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Index

1. Executive Summary
2. Introduction
3. Importance of Logistics
4. Military Logistics
5. Origin-To-Date
6. Principles of Military Logistics
7. Military Logistics Functions
8. Military Logistics Planning
9. Defense Transportation System
10. Airlift support to operations
11. Sealift Support to Joint Operations
12. Land Transportation Resources
13. Military Strategy
14. Anticipatory Logistics
15. Parallel of Military and Commercial Logistics
16. Technology Military logistics
17. Logistics used in wars
18. Logistics in WORLD WAR II
19. Roman Logistics
20. 1999 Kargil Conflict
21. Failure in logistics
22. Primary Research

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Executive summary
NAPOLEON FAMOUSLY said an army marches on its stomach. Clearly military
personnel need to eat well to perform well. But what Napoleon was really getting at with
this maxim was the importance of the supply line. Logistics - getting food, clothes, and
spare parts to the front - is often what makes or breaks a conflict. The truth of this was
illustrated by Napoleon himself when, in June 1812, he tried (and failed) to invade Russia
with a force of 500,000 men. Because the Russians removed most of the food and crops in
advance, Napoleon's army couldn't live off the land as they had in previous campaigns.

Despite this, his forces made it to Moscow by September, but they were too emaciated to
hold their position and in October went into retreat. Napoleon failed to live up to his own
dictum about supply and, as a result, his bid for continental domination was thwarted.

Logistics plays a significant role in any military action, whether the action is part of a war,
a military operation other than war, or even a training exercise. Whenever military units
are employed, they must be deployed and sustained. In fact, logistic activities are
conducted much the same way in peace as they are in war or military operations other
than war. Unlike certain functions, which are conducted only in war, logistics is always
“on.” Logistics is concerned with the provision and allocation of resources. The conduct
of war or military operations other than war normally requires extensive resources.
However, the re- sources available to create and sustain combat power are almost
always limited.

Demand usually exceeds supply. Logistics helps to ensure the effective use
of limited re- sources. Logistics assists the commander in making best use of the
available resources to accomplish the mission. Logistics by itself cannot win wars, but it
has been the major contributing factor in losing many wars, particularly in the 20th
century. At the strategic level, the inability of a nation to generate sufficient forces, move
them to the front, and support them once engaged invariably leads to deterioration of the

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forces’ material condition, morale, and tactical capability. This deterioration can be slow,
as in the European theater during World War II, or it can occur relatively quickly, as it did
in Desert Storm. Both the will and the ability to fight erode, often leading to collapse and
defeat.

Logistics..."embraces not merely the traditional functions of supply and


transportation in the field, but also war finance, ship construction,
munitions manufacture and other aspects of war economy."

- Lt Col George C. Thorpe, Pure Logistics, 1917

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Section 1

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Introduction
Logistics is concerned with getting the products and services where they are needed when
they are desired. It is difficult to accomplish any marketing or manufacturing without
logistical support. It involves the integration of information, transportation, inventory,
warehousing, material handling, and packaging.

The operating responsibility of logistics is the geographical repositioning of raw


materials, work in process, and finished inventories where required at the lowest cost
possible

The formal definition of the word ‘logistics’ is: - it is the process of planning,
implementing and controlling the efficient, effective flow and storage of goods, services
and related information from the point of origin to the point of consumption for the
purpose of conforming to customer requirements.

Within the firm the challenge is to coordinate individual job expertise into an integrated
competency focused on servicing customers. In most situations the desired scope of such
coordination transcends the individual enterprise, reaching out to include customers as
well as material and service suppliers. Ina strategic sense, the senior logistics officer leads
a boundary spanning initiative to facilitate effective supply chain relationships. The
excitement of contemporary logistics is found in making the combined results of internal
and external integration one of the core competencies of an enterprise. Throughout the
history of mankind wars have been won and lost through logistical strengths and
capabilities or the lack of them. Even though the generals of the past have understood the
critical role of logistics it is only in the recent past that the big organizations have realized
its role in the achievement of competitive advantage.

Arth Shaw in 1915 pointed out that: the relations between the activities of demand
creation and physical supply… illustrate the existence of the 2 principles of
interdependence and balance. Failure to co-ordinate any one of these activities with its

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group-fellows and also with those in the other group, or undue emphasis or outlay put
upon any one of these activities, it is certain to upset the equilibrium of forces which mean
efficient distribution. The physical distribution of the goods is a problem distinct from the
creation of demand.

There are many ways of defining logistics but the underlying concept might be defined as
follows: ‘Logistics is the process of strategically managing the procurement, movement
and storage of materials, parts and finished inventory through the organization and its
marketing channels in such a way that current and future profitability are maximized
through the cost-effective fulfillment of orders.’

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Importance of logistics
Logistics is the bedrock of trade and business.

Without selling and or buying there can be no trade and business. Buying and or selling
takes place only when goods are physically moved into and or away from the market.
Take away logistical support trade and business will collapse

Integrates logistical activities


In conventional management environment, various activities of logistics work in isolation
under different management functions. Each pocket trying to sub optimize its objectives at
the cost of overall organizational objectives. Purchasing trying to purchase at minimum
price at the cost of what is needed by operations. Operations produce large quantities at
minimum production cost ignoring demand leading to doom inventory. Logistics function
of management brings all such functions under one umbrella pulling down inter
departmental barriers.

Logistics wins or loses wars


1. British lost American war of independence due to poor logistics
2. Rommel was beaten in the desert by superior logistics of Allies

Supports critical functions like operations and marketing


Strong logistics support enables a company to move towards JUST IN TIME production system
for survival in a highly competitive market.

Logistical costs
For individual businesses logistics expenditures are 5% to 35% of sales depending on type
of business, geographical areas of operation, weight/value ratios of products and
materials. This is an expensive operation. Improvement in the efficiency of logistics
function yields savings as well as customer satisfaction

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Reasons For LOGISTICS to exits
Logistics management from this total system is the means whereby the needs of
customers are satisfied through the coordination of the materials and information
flows that extend from the marketplace through the firm and its operations and
beyond that to supplies.

For example for many years marketing and manufacturing have been seen as largely
separate activities within the organization. At best they have coexisted, at worst there has
been open warfare. Manufacturing priorities and objectives have typically been focused
on operating efficiency, achieved through long production runs, minimized setups,
changeovers and product standardization. On the other hand marketing has sought to
achieve competitive advantage through variety, high service levels and frequent product
changes.

In today’s more turbulent environment there is no longer any possibility of manufacturing


and marketing acting independently of each other.

It is now generally accepted that the need to understand and meet customer requirements
is a prerequisite for survival. At the same time, in the search for improved cost
competitiveness, manufacturing management has been the subject of massive renaissance.
The last decade has seen the rapid introduction of flexible manufacturing systems, of new
approaches to inventory based on materials requirement planning (MRP) and just in time
(JIT) methods, a sustained emphasis on quality.

Equally there has been a growing recognition of the critical role that procurement plays in
creating and sustaining competitive advantage as part of an integrated logistics process.

In this scheme of things, logistics is therefore essentially an integrative concept that seeks
to develop a system wide view of the firm. It is fundamentally a planning concept that

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seeks to create a framework through which the needs of the manufacturing strategy and
plan, which in turn links into a strategy and plan for procurement

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Section 2

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Military Logistics
Introduction
There is an old saying, "Amateurs talk strategy, and professionals talk logistics."

Logistics provides the foundation of our combat power. It can be


described as the bridge connecting a nation’s economy to a nation’s
war fighting forces. Logistics is the process of planning and executing
the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of
a military strategy and operations.

In military logistics, experts manage how and when to move


resources to the places they are needed. In military science,
maintaining one's supply lines while disrupting those of the enemy is a
crucial—some would say the most crucial—element of military
strategy, since an armed force without food, fuel and ammunition is
defenseless.

The art of logistics is how to integrate the strategic, operational, and


tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, while scheduling the
mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, and supplies in
support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant
commander. The relative combat power military forces can bring to
bear against an enemy is constrained by a nation’s capability to deliver
forces and materiel to the required points of application across the
range of military operations

For e.g.
The Iraq war was a dramatic example of the importance of logistics. It had become
very necessary for the US and its allies to move huge amounts of men, materials and
equipment over great distances. Led by Lieutenant General William Pagonis,

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Logistics was successfully used for this effective movement. The defeat of the British
in the American War of Independence, and the defeat of Rommel in World War II,
have been largely attributed to logistical failure. The historical leaders Hannibal
Barca and Alexander the Great are considered to have been logistical geniuses.

For e.g.
If you are a successful manager at Wal-Mart you have a profound understanding of
logistics. The tonnage that Wal-Mart moves everyday and the control, placement
and usage of people to get the job done is an excellent lesson in logistics. Just like the
military they have to find manufacturers to make the needed products. Arrange for
the shipment of the items, (to include ocean transport) distribute to multiple
locations and then get the goods into the hands of the ultimate user.

There are two major differences between Wal-Mart and military logistics. Wal-Mart
gets to make a profit on their distributed goods, and nobody is trying to blow up
their transportation system and kill their employees.

Levels of Logistic Support

There are three levels of war

1. Strategic
2. Operational
3. Tactical

They apply in war and in operations other than war. The Services concentrate on strategic
logistic matters. The Services and the subordinate commanders, down to their battlefield
logisticians at the unit and ship level, deal with operational and tactical logistic
responsibilities, including developing procedures, doctrine, and training for supplying
personnel with all necessary materiel to do their jobs. All levels are interrelated, with
constraints at any level limiting options of decision makers. All levels of logistics involve
combat service support and affect the sustainability of forces in the combat zone.

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Thus we can say that:

Military logistics is the art and science of planning and carrying out the movement and
maintenance of military forces. In its most comprehensive sense, it is those aspects or
military operations that deal with:

1. Design, development, acquisition, storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation,


and disposition of material.
2. Movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel.
3. Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities.
4. Acquisition or furnishing of services.

