

RULING:

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should
be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of
specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.
However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Dissenting opinion of Justice Puno

Puno: "When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into the
Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land
and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its distinct
sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the
mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfil the constitutional mandate of protecting
the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice
to our indigenous people."

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct
sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral
lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership
under customary law which traces its origin to native title.

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies who have
continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people
have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They
share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to
political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically
differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the
time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but
who may have been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.

Hizon vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517 (1996)

FACTS:
In September 1992, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan received reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters of the city. In response to these reports,
the city mayor organized Task Force BantayDagat to assist the police in the detection and apprehension of violators of the
laws on fishing.
On September 30, 1992 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, the Task Force BantayDagat reported to the PNP Maritime
Command that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by muroami within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of
Puerto Princesa. The police immediately proceeded to the area and found several men fishing in motorized sampans and
a big fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson within the seven-kilometer shoreline of the city. They boarded and inspected
the boat with the acquiescence of the boat captain, SilverioGargar. The police discovered a large aquarium full of live
lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat. They checked the license of the
boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order. Nonetheless, SPO3 Enriquez brought the boat captain, the crew
and the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for further investigation.
The boat captain was ordered to get random samples of fish from the fish cage for laboratory examination. The
NBI Forensic Chemist conducted two tests on the fish samples and found that they contained sodium cyanide,
In light of these findings, the PNP Maritime Command filed the complaint.
Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. As defense, they claimed that they are
legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a domestic corporation licensed to engage in fishing. They
alleged that they catch fish by the hook and line method and that they were intimidated by the policemen.
The facts show that on November 13, 1992, after the information was filed in court and petitioners granted bail,
petitioners moved that the fish specimens taken from the F/B Robinson be reexamined. The trial court granted the motion.
As prayed for, a member of the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa, in the presence of authorized
representatives of the F/B Robinson, the NBI and the local Fisheries Office, took at random five (5) live lapu-lapu from the
fish cage of the boat. The specimens were packed in the usual manner of transporting live fish, taken aboard a
commercial flight and delivered by the same representatives to the NBI Head Office in Manila for chemical analysis.
On November 23, 1992, Salud Rosales, another forensic chemist of the NBI in Manila conducted three (3) tests on
the specimens and found the fish negative for the presence of sodium cyanide.
The Information charged petitioners with illegal fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium
cyanide), of more or less one (1) ton of assorted live fishes. There was more or less one ton of fishes in the F/B
Robinsons fish cage. It was from this fish cage that the four dead specimens examined on October 7, 1992 and the five
live specimens examined on November 23, 1992 were taken. Though all the specimens came from the same source
allegedly tainted with sodium cyanide, the two tests resulted in conflicting findings. We note that after its apprehension,
the F/B Robinson never left the custody of the PNP Maritime Command. The fishing boat was anchored near the city
harbor and was guarded by members of the Maritime Command. It was later turned over to the custody of the Philippine
Coast Guard Commander of Puerto Princesa City.
The trial court found the petitioners guilty of the crime of Illegal Fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substance commonly known as sodium cyanide. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Hence, this petition.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the search and seizure was valid
2. Whether or not presumption of guilt in Section 33 of P.D. 704 prevails over the constitutional presumption of
innocence
3. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances

LAWS APPLICABLE
1. Philippine Constitution Article III, Sections 2 and 3 [2].
2. PD 704, sections 33 and 38

