DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

Sanders v Veridiano (G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988)

Facts:
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents, Rossi and Wyer, were advised that their employment had
been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time as gameroom attendants in the special
services department of U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. Their reaction was to protest this
conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the
U.S. Department of Defense. The result was a recommendation from the hearing officer who conducted
the proceedings for the reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus
backwages. However, petitioner Sanders, the special services director who has supervision over the private
respondents disagreed with the hearing officers report and asked for the rejection of its recommendation
before a letter addressed to the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, Moreau.
On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a letter purportedly coming from
petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private
respondent's employment status and requesting concurrence therewith.
The private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against
the herein petitioners and claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them
to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was
an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.
The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal
capacity. While in a motion to dismiss, the petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed
by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over
them under the doctrine of state immunity.
Issue: WON the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for
which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents.
Held: YES. It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called
to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the
special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the
private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and
other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply to a request from
his superior for more information regarding the case of the private respondents. As for Moreau, what he
is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the
private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced.
This act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly
answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA

Republic v Sandoval (G.R. No. 84607, March 19, 1993)

Facts: In the aftermath of the bloody dispersal in Mendiola between the police forces and the rallyists,
then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 11, (A.O. 11, for brevity) dated January
22, 1987, which created the Citizens' Mendiola Commission. The Commission recommended the
investigation regarding the identities of those who fired their guns that resulted to the death and injury of
the rallyists and to give compensation to the deceased and wounded victims of the incident.

Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of compensation was received by the

victims. Petitioners were constrained to institute an action for damages against the Republic of the
Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident, before the
trial court arguing that the State has impliedly waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered
view that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and
victims of the Mendiola incident and by the public addresses made by then President Aquino, the State has
consented to be sued. Respondent Judge Sandoval, in his first questioned Order, dismissed the complaint
on the ground that there was no waiver by the State. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
therefrom, but the same was denied by respondent judge.

Issue: WON the State waived its immunity from suit by way of the Administrative Order No.
11

Held: NO.

Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs of the
deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability
automatically attaches to the State. It is important to note that A.O. 11 expressly states that the
purpose of creating the Commission was to have a body that will conduct an "investigation of the
disorder, deaths and casualties that took place." In effect, whatever may be the findings of the
Commission, the same shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides
to litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue.
Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or said, the same
are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The President's act of joining
the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there was an admission by the State of
any liability, "it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people".
Thirdly, even if Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the
government. In the case it is upon the military officers and personnel who exceeded their authority.

United States v Guinto (G.R. No. 76607 February 26,1990)

Facts: Consolidated cases regarding the principle of state immunity:

In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed
in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering services in
the said base.

In G.R. No. 79470, one Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony
Lamachia, et al. for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station
in Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation as he was found guilty, from the testimony of
the petitioners that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to
the club customers. Lamachia invoked his immunity from suit, he being U.S. Airforce officer.

In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an
extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual
petitioners herein, namely, Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the U.S. Air Force
and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). Bautista was dismissed from his
employment. He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners herein claiming that
it was because of their acts that he was removed. Petitioners invoked their immunity since the act was in
conformity of their functions but was denied because under the Military Base Agreement, immunity covered
only criminal and not civil cases.

In G.R. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein
petitioners (except the United States of America), for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result
of the acts of the defendants. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them
and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries
to them. The defendants deny this and claim the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the
dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. The defendants stress that the dogs were called
off and the plaintiffs were immediately taken to the medical center for treatment of their wounds. The
defendants invoked their immunity and argued that acts doen by them are within their functions but denied
by the trial court stating that they exceeded and therefore liable.

Issue: WON Doctrine of State immunity is not applicable therefore the State is liable

Held: NO. A state may only be sued if it consents. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded
in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium
which says that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.

In GR No. 80018, it is proven that petitioners had acted in the exercise of their official functions
when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him
at his trial. The said petitioners were Special Investigators and were tasked of preventing the distribution,
possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of such acts therefore state immunity
can be applied.

In GR No. 80258, the court did not directly decide the case because the record is to meager to
indicate whether the defendants are acting within their functions or had actually exceeded their authority.

In GR No. 79470, the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the
dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. The reason is that by entering into the employment
contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign
immunity from suit. The restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a
business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary capacity thereby making
it a commercial and not a governmental activity. Petitioners are not liable based on the strength of
evidences.

In GR No. 76607, the court also found that the barbershops subject of the concessions granted by
the United States government are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. This being the case,
the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court
below.

Veterans Manpowers & Protective Services Inc. v CA (G.R. No. 91359)

Facts: On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with Philippine Association of
Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by
undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the
Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition,
hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the
cancellation of its license to operate a security agency. The VMPSI requested to set aside the decision or
disregard the findings of PADPAO and consider its application for renewal of license, even without
certification from PADPAO. As the Philippine Constabulary chief did not reply and its license was expiring,
VMPSI filed a civil case against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA regarding the matter. The PC Chief and PC-
SUSIA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it was against the state which had not given its consent
thereto.
Issue: WON VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the state
without its consent

WON the Memorandum of Agreement constitute as an implied consent of the State to

be sued

Held: YES. Invoking the rule (the court may not be sued without its consent), the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA
contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental
function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard
agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Government's
consent, especially in this case because VMPSI's complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents
to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of
P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney's fees from said
public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced
because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.

