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The South China Sea: ASEAN's Security Concerns about China

Liselotte Odgaard
Security Dialogue 2003 34: 11
DOI: 10.1177/09670106030341003

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Special Section: The Politics of the South China Sea

The South China Sea: ASEANs Security

Concerns About China

LISELOTTE ODGAARD*
University of Aarhus, Denmark

This article investigates whether the South China Sea is a source of

internal disagreement or unity in ASEAN. It argues that when the
focus is on the possibilities of cooperation beyond what is necessary
for regional peace and stability, five different member-state group-
ings can be identified according to their outlook on the desirable level
of US and Chinese regional engagement, their support for a dialogue
focusing on Sino-Southeast Asian cooperation and their views on the
scope of a code of conduct. By contrast, when addressing the
prospects of coexistence, unity prevails within ASEAN. The member-
states are in agreement that Southeast Asia cannot opt out of the
structure of deterrence that is consolidated between the USA and
China. In addition, they agree that a practice of consultation and a
conservative code of conduct between Southeast Asia and China will
contribute to peace and stability by offering assurance that pending
disputes in the South China Sea will be settled by the indigenous
powers through peaceful means and will remain separate from the
outer structure of strategic competition.

Introduction

T
HE PRESENT ARTICLE ARGUES that the Southeast Asian states are
in agreement that Great Power engagement, dialogue and a code of
conduct are required in order to contain the violent conflicts that may
erupt from the numerous maritime boundary and sovereignty disputes in
the South China Sea. This assessment is contradictory to the prominent argu-
ment that disagreement prevails on how to manage potential conflicts in the
area, preventing the member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) from effectively dealing with the security concerns arising
from Chinas involvement in some of these disputes. The Spratlys and the
Paracels are among the offshore features contested by one or several
Southeast Asian states as well as by China and Taiwan. The involvement of
China in such disputes has drawn attention to the potential eruption of
violent conflict. Despite the decade-long efforts of ASEAN to forge political

2003 PRIO, www.prio.no

SAGE Publications, www.sagepublications.com
Vol. 34(1): 1124, ISSN 0967-0106 [032672]
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12 Security Dialogue vol. 34, no. 1, March 2003

coordination in the region, no formal mechanisms exist that are appropriate

for internal or external conflict resolution. Instead, states are usually left to
their own devices when disagreement between states cannot be immediately
reconciled.1
The potential for violent conflict is one issue addressed in analyses of the
South China Sea. Lee Lai To (1999: 147) concludes that maritime boundary
and sovereignty disputes will remain bones of contention in Sino-ASEAN
relations in the foreseeable future, causing increased tension if acts of provo-
cation take place in attempts to justify jurisdictional claims. Zha Daojiong &
Valencia (2001) point out that inaction on the South China Sea disputes
creates instability and the potential for violent conflict, while Hiramatsu
(2001) argues that a strong USJapan relationship and a more active Japanese
role are essential to prevent a possible flare-up of skirmishes around the
South China Sea. Another central issue in the debate on the South China Sea
is the ineffectiveness of diplomacy in promoting dispute resolution. Leifer
(1999: 38) argues that diplomatic paralysis makes it difficult for ASEAN to
address the overlapping claims to jurisdiction in the South China Sea. Collins
(2000: 169) argues that in the aftermath of the economic crisis that broke out
in 1997, the ASEAN states are not capable of pressurizing China into accept-
ing multilateral negotiations as the basis for dispute resolution. Huxley
(1998: 117) emphasizes that unless the ASEAN states establish a modus
operandi for the resolution of internal ASEAN disputes, it is hard to conceive
of ASEAN developing the rule-based regime necessary for resolving dis-
putes with China in the South China Sea. Hence, a common theme in exist-
ing analyses is the tendency to see the South China Sea as a threat towards
ASEANs survival as a diplomatic community based on the non-use of force.
This article argues that an assessment of ASEANs ability to maintain a
common stand on the South China Sea issues depends on the level of diplo-
matic integration associated with unity. When the focus is on issues of co-
operation outside the political framework necessary for regional peace and
stability, ASEAN is an entity marked by internal disagreement. Issues of
cooperation concern common security provisions, such as alliances, formal
conflict resolution mechanisms and common obligations towards the security
problems of individual member-states. Judged by these standards, ASEAN
has never been a successful diplomatic community. During the Cold War,
only the Philippines and Thailand became US allies; ASEAN refused to
accept responsibility for conflict resolution; and a variety of subregional
agreements and security arrangements with internal and external powers
were encouraged. The tolerance for multiple values and interests among
ASEANs members has been maintained after the Cold War, as reflected in
1
The article focuses on Southeast Asian and mainland Chinese policies on the South China Sea, excluding
Taiwanese policies from the analysis. Owing to the focus on Sino-Southeast Asian relations, maritime
boundary and sovereignty disputes solely between Southeast Asian countries have also been excluded.