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Origin- to- Date
The word "logistics" is derived from the Greek adjective logistikos meaning "skilled in
calculating." The first administrative use of the word was in Roman and Byzantine times
when there was a military administrative official with the title Logista. At that time, the
word apparently implied a skill in the science of mathematical computations. Research
indicates that its first use in relation to an organized military administrative science was
by the French writer, Antoine-Henri Jomini, who, in 1838, devised a theory of war on the
trinity of strategy, ground tactics, and logistics. The French still use the words logistique
and loger with the meaning "to quarter."

The military activity known as logistics probably is as old as war itself. In the early
history of man when the first wars were fought, each man had to find his own food,
stones, and knotted clubs. Each warrior was his own logistician. Not until later, when
fighters joined as groups and fighting groups became larger, was there any basis for
designating certain men to specialize in providing food and weapons to the combatants.
The men who provided support to the fighters constituted the first logistics organization.
Logistics is not an exact science. No mathematical formula or set of tables tells precisely
what supplies or services will be needed, where and when they will be needed, or the best
way to provide them. Responsible officials must make judgments on these matters, using
intuition and scientifically weighing alternatives as the situation requires and permits.
Their judgments must be based not only upon professional knowledge of the numerous
aspects of logistics itself but also upon an understanding of the interplay of closely related
military considerations such as strategy, tactics, intelligence, training, personnel, and
finance.

In major military conflicts, logistics matters are often crucial in deciding the overall
outcome of wars.
For E.g.
Tonnage war - the bulk sinking of cargo ships - was a crucial factor in World War
II. The failure of the German Navy to sink enough cargo in the Second Battle of the

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Atlantic allowed Britain to stay in the war; by contrast, the successful disruption of
Japanese maritime trade in the Pacific effectively crippled its economy and thus its
military production capabilities.

More generally, protecting one's own supply lines and attacking those of an enemy is a
fundamental military strategy.

Military logistics has pioneered a number of techniques that have since become widely
deployed in the commercial world. Operations research grew out of WWII military
logistics efforts.

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Relationship between Military Logistics &
Warfighter

There is a relationship between the function of military logistics and the warfighter. What
is that relationship, and is it correctly defined? In the early 1960s, there was a stated
relationship between logistics and the weapons systems: military logistics "support"' the
weapons system. At that time, the subject of military logistics was fairly new and, with
little ongoing research, very slow in providing greater understanding about it. Therefore,
during that period, this definition of relationship seemed appropriate. It was not until the
late l970s that several advocates of military logistics came to the realization that logistics
support of the weapons system was actually creating and sustaining warfighting
capability. This warfighting capability was provided to the combat forces in the form of
continuing availability of operational weapons systems (the tools of war). This new
awareness set up another definition of the relationship: military logistics creates and
sustains warfightin g capability. While many heard the words, few realized their
implications.

The level of warfighting capability that logistics provides the combat forces determines
the extent to which war can be waged. This in turn limits and shapes how the war will be
waged. Warfighting capability is embedded in the design of all weapon systems.
Advancing technology increases speed, range, maneuverability, ceiling, and firepower, all
of which provide more lethal and accurately guided munitions, stealth, and other offensive
and defensive warfighting capabilities. They will be embedded into the design of future
weapon systems. It is the weapon systems that contain the warfighting capability of
military forces. The strength of military forces is no longer measured by the number of
men under arms.

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Today, military forces are measured by the number--and warfighting capabilities--of their
weapon systems. It is said that armies travel on their stomachs, what is usually left
unsaid is they perform on the basis of their logistics competency.

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Principles of Military Logistics
The following logistic principles are not a checklist but rather a guide for analytical
thinking and prudent planning:

Responsiveness
Responsiveness is the right support in the right place at the right time. This is the
keystone of the logistic principles, for all else becomes irrelevant if the logistic system
cannot support the concept of operations of the supported commander.

For e.g.
The average semi tractor-trailer you encounter on the highway is carrying only a
few tons of goods. When you are dealing with the military, especially wartime supply
requirements, you are talking in the millions of tons of supplies. If there is an
ongoing battle where the food, fuel and ammunition are being consumed in mass
quantities, the tonnage of needed supplies goes up dramatically. If they are not
supplied at right place and at right time, the defeat is certain

Simplicity
Simplicity is avoidance of complexity and often fosters efficiency in both the planning
and execution of national and theater logistic operations.

Flexibility
Flexibility is the ability to adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations,
missions, and concepts of operations. Logistics plans and operations must be flexible to
achieve both responsiveness and economy.

Economy
Economy is the provision of support at the least cost. This element must continually be
considered.

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For e.g.
Logistics is expensive and the Department of Defense is looking to cut costs. The cost
of logistics for the current Gulf War is the main reason for canceling a
number of air shows. War is expensive, but protecting country is more
important.

Attainability
Attainability (or adequacy) is the ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and
services required to begin combat operations. An operation should not begin until
minimum essential levels of support are on hand.

Sustainability
Sustainability is a measure of the ability to maintain logistic support to all users
throughout the theater for the duration of the operation. This focuses the supporting
commander’s attention on long-term objectives and capabilities of the supported forces.

For e.g.
We live in a world of instant gratification. We want it now. So, when a military
member is in combat and needs certain items to keep fighting, he sends an e-mail
demanding next-day-air delivery. The problem is UPS and Fed Ex do not deliver to
foxholes in the desert and only a fraction of supplies go by military airlift. You can
send an entire shipload of supplies for very close to the cost of one cargo aircraft
delivery. Unlike the world of total quality management, the wartime military cannot
function on "just in time" re-supply. Combat leaders have to plan well in advance,
that is why it is called logistics not Express Mail.

Survivability
Survivability is the capacity of the organization to prevail in the face of potential
destruction. Active measures must include a plan for ground defense of logistic
installations with provisions for reinforcement and fire support. Passive measures include

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dispersion, physical protection of personnel and equipment, deception, and limiting the
size and capabilities of an installation to what is essential for the mission.

Logistics comprises the means and arrangements, which work out the
plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings
the troops to this point.

- General Antoine Henri Jomini, (The Art of War), 1838

Military Logistic Functions


Logistic support requirements involve the following six broad functional areas:

Supply systems

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It acquires, manage, receive, store, and issue the materiel required by the operating forces
to equip and sustain the force from deployment through combat operations and their
redeployment.

Maintenance
It includes actions taken to keep materiel in a serviceable condition, to return it to service,
or to update and upgrade its capability.

Transportation
It is the movement of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies from the point of origin to
the final destination.

General engineering
It provides the construction, damage repair, and operation and maintenance of facilities or
logistic enhancements required by the combatant commander to provide shelter,
warehousing, hospitals, water and sewage treatment, and water and fuel storage
distribution in order to enhance provision of sustainment and services.

Health services
It include evacuation, hospitalization, medical logistics, medical laboratory services,
blood management, vector control, preventive medicine services, veterinary services,
dental services, and the required command, control, and communications.

Finally, other services are associated with non materiel support activities and consist of
various functions and tasks provided by Service troops and the logistic community that
are essential to the technical management and support of a force (i.e., aerial delivery,
laundry, clothing exchange and bath, and graves registration.)

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Logistics...as vital to military success as daily food is to daily work.
- Captain A.T. Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration, 1912

Military Logistic Planning


Logistics planning is a complex, interdependent concept that can apply leverage (plus or
minus) to a combatant commander’s combat power.

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An understanding of the combatant commander’s concept of operations and early
involvement by the logistic staff will ensure that national and theater deployment and
sustainment requirements are balanced with logistic capabilities.

The operation plans should have logistic implications coordinated at all levels:

1. International
2. National
3. Service
4. Functional component
5. Supporting command.

These plans should be adaptable and make provisions for changes to the concept of
operations. The reasoning for this is that proper logistic planning will reduce the need
for emergency measures and logistic improvisations, which are usually expensive and
often have an adverse effect on subordinate and adjacent commands.

Deployment planning is more deliberate and methodical than employment planning and
lends itself better to automated data processing support. Detailed logistic planning for
employment is equally important and should neither be neglected nor delayed until
deployment plans are completed. Only by thorough and concurrent consideration of both
deployment and employment facets of the campaign or operation will planners be able to
construct adequate logistic plans.

Logistic Planning Considerations

It is critical that planners identify key issues unique to a specific joint operation plan they
must support.

To anticipate priorities, planners should:

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1. Provide instructions or guidance for redistributing assets from low- to high-
priority organizations within the command
2. Obtain assets from external sources with lower priority needs
3. Control the allocation of new assets in short supply
4. Provide efficient means to retrograde, repair, and reissue damaged or
unserviceable critical items.

Critical supplies and materiel should be identified early in the planning process.
Critical items are supplies vital to the support of operations that are in short supply or are
expected to be in short supply.

Logistic planners must understand the constraining factors affecting all phases of the
deployment and sustainment plans. They can encounter bottlenecks that limit or degrade
the ability to support a campaign or operation plan. Logistic planners must anticipate
congestion and seek solutions to bottlenecks.

Movement control must coordinate the employment of all means of transportation,


including that provided by allies or host nations, to support the combatant commanders’
concept of operations.

For e.g.
1. Commander in Chief, Transportation Command, as the single transportation
manager, will provide for proper liaison with the combatant commanders for
movement of personnel and materiel into the theater.

2. The geographic commanders will exercise control over movement.

Whatever unique circumstances prevail in logistic plans should provide combatant


commanders with the highest practicable degree of influence or control over movement.

One unique Example

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One of the outstanding examples was Richard the Lionhearted, king of England in the
laye 12th century. Richard led a large army on Crusade to the Holy Land. Previous
Crusader armies had suffered greatly from a lack of logistical planning. Moving
through hostile, and often barren, country, several Crusader armies had literally fallen
apart from lack of food. Richard arranged for supplies to be accummulated and ships
used to deliver them to his troops as they marched along the coast. He thus managed to
defeat Saladin, the great Moslem general. Unfortunately, Saladin also understood
logistics. When Richard finally had to march inland to besiege Jerusalem, he found
that Saladin had stripped the countryside bare of food and fodder. The wells had been
poisoned and Richard realized that his army would fall apart from starvation if he tried
to besiege Jerusalem. The Crusaders had to settle for a treaty with Saladin that
guaranteed Christian pilgrims access to the Holy Places. This was also a classic
example of two able, and well matched, generals checkmating each other and then
negotiating an agreement that left both able to claim a victory.