NO. The Memorandum of Agreement did not constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued
because it was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardized the salaries of the security
guards. It is merely incidental to the purpose of RA No. 5487 which is to regulate the organization and
operation of private security agencies.

Waiver of the State's immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly
inferred, but must be construed strictissimi juris. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from
statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum.

Merritt v Government of the Philippine Islands (G.R. No. 11154, March 21, 1916)

Facts: E. Merritt who was driving his motorcycle along the Calle Padre Faura collided with the ambulance
of the Philippine General Hospital. The plaintiff was so severely injured. As the negligence which caused
the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, Act 2457 was enacted
authorizing the plaintiff to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Island and authorizing the
Attorney-General of said island to appear in the suit. Thereafter, a suit was filed before the Court of First
Instance in Manila in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.
Merritt is entitled on account of said collision.

Issue: WON defendant, Government of the Philippines, waived its immunity from suit as well
as conceded its liability to the plaintiff when it enacted Act No. 2457

Held: NO. By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to the plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any
cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submit
itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. The State (the
Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when
they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, and that the chauffeur of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

Par. 5 of Article 1903 defines special agents as duly empowered by a definite order or commission
to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where
the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or
technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility

AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA (G.R. NO. L-26400 FEBRUARY 29, 1972)

Facts: Appellant Victor Amigable, the owner of the lot used by the government for the construction of the
Mango and Gorordo Avenues filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca,
in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the
land and the payment of compensatory damages for illegal occupation of her land, moral damages,
attorneys fees and the cost of the suit. Appellant argued that without prior expropriation or negotiated
sale, the government used his lot for its use. The court rendered its decision holding that it had no
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion
of her lot in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent. Accordingly,
the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to Us, there being no question of fact involved.

Issue: WON the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.

Held: YES. Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without
going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit without its consent. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Considering that no annotation in favor of the
government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of
conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot.
As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at
anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.

Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 90478, November 21, 1991)

Facts: The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution, and damages against private respondents Bienvenido Tantoco and Dominador Santiago,
together with Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and
Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda. Private respondents jointly moved to strike out some portions of the
complaint and for bill of particulars of other portions, which motion was opposed by the PCGG. The
Sandiganbayan gave the PCGG 45 days to expand its complaint to make more specific certain allegations.
Private respondents then presented a Motion to leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of
Court.

Afterwards, the Sandiganbayan denied the private respondents motion to strike out, for bill of
particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be without legal and factual basis.

Private respondents then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. In response, the PCGG
presented a "Reply to Answer with Motion to Dismiss Compulsory Counterclaim."

Private Respondents filed a pleading denominated Interrogatories to Plaintiff, and Amended

Interrogatories to Plaintiff as well as a motion for production and inspection of documents. By resolution
dated August 21 and 25, 1989, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the
motion for production and inspection of documents, respectively.
 Thereafter, the PCGG filed a Motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989
(allowing production and inspection of documents) arguing that the documents are privileged in character
since they are intended to be sued against the PCGG and/or its Commissioner in violation of Sec.4, Executive
No. 1, viz.: (a) No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or
omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order., (b) No member or staff of the Commission
shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance."

After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions, the first, denying
reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of documents), and the second, reiterating by
implication the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff (PCGG).

Issue: WON PCGG is immune from suit

Held: NO. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without
its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds
its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or
preferred status to the State, even while assuming to represent or act for the State. "The consent of the
State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be manifested either through
a general law or a special law. Implied consent is given when the state itself commences litigation or when
it enters into a contract." By taking the initiative in an action against the private parties, the state surrenders
its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant.

Republic v Feliciano (G.R. No. 70853, March 12, 1987)

Facts: Respondent Feliciano filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of his land situated in the Barrio of Salvacion,
Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

That on November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for
settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines
Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started subdividing and
distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within the reservation
established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of plaintiff and should therefore be
excluded therefrom. Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in
question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares.

On August 21, 1980, the trial court, through Judge Esteban Lising, issued the questioned order
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Respondent moved for reconsideration, while the Solicitor
General, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filed its opposition thereto, maintaining that the
dismissal was proper on the ground of non-suability of the State.

Issue: WON the Republic of the Philippines can be sued for the recovery of ownership and
possession of his land.

Held: In this case, NO. The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence
is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by
implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing
in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent. This is a fatal
defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed
in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the Proclamation contended by the respondent where the consent was
allegedly inferred is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.

United States v Ruiz (G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985)

Facts: In May 1972, the United States naval base in Subic, Zambales invited the submission of bids for:
(a) Repair fender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station and, (b) Repair typhoon damage to NAS
Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf
approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines.

Respondent Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids but was
later denied on a letter sent by the United States Naval Station signed by William I. Collins, Director of
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, which stated that it did not qualify to receive an award of the
projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at
the boat landings of the naval station in Subic Bay and that the projects had been awarded to third parties.

Thereafter, the company sued the United States of America, Williams I. Collins and all members
of the Engineering Command and ordered to allow them to perform the work on the projects and, in the
event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages.

The defendants in return entered their special appearance "for the purpose only of questioning
the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the
subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of
defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any
other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint."

Issue: WON the United States may be sued

Held: NO. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence
and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly
developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii ) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts ( jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can be thus deemed to
have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense
of both the US and the Philippines, undisputed a function of the government of the highest order, they are
not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. The correct test for the application of
State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act.