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Liselotte Odgaard ASEANs Security Concerns About China 13

the variety of positions on the South China Sea. Hence the prevalence of
internal disagreement on the desirable level of US and Chinese regional
engagement, the purpose of the South China Sea dialogue and the scope of a
regional code of conduct.
By contrast, when examined in terms of issues of coexistence, internal unity
prevails within ASEAN. Issues of coexistence concern the political framework
necessary for maintaining regional peace and stability. During the Cold War,
ASEANs raison dtre was internal and external coexistence through the
non-use of force, the mobilization of diplomatic solidarity in the face of exter-
nal threats and non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states
(Leifer, 1989). After the Cold War, the ASEAN states debated whether the
association should compromise on the principle of non-interference in order
to transform ASEAN into a security community based on common values and
interests. For example, during consideration of the membership applications
of Myanmar and Cambodia, calls were made principally by Thailand and
the Philippines for the adoption of political criteria for admission. However,
ASEAN decided to admit Myanmar and Cambodia on the basis of the old
criteria, agreeing that political change was best promoted through inclusion.
ASEAN unity on issues of coexistence also shows in policies on the South
China Sea. At this level, the principal question is whether Great Power
engagement, dialogue and behavioural rules should form part of an order
between Southeast Asia and China. All ASEAN member-states answer this
question positively. From the perspective of coexistence, the Sino-Southeast
Asian disputes are not threats to ASEANs survival. Instead, they provide
opportunities to confirm that the ASEAN states remain committed to a politi-
cal framework that allows them to promote diverse interests and values, as
long as the common interest in regional peace and stability is not jeopardized.
The present article first addresses the issues of cooperation concerning the
South China Sea, arguing that disagreement flourishes in ASEAN at this
level of political integration. It then discusses the issues of coexistence con-
cerning the South China Sea, arguing that consensus exists that Southeast
Asia is to promote explicit confirmation from China that peaceful coexistence
will accompany its presence in the South China Sea. The article concludes by
discussing the implications of ASEANs South China Sea policy for regional
integration between Southeast Asia and China.

The South China Sea as a Source of Internal

Disagreement Within ASEAN

The South China Sea disputes are conflicts of jurisdiction over territory and
maritime space. As such, they are not formally an ASEAN issue, but only

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14 Security Dialogue vol. 34, no. 1, March 2003