Defense Transportation System


An integral part to any efforts in logistic planning is the Defense Transportation System
and its role in supporting national security objectives.

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The DTS is multifaceted, resulting in a versatility, which can support the entire continuum
of movement requirements ranging from peacetime cargo and passenger movement,
through reinforcement and sustainment operations in general war.

For e.g.
The DTS is an integral part of the total US transportation system and involves
procedures, resources, federal, commercial, and non-US activities that support
defence transportation needs.

There are several general considerations which influence transportation planning and
capability. They include the following:

1. Amount and availability of forces and material to be moved


2. Availability and characteristics of movement resources, both military and civilian
3. Priorities established for the movement
4. Duration of the movement and time available for planning the movement
5. Reception and throughput capabilities of ports of embarkation
6. Strategic transportation sustainment capability
7. The threat and potential attrition
8. Requirements to convoy
9. Degree of protection provided lines of communications
10. In-transit visibility and accessibility of items in the pipeline.

Airlift support to operations


Airlift supports national strategy by rapidly transporting personnel and materiel to and
from the war place. It operates across the range of military operations performing six
broad tasks:

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Deployment
For e.g.
US troops were deployed in iraq with the help of aircraft.

Employment
For e.g.
US had employed its combatant commanders to different areas with the help of aircraft

Redeployment
For e.g.
When US completed capturing Baghdad it redeployed its troops in different areas to find
saddam hussain

Sustainment
For e.g.
Aircraft was used to supply foods, shelter material to US troops in US, Iraq war.

Aeromedical evacuation
For e.g.
Recent war, between iraq and Lebanon is worthwhile example for people evacuation

Airlift is a cornerstone of global force projection. It provides the means to rapidly deploy
and redeploy forces, on short notice, to any location worldwide. Airlift employment
missions can be used to transport forces directly into combat. To maintain a force’s level
of effectiveness, airlift sustainment missions provide resupply of high-priority equipment,
personnel, and supplies. Finally, airlift supports the movement of patients to treatment
facilities and noncombatants to safe havens. Airlift’s characteristics — speed, flexibility,
range, and responsiveness — complement other US mobility assets

Planning Airlift Operations

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Planning airlift operations is a complicated process involving numerous interdependent
functions. These range from such things as assuring airlift facilities are capable of
supporting an operation to selecting the most appropriate airlift for that operation.

Airlift planners must be thoroughly familiar with each Service component’s unique airlift
capabilities as well as those of common-user airlift. They must comprehend the nature of
the threat to airlift and coordinate effective threat countermeasures. Finally, the entire
airlift operation requires detailed planning, to include coordination of appropriate airspace
control measures and communication procedures.

The following are general considerations for airlift planners:

Airlift Facilities
Planners must know the capabilities of each airlift facility in the theater.

Facility Support Forces


The supported Service component is responsible for the movement of personnel and cargo
to the on load site and forward after off-loading.

Air Base Defense


All echelons must plan for air base defense to protect airlift aircraft, aircrews, support
personnel, and base facilities. This may include protection against conventional air-to-
surface munitions, as well as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
unconventional warfare forces.

Joint Airspace Control


Airlift plans must integrate international, HN, and military airspace control procedures
and regulations.

Intelligence
Timely intelligence is essential to airlift mission planning. Airlift operations require
considerable intelligence support to reduce their vulnerability.

Threat
Airlift aircraft are very vulnerable to hostile actions.

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Communications for Deploying Ground Forces
Secure en route communication packages provide ground commanders embarked on
airlift aircraft secure communications with ground force subordinate commanders while
en route to an objective area.

Sealift Support to Joint Operations


Successful response to regional contingencies depends upon sufficient strategic mobility
assets to deploy combat forces rapidly and sustain them in a theater of operations as long
as necessary to meet military objectives. The strategic mobility triad of airlift, sealift,

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and prepositioning (PREPO) is the most cost effective method to provide such a
response. Each element of the triad has its own unique advantages and disadvantages.

In most cases, sealift accounts for the majority of the total cargo delivered to a theater of
operations. To meet these requirements, sealift forces are employed in the three phases
of strategic mobility, which are:
1. PREPO
2. Deployment (or surge)
3. Sustainment.

For e.g.
The United States is a nation with global interests and requires a military strategy
that achieves national security objectives across the range of military operations.
The strategy employed is based upon three main components: peacetime
engagement; deterrence and conflict prevention; fight and win nations wars. This
strategy cannot be executed without forward presence, power projection, and the
ability to sustain forces during an operation and redeployed forces when the
operation is terminated. As the principal means for delivering equipment and
logistic support, sealift impacts the ability to conduct sustained operations and may
influence the outcome of the operation being conducted. To the extent that sealift
limits deployment of forces or logistic support, geographic combatant and their
components are constrained in the strategic, operational, and tactical options they
might choose and the forces they can employ.

Flexible, assured sealift support permits to expand the strategic, operational, and tactical
options available.

Planning Sealift operations


During large strategic deployment operations, sealift support is typically conducted in
three phases.

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Prepositioning
Afloat is made up of ships from the Military Sealift Command’s Afloat Prepositioning
Force (APF). The flexibility inherent in the APF makes this force a key element in joint
operation planning; the APF is capable of supporting the plans for the entire range of
military operations.

Surge
It Includes ships to control fleet. Surge shipping delivers the heavy combat power and
accompanying supplies to allow the deployment of predominantly based forces to
anywhere in the world.

Sustainment
It refers to shipping provided by the merchant fleet, mostly container ships, to deliver
large quantities of resupply and ammunition to forward deployed forces augmented as
necessary by the Ready Reserve force.

For e.g.
US had these facilities during the war against Iraq. It had deployed its ships in the
sea’s near Iraq.

Although all three portions of the sealift trident are distinct entities they provide a
synergistic effect, and removing a segment of the trident will prove to deny the full range
of sealift support options.

Land Transportation Resources


The last major area of transportation is land transportation resource

The Department of the Army is responsible for making land transportation available in
overseas areas for the Military Departments, and coordinating all planning and
requirements for the use of controlled land transportation equipment and facilities.

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The Department of Defense owns a limited amount of resources capable of moving
supplies. Some of these assets, which include railcars and containers, are used for day-to-
day peacetime interstate transportation. The commercial transportation industry also has
substantial capability available to meet transportation needs of the Department of Defense
across the range of military operations. The Contingency Response Program provides,
through quick-reaction procedures, the Department of Defense priority use of commercial
transportation resources prior to and during contingencies, mobilizations, natural
disasters, and operations other than war.

They also must provide land transportation support within their installations and activities
and such other land transportation service.

Military Strategy
Introduction
Military strategy is a collective name for planning the conduct of warfare. Derived from
the Greek strategos, strategy was seen as the "art of the general".

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Military strategy deals with the planning and conduct of campaigns, the movement and
disposition of forces, and the deception of the enemy.

Fundamentals of military strategy


"Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods

be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances." –Sun Tzu

Strategy and tactics are closely related. Both deal with distance, time and force but
strategy is large scale while tactics are small scale. Originally strategy was understood to
govern the prelude to a battle while tactics controlled its execution. However, in the world
wars of the 20th century, the distinction between manoeuvre and battle, strategy and
tactics, became blurred. Tactics that were once the province of a company of cavalry
would be applied to a panzer army. In its purest form, strategy dealt solely with military
issues.
For E.g.
In earlier societies, a king or political leader was often the same person as the
military leader. If he was not, the distance of communication between the political
and the military leader was small. But as the need of a professional army grew, the
bounds between the politicians and the military came to be recognized.

As French statesman Georges Clemenceau said, "war is too important a business to be


left to soldiers." This gave rise to the concept of the grand strategy which encompasses
the management of the resources of an entire nation in the conduct of warfare. In the
environment of the grand strategy, the military component is largely reduced to
operational strategy -- the planning and control of large military units such as corps and
divisions. As the size and number of the armies grew and the technology to communicate
and control improved, the difference between "military strategy" and "grand strategy"
shrank.

Fundamental to grand strategy is the diplomacy through which a nation might forge
alliances or pressure another nation into compliance, thereby achieving victory without

33
resorting to combat. Another element of grand strategy is the management of the post-war
peace. As Clausewitz stated, a successful military strategy may be a means to an end, but
it is not an end in itself.

Strategy (and tactics) must constantly evolve in response to technological advances. A


successful strategy from one era tends to remain in favour long after new developments in
military weaponry and matériel have rendered it obsolete.

For E.g.
World War I, and to a great extent the American Civil War, saw Napoleonic tactics
of "offense at all costs" pitted against the defensive power of the trench, machine
gun and barbed wire. As a reaction to her WWI experience, France entered World
War II with a purely defensive doctrine, epitomised by the "impregnable" Maginot
Line, but only to be completely circumvented by the German blitzkrieg.

Principles of military strategy


Many military strategists have attempted to encapsulate a successful strategy in a set of
principles. Sun Tzu defined 13 principles in his The Art of War while Napoleon listed 115
maxims. American Civil War General Nathan Bedford Forrest required only one: "get
there firstest with the mostest".

The fundamental concepts common to most lists of principles are:

34
1. The Objective
2. Offense
3. Cooperation
4. Concentration (Mass)
5. Economy
6. Maneuver
7. Surprise
8. Security
9. Simplicity

Some strategists assert that adhering to the fundamental principles guarantees victory
while others claim war is unpredictable and the general must be flexible in formulating a
strategy. Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke expressed strategy as a system of "ad
hoc expedients" by which a general must take action while under pressure. These
underlying principles of strategy have survived relatively unscathed as the technology of
warfare has developed.

Examples of good strategies


1. Genghis Khan and the Mongols had all the features of above strategies.
2. Napolean had all the features in its war at water loo.

Anticipatory Logistics
The Army's Supply Chain Management
The Army is experimenting with the concept of anticipatory logistics for class III
(petroleum, oils, and lubricants), class V (ammunition), and maintenance. Anticipatory
logistics uses technologies, information systems, and procedures to predict and prioritize
customer requirements and provide appropriate sustainment. Although this sounds simple

35
enough, future logisticians will use current and future technologies as tools to monitor
supply levels and equipment conditions for combat units. They also will use decision
support software to determine the best use of combat service support assets.