ARGUMENTS
The petitioners, with the concurrence of the Solicitor General, primarily question the admissibility of the evidence
against petitioners in view of the warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners. More
concretely, they contend that the NBI finding of sodium cyanide in the fish specimens should not have been admitted and
considered by the trial court because the fish samples were seized from the F/B Robinson without a search warrant. As
defense, they claimed that they are legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a domestic corporation
licensed to engage in fishing. They alleged that they catch fish by the hook and line method and that they had used this
method for one month and a half in the waters of Cuyo Island.
Petitioners contend that this presumption of guilt under the Fisheries Decree violates the presumption of
innocence guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Prosecution contends that, they boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the boat with the acquiescence of
the boat captain, SilverioGargar
Furthermore the boat captain was ordered to get random samples of fish from the fish cage for laboratory
examination. The NBI Forensic Chemist conducted two tests on the fish samples and found that they contained sodium
cyanide.
COURT RULING
Search and Seizure
 Our constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of persons without a judicial warrant. As a general
rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is,
however, subject to certain exceptions. Some of these are: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure of evidence
in plain view; (3) search of a moving motor vehicle; and (4) search in violation of customs laws.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the
traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a vessel and
an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be
sought and secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have not required a search warrant of vessels and aircrafts
before their search and seizure can be constitutionally effected.
The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These
vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine Navy, the
Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery laws.
We thus hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having engaged in
illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of the search were properly admitted by the trial court.
Moreover, petitioners failed to raise the issue during trial and hence, waived their right to question any irregularity that
may have attended the said search and seizure.
Presumption of Guilt PD 704
The validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal cases is a settled matter. It is generally conceded that
the legislature has the power to provide that proof of certain facts can constitute prima facie evidence of the guilt of the
accused and then shift the burden of proof to the accused provided there is a rational connection between the facts
proved and the ultimate fact presumed. To avoid any constitutional infirmity, the inference of one from proof of the other
must not be arbitrary and unreasonable. In fine, the presumption must be based on facts and these facts must be part of
the crime when committed.
The third paragraph of section 33 of P.D. 704 creates a presumption of guilt based on facts proved and hence is
not constitutionally impermissible. It makes the discovery of obnoxious or poisonous substances, explosives, or devices
for electric fishing, or of fish caught or killed with the use of obnoxious and poisonous substances, explosives or electricity
in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman evidence that the owner and operator of the fishing boat or the
fisherman had used such substances in catching fish. The ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the
boat or the fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise from the discovery of the
substances and the contaminated fish in the possession of the fisherman in the fishing boat. The fact presumed is a
natural inference from the fact proved.
We stress, however, that the statutory presumption is merely prima facie. It cannot, under the guise of regulating
the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the accused from presenting his defense to rebut the main fact
presumed. At no instance can the accused be denied the right to rebut the presumption.
Illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances
The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the fish samples and this omission raises a
reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.
The absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports petitioners claim that they did not use the
poison in fishing. According to them, they caught the fishes by the ordinary and legal way, i.e., by hook and line on board
their sampans. This claim is buttressed by the prosecution evidence itself. The apprehending officers saw petitioners
fishing by hook and line when they came upon them in the waters of Barangay San Rafael.
The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or
obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage
itself.
We cannot overlook the fact that the apprehending officers found in the boat assorted hooks and lines for catching
fish. For this obvious reason, the Inspection/Apprehension Report prepared by the apprehending officers immediately
after the search did not charge petitioners with illegal fishing, much less illegal fishing with the use of poison or any
obnoxious substance. The only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI
laboratory test on the four fish specimens. Under the circumstances of the case, however, this finding does not warrant
the infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same four specimens, were caught with the use of
sodium cyanide.
Prosecution witness SPO1 Bernardino Visto testified that for the first laboratory test , boat engineer Ernesto Andaya
did not only get four (4) samples of fish but actually got five (5) from the fish cage of the F/B Robinson. his Certification
that four (4) fish samples were taken from the boat shows on its face the number of pieces as originally five (5) but this
was erased with correction fluid and four (4) written over it. The specimens were taken, sealed inside the plastic bag and
brought to Manila by the police authorities in the absence of petitioners or their representative. SPO2 Enriquez testified
that the same plastic bag containing the four specimens was merely sealed with heat from a lighter. Emilia Rosaldes, the
NBI forensic chemist who examined the samples, testified that when she opened the package, she found two ends of the
same plastic bag knotted. These circumstances as well as the time interval from the taking of the fish samples and their
actual examinationfail to assure the impartial mind that the integrity of the specimens had been properly safeguarded.
The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of
the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious
circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15417 is
reversed and set aside. Petitioners are acquitted of the crime of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances
defined under the Section 33 of Republic Act No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975. No costs.
 La BugalBlaanTribal Association, Inc., vs. Secretary of DENR, et al, GR No. 127882, January 27, 2004, CARPIO-
MORALES, J.:

FACTS: On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the
DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for
contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the
foreign proponent.

On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development,
utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining
operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms.
Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements.

On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of
general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30,
1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.

On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s.
1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO
No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.

On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the
implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The
DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.

Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

They pray that the Court issue an order:

(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative
Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as
unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the RA 7942 is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to explore, develop,
utilize and exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
(2) Whether or not the FTAA between the President of the Republic of the Philippines and WMCP is illegal and
unconstitutional.