involve the claimant states. However, the disputes are set within a political
framework largely defined by ASEAN principles of regional security and
member-states foreign policies. Furthermore, the disputes affect the security
of all Southeast Asian states, because Chinas presence in the South China
Sea makes it a Southeast Asian power outside the ASEAN security frame-
work. Consequently, common ASEAN positions and the foreign policies of
singular states on the South China Sea have a bearing on the ability of
ASEAN to maintain unity on this issue.
Issues of cooperation give rise to divergent foreign policy positions in
ASEAN, to the detriment of ASEAN unity. First, the ASEAN member-states
disagree on the level of US and Chinese involvement that is desirable for
maintaining a regional balance of power. Second, their opinions differ on
whether the South China Sea dialogue should result in tangible cooperation.
Third, the Southeast Asian states quarrel over the scope of a code of conduct.
These differences produce five discordant ASEAN positions.
The first of these positions is that of the claimant state Malaysia and may be
described as a status quo position. In public, Malaysia has been an outspoken
critic of US interference in Southeast Asian political and economic affairs. For
example, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad characterized US
opposition to ASEANs admission of Myanmar on grounds of human rights
as an attempt at foreign coercion of ASEAN (FBIS Daily Report, 1997). More-
over, Mahathir rebuffed mounting domestic criticism fuelled by the eco-
nomic crisis of the late 1990s by attacking US trade and monetary policies. At
the same time, Malaysia approves of a US military presence as the only effec-
tive means of preventing violent conflict. Malaysias participation in 1992
in ASEANs call for continued US presence and its low-key military co-
operation with the USA throughout the 1990s confirm that Malaysia sees US
military involvement in Southeast Asia as necessary for maintaining
stability. The war on terrorism has further strengthened USMalaysian rela-
tions, as witnessed by US support for a Malaysian law allowing for the
imprisonment of people without trial and the official visit of Mahathir to the
White House in May 2002. However, Malaysia does not condone the US
tendency to apply Cold War threat perceptions to China. Mahathir is
attempting to cultivate a rapprochement with China in order to extract politi-
cal and economic gains, such as the official visit to Malaysia in 1999 by
Chinese President Jiang Zemin to enlist the votes of ethnic Chinese for
Mahathirs United Malays National Organization.2
Malaysia has been very active in the Sino-Southeast Asian informal dia-
logue on the South China Sea that began in 1990 and has included China
since 1991. Malaysia has criticized attempts at pressurizing China into co-
operation, arguing that nothing will be gained from trying to force China to

2
Interview with Zainal Abidin Sulong, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 26 February 1998.

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Liselotte Odgaard ASEANs Security Concerns About China 15

concede, other than superficial compliance that is unlikely to last in the long
run (Chanda, 1994). Moreover, Malaysia has at times supported Chinese
attempts at constraining this dialogue. For example, Malaysia has supported
the Chinese demand not to internationalize the dialogue, claiming that issues
can be resolved without involving powers or forums external to the region,
provided that the freedom of the high seas is not jeopardized (Associated
Press, 1999). In the negotiations on a code of conduct, Malaysia has tried to
position itself as the voice of reason. Thus, Malaysia pointed out that a code
of conduct involving China could only be a guideline, not a treaty under
international law that the states would be obliged to observe (Mitton, 1999;
South China Morning Post, 1999). Bilateral negotiations between China and
Malaysia have fuelled speculations that Malaysia is seeking a modus vivendi
with China, sidestepping ASEAN initiatives to establish a multilateral agree-
ment.
Second, Indonesia is a non-claimant that harbours second thoughts on
Chinese regional engagement. Indonesia is traditionally suspicious of any
Great Power overtures for collaboration that may come at the cost of indige-
nous regional governance. Indonesian suspicions of China prevail and have
been fuelled by Chinas enigmatic claim to a gas-rich zone near Natuna
Island, which Indonesia occupies. Indonesia is not intimidated by China, and
it has refused bilateral negotiations on the issue on the grounds that no Sino-
Indonesian maritime boundary dispute exists. Moreover, large-scale Indo-
nesian exercises in 1996 near Natuna Island were a provocative signal that
Indonesia would not accept Chinese occupations in the area (Jayanth, 1996).
Indonesia places an increasingly high premium on US military presence,
although President Megawati is cautious about endorsing the US war on
terrorism owing to a desire to appease a potential Islamic challenge to her
rule. The 1997 financial crisis and religious, ethnic and political unrest have
forced Indonesia to direct its resources towards internal security problems,
and it is no longer capable of de facto leadership within ASEAN. In addition,
Indonesia is concerned about Chinas advance into the South China Sea. For
these reasons, the US military presence is considered a necessary evil.
Since 1990, Canadian funding and Indonesian neutrality in the South China
Sea disputes have enabled Indonesia to host the annual coordination meet-
ings of the Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China
Sea, the brainchild of Hasjim Djalal of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and
Ian Townsend-Gault of the University of British Columbia (Djalal, 1990). The
aim here was to prevent violent conflict by promoting cooperation between
Southeast Asia and China on a wide range of issues through confidence-
building. The workshop process is informal, and participants attend the
meetings in their private capacities (Djalal & Townsend-Gault, 1999: 117
118). The initiation in 1999 of formal negotiations between China and
ASEAN on a code of conduct was welcome progress at a time when the