How is this concept related to the supply chain management (SCM)


technique that corporations use?

Supply Chain Management

A supply chain is made up of all the manufacturers and suppliers who provide the parts
that make up a particular product. It includes production, storage, and distribution
activities that procure materials, transform the materials into intermediate and finished
products, and distribute the finished products to the customer. Supply chains exist in both
service and manufacturing industries. However, the complexity and organization of
supply chains vary immensely from industry to industry and from organization to
organization. In practice, supply chains have multiple products with the potential of many
shared components, facilities, and capacities.

While SCM and the supply chain seem to be very similar, the most notable difference is
that SCM is a process that integrates and synchronizes the supply chain to meet an
organization's goals and objectives. The chart on page 4 illustrates a corporate SCM
conceptual model. SCM has seven components and six essential success factors. The
seven components are:

1. Suppliers.
2. Procurement.
3. Manufacturing.
4. Order management.
5. Transportation.
6. Warehousing.

36
7. Customers.

The six essential success factors are—

1. Consumer demand.
2. Information and communication technologies.
3. Globalization.
4. Competition.
5. Government regulations.
6. Environmental concerns.

The dilemma that management in industry faces is how to satisfy two diametrically
opposing forces: the customers' demands for better, faster, and less costly products and
services and the organization's need for growth and profitability. To meet both
requirements, business organizations use SCM.

Consumer expectations concerning service, speed, cost, and choice will continue to rise.
The business trend is to provide consumers with what they want faster than any
competitors can, at a price lower than the current market price, and in real time. SCM
organizes the overall business process to enable the profitable transformation of raw
materials or products into finished goods and their timely distribution to meet customer
demands.

37
External Factors: Globalization, Government regulations, environment & Competition

External Factors: End-user needs, DOD regulations, environment, joint


interoperability, and deployment within and outside the
continental United States, mission requirements.

38
Supply chain management is similar for both corporate and military organizations.
However, some significant differences are evident in these models. The first is the
absence of maintenance on the corporate model. Another is that transportation,
distribution, and warehousing are unidirectional in the corporate model but dual
directional in the military model. The external factors differ between the two types of
organizations.

Military of Supply Chain Management


For military logistics operations, SCM has seven components and seven essential success
factors. SCM for the Army is slightly different from SCM for corporate organizations
because the Army's focus is on mission requirements rather than on quarterly earnings.
The seven components of SCM for the Army are the same as for business—

1. Suppliers.
2. Procurement.
3. Manufacturing.
4. Order management.
5. Transportation.
6. Warehousing.
7. Customers (soldiers).

The Army's seven essential success factors are—

1. Customer needs.
2. Information and communication technologies.
3. Deployment within and outside the continental United States.
4. Joint interoperability.
5. Department of Defense regulations.
6. Environmental concerns (to include enemy forces).
7. Mission requirements.

39
The SCM conceptual models for both business and the Army are similar; however, there
are some significant differences.

Differences
There are the dual directional arrows on the chart for transportation and for distribution
and warehousing in the Army SCM model. These illustrate that the Army may retrograde
equipment and components for maintenance or retrograde personnel for medical care.

Other differences are in the external factors that affect the supply chain. These factors
include—
1. Joint interoperability among the services' command, control,
communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) systems.
2. Deployment of forces.
3. Soldier and mission requirements.

The supply chain reflects the Army's focus on mission accomplishment as opposed to
business' focus on Profitability.

40
Anticipatory Logistics
Like the corporate world, the Army faces two diametrically opposing forces:

1. The need to support combat maneuver forces better, more responsively at a lower
cost
2. The need to reduce the logistics footprint of the Army's future forces.

The Army is exploring how to better support brigade combat teams by using some
underlying SCM concepts, such as information and communication technologies, order
management, and transportation using current and new technologies.

By using the "tactical Internet" to achieve situational awareness, future logisticians will be
able to track the status of supplies for individual units and better predict the needs of
combat units. Systems that provide logistics leaders enhanced situational awareness will
provide instantaneous supply status, predict component failures, and even provide two-
way messaging. Sensors in both combat and combat service support vehicles will monitor
supply levels, unit locations, and equipment status and be able to transmit this information
to logistics leaders.

Knowing on-hand supply levels will help logistics leaders to better configure "pulsed"
logistics resupplies, typically consisting of 3 to 7 days' worth of supplies. Leaders will use
this new, enhanced level of situational awareness, provided by decision support tools such
as embedded diagnostics, automated testing, and data analysis, to better support combat
forces with fewer logistics assets.

In an endeavor to revolutionize anticipatory logistics at the wholesale level, the Army is


forming a strategic alliance with SAP to integrate and streamline the wholesale logistics
process. This alliance will manage demand, supply availability, distribution, financial
control, and data management better and provide more flexible and dynamic logistics at
the wholesale level to meet specific customer requirements. The benefits will include a

41
synchronized global supply, distribution, and financial network that will increase weapon
system readiness and manage mission-based requirements more responsively.

Conclusion
Industry's SCM and the Army's anticipatory logistics for supporting future combat forces
are similar. Whereas anticipatory logistics concentrates on the wholesale and tactical,
which is a small slice of the supply chain that culminates with the customer, SCM takes a
holistic approach to the entire supply chain. Both anticipatory logistics and SCM share
various fundamental concepts in order to meet their respective goals and objectives. The
future of logistics in the Army is evolving toward a holistic approach, much like business'
SCM efforts, to improve its logistics capability while reducing its logistics footprint.

42
Parallel of Military and Commercial
Logistics
Military and commercial readiness can be defined as the optimization of available
resources to operate in a possible unforeseen event. In this sense, readiness can be viewed
as situational management of an event. Time, cost, and quality are still crucial to
measuring situational logistics management. A thorough assessment of supplies,
resources, and manpower would need to be matched with the needs of the unforeseen
event under surge circumstances.

Customer wait time measures the time needed to deliver an item to the customer's door,
including the time a component may spend in maintenance. Door-to-door delivery
times can be measured for other situational logistics scenarios.

Take, for instance, the hypothetical release of a biological weapon such as Anthrax in
the subways of New York City, or the crash of a busload of tourists on a congested Los
Angeles freeway that results in critical injuries.

These scenarios are not very different from a wartime surge scenario requiring logistics
management. Whether it is for a military or commercial surge scenario, carefully planned
situational logistics and effective supply chain management can get the supplies to the
people in need in an emergency. Both of these hypothetical scenarios involve fundamental
logistics processes, such as quickly exchanging information, identifying available supply
resources, and delivering supplies. Such scenarios call for an integrated plan involving
military, governmental, and commercial services.

Commercial
As the national infrastructure networks and ports become stressed by capacity constraints,
logistics companies are relying more on intelligent distribution methods such as the
Internet. Virtual service providers allow large corporations to exchange supply
information among globally situated retail locations. Since economy of scale is the driving

43
force in commercial industries, the larger the conglomerate, the better the business. When
businesses are located all over the globe and information acts as another mode of
transportation in logistics, technology becomes increasingly important for daily
operations. Some logistics providers have become information management firms. With
the adoption of the Internet for electronic commerce, customers have come to expect
ready access to real-time inventory procurement, ordering, and tracking. The Information
Revolution is leading the changes in supply chain distribution and fulfillment patterns.

E-commerce, e-procurement, e-retailing, and virtual warehousing concepts are changing


the relationships between suppliers and distributors, altering the implications for freight
movement patterns, and—since the Internet offers accessibility from any location—
redefining the relative location of the workplace. Real-time access to business data on
potential customers and suppliers provides managers with dynamic inventory control and
immediate vehicle dispatching capabilities for freight delivery systems.

Military
Each military installation can be conceived of as a decentralized retail center that can be
connected to a centralized hub or a major distribution center that can distribute supplies. If
end items are in need of repair parts, the technology is available to signal low stockage at
location for that particular repair part so it can be reordered instead of waiting for
carcasses. Transportation delivery systems are fairly reliable and are not the major
bottlenecks to getting the necessary parts to the soldier in the field. Finding the
manufacturer who can make component parts to order and connecting that manufacturer
with the direct support operations may be the next logical step in military logistics.

Commercial
In private sector logistics, direct coordination of retailers, suppliers, and transporters using
technology such as the Internet has enabled retailers to fill empty shelves more quickly
because such a system helps the respective parties predict each other's needs. For the
military, an Internet-based system connecting installations would require that all of the

44
installations share information with military procurement, supply, and transportation
offices.

Military
Lack of spare parts is not necessarily the major hindrance to efficient military logistics.
Having the spare part where it is needed is the key area for logistics improvement.

For e.g.
During Operation Desert Storm, $2.7 billion worth of spare parts went unused. It is
estimated that, if the Army had had an effective cargo-tracking method during the
Gulf War, it could have saved about $2 billion. As a result of the Gulf War
experience, automatic identification technology and intransit visibility systems have
been established as mechanisms that will save the military money in the long term.

For military surface distribution, the idea of having coordinated, scheduled truck
deliveries at installations is not very different from the type of coordination that occurs
between the retailers and the supply chain management system.

For e.g.
During the Gulf War, there also was a lack of equipment needed for deployment,
and the ports of embarkation and debarkation were overcrowded with supplies that
had to be processed and moved to direct support locations. Although military
manpower has been reduced since then, capital investments in technology have
helped expedite deployment operations.

Thus Military and commercial has lots of relevance but are used in different manner and
different sense. Whatever the use may be both emphasis on reduction of cost, proper
deployment of goods, people and proper use of transportation to say some.

45
Technology Military logistics
In recent years Army logisticians have used technology to solve complex supply issues.
For E.g.
During Operations Desert Shield and Storm, the Army sent tons of supplies to the
desert. But there was a problem: Far too much time was spent opening shipping
containers to discover what was inside them.

Computerized electronic devices now enable logisticians to identify and track military
shipments made the world over.

"Things have changed significantly in military logistics [since Desert Storm] and a lot
of that change is powered by the information Revolution," says Mark J. O'Konski,
executive director of the U.S. Army Logistics Integration Agency. "Today the Army has
total asset visibility. That means that for over 99 percent of all reportable inventory we
know, in real time, where it is and what condition it is in."