The Holy See v Rosario (G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994)

Facts: This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters (Lot
5-A)located in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner, The
Holy See. Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which registered in the name of the Philippine
Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr.,
acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent, Starbright
Sales Ent. Inc. (SSEI).

In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute
arose as who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating
the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation (Tropicana).

On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, for
annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against
petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos,
Jr., the PRC and Tropicana.

The petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit. It was denied on the ground that petitioner shed off its sovereign immunity by entering
into the business contract in question.

A motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari.

Issue: WON The Holy See can be sued

Held: NO. A state will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract
in its proprietary or private capacity (jus gestiones). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity (jus imperii)that no such waiver may be implied."

In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real
estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner
has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that
it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private
respondent failed to dispute said claim.

Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation
was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place
of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in
a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.

In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the
mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be
recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.

The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed
with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose
off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that
they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint.
 Republic v Villasor (G.R. No. L-30671, November 28, 1973)

Facts: On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered confirming the arbitration award in the amount of
P1,712,396.40 in favour of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International
Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Honorable
Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the decision to be final and executory, and directed the
Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision.

Pursuant to the said Order, corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of
the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served
notices of garnishment with several Banks, especially on the monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines
in the form of deposits, sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution. The funds
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans
Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated
for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition proceedings, challenges the validity of the Order
issued by Judge Villasor declaring the decision final and executory and subsequently issuing an alias writ
of execution directed against the funds of the AFP in pursuance thereof.

Issue: WON public funds may be made the object of payment for suits

Held: NO. It is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its consent." A corollary,
both dictated by logic and sound sense from such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object
of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state
liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, such a well-
settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule that where the State
gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action
`only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of the
Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of
public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed
or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by
law.

Department of Agriculture v NLRC (G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993)

Facts: The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a
contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their
arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the petitioner.

On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency led a complaint for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay,
holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, before the Regional Arbitration Branch of Cagayan
de Oro against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency.The Executive Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision finding petitioner jointly and severally liable with sultan Security Agency for the
payment of the money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security guards. The decision
became final and executory.
 The Labor Arbiter then issued a writ of execution which resulted in the property of the petitioner
being levied. The petitioner insisted the rule of non-suability of the State. The private respondents, on the
other hand, argued that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service
contract with Sultan Security Agency.

Issue: WON Dept. of Agriculture can be sued because of the contract entered by them

Held: YES. The rule is that the state may not be sued without its consent. On the contrary, as correctly
phrased, the doctrine only conveys that the State may not be sued without its consent. Its import then
is that the State may at times be sued. The States consent may be given either expressly or impliedly.
Express consent may be made through a general law waiving the immunity of the State from suit which is
found in Act 3083, where the Philippine government consents and submits to be sued upon any money
claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as basis of civil action
between private parties. Implied consent on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences
litigation, thus opening itself to counterclaim or when it enters into a contract.

In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity
apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could
have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But, be that as it may, the claims of private
respondents, i.e., for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising
from the Contract for Security Services, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives
the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied. Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving the State's immunity from suit.

When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an
unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is
to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.

PNB v Pabalan (G.R. No. L-33112, June 15, 1978)

Facts: A judgment against respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration had been rendered and
reached the stage of finality. Respondent Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution followed
thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
deposited with the Philippine National Bank (PNB). PNB invoked the fundamental constitutional law doctrine
of non-suability of a state, it being alleged that such funds are public in character.

Issue: WON PNB may invoke the Doctrine of State Immunity

Held: In this case NO. If the funds appertained to one of the regular departments or offices in the
government, then, certainly, such a provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is not the case here.
Garnishment would lie. The Court left no doubt that the funds of public corporations could properly be
made the object of a notice of garnishment.

When the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is
to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a
corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the
corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations

Rayo v CFI of Bulacan (G.R. No. L-55273-83, December 19, 1981)

Facts: Separate complaints for damages arising from the precipitate and simultaneous opening of
floodgates of the Angat Dam resulting in the inundation of several Bulacan towns were filed by petitioners
before respondent Court against the National Power Corporation (NPC) and the plant superintendent of
Angat Dam. In its answer, the NPC invoked a special and affirmative defense that in the operation of the
Angat Dam, it is performing a purely governmental function, hence it cannot be sued without the express
consent of the State. It asked for dismissal of the case. Respondent court ordered the dismissal of the
complaint against the NPC over the opposition of petitioners stating that the NPC performs governmental
function with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam, and that its power to sue and
be sued under its Charter does not include the power to be sued for tort. Respondent Court denied
reconsideration of its order.

Issue: WON respondent National Power Corporation performs a governmental function with
respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam

Held: YES. It is not necessary to write an extended dissertation on whether or not the NPC performs a
governmental function with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam. It is sufficient to
say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and
be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3[d].) As a government owned and controlled
corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. Moreover,
the charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be sued in any court" is without qualification on the cause
of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by petitioners.

Bureau of Printing v Bureau of Printing Employees Ass. (G.R. No.L-15751, Jan. 28, 1961)

Facts: Respondent Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU), Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza,
Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran filed a complaint against herein petitioners Bureau of Printing,
Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma, the
Director of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that petitioners have been engaging in unfair
labor practice by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing, particularly the
members of the complaining association, in the exercise of their right to self-organization and discriminating
in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing their union
activities.

In return, the petitioners denied the charges and claimed that the Bureau of Printing has no
juridical personality to sue and be sued and that it is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of
gain but is an agency of the Republic performing governmental functions.

