WATERCRAFT VENTURE CORP. v.

ALFRED RAYMOND WOLFE

G.R. No. 181721 September 09, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

RULE 57 PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

FACTS
Petitioner Watercraft Venture Corporation (Watercraft) is engaged in the business of building,
repairing, storing and maintaining yachts, boats and other pleasure crafts at the Subic Bay Freeport Zone,
Subic, Zambales. It hired respondent Alfred Raymond Wolfe (Wolfe), a British national and resident of
Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Zambales, as its Shipyard Manager. During his employment, Wolfe stored the
sailboat, Knotty Gull, within Watercraft1s boat storage facilities, but never paid for the storage fees. Later
on, Watercraft terminated Wolfes employment.

Sometime in June 2002, Wolfe pulled out his sailboat from Watercraft's storage facilities after
signing a Boat Pull-Out Clearance where he allegedly acknowledged the outstanding obligation of
US$16,324.82 representing unpaid boat storage fees. Despite repeated demands, he failed to pay the said
amount. Thus, Watercraft filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages with an
Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.

Wolfe on the other hand, claimed that he was hired as Service and Repair Manager, instead of
Shipyard Manager and denied owing Watercraft the amount of US$16,324.82. He explained that the
sailboat was purchased in February 1998 as part of an agreement between him and Watercraft1s then
General Manager and President for repair and be used as training or fill-in project for the staff, and to be
sold later on.

RTC granted Watercrafts application for Writ of Preliminary attachment. CA on the other hand,
granted Wolfes petition, annulling and setting aside the Writ of attachment, and declaring null and void
the Notice of attachment and levy.

ISSUE
WON the allegations of fraud are sufficient to warrant the ex-parte issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment in favor of Petitioner Watercraft.

HELD
A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court
where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the
same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might
be secured in the said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant.

For the issuance of an ex-parte issuance of the preliminary attachment to be valid, an affidavit of
merit and an applicant's bond must be filed with the court in which the action is pending. Such bond
executed to the adverse party in the amount fixed by the court is subject to the conditions that the
applicant will pay:
 1. All costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party; and
2. All damages which such party may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally
adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto.

As to the requisite affidavit of merit, Section 3 Rule 57 of the Rules of Court states that an order
of attachment shall be granted only when it appears in the affidavit of the applicant, or of some other
person who personally knows the facts:

1. that a sufficient cause of action exists;

2. that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1[17] hereof;

3. that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action; and

4. that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which he is
entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal
counterclaims.

The mere filing of an affidavit reciting the facts required by Section 3, Rule 57, however, is not enough
to compel the judge to grant the writ of preliminary attachment. The sufficiency or insufficiency of an
affidavit depends upon the amount of credit given it by the judge, and its acceptance or rejection, upon
his sound discretion. Watercraft failed to state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud, as
required by Section 5 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, and that Wolfe's mere failure to pay the boat storage
fees does not necessarily amount to fraud, absent any showing that such failure was due to insidious
machinations and intent on his part to defraud Watercraft of the amount due it. Watercraft's Affidavit of
Preliminary Attachment does not contain specific allegations of other factual circumstances to show that
Wolfe, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay. Neither
can it be inferred from such affidavit the particulars of why he was guilty of fraud in the performance of
such obligation.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
September 27, 2007 and its Resolution dated January 24, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97804, are AFFIRMED.
PAHILA-GARRIDO v. TORTOGO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 156358 August 17, 2011
BERSAMIN, J.:

RULE 58 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

FACTS
On June 23, 1997, Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC an action for ejectment with prayer
for preliminary and restraining order to evict several defendants, including the respondents herein, from
his properties. He amended the complaint to implead the spouses of some of the defendants, however,
he died during the pendency of the action, and his surviving spouse, herein petitioner Angelina Pahila-
Garrido, was substituted for him on September 24, 1998.

On February 16, 2000, the MTCC amended its decision to correct typographical errors in the
description of the properties involved. None of the parties objected to or challenged the corrections. On
April 5, 2000, the MTCC issued the writ of execution upon the petitioners motion. The writ of execution
was duly served on August 24, 2000 upon all the defendants, including the respondents, as the sheriffs
return of service indicated. On April 20, 2001, the respondents filed a motion to quash against the April 5,
2000 writ of execution and its aliases, and a motion to stay the execution of the March 17, 1999 decision
and the February 16, 2000 amended decision.

