46. SAPTO v.

FABIANA, 103 PHIL 683

FACTS: Sapto (Moro), now deceased, was the registered owner of a parcel of land
located in Alambre, Toril, Davao City. When Sapto died, he left his children
Samuel, Constancio, and Ramon as heirs of the property in question. Ramon pre-
deceased his two brothers, leaving no, other heirs. On June 6, 1931, Samuel and
Constancio Sapto executed a deed of sale of a portion of four hectares of the land
aforementioned in favor of defendant Apolonio Fabiana. The sale was duly
approved by the Provincial Governor of Davao, but was never registered.
Possession of the land conveyed was, however, transferred to Fabiana and the latter
has been in the possession thereof since 1931 up to the present. Thereafter,
Constancio Sapto died without any issue. Samuel Sapto married one Dora
(Bagoba) and upon his death was survived by his widow and two children,
Laureana and Vicente Sapto. On October 19, 1954, the widow and children of
Samuel Sapto filed this action in the Court of First Instance of Davao for the
recovery of the parcel of land sold by their predecessors to defendant Apolonio
Fabiana in 1931. After trial, the lower court held that although the sale between
Samuel and Constancio Sapto and defendant in 1931 was never registered, it was
valid and binding upon the parties and the vendors heirs, and ordered the plaintiffs
to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in defendant's favor and its annotation
in the certificate of title. From this judgment, plaintiffs appealed to this Court.

ISSUES:

a.) Whether or not the deed of sale executed by appellants' predecessors in favor of
the appellee over the land in question, although never registered, is valid and
binding.

b.) Whether or not the CFIs order of conveyance in favor of Fabiana is valid.

DECISIONS:

a.) The deed of sale executed by appellants' predecessors in favor of the appellee
over the land in question, although never registered, is valid and binding. The SC
first affirmed the validity of the sale between the Sapto brothers and Fabiana,
ruling, that even though it was never registered the sale was valid, binding, and
effective upon the heirs of the vendor. According to the court, as between the
parties to a sale, registration is not necessary to make it valid and effective, for
actual notice is equivalent to registration. In fact in the case of Medina vs. Imaz
and Warner Barnes and Co., 27 Phil., 314, it was held that the peculiar force of a
title is exhibited only when the purchaser has sold to innocent third parties the land
described in the conveyance, furthermore, in Galanza vs. Nuesa, 95 Phil., 713, the
court held that "registration is intended to protect the buyer against claims of third
persons arising from subsequent alienations by the vendor, and is certainly not
necessary to give effect as between the parties to their deed of sale". Since no right
of innocent third persons or subsequent transferees of the property in question is
involved herein. The property has remained and still is in the possession of the
vendee of appellants' predecessors, herein appellee. It is, therefore, clear that the
conveyance between appellee and his vendors are valid and binding upon the latter,
and is equally binding and effective against the heirs of the vendors, herein
appellants. In other words, the transfer and possession of the property was a clear
indication of the validity of the sale.

b.) The CFIs order of conveyance in favor of Fabiana is valid. In assailing the
order, the Sapto heirs claimed that the CFI cannot order the conveyance because
the defendants cause of action had already prescribed. The SC ruled however, that
the action for conveyance was actually one to quiet title. In ruling so, the SC cited
American jurisprudence and Art. 480 of the New Civil Code, which states, that
actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are
imprescriptible.
 47. LIGON VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

IDP (Islamic Directorate of the Phils) sold to INK (Iglesia Ni Kristo) 2 parcels of
land. . The parties stipulated in the deed of sale that the IDP shall undertake to
evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the property within forty-five (45) days
from the execution of the contract. IDP failed to fulfill this obligation. Hence INK
prayed that the trial court order IDP to comply with its obligation. IDP alleged in
its answer that it was INK which violated the contract by delaying the payment of
the purchase price and prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded. The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of INK. INK, then, filed a motion praying that
petitioner Leticia Ligon, who was in possession of the certificates of title over the
properties as mortgagee of IDP, be directed to surrender the certificates to the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale
in its name.

The trial court rendered decision ordering Ligon to surrender the duplicate copies
to INK. This was subsequently amended and Ligon was ordered to surrender such
copies to the Register of Deeds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to order the surrender of the owners
duplicate copies
Whether or not INK is entitled to the owners duplicate copies

HELD:
Jurisdiction of RTC
Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by the
Register of Deeds unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented together with
such instrument, except in some cases or upon order of the court for cause shown.
In case the person in possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or fails to
surrender the same to the Register of Deeds so that a voluntary document may be
registered and a new certificate issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529
clearly states that the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel
surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order
the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to
surrender the same and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon
such surrender.
Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided that "Courts of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications
for original registration of titles to lands, including improvements and interest
therein and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to
hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions."
Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits the change has simplified registration
proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not
only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising
upon such applications or petitions.
The principal action filed by INK before the trial court was for specific
performance with damages based on a document of sale. Such action was well
within the exclusive jurisdictions of the Regional Trial Court. When INK filed a
motion for the issuance of an order from the same court to compel the holder of the
duplicate certificates of title to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds for the
registration of the deed of sale subject of the principal action, the motion was a
necessary incident to the main case.
Right of INC over the owners duplicate copies
The order of the trial court directing the surrender of the certificates to the Register
of Deeds in order that the deed of sale in favor of INK can be registered, cannot in
any way prejudice her rights and interests as a mortgagee of the lots. Any lien
annotated on the previous certificates of title which subsists should be incorporated
in or carried over to the new transfer certificates of title. 9 It is clear therefore that
the surrender by petitioner of the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds as
ordered by the trial court will not create any substantial injustice to her. To grant
the petition and compel INK to file a new action in order to obtain the same reliefs
it asked in the motion before the trial court is to encourage litigations where no
substantial rights are prejudiced. This end should be avoided.