Social Legislation Cases

1. GSIS v CSC, G.R. No. 98395 and 102449 (1995)

2. Hilarion Beronilla v GSIS, L-21723, Nov. 26, 1970
3. Gaudencio Cena v CSC, G.R. No. 97419, July 3, 1992
4. Dionisio Rabor v CSC, 244 SCRA 614
5. Profeta v Drilon, G.R. No. 104149, Dec. 22, 1992
6. Santiago v COA, G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991
7. Raro v ECC, G.R. 58445, April 27, 1989
8. Iloilo Dock & Engineering v WCC, L-26341, Nov. 27, 1968
9. Belarmino v ECC, G.R. 90104, May 11, 1990
10. Alano v ECC, G.R. 48594, March 16, 1988
11. Lazo v ECC G.R. 78617, June 18, 1990
12. Enao v ECC, 135 SCRA 660
13. Gloria D. Menes v. ECC G.R. L-48488, April 25, 1980
14. Narazo v ECC G.R. 80157, Feb. 6, 1990
15. Dabatian v GSIS, G.R. 47294, April 8, 1987
16. Rodriguez v ECC, G.R. 46454, Sept. 28, 1989
17. Beronilla v GSIS, G.R. 21723 (1970)
18. ECC v CA, G.R. No. 121545 (1966)
19. Tancinco v GSIS, G.R. 132916 (2001)
20. Jimenez v ECC, G.R. L-58176 (1984)
21. Panotes v. ECC, G.R. L-64802 (1984)

GSIS vs CSC

Issues:
(1) Is government service rendered on a per diem basis creditable for
computing the length of service for retirement purposes; and
(2) Is CSC the proper government agency in determining what service is
creditable for retirement purposes?

Held:
1. NO. PD. 1146, Sec. 2(i) defines Compensation as the basic pay or salary
received by an employee, pursuant to his employment/appointments,
excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime pay, and allowances. xxx In essence,
the grant of retirement benefits necessitates an obligation on the part of the
employee to contribute to the insurance fund of petitioner. Such obligation
only arises where the employee is receiving "salary, pay or compensation" and
not per diem, which is not capable of paying off the premium contributions to
petitioner. xxx Joint CSC, DBM and GSIS Circular No. 1-89 states that services
rendered on a per diem bases are not creditable for retirement purposes.

2. NO. In Profeta v. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 (1992), held that the GSIS has the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a member is qualified
or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. No. 1146, based on its
computation of a member's years of government service. By analogy, we
reiterate our ruling in the cases at bench. The above mentioned circular also
confirms that it is the GSIS, and not the CSC which is the proper agency in
determining services which are creditable for retirement purposes.

Beronilla vs GSIS

Facts: Mr. Hilarion Beronilla requested CSC to change his date of birth
indicated in the records from 1902 to 1900, as he only later discovered his true
date of birth. It was initially granted by the General Manager Andal but the
decision was later reversed by the GSIS Board of Trustees. Beronilla, in a
special civil action for prohibition, seeks to reverse the Resolution by the BOT
to the effect that the petitioner be considered compulsorily retired from the
service (as Auditor of PNB) effective January, 14, 1963 as null and void.

Issue: (1) WON the GSIS BOT acted within its powers when it reversed the
approval by General Manager Andal of petitioners request for change of his
date of birth.
(2) WON the respondent guilty of laches or held in estoppels to change or alter
the action of GM for failure to act within three years.

Held: (1) Yes. Based on Commonwealth Act, the Charter of the GSIS, as
amended, together with the relevant resolutions of the BOT, the SC upheld the
super authority of the Board over the General Manager. The General
Managers approval is not beyond review and reprobation by the BOT. The
BOT directly manages the System and the GM is only the chief executive officer
of the Board.
In this case, all that the BOT has done is to set aside what it found to be
an erroneous decision of the GM in approving the change of date of
petitioners birth, because from the evidence before it, the BOT was convinced
that the originally recorded date of birth should not be disturbed.
 (2) No. Mere innocent silence will not work estoppels. There must also
be some element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence by
which another is misled to his injury and that the doctrine of estoppels
having its origin in equity and therefore being based on moral and natural
justice, its applicability to any particular case depends, to a very large extent,
upon the special circumstances of the case. Important also it is not to
overlook that as regards the actuations of government officials, the general
rule is that their mistakes and omissions do not create estoppels.