IETMs
Technology is helping military logisticians in other ways too. Bulky technical manuals for
military equipment, which once used masses of paper, are now contained in lightweight
portable compact disks. These are known as Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals -
IETMs. They have many advantages over paper-based versions, including:

Information Access

Printed technical manuals for complex equipment come in multiple volumes, which
means it can take a technician a lot of time to find the information he or she needs.
Whereas IETMs allow, internal cross-reference links and links to other material
(inventory, training, etc). Many also have audio and video features.

46
Up-to-date Information

Rapid changes to military equipment means supporting documentation must be updated


along with those changes. With paper documents much of this has to be done manually,
which takes time and personnel and is expensive. IETMs, on the other hand, can be
updated quickly and cost-effectively. Many IETMs also have a "sticky notes" feature,
which can be use as an interim solution between updates.

There are many advantages to IETMs. But what might come as surprise is they lessen the
need for highly skilled technicians. Tests show that inexperienced technicians, who were
unable to locate a fault using paper technical manuals, were able to do so using IETMs.

In cost terms this means it might be possible to shorten training programs and use less
experienced personnel.

One thing is certain. Logistics have come a long way since


Napoleon's day. But an army still marches on its proverbial stomach -
it's just the supply chain is now digital.

47
Logistics used in wars

48
Logistics in WORLD WAR II
The logistic network performed prodigious feats in World War II. Millions of tons of
food, weapons, and equipment, and millions of men were transported to every corner of
the globe. Supplies were moved by ship to ports in the war zones and then to forward
supply bases. Quartermaster units attached to the armies then moved the supplies forward
to corps supply dumps. Divisional quartermaster units then, in turn, moved the supplies
forward and distributed them to units. Ground transport was by railroad, truck.
Ammunition supply was performed in a similar manner, except that it was the
responsibility of the Ordnance Corps.

Supply of materials during WORLD WAR II

Supplies

War zone War zone War zone


Port 1 Port 2 Port 3

Supply base 1 Supply base 3


Supply base 3
Supply base 1 Supply base 2
Supply base 2 Supply base 3

Supply base 2
Quarter Quarter
master units Quarter master units
Quarter Supply base 1
master units
master units
Quarter
master units Units
Quarter Units Quarter
master units Quarter master units
Units Quarter master units
master units
Units
Units
Units
Units
Units Units

49
In general, most types of supply were plentiful. Food, clothing and general equipment
items were usually plentiful. However, gasoline (petrol), oil, and lubricants (called POL, a
term inherited from the British) and ammunition tended to be in short supply at many
times. POL could be difficult to get forward, container trucks and trailers worked well for
unit distribution, but were inefficient for long hauls, as was the case in Europe. The
solution in Europe was PLUTO (for pipeline under the ocean), a POL pipeline (actually a
number of separate pipelines) laid across the English Channel and with a terminus that
eventually reached to Belgium. In the Pacific, it was often a simple matter of tying up a
tanker to a pier and pumping fuel directly into trucks on the dock.

Ammunition, particularly artillery ammunition, tended to be a much more pernicious


problem. In the early stages of the Army's expansion there were plans calling for a high
priority in the production of 105mm shells of all types, in as much as these were the
standard, general-support divisional field piece. Ammunition for heavier guns was
accorded a lower priority, under the assumption that mobile warfare would reduce the
utility of large, unwieldy and relatively immobile large artillery pieces. Unfortunately, a
number of factors then intervened as follows:

Congressional criticism was raised over large over stocks of all types of artillery
ammunition that had accumulated in Tunisia in 1943. The Army was pressured to scale
back production, particularly of 105mm ammunition.

The perceived need for an expansion of the heavy and medium artillery was mirrored by
an expansion of the production facilities for the heavier types of shells. The expansion in
heavy shell production was facilitated by converting light ammunition production to
heavy. Thus, by late 1943 priorities had shifted radically. Many plants were retooling for
other production, while some 105mm plants were closed completely.

Events in France and Italy in mid 1944 then changed all the assumptions again. The fierce
German resistance in the bocage of Normandy and in the Appenine Mountains of Italy
placed a premium on all types of ammunition - just as stocks of 105mm ammunition

50
began to shrink. Rationing was instituted (and extended to most other types of mortar and
artillery ammunition), and captured German weapons and ammunition were utilized
against their former owners. By 1 January 1945 the entire ETO stock of 105mm
ammunition was reduced to 2,524,000 rounds, a twenty-one-day supply according to War
Department planning factors, which were widely acknowledged to be too optimistic. The
poor flying weather encountered in Europe in the fall and winter exacerbated this near-
disastrous situation.

51
Roman Logistics
To understand how ill served medieval armies were in terms of logistics, consider what
the Romans did and how they did it. The Romans were supremely organized in all they
did. Literacy was encouraged, and in the Roman armies nearly half their troops may have
been capable of reading and writing. This was important because about five percent of a
Roman army consisted of technicians, clerks, and supply specialists. These troops
received extra pay and/or exemption from manual labor so they could keep track of what
supplies the army had on hand, how long these would last, and where new supplies were
coming from. A Roman army kept records, lots of records. There were lists for
everything, including how much of each soldiers' pay (and Roman troops were
generally paid on time) was to be deducted for food, clothing, weapons, and burial
expenses, not to mention the annual party. When any of these items were needed, the
Roman army clerks had it available. The Romans built a network of roads (some
still in use) throughout their empire to speed the movement of troops and supplies.
All cities and many towns had military purchasing agents who received reports from
the army detailing how much food, shoes (hob nailed sandals), weapons, and other
supplies and were they were to be delivered. The army commanders had finance
officers who arranged for suppliers to be paid promptly, thus encouraging timely
and accurate fulfillment of military contracts.

The Romans knew how much food (by weight and cost) their troops would consume
each day. Their army clerks kept daily records of how many troops were with each
unit. Army purchasing agents kept track of what supplies were available in their area, and
how much of it was for sale and for how much. Paper reports were carried up and
down the Roman roads to keep everyone informed of who needed what and when.
The Romans usually managed to control the sea-lanes also, and would rent, buy or build
the shipping they needed for each campaign.

The Roman system wasn't perfect. Money problems, enemy action, or


communications foul ups would sometimes leave the troops lacking key items. But

52
when compared to their opponents, the Romans were much better off. Roman
opponents were either barbarians, who stole what they could find in the areas they passed
through, or ill organized kings who at best made haphazard arrangements.

Assured of regular supply, Roman troops could more easily survive being under
siege, or reduce enemy fortifications themselves without worrying about starving.
Well-supplied Roman armies could march hither and yon for months at a time while
their ill-organized foes would see their troops getting hungry, and shortly there
afterwards deciding to go home (with or without permission).

53
Roman Tactics, Strategy & battle
formation
Rome faced multiple, simultaneous enemies which hastened the development of its
military system. The first Roman soldiers were equipped and fought as Greek Hoplites
and in the close order of a Phalanx. Soldiers provided their own weapons and equipment
and only the richest person could afford the "panoplia" which included:

1. A bronze corselet called Lorica


2. A spear usually three meters long
3. A large oval shield
4. Greaves

The remainder of the army were equipped as Velites, light infantry skirmishers. During
the reign of Servius Tullius , all Roman able-bodied, property-owning male citizens were
first divided into five classes for military service based on wealth, since soldiers provided
their own weapons and equipment. These classes were further organized into units of 100
called Centuries. The Equites, could afford horses and so made up the smallest, wealthiest
class. The next wealthiest were the heavy infantry Triarii, below them were two classes of
medium infantry the Principes and Hastati, with the poorest class serving as the Velites.
The army "Legio", meaning levy in Latin, was comprised of 3,000 infantry pedites and
300 cavalry equites. Each of the three original tribes- the Titis, Ramnes and Luceres had
to provide 1000 pedites and 100 equites.

The army was deployed with a strong infantry center and the equites on the wings. The
infantry was commanded by a tribunus militum while the cavalry by tribunus celerum.

During the early Republic the Roman army changed its shape, the army abandoned the
heavy and inflexible phalanx formation. Now recruitment was based on a census which
took into account not only wealth but age and battle experience. The richest and the most
experienced soldiers would serve as the Triarii, the middle class, somewhat less

54
experienced and the small landowners as the principes and the remainder as the hastati
and velites. The Romans developed a more flexible unit, called the Manipulus with 120
men in two "centuria", which despite the name were in fact composed of 60 men each and
not 100. Each maniple had two centurions, with one being the senior or the prior acting as
the commanding officer. The maniples would be further temporarily grouped into
Cohortes of around 300 men. A typical Maniple cohort would consist of:

1. 120 hastati
2. 120 principes
3. 60 triarii.

Ten cohorts would form a legion.. Each type of soldier had standard equipment which
consisted of-

For Triarii: Lorica hamata plus a bronze corselet, a large rectangular shield,
called scutum, a small thrusting spear.

For principes: Lorica hamata plus a scutum, two javelins (pila), and a gladius

For hastati: A bronze corselet, a scutum, two pila and a gladius.

55
They were deployed in a checker board pattern, with the hastati first to face the enemy,
the principes in the second line and the triarii in the third line at the rear. The tactical
objective was simple:

The hastati would wear down the enemy by throwing their pila , then in the gaps left
between each maniple, the principes would charge in to rout the enemy, if the principes
failed to do so, they would fall back or the triarii would advance to attack and push back
the enemy.

The battle signals were given by a cornicifer, which in Latin means Horn carrier, and by
an Optio, who was the second in command of a centuria.

Formation & tactics


Pre-battle maneuver
The Romans generally followed the same basic methods in battle, although of course
adjustments were made depending on the enemy, terrain, etc. The approach march was
made in several columns, enhancing maneuver. As the opponents drew closer to each
other, movement became more careful and more tentative. The Romans typically
established a strong field camp, complete with palisade and ditch, providing a basis
for supply storage, troop marshalling and defence. Camps were recreated each time
the army moved. Several days might be spent in a location, studying the terrain and
opposition, and a number of demonstrations might be undertaken to test enemy
reaction as well as to build troop morale. Part of the army might be drawn up in battle
array towards the enemy.

