Republic v.

Hughes, GR 100835, 26 October 1993

G.R. No. 100835, October 26, 1993

REPUBLIC vs. CA and HUGHES

FACTS:

James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married Lenita Mabunay
Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country. On 29 June
1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the RTC of Angeles City to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and
Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple
even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the
adoption. On 29 November 1990, the RTC rendered a decision granting the petition. A petition for
Review onCertiorari was filed with this Court, assailing the trial court's decision. This Court referred the
case to the Court of Appeals which, on 09 July 1991, affirmed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE: W/N the spouses Anthony and Lenita Hughes are qualified to adopt the minor niece and nephews
of Lenita under Philippine law

HELD:

No, it is clear that James Anthony Hughes is not qualified to adopt under Article 184 of the Family Code
because he does not fall under any of the following exceptions enumerated in paragraph (3): (a) A
former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her Filipino spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. While James
Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant to paragraph
(3)(a). The problem in her case lies, instead, with Article 185 of the Code, expressing as follows:

Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the wife,
a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.

Executive Order No. 91, dated 17 December 1986, of President Corazon C. Aquino amended Article 29 of
PD 603 and is expressed as follows

Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In such case, parental authority shall be exercised as if the
child were their own by nature.

If one of the spouses is an alien, both husband and wife shall jointly adopt. Otherwise, the adoption shall
not be allowed.

As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both
the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were
of the same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the necessity
for joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

The respondent court, in affirming the grant of adoption by the lower court, has theorized that James
Anthony should merely be considered a "nominal or formal party" in the proceedings. This view of the
appellate court cannot be sustained. Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate
paternity and filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption, such as,
but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of surname of the adopter by the
adopted, as well as support and successional rights. These are matters that obviously cannot be
considered inconsequential to the parties.

We are not unmindful of the possible benefits, particularly in this instance, that an adoption can bring
not so much for the prospective adopting parents as for the adopted children themselves. We also
realize that in proceedings of this nature, paramount consideration is given to the physical, moral, social
and intellectual welfare of the adopted for whom the law on adoption has in the first place been
designed.

Republic v. Toledano, GR 94147, 8 June 1994

Facts:

On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a former
Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a minor who is
Evelyn's youngest brother. The trial court granted the petition. Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor General appealed contending that the lower court erred in granting the petition for the spouses
are not qualified to adopt under Philippine Law.

Issue:

Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt

Held:

Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of
the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph
Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not
qualified to adopt, viz.:

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules
on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon
Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is
not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second
place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his
spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt
Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a
Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States
in 1988.

Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph
3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger
brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating
Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along
together with Article 184.
Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted
is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The
rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

Note:

The alien husband can now adopt under Sec. 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998).
The Supreme Court has held in several cases that when husband and wife are required to adopt jointly,
each one of them must be qualified to adopt in his or her own right. However, the American husband
must comply with the requirements of the law including the residency requirement of 3 years.
Otherwise, the adoption will not be allowed

Landingin v. Republic, GR 164948, 27 June 2006

FACTS: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage
and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on. The minors are the natural children of Manuel
Ramos, petitioners brother (deceased), and Amelia Ramos- who went to Italy, re-married there and
now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children .

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the biological mother?

HELD:

No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. When
she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof
provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of
the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the
minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal
guardian.

Republic v. Vergara, GR95551, 20 March 1997

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE VERGARA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPS. AMADO and TERESA RUBITE, petitioners,

vs.
HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 51, PALAWAN, and LEONARDO SALDE, SR.,
LEONARDO SALDE, JR., FLORESITA SALDE, GLORIA SALDE-PANAGUITON, and JOJETA PANAGUITON,
respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Judge, upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal, ordered without notice and hearing the
dismissal of Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 both for frustrated murder filed against private
respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, which thereafter were reinstated upon
initiative of the Secretary of Justice and docketed anew as Criminal Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573. After
pleading not guilty to the new informations, the accused moved to quash on the ground of double
jeopardy, which was opposed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Petitioners contend that the filing of the two (2) new Informations did not place accused-private
respondents in double jeopardy since the dismissal of the previous cases was made with the latter's
express consent, which can be equated with their motion for reinvestigation of the cases, dismissal of
the cases being their ultimate intention in moving for reinvestigation. It is the position of petitioners
that when the dismissal is with the express consent of the accused, such dismissal cannot be the basis of
a claim of double jeopardy.

