Stulz
Risk Management,
Governance, Culture, and
Risk Taking in Banks
1. Introduction role, the organization, and the limitations of risk management
in banks when it is designed from the perspective of increas-
The Oxford Dictionary defines risk as a situation that involves ing the value of the bank for shareholders.
exposure to danger. It also states that the word comes from In corporate finance, the well-known Modigliani-Miller
the Italian word risco, which means danger. I call risks that are theorem of leverage irrelevance implies that the value of a
only danger bad risks. Banksand any firm for that matter firm does not depend on its leverage. For the theorem to
also have opportunities to take risks that have an ex ante reward hold, markets have to be frictionless, so there cannot be
on a standalone basis. I call such risks good risks.1 transaction costs of any kind. As has been stressed by modern
One might be tempted to conclude that good risk manage- banking research, there is no reason for banks to exist if the
ment reduces the exposure to danger. However, such a view of conditions of the Modigliani-Miller theorem hold. With
risk management ignores the fact that banks cannot succeed the Modigliani-Miller theorem, a bank has the same value
without taking risks that are ex ante profitable. Consequently, whether it is mostly financed by debt or mostly financed by
taking actions that reduce risk can be costly for shareholders equity. Hence, the value of a bank is the same irrespective of
when lower risk means avoiding valuable investments and its risk of default or distress. It follows that if the conditions
activities that have higher risk. Therefore, from the perspec- for the Modigliani-Miller theorem apply, a bank has no
tive of shareholders, better risk management cannot mean risk reason to manage its risk of default or its risk of financial
management that is more effective at reducing risk in general distress (see, for example, Stulz [2003]).
because reducing risk in general would mean not taking When the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not apply, the
valuable projects. If good risk management does not mean low most compelling argument for managing risk is that adverse
risk, then what does it mean? How is it implemented? What outcomes can lead to financial distress and financial distress
are its limitations? What can be done to make it more effec- is costly (Smith and Stulz 1985). When a firm is distressed,
tive? In this article, I provide a framework to understand the
it loses its ability to implement its strategy effectively and
1
finds it more difficult and expensive to conduct its business.
For a related useful taxonomy, see Kaplan and Mikes (2012). The authors
distinguish between preventable, strategic, and external risks and show that As a result, the value of a firms equity is reduced by the
the role of risk management differs across these types of risk. present value of future costs of financial distress. When a
Ren M. Stulz is the Everett D. Reese Chair of Banking and Monetary The author thanks Rich Apostolik, Brian Baugh, Harry DeAngelo, Rudiger
Economics at the Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University, Fahlenbrach, Andrei Gonalves, Ross Levine, Hamid Mehran, Victor Ng,
and is affiliated with the National Bureau of Economic Research, Jill Popadak, Anthony Santomero, Anjan Thakor, and Rohan Williamson for
the European Corporate Governance Institute, and the Wharton comments. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do
Financial Institutions Center. not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
stulz.1@osu.edu or the Federal Reserve System.
To view the authors disclosure statement, visit https://www.newyorkfed.org/
research/author_disclosure/ad_epr_2016_risk-management-governance_stulz.html.
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