Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV)

St Andrews University, March 2009

Roger Patrick Warren

WHAT IS TERRORISM?
ABSTRACT

The often quoted dictum that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom
fighter’ has contributed to the inability of the international community,
including the United Nations, to agree on a universally accepted definition of
terrorism. Perceptions, politics and prejudices have all influenced policy
makers to view terrorism through different prisms, often underpinned by
national interest and global strategic influence. This is supported by Horgan
and Boyle (2008) who claim that ‘Western democracies have often been guilty
of backing regimes and groups which have been involved in committing
terrorist attacks on civilian populations.’ In the attempt to define terrorism, this
paper will probe four areas of interest; firstly terrorism vis-à-vis resistance to
occupation (including guerrilla war and insurgency), secondly state terror and
war crimes, thirdly state sponsored terrorism and finally non-state terrorism. It
will be concluded that, although a universally accepted definition of terrorism
would be advantageous, currently there appears to be no political leverage to
be gained in agreeing on a definition of terrorism. The current impasse suits
both state and non-state actors. Finally, an unbiased definition of terrorism will
be presented, acknowledging that while most academics and students strive
for objectivity, defining terrorism may nonetheless remain elusive.

The fog of violence in general and of political violence in particular, creates vast overlaps in
the typology of armed conflict. This blurring of interpretations between, for instance,
terrorism and resistance against occupation, takes on a political dimension. Terrorism is
political by its very nature, thus the influence of politics on defining terrorism is axiomatic.

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Explaining and defining terrorism has taken on greater importance since the 9/11 attacks in
America and the so called ‘war on terror’, with politicians and lawmakers, nationally and
internationally, attempting to define the term ‘terrorism’ - yet there is little consensus. Why is
it so important to define terrorism? Ganor (2004:13) articulates that:

‘since terrorism is an international phenomenon, responses to terrorism must also

be on an international scale. Developing an effective international strategy requires
agreement on what it is we are dealing with, in other words, we need a definition of
terrorism.’

For clarity, to distinguish state from non-state (group) terrorism, this paper adopts the
academically accepted practice of using the term ‘state terror’ to mean a state's use of
terrorism and ‘terrorism’ to mean a non-state's (or group’s) use of terrorism. Additionally,
international terrorism refers to terrorist violence that involves citizens of more than one
country, as perpetrators or victims, where domestic terrorism is confined within the borders
of one country, sometimes within a particular locality in the country.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has attempted to draft a suitable overarching
definition, specifically within resolutions UNSCR 1269 (1999), UNSCR 1373 (2001) and
1566 (2004). It is clear from the resolutions above, that however well intentioned, there is
still an inherent inability to properly and accurately define ‘terrorism’ within the UNSC, let
alone the UN General Assembly. Lord Carlile of Berriew QC (2007) confirms in his report
(‘The Definition of Terrorism’) that ‘there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism.’

Academically, there appears to be greater consensus. The internationally respected

intellectual, Professor Schmid (2009), offers a ‘Revised Academic Consensus Definition’,
namely that:

‘Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of
a special form or tactic of  fear-generating, coercive political violence  and, on the
other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent

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 action without legal or moral restraints, performed for its propagandistic and
psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties;.…………..’

Terrorists, according to Hoffman (2006), ‘almost without exception now regularly select
names for themselves that consciously eschew the word terrorism in any of its forms.’
Aware of the stigma of being labeled a ‘terrorist’, terrorists would prefer a term that creates
an image of a liberator or freedom fighter.

This essay will begin by setting the scene using both a British and an American official
government department definition of terrorism, and subsequently will explore the challenges
and difficulties faced by the international community in defining terrorism. In the attempt to
define terrorism, four areas of interest will examined; firstly terrorism vis-à-vis resistance to
occupation (including guerrilla war and insurgency), secondly state terror and war crimes,
thirdly state sponsored terrorism and finally non-state terrorism. It will probe the influence of
politics on state terror and terrorism focussing attention on the Palestinian / Israeli conflict,
as there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that the two central difficulties in defining
terrorism lie with the interpretation of resistance to occupation, based on nationalist
agendas, and the lack of transparency involved in state terror and war crimes. Throughout,
common themes of terrorism will be identified and highlighted, particularly the perpetrators,
victims, target audiences, motives and concepts.
It will be concluded that, although a universally accepted definition of terrorism would be
advantageous, there appears to be no political leverage to be gained in agreeing on such a
definition. The current impasse suits both state and non-state actors. Finally according to
Hoffman (2006:33), despite ‘Walter Laqueur maintaining that defining terrorism is neither
possible to do so nor worthwhile to make the attempt,’ an unbiased definition of terrorism
will be presented, acknowledging that while most academics and students strive for
objectivity, defining terrorism may nonetheless remain elusive.