Cena vs CSC

Facts: Gaudencio Cena worked for 7 years as a Legal Officer of the Law Dept of
Caloocan City. He was then transferred to the Office of the Congressman
where he worked as a Supervising Staff Officer for 3 months. He was then
appointed as Registrar of the RD (Register of Deeds) in Malabon. In total, he
has rendered govt service for 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before reaching
his 65th bday, he requested the LRA Administrator that he be allowed to
extend his service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him
to retire with full benefits of old age pension.
The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the CSC. The CSC denied the
extension but Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. This time around, CSC
granted a 1-yr extension to him. Cena still filed a case against CSC for grave
abuse of discretion when it granted an extension of only 1 yr. He contends that
the law(Sec 11, PD 1146 also known as Revised Govt Insurance Act) does not
limit or specify the maximum number of years the retiree may avail of to
complete the 15-year service. Thus, the CSC has no authority to limit through a
memorandum the number of years.
In defense, CSC said that since it is the central personnel agency of the
govt, it is vested with power to grant or allow extension of service beyond
retirement age.

Issue: WON Cena is allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15-year
service requirement?

Held: Yes. An administrative circular, such as a memorandum of the CSC

cannot limit PD 1146, on extension of service of employees who reach 65.
While it is true that CSC is given the authority to take appropriate action on all
appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service, it cannot
extend to matters not covered. The CSCs authority is limited only to carrying
into effect what PD 1146 says. It cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of
the basic law.
The CSC Memorandum, being in the nature of an administrative
regulation, must be governed by the principle that a regulation must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. CSC has no power to supply or add
perceived omissions in PD 1146.

The Court held that a government employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the same time has
not yet completed fifteen (15) years of government service required under
Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to qualify for the Old-Age Pension Benefit, may
be granted an extension of his government service for such period of time as
may be necessary to "fill up" or comply with the fifteen (15)-year service
requirement.

The petition was granted. The LRA and DOJ has the discretion to allow
Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months, and 6 days of government service to
complete the 15-year service so that he may retire with full benefits.

Dionisio Rabor vs CSC

Facts: Rabor entered government service as utility worker on 10 April 1978 in

the Office of the Mayor, Davao City at the age of 55. He was advised to retire in
May 1991, with 13 years and 1 month of service. He requested from the Mayor
an extension of services to 15 years so he could be entitled to the retirement
benefits. Director Cawed of CSRO-XI advised Mayor Duterte that the extension
of his services is contrary to MC 65 of the Office of the President. Duterte then
furnished Rabor with a copy of the letter and advised him to stop reporting
effective August 16, 1991.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990 provides, in part: 1. Any
request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen
years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent
appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) and shall be granted for a period of not
exceeding one (1) year.
Rabor sent another letter in 1993 requesting to be allowed to continue
rendering services, but it was once more denied by the Mayor stating that he is
nearly reaching 70yo and his position has already been filled up.
In Toledo vs CSC, CSRPAP prohibited the appointment of persons 57yo
without prior approval from CSC. Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 5
provides that they may be appointed provided that (1) the exigencies of the
government service so required and provided that (2) the appointee possesses
special qualifications not possessed by other officers or employees in the Civil
Service and that the vacancy cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers
or employees of the Civil Service.

Issues: WON Rabor should be allowed to continue rendering service

tocomplete his 15-year service. Rabor asserts that his case is analogous to
Cena.

Held: NO. SC conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby
modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series
of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and
effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together
with Memorandum Circular No. 27.
SC reiterated, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the
government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow
or disallow extension of the service of an official or employee who has reached
sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of
government service; this discretion is nevertheless, to be exercised
conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27,
Series of 1990.

