Case 2 - Garcia vs Sandiganbayan, 603 SCRA

Clarita Depakakibo Garcia v Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 170122 and 171381 (October 21, 2009)

Facts:

The forfeiture suit docketed as Civil Case No. 0193 (Forfeiture I) was filed with the Sandiganbayan by the
Ombudsman(OMB) to recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that the retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F.

Garcia, his wife, Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had
allegedly allegedly acquired and amassed. Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the Garcias for
violation of RA 7080 (plunder). Then, OMB filed another case of forfeiture involving the same parties was
filed docketed as Civil Case 0196 (Forfeiture II). The plunder charge covered substantially the same

properties identified in both Forfeiture I and II.

The summons for Forfeiture I were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention while the
summons for Forfeiture II were given to the OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center who in turn

handed them to Gen. Garcia. The Garcias filed motions to dismiss and/or to quash but such were denied.

Hence, these two consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed by petitioner Clarita D. Garcia, with

application for injunctive relief.

Issues:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has not acquired jurisdiction over Clarita Garcia and her three children

on the ground that plunder absorbed the forfeiture cases.

Decision:

No, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases.

The SB has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in

nature. Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus
depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions holding
it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil action for

recovery of civil liability ex delicto.

As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution, the civil liability for forfeiture cases

does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus: Such liability is based on a statute that
safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises
when a public officer or employee[acquires] during his incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion of his salary x x x and to his other lawful income x x x.Such amount of
property is then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. Thus if the respondent [public
official] is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in
question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such
judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State.

Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining only the jurisdiction over
cases involving ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate family and business associates,
authorizes under its Sec. 3[17] the filing of forfeiture suits under RA 1379 which will proceed independently

of any criminal proceedings.

It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action

separate and different from a plunder case. In the language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for purposes of

establishing the crime of plunder, it is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of o vert or

criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or acquire ill -
gotten wealth]. On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence,

under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondents properties to his legitimate income, it being

unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties.

However, the court ruled that the proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196 before the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner and her three children, are VOID for lack of jurisdiction
over their persons there being no valid substituted services of summons made.

Case 4 - People vs Henry T. Go, March 25, 2014

G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
Facts
Go, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, was charged for alleged violation of RA 3019 for
having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a
contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, herein respondent for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary
Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable
cause.

an Information was filed against respondent before the SB

On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:

The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the
public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this
case.5

The prosecution complied, contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he
posted bail. It also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a
private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6

Go filed a Motion to Quash7 on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an
offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 and contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary
Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public
officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

The prosecution filed its Opposition.8

On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, granting the Motion to Quash and the Information
filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.
Issues

1. whether herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing
of the Information.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT
GO.

Held:

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may
be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and
private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.12 This is the
controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein
private respondent.13

1.

It does not mean, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their
alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his
criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not
mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of
Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among
others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The
law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public
officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present
case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.

Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15

Thus, this Court held that:

x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends
upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be
convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases
of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.

2.

The Court does not agree.

Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail
for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091.
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his
Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act
of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of
his person to the jurisdiction of the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:

When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest
or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the
question of the courts jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs
to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction
over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)

, petitioners participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition
to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent courts
exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said courts jurisdiction over him. x x
x.28

SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A.
3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This
includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said
public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in
conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should
have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the
latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the
SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting
respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith
DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.

Case 6 - People vs Benipayo, 586 SCRA

People vs. Benipayo

Facts:

Photokina Marketing Inc. filed an affidavit complaint for libel against respondent Benipayo, COMELEC

Chairman, for allegedly being the one alluded to by the respondent in his speech at UP Diliman which was

published in Manila Bulletin issues.

Said speech is as follows: Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly

disadvantageous to the government that it offends common senses to say that it would be worth the 6.5
billion-peso price tag.

Arguing that hes an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the

Prosecutor of QC. City prosecutor still filed an information for libel against him.

Respondent moved for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over his person for he was an impeachable officer and thus, could not be criminally prosecuted before any
court during his incumbency; and that, assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the

Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.

Trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was committed in

relation to his office when he delivered speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it
was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to the exclusiona of all other courts.

On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its ruling that it was not vested with jurisdiction

to hear the libel case.

Issue:

Whether the respondent committed the crime of libel in relation to his office and that the trial court is

correct in saying that it has no jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

Criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneously aor

separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the

jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence of an express repeal or modification, the
specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid , jurisdiction over defamations in writing or by

similar means. The grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to

(public) office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction on the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its

exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is
committed in relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of Sevtion 4, PD 1606, as amended by

RA 8249, cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and

original jurisdiction of the RTC.

Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification, it is
unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to office.
Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in
relation to his office as former COMELEC Chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case is following

the above disquisition, gross error. The Court, therefore, orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. Q-
02-109406 and Q-02-109407 and their remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts for further
proceedings. Having said that, the Court finds unnecessary any further discussion of the other issues raised

in the petitions.

Case 7 - Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA

PANFILO LACSON v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 128096; 20 January 1999

Facts:

Eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng, an organized crime
syndicate, were killed by the elements of Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Said
group was composed of several police units including the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force
Habagat (P

ACC-TFH) headed by herein petitioner. Consequently, a police from the Central Investigation Command
(CIC), another unit belonging to ABRITG, stated that what transpired between the ABRITG and the gang
members was a summary execution. This led to the investigation of the incident, finding that said
encounter was a legitimate police operation.

However, the review board modified the findings and recommended for the indictment for
multiple murder against all of the respondents of the case, including herein petitioner. Information for
murder were filed against the same before the Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman then filed an amended
information to the Sandiganbayan, charging herein petitioner only as an accessory.

The petitioner then moved to question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, contending that
since the amended information only charged him as an accessory, his case would thereby fall within the
Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction. Petitioner asserted that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is limited
only to cases where one or more of the principal accused who are government officials with Salary Grade
27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. When the Sandiganbayan
admitted the amended information, it ordered for the case to be transferred to the RTC of Quezon City.

