Liyao v.

Liyao

FACTS:

William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon), filed a
petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and
acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all successional
rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased
having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime. There
were two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she and the deceased were legally married but
living separately for more than 10 years and that they cohabited from 1965 until the death of the
deceased. On the other hand, one of the chidren of the deceased stated that her mom and the
deceased were legally married and that her parents were not separated legally or in fact.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the
deceased.

HELD:

Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases,
his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. Hence, it was then settled that the
legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper
parties and within the period limited by law.

Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the
petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

Cabatania v. CA, GR 124814, 21 October 2004

Cabatania v ca

GR No. 124814

October 21, 2004

ISSUE:
Florencia, a married househelp had sexual intercourse with Camelo Cabatania and allegedly had a child
from him named Camelo Regodos. Can the court compel petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge
Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter?

APPLICABLE LAW:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

RULING:

The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives
rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Article 167 of
the Family Code)

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of
physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation
before the courts of law.

People v. Delantar, GR 169143, 2 February 2007, 514 SCRA 115

FACTS: An information for violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 was filed
against appellant Simplicio Delantar y Redondo. The testimony of AAA shows that appellant procured
her as a child prostitute for at least two clients: the first, an Arab national named Mr. Hammond and the
second, then Congressman Romeo Jalosjos. AAA testified that she was brought to the first client at least
eleven (11) times between the period 1994 to June 1996. Once left alone with AAA, the client would
perform lascivious acts on AAA, the recurrent salient points of her harrowing experience revolved
around the client's kissing her, touching her breasts, embracing her, and inserting his finger in her
private parts. After their first visit to the client, AAA told appellant that she did not want to go back
because the client was "bastos." Appellant promised her that they would no longer go back but the
promise was broken as they went back a few more times.

As with the first client, appellant would tell AAA that they had to go to the second client because they
had obligations to pay. During each of these visits, the client would give AAA money ranging from
P2,000.00 to P10,000.00. The details of what transpired when AAA was left alone with the second client
were vividly recounted in People v. Jalosjos, where the second client was convicted of two (2) counts of
rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness, all committed against AAA on various dates.

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of violation of Section 5 (a),
paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of Article III of R.A. No. 7610. On appeal, the CA found the appellant guilty of only
one count of violation of Section 5 (a), paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

ISSUE: Was the accused guilty for violation of R.A. No. 7610?

HELD: Yes. There is no doubt, drawing from the evidence, that AAA was a child who was exploited in
prostitution as defined in Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The law punishes not only the person
who commits the acts of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with the child but also those who
engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution. Appellant is one such person. Appellant, in
his brief, does not deny that he brought AAA to the clients. He, however, attempts to exculpate himself
by stating that he did not coerce or influence AAA to go to the two clients to be exploited in prostitution.
Verily, it was against AAA's will and consent to see the two clients. But even if AAA had in fact
consented, appellant may still be prosecuted for child prostitution under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No.
7610 because the child's consent or lack of it is not an element of the offense.

Dela Cruz v. Garcia, GR 177728, 31 July 2009

FACTS:

Dominique and Jenie were living together without the benefit of marriage. Jenie got pregnant but
unfortunately, Dominique died 2 months before Jenie gave birth.
Jenie then applied for registration of the childs birth using Dominiques surname, Aquino.
When Jenie applied for registration of childs birth, Jenie attached the ff.:
Certificate of Live Birth
AUSF, together with Dominiques handwritten autobiography
Affidavit of Acknowledgment issued by Dominiques father and brother
Respondent denied the registration because the child was born out of wedlock.
 Trial court then dismissed Jenies petition because the document (autobiography) was unsigned and
as per IRR of RA 9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father)
which states that:
Private handwritten instrument must be duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes
paternity
Furthermore, petition was denied because the document did not contain any express recognition of
paternity.

ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered
as a recognition of paternity

RULING: YES.

RATIONALE:

Art. 176 does not expressly/explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument must be signed by putative
father. It must be read in conjunction with Art. 175 and 172. It is therefore implied.

Special circumstances to the case:

Died 2 months prior to childs birth

Handwritten and corresponds to facts presented
Corroborated by Affidavit of Acknowledgment by father and brother who stand to be affected by their
hereditary rights

The Court then adopted the ff. rules:

1. Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent
2. Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence

Perla v. Baring, GR 172471, 12 November 2012

FACTS: Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and petitioner Antonio Perla (Antonio) were allegedly
neighbors. Eventually, they became sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio allegedly
assured her that he would support her. However, Antonio started to evade her.

Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint for support
against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy. During the
trial, Mirasol presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her and
Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in the
said certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Antonio to support Randy, which was affirmed by
CA.
ISSUE:

Is Randy entitled for support from Antonio?

HELD: Mirasol and Randy's Complaint for support is based on Randy's alleged illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with sufficient
certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and
filiation. An order for x xx support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the
family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence.

In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The
Certificate of Live Birth and baptismal certificate of Randy have no probative value to establish Randys
filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a baptismal certificate may
be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament
on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, x xx
baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be
admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

***

Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court. However,
this rule admits of certain exceptions such as when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures or when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts. As this
case falls under these exceptions, the Court is constrained to re-examine the factual findings of the
lower courts.

GRANTED

Salas v. Matusalem, GR 180284, 11 September 2013

G.R. No. 180284

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution[2] dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64379.

The factual antecedents:

On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages against
Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofCabanatuan City (Civil Case No. 2124-AF).

Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who was born on
December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only 24
years old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent
stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian
operation and hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner's family
to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of
relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but still
petitioner refused to support her and their child.

Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the amount of P20,000.00, as
well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

Petitioner filed his answer[4] with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaims. He described
respondent as a woman of loose morals, having borne her first child also out of wedlock when she went
to work in Italy. Jobless upon her return to the country, respondent spent time riding on petitioner's
jeepney which was then being utilized by a female real estate agent named Felicisima de Guzman.
Respondent had seduced a senior police officer in San Isidro and her charge of sexual abuse against said
police officer was later withdrawn in exchange for the quashing of drug charges against respondent's
brother-in-law who was then detained at the municipal jail. It was at that time respondent introduced
herself to petitioner whom she pleaded for charity as she was pregnant with another child. Petitioner
denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was motivated by no other reason except genuine
altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of
respondent's chicanery and deceit designed to "scandalize" him in exchange for financial favor.

At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was declared to have waived
his right to present evidence and the case was considered submitted for decision based on respondent's
evidence.
Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his "kumadre" Felicisima de Guzman at
Bgy. Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. During their subsequent meeting, petitioner told her he is already
a widower and he has no more companion in life because his children are all grown-up. She also learned
that petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and a housing subdivision (petitioner offered
her a job at their family-owned Ma. Cristina Village). Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a
single mother as she had a child by her former boyfriend in Italy. He then brought her to a motel,
promising that he will take care of her and marry her. She believed him and yielded to his advances,
with the thought that she and her child will have a better life. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly
and petitioner gave her money for her child. When she became pregnant with petitioner's child, it was
only then she learned that he is in fact not a widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner
opposed it because he wanted to have another child.[5]

On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where she stayed with a
housemaid; he also provided for all their expenses. She gave birth to their child on December 28, 1994
at the Good Samaritan Hospital in Cabanatuan City. Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at the
hospital room and massaged her stomach, saying he had not done this to his wife. She filled out the
form for the child's birth certificate and wrote all the information supplied by petitioner himself. It was
also petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove her baby home. He was excited and happy to have a
son at his advanced age who is his "look-alike," and this was witnessed by other boarders, visitors and
Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment unit petitioner rented. However, on the 18th day after the
baby's birth, petitioner went to Baguio City for a medical check-up. He confessed to her daughter and
eventually his wife was also informed about his having sired an illegitimate child. His family then decided
to adopt the baby and just give respondent money so she can go abroad. When she refused this offer,
petitioner stopped seeing her and sending money to her. She and her baby survived through the help of
relatives and friends. Depressed, she tried to commit suicide by drug overdose and was brought to the
hospital by Murillo who paid the bill. Murillo sought the help of the Cabanatuan City Police Station
which set their meeting with petitioner. However, it was only petitioner's wife who showed up and she
was very mad, uttering unsavory words against respondent.[6]

Murillo corroborated respondent's testimony as to the payment by petitioner of apartment rental, his
weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her, his presence during and after delivery of
respondent's baby, respondent's attempted suicide through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization
for which she paid the bill, her complaint before the police authorities and meeting with petitioner's
wife at the headquarters.[7]

On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision[8] in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant as follows:
Ordering the defendant to give as monthly support of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS for the child
Christian Paulo through the mother;

Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 by way of litigation expenses; and

To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Herrera v. Alba, GR 148220, 15 June 2005

June 15, 2005

ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner,

vs.

ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES,
Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court, Manila, respondents.