Deployment
The Roman infantry typically was deployed, as the main body, facing the enemy, in three
lines, with the cavalry or equites on their wings. The less experienced cohorts - usually the
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th - were in the front; the more experienced cohorts - 1st, 5th, 7th,
9th, and 10th - were placed behind.

56
They were deployed in a Quincunx checkered pattern, in Latin triplex acies, with archers
and auxiliares in the spaces between the cohorts. Before each battle, the commander
exhorted his troops with a speech, and after that speech each soldier screamed his war cry
and clashed his own gladius on his shield, a psychological tactic to demoralize the enemy.

The Roman maneuver was a complex one, filled with the dust of thousands of men
wheeling into place, and the shouting of officers moving to and fro as they attempted to
maintain order. Several thousand men had to be
positioned from column into line, with each unit
taking its designated place, along with light troops
and cavalry. It might take hours for the final
deployment, but when accomplished the legion
represented a formidable fighting array, arranged in
three lines with a frontage as long as one mile. This
is best case of networking of armies and
deployment into a perfect area.

Field Combat
Hand to hand
The battle usually opened with light troops skirmishing with the opposition- archers,
slingers, javelin-men etc. These light forces withdrew to the flanks or between the gaps in
the central line as the hour of decision drew nigh. Cavalry might be launched against their
opposing numbers or used to screen the central core from envelopment. As the gap
between the contenders closed, the main Roman force went into action. The heavy
infantry typically took the initiative, attacking on the double. The front ranks usually cast
their pilum, and the following ranks hurled theirs over the heads of the front-line fighters.
They then drew their swords and engaged the enemy. In the slogging match that ensued
Roman discipline and training were to give them important advantages. Heavily armored,

57
with a large shield and aggressive swordplay, the infantry over time would wear down the
opposition. Fresh troops were fed in from the rear, through the "checkboard" arrangement,
to relieve the injured and exhausted further ahead. Eventually one side or another broke
under the pressure and it is then that the greatest slaughter began.

Using Covering Fire

Many Roman battles, especially during the late empire, were fought with the preparatory
fire from Ballistas and Onagers. These war machines, a form of ancient
artillery, fired arrows and large stones towards the enemy. Following this
barrage, the Roman infantry advanced, in four lines, until
they came within 30 meters of the enemy, then they
halted, hurled their pila and charged. If the first line was
repelled by the enemy, another line would rapidly
resume the attack. Often this rapid sequence of
deadly attacks proved the key of victory.

Ballista

Another common tactic was to taunt the enemy with feigned charges and rapid arrow fire
by the auxiliary cavalry, forcing the enemy into pursuing
them, and then leading the enemy into an ambush where
they would be counter attacked by Roman heavy infantry
and cavalry

Auxiliary Cavalry

Why Romans Succeeded?


58
The film "Gladiator" (2000) presents a typical picture of Roman invincibility, complete
with wild Germanic hordes that were quickly crushed. Rome suffered a number of
embarrassing setbacks against such barbarians. One of Rome's greatest military
defeats, (the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest) saw the liquidation of three imperial
legions to Germanic warbands, and was to spark a limit on Roman expansion in the
West. And it was these Germanic hordes in part (most having some familiarity with
Rome and its culture) that were to eventually bring about the Roman military's final
demise in the West.

The core of the Roman Army was infantry and when they faced armies heavy with
cavalry, they often encountered problems. One classic case of course is Hannibal's
army, but both the horse reliant Parthians and heavy Sarmatian cavalry gave the legions
more than a run for their money.

Several of Rome's other military campaigns hardly show sustained invincibility or


dazzling genius. Indeed Roman performance in many battles was unimpressive or
disastrous. As far as ambushes for example, Roman forces seemed to have a penchant for
falling into them repeatedly. Over the course of the empire, they were out-generaled by
Hannibal (during the early years of the Second Punic War) and suffered a number of other
severe defeats by opponents like the Parthians. And yet, over time, the Romans not only
bounced back, but for the most part eventually crushed or neutralized their enemies. How
then did they do it against a variety of enemies that were, at various times and places,
more numerous, more skilled or better led?

Central factors in Roman success


Some elements that made the Romans an effective military force, both tactically and at
higher levels, were:

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The Romans were able to copy and adapt the weapons and methods of
its opponents more effectively
Some weapons, such as the gladius, were adopted by romans. Especially formidable
enemies units of their forces were invited to serve in the Roman army as auxiliaries after
peace was made. In the naval sphere, the Romans followed some of the same methods
they used with the infantry, dropping their ineffective designs and copying, adapting and
improving warships, and introducing heavier marine contingents (infantry fighters) on to
their ships.

Roman organization was more flexible than those of many opponents

Tribal peoples for example often attacked en-masse with little coordination, using
standard tactics traditional to their culture that varied relatively little. There were
exceptions, notably by leaders who had previously been extensively exposed to Roman
military methods, but this was the general rule. By contrast, the heavy infantry, through
their training and discipline, and operating in conjunction with light foot and cavalry,
could more quickly adopt a number of methods and formations depending on the
situation. Against more sophiscated opponents the Romans also showed great flexibility at
times, such as the brilliant adjustments Scipio made against Hannibal at Zama. These
included leaving huge gaps in the ranks to trap the charging elephants, and the recall,
reposition and consolidation of a single battle line that advanced to the final death struggle
against the Carthaginian veterans of Italy. This is best example of logistical planning
and felxibility.

Roman discipline, organization and logistical systemization sustained


combat effectiveness over a longer period.

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The Roman system of castra, or fortified camps, allowed the army to stay in the field
on favorable ground and be rested and resupplied for battle. Well organized Roman
logistics also sustained combat power, from routine resupply and storage, to the
construction of military roads, to state run arsenals and weapons factories, to well
organized naval convoys that helped stave off defeat by Carthage. The death of a
leader generally did not cause the legions to lose heart in battle. Others stepped to the fore
and carried on. In the defeat by Hannibal at the River Trebia, 10,000 Romans cut their
way through the debacle to safety, maintaining unit cohesion when all around was rout, a
testimony to their tactical organization and discipline.

Conclusion
Few of the armies Rome faced over the centuries had efficient logistics and were thus
under a lot more time pressure to reach a decision before their troops starved or, more
likely, quit the field.

Unless you had a logistical system comparable to the Romans, and few medieval armies
did, you had to live off the land. This could have dire consequences. Each man needed at
least three pounds of food a day, and each horse twenty pounds of feed. If these
requirements were not met, the troops would first go hungry and then most of them would
either desert or, if you were far from friendly territory, starve to death or be picked off by
enemy troops.

1999 Kargil Conflict

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Introduction
The 1999 Kargil War took place between May 8, when Pakistani forces and Kashmiri
militants were detected atop the Kargil ridges and July 14 when both sides had essentially
ceased their military operations. It is believed that the planning for the operation, by
Pakistan, may have occurred about as early as the autumn of 1998.

The spring and summer incursion of Pakistan-backed armed forces into territory on the
Indian side of the line of control around Kargil in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the
Indian military campaign to repel the intrusion left 524 Indian soldiers dead and 1,363
wounded, according to December 1 statistics by Defense Minister George Fernandes.
Earlier Government figures stated that 696 Pakistani soldiers were killed. A senior
Pakistani police official estimated that approximately 40 civilians were killed on the
Pakistani side of the line of control.

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By 30 June 1999 Indian forces were prepared for a major high-altitude offensive against
Pakistani posts along the border in the disputed Kashmir region. Over the previous six
weeks India had moved five infantry divisions, five independent brigades and 44
battalions of paramilitary troops to Kashmir. The total Indian troop strength in the region
had reached 730,000. The build-up included the deployment of around 60 frontline
aircraft. This is where logistics have come into force i.e. Deployment of resources.

The Pakistani effort to take Kargil occurred after the February 1999 Lahore summit
between then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Indian Prime Minister Atal
Bahari Vajpayee. This conference was believed to have de-escalated the tensions that had
existed since May 1998.

Major motive
The major motive behind the operation was to help in internationalising the Kashmir
issue, and for which global attention had been flagging for some time. The intrusion plan
was the brainchild of Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, Gen Pervez Musharraf and Lt Gen
Mohammed Aziz, the Chief of General Staff. They obtained only an 'in principle'
concurrence, without any specifics, from Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistani Prime Minister.

What Pakistan Exploited?

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Pakistan's military aim for carrying out the intrusions was based on exploitation of the
large gaps that exist in the defenses in the sector both on Indian and Pak side of the Line
of Control (Loc). The terrain is extremely rugged with very few tracks leading from
the main roads towards the Loc. During winters the area gets very heavy snowfall
making movement almost impossible. The only mountain pass connecting the Kargil
area to the Kashmir Valley, Zoji La, normally opens by the end of May or beginning
of June. Thus, moving of reinforcements by surface means from Srinagar would not
have been possible till then. Thus to win over India needs best logistical system to be
in place because wrong deployment of resources, arms, food supplies & warehousing
and transportation of food to our soldiers death and would led to loss of war.

Pakistan Army Calculations


Pakistan Army calculated that even if the intrusions were discovered in early May, as they
were, the Indian Army's reaction would be slow and limited, thereby allowing him to
consolidate the intrusions more effectively. In the event, however, Zoji La was opened for
the induction of troops in early May itself.

What Pakistan army Tried to pressurize on?


1. The intrusions, if effective, would enable Pakistani troops to secure a number
of dominating heights from where the Srinagar-Leh National Highway 1A could
be interdicted at a number of places. Thus trying to crub transportation system
which is core to logistics.

2. The intrusions would also draw in and tie down Indian Army reserves. Thus
to crub Warehousing and inventory systems of Indian Army.

3. The intrusions would, further, give Pakistan control over substantial tracts of
strategic land area across the LoC, thereby, enabling Islamabad to negotiate
from a position of strength. Thus giving command over logistical area where they
can do networking and forward their operations.

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4. The intrusions would irrevocably alter the status of the Loc.

