442159 PLT11410.

1177/1473095212442159CampbellPlanning Theory

Special issue article

Planning Theory
1 11(4) 379399
Planning ethics The Author(s) 2012
Reprints and permission:
and rediscovering the idea sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1473095212442159
of planning2 plt.sagepub.com

Heather Campbell
University of Sheffield, UK

Abstract
This paper is inspired by Sue Hendlers considerable contributions to the field of ethics and
planning. There can be few more insightful vantage points from which to view planning than
through exploration of the fields engagement with ethics. A perspective derived from ethics
helps to cut through the analytical noise, to expose often troubling but fundamental issues about
the very nature of planning. This paper examines how ethical concerns have been, and are being,
understood in planning, and the profound questions which are posed about past, present and
future intellectual and professional priorities. It concludes that the planning community needs to
rediscover its ethical voice and its confidence in the idea of planning.

Keywords
Ethics, planning theory, professional ethics

Introduction
I am delighted to have been asked to contribute to this tribute to the work of Sue Hendler.
I cannot claim to have known Sue all that well, but as a fellow traveller along the high-
ways and byways of debates about ethics and planning, it was inevitable that I would
be drawn to her writing and research. In the process of reacquainting myself with Sues
highly significant contributions, however, I have had cause to ponder about the evolution
of work on ethics and planning and its on-going trajectory. In 1995 in the introduction to
Planning Ethics Hendler wrote: Planning ethics has reached a level of sophistication
and what seems no less than exponential growth. Keeping up with the theoretical, profes-
sional, and pedagogical developments in this area has become increasingly challenging

Corresponding author:
Heather Campbell, Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Sheffield, Western Bank,
Sheffield, S10 2TN, UK.
Email: h.j.campbell@sheffield.ac.uk
380 Planning Theory 11(4)

(Hendler, 1995b: xx). So, what of that envisaged exponential growth? What have been
the key developments in planning ethics? What issues and challenges are emerging, in
the context of contemporary sensibilities?
The publication in 1976 of Peter Marcuses paper, in the then Journal of the American
Institute of Planners, is often regarded as marking a watershed in considered intellectual
and professional engagement with ethical concerns by the planning community. Certainly,
as crudely evidenced by the number of publications taking ethical concerns as their
starting point, there was a surge of activity in the couple of decades between the publica-
tion of Marcuses paper and the completion of Hendlers Reader, Planning Ethics.3 This
significant growth in writing was evident on both sides of the Atlantic, but importantly
was not merely an academic preoccupation. It simultaneously reflected and stimulated
lively debates within the various national professional associations over the ethical
dimensions of the still relatively young profession of town planning. These debates most
often found expression in concerns about the appropriate nature and wording of profes-
sional codes of ethics.
But why this burst of concern with issues linked to ethics? The recurrent stimulus is
clear in the introductions to the work of this period, and centred on profound changes to
underlying perceptions about the theory and practice of the planning activity. The notion
of planning based on the one hand on design skills, or on the other, on a model of rational
comprehensive decision-making and hence of an essentially technical profession,
became increasingly discredited. The technocratic premise was replaced by widespread
acceptance of the political and therefore value-based character of the activities with
which planners engage.4 This shift away from planners reliance on technique or rational
calculus as a basis for their professional standing prompted greater engagement with ethics.
It followed that in circumstances now characterized by competing interests and priori-
ties, planning theorists and practitioners should search for inspiration in the field for
which normative questions of what should be done are foundational to its very purpose.
Martin Wachs foreword to Hendlers Reader effectively captures the mood of the
moment: While retaining technical analytical and design components, planning has
come to be seen also as intensely political and value laden. Not surprisingly, planners
discussions of ethics within the realm of their profession have evolved in reflection of
our changing conception of the field (1995: xiii). He goes on to characterize the symbi-
otic relationship between the changing nature of the profession and its engagement with
ethical debates as follows:

This shift is symbolised by the evolution of the labels by which we discuss ethics: from a
circumscribed view of professional ethics two decades ago to a broader concept of ethics in
planning a decade ago, we have evolved to discussions of planning ethics in this book. The
latest term adopted here by Sue Hendler symbolises that, as an intellectual and professional
community, planners recognize that every act of planning pursues certain human values and
that planning is in many ways a series of statements about what we take to be right or wrong
and what we take to represent priorities of the society in which the planning is undertaken
(Wachs, 1995: xiiixiv).

So what of the subsequent development of debates about ethics and planning? As Wachs
suggests, the conjoining of planning and ethics, uninterrupted by any form of preposition
Campbell 381

in the title of Hendlers Reader, was indicative of a taken-for-granted acceptance, even

confidence in, a mutually beneficial relationship between the theory and practice of plan-
ning and that of ethics. The tone of the contributions to Planning Ethics exudes a sense
of both the significance of the emergent field as well as a degree of humbleness about the
resultant intellectual and professional challenges. Strikingly, however, the period since
1995 has not seen the publication of a further or updated Reader in planning ethics. This
prompts the question: how far and in what ways has a concern with ethics and planning
developed in the subsequent years? Have we witnessed the exponential growth and
increased sophistication in the field, or something rather more fitful and patchy?
Moreover, what does this have to say about the priorities and sensibilities of contempo-
rary planning theorists, professional bodies and practitioners?
The general thrust of current understandings about the planning activity continues to
challenge the appropriateness of technocratic perspectives. If anything, the planning com-
munity is now more conscious of the political nature of its practices and the non-
formulaic quality of the judgements which lie at the heart of its work. The conclusions of
many academic papers refer to the ethical implications of their research findings for plan-
ning. Similarly, debate about ethics continues to attract attention within the planning pro-
fession. These debates most obviously come together in concerns over planning education.
As a member of the Royal Town Planning Institutes (RTPI) Partnership and Accreditation
Panel, I am aware that a key priority for the profession in Britain is the adequate and effec-
tive teaching of ethics. But, recognition of the importance of ethics to the education of
future planning professionals says little in and of itself. What is it that practitioners need to
know? Does a lecture introducing students to the relevant code of ethics and a couple of
case studies cover the necessary issues? More fundamentally and controversially, are there
views or approaches to practice which it is regarded as professionally unacceptable for a
planner to have? According to the RTPI, simply familiarizing students with their profes-
sional code is not adequate, but with what should the teaching of ethics be concerned?
The essential relevance of ethical concerns to the theory and practice of planning
appears no less pertinent today than at the time Hendlers Reader was published.
However, it is one thing to say ethics matters who is going to say otherwise? it is quite
another to be specific as to what this actually means. This paper examines how ethical
concerns have been, and are being, understood in planning, and the profound questions
which are posed about past, present and future intellectual and professional priorities.
Have the words planning and ethics become conjoined or are they uneasy compan-
ions, unclear, even troubled, as to their relationship, one to another.
The arguments presented in this paper are based on the synthesis of ideas and under-
standings drawn for the most part from literature and experiences relating to the
Anglophone world, especially the United Kingdom and United States. By its nature syn-
thesis involves some measure of generalization and simplification. However, such a pro-
cess also offers opportunities to shine a light on the taken-for-granted and hence to
challenge existing agendas. As a consequence while the conclusions are somewhat tenta-
tive, it is hoped that the arguments are sufficiently well formed to have broad applicabil-
ity and to encourage, and may be even provoke, further debate.
The papers argument is presented in three parts. The next section explores the key
themes which have characterized debate around planning and ethics, in the couple of
382 Planning Theory 11(4)

decades since the publication of Hendlers Reader in 1995. The following section focuses
on the more recent developments in the field. In the concluding section the theoretical
and practical implications of the review are examined and the challenges and priorities
for the future identified.