Carpio, J.:

SUMMARY: Herrera, the putative father of Rosendo, did not want to undergo a DNA paternity test
ordered by the RTC in a paternity proceeding against him; so he questioned the order before the CA and
the SC. Upholding the lower courts, SC ordered him to undergo the test, brushing aside his arguments
that: DNA testing is not legally accepted; DNA testing is unreliable; and DNA testing is self-incriminatory.
SC also laid down standards for the consideration of DNA evidence with respect to its weight and
probative value, which later formed part of the basis for the DNA evidence rule.

DOCTRINE: DNA evidence has already been accepted in the Philippine jurisdiction, subject to the basic
principle that in the assessment of its probative value, courts should consider, among other things, the
following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.

In the establishment of paternity through DNA evidence, the probability of paternity W must at least be
99.9%. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of
paternity. This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.
NATURE: Appeal from a CA decision affirming an RTC order. Original action for compulsory recognition,
support, and damages.

FACTS

May 14, 1998 Then only 13 y/o, ROSENDO Alba, represented by his mother ARMI Alba, filed a
petition for compulsory recognition, support, and damages against his alleged father, Rosendo
HERRERA, before the RTC of Manila.

Aug. 7, 1998 In his answer with counterclaim, Herrera denied paternity of Rosendo. He also
denied having any physical contact with Armi.

Rosendo moved for the taking of DNA paternity testing.

o Rosendo presented as expert witness Dr. Saturnina Halos, a molecular biologist and professor at
DLSU and UP, who had experience heading a DNA analysis laboratory in UP.

o Dr. Halos testified to the process of DNA paternity testing and asserted that it was 99.9999%
accurate in establishing paternity.

o Herrera opposed the motion, arguing that DNA paternity testing has not gained acceptability,
and that it violates his right against self-incrimination.

Feb. 3, 2000 The RTC granted the motion. Herrera was ordered to undergo DNA paternity
testing.

June 8, 2000 Herreras MR was denied.

July 18, 2000 Herrera filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA, advancing the
following arguments:

o RTC misapplied the ruling in Lim v. CA

o DNA testing was accepted without considering the limitations and conditions for its admissibility
and regardless of the constraints affecting the reliability of the test as admitted by Dr. Halos herself

o The scientific findings relied upon by the RTC are unfit for judicial notice and are not supported
by experts

o DNA testing, under the circumstances, is inconclusive, irrelevant, coercive, and unconstitutional

Nov. 29, 2000 CA DECISION

o RTC affirmed.

o Since the thrust of the petition is to seek a reevaluation of the evidence, the remedy of appeal is
available.
o DNA paternity testing does not violate the right against self-incrimination, which refers only to
testimonial compulsion.

o An adverse DNA paternity test result may still be refuted anyway.

May 23, 2001 CA denied MR. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUES (HELD)

1) W/N DNA testing should be allowed despite lack of official recognition and presence of technical and
legal constraints to its implementation (YES, DNA analysis has been accepted as evidence)

2) W/N DNA testing is a valid probative tool to determine filiation under Philippine law (YES, but subject
to relevant standards)

3) W/N DNA testing violates the right against self-incrimination (NO)

RATIO

1) PRELIMINARY: OVERVIEW OF THE PATERNITY AND FILIATION SUIT

Filiation proceedings are instituted not only to adjudicate paternity but also to secure legal
rights associated with paternity, e.g., support or inheritance.

BURDEN OF PROOF is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father
of the child

4 SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS

o PRIMA FACIE CASE

exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative father.

corroborative proof is required to shift the burden of proof to the putative father

CASE AT BAR: Armi asserted that Herrera is the biological father of Rosendo. She presented
corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures.

o AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

two are available to the putative father: incapability to have sexual relations (due either to
physical absence or impotency) or proof that the mother had sexual relations with other men around
the time of conception.

CASE AT BAR: Herrera raised both defenses, denying that he ever had intercourse with Armi.

o PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY

A child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate (FC 165, 167). The presumption may
be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law.
o PHYSICAL RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN PUTATIVE FATHER AND CHILD

trial technique unique to paternity proceedings

may be offered as evidence of paternity

although likeness is a function of heredity, no quantitative formula or standard can be used to

measure likeness. This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions/senses of the judge.

CASE AT BAR: Armi submitted pictures of Rosendo and Herrera side by side, to show how much
they resemble each other.