Indian strategists believe that the Pakistani offensive had four major
objectives:
1. Choke the strategic road linking Srinagar with Leh and prevent vital winter
supplies reaching Ladakh.
2. Occupy Drass and Kargil and use that to open up the Loc.
3. Use the capture of heights in Chugh valley, Batalik and Turtuk regions to force
India to back down in Siachen.
4. Control the Mashkoh Valley nullah near Kargil and use it as a major route for
fresh infiltration.
The grand design was to alter the LoC by force, bury the Simla Agreement and bring
the Kashmir issue back on the international stage.

Apart from keeping the plan top secret, the Pakistan Army also undertook certain steps to
maintain an element of surprise and maximise deception. Any large-scale troop movement
involving even two or three battalions would have drawn the attention of the Indian Army.
There was no movement of reserve formations or units until after the execution of the plan
and operations had begun with the Indian Army's response. No new administrative bases
for the intrusions were to be created, instead they were to be catered for from those
already in the existing defences. The logistic lines of communication were to be along the
ridgelines well away from the tracks and positions of the Indian Army troops already in
position.

After it was finalised, the plan was put into action towards the end of April. The main
groups were broken into a number of smaller sub groups of 30 to 40 each for
carrying out multiple intrusions along the ridgelines and occupy dominating heights.
This has proper deployment of troops to areas and trying to get most of the logistical
areas.

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The terrain of the Kargil and surrounding regions of the LOC is inhospitable in the best of
times. Some of the characteristics of the region are jagged heights of up to 18,000 feet and
harsh gusts of wind and temperatures plunging to about -60 degrees Celsius in the winter.
The battle terrain of 'Operation Vijay' is dominated by high altitude peaks and ridgelines
most of which are over 16000 ft. This region is part of the 'cold desert' region of Ladakh.
Dry, and at the same time very cold, the Kargil Mountains are a formidable constituent of
the Greater Himalayas. Unlike other similar high altitude areas, the Kargil Mountains lose
snow cover rapidly as the summer progresses. Below the peaks and the ridgelines are
loose rocks, which make climbing extremely difficult. If it is not the snow cover, then it is
the rocks, which cause extreme hardships on the troops.

There had existed a sort of "gentleman's agreement" between India and Pakistan that the
armies of either side will not occupy posts from the 15 September to 15th April of each
year. This had been the case since 1977, but in 1999 this agreement was cast aside by the
Pakistani army in hopes of trying to gain the upper hand in Kashmir and plunging the
Indian subcontinent in brief and limited war and raising the spectre of nuclear war.

As events unfolded, Zoji La opened early on account of the unseasonal melting of snows
and the Indian Army's reaction was far swifter than Pakistan had expected. Further,
Pakistan also did not expect the reaction of the Indian Army to be as vigorous as has been
demonstrated manifested.

Indian Army Patrols detected intruders atop Kargil ridges during the period 8-15
May 1999. The pattern of infiltration clearly established the participation of trained
Mujahideen and Pakistan Army regulars in these operations in areas east of Batalik and
north of Dras. Pakistan resorted to artillery firing from across the border both in general
areas of Kargil and Dras. Indian army launched operations, which succeeded in
cutting off the infiltrators in Dras sector. Infiltrators were also pushed back in
Batalik sector. Thus there was logistical strategy used of cutting down the
connections of the competitor, if we say in business terms.

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The Intruders on the heights were an amalgam of professional soldiers and mercenaries.
They included the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 12th battalions of the Pakistan Army’s
Northern Light Infantry (NLI). Among them were many Mujaheddin and members of
Pakistan's the Special Services Group (SSG). It was initially estimated that there were
about 500 to 1,000 intruders occupying the heights but later it is estimated that the actual
strength of the intruders may have been about 5,000. The area of intrusion extended in an
area of 160km. The Pakistani Army had set up a complex logistical network through
which the intruders across the LOC would be well supplied from the bases in POK
(Pakistan Occupied Kashmir). The intruders were also well armed with AK 47 and
56, mortars, artillery, anti aircraft guns, and Stinger missiles.

Indian Army Operations


The Indian Army detected the intrusions between May 3-12.
From May 15 - 25, 1999, military operations were planned,
troops moved to their attack locations, artillery and other
equipment were moved in and the necessary equipment
was purchased. Thus purchasing and deployment of
resources becomes part of logistical system. Indian Army’s
offensive named Operation Vijay was launched on May 26,
1999. Indian troops moved towards Pakistani occupied
positions with air cover provided by aircraft and helicopters.

Operation Vijay in the Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir during the summer months
of 1999 was a joint Infantry-Artillery endeavour to evict regular Pakistani soldiers of the
Northern Light Infantry (NLI) who had intruded across the Line of Control (Loc) into
Indian Territory and had occupied un-held high-altitude mountain peaks and ridgelines. It
soon became clear that only massive and sustained firepower could destroy the
intruders and systematically break their will to fight through a process of attrition
and, in the process, enable the gallant infantrymen to close in with and evict the
intruders. Thus began a unique saga in the history of the employment of Artillery
firepower in battle.

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First Goal to achieve
The first major ridgeline to fall was Tololing in the Drass sub-sector on June 13, 1999,
which was captured after several weeks of bitter fighting. The attacks were preceded by
sustained fire assaults from over one hundred Artillery guns, mortars and rocket launchers
firing in concert. Thousands of shells, bombs and rocket warheads wrecked havoc and
prevented the enemy from interfering with the assault. The 155 mm Bofors medium guns
and 105 mm Indian field guns in the direct firing role destroyed all visible enemies and
forced the enemy to abandon several positions. The arcs of fire trailing behind the Bofors
high explosive shells and the Grad rockets provided an awesome sight and instilled fear
into the minds of Pakistani soldiers. And this was only possible because of best logistics
drawn by our experts in the sense of deployment of resources, food, arms and
ammunitions and other means of communication.

Second Goal
The capture of the Tololing complex paved the way for successive assaults to be launched
on the Tiger Hill complex from several directions. Tiger Hill was re-captured on July 5,
1999 and Point 4875. Over 1,200 rounds of high explosive rained down on
Tiger Hill and caused large-scale death and devastation. Once again,
the Gunners of the Indian Artillery fired their guns audaciously in the
direct firing role, under the very nose of Pakistani artillery observation
posts (OPs), without regard for personal safety. Even 122 mm Grad
multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRLs) were employed in the direct
firing role. Hundreds of shells and rocket warheads impacted on the
pinnacle of Tiger Hill in full view of TV cameras and the nation watched
in rapt attention the might of the Regiment of Artillery .

Third Goal
To the west of Tiger Hill and jutting into Mashkoh Valley, was re-
captured on July 7, 1999. Point 4875 has since been re-named "Gun

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Hill" in honour of the stupendous performance of the Gunners in the
Drass and Mashkoh sub-sectors.

Simultaneous to all above goals


While the nation's attention was riveted on the fighting in the Drass sector, steady
progress was being made in the Batalik sector despite heavy casualties. In the Batalik
sector, the terrain was much tougher and the enemy was far more strongly entrenched.
The containment battle itself took almost a month. Artillery Operations were established
on dominating heights and sustained Artillery fire was brought down on the enemy
continuously by day and night allowing him no rest.

The rule of thumb is that mountain ridges or spurs descending or linked to high
Pakistani features in Batalik and Mashkoh will be difficult nuts to crack since they
facilitate supplies, reinforcements and ammunition for the intruders from their PoK
bases. Where there is a break, such as the Tiger Hill and Tololing area, it is possible
to push forces to interpose themselves between the intruders and their supply lines.
The Army plan, according to retired vice-chief of staff Lt-General K.K. Hazari, seems to
be following this strategy. "We interpose our forces where we can, progressively deplete
their ability to fight and then expect to roll them up in a month or two,"

Fourth Goal
Point 5203 was re-captured on June 21, 1999

Fifth Goal
Khalubar was re-captured on July 6, 1999. Within the next few days, further attacks were
pressed home against the remaining Pakistani posts in the Batalik sub-sector and these fell
quickly after being pulverised by Artillery fire. Once again, Artillery firepower played an
important part in softening the defences and destroying the enemy's battalion headquarters
and logistics infrastructure.

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The Indian Artillery fired over 250,000 shells, bombs and rockets during the Kargil
conflict. Approximately, 5,000 Artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were fired
daily from 300 guns, mortars. Such high rates of fire over long periods had not been
witnessed anywhere in the world since the Second World War.

Logistically support system to land operations in Kargil


Air Operations
From May 11 to May 25, ground troops supported by the Air Force tried to contain the
threat, assessed the enemy dispositions and carried out various preparatory actions. Entry
of the Air Force into combat action on May 26 represented a paradigm shift in the nature
and prognosis of the conflict. In operation Safed Sagar, the Air Force carried out nearly
5,000 sorties of all types over 50-odd days of operations.

Operations in this terrain required special training and tactics. It was soon realised that
greater skills and training were needed to attack the very small/miniature targets extant,
often not visible to the naked eye.

The shoulder-fired missile threat was omnipresent and there were no doubts about this.
An IAF Canberra recce aircraft was damaged by a Pakistani Stinger fired possibly from
across the LoC. On the second and third day of the operations, still in the learning curve,
the IAF lost one MiG-21 fighter and one Mig-17 helicopter to shoulder-fired missiles by
the enemy. In addition, one MiG-27 was lost on the second day due to engine failure just
after the pilot had carried out successful attacks on one of the enemy's main supply
dumps. These events only went to reinforce the tactics of the IAF in carrying out attacks
from outside the Stinger envelope and avoiding the use of helicopters for attack purposes.
Attack helicopters have a certain utility in operations under relatively benign conditions
but are extremely vulnerable in an intense battlefield. The fact that the enemy fired more
than 100 shoulder fired against IAF aircraft indicates not only the great intensity of the
enemy air defences in the area but also the success of IAF tactics, especially after the first
three days of the war during which not a single aircraft received even a scratch.

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The terrain in the Kargil area is 16,000 to 18,000 feet above sea level. The aircraft are,
therefore, required to fly at about 20,000 feet. At these heights, the air density is 30% less
than at sea level. This causes a reduction in weight that can be carried and also reduces the
ability to manoeuvre as the radius of a turn is more than what it is at lower levels. The
larger radius of turn reduces manoeuverability in the restricted width of the valley. The
engine’s performance also deteriorates as for the same forward speed there is a lesser
mass of air going into the jet engine of the fighter or helicopter. The non-standard air
density also affects the trajectory of weapons. The firing, hence, may not be accurate. In
the mountains, the targets are relatively small, spread-out and difficult to spot visually,
particularly by pilots in high-speed jets.