Consequently, while the case was pending to be resolved, a law was passed defining and
expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (RA 8249), removing the word principal from principal
accused in Section 2 of RA 7975 (Old Sandiganbayan Law). Aggrieved, petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of the law and argued that it is prejudicial to his cause considering that the law shall apply
to all cases pending in any court over which a trial has not begun.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try and decide the case.

HELD:

Yes. Sandiganbayan has the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan also covers the felonies committed by public officials and employees in
relation to their office. Since herein petitioner was charged with murder, what determines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those officers
enumerated in the law. The provisions of RA 7975 (Old Sandiganbayan Law) do not make any preference
to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice, or accessory. In effect, the Congress, in enacting RA 8249 (New Sandiganbayan Law), did not
mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

Case 9 - Disini Jr. vs Secretary of Justice, Feb.18, 2017 , 716 SCRA

Disini Jr. vs Secretary of Justice February 18, 2014, 716 SCRA

Facts:

The case arises out of consolidated petitions on the constitutionality of several provisions of Republic Act
(R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. They claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime
law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. These
provisions are: a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access; b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference; c. Section 4(a)(6)
on Cyber-squatting; d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft; e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; f. Section 4(c)(2) on
Child Pornography; g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications; h. Section 4(c)(4) on
Libel; i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes; j. Section 6 on the
Penalty of One Degree Higher; k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
and R.A. 10175; l. Section 8 on Penalties; m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data; n. Section 13
on Preservation of Computer Data; o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data; p. Section 15 on Search,
Seizure and Examination of Computer Data; q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data; r. Section 19
on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data; s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice; t. Section 24
on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and
Functions; related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.

However the government asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace
activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system. Hence in February 2013, the
Supreme Court extended the duration of a temporary restraining order against the government to halt
enforcement of the Act until the adjudication of the issues.

Issue:
1. Whether some provisions of Cybercrime law are unconstitutional?

2. Whether RTC has jurisdiction of Cybercrime law?

Held:

1. The court held the following provisions void for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL: Section 4(c)(3) of
Republic Act 10175 violated the right to freedom of expression by penalizing of posting of unsolicited
commercial communications; b. Section 12 that it violated the right to privacy by authorizing the
collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; and c. Section 19 of the same Act for authorizing the
Department of Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data without any judicial
warrant.
2. The designation of special cybercrime courts of course is not outside our power to undertake: Section
21 of the Cybercrime Law grants the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over any violation of the
Cybercrime Law, and provides that special cybercrime courts manned by specially trained judges
should be designated. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, empowers this
Court to promulgate rules on the pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.

*Military Court Jurisdiction:

Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 lays down the general rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject
to military law who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup detat),
other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court, except that, where the
civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-connected, then the offending
soldier shall be tried by a court martial, and with the further exception that, where the President, in the
interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil
court.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54
to 70, Articles 70 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No, 408, as amended.

In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the
penalty prescribed therefore in the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government
ordinances.

Case 13 - People vs Soria, 685 SCRA 483

Case 13: People vs Soria GR No. 179031 February 24, 2014

Facts: Soria was convicted of the crime of rape by sexual assault. However, the court received a letter
from the Bureau of Corrections informing the death of accused-appellant. A certified true copy of the

death certificate of accused was submitted. His appeal was still pending.

Issue: Whether or not the criminal liability of the appellant is totally extinguished by his death

Held: Yes, the criminal liability of the convict is totally extinguished on account of accused-appellants

demise. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the
death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is

extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

Further, in People vs Amistoso provides that it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his

conviction extinguished his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto.

Case 15 - Solidum vs People, 718 SCRA 263

Solidum vs. People

GR No. 192123
March 10, 2014

Bersamin, J.:

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari

Facts:
This appeal is taken by petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum, a physician-anaesthesiologist, who has
been pronounced guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA). He had been part of the team of anaesthesiologists during the
surgical pull-through operation conducted on Gerald Albert Gercayo a three-year old patient, born with an
imperforate anus, at the Ospital ng Maynila. The operation resulted in the patient suffering cardiac arrest
and consequently a defect called hypoxic encephalopathy meaning insufficient oxygen supply in the brain,
thereby rendering the said Gerald Albert Gercayo incapable of moving his body, seeing, speaking or
hearing, to his damage and prejudice.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ospital ng Maynila can be held civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr.
Solidum?

Holding:

No. In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. It is puzzling,
therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with
Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had
not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically,
which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction .

Case 20 - Magistrado vs People, 527 SCRA 125

Magestrado vs People

FACTS:
Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint1 for perjury against petitioner with the Office

of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended
pleadings, the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for perjury against

petitioner.

Perjury case was due to:

willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly make an untruthful statement under oath upon a

material matter before a competent officer authorized to receive and administer oath and which the law so
require, to wit: the said accused subscribe and swore to an Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public Erlinda B.

Espejo of Quezon City, falsely alleging that he lost Owners Duplicate Certificate of TCT No. N-173163,
which document was used in support of a Petition For Issuance of New Owners Duplicate Copy of

Certificate of Title and filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as LRC# Q-10052 (98)
on January 28, 1998 and assigned to Branch 99 of the said court, to which Petitioner signed and swore on

its verification, per Doc. 413 Page 84 Book No. CLXXV Series of 1998 of Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of
Quezon City; the said accused knowing fully well that the allegations in the said affidavit and petition are

false, the truth of the matter being that the property subject of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N -173163

was mortgaged to complainant Elena M. Librojo as collateral for a loan in the amount of P 758,134.42 and

as a consequence of which said title to the property was surrendered by him to the said complainant by
virtue of said loan, thus, making untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to the damage and

prejudice of the said Elena M. Librojo.

The petitioner filed a motion of suspension due to prejudicial question since there is a civil case for the

recovery of a sum money and a civil case for the cancellation of mortgage and delivery of title and

damages pending before the RTC.

The aforementioned petitioned was denied, thereafter the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before
the RTC with a prayer of writ of preliminary Injunction in the civil case since the METC acted I grave abused

of secretion amounted to lack or excess in jurisdiction.