LAWS, RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON FILIATION

o FC 175: Illegitimate children may establish their filiation in the same way as legitimate children.

o FC 172: Establishment of filiation by legitimate children can be made by:

record of birth in the civil registry or in a final judgment

admission made in a public document or in a private handwritten instrument signed by the

parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing, by open and continuous possession of legitimate status or by
any other means allowed by the RoC and special laws.

o RoC 130, Secs. 39-40 relate to acts, declarations, family tradition and reputation relating to
pedigree. Pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and
the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.

o Lim v. CA: SC adopted a wary attitude towards DNA testing; held that paternity still has to be
resolved by conventional evidence.

o To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the
writing must be the writing of the putative father.

o A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was
considered acceptable evidence.

o Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father
cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation.

o However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a fathers operation, or a marriage

contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing.

o Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish
filiation.

Scientific advances have widened the range of evidence available to establish paternity; it is now
no longer limited to evidence of incriminating acts. Blood grouping tests have been upheld as conclusive
of non-paternity and have been allowed by the SC in Co Tao v. CA and in Jao v. CA.
2) DNA ANALYSIS AS EVIDENCE CONCEPT AND PROCESS

Deoxyribonucleic acid is the basic building block of the human genetic makeup. It is found in all
human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Since genetic identity is unique, a persons
DNA profile can determine his identity.

DNA analysis is a procedure where a biological sample from an individual is processed to form a
DNA profile and then examined.

Quoting from the trial court order (sorry for the copypasta, Carpio quoted it verbatim):

o Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular sequence.
This gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework, nonetheless, are
sections that differ. They are known as polymorphic loci, which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing
(profiling, tests, fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA fingerprinting/genetic tests or fingerprinting). In other
words, DNA typing simply means determining the polymorphic loci.

o PROCEDURE FOR DNA TYPING

From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed to analyze it in
several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction
fragment length polymorphism); reverse dot blot or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases
that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; mtDNA process; VNTR
(variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain
reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of by most forensic
laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence sample a
million times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme.
STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and can match two (2) samples with
a reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.

o Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, matches are determined. To illustrate, when
DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence collected from
the crime scene is compared with the known print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features
are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the
DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.

o As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of
these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called allele, one inherited from each parent. In
[a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to
produce a DNA profile.

o Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half
of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the
biological father. The alleged fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA
types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match
that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as
the father.
3) AS OF 2002, THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY QUESTION ON THE VALIDITY OF THE USE OF DNA ANALYSIS
AS EVIDENCE

Prior to 2002, SC was of skeptical stance with respect to DNA analysis as evidence, as reflected
in Lim v. CA (1997) and People v. Tijing (2001), although in the latter case, the SC recognized that UP had
already set up a laboratory capable of performing STR analysis and DNA analysis will prove useful in the
future.

The Vallejo case, decided in 2002, represented the change in the SCs stance. Vallejo was meted
the death penalty, partly because of the match between the DNA profile of the sample taken from the
victim and the DNA profile of Vallejo.

Said the Court in that case: In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts
should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they
were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

Thus the SC was no longer talking about admissibility, but has moved on to analyzing the
probative value of DNA evidence. It was no longer about the official recognition of DNA evidence, as
the issue is now the observance of the procedures in conducting DNA analysis.

In 2004, the Yatar and de Villa cases followed the Vallejo trend. In both cases the Court gave
credence to DNA evidence in disposing of the issues.

NO NEED TO REFER TO AMERICAN JURISPRUDENTIAL STANDARDS REGARDING ADMISSIBILITY

OF DNA EVIDENCE

o Both Herrera and Rosendo cite US cases in support of their positions regarding the admissibility
of DNA evidence.

o Frye v. US: Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which
the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.

o Frye-Schwartz standard: While [the US Circuit Court agrees] that forensic DNA typing has
gained general acceptance in the scientific community, we hold that admissibility of specific test results
in a particular case hinges on the laboratorys compliance with appropriate standards and controls, and
the availability of their testing data and results.

o Failure to meet Frye standards with respect to expert testimonies in product liability cases led to
the development of the Daubert-Kumho standard, which in turn led to the amendment of Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Procedure.

o Expert witness may testify as to specialized knowledge if:

(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data

(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and

(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

o However, in the Philippines, the Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho standards go into the
weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. American jurisprudence is merely persuasive.

o The Philippine Rules of Court are more liberal evidence is admissible when it has such relation
to the fact in issue as to induce belief or non-belief in its existence and is not excluded by law or the
rules. Neither does Rule 130, Sec. 49 on expert testimony preclude the admissibility of DNA evidence.

o SC: Rule 130, Sec. 49 does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as
evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.

4) GUIDELINES ON THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA EVIDENCE

Basic principle has been enunciated in Vallejo: see No.3, 3rd bullet.