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16 Security Dialogue vol. 34, no. 1, March 2003

Indonesian political establishment was increasingly concerned about the

limited record of tangible cooperation projects. Although the formal negoti-
ations are a separate process, as host of the informal dialogue Indonesia has
provided a setting in which progress on this issue has been able to get off
the ground. Keenly advocating that international law is used as the basis for
dialogue and agreements on the South China Sea, Indonesia prefers a code
of conduct with the status of a treaty. However, Indonesias principal stake
is to go down in history as the state that provided the necessary conditions
for maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea region.
Third, claimant states Vietnam and the Philippines have experienced the
most serious conflicts with China in the South China Sea. As such, they are
also the ASEAN states most concerned about Chinas intentions. Sino-
Vietnamese hostilities in the South China Sea have twice resulted in naval
battles in 1974 in the Paracels and in 1988 in the Spratlys. China won both
battles, resulting in its occupation of the Paracels and its entry into the
scramble for occupation of the Spratlys. Relations between Vietnam and the
USA are negligible, and, although cordial, Russo-Vietnamese relations bear
no resemblance to the security benefits Vietnam derived from the former
Soviet Union. Vietnams increasing isolation in the early 1990s augmented its
fears of becoming a prime target of Chinese ambitions to secure dominance.
Consequently, Vietnam opted for ASEAN membership in 1995, seeing the
association as the best offer of protection against the threat from China.
Sino-Philippine hostilities in the South China Sea are more recent. The
Philippines considers Chinas occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995 and
repeated Chinese incursions into Scarborough Reef since 1997 direct assaults
on Philippine territory. The Philippines regards containment of China as a
necessary precautionary measure against Chinese expansion in the South
China Sea. Recurring bouts of anti-US nationalism necessitate continued
public downplaying of the USAs centrality for Philippine security following
the closure of Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base in 1992. However, not con-
fident of ASEANs ability to counter the Chinese advances, the Philippine
government prefers to rely on continued US military balancing. In 2000, the
USA resumed large-scale military exercises in the Philippines, allowing it to
familiarize itself with conditions in the South China Sea. In addition, the war
on terrorism led to the deployment of more than 1,000 US troops in the
Philippines to assist in the fight against the Muslim guerrillas Abu Sayyaf.
This strengthened military alignment with the USA allows the Philippines to
be less confrontational towards China than Vietnam.
Vietnam and the Philippines have been anxious to see tangible results from
the South China Sea dialogue, expressing dissatisfaction with ASEANs
resolve to accept Chinese constraints on the informal dialogue and calling for
increased pressure on China to achieve progress in formal negotiations. Both
have accepted bilateral negotiations with China on border disputes, but the

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Liselotte Odgaard ASEANs Security Concerns About China 17