To set the scene, it is useful to study definitions used in the United Kingdom and the United
States as both countries have suffered recent terrorist attacks, both are fully engaged in the
so called ‘war on terror’ and both have a comprehensive security infrastructure. Firstly,

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below is a condensed version of the UK Terrorism Act 2000 (Section 1), where ‘terrorism’
means the use or threat of action where:

 The action (within / outside the UK) involves serious violence against a person and
serious damage to property; endangers a person’s life (other than that of the person
committing the action); creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a
section of the public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt
an electronic system.
 The use or threat is:
o Designed to influence the government or an international governmental
organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public.
o Made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.
o Involving the use of firearms or explosives whether or not it is designed to
influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to
intimidate the public or a section of the public.

Although broad, this UK definition is well crafted and includes many of the top definitional
elements connected to terrorism that Professor Schmid (2009) identified in his ‘Revised
Academic Consensus Definition’, namely the use or threat of violence, promotion of
political, religious or ideological cause and designed to intimidate. This legal definition does
not articulate the perpetrators of terrorism, presumably as it is a legal definition and deemed
unnecessary.

According in the US State Department (2006) report concerning the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ‘‘within the United States, there is no uniform
‘definition of terrorism under [U.S.] national law’ ....’’ However, the American example for
this paper is from the PATRIOT Act of 2001. The State of Department (2007) uses Title 22
of the US Code, Section 2656f(d) to describe terrorism as ‘premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.’ It includes many of the top
definitional elements connected to terrorism identified by Professor Schmid (2009), namely

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the use of violence, politically motivation and designed to intimidate. Interestingly, this
definition articulates the perpetrators of terrorism and has used the term ‘sub-national
groups’ in order to exclude states involved in state terror / war crimes. According to
Hoffman (2006:25), terrorism analyst Brian Jenkins (1980:2), would support the US
definition in that he argues that terrorism should be ‘defined by the nature of the act, not the
identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause.’ Hoffman (2006:25) however
disagrees as ‘it fails to differentiate clearly between violence perpetrated by states and by
non-state entities, such as terrorists.’ On balance, in the interests of transparency and
accountability, it would be beneficial to include the perpetrators of terrorism within a
definition. It is clear that the UK and US articulate different definitions, each representing
their unique national circumstances and interests.

The first area of interest is the debate on terrorism vis-à-vis resistance to occupation, and
central to it is the Palestinian resistance against Israel occupation (generally of land taken
during the 1967 war) and the often quoted dictum that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s
freedom fighter’. No other issue has contributed so emphatically to the inability of the
international community (including the United Nations) to agree on a universally accepted
definition of terrorism. Perceptions, politics and prejudices have all influenced policy makers
to view terrorism through different prisms, often underpinned by national interest and global
strategic influence.

Yassir Arafat reinforced the case, that resistance to occupation cannot be termed terrorism,
when he spoke to the UN General Assembly in 1974,

‘For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his
land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called
terrorist, otherwise ... the European resistance against the Nazis would be terrorism,’

Yassir Arafat’s point, through the eyes of a resistor to an occupation, may be academically
simplistic but it has gained unprecedented traction throughout the Middle East. Currently,
many in the West view the Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation as terrorism, as the

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tactics employed by Palestinian resistance groups often involves targeting (although not
exclusively) civilians. They are therefore complicit in terrorism and thus terrorists (or
alternatively freedom fighters who employ terror tactics).

Through the eyes of the occupier, in this case Israel, Noam Chomsky (1991:13) believes
that ‘the resistance of an oppressed [Palestinian] population to a brutal [Israeli] military
occupation is terror from the view point of the occupiers and their paymaster.’ It is a much
debated point, often argued from outdated historical contexts, prejudices and entrenched
positions. Interestingly, the Israeli position on resistance to occupation was somewhat
different in 1948, while they struggled to create the State of Israel and rid themselves of the
British colonial yoke. Noam Chomsky (1991) writes, that the then Prime Minister, Yitzhak
Shamir very honestly directed that ‘neither Jewish morality nor Jewish tradition can be used
to disallow terror as a means of war … we are very far from any moral hesitations when
concerned with the national struggle.’ Sixty years on this doctrine appears to remain extant,
and will be studied under state terror.

There has been much talk of terrorists and freedom fighters resisting an occupation, but
what is a freedom fighter? According to Schmid (2004:203):

‘irregular fighters must fulfil four conditions in order to fall under the Hague
Regulations and Geneva Conventions; [namely] be commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates; must have a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at
the distance; must carry their arms openly and must conduct their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war.’