From professional ethics via ethics in planning to

planning ethics5
Background delimiting the scope of debate
The introductory remarks have presumed both what is implied by the term ethics and
also the sorts of concerns within the planning field that fall under the scope of debates
associated with ethics. A little more needs to be said at this point about the treatment of
the boundaries of these debates in this paper.
The domain of concerns related to ethics is drawn quite broadly.6 Clearly there is a
vast philosophical literature underpinning work in this area. The essential concern of this
body of work is with determining what ought to be done. This normative orientation is
framed by understandings of the nature of good and bad outcomes or right and wrong
actions.7 These fundamental notions have been subject to on-going debate and dispute,
as exemplified in the various strands of utilitarianism or John Rawls notion embodied in
the term justice as fairness. The underlying objective of these perspectives is to suggest
broad standards by which the ethical extent of decisions may be arrived at and judged.
This is complemented by a much more personalized focus, at the level of the individual,
on the nature of ethical character and conduct. This follows from Aristotelian concerns
with the virtues or characteristics required of an individual to live the good life. These
often abstract conceptualizations have been rendered more applied through application
to particular areas of controversy, for example euthanasia, abortion or the environment,
to professional activities, such as medicine or planning, or more specifically to public
life and the conduct of elected politicians and officials.
Overall therefore ethics is concerned with making choices and practical judgement.
Popular rhetoric often presents such choices in black and white terms. However, for the
most part, ethical debates confront situations where simple distinctions between good
and bad, right and wrong, do not pertain. Rather difficult judgements, with uncertain
impacts, have to be made as to better and worse courses of action.
As, arguably, the essence of planning involves making choices in contexts character-
ized by complexity and uncertainty, it might seem that most everything written or debated
within the planning field relates to ethical concerns. At its most basic, this is a conclusion
with which I would find it hard to disagree (Campbell, 2006; see also, Upton, 2002) and
would seem to have been reflected in the sentiments expressed at the time of the publica-
tion of Hendlers Reader. However, the issue for this paper is not whether ethical con-
cerns are fundamental to a professional activity such as planning this must inevitably
be so but rather what form such debates have taken and what this says about the theory
and practice of planning. In relation to this review as a result, while the potentially all
embracing nature of ethical concerns is understood, the starting point is with analysis of
the themes and perspectives the self-styled literature on ethics and planning (and/or plan-
ners) examines or develops. Given the expectation of a sea change in the extent and
Campbell 383

sophistication of arguments stated at the time of publication of Hendlers Reader, how

far the period since 1995 has seen continuation of this momentum, forms an intriguing
background question.

Key themes planning and ethics

It is a feature of popular debate and academic analysis with respect to planning, as many
other areas of public or professional life, that concluding comments often run something
to the effect, this case raises ethical issues. The more problematic or controversial
the challenges faced, the more likely it is for the resulting implications to be regarded as
having an ethical character. However, such statements provide little real insight into the
evolution of debates, other than the enduring pertinence of such issues. The focus here
therefore is with discussions which take ethical concerns as their starting point, not as the
point of departure for the implications of analysis or experiences.
Marcuses (1976) seminal paper is often regarded as the first to focus concerted atten-
tion on ethical matters in planning. In many respects the scope of this paper was rela-
tively narrowly conceived around professional ethics. During a period which witnessed
the increasing professionalization of planning, Marcuse challenged the planning com-
munity not to take professional ethics for granted. More especially he sought to demon-
strate the highly politicized nature of professional ethical frameworks and their tendency
to support the status quo rather than to provide the foundations for progressive and radi-
cal practices. However, while he states, Professional ethics are likely to be system main-
taining rather than system challenging, he goes on in the subsequent sentence to offer
the faintest glimmer of hope that while difficult, change was possible: The movement to
reshape them [professional ethics] in a different direction is likely to be a long and uphill
one (Marcuse, 1976: 273).
Marcuses analysis fitted with an emerging sense as to the political, rather than techni-
cal, character of planning. But more than this, it also sought to highlight the politicized
nature of the professional activity of planning itself. A concern that the professionaliza-
tion of planning, which brought with it adherence to professional codes of ethics, might
constrain planners and foster cautious, and even self-serving, attitudes. Ethics, largely
associated with (professional) codes of ethics, hence became a focus of attention. The
association between ethics and the assumed self-aggrandising and officially apolitical,
even value-neutral, character of professional bodies, was a source of contention. Many
questioned (and continue to question) whether the professionalization of the planning
activity necessitated a corporatist bargain with the state, which, in return for status,
employment and thus remuneration, eroded the socially progressive qualities of plan-
nings origins and inheritance.8 The framing and even disciplining9 role of the various
codes of the professional bodies meant that ethics, in the sense of professional ethics,
became strongly implicated in these debates.
Marcuses paper points towards the Janus-faced character of planning debates con-
cerned with ethics. On the one side, ethics, as professional ethics, is viewed as inherently
conservative and becomes the focus for condemnation and critique, but on the other side,
ethical insights are seen as a potential source of inspiration and challenge to the status
quo. The inherent pessimism of critical analysis and fashionable intellectual debate is
384 Planning Theory 11(4)

simultaneously qualified by a nagging hope that better can be achieved; otherwise, what
point to planning, why educate planners?10 Despite, or perhaps even because of this ten-
sion, interest in ethical debates, broadly defined, began to increase in the 1980s.
By 1981 Jerome Kaufman started a review in the Journal of the American Planning
Association of three books concerned with applied ethics, but notably not related to the
planning profession, with the words: Ethics is in nowadays (1981: 196, emphasis
added). More specifically he contextualized and justified this statement by observing
that increasing priority was being given to the teaching of applied ethics within planning
schools, as well as noting the overhaul which was then taking place of the American
Institute of Certified Planners Code of Professional Responsibilities. More fundamen-
tally, in relation to understandings about planning, he went on to say: What is becoming
clearer is that many contemporary planners are increasingly recognizing the ethical basis
of choices they must make about a wide range of complex issues involved in their work.
Knotty questions abound (1981: 196). This was in line with the challenge presented by
the growing acceptance of the essentially political nature of planning decisions but also
suggests a broadening in focus beyond a concern merely with professional ethics.
Importantly, too, Wachs (1982) highlighted that the traditionally technical areas of plan-
ning such as forecasting were not without their politically contentious aspects.11 But
while ethics might be in, what this meant for the development of thought and profes-
sional practice within planning was less clear.
Starting by focusing on the period up to 1995, there would seem to be four distinct,
although often overlapping, strands of debate. Two of these strands were evident in
Kaufmans contextual comments and concerned firstly, the nature and content of codes
of ethics; and secondly, planning education, more particularly the endlessly perplexing
issues of the appropriate content and methods of delivery of ethics-related material. In
many ways it seemed then (as now) that the knee-jerk response to the raising of matters
ethical was to focus attention on professional codes of ethics and/or the enhancement
of the teaching of ethics. Codes and the curriculum certainly represent the most obvious
mechanisms for the articulation of ethical concerns within professional practice.
However, the meaningfulness of these essentially delivery mechanisms required more
fundamental questions to be addressed about the nature of the ethical issues at stake. It
is in respect to such concerns that two further strands of activity are discernable, which
were largely taken forward by the academic community. Firstly, in the domain of plan-
ning theory, various theories derived from ethical philosophy were re-presented and to
some extent translated into a planning context. This was complemented by a second
stream of empirical research activity, which sought to identify the ethical frameworks
being utilized by practising planners in their everyday work. This research was premised
on the merits of learning from practice. The lessons and insights derived are revealing
both about the evolution of thinking with respect to ethics but more especially about the
nature of planning itself. In the following section each of these strands is explored fur-
ther, starting with the latter two.