Issue: WON the Bureau of Printing can be sued

Held: NO. The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of
1916. It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations
Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and is
obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit. Indeed, as an office of the
Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec.
1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would
actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the
Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection.

Mobil Phils. Exploration v Customs Arrastre Service (G.R. No. L23139, Dec. 17, 1966)
Facts: Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville" sometime in November
of 1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila
on April 10, 1963, and was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the
Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered
to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment.

On April 4, 1964 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the
undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages. On April 20, 1964 the defendants filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot
be sued. After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964, dismissed the complaint on the
ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable. Appellant contends
that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of
the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such can be sued by
private individuals.

Issue: WON Customs Arrastre Service or the Bureau of Customs can be sued

Held: NO. The Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code), with
no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental,
that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs
duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R. A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a
necessary incident. For practical reasons said revenues and customs duties cannot be assessed and
collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being
imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it
that the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires that the
landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs premises to enable
said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operation.

The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the
operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of
its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.

Civil Aeronautics Admin. V CA (G.R. No. L-51806, Nov. 8, 1988)

Facts: In the afternoon of December 13, 1968, private respondent with several other persons went to the
Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. In order to get a better view of the incoming
passengers, he and his group proceeded to the viewing deck or terrace of the airport. While walking on
the terrace, then filled with other people, private respondent slipped over an elevation about four (4) inches
high at the far end of the terrace. As a result, private respondent fell on his back and broke his thigh bone.
Private respondent undergone an operation.

Private respondent then filed an action for damages based on quasi-delict with the CFI of Rizal,
Branch VII against petitioner Civil Aeronautics Administration or CAA as the entity empowered "to
administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport. CFI as well
as the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the private respondent. Petitioner argued that the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in not holding that the present suit against the CAA is really a suit against the
Republic of the Philippines which cannot be sued without its consent.

Issue: WON CAA, being an agency of the government, can be made a party defendant
HELD: YES. Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits.
Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. The
CAA was created to undertake the management of airport operations which primarily involve proprietary
functions, it cannot avail of the immunity from suit accorded to government agencies performing strictly
governmental functions.

Air Transportation Administration v Spouses David (G.R. No. 159402, Feb. 23, 2011)

Facts: Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their land located in
Baguio City was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being
operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). On August 11, 1995, the respondents agreed after
negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of
P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands. Thereafter,
respondents led an action for collection against the ATO. ATO invoked as an afrmative defense the issuance
of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the
respondents' affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction
to entertain the action without the State's consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into
in the performance of governmental functions.

Issue: WON ATO can be sued without the States consent

Held: YES. ATO was an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign
function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity
that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim
to the State's immunity from suit.

Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an
instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the right of eminent domain, the Court
explained, the State exercised its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis ;
yet, even in that area, where private property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation
being paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against an action for
payment by the owners.

Municipality of San Fernando v. Firme (G.R. No. 52179, April 8, 1991)

Facts: In the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven
by Bernardo Balagot, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino
Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig.
Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of
the injuries they sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

Private respondents-heirs of Bania Sr. filed a complaint for damages against the owner and
driver of the passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against
the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.

Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV, presided over by respondent
judge. By virtue of a court order dated May 7, 1975, the private respondents amended the complaint
wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as
defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action,
non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action, and the negligence of the owner and driver of
the passenger jeep as the proximate cause of the collision.

The trial court rendered a decision ordering the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and
Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses, actual damages consisting
of the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial. However, respondent judge
issued another order denying the motion for reconsideration of the order for having been filed out of
time.

Issue: WON the municipality is liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee

Held: NO. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his
way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal
streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty
is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court.

After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, the Supreme Court arrived at the
conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee,
who was then engage in the discharge of governmental function. Hence, the death of the passenger
tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary
compensation.

Municipality of San Miguel v Fernandez (G.R. No. L-61744, June 25, 1984)

Facts: In a civil case entitled "Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, et al. vs. Municipal Government of San
Miguel, Bulacan, et al, the then CFI of Bulacan rendered a judgement holding herein petitioner
municipality liable to private respondents regarding the possession of five lots in dispute. Thereafter,
herein private respondents moved for issuance of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that the municipality's property or
funds are all public funds exempt from execution. The said motion to quash was, however, denied by the
respondent judge and the writ of execution stands in full force and effect.

The judge issued an order requiring both the municipal and provincial treasurer to comply with
the money judgment. When the treasurers failed to do so, respondent judge issued an order for their
arrest and that they will be released upon compliance, hence the petition.

Issue: WON funds of Mun. of San Miguel are exempt from execution

Held: NO. Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution. The reason for
this was explained in the case of Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 "that they are held in
trust for the people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal
corporations are created, and that to subject said properties and public funds to execution would
materially impede, even defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose." And, in Tantoco vs.
Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52, it was held that "it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only
the public property but also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations cannot be seized under
execution against them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and
the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless so
declared by statute." Thus, it is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the
Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of
Bulacan, are also public funds and as such they are exempt from execution.
 There must be a corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the municipality may be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not
been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed any ordinance to this effect.

Municipality of Makati v CA (G.R. No. 89898-99, Oct. 1, 1990)

Facts: In the case, petitioner Municipality of Makati instituted an action for eminent domain against
private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty
Corporation and one Arceli P. Jo, involving a parcel of land and improvements thereon located at Mayapis
St., San Antonio Village, Makati. After due hearing where the parties presented their respective appraisal
reports regarding the value of the property, respondent RTC judge rendered a decision on June 4, 1987,
fixing the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordering petitioner to pay this amount.