On October 25, 2002, the petitioner sought a clarificatory order moving that the TRO be vacated
due to its being effective for only twenty days and because such effectivity could neither be extended nor
be made indefinite. She complained that her hands had already been tied for a year from executing the
decision and from availing herself of the writ of demolition; and pleaded that it was time to give her justice
in order that she could already enjoy the possession of the property. On October 30, 2002, the
respondents moved for the early resolution of the case and for the issuance of the writ of prohibitory
injunction. On November 12, 2002, the RTC issued the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.

ISSUE
WON the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin
the execution of the already final and executory March 17, 1999 decision of the MTCC.

HELD
Under the circumstances, the principle of immutability of a final judgment must now be absolutely
and unconditionally applied against the respondents. They could not anymore be permitted to
interminably forestall the execution of the judgment through their interposition of new petitions or
pleadings. The RTC Judges issuance of the assailed order dated November 12, 2002 granting the
respondents application for the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction constituted manifestly grave
abuse of discretion.

Generally, injunction, being a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or
interests, is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is
resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be
redressed under any standard of compensation. A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event
and is the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy. It is granted only to protect actual and existing
substantial rights. Without actual and existing rights on the part of the applicant, and in the absence of
facts bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for
being issued in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse,
which is merely contingent, and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a
cause of action.

The respondents did not establish the existence of an actual right to be protected by injunction.
They did not, to begin with, hold any enforceable claim in the property subject of the MTCC decision and
of the writ of execution. Presumably well aware that the respondents held absolutely no valid and existing
right in the land, the RTC Judge had plainly no factual and legal bases for enjoining the enforcement of
the writ of execution through the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction. He obviously acted arbitrarily
and whimsically, because injunction protected only an existing right or actual interest in property. Thus,
he was guilty of committing manifestly grave abuse of discretion, and compounded his guilt by stopping
the enforcement of a final and executory decision of the MTCC.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for certiorari. We NULLIFY and SET ASIDE the writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction issued on November 12, 2002 for being devoid of legal and factual
bases; and DIRECT the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, in Bacolod City to dismiss SCA Case No. 01-11522.
HOME GUARANTY CORP. v. R-II BUILDERS INC. & NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 192649 June 22, 2011
PEREZ, J.:

RULE 59 RECEIVERSHIP

FACTS
Before the Court are: (a) the Entry of Appearance filed by Atty. Lope E. Feble of the Toquero
Exconde Manalang Feble Law Offices as collaborating counsel for respondent R-II Builders, Inc. (R-II
Builders), with prayer to be furnished all pleadings, notices and other court processes at its given address;
and (b) the motion filed by R-II Builders, seeking the reconsideration of Court's decision dated 9 March
2011.
R-II Builders argues that it filed its complaint with the Manila RTC which is undoubtedly vested
with jurisdiction over actions where the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation; that through
no fault of its own, said complaint was raffled to Branch 24, the designated Special Commercial Court
(SCC) tasked to hear intra-corporate controversies; that despite the determination subsequently made by
Branch 24 of the Manila RTC that the case did not involve an intra-corporate dispute, the Manila RTC did
not lose jurisdiction over the same and its Executive Judge correctly directed its re-raffling to Branch 22
of the same Court; that the re-raffle and/or amendment of pleadings do not affect a court's jurisdiction
which, once acquired, continues until the case is finally terminated; that since its original Complaint,
Amended and Supplemental Complaint and Second Amended Complaint all primarily sought the
nullification of the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) transferring the Asset Pool in favor of
petitioner Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC), the subject matter of the case is clearly one which is
incapable of pecuniary estimation; and, that the court erred in holding that the case was a real action and
that it evaded the payment of the correct docket fees computed on the basis of the assessed value of the
realties in the Asset Pool.

HELD
The record shows that, with the raffle of R-II Builders complaint before Branch 24 of the Manila
RTC and said courts grant of the application for temporary restraining order incorporated therein, HGC
sought a preliminary hearing of its affirmative defenses which included, among other grounds, lack of
jurisdiction and improper venue. It appears that, at said preliminary hearing, it was established that R-II
Builders complaint did not involve an intra-corporate dispute and that, even if it is, venue was improperly
laid since none of the parties maintained its principal office in Manila. While it is true, therefore, that R-II
Builders had no hand in the raffling of the case, it cannot be gainsaid that Branch 24 of the RTC Manila
had no jurisdiction over the case. Rather than ordering the dismissal of the complaint, however, said court
issued the 2 January 2008 order erroneously ordering the re-raffle of the case.