It appears clear therefore, that although the view that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s
freedom fighter’ is well established, it is not an intellectually compelling argument, and is
espoused by those who do not wish to be branded as terrorists. Israel’s presence and
conduct in the ‘occupied territories’, legal or otherwise, is clearly beyond the scope this
paper.

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The two recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the difficulties in making
meaningful delineations between terrorists, guerrillas and insurgents, where the resistance
to both occupations has often been termed terrorism. According to Hoffman (2006:35)
guerrillas ‘operate as a military unit, attack enemy military forces and seize and hold
territory’ and ‘insurgents share the same characteristics’ [as guerrillas] however their
strategy involves ‘coordinated informational (eg. propaganda) and psychological warfare
efforts designed to mobilise popular support against .... foreign occupation.’

Thus having established the relationship between guerrillas and insurgents, what about
terrorists? In Afghanistan, Taliban violence has been primarily directed against Coalition
and Afghan troops where they do ‘attack enemy military forces’ and ‘seize and hold
territory.’ According to Hoffman (2006) therefore, such targeting of the military (although not
exclusively) and the holding of ground would suggest that the resistance is being conducted
by guerrillas and not terrorists, yet the Taliban are often categorised as terrorists.
Academically, it may be argued that the Taliban are a nationalist guerrilla group, resisting
an occupation, who on occasions conduct acts of terrorism.

In Iraq, according to Hoffman (2006:36) the ‘definitional rule of thumb’, was that the
‘Baathist Party loyalists and other former regime elements’ were ‘deemed insurgents while
foreign jihadists and domestic Islamic extremists’ were ‘labelled terrorists.’ This delineation
between the two groups was broadly representative of conditions on the ground; the Iraq
Body Count (Jan 08) recorded 81,174 - 88,585 civilian deaths, chiefly as a result of
terrorism, in the form of vehicle bombings. This tactic of violence reinforces the case that
such targeting of civilians constitutes terrorism.

Returning to Ganor (2004:4), he rejects the suggestion that ‘one person’s terrorist is
another’s freedom fighter’ as ‘freedom fighters do not blow up buses containing non-
combatants; terrorists murderers do.’ Although his rejection is supported, his reason is an
over simplification and perhaps disingenuous. The assumption here is that democratic
states, signatories to the Human Rights Act & Geneva Convention, do not target non
combatants, otherwise, according to Ganor’s hypothesis, states too could be ‘terrorist

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murderers.’ However the harsh reality is, in the fog of violence, democratic states do
intentionally or not, target non combatants. This reality, involving states’ involvement in
state terror (war crimes) contributes significantly to the difficulty in being able to articulate
the phenomenon of terrorism, and leads neatly into the second area of interest.

According to Ruth Blakely (2006:2) ‘state terror[ism] is defined as threats or acts of violence
carried out by representatives of the state against the population for political purposes.’ She
continues that ‘it is largely absent from definitions of and the debate about terrorism.’
Why? The answer may lie, according to Horgan & Boyle (2008:56) and Wilkinson
(2001:41), in that ‘we need to recognise throughout history it is regimes and states, with
their overwhelming propensity of coercive power, which have shown the greatest propensity
for terror on a mass scale ….’ If Blakely (2006:2) and Horgan/Boyle/Wilkinson are correct,
then discussing state terrorism would not be in the interests of the ‘regimes and states with
their overwhelming propensity of coercive power.’ According to Ruth Blakely (2006:2):

‘the reality is that Northern democracies, and the US in particular, have condoned
and used terrorism against thousands of citizens from other states …… the record of
these states … is one of complicity in and advocacy of, state terrorism on a massive
scale.’

As discussed above, the Israeli / Palestinian conflict is central to the political and academic
debate and the lack of agreement over the definition of terrorism. Notwithstanding the
Israeli right to defend herself against Arab aggression in the 1956, 1967 and 1973 wars;
since 1973 they have been responsible for exercising disproportionate force (state terror)
on Lebanese and Palestinian civilians. For example, on 17 September 1982, the BBC
(1982) reported that the Israeli Army was complicit in the massacre of 3000 Palestinian
refugees in the camps of Sabra and Shatila in Beirut. An Israeli judicial inquiry into the
massacre, published in February 1983, held Israel directly accountable, forcing the then
Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, to resign. Again in Lebanon in 2006, Israel’s response to the
abduction of two of their (dead) soldiers by Hizbullah, lead to the destruction of much of
southern Lebanon. According to Cordesman (2007) this led to ‘some 900 to 1,191