A writ of execution was thereafter issued. After such issuance of the writ of execution, a Notice
of Garnishment was served by respondent sheriff Silvino R. Pastrana upon the manager of the PNB
Buendia Branch where the petitioner had accounts. However, the sheriff was informed that a hold code
was placed on account of the petitioner. For its part, petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB
Buendia Branch could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the
disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law.

In a petition with the Court of Appeals, petitioner alleges for the first time that it has actually
two accounts with the PNB, one exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property with the
outstanding balance of P99, 743. 94. The other account was for the obligations and other purposes of
the municipal government with a balance of P170,098,421.72.

Admitting that its PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was specifically opened for expropriation
proceedings it had initiated over the subject property, petitioner poses no objection to the garnishment or
the levy under execution of the funds deposited therein amounting to P99,743.94. However, it is
petitioner's main contention that inasmuch as the assailed orders of respondent RTC judge involved the
net amount of P4,965,506.45, the funds garnished by respondent sheriff in excess of P99,743.94, which
are public funds earmarked for the municipal government's other statutory obligations, are exempted
from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law

Issue: WON the bank account of a municipality may be levied on execution to satisfy a
money judgment against it

Held: In this case YES. As a general rule public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or
personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a
money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market
fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental
activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution.

This is not to say that private respondents are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality
fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against
it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval
of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds
therefor.
 City of Caloocan v Judge Allarde (G.R. No. 107271, Sept. 10, 2003)

Facts: Marcial Samson, City Mayor of Caloocan City, through Ordinance No. 1749, abolished the position
of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions from the plantilla of the local government of
Caloocan. The City Government of Caloocan paid respondent Santiago P75,083.37 in partial payment of
her backwages, thereby leaving a balance of P530,761.91. Her co-parties were paid in full. In 1987, the
City of Caloocan appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries. This was included in Supplemental
Budget No. 3 for the fiscal year 1987. Surprisingly, however, the City later refused to release the money
to respondent Santiago.

Respondent Santiago exerted effort for the execution of the remainder of the money judgment
and eventually respondent judge granted such. On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public
auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000. The amount was given to
Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity of the sale of motor vehicle and contended that
properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed
the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles.

On October 5, 1992, the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992,
which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by respondent Santiago as back salaries, plus interest
but then Mayor Asistio refused to sign the check intended as payment for Santiagos claim. Judge Allarde
ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding
to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an
advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any damages
which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city.

Issue: WON funds of City Caloocan may be garnished to satisfy Santiagos claim

Held: In this case YES. As a rule, all government funds deposited in any official depositary of the
Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit,
remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy. However, the rule is not
absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as
required by law. Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment
does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law
specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the government.

In the instant case, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance No.
0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for respondent Santiago's back salaries plus
interest. Thus this case fell squarely within the exception. For all intents and purposes, Ordinance No.
0134, Series of 1992, was the "corresponding appropriation as required by law." The sum indicated in the
ordinance for Santiago were deemed automatically segregated from the other budgetary allocations of
the City of Caloocan and earmarked solely for the City's monetary obligation to her. The judgment of the
trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.

Fundamental Principles and State Policies

Section 1

Villavicencio v Lukban (G.R. No, 14639, March 25, 1919)

Facts: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice,
ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years
in the city of Manila, closed. The women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police.
about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton
Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some
170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. They
had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they
wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the
deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the
Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling
passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.

Issue: WON the act of the Mayor of the City of Manila is constitutional

Held: NO. These women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels
but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens to change
their domicile from Manila to another locality.

Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum
which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said
Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme
power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions
is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it
imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives."

Section 2

Kuroda v Jalandoni (G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949)

Facts: Shigenori Kuroda, former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before a Military Commission
convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with having unlawfully disregarded
and failed "to discharge his duties as such commander to control the operations of members of his
command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against non-combatant
civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war. He
contended that Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of
our constitutional law but also our local laws, to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a
signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare.,

Issue: WON the Philippines, not a signatory to the Hague Convention, can adopt its rules and
regulations

Held: YES. Art. 2 Sec.3 of the Constitution provides that "The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the nation." In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the
present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and signicant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who
have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes
and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war, of
humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in the promulgation and
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the
generally accepted principles and policies of international law which are part of our Constitution.
 It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of The Hague and Geneva conventions form
part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules
and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were
signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our
nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government
may have been or shall be a signatory.

Agustin v Edu (G.R. No. L49112, Feb. 2, 1979)

Facts: Petitioner Agustin questioned the Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos providing for
an early warning device for motor vehicles. He alleged that it clearly violates the provisions of the New
Constitution on due process, equal protection and delegation of police power. That it is oppressive,
unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society.

The respondents' Answer demonstrated that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid
exercise of the police power; that the implementing rules and regulations of respondent Land
Transportation Commissioner do not constitute unlawful delegation of legislative power and that the
hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned
with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals of which Philippines was a
signatory and which was duly ratified and the United Nations Organization.

Issue: WON Letter of Instruction No. 229 is constitutional

Held: YES. Letter of Instruction 229 is a police measure clearly intended to promote public safety. It is
encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive Department. The President had in his
possession the necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instruction
and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion, not backed up by
demonstrable data on record, that early warning devices are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime
vehicular accidents.