Profeta vs Drilon

GSIS has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a

member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D.
No. 1146, based on its computation of a member's years of government
service.

Santiago vs COA
Facts: Santiago was employed in COA as State Auditor IV with a monthly salary
of P7,219.00. In 1988, he was assigned to COA Auditing Unit in DOTC and
detailed to MIAA. MIAA issued a resolution which included his authority to
collect RATA of P1,200 and other allowances. In total, he collects a
compensation of P13, 068. 00. In computing his retirement benefits, GSIS
based on the P13, 068 but COA disagreed and based only on his monthly salary
of P7,219 as State Auditor.

Issue: (1) Whether the honorarium should be added to the salary in computing
Santiagos retirement benefits. NO
(2) WON designated falls under the general term appointment, and
thus be allowed to invoke Section 9 of Act 4187. YES

Held: (1) Act 4187, Sec. 17 excludes (2) Auditor and accountants from officer
prohibited from receiving any kind of additional or extra compensation. The
SolGen argues that the additional compensation received by Santiago was
merely an honorarium and not a salary, thus would not fall under the provision
of Sec. 9 and so should not be added to his salary in computing his retirement
benefits.
The Court disagrees. An honorarium is defined as something given not as
a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a voluntary
donation in consideration of services which admit of no compensation in
money. The additional compensation given to the petitioner was in the nature
of a salary because it was receive by him as a matter of right in recompense for
services rendered by him xxx.
(2) While appointment is essentially executive and designation is
legislative in nature, the Court held in the case at bar that the term
appointment was used in a general sense to include the term designation.
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because
their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort,
when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After
devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the
appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a
generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his
services. That generosity is the least he should expect now that his work is
done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and
glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to
luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it.
Petition is granted, directing the computation of petitioners retirement
benefits on the bases of his Highest Basic Salary rate of P13,068.
Raro vs Employees Compensation Commission and GSIS

Facts: Zaida Raro was in perfect health when employed in Bureau of Mines and
Geo-Sciences. 4 years later, she lost her memory, sense of time, vision and
reasoning power after and frequently taking sick leaves. She was then Mining
Recorded in the Bureau.

Issue: (1) Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted
during employment is compensable under the present compensation laws.
(2) Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable
under the present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as
occupational disease.

Held: (1) No. It does not fall under Occupational Diseases Nature of
Employment under the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. What
the law requires is proof that the illness is caused by the employment.
Dissenting, Paras: while brain tumor is not expressly referred to as an
occupational disease xxx we may say that the disease is akin to cancer of the
brain and should therefore be regarded as either compensable or borderline
case.
(2) Yes. The presumption of compensability and the theory of
aggravation is espoused under the Workmens Compensation Act, is now
abandoned under the New Labor Code.

Iloilo Dock & Engineering (IDECO) v Workmens Compensation Commission

(WCC)
Facts: Teodoro Pablo and Rodolfo Galopez, had just finished overtime work at
5:00 pm and was going home. At around 5:02 pm, while Pablo and Galopez
were walking along the IDECO road, about20 meters from the IDECO main
gate, Pablo was shot by Martin Cordero. The motive for the crime was and still
unknown since Martin Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for
Pablos death.
Issues: (1) WON Pablos death occurred in the course of employment and
arising out of the employment.
(2) WON the PROXIMITY RULE should apply in this case.
(3) WON the death of Pablo was an accident within the purview of the
Workmens Compensation Act.

Held: (1) Yes. Workmens compensation is granted if the injuries result from an
accident which arises out of and in the course of employment. Both the
arising factor and the course factor must be present. If one factor is weak
and the other is strong, the injury is compensable but not where both factors
are weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work connected.
The words arising out of refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are
descriptive of its character, while the words in the course refer to the time,
place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. The
presumption that the injury arises out of and in the course of employment
prevails where the injury occurs on the employers premises. While the IDECO
does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using the same
as the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road leads directly to
its main gate. Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed from either
an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right therefore is either a legal one
or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be
charged with security control of the road.