South China Sea remains a contentious issue. Neither Vietnam nor the
Philippines are keen to negotiate further bilateral settlements with China in
areas of multilateral dispute since they are not confident that China will take
into account their interests. Vietnam turned down Chinas 1992 proposal to
shelve the sovereignty issue and jointly explore disputed maritime areas,
emphasizing that under no circumstances does it endorse Chinas granting
of licences to companies for areas of the continental shelf considered to be
under Vietnamese jurisdiction. Similarly, the Philippines refused the
Chinese offer of joint use of its facilities on Mischief Reef, stating that it
would settle for nothing less than Chinas return of the feature (FBIS Daily
Report, 1998). To demonstrate that they are not inclined to submit to Chinese
divide-and-rule tactics, Vietnam and the Philippines have agreed on a sepa-
rate code of conduct.
Vietnam and the Philippines have been active participants in the formal
Sino-ASEAN negotiations on a code of conduct for the South China Sea. The
two states have bilateral codes of conduct with China that have set the stage
for subsequent negotiations between ASEAN and China. In 1999, Vietnam
and the Philippines prepared the initial draft code, demanding that it replace
those agreed bilaterally. The downside to the vociferousness of Vietnamese
and Philippine participation in the negotiations is that they also create
roadblocks to reaching agreement. For example, the Philippines initially
demanded that the Spratly dispute be resolved by the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea or the International Court of Justice, although the other
claimants are not inclined to accept this method. Vietnam has demanded that
a code of conduct encompass the Paracels, although China flatly refuses their
inclusion in multilateral negotiations.
Fourth, Singapore and Thailand, not involved in maritime disputes with
China, enjoy cautious, but friendly, relations with the regional power. Sino-
Singaporean relations are strengthened by close cultural and economic links
and compatible views on issues such as press freedom, democracy and
human rights. Chinas proximity to Thailand, mutual economic interests and
common security concerns about Vietnams occupation of Cambodia in 1978
have strengthened Sino-Thai relations since the establishment of diplomatic
relations in 1975. Singapores and Thailands relations with China prompted
them to downplay the seriousness of Chinas occupation of Mischief Reef,
but the two countries also called for more transparency in Chinese defence
policy on this occasion. Thailand and Singapore advocate the view that
cordial, cooperative ties with China are best reached with continued US
military presence in the region. Singapore is the most vocal supporter of pre-
serving US regional engagement. The permanent stationing of Commander,
US Logistics West Pacific in Singapore makes it the only Southeast Asian
country to permanently host an administrative unit of the US armed forces.
Singapore has built and financed the new Changi naval base to facilitate

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18 Security Dialogue vol. 34, no. 1, March 2003

deployment of the US Seventh Fleet in Southeast Asia and has called for
stronger ties between ASEAN and Japan to counter Chinese influence (Zi
Hua, 2000). However, Singapore does not avoid criticizing the USA. During
the 2001 Hainan incident, when a US reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese
fighter collided over the South China Sea, Singapore called for a cautious
approach to China. Nevertheless, Singaporean support for the fundamentals
of US Asia-Pacific policy confirms that Singapore is the most reliable advo-
cate of continued US military presence in Southeast Asia.
Despite the USThai military alliance, Thailand maintains a cautious atti-
tude to the USA because of recurring trade and economic disputes between
the two countries and because Thailands proximity to China encourages it
to avoid entanglement in Sino-US strategic competition. Hence, Thailand
withstood US pressures in the mid-1990s for the stationing of supply ships in
the Gulf of Thailand so as not to provoke China. However, Thailand is also
concerned to keep China at arms length. For example, in 1996 Thailand
came to the relief of Chinese flood victims by discreetly donating part of the
US$3 billion in military assistance given by China to Thailand in 1995.
Singapore and Thailand are not involved in maritime boundary and sover-
eignty disputes with China, but its presence in the maritime centre of
Southeast Asia has an impact on their security. They support the South
China Sea dialogue because they both advocate enhanced Sino-Southeast
Asian multilateral cooperation to secure regional peace and stability.
Thailand and Singapore are also in favour of a code of conduct, arguing that
explicit multilateral rules of behaviour are necessary to prevent the use of
force (South China Morning Post, 1999; Bangkok Post, 2001).
Fifth, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Brunei have a subdued foreign policy
profile that also characterizes their South China Sea policies. Having no dis-
putes with China in the South China Sea, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia
mainly have indirect interests in keeping peace in the area. Consequently,
they tend to follow the official ASEAN policy line and rarely voice an inde-
pendent opinion on the matter. The USA maintains sanctions against
Myanmar on grounds of political oppression. Not surprisingly, Myanmar is
opposed to US interference in regional affairs and gravitates towards China.
China is helping Myanmar modernize its naval base at Hainggyi, and the
two states have established close strategic and intelligence cooperation. The
poverty-stricken countries Laos and Cambodia gravitate towards Vietnam,
but Chinas influence is rising. Brunei is involved only in maritime boundary
disputes in the South China Sea and occupies no territory. Brunei enjoys
special relations with Singapore, but relies on amicable relations with major
powers such as China, the USA and Indonesia to avoid foreign dominance.
It has faint, but friendly, relations with China, which it takes care not to pro-
voke. For example, contrary to the other ASEAN members, Brunei and
Thailand refrained from expressing concern about the situation in the South