Petitioners further submit that the dismissal of the previous cases is null and void as the motion to
dismiss filed by the Provincial Prosecutor which led to the dismissal of the cases did not contain a notice
of hearing; hence, it was then a "mere scrap of paper" which the lower court should not even have
entertained.

Finally, petitioners maintain that where the prosecution has been deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is violated.

While the Solicitor General concedes that "[w]hat should have been done by the new Provincial
Prosecutor was to refile the Informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 and not to file new
Informations which were docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573," he nevertheless avers that the
filing of the new Informations amounted merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy and did not
expose the private respondents to a second jeopardy.

The Solicitor General then claims that there can be no valid defense of double jeopardy since one of the
requisites for its valid defense, i.e., that there be a valid termination of the first jeopardy. He further
argues that the motion to dismiss filed by the public prosecutor should not have been entertained,
much less granted, since there was no notice of hearing, nor was it actually set for hearing.

Private respondents on the other hand, invoking the now repealed Sec. 9, Rule 117, of the Rules of
Court, asseverate that the "rules provide and speak of EXPRESS CONSENT" which cannot be equated
with intention. Hence, while they may have intended to have their cases dismissed upon moving for
reinvestigation, they never gave their express consent to the dismissal of the cases. In fact, they never
sought the dismissal of the charges against them.

Furthermore, private respondents, in response to the allegation that the orders of respondent judge
dismissing the first two cases were null and void, argue that if indeed the dismissal orders were null and
void, petitioners should not have waited for the filing of the new Informations and their subsequent
quashal. They should have immediately challenged the dismissal order. After sleeping on their rights,
they cannot belatedly say that they were denied due process.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not private respondents gave their express consent to the dismissal of the original
Informations.

b) Whether or not notice and hearing are required in motion to dismiss filed by the Public Prosecutor
who himself instituted the criminal cases.

c) Whether or not the first jeopardy was validly terminated.

HELD:

a) No. Express consent has been defined as that which is directly given either viva voce or in writing. It
is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning.
This is hardly what private respondents gave. What they did was merely to move for reinvestigation of
the case before the prosecutor. To equate this with express consent of the accused to the dismissal of
the case in the lower court is to strain the meaning of "express consent" too far. Simply, there was no
express consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the original
Informations.
b) No. Since it was the prosecuting officer who instituted the cases, and who thereafter moved for their
dismissal, a hearing on his motion to dismiss was not necessary at all. While it may be true that, as a
general rule, all motions should contain a notice of hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, these
cases present an unusual situation where the motion to dismiss filed negates the necessity of a hearing.
Here, it was the public prosecutor himself who after instituting Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that after a reinvestigation it was found that . . . the evidence in
these cases clearly tilts in favor of both accused. Moreover, Section 5 of Rule 110 of the New Rules of
Criminal Procedure expressly provides that "[a]ll criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be under the direction and control of the fiscal." The private complainants are also
precluded from questioning the discretion of the fiscal in moving for the dismissal of the criminal action.
Hence, a hearing on the motion to dismiss would be useless and futile.

c) Yes. It has been repeatedly held that once an Information is filed with the court, it acquires
jurisdiction over the case, and the consequent discretion to dismiss it. While the prosecutor retains full
control over the prosecution, he loses jurisdiction over the entire proceedings. Hence, what petitioners
should have done was to appeal the dismissal of the cases on the ground that the said motion failed to
include a notice of hearing, and should not have waited for the dismissal of the subsequent cases on the
ground of double jeopardy, and thereafter question the first dismissal, which by then had already
become final, erroneous though it may be.

The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of
service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of
jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The
remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity
otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal order, and
not certiorari.

It must be stressed that after a court has obtained jurisdiction over the case, the failure to give notice of
a subsequent step in the proceedings does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. If substantial injury
results from failure of notice and complaint is duly made thereof, the act of the court may be held to be
erroneous and will be corrected in the proper proceeding, but it is not an act without or in excess of
jurisdiction and is not void. There is a great difference in the results which follow the failure to give the
notice, which is necessary to confer on the court jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of
the action, and that which follows a failure to give notice of a step taken after the court has obtained
such jurisdiction and is proceeding with the action.