It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines . . . adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land, . . ." . The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with
such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word.
The concept of Pacta Sunt Servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war
with the principle of international morality.

Ichong v Hernandez (G.R. No.L-7995)

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships filed a suit challenging the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 1180. RA 1180 or An Act
to Regulate the Retail Business imposed a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens
of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade. Petitioner contended that the
Act violated international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines as regard with the
international principle of pacta sunt servanda.
Issue: WON RA 1180 is unconstitutional for its alleged incompliance with treaties where
the Philippines is a signatory.

Held: No. The United Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and
freedom of their subjects, and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. That such is the
import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred from the fact
that members of the United Nations Organization, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from
engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic
trade are adopted.

The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such
dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State.
It cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty
or any other conventional agreement.

Gonzales v Hechanova

Facts: On September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000
tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee
composed of the other respondents herein 1 for the implementation of said proposed importation.
Thereupon, or on September 25, 1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales a rice planter, and
president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the
production of rice and corn filed the petition herein, averring that, the aforementioned respondents
"are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals
or amends Republic Act No. 2207 explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and
Corn Administration or any other government agency.

Respondent contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2)
contracts for the purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the Government of
Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international law; that such
agreements became binding and effective upon signing thereof by representatives of the parties thereto.
that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and the
aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are
inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved under the American jurisprudence in
favor of the one which is latest in point of time.

Issue: WON respondents acted without or in excess of jurisdiction

Held: YES. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said contracts as alleged executive agreements
has been sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same
as executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly be considered as
executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint,
said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although
the President may, under the American constitutional system, enter into executive agreements without
previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is
prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is
to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments
that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

The American theory argued is not applicable to the case for respondents not only admit, but,
also, insist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground
that treaties to which the United States is signatory require the advice and consent of its Senate, and,
hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional
set up and that of the United States.

In Re: Garcia

Facts: Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without
submitting to the required bar examinations. In his veried petition, he avers, among others, that he is a
Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he had
taken and nished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and
qualied by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he
studied and nished the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he was
allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic
Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state,
he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar
examinations.

Issue: WON the Treaty can be used to exempt one from taking the bar examination

Held: NO. The provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State cannot be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11 of
the Treaty, it was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and
the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen
desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own
country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the
Philippines.

Moreover, under Article 1 of the Treaty, that the privileges provided therein are made expressly
subject to the laws and, regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the
legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have
the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippines he must
first successfully pass the required bar examinations.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish
State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon
the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the
Congress of the Philippines.

Section 4
 People v. Lagman and Sosa

Facts: The appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section
60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two
appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully
refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding
the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly
notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for
military service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not
registered up to the date of filing of the information.

The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered
in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years
old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings, and does
not wish to kill or be killed.

Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one
day of imprisonment, with the costs. Hence, the constitutionality of National Defense Law is assailed.

Issue: WON National Defense Law is constitutional

Held: YES. Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that The defense of the
State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law
to render personal military or civil service."

The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go
against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of
the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. The right of the Government
to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal
with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen.

Section 6

Aglipay v Ruiz

Facts: In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty- third
International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons.
Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this
court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage
stamps. The petitioner, in the fulfilment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto,
Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. It is
alleged that it violated the provision of the Constitution which states that No public money or property
shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support
of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such.

Issue: WON the issuance of postage stamps violates the Constitution

Held: NO. In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps
in question under the provisions of Act. No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is
the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government." The issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of
Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to
favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit
of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.
The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of
international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people". It is significant to note that
the stamps as actually designed and printed, instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally
planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila. What is emphasized is
not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress.
It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably
linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman
Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government.

Garces v Estenzo

Facts: A wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of Brgy. Valencia in Ormoc
City was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash donations
pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of said council, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite,
reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. The image was brought to
the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day as per Resolution No. 6 which also designated the
hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest refused
to return custody of the image to the council until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case
against the priest and posted the required bond. The parish priest and his co-petitioners thereafter filed
an action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending that when
they were adopted, the barangay council was not duly constituted because the chairman of the
Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to participate; and that they contravened the constitutional
provisions on separation of church and state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor
any sect or church. The lower court dismissed the complaint and upheld the validity of the resolution.

Issue: WON Resolutions violated the Constitutional provision on the separation between the
church and the state

Held: NO. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge
religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or
clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The wooden image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente
Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the
religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently,
the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. As noted in
the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in
rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to
forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that
arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to
any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.

Taruc v De la Cruz

Facts: The conflict stemmed when Petitioners led by Dominador Taruc, members of the Philippine
Independent Church, clamoured for the transfer of Respondent Fr. Rustom Florano, parish priest of the
same church, to another parish. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Florano's wife belonged
to a political party opposed to petitioner Taruc's. Respondent Bishop Porfirio dela cruz denied their
request for the reason that the contention of petitioners were too flimsy. Petitioner and his sympathizers
then conducted a mass with a different priest. After that, they were declared expelled/ excommunicated
by Bishop de la Cruz from their church for disobedience to duly constituted authority in the church.

Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial
Court of Surigao City. They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial
thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue: WON courts have jurisdiction to decide cases involving the

expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution

Held: None. It is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the
performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.

Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the
protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the
courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church
property. Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case. Ergo, this Court is of the
opinion and so holds that the instant case does not involve a violation and/or protection of a civil or
property rights in order for the court a quo to acquire jurisdiction in the instant case.