RTC Ruled no Prejudicial Question

The CA question the filing of certiorari since it is not the proper remedy for the resolution of a civil action..

CA Ruled Negatively

The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant petition, may be
appealed x x x under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not by
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same rules. Thus, the said rule provides:

Section 10. Time for filing memoranda on special cases. In certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file in lieu of briefs,
their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt
of the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, is already
attached to the record

Issue: WON, the remedy of Certiorari was the appropriate recourse for the resolution in a civil
case

WON, There is a Prejudicial Question.

First ISSUE:

The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal, not only because RTC-Branch 83 did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners Petition for Certiorari in Civil
Case No. Q-99-39358 but also because RTC-Branch 83s Order of dismissal was a final order from
which petitioners should have appealed in accordance with Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules
of Court.

An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that
nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends
the litigation in the lower court

Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Revised
Rules of Court to be appealable. The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or final order is also
provided in Rule 41 as follows:

(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals
 where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed
and served in like manner.

Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy available to petitioners. Here, appeal was available. It was adequate to deal with any
question whether of fact or of law, whether of error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion or
error of judgment which the trial court might have committed. But petitioners instead filed a
special civil action for certiorari.

As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, we have repeatedly emphasized that the perfection
of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision of the trial court final
and executory.

Second Issue: Prejudicial Question

SC Ruled negatively

Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question . A petition for suspension of

the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may
be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question

are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the
accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case
be determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a
prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other.

It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other.
Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the
petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution
of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and
fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of TCT No. N-173163.

Case 21 - Pimentel vs Pimentel, 630 SCRA 436

PIMENTEL vs PIMENTEL

G.R. No. 172060

Facts:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner). On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial

question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key

element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed

against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The RTC ruled that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The Court of Appeals, likewise, ruled that even if the

marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the

criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated
parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of

frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

Held:

CIVIL ACTION MUST BE INSTITUTED FIRST

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this
case, the Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City

on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set
Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons
in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005. Respondents petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4
November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the
filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the

2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of
the criminal action.

ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE FOR PARRICIDE

Annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal case for parricide. Further, the resolution of
the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There

is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the
civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because

howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence

of the accused in the criminal case.

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which

punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of
his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. The relationship between the offender and the victim

distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the

relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the

accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether

petitioner is psychologically incapacitate d to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated

parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent
as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were
married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is
granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the

marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could
still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married
to respondent.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

Case 22 - J.M Dominguez vs Liclican, 764 SCRA 338 (7/28/15)

22. JM Dominguez v Liclican (Prejudicial Question)

FACTS:

During the annual stockholders meeting of petitioner JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc. (JMD)
held on December 29, 2007 at the Baguio City Country Club, the election for its new set of directors was
conducted. This event was presided by then company president, and herein respondent and attended by
her co-respondents and by petitioners as well.

Conflict ensued when petitioners were allegedly not allowed to vote on the ground that they are not
registered stockholders of JMD. As pointed out, it was their mother and grandmother, both deceased,
who are the stockholders in JMD, and that there is still no settlement of their respective estates to
effectively transfer their shares in the company to Patrick and Kenneth Pacis.

Tensions rose and respondents, allegedly, walked out of the meeting. But since the remaining
stockholders with outstanding shares constituted a quorum, the election of officers still proceeded.

In reaction to the foregoing developments, petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents before the
RTC for nullification of meetings, election and acts of directors and officers, injunction and other reliefs.

Meanwhile, petitioner stockholders immediately took hold of corporate properties, represented

themselves to JMD's tenants as the true and lawful directors of the company, and collected and deposited
rents due the company to its bank account.

Subsequently, JMD, represented by petitioners, executed a Complaint charging respondents with

qualified theft. Petitioners alleged in the complaint that on January 2, 2008, without any authority
whatsoever, petitioners conspired to withdraw from the corporation's savings account with the Equitable-
PCI Bank; and that the following day, they issued Check payable to cash to be drawn against JMD's
account with Robinson's Savings Bank.

In due time, respondents lodged a petition for certiorari with the CA to annul and set aside the two Orders
by the RTC, anchored, among others, on the alleged existence of a prejudicial question. According to
respondents, petitioner stockholders, by filing the complaint-affidavit, are already assuming that they are
the legitimate directors of JMD, which is the very issue in the intra-corporate dispute pending in the RTC.
ISSUE:

Whether the Civil Case constituted a prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the proceedings in
Criminal Case.

Ruling:

Yes, Civil Case constituted a prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the proceedings in
Criminal Case.

As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be pre-emptively
resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative Juris et de Jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The
rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions, and its existence rests on the
concurrence of two essential elements:

(1) The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and

(2) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Here, the CA aptly observed that Civil Case, the intra-corporate dispute, posed a prejudicial question to
Criminal Cases. To be sure, Civil Case involves the same parties herein, and is for nullification of JMD's
meetings, election and acts of its directors and officers, among others. Court intervention was sought to
ascertain who between the two contesting group of officers should rightfully be seated at the company's
helm. Without Civil Case resolution, petitioners' authority to commence and prosecute Criminal Case
against respondents for qualified theft in JMD's behalf remained questionable, warranting the suspension
of the criminal proceedings.

Judge Tiongson-Tabora is well-aware of the existence of said prejudicial question that should have
barred the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioners Liclican and Isip, for the simple reason that a
juridical person can only act through its officers, and the issue in the main case submitted for JDR before
Judge Tiongson-Tabora is one for nullification of meetings, election and act of directors and officers,
injunction and other reliefs. Thus, she knows for a fact that there is a question as to who are the
legitimate directors of JMD such that there is doubt as to whether private respondents are in a position to
act for JMD.

Verily, the RTC ought to have suspended the proceedings, instead of issuing the challenged Orders
issued by the RTC.
60. People v De Leon (Motion to Quash- Double Jeopardy)

Facts:

Emilio and his wife Erlinda were walking along Sta. Lucia Street, Novaliches, on their way to RP Market. The

accused-appellants, who are siblings, blocked their way. Accused-appellant Danilo, armed with a "sumpak",

suddenly hit Emilio with a "bakal" while accused-appellant Antonio, who was armed with a "samurai",
hacked Emilio in the forehead and struck him with a lead pipe at the right back portion of his legs and

middle back portion of his torso.