(2) Yes. The general rule in workmens compensation law known as going and
coming rule provides that in the absence of special circumstances, an
employee injured in going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded
from the benefits of workmens compensation acts. The following are the
exceptions: a. Where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the
premises of his employer b. Where the employee is about to enter or about
to leave the premises of his employer by way of exclusive or customary
means of ingress and egress. Where the employee is charged while on his way
to or from his place of employment or at his home or during his employment,
with some duty or special errand connected with his employment. Where the
employer, as an incident of the employment provides the means of
transportation to and from the place of employment. The second exception is
known as the proximity rule. The place where the employee was injured
being immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question
must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and
therefore arose out of or in the course thereof.

(3) Yes. An assault although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is
considered an accident within the meaning of the Workmens Compensation
Act since the word accident is intended to indicate that the act causing the
injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not
legally responsible.

Belarmino v ECC

Facts: Oania Belarmino was a classroom teacher of the Department of

Education Culture and Sports assigned at the Burucan Elementary School
in Dimasalang, Masbate for 11 years. On Jan. 14, 1982, Mrs. Belarmino who
was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the
classroom floor. She complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps but
she continued reporting for work because there was much work to do. On Jan.
25, 1982, whe went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home.
However, her abdominal pain persisted even after delivery. When she was
brought to the hospital, her physician informed her that she was suffering from
septicemia post partum (severe bacterial infection) due to infected lacerations
of the vagina. After she was discharged from the hospital, she died three days
thereafter.
The GSIS denied the claim on the ground that septicemia post partum,
the cause of death is an occupational disease and neither was there any
showing that the ailmentwas contracted by reason of her employment.
On appeal to the ECC, latter also denied the claim.

Issue: WON the cause of death of Mrs. Belarmino is not a work-related and
therefore not compensable.
Held: No. The death of Mrs. Belarmino from septicemia post partum
is compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her
employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom
floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as aresult. The
fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in
the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences
to her. Her fall on theclassroom floor brought about her premature delivery
which caused the development of postpartum septicemia which resulted
in death. Her fall therefore was that set in motion an unbroken chain of events,
leading to her demise. The right to compensation the proximate cause (cause
or event that sets all other events in motion) extends to disability due to
disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a
compensable injury.
Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course
of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise
arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent
intervening cause attributable to claimants own negligence or misconduct.
Mrs. Belarminos fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of here
mployment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences
flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her
baby, her septicemia post partum and death are compensable.

Alano v ECC

Facts: Dedicacion De Vera worked as principal of Salinap Community School in

San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her usual tour of duty was from 7:30 am to 5:30
pm. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00AM while she was waiting for a ride at
Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to school, she was bumped and ran
over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted to her instantaneous death.
Her brother Generoso Alano filed the instant claim for income benefit with the
GSIS for and in behalf of the decedents children. The claim was denied by GSIS
on the ground that the injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not
an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law. The
ECC affirmed the denial by GSIS. It claimed that the deceaseds accident did
not meet the conditions under the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation. First, the accident occurred at about 7:00 am or thirty minutes
before the deceaseds working hours. Second, it happened not at her
workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to her work.
Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school principal nor
was she on a special errand for the school.

Issue: WON the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting
in her death is compensable under the law as an employment accident.

Held: Yes. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured

at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and
from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of
his employment. In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while
going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts
it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work
on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principals
being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment
required her to be there.

Lazo v ECC

Facts: Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines
assigned to its main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of duty is from
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986,
the petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00
o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed
to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the
morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked permission from his superior to leave
early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice. On his way
home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the passenger
jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a
result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital
for treatment. He was later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital
where he was confined until 25 July 1986.
For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefit
under PD 626, as amended. His claim, however, was denied by the GSIS. Upon
review of the case, the respondent ECC affirmed the decision since the
accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and
while he was attending to a personal matter.