Planning and ethics: Learning from theory and learning from practice. It is immensely strik-
ing that given the often controversial and emotive qualities of ethical debates, at least the
published material is characterized by a politeness and lack of impassioned argument.
Campbell 385

The explorations of various philosophical positions do precisely that: they summarize for
a planning audience the key ideas underpinning the classic theories in the field of ethics,
such as notions of virtue, utilitarianism, Kants categorical imperative or Rawlsian jus-
tice.12 The purpose of such writing was generally to inform and to link to debates within
planning theory. There is little sense, other than maybe in some of the feminist writings,
of a polarizing debate between different ethical positions. Rather, as Hendler explains, in
relation to the approaches taken by the more theoretical chapters in her book: While
some writers attempt to refute some aspects of their colleagues work, for the most part,
they leave it up to the reader to decide where he or she stands (1995c: 6). This strong
imperative not to be seen to advocate for a particular ethical stance, and a related fear of
being open to accusations of imposition, has had a huge influence on the evolution of
debate about ethics and planning. It could be argued that this in itself was a distinctive
ethical stance, particularly in the context of a profession and discipline grappling with
the realization of its politicized nature.
Further to the development of these debates, some questioned the extent to which
normative theory could or should guide practitioner understandings of ethics.13 In con-
trast, it was argued that ethical insight was most effectively derived from the direct
experiences of individual planners. Such sentiments (amongst others) encouraged a sig-
nificant body of empirical research to be undertaken, which placed emphasis on the
importance of learning from practice. What might be characterized as a bottom-up,
rather than top-down orientation. Two slightly different approaches are discernible in
this work. First, descriptive analyses based on surveys of and interviews with practi-
tioners, which investigated the ways individual planners frame ethical concerns, and the
relationships between these frameworks and social characteristics, such as upbringing
and personal circumstances. Studies of this type include research undertaken by Jerome
Kaufman and Elizabeth Howe of American and Israeli planners, by Sue Hendler in the
Canadian context, and with a slightly different orientation by Charles Hoch, again based
in the US, and Patsy Healey and Jacky Underwood in London.14 Unsurprisingly, per-
haps, such studies found varied perspectives amongst planners on what they considered
to be ethical, from those adopting a largely technocratic orientation, who tended to be
concerned with procedural correctness, to those with stronger political motivations
based on substantive ethical values often associated with social justice or the environ-
ment, and who displayed greater flexibility when it came to matters of due process.
Most planners demonstrated something of a hybrid approach, with their underlying
objective and choice of action dependent on the case in question and circumstances.
Notably the focus was largely on the ethical perspectives of individual planners, not
planning as a societal activity. The second research approach consisted of accounts
written by planning practitioners about their everyday work. Although these discussions
were generally edited by academics, the underlying objective was to provide a medium
for planners to speak for themselves, in their own words, about the dilemmas they
faced, and thus to remove (or at least reduce) the intermediary role performed by
researchers. This is exemplified in the contributions to Huw Thomas and Patsy Healeys
edited collection and rather differently in the book which resulted from the collabora-
tion between Norman Krumholz, the former head of planning for the City of Cleveland,
Ohio, and John Forester.15
386 Planning Theory 11(4)

However, beyond these relatively bland descriptions, what was the ethical point of
this body of work? Howe and Kaufman set the scene for their key early study of the ethi-
cal perspectives of planners, with the statement:

The primary interest of our study was simply to find out more about how contemporary planners
view ethics what do they agree and disagree about, and what is the nature and extent of their
agreement and disagreement. In other words, our intention is to describe what planners think is
ethical, not to judge whether or not planners are ethical by some predetermined standard (1979:
244).

Hence, while ethical concerns were increasingly regarded as highly significant, the
underlying imperative was about maintaining a non-judgemental distance.
It might be perceived that a similar stance underpinned the motivations of those facili-
tating practitioners to write about their experiences, and to a point that may well have
been the case. However, the practitioner accounts themselves tend not to be character-
ized by equivocation with respect to substantive ethical positions. Norman Krumholzs
vision of equity planning could hardly be described as value-neutral. So, what of the
editorial criteria for the selection of practitioner authors? It would seem surprising if this
process was anything other than purposeful. Hence, while planners may have been
encouraged to speak for themselves, it was in practice only certain planners who were
being given voice. Overall therefore, while sensitivity to being seen to adopt (or impose)
a particular substantive ethical stance militated against explicitly judgemental approaches,
arguably, slightly obscured from direct scrutiny, lay exactly such value-based motiva-
tions. This is not in any way to suggest double standards, or worse hypocrisy. Rather it
highlights a massive enduring challenge for theory and practice in planning: how to
articulate substantive ethical values, given the political nature of planning, without
appearing insensitive, at best, or imposing and dogmatic, at worse?

Professional ethics and more: Codes and education. At a general level, it is clear that in the
couple of decades up to 1995 there was a growing appetite for both theoretical and
empirical research exploring what Wachs described as ethics in planning, and certainly
amounted to a concern with ethics and planning. Despite some contention over the mer-
its of normative theory as against practice-based research, there was a broad sense of a
complementarity; hardly surprising, as the same authors contributed to both fields. In
parallel to these debates, which were mainly centred within the planning academy, was
focus on professional ethics more particularly, concern as to the form and content of
professional codes of ethics and also the what and how of the teaching of ethics
within programmes of initial planning education.
The underlying assumption that ethical awareness, and hence ethical behaviour on
the part of planners, was consequent upon knowledge of an appropriate code of profes-
sional ethics, no more and no less, pervaded general planning debates. To this day, virtu-
ally any concern about ethics often seems to be reduced to a need for the various
professional bodies to review their codes of ethics and/or for planning students to be
more effectively educated about their contents. Yet, following Marcuses (1976) critique,
most of the written output from the academic community questioned the role and
Campbell 387