With respect to paternity:

o In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an
individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is
possible to determine which half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must
have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged fathers profile is then examined to ascertain
whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the mans
DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match,
then he is not excluded as the father.

o It is not enough to state that the DNA profiles of the putative father and the child match. A
complete match of DNA profiles does not necessarily establish paternity.

o PROBABILITY OF PATERNITY MEASURE

Following the Louisiana standard, courts should require a minimum of 99.9% W prior to a
paternity inclusion

W stands for Probability of Paternity. It is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of
a putative father compared to the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An
appropriate population database is required to compute for W.

Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal 100% (hence it is a
limit :])

Accuracy of W estimates is higher when the mother, child, and putative father are all subjected
to DNA testing.

SC: DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of
non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered
as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of
paternity. This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.
5) NO VIOLATION OF RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

It has been repeatedly stated in jurisprudence that the protection of the constitution against
self-incrimination extends only to testimonial compulsion.

The protection relates to forced extraction of communicative evidence. Bodily or object

evidence is not covered. Thus the SC has allowed forcible spitting of morphine, compulsory pregnancy
tests, and trying on of pants for size as admissible evidence over self-incrimination objections.

The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and
filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative
parent to claim his or her own defenses.

Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern
science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law,
rules, and jurisprudence.

DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed; judgment affirmed.

Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz, GR 171713, 17 December 2007

FACTS:

The Estate of Rogelio Ong opposed on the CA order directing the Estate and Joanne Rodgin Diaz for DNA
analysis for determining the paternity of the minor Joanne. Trial court formerly rendered a decision and
declared the minor to be the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to
support the child until she reaches the age of majority. Rogelio died during the pendency of the case
with the CA. The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA. They contended that a dead
person cannot be subject to testing. CA justified that "DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence
affirms, would be the most reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity dispute."

ISSUE:

Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio.

RULING:

Yes.

The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist
appropriate biological samples of his DNA. New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA
testing by using biological samples--organic material originating from the person's body, ie., blood,
saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic materials- that is susceptible to DNA
testing.
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and
any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. (People vs Umanito, citing Tecson vs
Comelec 424 SCRA 277)

De Villa v. Director, GR 158802, 17 November 2004

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA

G.R. No. 158802. November 17, 2004 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

REYNALDO DE VILLA, Petitioner,

JUNE DE VILLA, Petitioner-relator,

THE DIRECTOR OF NEW BILIBID PRISONS, Respondent.

DNA evidence of non-paternity by the accused of a child born to the victim of the crime of rape does
not affect his conviction, but it may nonetheless affect the award of child support imposed against him

FACTS:

Sometime in April 1994, the 12-year old victim Aileen Mendoza woke up in her familys rented
room in Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to find petitioner Reynaldo de Villa (her uncle by affinity)on top of
her.

She was unable to shout for help because petitioner covered her mouth with a pillow and
threatened to kill her. He succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. After making thrusting
motions with his body, petitioner ejaculated.

This encounter allegedly resulted in Aileens pregnancy, which was noticed by her mother,
Leonila Mendoza. It was then revealed that she was raped, prompting her parents to bring her to the
Pasig Police Station, where they lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner.

Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight months pregnant. On
December 19, 1994, Aileen prematurely gave birth to an 8-month old baby girl whom she named
Leahlyn Mendoza.
 Petitioners defenses: (1) Old age (67 years old) and sickness rendered him incapable of having
an erection (2) Aileens family had a grudge against him, (3) Alibi, he was in San Luis, Batangas.

The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape,
and sentenced him to death, to indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of
the suit and to support the child, Leahlyn Mendoza. Hence, the automatic review to the SC.

In petitioners brief, he sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in order to
determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape. This relief was implicitly
denied in our Decision of February 21, 2001 affirming petitioners conviction for rape.

Reynaldo filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, wherein he once more prayed that DNA
tests be conducted. This was denied with finality; hence, the Decision became final and executory.

Three years after the promulgation of the 2001 decision, June de Villa, the son of Reynaldo
alleged that he was unaware of the availability of DNA testing during the trial of the case and was only
informed about it during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioners case.

Undaunted, June, asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo and a classmate of Leahlyn
Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. Leahlyn readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took
the sample home and gave it to June, who immediately labeled the cup as Container A.

June then gathered samples from four (4) grandchildren of Reynaldo, placed them in separate
containers with distinguishing labels, and temporarily stored them in a refrigerator. During transport to
the DNA Analysis Laboratory, the containers were kept on ice.