Issue: WON the injuries sustained due to the vehicular accident on way home
from work should be construed as "arising out of or in the course of
employment" and thus, compensable.

Held: YES. While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation

under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the
New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor
of the workingman still subsists. As agent charged by the law to implement
social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the ECC should
adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a
work connection to the accident.
There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected
for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a
reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises.
If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who was on his way
from home to his work station one day before an official working day, there is
no reason to deny compensation for accidental injury occurring he is on his
way home one hour after he had left his work station.
The SC did not consider the defense of the street peril doctrine and
instead interpret the law liberally in favor of the employee because the
Employees Compensation Act, like the Workmen's Compensation Act, is
basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and
women in our society.

Enao v ECC

Facts: On August 1, 1975, Emelita Enao, a Public School Teacher, together with
others, was on her way from her official station at Sergio Osmena, Sr.,
Zamboanga del Norte to Dipolog City. According to the Acting Administrative
Officer of her employer, 'Having held classes on July 26, in lieu of August 1,
1975, as per District Memorandum hereto attached, Miss Enao was on her way
home from station when their group was ambushed and fired. According to
appellant's witnesses, who were members of the ambushed party, she was on
her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of 'securing supplies and other training
and school aids necessary for furthering services as a school teacher.' As a
result of the ambush, the appellant sustained gunshot wounds on her left
forearm and abdomen which compelled her confinement.

On August 5, 1975, a claim for income benefits for disability was filed by
the herein petitioner with the Government Service Insurance System but this
claim was denied by the System.

Petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission. On

October 26, 1976, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS appealed from and
dismissed the Petitioner's claim.

Issue: (1) WON the petitioners injury incurred when she left her official station
for Dipolog City for the purpose of procurring school supplies and training aids
to enhance her teaching efficiency is compensable. (2) WON the sworn
statements of the witnesses are to be set aside.

Held: (1) Yes, it is compensable. The Petitioner, in proceeding to Dipolog City

on August 1, 1975, which is a Friday, from her station, intended to procure
supplies and other training aids which are needed facilities in connection with
her services as a school teacher, cannot be at all disputed. The companions of
the Petitioner at the time of the ambush and who appear to be co-teachers of
the Petitioner, have attested in their respective affidavits. Furthermore, the SC
held that it is obvious that in proceeding to purchase school materials in
Dipolog City, Petitioner would necessarily have to leave the school premises
and her travel need not be during her usual working hours. What is significant
and controlling is that the injuries she sustained are work-connected, which
the Court finds to be so.

In the case of Vda. de Torbela vs. ECC, where, by a significant majority

vote of this Court, it was held that a claim arising from a vehicular accident
sustained by a school principal on his way from Bacolod City where he lived to
his school at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where he was the school principal
of, is compensable. It was therein ruled that "where an employee is accidentally
injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place of work, while she is going
to and from her work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the
course of her employment.

(2) No, the sworn statements by the witnesses should not be set aside. The SC
finds no basis at an for the findings made by the ECC in its decision that the
statements of Petitioner and her witnesses are merely self-serving declarations
because SC can discern no circumstance that would indicate or support such a
conclusion. Uncontroverted and unrefuted by any evidence, then such
statements of appellant's witnesses would suffice to establish that the multiple
gunshot wounds and injuries sustained by appellant and which caused her
confinement are definitely work-connected.

Gloria D. Menes v. ECC

Facts: Petitioner, Gloria D. Menes, was a Ministry of Education and Culture

(MEC)-employed school teacher for 32 years and was assigned in Raja Soliman
High School, Tondo-Binondo, Manila just before her retirement on 21 August
1975. She had opted to retire early due to her rheumatoid arthritis pain and
bronchiectasis with hemoptysis related to long-term pneumonitis. On October
21, 1976, petitioner filed for a disability benefits under P.D. 626 with GSIS.
However, GSIS denied said claim on the ground that rheumatoid arthritis and
pneumonitis are not occupational diseases related to her line of work. But on,
November 24, 1976, petitioner requested for a reconsideration of the denied
claim; contending that her ailments arose in the course of employment and
were aggravated by the conditions of the work place and the nature of her
work. GSIS denied her claim again, reiterating their previous decision. Hence,
elevated to ECC but ECC issued a decision affirming the decision of the GSIS.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner, Gloria Menes, is entitled to disability benefits from

respondent GSIS.