Accused-appellant Danilo then took Emilios money in the amount of 7,000.00 and thereafter aimed the

"sumpak" at the lower portion of Emilios chest and fired the same, causing Emilio to slump on the ground.
Accused-appellant Yoyong also hit Emilio with a lead pipe at the back of the neck and middle portion of

his back.

Under the Information, the accused-appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide.

Ruling of the RTC

The trial court found established the circumstances of abuse of superior strength and treachery, abuse of
strength absorbed by the aggravating circumstance of treachery, however, the RTC ruled that because

robbery was not duly established, it cannot convict accused-appellants for robbery with homicide. It relied

on the principle that in order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must be proven as
conclusively as the killing itself. Thus, as opposed to the Information which charged the accused-appellants
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime of Murder by conspiracy.

Ruling of the CA

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellants. Also, the Court of Appeals found

accused-appellant Danilo guilty of Robbery for unlawfully divesting Emilio of 7,000.00, which it
considered as an action independent of and outside the original design to murder Emilio.

The RTC did not find the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as charged in the
Information, but found all the accused guilty of the crime of murder. According to the RTC, contrary to the

charge of robbery with homicide, the accused is guilty of the crime of murder because the prosecution
failed to establish the crime of robbery. The RTC, citing People v. Nimo, ratiocinated that in order to sustain

a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the ruling of the RTC and found all of
the accused guilty of the crime of murder. However, contrary to the findings of the RTC with regard to the

crime of robbery, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC and found accused Danilo guilty of

the separate crime of robbery.

Issue:

Whether the CA violates the right of the accused against double jeopardy by reversing the ruling of the

RTC and found accused guilty of the separate crime of robbery.

Ruling:

We find that the appellate court erred for violating the constitutional right of Danilo against double
jeopardy as enshrined in Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit: Section 21. No person shall
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same

act.
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a
court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was

acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.

In case at bar, it is undisputed the presence of all the elements of double jeopardy: (1) a valid Information

for robbery with homicide was filed; (2) the Information was filed in the court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge; and (4) the RTC acquitted Danilo for the crime of robbery for

lack of sufficient evidence, which amounted to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Indeed the

conviction for murder was premised on the fact that robbery was not proven.

The RTC Decision, which found accused guilty of the crime of murder and not of robbery with homicide on

the ground of insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal as to the crime of robbery alone.

As the first jeopardy already attached, the appellate court is precluded from ruling on the innocence or

guilt of Danilo of the crime of robbery. To once again rule on the innocence or guilt of the accused of the

same crime transgresses the Constitutional prohibition not to put any person twice x x x in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense.

As it stands, the acquittal on the crime of robbery based on lack of sufficient evidence is immediately final

and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. A judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable. In fact, the Court cannot, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence,
review the verdict of acquittal of the trial court due to the constitutional proscription, the purpose of which
is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard from government

oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. The crime of robbery was not proven during the trial.
As we discussed, the acquittal of the accused-appellant, including Danilo, is not reversible.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-
Appellants are hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are sentenced

to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. SO ORDERED.

Case 24 - Burgundy Realty Corporation vs Reyes, 687 SCRA 524

BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. JOSEFA "JING" C. REYES and SECRETARY RAUL
GONZALEZ of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondents.

G.R. No. 181021 December 10, 2012

NATURE OF CASES:

Petition for review

BRIEF:

For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari, dated February 13, 2008, of petitioner

Burgundy Realty Corporation, seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution of the Court of

Appeals (CA), dated September 14, 2007 and December 20, 2007, respectively.

FACTS:

Josefa "Jing" C. Reyes is the real estate agent of the petitioner in buying parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna, which are to be developed into a golf course. She informed petitioner that more or less ten (10) lot
owners are her clients who were willing to sell their properties. Convinced of her representations, petitioner
released the amount of P23,423,327.50 in her favor to be used in buying those parcels of land. Reyes,

instead of buying those parcels of land, converted and misappropriated the money given by petitioner to

her personal use and benefit. Petitioner sent a formal demand for Reyes to return the amount of
P23,423,327.50, to no avail despite her receipt of the said demand. As such, petitioner filed a complaint for
the crime of Estafa against Reyes before the Assistant City Prosecutor's Office of Makati City.
Reyes, while admitting that she acted as a real estate agent for petitioner, denied having converted or

misappropriated the involved amount of money and avers that it is his sub-agent who misappropriated the
funds. Reyes filed a complaint for the crime of estafa against Mateo Elejorde his sub-broker.
After a preliminary investigation was conducted against Reyes, the Assistant Prosecutor of Makati City and

recommended the indictment of that Reyes be indicted of the crime of estafa. Thereafter, an Information
for the crime of Estafa under was filed against Reyes.

Reyes filed a petition for review with DOJ but was dismissed, aggrieved, she then filed a motion for

reconsideration and said motion was granted. DOJ Sec. in a resolution directed to cause the withdrawal of

the information against Reyes.

ISSUE:
Whether the DOJ erred in not finding a probable cause to charge Reyes with the crime of estafa.

COURT RATIONALE IN THE ABOVE FACTS:

This Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely
determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a

crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires

after trial on the merits.15 The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond rea sonable doubt.

A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence.
Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective
claims.

A review of the records would show that the investigating prosecutor was correct in finding the existence

of all the elements of the crime of estafa. Reyes did not dispute that she received in trust the amount of
P23,423,327.50 from petitioner as proven by the checks and vouchers to be used in purchasing the parcels

of land. Petitioner wrote a demand letter for Reyes to return the same amount but was not heeded. Hence,
the failure of Reyes to deliver the titles or to return the entrusted money, despite demand and the du ty to
do so, constituted prima facie evidence of misappropriation. The words convert and misappropriate
connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a
purpose or use different from that agreed upon.19 To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only
conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another

without right.20 In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of

misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to
be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts. Thus, the mere presumption of misappropriation

or conversion is enough to conclude that a probable cause exists for the indictment of Reyes for Estafa. As
to whether the presumption can be rebutted by Reyes is already a matter of defense that can be best
presented or offered during a full-blown trial.