effectiveness of professional codes as the basis for framing ethical concerns. It is not just
that such codes were the outcome of power relationships, which sought to maintain the
existing order of things, but at a practical everyday level, codes perform multiple func-
tions. This is reflected in variations in terminology. So far in this paper the term code of
ethics has been used as a general catch-all for the frameworks planners must adhere to
if they are to be granted the status and opportunities associated with professional mem-
bership. However, professional codes differ in their form and purpose. A key distinction
is between codes primarily focused on matters of conduct, and hence establishing what
constitutes unacceptable professional behaviour, with an eye to punitive measures and
the requirements associated with disciplinary action, and those concerned with ethical
ideals, and the very best of what a professional ought to be (Hendler, 1990). Codes of
conduct therefore aim to set the outer boundaries of appropriate conduct as a protection
for citizens and society against corruption or malpractice, and are circumscribed by the
need to be legally enforceable. Codes of ethical values, in contrast, are concerned with
normative ideals and seek to provide an inspirational foundation as to what should (or
might be) possible, either with a focus on planning (as a professional and societal activ-
ity), or the character of planners (as individual professionals). As a total package, ethical
codes usually make some reference to upholding or protecting a generally unspecified
notion of the public interest.
These broad distinctions were used as the basis for evaluations of the codes of the vari-
ous national and (in some cases in the US and Canada) regional professional bodies. Such
studies found most professional associations to favour some hybrid form of code, although
always underpinned by a baseline need for a legally enforceable specification of accept-
able conduct.16 In these analyses, there is an underlying sense of researchers holding up a
mirror to the professional institutes and in turn challenging them to adopt more inspira-
tional ethical positions. Such interventions not only sought to influence but were spurred
on by lively debates within the professional bodies, resulting in several cases in the over-
haul of the existing codes.17 These debates were, of course, taking place in the context of
growing appreciation of the political, and more particularly politicized, nature of planning
and the planning profession. Further to this, the reasoning for a distinction between codes
of conduct and ethical ideals came under scrutiny. Nigel Taylor (1992), for example,
argued that statements about conduct do not just emerge from nowhere, they are them-
selves premised on ethical principles, whether specified or not. He stated:

there is no logical reason why the more fundamental visionary ethical principles which
underpin a profession should not be seen as a central part of a code of professional conduct. On
the contrary, if a profession claims to be a cause and not just a (self-) interest group, then such
visionary ethical principles should be central to its code of professional conduct (1992: 234).

This raises once again the issue of how far matters of ethical substance have tended to be
subsumed within (or perhaps behind) other debates, rather than being the subject of more
direct consideration.
The preceding themes find resonance in discussions about the teaching of ethics in plan-
ning. The need to include ethical concerns within the curriculum followed from recogni-
tion of the political nature of planning. This largely intellectual argument linked to more
general concerns within the profession, resulting in the increasing significance of the
388 Planning Theory 11(4)

teaching of ethics as a requirement of professional accreditation. However, making ethics

a requirement was a relatively easy step to take; far more of a challenge for the profession
and educators was determining what and how such material should be taught. One of the
three sections which made up Hendlers Reader was entirely devoted to planning educa-
tion. These chapters are striking if for no other reason than that published material about
pedagogy in general is relatively limited. The educational concerns they considered were
linked to related debates about the very essence of the activity, and importantly pointed to
the superficiality of educational provision which simply viewed ethics in terms of an intro-
duction to the requisite professional code. A key feature of these discussions were reflec-
tions on the use of highly innovative teaching methods in an attempt to bridge theory and
practice, including such techniques as role play, simulation, group discussions and practi-
tioner interviews. However, at the heart of these insightful reflections is the enduring
dilemma as to how to sensitize students to the ethical challenges they will confront on a
daily basis in practice, yet without imposing a particular ethical position. Jerome Kaufman
most effectively captures this in the following: there needs to be a balance to avoid teach-
ing ethics in a way that is too strongly normativeAbove all, its important to make sure
that students do not end up feeling that the course was a vehicle for transmitting the private
prejudices of the instructor (1993: 113). And yet also:

it is important to conduct rigorous class discussions to elicit a fuller consideration of issues. To

do this, the instructor needs to have a clear plan of the central points to make in the class session
and steer the discussion back on track when it is going off course. In a class like planning ethics,
where students sometimes differ sharply with each other because of the different weights they
attach to ethical principles, it is essential that the instructor be adept at keeping discussions
from degenerating into windy exchanges of student opinion (p.113).

It is perhaps in the area of pedagogy that the thrust of concern comes closest to
embracing the notion of planning ethics. Educators are not merely involved in informing
students, but more profoundly, given the normative nature of the material, teaching about
ethics speaks to the essential soul of planning as a societal and not merely regulatory
activity. Despite, or may be because of this, there is a palpable sense of unease with
respect to matters of substantive ethical values. To use Kaufmans words, the teaching of
ethics should not be about peddling personal prejudice, but nor is it appropriate or
adequate just to provide opportunities for the (windy) exchange of opinions. It is clear
that the problematic of the boundary between openness (some might call it tolerance) and
imposition (some might call it vision) was a recurrently troubling theme in all the debates
concerned with ethics up to 1995. Arguably in the more recent period, negotiation of this
metaphorical boundary has been no less troubling, while if anything the associated intel-
lectual and practical issues have become of even more fundamental significance. But to
what extent has this debate been conceived using the language of ethics?

Planning ethics where next?

It might seem that undue attention has been paid in this paper to a body of work much of
which was published more than two decades ago. However, rather than an exponential
growth in the field as envisaged in 1995, the subsequent period has witnessed a piecemeal
Campbell 389

and somewhat uneasy engagement with ethical concerns. Such issues continue to be
invoked rhetorically or as an implication of research findings, but more rarely as the
starting point for investigation. Most obviously, there has been no follow-up to Hendlers
edited collection and a literature search based around the key words of ethics and plan-
ning produces a set of references which mainly relate to the period up to the mid-1990s.
Such searches are admittedly relatively superficial analytical devices and can only ever
be broadly indicative. There certainly are exceptions to this general trend which will be
considered further,18 but the overall thrust of the point remains pertinent and somewhat
intriguing. Notably, many of the most prolific authors from the early period have since
ceased writing directly about ethics. So why, given on-going recognition of the political
nature of planning and hence the importance of judgement rather than technique, does
explicit reference to ethics not appear to feature more? Undoubtedly much of the theo-
retical and practical insight provided by the early body of work has continued relevance.
But it could hardly be said that the field had been exhausted.
In trying to understand subsequent developments, the experience and outcomes asso-
ciated with the Royal Town Planning Institutes (2001) New Vision initiative prove
instructive. While there is clearly a UK focus to this experience, the theoretical and
practical implications would seem to travel far wider. The RTPIs New Vision statement
was finally published in 2001 and marks an attempt by the leadership of the Institute to
confront the long-standing critique of professional bodies as self-serving, apolitical,
even reactionary, institutions. Its central concern is with ethical aspiration and questions
of substantive values. The statement talks of a programme of radical evolution, which
will lead to a body so different it will be seen as a New Institute.. (RTPI, 2001: 1) and
that the Institute needs to rise to the challenge of seeing planning as an activity which
professional planners facilitate, but do not own or monopolise (p.2).
The substantive ethical content of the New Vision statement would be noteworthy
were it penned by a campaigning group; for it to be produced by that bastion of the plan-
ning establishment, the RTPI, is all the more remarkable. The statement breaks all the
accepted conventions of the stereotypical technocratic profession. Issues of substantive
values are not hidden from view but are recognized as being at the very core of the plan-
ning activity. Significantly, focus is placed on the nature of planning as an idea, not its
current statutory manifestations in Britain or the actions and character of individual plan-
ners. For example, the New Vision includes the following passages: We need to under-
stand that conflicts are often resolved through the established power structures in ways
which disadvantage those most in need. Planning as a truly societal activity must seek to
give voice to those excluded communities those with a direct interest in creating a bet-
ter world but with little power to influence it and also: We need to recognise however
that effective planning cannot always be achieved through consensus. Where hard
choices are required, clear and equitable decision-making frameworks are essential
(p.4). There are inconsistencies and ambiguities in the New Vision, which is probably
inevitable given authorship by committee. Some might wish to pick over and deconstruct
the detailed text, but this would be to miss the real significance of the document. It is the
overall thrust of the New Vision which is of significance, in terms of the head-on engage-
ment with ethical ideals and in challenging widely accepted assumptions about profes-
sional organizations. However, beyond the production of the written document, what has been
the legacy and impact of the New Vision?
390 Planning Theory 11(4)