HELD: Yes, Gloria Menes is entitled to disability benefits. All public high school
teachers are admittedly the most underpaid and overworked employees of the
government; they are subject to emotional strains and stresses, dealing with
teenagers and harassed as they are by various extra-curricular or non-
academic assignments, aside from preparing lesson plans until late at night, if
they are not badgered by very demanding superiors. In the case of the
petitioner, her emotional tension is heightened by the fact that she teaches in
a tough-situated area: Binondo district, which is inhabited by thugs and other
criminal elements and further aggravated by the heavy pollution and
congestion therein as well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina
nearby. Women, like herein petitioner, are most vulnerable to such unhealthy
conditions. The pitiful situation of all public school teachers is further
accentuated by poor diet for they can ill-afford nutritiously-balanced meals
and would resort to poor mans staple diet of tuyo, daing, mongo and rice.
Furthermore, judicial notice should be taken of the fact that our country is in a
typhoon belt and that annually we experience torrential storms. The petitioner
would go through the ordeal of perspiring and getting drenched from
downpours in her daily commute from home to school and vice versa.
Petitioner is also in contact with at least 250 students everyday who might be
carriers of contagious disease, which would be a factor as to how she got her
ailments.

Narazo v ECC

Facts:

Dabatian v GSIS

Facts: At the time of his death, Sigfredo A. Dabatian was employed as Garbage
Truck Driver in the General Services Department of the City Government of
Cagayan deOro City. As Garbage Truck Driver, he was assigned mostly in the
night shift. Infact, at the time of his death, his time of duty started from 10:00
o'clock at night to6:00 o'clock in the morning the next day. It was gathered
from the evidence onrecord that the deceased was a heavy coffee drinker
which was his way of warding off sleepiness.Prior to his death, he was
observed by his co-employees to have been getting paler and weaker while at
work until the time he collapsed and becameunconscious while on his tour
duty and was brought to his residence by hiscompanions. Despite
hospitalization, he died two weeks later on July 3, 1976.A claim for income
benefits under the Employee's Compensation Program wasfiled by the widow,
the herein appellant. The GSIS denied the petition on the ground that
decedent's ailment, Peptic Ulcer, is not definitely accepted as an occupational
disease, as listed under the present law on compensation. Neither was there a
showing that the same was directly caused by his employment and that the
risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions
attendant to thedeceased's employment. The case was then elevated to the
ECC which ruled that the ailment is not work-connected, specifically, his
inherent predisposition to drinkingcoffee heavily which could have aggravated
his contraction of the diseaseresulting to his death. However, aggravation of
an illness is not a ground for compensation under the present compensation
law.

Issue: Whether or not under the premises the death of Sigfredo A. Dabatian is
compensable.