To reiterate, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would

excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Probable cause is a reasonable

ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or

strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause

does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough
that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition is hereby GRANTED and, accordingly, the Decision

and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 14, 2007 and December 20, 2007, respectively,
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati City,
where the Information was filed against private respondent Josefa "Jing" C. Reyes, is hereby DIRECTED to
proceed with her arraignment.

Case 33 - Luz vs People, 667 SCRA 421

G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012

RODEL LUZ y ONG vs. PEOPLE

Ponente: SERENO, J.:

FACTS:

At around 3:00 am of March 2003, Rodel Ong Luz was flagged down by PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza of the
Naga City Police Station, for violating a municipal ordinance of driving a motorcycle without a helmet.
Alteza invited Luz to their nearby sub-station. While Alteza and another police officer were issuing a
citation ticket, he noticed that Luz was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket, thus, he told
Luz to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container. After
instructed to open the container, Alteza noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and upon
Altezas instruction, Luz spilled out the contents suspected as shabu.

Luz was charged of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and later convicted by the RTC of the same
crime. The RTC found that Luz had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a
valid search, which led to the discovery of two plastic sachets of shabu. The RTC also found Luzs defense
of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated

Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

Hence, this petition filed under Rule 45 for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was no lawful search and seizure on the ground that there was no lawful arrest.

Held:

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit. There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was
flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. (Sec 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court) It is effected by an actual restraint of the person
to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the part ies to
arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a
traffic violation is not the arrest, but the confiscation of the drivers license.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, U.S. Supreme Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial
interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. The usual
traffic stop is more analogous to a "Terry stop" than to a formal arrest.

According to the City Ordinance violated, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is
penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information
or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. Neither can a warrantless arrest be made for
such an offense.

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to read
his Miranda rights. But these constitutional requirements were complied only after petitioner had been
arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are
applicable to this case.

While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
the illegal warrantless arrest.

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are
inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the judgment of
conviction of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is
hereby ACQUITTED

Case 34 - Antiquera vs People, 712 SCRA, 12/11/2013

Procedure: Delivery to the nearest police station or precinct
ANTIQUERA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

George Antiquera y codes, petitioner,

vs.
People of the Philippines, respondent.

GR No. 180661

December 11, 2013

Ponente: Abad

Nature of the case: Petition for Review (Appeal)

Brief:

This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent search prompted by the police officers'
chance sighting through an ajar door of the accused engaged in pot session.

FACTS:

On January 13, 2004, the Assistant Prosecutor charged George Antiquera and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with
illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. On February 11, 2004, police officers PO1 Recio,
PO1 Cabutihan, P/Inso. Ibon, PO1 Rania and two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle
were conducting police surveillance on David St, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out
of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep. Suspecting a crime has been committed, the
policemen rush out to the house where men came out, they saw partially opened door. The two police
officers Recio and Cabutihan saw the accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter
beside him, Cruz was holding an aluminium foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at
the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the house and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.
Immediately the police officers inspect the area they saw a wooden jewellery box. It contained an
improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small plastic sachets with traces of white crystalline substance,
improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminium foil, they confiscated all of these and brought
back to the police station. The substance found was tested and declared positive for traces of shabu.

The accused Antiquera contended that he and Cruz were asleep in their house when he was roused by
knocking on the door. When he went to open it, three armed police officers forced themselves into the
house. One of them shoved him and said Dyan ka lang, pusher ka. Then he was arrested brought him
and Cruz to the police station. The RTC rendered a decision against the accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty
of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE/S OF THE COURT

1) Whether or not the CA is correct that the accused was guilty of illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police officers that they saw Antiquera and Cruz in the
act of possessing drug paraphernalia.

ACTIONS of the COURT:

RTC: Convicted the appellant for illegal possession of drugs.

SC: Reversed the decision of the RTC and acquitted the appellant.

COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:

No. The prosecutions theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid warrantless
arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door of their house, in the
act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the
living room for objects relating to the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found there. Section
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt
act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.

1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly r ush out
of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing
for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were
in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers
instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.
 2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the stree t
where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that
warranted their entering it.

Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of
accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal,
the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug
paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having
proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.

One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to
sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated September 21, 2007 and Resolution
dated November 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 28937 and ACQUITS the accused George
Antiquera y Codes of the crime of which he is charged for lack of evidence sufficient to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt

Case 38 - Govt of HK Spec Adm. Region vs. Olalia, 521 SCRA

Jan GOVT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VS HON. OLALIA

Bail, Section 1, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure - is the surety for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as
required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety,
property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
Extradition:
FACTS:
Respondent Muoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of accepting an advantage as agent, and 7
counts of conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the common law of Hongkong. The Hongkong
Depoartment of Justice requested DOJ for the provisional arrest of respondent Muoz; the DOJ forward
the request to the NBI then to RTC. On the same day, NBI agents arrested him.
 Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction and writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the order of arrest.
f
The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition by the Hongkong Department of Justice thru DOJ.

DOJ filed a petition for certiorari in this Court and sustained the validity of the arrest.

Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the RTC petition for extradition and arrest of respondent.
Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the petitioner, initially the RTC
denied the petition holding that there is no Philippine Law granting bail in extradition cases and that
private responded is a flight risk.

Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent, which was granted. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition cases.

HELD:
In Purganan case, the right to bail was not included in the extradition cases, since it is available only in
criminal proceedings.

However the Supreme Court, recognized the following trends in International Law.
1. The growing importance of the individual person in publican international law who, in the 20th century
attained global recognition.
2. The higher value now being given in human rights in international sphere
3. The corresponding duty of countries to observe these human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations
4. The of duty of this court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand,
and the law on extradition on the other.

The modern trend in the public international law is the primacy placed on the sanctity of human rights.