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Lebanese civilian deaths.’ In the eyes of the Arab world and many in the West, this
excessive use of force against civilians was tantamount to state terror, the action by a state
being a war crime. Again in the 2008/09 Israeli conflict in Gaza against HAMAS, according
to the United Nations Press Conference (on 19 January 2009) in New York, ‘1314 people
had been killed, including 416 children and 106 women.’ The media were denied access to
Gaza, thereby reducing the need for accountability, such as for example, according to
Amnesty International (2009), the ‘inherently indiscriminate’ (illegal under the Geneva
Conventions) use of white phosphorous against civilians. But was Israeli’s disproportionate
force against the Palestinians acts of state terror or international war crimes? Can a country
commit terrorism? Schmid (2004:198) believes

‘there is broad consensus that states can commit international crimes …. that the
armed forces of a state can ….. commit war crimes if there is a violation of laws,
customs or established rules of warfare.’

This appears to be little more than semantics; intentional acts of aggression against civilian
targets by a state being called war crimes rather than state terror. Schmid (2004:203)
continues by stating that ‘equating terrorism with war crimes is more appropriate since the
laws regulating warfare are violated as a matter of principle.’ But how does this assist with
defining terrorism?

Ganor (2004:6) proposes a definition of terrorism as ‘the intentional use of, or threat to use
violence against civilians or civilian targets, in order to attain political aims.’ The key word
here is intentional; however in conflict situations there is both unintentional and intentional
collateral damage which are generally difficult to distinguish particularly if there is a blurring
of accountability. Schmid (2004:204) believes

‘there is a profound difference between collateral but unintentional war damage to

civilians and intentional attacks on civilians. When the later [intentional attacks on
civilians] are committed in war they are justly labeled war crimes. These are

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 excesses of war. Terrorism, on the other hand, elevates such excesses to its specific
tactic.’

The Palestinian / Israeli conflict is a useful case study to highlight the difficulties when
exploring intentional attacks on civilians (‘excesses of war’) by democratic states, ‘freedom
fighters’ and terrorists. Within the Palestinian / Israeli conflict, there is broad academic
consensus that, on occasions, Israel, HAMAS and Hizbullah have all used the ‘specific
tactic’ of terrorism to achieve their political aims.

The Algerian War (1954-62) is a useful example to further explore the term state terror, and
examine French and the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) atrocities against civilians and
see whether either used terrorism as a tactic and how it may assist with defining terrorism.
There are numerous examples of French excesses against the civilian population in Algeria;
in one village bombing incident (even before the official war) in May 1945, according to
Horne (2006:27) ‘a figure of 6000 [civilians] killed .... now seems generally acceptable to
moderate French historians.’ Again in 1958, France repeated bombed civilian areas and
again, according to Horne (2006) ‘villages would not always be evacuated before the
bombing started.’ This tactic of ‘collective responsibility’ against the Muslim population led
‘to the cycle of repression getting ever tougher, and rebellion ever stronger, [and ruined] all
efforts of pacification ...’ Observing the Algerian War, post 9/11, such violence and terror by
the French against Algerian civilians, was tantamount to state terror. But it was not one
sided; Horne (2006:119) asserts that in 1955, the FLN had a policy of:

‘total war on all French civilians, regardless of age and sex. Justifying it, Zighout
[Algerian local commander] declared in response to the colonialism’s policy of
collective repression we must reply with collective reprisals against Europeans,
military and civil, who are all united behind the crimes upon our people. For them, no
pity, no quarter.’

It is clear that both sides adopted terroristic tactics; however as Martha Crenshaw (1981)
opines, ‘provocative terrorism is designed to bring about revolutionary conditions rather

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than to exploit them … the FLN against the French appear to have used terrorism as
provocation.’

Therefore to further our understanding of terrorism, and to assist in a comprehensive

definition, it is essential to include state terror, rejecting the current position, which
according to Ruth Blakely (2006:4) is that ‘acts of state terrorism are simply ignored.’ The
semantics of intentional state acts of aggression against civilians being called war crimes
rather than state terror(ism), appears politically motivated and does not stand up to
objective academic scrutiny. It is thus reassuring that Professor Schmid (2009) identified in
his ‘Revised Academic Consensus Definition’ that ‘terrorism as a tactic is employed .... as
an illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by state and non-state actors.’