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Liselotte Odgaard ASEANs Security Concerns About China 19

China Sea in 1996 following Chinas controversial declaration of baselines

around the Paracels (Pathan & Loetcharoenchok, 1996). Brunei is not a core
partner of the USA, but the two countries engage in joint military training. In
addition, Brunei allows transit rights for US ships and aircraft. Myanmar
only participates in the formal negotiations on a code of conduct on account
of its ASEAN membership, as it has no interests in the South China Sea. On
the issues of dialogue and a code of conduct, Laos and Cambodia take a
back-seat position, although they do have rights to ocean resources. The two
countries send qualified people to participate in the discussions, an indica-
tion of their support for a rapprochement between Southeast Asia and
China. Bruneis low-key position is caused neither by insufficient means nor
the absence of direct interests in the South China Sea, but rather is deter-
mined by its general policy of remaining in line with official ASEAN views
and maintaining cordial, but limited, relations with regional powers.
The South China Sea is a source of disunity if viewed from the perspective
of cooperation. Malaysia is the status quo state, favouring continued US
presence despite a critical approach to US economic and political inter-
ference in Southeast Asia, and advocating a policy of appeasement towards
China. Indonesia is the midwife, maintaining friendly, but guarded, relations
with the USA and China and advocating that peace and stability be achieved
through extensive cooperation. Vietnam and the Philippines form the suspi-
cious activists, fearing that Chinese hegemonic policies will target them.
They are heavily engaged in establishing dialogue and a code of conduct, but
doubt that ASEAN is able to engender genuine cooperation with China.
Thailand and Singapore are the armed activists, supporting the view that
peace and stability through cooperation is possible, provided that US
military balancing of China is maintained. Consequently, their concern is to
persuade China that USSoutheast Asian military cooperation is not aimed
at containing China. Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Brunei constitute
the followers on the South China Sea issues. As a rule, they avoid adopting
independent stances.

The South China Sea as a Source of ASEAN Unity

Disagreement within ASEAN on the possibilities and desirability of co-

operation in the South China Sea implies modest expectations of regional
integration. However, this does not prevent Southeast Asia from promoting
in unison the establishment of a political framework that allows for coexist-
ence with China. At issue is not the scope of Great Power engagement, dia-
logue and a code of conduct, but whether these mechanisms should form
part of a Sino-Southeast Asian order at all.

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20 Security Dialogue vol. 34, no. 1, March 2003