Enshrined the Constitution The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights. The Philippines therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or a` rrested can
participate in the proceeding before the a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified.
 Examination of this Court in the doctrines provided for in the US Vs Purganan provide the following.
1. The exercise of the States police power to deprive a person of his liberty is not limited to criminal
proceedings.
2. To limit the right to bail in the criminal proceeding would be to close our eyes to jurisprudential history.
Philippines has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has
admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been involved in
this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the tendency of administrative proceedings, taking into
cognisance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.

EXTRADITION, is defined as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him
at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with criminal investigation directed against him or execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal and criminal law of the requesting state or government. Thus characterized as the right of
the a foreign power, created by treaty to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crimes
within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative obligation of the other state to surrender him to the
demanding state.

The extradited may be subject to detention as may be necessary step in the process of extradition, but the
length of time in the detention should be reasonable.

In the case at bar, the record show that the respondent, Muoz has been detained for 2 years without
being convicted in Hongkong.

The Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the individual his right to liberty and due process and should
not therefor deprive the extraditee of his right to bail PROVIDED that certain standards for the grant is
satisfactorily met. In other words there should be CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

However in the case at bar, the respondent was not able to show and clear and convincing evidence that
he be entitled to bail. Thus the case is remanded in the court for the determination and otherwise, should
order the cancellation of his bond and his immediate detention.

Case 39 - People vs. Sandiganbayan, 529 SCRA 764

People v Sandiganbayan and Jose Jinggoy Estrada G.R. No. 158754 (August 10, 2007)
Facts:

As an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Information was for the
crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose

Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan motion to quash and alternative prayer to post bail but was denied
thereof. Estrada interposed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court claiming that the respondent

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in, inter alia, (a) sustaining the charge against him for
alleged offenses and with alleged conspirators with whom he is not even connected, and (b) in not fixing

bail for him. The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari and ruled that Sandiganbayan should
conduct hearings to determine if the evidence of Estradas guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail

to him.

Thereafter, Estrada filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for Bail against which the
prosecution filed its comment and opposition. Bail hearings were then conducted, followed by the

submission by the parties of their respective memoranda. The Sandiganbayan granted Estradas Omnibus
Application for Bail. Hence, respondent filed this instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court to seek to reverse and set aside the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan.

Issues:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the application for

bail of Estrada.

Decision:

No, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting the application for

bail of Estrada.

Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the
right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great. Here, ever since the
promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a little more than four years ago, Estrada does not, as determined

by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk.

The rulings on overlapping conspiracy in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong are not on all fours applicable
to and of governing sway to the issue of the propriety of revoking Estradas release on bail. As it were, the
petitioner erroneously equates the provisional grant of bail to respondent Estrada to his virtual acquittal in

Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner is wrong. Castelo and Ty Sui Wong contextually dealt with the guilt of
culprits therein for the crimes of murder after all the evidence had been adduced. Unlike in this
proceeding, the propriety of a grant of bail, given the evidence for or against the bail application, was not

an issue in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong. And in the present case, respondent Sandiganbayan is still in the

process of determining the facts and merits of the main case.

With the view, the Court take of this case, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its assailed resolutions, because the grant of bail therein is predicated only on its
preliminary appreciation of the evidence adduced in the bail hearing to determine whether or not

deprivation of the right to bail is warranted. Needless to stress, a grant of bail does not prevent the trier of
facts, the same Anti-Graft Court, from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the
merits. As jurisprudence teaches: Such appreciation [of evidence] is at best preliminary and should not
prevent the trial judge from making a final assessment of the evidence before him after full trial. It is not an

uncommon occurrence that an accused person granted bail is convicted in due course.

Case 43 - Del Castillo vs People, 664 SCRA

RUBEN DEL CASTILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities

who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in

authority. Police Officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon went to serve a search warrant from the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) to Petitioner Ruben Del Castillo in search of illegal drugs. Upon arrival,
somebody shouted raid which prompted the police officers to immediately disembark from the jeep they

were riding and go directly to Del Castillos house and cordoned it off. Police men found nothing
incriminating in Del Castillos residence, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the

hut several articles including four (4) plastic packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu. An
Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with violation of Section 16, Article III of
R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). During the arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not guilty. The
RTC found Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the information. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision. Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA, insisting that there was a
violation of his constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. On the contrary, the
Office of the Solicitor General argued that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and

seizure is applicable only against government authorities. Hence, assuming that the items seized were
found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as

evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of Del Castillos right against unreasonable searches and seizure.

HELD:

Petition GRANTED. It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to
be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that
points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace

officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the present case, the search warrant
specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally,
the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the Del

Castillo. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the search

warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid.

Case 45 - People vs Lara, 678 SCRA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARTURO LARA Y. ORBISTA

G.R. No. 199877; 13 August 2012

FACTS:

On or about 31 May 2001 in Pasig City, the accused, armed with a gun, conspired and

confederated with an unidentified person and with violence and intimidation, stole and divested from one
Joselito M. Bautista cash amounting to P230,000.00 and shot and assaulted the same inflicting several
wounds which led to the his death. The money belonged to San Sebastian Allied Services, represented by
the witness Enrique Sumulong. On the said date, Sumulong was accompanied by Virgilio Manacob, Jeff
Atie, and the deceased after withdrawing the money supposedly for the salary of the companys
employees. The accused pleaded not guilty and the trial commenced. During the course of the trial, the

prosecution presented several witnesses including Enrique Sumulong, SPO1 Cruz, and PO3 Calix.

The first witness testified that on 07 June 2001, while on his way to barangay San Miguel in Pasig

City, he saw the accused walking in Dr. Pilapil Street. He then alerted the other witnesses about this
incident. Consequently, Sumulong, together with four (4) policemen, went to the said street and positively
identified the accused. Having confirmed the identity of the accused, the police approached him and
invited him at the police station for questioning. The accused was then placed in a police lineup and there,
Manacob and Atie attested that it was really the accused who robbed and killed the deceased. Thereafter,

the accused was informed of his rights and subsequently detained.

In his defense, the accused stated that on the said date of the robbery, he was at his house fixing a

sewer trench. Finding this as a weak alibi, the Court considered the vicinity of his residence and the crime

scene located in the same barangay, the RTC convicted him of robbery with homicide.