A more subtle way for a state to conduct terrorism with less accountability is by the use of
proxies. This is usually termed state sponsored terrorism and is the third area of interest to
explore. According to Israeli Professor Yonah Alexander (Noam Chomsky 1991:2), ‘state
sponsored terrorism is a form of low intensity conflict that states undertake when they find it
convenient to engage in war without being held accountable for their action.’ This is
supported by Ruth Blakely (2006:5) who asserted that ‘Northern democratic states have a
long history of complicity in state terrorism in the South, often through providing military and
financial support to repressive governments.’ She later cites examples of ‘US complicity in
state [sponsored] terrorism’ in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Guatemala, Brazil,
Venezuela and Haiti. There are numerous other examples of state sponsored terrorism; the
US Department of State identifies Iran and Syria (for support to Hizbullah), Sudan (for
support to Iraq insurgency) as well as Cuba (for lack of counter terrorism cooperation).
According to Schmid (2004:200) ‘support for terrorist groups has been utilized as a war-by-
proxy device by states unwilling or unable to engage directly in armed conflict with another
state;’ a good example by way of illustration is Iranian support for Hizbullah; used
successfully against US Marines and French forces in Lebanon in 1982, which saw the
‘redeployment’ of forces out of Lebanon. Norton (2007:78) quotes CIA Agent, Robert Baer,
who argued that ‘it is not Hizbullah doing the terrorism out of Lebanon. They did not do the
US Embassy in 1983 or the Marines. It was the Iranians.’

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Here the murky waters of international politics and state sponsorship of terrorism make
defining terrorism a challenge. On the one hand the United States (Department of State)
publish the ‘State Sponsors of Terror Overview’, on the other hand, according to Noam
Chomsky (1991:2) ‘there are many terrorist states in the world, but the United States is
unusual in that it is officially committed to international terrorism, and on a scale that puts its
rivals to shame.’ This dichotomy where the US is allegedly involved in terrorism but also is
the custodian of the ‘State Sponsors of Terror Overview’ is not lost on the people in the
Middle East and does not assist intellectuals with developing an objective definition of
terrorism. Again, according to Noam Chomsky (1991:4) ‘the guiding principle, it appears, is
that the US is a lawless terrorist state and this is right and just, whatever the world may
think, whatever international institutions may declare.’ This is a strong view, backed by
much research and empirical evidence. Although difficult to reconcile, to further our
understanding of terrorism, and to assist in a comprehensive definition, it is essential to
include the possibility and reality that a state may sponsor terrorism, within the overall
definition.

Having studied state sponsored terrorism, it is logical now to examine the last area of
interest which is non-state terrorism, which in its purest sense (and not as a form of
resistance to occupation), is easier to conceptualise. Non-state terrorism is used by groups,
sub state actors and individuals as a form of violent tactic, lacking moral restraints, mainly
conducted for its effects on others rather than the immediate victims in order to gain
publicity. It is sometimes viewed as ‘propaganda by the deed.’ With the advent of
globalisation, there can be few true non-state terrorist groups that do not gain some form of
support or sponsorship in the form of money, weapons, intelligence, shelter etc. The
obvious contemporary example of a group that has conducted non-state terrorism is the Al
Qaeda network where the emphasis is on a religiously inspired extreme ideology,
demanding unrealistic objectives (an Islamic Caliphate) and causing mass civilian
casualties. Non-state terrorism therefore suffers from less political interference and is
viewed as a common threat to world stability. Drawing it into a definition of terrorism, the
‘sound bites’ would include the threat or deed of religiously motivated violence against

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primarily (though not exclusively) civilian targets, lacking morality and conducted for its
propaganda value.

In conclusion, this has paper has attempted to define terrorism, using four areas of interest,
terrorism vis-à-vis resistance to occupation (including guerrilla war and insurgency), state
terror and war crimes, state sponsored terrorism and non-state terrorism. There is a
growing body of evidence to suggest that the two central difficulties in defining terrorism lie
with the interpretation of resistance to occupation based on nationalist aims, and the
interpretation of state terrorism vis-à-vis war crimes. The main definitional issues emerging
from this paper are that the definition of terrorism should be underpinned by five pillars.
Firstly, terrorism is political in nature and is designed to influence a government;
‘propaganda by the deed.’ Secondly, that terrorism represents intentional serious violence
against civilians, without moral restraint. Thirdly, terrorism is conducted by both non-state
and state actors. The current view that a state’s equivalent of terrorism is a war crime is at
best unhelpful, thus within the definition will be included ‘state’. Fourthly, the main aim of
terrorism is to advance a political, religious or ideological cause. Lastly, resistance to
occupation is terrorism, if it indiscriminately targets civilians.

Therefore, it is proposed that terrorism is:

‘the threat or use of violent action without restraint, against civilian targets, designed
to influence a government for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or
ideological cause, conducted by both state (including state sponsors) and non-state
actors, where the direct victims are rarely the target audience.’

Despite most academics and students striving for objectivity, defining terrorism may
nonetheless remain elusive.

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