Estrada v Escritor

Facts: Complainant Alejandro Estrada requested Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch
253, Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, for an investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor, court
interpreter in said court, for living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-
in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of
the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act. Consequently, respondent was charged with committing "disgraceful and immoral
conduct."

On the other hand, Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was
already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she started living with Luciano
Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive
but living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. But as a member of
the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society,
respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has
the approval of her congregation.
Issue: WON the administrative case should be dismissed

Held: YES.

Section 10

Calalang v Williams

Facts: Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before
the court a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and
Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila regarding the resolution promulgated by the National
Traffic Commission in July 17, 1940 which prohibits all animal-drawn vehicles to pass and pick up
passengers in the places covered by the resolution to the detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well. Petitioner avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people.

Issue: WON rules and regulation complained of violates the social justices provision of the
constitution

Held: NO. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims
to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of
the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. Which is, to
say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said
law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.

Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justiable, or
extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Almeda v Court of Appeals

Facts: Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is an agricultural share tenant of Glicerio, Sinfroso, Susana, Maria,
Sebastian, Rufina, Bienvenido, Besmark and Cesar, all surnamed Angeles, on their land situated in
Tanauan, Batangas, and devoted to sugar cane and coconuts. On September 30, 1968, the landowners
sold the property without notifying respondent-tenant in writing of the sale. Respondent-tenant thus
seeks the redemption of the land in a complaint filed before the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Petitioners contended that ong before the execution of the deed of sale, Glicerio Angeles and
his nephew Cesar Angeles first offered the sale of the land to respondent Gonzales, but the latter said
that he had no money; that respondent-tenant went personally to the house of the petitioners and
implored them to buy the land for fear that if someone else would buy the land, he may not be taken in
as tenant; that respondent-tenant is a mere dummy of someone deeply interested in buying the land;
that respondent-tenant made to tender of payment or any valid consignation in court at the time he filed
the complaint for redemption.

The Agrarian Court rendered judgment authorizing, the respondent tenant, Eulogio Gonzales, to
redeem the tenanted land for P24,000.00. Petitioners appealed the case before the Court of Appeals but
the court affirmed the decision of the Agrarian Court. Hence, the petitioners instituted a petition for
review.

Issue: WON right of redemption is available to tenants in sugar and coconut lands?

Held: YES. Among those exempted from the automatic conversion to agricultural leasehold upon the
effectivity of the Agricultural Land Reform Code in 1963 or even after its amendments (Code of Agrarian
Reforms) are sugar lands.

Section 4 thereof recognizes share tenancy in sugar lands until after a special proclamation is
made, which proclamation shall have the same effect of an executive proclamation of the operation of
the Department of Agrarian Reform in any region or locality; the share tenants in the lands affected will
become agricultural lessees at the beginning of the agricultural year next succeeding the year in which
the proclamation is made. But, there is nothing readable or even discernible in the law denying to tenants
in sugar lands the right of pre-emption and redemption under the Code. The exemption is purely limited
to the tenancy system; it does not exclude the other rights conferred by the Code, such as the right of
pre-emption and redemption. In the same manner, coconut lands are exempted from the Code only with
respect to the consideration and tenancy system prevailing, implying that in other matters the right of
pre-emption and redemption which does not refer to the consideration of the tenancy the provisions of
the Code apply.

It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, property ownership is impressed with social
function. Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The State, in
the promotion of social justice, may "regular the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition
of private property, and equitably diffuse property . . . ownership and profits." .One governmental policy
of recent date projects the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and the transfer to them
of the ownership of the land they till.

Ondoy v Ignacio

Facts: Petitioner Estrella Ondoy, seeks for the granting of the claim for compensation against private
respondent, Virgilio Ignacio after her son, Jose Ondoy, was drowned while in the employ of the latter.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss based on the alleged absence of an employment relationship.
However, private respondent submitted affidavits executed by the chief engineer and oiler of the fishing
vessel that the deceased, a fisherman, was in that ship, undeniably a member of the working force, but
after being invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. The
referee summarily ignored the affidavit of the chief-mate of respondent employer to the effect "that
sometime in October, 1968, while Jose Ondoy,his co-worker, was in the actual performance of his work
with said fishing enterprises, he was drowned and died on October 22, 1968. That the deceased died in
line of duty". The hearing officer or referee dismissed the claim for lack of merit. A motion for
reconsideration was duly filed, but in an order dated August 29, 1977, the then Secretary of Labor, now
Minister Blas F. Ople, denied such motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Issue: WON compensation for the death of Ondoy is constitutional

Held: YES. There is evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that the deceased was drowned while
"in the actual performance of his work" with the shipping enterprise of private respondent. Even without
such evidence, the petitioner could have relied on the presumption of compensability under the Act once
it is shown that the death or disability arose in the course of employment, with the burden of
overthrowing it being cast on the person or entity resisting the claim.

This Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the
interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this Court resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant. What
was said in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission is not amiss: "There is
need, it seems, even at this late date, for [private respondent] and other employers to be reminded of
the high estate accorded the Workmen's Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme of social justice
and protection to labor." No other judicial attitude may be expected in the face of a clearly expressed
legislative determination which antedated the constitutionally avowed concern for social justice and
protection to labor. It is easily understandable why the judiciary frowns on resort to doctrines, which
even if deceptively plausible, would result in frustrating such a national policy." To be more specific, the
principle of social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. As between a laborer, usually poor
and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to
demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection.