Hence, the conditions for a valid defense of double jeopardy, i.e., (a) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and, (c) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the first, all being present in these cases, the defense
of double jeopardy must prevail.
In Re: Petition for adoption of Michelle Lim, GR 168992-93, 21 May 2009

FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor
children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of
DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents.
Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December
2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and
Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario
gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

HELD:

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and
wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses
jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word shall signifies that
joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since
there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one
of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

Cervantes v. Fajardo, GR 79955, 27 January 1989

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. Angelie Ann Cervantes was born on 14 February 1987 to Conrado Fajardo andGina Carreon, who
are common-law husband and wife. They offered the child foradoption to Gina Carreon's sister and
brother-in-law, Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody
of the child when she was barely two weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child was
executed by respondent Gina Carreon.
2. The petition for adoption was filed bypetitioners before the RTC of Rizal, which granted the
petition. It ordered that the child be freed from the parental custody of her natural parents, and
henceforth, that she shall be a child of Zenaida and Nelson.

3. On March or April, 1987, the spouses received a letter from Gina and Conrado demanding that
they be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise they would get their child.

4. When the spouses ignored their demands, Gina took the minor from her yay a and brought the
child to her house in Paranaque City. The spouses demanded the return of the child, but Gina refused,
saying she had no desire to give up her child; the affidavit of consent was not fully explained to her;
however, she sent word that she will return Angelie to the spouses if they paid the amount of
P150,000.00.

5. Thus, the spouses filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court to compel Gina to return
custody of Angelie to them. During hearing, the social worker who conducted the case study testified
that she interviewed Gina in connection with the petition for adoption and Gina manifested her desire
to have the child adopted by the spouses.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the adoptive parents have rightful custody over Angelie.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:

In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latters welfare is
paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will
not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise.[1] In all controversies regarding
the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending
parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion.

It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent
Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His
open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable
atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person.

Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another married man
with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor
(like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose father is not her true father, could also
affect the moral outlook and values of said minor.
Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially,
and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural
mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation
with a married man, can most likely give her.

Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in
natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural
parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by
both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and
exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

Republic v. Hernandez, GR 117209, 9 February 1996

Facts: The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously
granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to
complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.

Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption
objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single
proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other,
being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the
law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the
adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of
the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of ones legal
name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the
substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change
of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order
to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious
litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and
change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition.
Issue: WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper name if the
adoptee in a petition for adoption.

Held: No.

Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both
shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter,
upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the
adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be
contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must
remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does
not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The
automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a
decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that
a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein.
If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the
substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and
accordingly determined.

A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements
therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an
independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori,
it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot
of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy
available under our remedial law system.
Sayson v. CA, GR 89224-25, 23 January 1992

Adoption; Succession; Representation;

While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same rights
as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation.

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and
Teodoro. Eleno died on Nov. 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel
Bautista, died on Mar. 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on Mar. 26, 1981. Their properties were
left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their
children.

On Apr. 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa and Remedios, together with Juana (Isabels mother), filed
a complaint for partition of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel. Delia, Edmundo (both legally
adopted) and Doribel (the legitimate daughter), who alleged successional rights to the estate as the
decedents lawful descendants, resisted said complaint and filed their own complaint for the partition of
the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela claiming that they are entitled to inherit Teodoros share in his
parents estate by right of representation.

The trial court declared them entitled to inherit by right of representation.

On appeal, the CA modified the decision disqualifying Delia and Edmundo from inheriting from the
estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Delia, Edmundo and Doribel are entitled to inherit their fathers share in the estate of
his (Teodoro) parents estate by right of representation.

HELD: YES as to Doribel but NO as to Delia and Edmundo.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus granddaughter of Eleno and
Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent here deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate
of her grandparents. Under Art. 981 (NCC), she is entitled to the share her father would have directly
inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents other children.

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, those rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the
adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under
no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The CA was correct however, in
holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents
intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased
Teodoro.

Lahom v. Sibulo, GR 143989, 14 July 2003

FACTS:

A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial court
granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo
to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which
she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their
surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the
case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters
to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).

These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and concern
prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption
previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law
on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998,
wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to
rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopters action prescribed.

RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was
filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the
decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right
of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force,
could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five
year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke
the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period
is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are
considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional
guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the
context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by
statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be
for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of
the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a
right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause
the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his
legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable
portion of his estate