June requested the National Science Research Institute (NSRI) to conduct DNA testing on the
samples, including that of Reynaldo. The preliminary report dated March 21, 2003, showed that
Reynaldo could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested due to the absence of a
match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioners sample and those of any of the other
samples, including Leahlyn's.

Hence, the instant petition for habeas corpus with a prayer for new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence.
ISSUE:

Does DNA evidence entitle the accused to outright acquittal, or if already convicted and
incarcerated, to avail of the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy?

HOLDING:

NO. In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to collaterally attack
the 2001 Decision. The ancillary remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted to solely to allow the
presentation of what is alleged to be newly-discovered evidence.

It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendozas paternity is not central to the issue of
petitioners guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question,
separate and distinct from the question of the father of her child. (People vs. Alberio: Pregnancy is not
an essential element of the crime of rape).

The grant of child support to Leahlyn Mendoza indicates that our Decision was based, at least in
small measure, on the victims claim that the petitioner fathered her child. This claim was given
credence by the trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was affirmed by this Court on automatic review.

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ is that the individual seeking such relief be
illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an
individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ is unavailing. Concomitant to this
principle, the writ cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court which,
having duly acquired jurisdiction was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly
in the conduct of the proceedings.

The writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability as a post-conviction remedy. In the case
of Feria vs. CA, we ruled that review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus only if:

1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;

2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or

3) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.
 In the case at bar, petitioner invokes the writ to assail a final judgment of conviction, without,
however, providing a legal ground on which to anchor his petition. Clearly, mere errors of fact or law,
which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the person
of the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Even in the light of the sudden withdrawal of appearance of the petitioners counsel of record,
Atty. Alfonso Salvador (leaving for US for an indefinite period of time), there was no such negligence
committed by his earlier counsel so as to amount to a denial of a constitutional right.

On the other hand, a motion for new trial, under the Rules, is available only for a limited period
of time, and for very limited grounds, that is, it may be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction
becomes final, that is, within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or notice. Upon finality of the
judgment, therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an available remedy.

The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition has long attained finality, and entry of
judgment was made as far back as January 16, 2002. Moreover, the DNA evidence does not fall within
the statutory or jurisprudential definition of newly-discovered evidence.

Although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, it does not meet the
criteria such that the evidence disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial
with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Junes claim that he was unaware of the existence of DNA
testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight with this Court.

Even with all the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner and his
counsel, Reynaldo is not entitled to outright acquittal. His conviction could, in theory, still stand, with
Aileen Mendozas testimony and positive identification as its bases

Lee v. Republic, GR 128195, 3 October 2001, 366 SCRA 524

FACTS:

Petitioner Gerardo Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almontewere married in 1989.
Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. In 1991, however, Gerardo filed a petition
to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that 9 years before
he married private respondent, the latter had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she
married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to
be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo
was granted visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that Jose Gerardo was
not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during his first marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of Mario and
not petitioner Gerardo.

RULING:

Yes. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his
parents is legitimate. In the present case, since the marriage between Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was
void ab initio, the marriage between Mario and Ma. Theresa was still subsisting at the time Jose Gerardo
was conceived, and thus the law presumes that Jose Gerardo was a legitimate child of private
respondent and Mario. Also, Gerardo cannot impugn the legitimacy of the child because such right is
strictly personal to the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and
Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired
any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

The petition was denied.

SSS v. Aguas, GR 165546, 27 February 2006

FACTS:

Pablo Aguas, a member and pensioner of the SSS died.

Pablos surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on indicating
in her claim that Pablo was survived by his minor child, Jeylnn

Her claim for monthly pension was settled.

SSS received a sworn from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablos sister, contesting Rosannas claim for
death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than 6 years
before, and lived with another man on whom she has been dependent for support. She further averred
that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna.

The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary.

CA reversed the SSC deicision and favored the respondents.

ISSUE:

W/N Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo

HELD: Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate.

Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo.
Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing that she was born
on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977
and the marriage subsisted until the latters death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that
Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablos marriage.

Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases,
his heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his
lifetime.

The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablos
signature, which was verified from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate
signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity.

For Rosanna, to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must establish 2 qualifying factors: (1) that she
is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support.

A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for
support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. If it is proved that the were till living
together at the time of his death, it is presumed that she was dependent on the husband for support,
unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.

Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits as it was established that she is his legitimate child.
Records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it.
Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she
failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for
support even if they were already living separately. NOTE: Legitimacy cannot be extended to other
siblings