Held: No, not compensable. No competent evidence whatsoever was

submitted to prove that Dabatian's ailment was contracted prior to January 1,
1975 in order to bring it under the protective mantle of the old compensation
law. There are no medical findings, affidavits,reports or any other evidence
that deceased suffered from pain or any discomfort prior to the effectivity of
the New Labor Code. No allegation was even made to this effect. True it is, that
strict rules on evidence do not apply in cases such as this and that all doubts
should be resolved in favor of labor. However, We cannot over-extend the
limits of such rules. Justice and fair playdictate otherwise. The new law
on compensation should be applied to this case.
The present Labor Code, P.D. 442 as amended, abolished the
presumption of compensability andthe rule on aggravation of illness caused by
the nature of employment.
Thus, under the present law, in order for the employee to be entitled to
sickness or death benefits, the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be,
or must have resulted from either a)any illness definitely accepted as an
occupational disease listed by the Commission or b) anyillness caused by
employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by working conditions. Since peptic ulcer is not included in the list of
occupational diseases as drawn up by the Commission, then petitioner has the
burden of proving that the nature of her husband's work increased the risk of
contracting the disease. Aside from the undisputed fact that the deceased is a
heavy coffee drinker, which was his way of warding off sleepiness, no evidence
was ever adduced by petitioner to bolster the theory that her husband's work
increased the risk of contracting the ailment.Being a heavy coffee drinker may
have aggravated his peptic ulcer, but, aggravation of an illnessis no longer a
ground for compensation under the present law. This Court takes notice of the
fact that the conditions in this case are not peculiar to the work mentioned
herein. Many, if not most, employees are equally exposed to similar conditions
but have not been victims of peptic ulcer.

Rodriguez v ECC

Facts: Hector Rodriguez was a public school teacher assigned at Salaan

ElementarySchool in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. On November 19, 1975, he went on sick
leave and was hospitalized at Pangasinan Provincial Hospital after he complained of
severe stomach pains accompanied by nausea and vomiting. He was later diagnosed to
have an Intestinal Lipomatis of theLarge Colon with Obstruction of the Ascending
Colon. He underwent surgery but the same was unsuccessful. He died on December
2,1975.4. When his widow filed a claim with GSIS, the same was denied. GSIS
contended that the nature of the deceased duties as a teacher could not have directly
caused his ailment which eventuated in his subsequent death. The ECC affirmed the
decision of the GSIS. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that the principal duties of her
husband as aclassroom teacher alone would not have any connection with the disease.
However, she posits that the deceaseds auxiliary activities as a classroom teacher
directly affected his physical consatitution and caused him to have sustained some
trauma in his abdominal cavity and other parts of the body.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the deceased caused by Intestinal Lipomatis of the
Large Colon with Obstruction of the Ascending Colon, is compensable.

HELD: NO. Claims on death benefits under Art. 194 must result from an occupational
disease. A compensable disease means any illness accepted and listed by the ECC or
any illness caused by the employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of
contracting the same was increased by the working conditions. If the disease is listed in
Annex A, no proof of causation is required. If it is not so listed, it has been held that the
employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove, a positive
proposition, that is, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working
conditions. Proof of direct causal relation is indispensably required. It is enough that the
claimant adduces proof of reasonable work connection, whereby the development of
the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the
job. Strict rules of evidence, which has been held to be such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. The circumstances
alleged by the petitioner and the evidence she presented are not enough to discharge
the required quantum of proof, liberal as it is. There is no clear evidence as to when the
diseased commenced and supervened; the tumors which developed in the deceaseds
colon may have been growing for many years even before he was employed as a
teacher. The trauma that was supposed to have caused or at least contributed to the
disease was neither satisfactorily clarified nor adequately proved.

Casumpang v ECC

Facts: Petitioners husband, Jose Casumpang, then working as Prison Guard of

the Bureau of Prisons with assignment at the San Ramon Prison and Penal
Farm, Zamboanga City. Mr. Casumpang died due to Cancer of the Stomach.
Thus, Mrs. Casumpang claims for income benefits for death. However the
GSIS, together with ECC, denied the petition on the ground that the cause of
death is not an occupational disease nor the result of the deceased's nature of
occupation as Prison Guard.

Issue: WON cancer of the stomach is an occupational disease and hence,

compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.

Held: NO. The contention of the appellant that compensability is presumed

once the ailment is shown to have supervened in the course of employment
cannot be accorded merit. The doctrine of presumptive compensability which
was then expressly provided under the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act
3428) is not recognized under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the
present law on employees' compensation. In the latter law, proof of causation
by the claimant is imperative, such burden being incompatible with the
presumption of compensability. Thus, SC affirmed the decision appealed.