LAWS APPLICABLE:

(4) Republic Act No. 7942,5 otherwise known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995
(5) Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40
(6) (E.O.) No. 279
(7) Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
(8) Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 65
(9) Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution
(10) The Regalian Doctrine
(11) The 1935 Constitution and the Nationalization of Natural Resources
(12) The Petroleum Act of 1949 and the Concession System
(13) Presidential Decree No. 87, The 1973 Constitution And The Service Contract System
(14) The 1987 Constitution And Technical Or Financial Assistance Agreements
(15) Draft Of The Up Law Constitution Project
(16) Proposed Resolution No. 496 Of The Constitutional Commission

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioners
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in signing and
promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-
40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter
being unconstitutional in that it allows fully foreign
owned corporations to explore, develop, utilize and
exploit mineral resources in a manner contrary to
Respondents
Respondents, aside from meeting petitioners'
contentions, argue that the petitioners have not met
the requisites for judicial inquiry and that the
petition does not comply with the criteria for
Section 2, paragraph 4, Article XII of the prohibition and mandamus . Additionally,
Constitution;
respondent WMCP argues that there has been a
violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts.

Respondents insist that "agreements involving

Petitioners submit that, in accordance with the text
of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, FTAAs
should be limited to "technical or financial
assistance" only. They observe, however, that,
contrary to the language of the Constitution, the
WMCP FTAA allows WMCP, a fully foreign-owned
mining corporation, to extend more than mere
financial or technical assistance to the State, for it
permits WMCP to manage and operate every
aspect of the mining activity.
technical or financial assistance" is just another
term for service contracts. They contend that the
proceedings of the CONCOM indicate "that
although the terminology 'service contract' was
avoided [by the Constitution], the concept it
represented was not." They add that "[t]he concept
is embodied in the phrase 'agreements involving
financial or technical assistance.'"229 And point out
how members of the CONCOM referred to these
agreements as "service contracts."

COURTS RULING:

First Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.

The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and
hereby declares unconstitutional and void:

(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit:
Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting
an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit.

(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a
financial or technical assistance agreement,

(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance agreement;

(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance agreement;

(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a
mineral production-sharing agreement;

(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a financial and technical
assistance agreement;
The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing provisions and cannot
stand on their own:

(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement.

Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance agreement
proposals;

Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA;

The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's share in a financial and technical
assistance agreement; and

Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors;

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the
nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly
against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service
contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987
Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership
to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just
like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the
mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations mineral resources to these
contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.

The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40%
capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of
Philippine natural resources.

When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or
compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are
unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.

Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial
assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils.

Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract

The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a
service contract.

Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and
dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement
provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining
Operations.

These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over
natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are
abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it
aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 135190. April 3, 2002]

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BALITE PORTAL MINING
COOPERATIVE and others similarly situated; and THE HONORABLE ANTONIO CERILLES, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL MINING REGULATORY
BOARD OF DAVAO (PMRB-Davao), respondents.

Diwalwal Gold Rush Area is situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. Thousands of people flocked
to stake their respective claims. Peace and order rapidly deteriorated due to unregulated mining activities. On March 10,
1988, Marcopper was granted mining rights over 4,491 hectares of land including the Diwalwal area by virtue of
Exploration Permit No. 133. The permit was challenged before the Supreme Court in the case of Marcopper v APEX,
where the mining rights of Marcopper were sustained.

Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076 or the Peoples Small-scale Mining Act on June 27, 1991. The law
established a Peoples Small-scale Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of DENR, and created the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the direct supervision and control of the DENR Secretary. The law also
authorized PMRB to declare and set-aside small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award
mining contracts to small-scale miners under certain conditions.

On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran issued Department Administrative Order No. 66
declaring the Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining. Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of
EP No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed
before the DENR Reional Executive Director docketed as RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94.

On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned its exploration permit to
Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM) which in turn applied for the integrated MPSA over the land covered
by the permit.
 In due time, Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. XI in Davao City accepted and registered the
integrated MPSA. After publication, many filed their respective oppositions referred to as MAC cases.

On March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act was enacted which created the Regional
Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining rights. The RPA took cognizance of and
consolidated the RED Mines case with the MAC cases.

On April 1, 1997, PMRB Davao passed Resolution No. 26 authorizing the issuance of ore transport permits
(OTPs) to small-scale miners operating in Diwalwal.

On May 30, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City against
DENR Secretary and PRMB Davao. SEM alleged that the illegal issuance of the OTPs allowed the extraction and hauling
of gold ore from SEMs mining claim.