Looking beyond the rhetoric, most Southeast Asian states consider con-
tinued US military balancing of China a necessity, as Southeast Asian mili-
tary capabilities are no match for those of China and a common ASEAN
defence identity is absent (Odgaard, 2002: 108157). ASEAN has not explic-
itly defined China as a potential threat. However, in 1992 ASEAN recom-
mended that the USA maintain its forces in the region since Chinese
advances into the South China Sea had implied that Southeast Asia was not
immune to the consequences of the strategic choices of China and the USA
(Tasker, 1992). By the early 1990s, China was gaining a foothold in the back-
yard of Southeast Asia, threatening to fill the regional security vacuum that
might emerge in the event of a reduced US military presence.
By the late 1990s, most Southeast Asian states had established some form
of military cooperation with the USA, ranging from defence dialogues to
alliance agreements requiring mutual defence against aggression. Singapore,
Thailand and the Philippines constitute the core US partners in Southeast
Asia. Cooperation agreements involve large-scale exercises, frequent visits of
US troops and, in Singapores case, the permanent stationing of a small US
logistics unit. US military cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei
is more modest. This principally involves limited transit, refuelling and visit-
ing rights, and joint training. Malaysian and Indonesian support for con-
tinued US military presence is particularly noteworthy since, during the
Cold War, these countries tended to consider US regional engagement a
potentially destabilizing factor. Hence the endorsement by ASEAN core
members of US military balancing of China.
Of the new member-states Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia
only Vietnam has even considered establishing a nascent military relation-
ship with the USA. The three other states, constituting the periphery of
ASEAN in terms of military, economic and diplomatic capabilities and geo-
graphic location, are closer to China and remain suspicious of any form of US
interference in Southeast Asia. Their inclusion in ASEAN in the late 1990s
may nevertheless aid a Sino-Southeast Asian rapprochement. The presence
of states amenable to understanding and promoting Chinese concerns in the
South China Sea arguably reduces Chinas fears that its interests are ignored
in multilateral settings touching upon security issues.
ASEANs inclusion of Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia implies that South-
east Asia has invited Sino-US strategic competition into the region. This
development indicates Southeast Asian recognition that the region is not
able to opt out of such competition. The states differ on the appropriate posi-
tion of Southeast Asia within this framework. However, they agree on the
prevalence of strategic competition between the Great Powers and do not
expect this to preclude a Sino-Southeast Asian rapprochement.
The participation of all ASEAN members, except Myanmar, in the informal
dialogue on the South China Sea and the ASEAN states explicit endorse-

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Liselotte Odgaard ASEANs Security Concerns About China 21

ment of the dialogue process in the 1992 ASEAN declaration on the South
China Sea indicate that they are in agreement that such dialogue is a feasible
way of establishing coexistence with China in the absence of formal dispute
resolution mechanisms. The Southeast Asian contribution to a stable balance
between the USA and China can only be minor. However, within this frame-
work they can promote a practice of consultation, sustaining peace and sta-
bility in the South China Sea. This requires that the states try to avoid and
control crises in their relations by respecting each others spheres of influ-
ence.
ASEAN has demonstrated some unity in meeting this requirement. First,
ASEANs members agree that China and Southeast Asia must refrain from
intervening unilaterally in each others spheres of influence. For example,
with a thinly veiled reference to China, the 1995 ASEAN foreign ministers
statement on the South China Sea called for all parties to refrain from taking
actions destabilizing the region and for an early resolution of the problems
caused by the developments in Mischief Reef (ASEAN, 1995). ASEAN left
China in no doubt that it considered the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef
in the maritime centre of Southeast Asia to be an unacceptable encroachment
of the tacit border between Southeast Asian and Chinese spheres of influ-
ence, to the detriment of regional peace and stability.
Second, ASEAN has suggested preventive measures against armed con-
frontation. ASEAN remained silent when Vietnam and China engaged in
naval battles in the South China Sea in 1974 and 1988. However, Vietnam
did not join ASEAN until 1992, when it was granted observer status, and it
became a full member only in 1995. Furthermore, during the Cold War
Vietnam created threats to regional peace and stability that ASEAN was con-
cerned to keep at arms length. By contrast, in 1992 a unified ASEAN call was
issued for multilateral agreement that claimants in the South China Sea
refrain from the use of force, a principle previously endorsed by the Chinese
participants at the Second Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the
South China Sea (ASEAN, 1992; Second Workshop on Managing Potential
Conflicts in the South China Sea, 1991). When the 1995 Mischief Reef incident
threatened to produce armed confrontation between China and the Philip-
pines, the ASEAN member-states unanimously called for the resolution of
differences by peaceful means. Southeast Asian participants in the informal
dialogue have suggested preventive measures, such as low-level consulta-
tions between the armed forces deployed in the South China Sea.
ASEAN is similarly united in supporting the establishment of a code of
conduct. The specific contents of such a code envisaged by individual
member-states vary. For example, ASEAN refrains from suggesting prohibi-
tive measures against construction work on occupied features owing to
Malaysian resistance. Similarly, ASEAN does not recommend models of
settlement owing to internal disagreement on this issue. For example, the