The Indian airfields nearest to Kargil were:


1. Srinagar
2. Avantipur
3. Adampur near Jalandhar

They supported air operations. Therefore, the IAF operated from these three bases. The
planes used for ground attack were:
1. MiG-2ls
2. MiG- 23s
3. MiG-27s
4. Jaguars
5. Mirage- 2000.

The Mig-2l was built mainly for air interception with a secondary role of ground
attack. However, it is capable of operating in restricted spaces, which was of
importance in the Kargil terrain.

The MiG-23s and 27s are optimized for attacking targets on the ground. They can
carry a load of 4 tonnes each. This could be a mix of weapons including cannon,
rocket pods, free- fall and retarded bombs and smart weapons. It has a

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computerised bomb sight which enables accurate weapon delivery. These planes
were, therefore, ideal for use in the mountainous terrain of Kargil.

Naval Operations
While the Army and the Air Force readied themselves for the battle on the heights of
Kargil, Indian Navy began to draw out its plans. Unlike the earlier wars with Pakistan,
this time the bringing in of the Navy at the early stages of the conflict served to hasten the
end of the conflict in India's favor.

In drawing up its strategy, the Navy was clear that a reply to the Pakistani misadventure
had to be two-pronged. While ensuring safety and security of Indian maritime assets from
a possible surprise attack by Pakistan, the Indian imperative was that all efforts must be
made to deter Pakistan from escalating the conflict into a full-scale war. Thus, the Indian
Navy was put on a full alert from May 20 onwards, a few days prior to the launch of the
Indian retaliatory offensive. Naval and Coast Guard aircraft were put on a continuous
surveillance and the units readied up for meeting any challenge at sea.

Time had now come to put pressure on Pakistan, to ensure that the right message went
down to the masterminds in that country. Strike elements from the Eastern Fleet were
sailed from Visakhapatnam on the East Coast to take part in a major naval exercise called
'SUMMEREX' in the North Arabian Sea. This was envisaged as the largest ever amassing
of naval ships in the region. The message had been driven home. Pakistan Navy, in a
defensive mood, directed all its units to keep clear of Indian naval ships. As the exercise
shifted closer to the Makaran Coast, Pakistan moved all its major combatants out of
Karachi. It also shifted its focus to escorting its oil trade from the Gulf in anticipation of
attacks by Indian ships.

As the retaliation from the Indian Army and the Air Force gathered momentum and a
defeat to Pakistan seemed a close possibility, an outbreak of hostilities became imminent.
Thus the naval focus now shifted to the Gulf of Oman. Rapid reaction missile carrying

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units and ships from the fleet were deployed in the North Arabian Sea for carrying out
missile firing, anti-submarine and electronic warfare exercises. In the absence of the only
aircraft carrier, Sea Harrier operations from merchant ships were proven. The Navy also
readied itself for implementing a blockade of the Pakistani ports, should the need arise. In
addition, Naval amphibious forces from the Andaman group of islands were moved to the
western sea-board.

In a skilful use of naval power in the form of ‘Operation Talwar’, the ‘Eastern Fleet’
joined the ‘Western Naval Fleet’ and blocked the Arabian sea routes of Pakistan. Apart
from a deterrent, the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief later disclosed that Pakistan
was left with just six days of fuel (POL) to sustain itself if a full fledged war broke out.

Indian Army Logistical Limitations


1. Ideally the army would have adopted the "encircle and squeeze" tactic to evict the
intruders. But it has strict orders not to cross the LoC into PoK which means it cannot
really cut off the Pakistan Army supplies to the intruders at many of the key ridges.

2. The inhospitable terrain, which is almost like Siachen with temperatures dropping to
minus 15 degrees Celsius, high winds and steep escarpments, the Indian Army was
initially ill prepared to take on such a large-scale intrusion. Almost half of its frontline
troops were without what is known as "glacier clothing" to withstand extreme cold in
the high reaches and fresh supplies took time in coming.

3. With casualties mounting, the army's strategy is to avoid costly "Charge of the Light
Brigade" kind of assault and follow the textbook by attacking intruder posts from
several directions, geared towards cutting off their supplies and reinforcements from
Pakistan. Such a method requires numbers and time as fast as it could be.

To support this effort there was thousands of soldiers – logistical strategy, artillery forces,
reserve and specialized forces.

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Logistical cost to India
1. Deployment of forces
2. Supplying food – no army can win war without food.
3. Deployment of arms and ammunitions
4. Choking out transportation network where goods can be supplied at minimum cost
and at faster rate.
5. Deployment of medical services
6. Deployment of communication system

Moreover
All these have to move with the battalions moving forward.

Logistical cost
It has been estimated that daily cost of war for India at Rs 15 crore.

Thus daily cost of 15 crore states the importance of logistics in military operations. If a jet
plane chooses wrong route for flying it can become more expensive as well as it
consumed more time, in the same manner if the logistics is not planned in proper manner
it can add more cost to the military operations.

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Failure in logistics

Israel failure in Lebanon

Israeli military chief of staff, Lt Gen Dan Halutz, has publicly


admitted to failings in the conflict with Hezbollah militants in
Lebanon. Halutz has been widely criticised for not achieving

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Israel's war aims. In a letter to troops, he said it had exposed shortcomings in following
areas:

1. Military’s logistics
2. Operations
3. Command.

The Israeli army lost 116 soldiers. Forty-three civilians were also killed by more than
4,000 Hezbollah rocket attacks. About 1,000 Lebanese were killed in the conflict, mostly
civilians in Israel's vast bombardment of the county and land invasion in the south. The
conflict was sparked by a cross-border raid by Hezbollah fighters in which they captured
two Israeli soldiers and killed eight others.

Israel’s Aim

1. The return of the captured Israeli soldiers


2. The removal of Hezbollah's influence from southern
Lebanon.

But neither of these aims has been achieved.

Lebanon deaths: About 1,000 - mostly civilians, No precise data on Hezbollah dead
Israeli deaths: Soldiers: 116, Civilians: 43
Lebanon displaced: 700,000 - 900,000 (UNHCR; Lebanese govt)
Israeli displaced: 500,000 (Human Rights Watch)

US Army supply chain Failure in Iraq war


The failure of automated supply chain management and tracking systems in Iraq, U.S.
Army combat units had to resort capturing key supplies such as lubricants and explosives
from enemy stockpiles.

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Food supplies barely met demand, and stocks of ammunition and spare parts were
nearly depleted during combat, wrote analysts at the Center for Army Lessons Learned,
a military think tank that's sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense and based at
Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

After studying the Iraq war up to the fall of Baghdad, the CALL analysts found that the
performance of logistics and supply chain operations were "barely above subsistence
level," in large part because of problems with software based on radio frequency
identification technology (RFID) and network communications.

There is no one answer to why the logistics failures occurred, said Gregory Fontenot, a
retired Army colonel who was one of the three co-authors of the book. But, he added, "In
my assessment, the biggest single problem was the communications issue."

The Army did stress-testing on its battlefield systems before the war, but nothing could
have fully prepared them to deal with fast-moving combat operations involving 150,000
troops and several million supply items.

The Army is working to replace its 13 core logistics systems, which include several
thousand applications, with a version of SAP AG's software tailored for defense
operations.

Failure areas
1. The SAP application was not in place. If SAP's applications had been in place
prior to the start of the war in Iraq, the Army simply could have installed an RFID
module. Although the communications infrastructure in Iraq was poor when the war

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began. Probably greatest frustration was the inability to connect all computers to the
network," he said.

2. The Army was unable to start deploying transmitting devices with satellite dishes
and readers that can pull information from RFID tags attached to supplies until just
before the U.S. launched its attack. As a result, the ability of logistics managers to
track supplies plummeted after the goods reached Iraq.

3. Another problem was that the logistics systems weren't flexible enough to deal
with exceptions and glitches.

For example, if a combat unit unexpectedly changed its location, there was no way
to reroute its supplies.

Conclusion

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No military operation is complete with out logistics. It has become the importance of
today’s business as well as for wars to implement proper logistical system. If logistical
system is not in place it can make a successful strategy a failure. We have seen an
example of Israel failure in Lebanon as well as US army’s supply chain failure. It have
added to much cost to the war because a failure system have to be revamped and it has to
be implemented against so the cost of reserve logistics makes all the difference to the
country’s expenditure.

A well-managed and implemented logistical system could place a weak opponent into a
powerful position where as it can change the whole scenario. The use of logistics has been
on a wide scale since ancient times. At every step of our life we use logistics i.e. how can
we lower down cost and become more efficient.

Logistics is here to stay, may be used in different areas and would be implemented in
different manner but it’s a clear picture that logistics is here to stay. Those who implement
it would be in a powerful position and those who do not implement it would face a severe
loss. Competition is growing, cost reduction has become the main hurdle, war expenses
are reaching at more high levels and moreover protecting a country and its people has
become much more important. All this suggests that logistics is here to stay now it’s upon
you to follow or not.

Bibliography

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Books
1. Military logistics and strategic performance Thomas . k. Mane
2. Low intensity conflicts in india: an analysis vivek chadha
3. Military operations research N. K. Jaiswal

Magazines
1. Business & Economy IIPM Publication August 2006 issue
2. Supply chain management ICFAI Publication June 06 isue
3. Global educator IMS publication

Newspaper
1. Economics times
2. Business Standard

Websites
1. http://www.chuckhawks.com/index3.naval_military_history.htm
2. http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/kowar/log-sup/log-sup.htm
3. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/BigL/
4. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_1_28/ai_n6172424
5. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=65845832
6. http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/concepts_logistics.html
7. http://www.historyofwar.org/warsframe.html
8. http://www.historyofwar.org/weaponsframe.html
9. http://www.answers.com/topic/principles-of-military-strategy
10. www.rickard.karoo.net/articles/concepts_logistics.html - 58k
11. library.nps.navy.mil/home/sm/transportation.htm
12. www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/jv2020/Hodge_J_L_01.pdf

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