Meanwhile, on June 13, 1997, the RPA resolved the Consolidated Mines cases in favor of SEM by affirming the
validity of EP No. 133 and all adverse claims against integrated MPSA are dismissed.

On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order 97-03 which provides that the DENR shall
exhaustively and thoroughly study the option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold Rush
Area.

On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of
Appeals against PRMB Davao, DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC), which
represented all the OTPs grantees. It prayed for the nullification of the Memorandum Order on the ground that the direct
state utilization would effectively impair its vested rights under EPP No. 13 and that the DENR Secretary unduly usurped
and interfered with the jurisdiction of the RPA.

On January 6, 1998, the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) rendered a decision in the Consolidated Mines case
setting aside the judgment of RPA. This decision was then elevated to the Supreme Court.

On March 19, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of SEM. It ruled that the DENR Secretary did not
abuse his discretion since the Memorandum Order was merely a directive to conduct studies on the various options
available to the government. The said memorandum did not conclusively adopt direct state utilization as official
government policy but was simply a manifestation the DENRs intent to consider one of its options. The appellate court
likewise pointed out that the rights under the exploration permit are not inviolable, sancrosanct or immutable, being in the
nature of a privilege granted by the State which can be revoked, amended or modified when national interest so requires.
The Court of Appeals, however, declined to rule on the validity of OTPs because it is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RPA. Petitioner filed for Motion for Reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not MO 97-03 divested petitioner of its mining rightsunder its EP No. 133.

Applicable Law/s:

1. Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically provides:

SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

2. Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states:

SEC. 4.Ownership of Mineral Resources. - Mineral Resources are owned by the State and the exploration,
development, utilization, and processing thereof shall be under its full control and supervision. The State may
directly undertake such activities or it may enter into mineral agreements with contractors.

Arguments:

Petitoner Respondent

MO 97-03 was issued to preempt the resolution Petitioners rights under EP No. 133 are not
of the Consolidated Mines cases. The direct inviolable, sacrosanct or immutable. Being in
state utilization scheme espoused in the the nature of a privilege granted by the State,
challenged memorandum is nothing but a legal the permit can be revoked, amended or
 shortcut, designed to divest petitioner of its modified by the Chief Executive when the
vested right to the gold rush area under its EP national interest so requires.
No. 133.

Ruling:

As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision, EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege
granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This
is necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources are
matters impressed with great public interest.
The State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the exploration, development and
utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into
agreements with qualified entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study
of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in accordance with the constitutional policy
enunciated above. Obviously, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it
is the only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush. As implied earlier,
the State need be guided only by the demands of public interest in settling for this option, as well as its material
and logistic feasibility.

The petition is DENIED. The decision of Court of Appeals is affirmed.

G.R. No. 129546

Promulgated: December 13, 2005

PROVINCE OF RIZAL, MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MATEO, PINTONG BOCAUE

MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE, CONCERNED CITIZENS OF RIZAL, INC.,
ROLANDO E. VILLACORTE, BERNARDO HIDALGO, ANANIAS EBUENGA,
P e t i t i o n e r s, VILMA T. MONTAJES, FEDERICO MUNAR, JR., ROLANDO BEAS, SR., ET AL.,
and KILOSBAYAN, INC.,
- versus -

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT & NATURAL

Respondents RESOURCES, LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, SECRETARY OF
PUBLIC WORKS & HIGHWAYS, SECRETARY OF BUDGET & MANAGEMENT,
METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS,

Facts:

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

A petition is filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and various concerned citizens for
review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals denying, for lack of cause of action, the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction assailing the legality and constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635.

At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President, through Proclamation No. 635 for use as a sanitary
landfill and similar waste disposal applications.

A MOA is entered into by DPWH, DENR and Metro Manila Commission (MMC) agreeing to immediately allow
MMC to utilize of DENRs property as a sanitary landfill site. The land subject of the MOA was part of the
Marikina Watershed Reservation Area. The petitioners together with other government agencies had been
sending letters of objections to the use of the Watershed Area as sanitary landfill.