On appeal, the accused raised several errors including the argument that he was not assisted by

counsel when the police placed him on the lineup, which according to him, was a flagrant violation of his

right under Section 12, Article III of the constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lara was denied his right to counsel thereby making his arrest illegal, making it a

sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings.

HELD:

No. Since the contention of Lara was a belated invocation, the court did not find merit on his

appeal. Any objections to the legality of the warrantless arrest should have been raised in a motion to
quash duly filed before the accused entered his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived. Furthermore, the

Court held that the illegal arrest is not a ground to set aside conviction duly arrived at and based on
evidence that sufficiently establishes his culpability. As regards his claim that he was denied a counsel, the
Court dismissed the same stating that there was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel because the

police lineup was not part of the custodial investigation.

Case 47 - People vs Ayson, 175 SCRA 216

Rule 115: Rights of the Accused

Facts:

Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its

Baguio City station. He was allegedly involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, hence the PAL

management conducted an investigation in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and
the Collective Bargaining Agreement. On the day before the investigation Ramos gave to his superiors a
handwritten notes stating his willingness to settle the irregularities allegedly charged amounting to Php 76,

000.00. While on investigation, Ramos confessed that he had misused the proceeds of the tickets and he

had planned on paying back the money. Two months after, a crime of estafa was filed against him. Ramos
pleaded not guilty. While on the presentation of evidence, private prosecutors made a written offer of

evidence which were marked as Exhibit A which was the statement of Ramos and exhibit K as his
handwritten admission, however the defendant counsel refuted and said that the document were
confessions and were taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. The respondent judge

rejected the exhibits A and K being inadmissible evidence, since it does not appear that the accused was

reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the

same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel. The private prosecutors filed
a motion for reconsideration however denied, hence this appeal. 9

Issue:

Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion to have excluded the People's Exhibits

A and K?

Held:

Yes, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion to have excluded the People's Exhibits A and K.
It seems quite evident that a defendant was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term
should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered
irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. . It is also clear, too, that Ramos had
voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation.

Hence, the constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation, Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry.
Rights of the accused was laid down in Miranda v. Arizona, Section 20 states that whenever any person is
"under investigation for the commission of an offense":

1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right, 21

2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him; 22 and

3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be inadmissible in

evidence. 23

Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others-

1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 31

and 2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if
he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or
refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him .

Case 51 - People vs Janjalani, 639 SCRA 157

Case 51: People vs Janjalani GR No 188314 Janury 10, 2011

Facts: This was the case regarding Valentines Day Bombing.

The accuseds were charged of the crime of complex crime of multiple murder and

multiple frustrated murder due to the bombing incidence in an RRCG bus with southbound route.
This incidence happened on the evening of February 14, 2005 (Valentines Day). This was allegedly
act of Abu Sayyaff Group as a gift for the former President Arroyo. The accused (Baharan, Trinidad

and Asali) were arraigned for the multiple murder charge and all entered plea of guilty. On the

other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder two of the accused (Trinidad and

Asali) pled not guilty.

However in the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused
Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to the charge of multiple
frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the heavier charge of multiple murder,
creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan
and Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused

acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the
Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple

frustrated murder.

Issue: Whether or not gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants plea of guilt despite
insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the

consequences of the said plea

Held:

As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that all trial judges must

refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy
administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused

pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable

conviction.

We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains
the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had
not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the

significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. [10] This requirement is stringent and

mandatory.

Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was

conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court
observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge multiple
murder based on the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court
further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made

two other confessions of guilt one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television
interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission
(pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on
the sufficiency of the searching inquiry in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is

not warranted, as the accuseds plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment
under consideration.
Case 59 - Co. vs New Prosperity Plasctic Products, 727 SCRA 503

WILLIAM CO vs. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS

G.R. No. 183994

Facts:

Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private

complainant for Violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against petitioner William Co (Co), which
were raffled to the MeTC Branch. 49 of Caloocan City. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the
cases were provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules). Uy received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003,

while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after.

On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases. Hon. Belen B.
Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of the MeTC Branch 49, granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and denied

Cos motion for reconsideration.

The cases were, thereafter, raffled to the MeTC Branch 50 of Caloocan City. On March 17, 2005, Co
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order

(TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the

criminal cases. It was, however, dismissed for lack of merit on May 23, 2005.

Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 were re-

raffled after the inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" on July 13, 2006.

Uy opposed the motion, contending that the motion raised the same issues already resolved with
finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. In spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated

September 4, 2006 granting Cos motion. When the court subsequently denied Uys motion for
reconsideration on November 16, 2006, Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City.
On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on the
petition, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 and
directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases. Co then filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the petition and denied his motion for

reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.

Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59,

206661-77 and 209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy
trial was denied. He reasons out that from his arraignment on March 4, 2002 until the initial trial on June 9,
2003, there was already a "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay, which is in violation of Section 6 of
Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998)24 and Section 2, Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure mandating that the entire trial period should not exceed 180 days from the first day of
trial. As the dismissal is deemed final, Co contends that the MeTC lost its jurisdiction over the cases and

cannot reacquire jurisdiction over the same based on a mere motion because its revival would already put

him in double jeopardy.

Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such

dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice to the
offended party. He also insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and the trial courts issuance of

the order granting the revival must be within the one-year period. Lastly, even assuming that the one-year

period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co

asserts that the motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap year.

Held:

RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL

This Court has emphasized that speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept.
In determining whether the accuseds right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in

view of the entirety of the proceedings.

The factors to balance are the following:

(a) duration of the delay;

(b) reason therefor;

(c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and

(d) prejudice caused by such delay.

 Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of

everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that
particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

While the Court recognizes the accuseds right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy
administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute
criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what

offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.

ESSENTIAL REQUISITE OF PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL

Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules,

which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph thereof, to

wit:

(1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for

a provisional dismissal of the case;

(2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;

(3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and

(4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.