It would seem fair to say relatively limited.19 More specifically and strikingly, the
proportion of practitioners who are even aware of the existence of the New Vision is woe-
fully small. In relation to the most recent generation of planners, while critiques of the
planning profession and of planning practices feature prominently in the curricula of
British planning schools, very few even mention the New Vision. The teaching of ethics
largely equates to an introductory class on the RTPIs code of conduct, without reference
to its more inspirational and visionary sibling. Hence, while the political and value-ori-
entated starting point for the New Vision is remarkable and might be expected to be the
source of controversy and debate, even more remarkable is the subsequent silence.
Astoundingly, not a single academic paper has been written about the New Vision and
few academics know of its content. It is as if the New Vision has been written out of the
history of British planning. It was not as if the New Vision was written by a splinter group
of Institute members; the initiative came from the leadership. This experience, of pro-
found engagement with ethical ideals and values, accompanied by passive disinterest
and mass inertia, says much about the nature of contemporary planning. Perhaps matters
of substantive ethics are too difficult, too troubling or just a seeming irrelevance to
(British) planners both academics and practitioners? Perhaps, planners have lost their
visionary aspirations? The implications of these underlying themes will be returned to,
as they are also reflected in the literature of the last couple of decades.
The most direct and impassioned engagement with ethical concerns in the recent litera-
ture has focused attention on the actions and behaviours of planning researchers, rather
than practitioners.20 Much of the literature so far examined has conceived of ethics as being
about the behaviours of individual planners, not about planning as an ethical activity per se.
In this regard, academics have focused their critical gaze on the actions of practitioners, for
the most part. However, Huw Thomas, in particular, has challenged planning researchers to
reflect on their own actions and to ask serious questions about the nature of their research,
the potentially compromising expectations of funders and the culture of ethical values
being reproduced within individual planning schools. Issues are raised about the gradual
erosion of the notion of a moral community and hence of the social connections which
encourage concern and debate about appropriate social practices (after Alasdair MacIntyre
(1985)). Thomas argues that the communal cultivation of ethical sensibilities has been
replaced by a reliance on codes and reporting structures. He does not quite use these words,
but the implication is of the substitution of critical reflection and ethical aspiration by the
lowest common denominator of risk and performance management.
It is worth acknowledging against the background of this performance culture, that
alongside the exuberance of the early 1990s, Kaufman wrote these cautionary words: the
incentives for younger planning faculty to teach planning ethics are limited (1993: 113).
This statement was premised on the lack of funding for research on ethics, but more espe-
cially on the steep and challenging learning curve associated with teaching and research-
ing in this area of planning. Kaufman recognized, even then, that there were many easier
routes to academic advancement. Given, todays increasingly delivery-orientated aca-
demic context, these words were all the more prescient. Moreover, it suggests that plan-
ning academics need to ask serious questions about their choices and priorities. While
publications can be counted and even ranked, their generation is not the same as the
advancement of professional and intellectual knowledge; perhaps, quite the reverse.
Campbell 391

The institutional trends noted with respect to the university sector mirror more gen-
eral developments in the public sector and of course planning:21 a culture in which oth-
ers senior management, government edicts, codes of conduct tell professionals what
to do and rewards follow on this basis; rather than a culture which cultivates individual
and collective reflexivity as the basis for judging what should be done, and hence, right
from wrong or good from bad. The former fosters retorts such as Nobody told me, I
didnt know, Thats not my area or I was just doing my job, where ignorance or an
absence of considered questioning might appear acceptable. These types of responses are
further bolstered by assumptions of increasing complexity, which has encouraged pro-
fessional and academic specialization over the more synthetic and even visionary capa-
bilities of the much-frowned-upon generalist.22 Linked to this has been the tendency for
matters of ethics to be increasingly left to the individual typified in such responses as
thats your view, its not for me to comment and hence, not part of a culture of collec-
tive debate, far less collective responsibility.
From a critical analytical position, the evolution of this type of institutional context
suggests why the RTPIs New Vision has had such limited purchase within the British
planning community. It simply has not fitted with the prevailing performance culture,
whereby planners (practitioners and academics) are encouraged to react to governmental
or managerial instructions as to what to do, rather than to reflect individually and col-
lectively as to what should be done. However, assuming that planners have not turned
into automata, acquiescence to a prevailing culture is a choice. Individual and collective
inaction represents an ethical choice and as such is not value-neutral. Silence masquer-
ades as the excuse of those who prefer stand, as the metaphorical ostrich, with their heads
in the sand. Inaction by planners allows the often perverse imperatives of governments,
politicians and influential interests to marginalize their professional concerns and ethical
ideals. Such ethical considerations raise admittedly difficult and challenging questions,
but in choosing to ignore such concerns, academics in the context of universities no less
than practitioners, risk devaluing the premise which underpins their very societal pur-
pose: the pursuit of the common good.
If arguably the institutional context of planning practice and research has provided a
reason (or excuse) to overlook ethical concerns, then intellectual trends have largely
failed to challenge such attitudes. Normative concerns in particular have become the
focus of critique and condemnation. The spectre of post-war redevelopments continues
to be invoked as exemplifying the folly of utopian idealism. Answers to the question of
what ought to be done have exclusive implications, which sit uncomfortably amid recog-
nition of a world of diversity, multiple knowledge forms and contested truths. Given this,
determination of the basis on which to privilege one knowledge claim over another
appears extremely problematic. The precursor to more recent post-modern and post-
structural arguments can be seen in the concerns which troubled writers prior to 1995.
This was manifest in unease about choosing between substantive ethical positions.
Furthermore, as the language of ethics has become increasingly invoked in populist rhet-
oric with respect to issues such as abortion and euthanasia, the more it has become asso-
ciated with intolerance, and susceptible to the ridicule of critical deconstruction. Terms
such as preaching and moralizing are used to convey the unacceptability of engage-
ment with ethical concerns. Even to undertake work in the field of ethics is to risk
392 Planning Theory 11(4)

accusations of trying to assert moral superiority. It seems that critical analyses which
expose the inequalities and injustices of capitalism are respected, while normative con-
cern with the qualities of justice or greater equality is derided. Yet, alongside this unease
about ethical values is a frequently side-stepped and poorly articulated sense within the
planning community that not all perspectives could or should be tolerated.
This takes us back to the Janus-faced character of the planning discipline. How to be
sensitive to societal diversity, while taking actions which must necessarily exclude and
impose? How to be analytically critical, while also adopting a normative position and
wanting to effect transformative change? Such dilemmas have been woven through
much of the debate within planning theory over the last couple of decades, although
generally without direct reference to ethics.23 Meaningfully conversing about ethical val-
ues is difficult and uncomfortable. Consequently, matters of substantive ethics tend to be
avoided, assisted by the smokescreens of intellectual argumentation and contextual anal-
ysis. However, notwithstanding the acknowledged existence of contested truths and
challenging constraints, plans still have to be made and decisions taken over the location
of housing developments, waste incinerators and wind farms. Alasdair MacIntyre recog-
nized this in his comments about philosophy and professional education:

For in the realm of professional practice matters which affect problems of immediate action
cannot be allowed to go unsettled. One way or another codes must be formulated, choices
made, dilemmas resolved, with or without rational justification. Hence in this realm what is in
fact inconclusive intellectual debate nonetheless issues in the practical resolution of problems
(1990: 226227).