An investigation by DENR showed that the surrounding lot is being endangered because soil erosion caused
severe siltation and sedimentation of the Dayrit Creek which water is greatly polluted by the dumping of soil
bulldozed to the creek; bad odor greatly affected the pupils nearby who are sometimes sick with respiratory
illnesses. Besides large flies (Bangaw) are swarming all over the playground of the school. Thus, DENR
recommended that MMA be made to relocate the landfill site because the area is within the Marikina Watershed
Reservation. The leachate treatment plant has been eroded twice already and contaminated the nearby creeks
 which are the source of potable water of the residents. The contaminated water also flows to Wawa Dam and
Boso-boso River which also flows to Laguna de Bay.

Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the government agencies, the Office of the
President signed and issued Proclamation No. 635, Excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation Certain
Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal Under the
Administration of the MMDA.

The petitioners Municipality of San Mateo and the residents of Pintong Bocaue requested President Ramos to
reconsider Proclamation No. 635. Receiving no reply, they sent another letter reiterating their previous request.
The petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. On 1997, the court a quo rendered a
Decision denying the petitions.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DELIBERATELY AND WILLFULLY BRUSHED ASIDE THE UNANIMOUS FINDINGS AND ADVERSE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND NON-PARTISAN
OFFICIALS CONCERNED WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, IN FAVOR OF THE MMDA.

Subsequent events before the decision:

The people of Antipolo staged a rally and barricade along the Marcos Highway to stop the dump trucks from
reaching the site for five successive days. On the second day of the barricade, all the municipal mayors of the province of
Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally, and notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to
dump garbage in their province. As a result, MMDA agreed to abandon the dumpsite after six months. Then President
Joseph E. Estrada, taking cognizance of the gravity of the problems in the affected areas and the likelihood that violence
would erupt among the parties involved, issued a Memorandum ordering the closure of the dumpsite. On January 2001,
President Estrada directed the DILG and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite in view of the
emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation
epidemic. Meanwhile, on 26 January 2001, Republic Act No. 9003, otherwise known as The Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act of 2000, was signed into law by President Estrada.

Subsequent Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PERMANENT CLOSURE OF THE SAN MATEO LANDFILL IS MANDATED BY R.A. NO.
9003.

Laws Applicable:

PD No. 1586 Proclamation No. 2146 R.A. 9003 EO 192

Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000 National Water Crises Act

1987 Philippine Constitution Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987

Arguments Presented:

Petitioners Respondents

The MOA entered into is a very costly error The site had been recommended by the DENR,
because the area agreed to be a garbage and approved by the President, to already be
dumpsite is inside the Marikina Watershed
excluded from the Marikina Watershed
Reservation.
reservation and placed under the
administration of MMDA.

The garbage disposal operations should be The amount of effort and money already
transferred to another area outside the invested in the project by the government
Marikina Watershed Reservation to protect
 the health and general welfare of the
residents of San Mateo in particular and the
residents of Metro Manila in general.
cannot easily be disregarded, much more set
aside in favor of the few settlers/squatters who
chose to ignore the earlier notice given to them
that the area would be used precisely for the
development of waste disposal sites, and are
now attempting to arouse opposition to the
project.

Respondents Court

Marikina Watershed Reservation, and thus the
San Mateo Site, is located in the public domain.
As such, neither the Province of Rizal nor the
municipality of San Mateo has the power to
control or regulate its use since properties of this
nature belong to the national, and not to the local
governments.
Court Decision:
The Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive
Order No. 192 entrust the DENR with the
guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation and other natural treasures.
However, although the DENR, an agency of the
government, owns the Marikina Reserve and has
jurisdiction over the same, this power is not absolute,
but is defined by the declared policies of the state,
and is subject to the law and higher authority.

The petition is GRANTED. Proclamation No. 635 is declared illegal. The earth belongs in usufruct to the living.

The court held that the San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed. First, the San Mateo site has adversely

affected its environs, and second, sources of water should always be protected. As to the first point, the adverse effects

of the site were reported as early as 19 June 1989, stating that the sources of domestic water supply of over one

thousand families would be adversely affected by the dumping operations. The succeeding report included the

observation that the use of the areas as dumping site greatly affected the ecological balance and environmental factors of

the community. Water is life, and must be saved at all costs. The most important product of a watershed is water, which is

one of the most important human necessities. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for

future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of

watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now.

Laws pertaining to the protection of the environment were not drafted in a vacuum. Congress passed these laws

fully aware of the perilous state of both our economic and natural wealth. It was precisely to minimize the adverse impact

humanitys actions on all aspects of the natural world, at the same time maintaining and ensuring an environment under

which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, that these legal safeguards were

put in place. They should thus not be so lightly cast aside in the face of what is easy and expedient.