Salonga v Farrales

Facts: An ejectment case filed by the appellee Farrales, the titled owner of the land in question against
the possessors, the appellants Salongas, who erected a house thereon, the Olongapo City Court rendered
a decision ordering the Salongas to vacate the land and Pay the rentals in arrears. When aforesaid
decision was affirmed by the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City and the decision was
partially satisfied by the payment of rentals, Salonga offered to purchase from Farrales said land but the
latter persistently refused. Instead Farrales insisted on the execution of the judgment. Salonga filed a
complaint against Farrales and the Sheriff with the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City
for specific performance which was dismissed on the ground that there exists no legally enforceable
compromise agreement by which Farrales can be compelled to sell the land in question. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals certified this case to the Supreme Court on purely question of law.

Issue: WON promotion of social justice can be invoked to force the defendant to sell her land

Held: NO. It must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of
property owners who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice
consecrated in our constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to
another who is not entitled thereto. Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on
obligations and contracts, and is, therefore, beyond the power of the Court to grant.

Section 11

Sec. of National Defense v Manalo

Facts: Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were suspected to be members of the New Peoples
Army. They were abducted, brought in various locations and was tortured by the military officials who
turned out to be members of Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU). The brothers learned
that their captors were led by then General Jovito Palparan. While in captivity, they met
other desaperacidos (including the still-missing University of the Philippines students Karen Empeno,
Sherlyn Cadapan and Manuel Merino) who were also suspected of being communist insurgents and
members of the NPA. After eighteen months of detention, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.

Respondents filed a petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
to stop petitionersand/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other
basic rights. They also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of
Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII,
Section 5 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The
CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to To furnish to the
petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports
of the investigation undertaken and to confirm the present places of official assignment of two military
officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military
custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking
to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.

Issue: WON petition for issuance of Writ of Amparo be granted

Held: YES. the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government.
In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty
under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from
threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to
security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for
human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when
they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances
(or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.

Section 12

Imbong v Ochoa

Facts: Spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as
citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Learning
Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution challenged the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 10354 otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law). Petitioners contended that the law violates the right to life of the unborn|||which is
backed up by Art.II Sec 12 of the Constitution, that it violates right to health, the right to protection
against hazardous products as it will provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous
to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems, that it violates the right to religious
freedom because the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs
included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom, that it also violates the constitutional
provision on involuntary servitude, the equal protection clause and due process clause, the
right to free speech and lastly, right to privacy.

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for
the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and,
therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] same petitioners lack standing to
question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.|

Issue: WON RH Law is constitutional

Held: The authors of the RH laws IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that primarily induce
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the
approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization.
This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.||

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word or in
defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers
womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded
duty to protect it.

Virtouso v Municipal Judge

Facts: Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., filed an application for the writ of habeas corpus, premised his
plea for liberty primarily on the ground that the preliminary examination which led to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against him was a useless formality as respondent Municipal Judge of Mariveles,
Bataan, failed to meet the strict standard required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a
probable cause. He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that tainted the procedure
followed in the preliminary examination, the bail imposed was clearly excessive. Respondent Judge, in his
return justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest, alleging that there was no impropriety in the way
the preliminary examination was conducted. As to the excessive character of the bail, he asserted that
while it was fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge of
Bataan in 1977. In the course of intensive questioning by the members of this Court, especially Justices
Barredo, Aquino and Santos, it was ascertained that petitioner is a seventeen-year old minor entitled to
the protection and benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, a youthful offender being defined
therein as "one who is over nine years but under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of
the offense.

Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to be release, him being a minor.

Held: YES. It was ruled that Courts should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth
and Welfare Code, which is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate. "The State
recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and
social well-being."

Obergefell v Hodges

Facts: The petitioners are same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased. The
respondents are state officials responsible for enforcing the laws in question. The petitioners claim that
respondents violate the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have their
marriages, lawfully performed in another State, given full recognition. They filed suit in the United States
District Courts in their home States and each District Court ruled in their favor. The respondent appealed
the decision before the United States Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the District Courts and held d that a State has no constitutional obligation to license same-sex marriages
or to recognize same-sex marriages performed out of State. Hence, a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court by the petitioners was instituted.

Issue: WON Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license same sex marriage

Held: The institution of marriage has evolved over time both legally and socially and that the states were
now divided on the issue of same-sex marriage.

Constitutional principles, including four essential principles relating to the right to marry are:
the right to personal choice in relation to marriage as an inherent aspect of an individuals autonomy;
the importance of the union of marriage to the two individuals which was unlike any other; that
marriage provides a safeguard for children and families; and that marriage was central to social order,
with states offering married couples rights, benefits and responsibilities. Each of these principles applies
equally to same-sex marriages and while limiting marriage may have previously been seen as just and
natural, it is now manifest that limiting marriage to opposite-sex partners is inconsistent with the
central meaning of the right to marry. Such knowledge must lead to recognition that banning of same-
sex marriage imposes stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.

Rights cannot be restricted only to those who have exercised them in the past. Such a
restriction would allow accepted practice to provide its own continuing justification and prevent groups
from invoking rights previously denied to them. Rights do not come only from history, but from a better
understanding of how liberty should be defined in our own time. It would diminish the personhood of
same-sex couples and disparage their choices if they were denied the same rights to marry as opposite-
sex couples under the Constitution. The right to same-sex marriage is also guaranteed