Currently, at its worst, inconclusive intellectual debate runs alongside, and to some
extent reinforces, denial of the capacity of planners to act in the common good, or less
grandly, to exercise choice. The wilful or inadvertent acceptance of the narrowing of the
boundaries in which to select courses of action makes for a quieter life, if more mundane
and arguably less professional. Intellectually and professionally the ethical buck has
been passed. But to whom? Paradoxically, it has to be to the existing dominant interests.
It is intriguing that it is some of those working in the contexts of the global South, where
the urgency of the planning challenges are most acute and raw, who have shown the
greatest preparedness explicitly to invoke the terminology of ethics and to wrestle with
matters of substantive values.24
Overall therefore in the period since the publication of Hendlers Reader, rather than
the conjoining of planning and ethics, if anything the distance between planning and eth-
ics has grown greater. There seems an increasing tendency to place ethics into boxes
marked planning education and codes of ethics and hope that the necessary issues will
be covered, yet without engaging with what they might be. Both professionally and intel-
lectually matters of substantive ethics invoke a sense of discomfort. Planning continues,
of course, to be understood as inherently political in nature. However, this recognition is
largely constructed in descriptive terms as an appreciation of plannings politicized
nature, not in normative terms, with respect to the challenge of judging between better
and worse options. Moreover, ethical concerns where they are acknowledged have been
increasingly privatized, and hence conceived as matters for individual conscience, not
collective reflection. And yet, while it would make life easier to side-step the troubling
Campbell 393

and difficult normative questions of substantive ethics, planners know that not all opin-
ions about the future of neighbourhoods, cities and regions can or should be tolerated. It
is with the implications of the enduring conundrums of openness and imposition, critique
and transformative action, that the conclusions are concerned.

Conclusions: Searching for planning ethics and

rediscovering the idea of planning
Sue Hendler noted in her introduction to Planning Ethics that questions of ethics include
the usual issues of professional etiquette, such as conflict of interest, as well as more
complex issues of fairness, social justice and equity and are more than merely questions
of so-called subjective values and personal preferences (1995a: xviii). Few practitioners
or academics would dispute that ethical considerations are central to planning, particu-
larly given its political character. The fundamental normative question of what should be
done remains as pressing today as two decades ago. However, engagement with ethics
both within the profession and the academic community has been patchy and most
recently has somewhat foundered. The momentum which culminated in the publication
of Hendlers Reader has tended to evaporate, aside from a few exceptions.
The preceding discussion suggests a combination of institutional constraints and
intellectual understandings have provided justification (whether appropriate or other-
wise) for deflecting attention away from fundamental ethical concerns. But more than
this, these trends may be indicative of a much more profound development a loss of
faith by the planning community in the very idea of planning.25 There is a world of dif-
ference between not being seen to take a substantive ethical stance in certain circum-
stances that may be tactically smart and lacking confidence in or allowing others to
dictate your substantive ethical position that fundamentally questions the extent to
which the profession and the academic discipline have a future. The term the idea of
planning is used to indicate the notion of planning as societal activity, rather than a par-
ticular set of governmental regulations or a particular professional body. The idea of
planning is therefore prior to a particular set of practices or institutions, and provides a
vantage point from which to judge the vagaries of regulatory or professional require-
ments, and hence the possibility for challenge and subversion. This is as much an issue
for the academic discipline as for the profession of planning. If you do not know who you
are, advocating effectively for your future existence becomes exceedingly problematic.
The idea of planning is premised on the expectation that through intervention and
action better space and place-based outcomes can be achieved than would otherwise be
the case. It is the nature of better that requires engagement with ethical concerns. This
places ethics not as a troublesome and disconcerting area of debate within planning, but
as fundamental to the future of a progressive discipline and a vital profession. In looking
to the future three areas should be prioritized.
First, the tendency in theory and in practice to focus on best, rather than better, is
deeply counter-productive. Bish Sanyal (2002), in observing that planners should under-
stand more about the qualities of ethical compromise, noted that being flexible does not
mean being unprincipled. Equally, being principled does not mean being dogmatic, but
it does mean being able to discern a good compromise from a bad one. Tellingly, Amartya
394 Planning Theory 11(4)

Sen (2009) in his recent book on justice highlights how far by seeking for some ultimate
notion of justice, the possibility of making practical improvements which will reduce
injustices is eroded. Despite much academic debate which might suggest otherwise,
there is no need for a perfect definition of, for example, justice or equality, to be able to
take actions which will reduce injustices and diminish inequalities. Moreover, that such
actions will fall short, is no great intellectual revelation. The revelation lies in the quality
of the learning from the experience, and the ability to envisage better actions, which will
deliver better outcomes in the future. As Samuel Beckett (1983: 7) states in Worstward
Ho: Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better (emphasis
added). Academic contributions which only see failure are themselves failing. There may
seem an intellectual purity to searching for the ultimate definition of, say, justice or of
deconstructing past policies and practices, but the real intellectual challenge is in contrib-
uting to how communities and governments can find ways to fail better.
Second, as a community of academics and practitioners, planners need to discover the
art of conversation. This may seem a strange priority given the emphasis that planning
theory has placed on communicative action and deliberation, and the resultant vast litera-
ture. However, while much has been learnt about communication, it is evident that plan-
ners, perhaps academics (especially theorists) more than practitioners, struggle to
articulate and converse over matters of ethical substance and value. The rhetoric of
thats your opinion or thats outside my area does not help further meaningful conver-
sations. Rather there is a need to develop abilities in reasoning, not in an egotistical sense
of wishing to score points, but as the basis for furthering the idea of planning. There is
no pretending that conversations about ethical concerns are easy, and if the conversation
is more than a token gesture there are likely to be disagreements, maybe deeply felt. A
sign of disciplinary maturity would be the capacity to disagree respectfully, and yet also
to carry on talking. If we, as planners, cannot converse amongst ourselves about what
matters, then it will be struggle to know where we stand in debates with others.
Third, the what and how of teaching ethics to planning students needs to be given
more considered attention than is generally the case. It is evident from the preceding
discussion that the teaching of ethics is about very much more than an introduction to the
relevant professional code of ethics. It is about equipping students to ask questions of the
practices they confront and giving them the basis on which to search out better options.
It is about providing them with a sense of the idea of planning and the confidence to be
able to do better, not providing them with excuses for inaction.
In 1965 Paul Davidoff stated in his seminal paper:

As a profession charged with making urban life more beautiful, exciting, and creative, and
more just, we have had little to say. Our task is to train a future generation of planners to go well
beyond us in its ability to prescribe the future urban life (p.337).

It is long overdue time that planners found something to say: their ethical voice and
confidence in the idea of planning.