PERMANENCY OF PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL

There is evident want of jurisprudential support on Cos supposition that the dismissal of the cases became
permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order and not after notice to the offended

party. When the Rules states that the provisional dismissal shall become permanent one year after the

issuance of the order temporarily dismissing the case, it should not be literally interpreted as such. Of
course, there is a vital need to satisfy the basic requirements of due process; thus, said in one case:
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent
one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be

construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order
of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having
been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served

with a copy of the order of dismissal.

JUDICIAL NOTICE

The contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order reviving it must be
made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is unsustainable. Such interpretation is not found in
the Rules. Moreover, to permit otherwise would definitely put the offended party at the mercy of the trial

court, which may wittingly or unwittingly not comply. Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that most, if
not all, of our trial court judges have to deal with clogged dockets in addition to their administrative duties

and functions. Hence, they could not be expected to act at all times on all pending decisions, incidents,
and related matters within the prescribed period of time. It is likewise possible that some of them,

motivated by ill will or malice, may simply exercise their whims and caprices in not issuing the order of

revival on time.

A YEAR US EQUIVALENT TO 365 DAYS REGARDLESS WHETHER LEAP YEAR OR NOT

Granting for the sake of argument that this Court should take into account 2004 as a leap year and that
the one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of
provisional dismissal by Uy, We still hold that the motion to revive the criminal cases against Co was timely

filed. A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. Equally so,

under the Administrative Code of 1987, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. The number of days is

irrelevant.

LAWYERS ARE ENJOINED TO USE THE RULES TO DEFEAT THE ENDS OF JUSTICE

We find it hard to disregard the thought that the instant petition was filed as a dilatory tactic to prosecute
Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634. As correctly pointed out by Uy since the time when
the Motion for Permanent Dismissal was filed, the issues raised herein were already resolved with finality
by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. Verily, Co, acting through the guidance and advice of his counsel, Atty.
Oscar C. Maglaque, adopted a worthless and vexatious legal maneuver for no purpose other than to delay

the trial court proceedings. It appears that Atty. Maglaques conduct contravened the Code of Professional
Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat

the ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10) as well as not to unduly delay a case or misuse court processes
(Rule 12.04, Canon 12). The Lawyers Oath also upholds in particular: x x x I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no

man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The April 30, 2008 and August 1, 2008
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which affirmed the January 28,
2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Caloocan City, annulling and setting aside the
Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 50 of
Caloocan City that permanently dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634, are

hereby AFFIRMED. Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.

The Commission on Bar Discipline-Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate Atty. Oscar

C. Maglaque for his acts that appear to have violated the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional

Responsibility, and the Rule on Forum Shopping.

Case 60 - People vs De Leon, 754 SCRA 147

60. People v De Leon (Motion to Quash- Double Jeopardy)

Facts:

Emilio and his wife Erlinda were walking along Sta. Lucia Street, Novaliches, on their way to RP Market. The
accused-appellants, who are siblings, blocked their way. Accused-appellant Danilo, armed with a "sumpak",
suddenly hit Emilio with a "bakal" while accused-appellant Antonio, who was armed with a "samurai", hacked
Emilio in the forehead and struck him with a lead pipe at the right back portion of his legs and middle back portion
of his torso.

Accused-appellant Danilo then took Emilios money in the amount of 7,000.00 and thereafter aimed the
"sumpak" at the lower portion of Emilios chest and fired the same, causing Emilio to slump on the ground.
Accused-appellant Yoyong also hit Emilio with a lead pipe at the back of the neck and middle portion of his back.

Under the Information, the accused-appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide.
Ruling of the RTC

The trial court found established the circumstances of abuse of superior strength and treachery, abuse of strength
absorbed by the aggravating circumstance of treachery, however, the RTC ruled that because robbery was not duly
established, it cannot convict accused-appellants for robbery with homicide. It relied on the principle that in order
to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself. Thus,
as opposed to the Information which charged the accused-appellants of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the
RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder by conspiracy.

Ruling of the CA

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellants. Also, the Court of Appeals found accused-
appellant Danilo guilty of Robbery for unlawfully divesting Emilio of 7,000.00, which it considered as an action
independent of and outside the original design to murder Emilio.

The RTC did not find the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as charged in the Information, but
found all the accused guilty of the crime of murder. According to the RTC, contrary to the charge of robbery with
homicide, the accused is guilty of the crime of murder because the prosecution failed to establish the crime of
robbery. The RTC, citing People v. Nimo, ratiocinated that in order to sustain a conviction for robbery with
homicide, robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the ruling of the RTC and found all of the
accused guilty of the crime of murder. However, contrary to the findings of the RTC with regard to the crime of
robbery, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC and found accused Danilo guilty of the separate crime
of robbery.

Issue:

Whether the CA violates the right of the accused against double jeopardy by reversing the ruling of the RTC and
found accused guilty of the separate crime of robbery.

Ruling:

We find that the appellate court erred for violating the constitutional right of Danilo against double jeopardy as
enshrined in Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit: Section 21. No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In case at bar, it is undisputed the presence of all the elements of double jeopardy: (1) a valid Information for
robbery with homicide was filed; (2) the Information was filed in the court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the
accused pleaded not guilty to the charge; and (4) the RTC acquitted Danilo for the crime of robbery for lack of
sufficient evidence, which amounted to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Indeed the conviction for
murder was premised on the fact that robbery was not proven.

The RTC Decision, which found accused guilty of the crime of murder and not of robbery with homicide on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal as to the crime of robbery alone.

As the first jeopardy already attached, the appellate court is precluded from ruling on the innocence or guilt of
Danilo of the crime of robbery. To once again rule on the innocence or guilt of the accused of the same crime
transgresses the Constitutional prohibition not to put any person twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense.

As it stands, the acquittal on the crime of robbery based on lack of sufficient evidence is immediately final and
cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. A judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. In fact,
the Court cannot, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence, review the verdict of acquittal
of the trial court due to the constitutional proscription, the purpose of which is to afford the defendant, who has
been acquitted, final repose and safeguard from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.
The crime of robbery was not proven during the trial. As we discussed, the acquittal of the accused-appellant,
including Danilo, is not reversible.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-Appellants
are hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. SO ORDERED