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22 Security Dialogue vol. 34, no. 1, March 2003

Philippines claims features occupied by Malaysia. Consequently, the

Philippines has advocated a settlement that involves declaring the disputed
area common fishing ground, while Malaysia is happy with a model based
on existing occupations. In view of such disagreements between ASEAN
states claiming features in the South China Sea, the ASEAN requirements
for a code of conduct are quite conservative. They focus on restrictions on
violence, such as the non-use of force and consultations between defence
officials, and the application of international legal provisions pertaining to
the South China Sea.
The ASEAN approach to managing potential conflicts in the South China
Sea implies that the Southeast Asian states have not aimed at a code of con-
duct with China that includes multilateral agreements on sovereignty dis-
putes, let alone multilateral joint development arrangements. The ASEAN
member-states are looking for reassurance that the Chinese presence after
the Cold War will not upset the fragile order that has so far ensured regional
peace. Southeast Asia is not looking for extensive cooperation with China.
That would be a far-fetched goal, given the bleak record of internal ASEAN
cooperation. Instead, the member-states are searching for explicit confirma-
tion that Chinas presence in the South China Sea will not jeopardize peace-
ful coexistence.

Conclusion

The Southeast Asian states acknowledge that the USA and China are strate-
gic competitors and that Southeast Asia is not able to opt out of this com-
petition. They furthermore agree that a Sino-Southeast Asian practice of
consultation and a code of conduct will contribute to regional peace and
stability by ensuring that pending disputes between the states will be settled
by peaceful means between the indigenous powers and remain separate
from the outer structure of Great Power competition. Consequently, ASEAN
is united in the fundamental principles of sustaining peaceful coexistence
with China.
The principal pitfall of the Southeast Asian position on the South China
Sea is that Chinese participation in the Sino-Southeast Asian dialogue may
merely be a policy of appeasement, not underpinned by genuine intentions of
compromise. By adopting a flexible approach, Southeast Asia risks leaving
room for China to consolidate its position in the South China Sea without
regard for Southeast Asian interests. Because Southeast Asia cannot provide
a credible deterrent to China, continued US military presence is a precondi-
tion for ASEANs daring to travel down this road. The principal advantage of
the ASEAN approach is that by combining quasi-institutionalized proce-

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Liselotte Odgaard ASEANs Security Concerns About China 23

dures and a flexible agenda, it satisfies the Chinese requirements that no a

priori obligations to enter into multilateral agreements are placed on it and
that sovereignty issues will not be negotiated in a multilateral setting. It is
difficult to measure ASEANs efforts to create a regional order involving
China, since the issue concerns not so much tangible cooperation as agree-
ment on a set of rules allowing for peaceful coexistence. However, Chinese
acceptance in 1999 of transferring negotiations on a code of conduct from the
informal to the formal level and the gradual change in the Chinese attitude
from erecting barriers to dialogue towards actively promoting its interests
leaves the impression that China is beginning to seriously consider the possi-
bility of benefiting more from a regional order compatible with Southeast
Asian interests than from an order based solely on Chinese terms. This
impression was confirmed in November 2002, when China and ASEAN
signed a non-binding agreement, committing the parties to exercising self-
restraint and avoiding activities that would complicate or escalate disputes in
the South China Sea (Kazmin, 2002). Since Sino-US strategic competition
allows little latitude for Great Power collaboration, the consolidation of a
Sino-Southeast Asian order requires the USA to leave responsibility for con-
flict prevention mechanisms to the indigenous powers.

* The author is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of

Aarhus, Denmark. E-mail: lodgaard@ps.au.dk. A preliminary version of this article was
presented at the Third EUROSEAS Conference, London, 68 September 2001. The author
wishes to thank Lee Lai To, Stein Tnnesson, Greg Austin, Ian Townsend-Gault, Clive
Schofield, Ramses Amer, Timo Kivimki and the anonymous reviewers for helpful com-
ments.

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