Notes
1 The phrase planning ethics follows the title of Sue Hendlers 1995a edited volume: Planning
Ethics: A Reader in Planning Theory, Practice and Education.
Campbell 395

2 The notion of the idea of planning echoes the titles of John Henry Newmans book, The Idea
of a University (original 1873/reprint 2009) and more recently Amartya Sens, The Idea of
Justice (2009).
3 See, for example, in North America: Howe and Kaufmans studies of planning practitioners
(Howe and Kaufman, 1979, 1981; Kaufman, 1981, 1985); Howes more theoretical work
(Howe, 1990, 1992) and the consolidation of this work in her book (Howe, 1994); Hendlers
studies of practitioners and students and the role of professional codes of conduct (Hendler,
1990, 1991a, 1991b; Bickenbach and Hendler, 1994); Klostermans, Bolans, and Harper and
Steins more theoretical contributions (Klosterman, 1978; Bolan, 1983; Harper and Stein,
1992); Lucys reflections on the American Planning Associations ethical principles (Lucy,
1988); and the first edited volume focused on ethics (Wachs, 1985); and in the UK: Thomas
and Healeys edited volume exploring theoretical concerns and the reflections of practitioners
(Thomas and Healey, 1991); Thomas subsequent text focused on values (Thomas, 1994a);
and Taylors exploration of professional ethics (Taylor, 1992).
4 The political nature of planning was certainly recognized by many prior to the 1970s and
1980s (see Davidoff, 1965, for instance) but it was not until this period that such an under-
standing became more generally accepted.
5 See Wachs distinctions above (Wachs, 1995: xiiixiv).
6 Terms derived from the word ethics, rather than morality, are used throughout this paper.
Overall, any distinctions between the nature of the ethical and the moral are not material to
the underlying arguments, and ethics is the term which has overwhelmingly been favoured
in the planning literature. Hence, the favouring of ethics related terminology should not be
regarded as having any particular conceptual significance.
7 See the distinction between teleological or consequential understandings with respect to good
and bad outcomes and deontological perspectives in relation to the nature of right and wrong
actions or matters of due process.
8 See, for example, in relation to the UK context: Healey, 1985; Reade, 1987; Evans, 1993;
Thomas, 1994b; and for a more general overview: Campbell and Marshall, 2005.
9 Discipline is used here in both a literal and Foucauldian sense.
10 See Campbell, 2012; Tallis, 1997.
11 See Wachs, 1982, and then later 1989. This also mirrored issues raised in Marcuses (1976)
Oldport case study.
12 See Howe, 1990; and Harper and Stein, 1992; or the opening chapters of: Hendler, 1995a; and
more recently, Lo Piccolo and Thomas, 2009.
13 See Hochs (1993) commentary on the paper by Harper and Stein (1992).
14 See: Healey and Underwood, 1978; Howe and Kaufman, 1979, 1981; Kaufman, 1985;
Hendler, 1991b, and also studies of planning students; Hoch, 1994; Howe, 1994.
15 See: Krumholz and Forester, 1990; Thomas and Healey, 1991.
16 See in North America: Hendler, 1990, 1991a; Bickenbach and Hendler, 1994; and more
recently based on a feminist analysis, Hendler, 2005; Howe, 1994; and in the UK: Taylor,
1992.
17 See, for example, revisions in the codes of the American Institute of Certified Planners,
American Planning Association and the Royal Town Planning Institute during the 1980s and
early 1990s.
18 See, for example: Hendler, 2005 on a feminist code of ethics; Upton, 2002, considering pro-
fessional practice; Lo Piccolo and Thomas (2008), the chapters in their edited collection (Lo
Piccolo and Thomas, 2009), and the contributions to the Planning Theory and Practice
Interface (Campbell, 2005a, in particular: Thomas) all concerned with ethics and planning
research; the practitioner reflections in the Planning Theory and Practice Interfaces
(Campbell, 2005b, see in particular: Wilson; Burley); and debates stimulated by the
396 Planning Theory 11(4)

challenges of planning in the context of the global South (Sanyal, 2002; Watson, 2003; Roy,
2006; Rankin, 2010); Friedmann (2000) on the good city; and the authors own contribu-
tions Campbell and Marshall, 1999, 2000; Campbell, 2002, 2006.
19 The New Visions impact probably has been greatest as the context for the work of the
Education Commission. The final report of the Commission shaped significant reforms to
planning education and training, and membership categories and requirements over the last
decade (see: RTPI, 2003).
20 See Lo Piccolo and Thomas (2008), the chapters in their edited collection (Lo Piccolo and
Thomas, 2009), and the contributions to the Planning Theory and Practice Interface
(Campbell, 2005a, in particular: Thomas).
21 See Marquand (2004) and ONeill (2002) on the public sector; Sandel (2009) on politics; and
MacIntyre (1990) on societies and universities.
22 See Campbell (2012); MacIntyre (1990) on universities and knowledge; Raadschelders
(2011) on public administration in the US. The struggle to achieve anything close to real
inter-disciplinarity is symptomatic of the atomization of knowledge. Despite claims to inter-
disciplinarity, generally little more than sub-disciplines working in parallel takes place.
23 See debates between the advocates of Foucauldian (or post-structural) as against Habermasian
perspectives (see: Healey, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Forester, 1999) or more recently, those
emphasizing the justice of outcomes over the inclusiveness of processes (Fainstein, 2000,
2010; Forester, 2009, 2012).
24 See, for example: Sanyal, 2002; Watson, 2003; Roy, 2006; Rankin, 2010.
25 The notion of the idea of planning echoes the titles of John Henry Newmans book, The Idea
of a University (original 1873/reprint 2009) and more recently Amartya Sens The Idea of
Justice (2009).

References
Beckett S (1983) Worstwood Ho. London: John Calder.
Bickenbach J and Hendler S (1994) The moral mandate of the profession of planning. In: Thomas
H (ed.) Values and Planning. Aldershot: Avebury, 162177.
Bolan R (1983) The structure of ethical choice in planning practice. Journal of Planning Education
and Research 3: 2334.
Campbell H (2002) Planning: an idea of value. Town Planning Review 73(3): 271288.
Campbell H (ed.) (2005a) Interface: Reflexivity and the planning academic: challenges and
responsibilities. Planning Theory and Practice 6(2): 235253.
Campbell H (ed.) (2005b) Interface: The darker side of local communities: is this the real world of
planning? Planning Theory and Practice 6(4): 519543.
Campbell H (2006) Just planning: the art of situated ethical judgment. Journal of Planning Educa-
tion and Research 26(1): 92106.
Campbell H (2012) Planning to change the world: between knowledge and action lies synthesis.
Journal of Planning Education and Research 32(2) (forthcoming).
Campbell H and Marshall R (1999) Ethical frameworks and planning theory. International Journal
of Urban and Regional Research 23(3): 464478.
Campbell H and Marshall R (2000) Moral obligations, planning and the public interest: a commen-
tary on current British practice. Environment and Planning B 27(2): 297312.
Campbell H and Marshall R (2005) The changing conception of professionalism in planning. Town
Planning Review 76(2): 191214.
Davidoff P (1965) Advocacy and pluralism in planning. Journal of the American Planning
Association 31(4): 331338.
Campbell 397

Evans B (1993) Why we no longer need a planning profession. Planning Practice and Research
8(1): 915.
Fainstein S (2000) New directions in planning theory. Urban Affairs Review 35(4): 45178.
Fainstein S (2010) The Just City. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Flyvbjerg B (1998) Rationality and Power: Democracy and Practice. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Forester J (1999) The Deliberative Practitioner. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Forester J (2009) Editorial: Learning from the process versus outcomes debate. Planning Theory
and Practice 10(4): 429433.
Forester J (2012) Learning to improve practice: lessons from practice stories and practitioners
own discourse analysis. Planning Theory and Practice 13(1): (forthcoming).
Friedmann J (2000) The good city: in defense of utopian thinking. International Journal of Urban
and Regional Research 24(2): 460472.
Harper T and Stein S (1992) The centrality of normative ethical theory to contemporary planning
theory. Journal of Planning Education and Research 11(2): 105116.
Healey P (1985) The professionalism of planning in Britain: its form and consequences. Town
Planning Review 56(4): 492507.
Healey P (1997) Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies. Basingstoke:
Macmillan.
Healey P and Underwood J (1978) Professional ideals and planning practice: a report on research
into planners ideals in practice in London Borough Planning Departments. Progress in Plan-
ning 9: 73127.
Hendler S (1990) Professional codes as bridges between planning and ethics: a case study. Plan
Canada 3: 2229.
Hendler S (1991a) Do professional codes legitimate planners values? In: Thomas H and Healey
P (eds) Dilemmas of Planning Practice, Ethics Legitimacy and the Validation of Knowledge.
Aldershot: Avebury, 156167.
Hendler S (1991b) Ethics in planning: the views of students and practitioners. Journal of Planning
Education and Research 10(2): 99105.
Hendler S (ed.) (1995a) Planning Ethics: A Reader in Planning Theory, Practice and Education. New
Brunswick, NJ: Centre for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey.
Hendler S (1995b) Introduction. In: Hendler S (ed.) Planning Ethics: A Reader in Planning The-
ory, Practice and Education. New Brunswick, NJ: Centre for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers,
The State University of New Jersey, xviixx.
Hendler S (1995c) Introduction to Part I. In: Hendler S (ed.) Planning Ethics: A Reader in Plan-
ning Theory, Practice and Education. New Brunswick, NJ: Centre for Urban Policy Research,
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 110.
Hendler S (2005) Towards a feminist code of planning ethics. Planning Theory and Practice 6(1):
5369.
Hoch C (1993) Commentary on The centrality of normative ethical theory to contemporary plan-
ning theory. Journal of Planning Education and Research 12(2): 93.
Hoch C (1994) What Planners Do: Power, Politics, and Persuasion. Chicago, IL: Planners Press.
Howe E (1990) Normative ethics in planning. Journal of the American Planning Association 5(2):
123150.
Howe E (1992) Professional roles and the public interest in planning. Journal of Planning Litera-
ture 6(3): 230248.
Howe E (1994) Acting on Ethics in City Planning. New Brunswick, NJ: Centre for Urban Policy
Research, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey.
Howe E and Kaufman J (1979) The ethics of contemporary American planners. Journal of the
American Planning Association 45(3): 243255.
398 Planning Theory 11(4)

Howe E and Kaufman J (1981) The values of contemporary American planners. Journal of the
American Planning Association 47(3): 266278.
Kaufman J (1981) Ethics and planning: some insights from the outside. Journal of the American
Planning Association 47(2): 196199.
Kaufman J (1985) American and Israeli planners: a cross-cultural comparison. Journal of the
American Planning Association 51(3): 352364.
Kaufman J (1993) Reflections on teaching three versions of a planning ethics course. Journal of
Planning Education and Research 12(2): 107115.
Klosterman R (1978) Foundations for normative planning. Journal of the American Planning
Association 44(1): 3746.
Krumholz N and Forester J (1990) Making Equity Planning Work: Leadership in the Public Sector.
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Lo Piccolo F and Thomas H (2008) Research ethics in planning: a framework for discussion.
Planning Theory 7(1): 723.
Lo Piccolo F and Thomas H (eds) (2009) Ethics and Planning Research. Farnham: Ashgate.
Lucy W (1988) American Planning Associations ethical principles include simplistic planning
theories. Journal of the American Planning Association 54(2): 147149.
Marcuse P (1976) Professional ethics and beyond: values in planning. Journal of the American
Planning Association 42(3): 264274.
Marquand D (2004) Decline of the Public. Cambridge: Polity Press.
MacIntyre A (1985) After Virtue. 2nd edn. London: Duckworth.
MacIntyre A (1990) Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tra-
dition. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Newman J H (1873)[2009] The Idea of a University. Dublin: Ashfield Press.
ONeill O (2002) A Question of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Raadschelders J (2011) The study of public administration in the United States. Public Administra-
tion 89(1): 140155.
Rankin K (2010) Reflexivity and post-colonial critique: toward an ethics of accountability in plan-
ning praxis. Planning Theory 9(3): 181199.
Reade E (1987) British Town and Country Planning. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
Roy A (2006) Praxis in the time of empire. Planning Theory 5(1): 729.
Royal Town Planning Institute (2001) A New Vision for Planning: Delivering Sustainable Com-
munities, Settlements and Places The Need for Action. Available at: www.rtpi.org.uk/
download/245/RTPI-New-Vision-for-Planning.pdf (accessed 26 August 2011).
Royal Town Planning Institute (2003) RTPI Education Commission Report. London: Royal Town
Planning Institute.
Sandel M (2009) Justice: Whats The Right Thing To Do. London: Allen Lane.
Sanyal B (2002) Globalization, ethical compromise and planning theory. Planning Theory 1(2):
116123.
Sen A (2009) The Idea of Justice. London: Allen Lane.
Tallis R (1997) Enemies of Hope: A Critique of Contemporary Pessimism. Basingstoke: Macmil-
lan Press.
Taylor N (1992) Professional ethics in town planning: what is a code of professional conduct for?
Town Planning Review 63(3): 227241.
Thomas H (ed.) (1994) Values and Planning. Aldershot: Avebury.
Thomas H (1994) Introduction. In: Thomas H (ed.) Values and Planning. Aldershot: Avebury, 111.
Thomas H and Healey P (eds) (1991) Dilemmas of Planning Practice, Ethics Legitimacy and the
Validation of Knowledge. Aldershot: Avebury.
Upton R (2002) Planning praxis: ethics, values and theory. Town Planning Review 73(3): 253269.
Campbell 399

Wachs M (1982) Ethical dilemmas in forecasting for public policy. Public Administration Review
42(2): 562567.
Wachs M (ed.) (1985) Ethics in Planning. New Brunswick, NJ: Centre for Urban Policy Research,
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey.
Wachs M (1989) When planners lie with numbers. Journal of the American Planning Association
55(4): 476479.
Wachs M (1995) Foreword. In: Hendler S (ed.) Planning Ethics: A Reader in Planning Theory,
Practice and Education. New Brunswick, NJ: Centre for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers, The
State University of New Jersey, xiiixv.
Watson V (2003) Conflicting rationalities: implications for planning theory and ethics. Planning
Theory and Practice 4(4): 395407.

Author Biography
Heather Campbell is Professor of Town and Regional Planning at the University of Sheffield
where she was Head of Department from 2003 to 2007. A founding co-editor of the journal
Planning Theory and Practice, she became Senior Editor in 2009. She was elected an Academician
of the Social Sciences in 2010. She has recently presented seminars and lectures at the universities
of Harvard, Amsterdam, Cornell, Cambridge and Cape Town as well as MIT, University College
Dublin and Harbin Institute of Technology. Her research interests focus on ethics, including issues
of social (and spatial) justice, judgement and the public interest.