Having consistently sought the transfer of possession and control of the properties comprising
the Asset Pool over and above the nullification of the Deed of Conveyance in favor of HGC, it follows R-II
Builders should have paid the correct and appropriate docket fees, computed according to the assessed
value thereof. This much was directed in the 19 May 2008 Order issued by Branch 22 of the Manila RTC
which determined that the case is a real action and admitted the Amended and Supplemental Complaint
R-II Builders subsequently filed in the case. In obvious evasion of said directive to pay the correct docket
fees, however, R-II Builders withdrew its Amended and Supplemental Complaint and, in lieu thereof, filed
its Second Amended Complaint which, while deleting its causes of action for accounting and conveyance
of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, nevertheless prayed for its appointment as Receiver
of the properties comprising the same.

In addition to the jurisdictional and pragmatic aspects underlying the payment of the correct
docket fees which have already been discussed in the decision sought to be reconsidered, it finally bears
emphasizing that the Asset Pool is comprised of government properties utilized by HGC as part of its
sinking fund, in pursuit of its mandate as statutory guarantor of government housing programs. With the
adverse consequences that could result from the transfer of possession and control of the Asset Pool, it
is imperative that R-II Builders should be made to pay the docket and filing fees corresponding to the
assessed value of the properties comprising the same.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a) NOTE the Entry of Appearance of Atty. Lope E. Feble of
Tuquero Exconde Manalang Feble Law Offices as collaborating counsel for respondent R-II Builders, Inc.;
and DENY counsels prayer to be furnished with all pleadings notices and other court processes at Unit
2704-A, West Tower, Philippine Stock Exchange Centre, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center Pasig, since only
the lead counsel is entitled to service of court processes; and (b) DENY with FINALITY R-II Builders, Inc.s
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 9 March 2011 for lack of merit, the basic issues having
been already passed upon and there being no substantial argument to warrant a modification of the same.
No further pleadings or motions shall be entertained herein.
SIXTO N. CHU v. MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 184333 April 1, 2013
PERALTA, J.:

RULE 60 REPLEVIN

FACTS
Respondent Mach Asia Trading Corporation is a corporation engaged in importing dump trucks
and heavy equipments. Petitioner Sixto N. Chu purchased on installment one (1) Hitachi Excavator, one
(1) motorgrader and one (1) payloader. Petitioner made down payments with the balance payable in 12
monthly installments through Land Bank postdated checks. However, upon presentment of the checks for
encashment, they were dishonored by the bank either by reason of closed account, drawn against
insufficient funds, or payment stopped.

Respondent filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City for sum of money,
replevin, attorneys fees and damages against the petitioner. The RTC issued an Order allowing the
issuance of a writ of replevin on the subject heavy equipments. Sheriff Cortes proceeded at petitioners
given address for the purpose of serving the summons, together with the complaint, writ of replevin and
bond. However, the Sheriff failed to serve the summons personally upon the petitioner, since the latter
was not there. The Sheriff then resorted to substituted service by having the summons and the complaint
received by a certain Rolando Bonayon, a security guard of the petitioner.

Petitioner failed to file any responsive pleading. Upon motion, the RTC issued an Order declaring
defendant in default and, thereafter, allowed respondent to present its evidence ex parte. The RTC
rendered a decision against the petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

HELD
As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons
cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted
to. Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.

It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the
person who received the summons in the defendants behalf was one with whom the defendant had a
relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summon. Clearly, it was not
shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and
possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not the
kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered as
substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service. The service of summons is a vital
and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned,
the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and
void. Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, the judgment rendered
by the court could not be considered binding upon him for being null and void.

Hence, if Chu had actually received the summons through his security guard, the requirement of
due process would have nevertheless been complied with. x x x. Based on the presumption that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns, the security guard would not have allowed the sheriff to take
possession of the equipments without the prior permission of Chu; otherwise he would be accountable
to Chu for the said units. Chu, for his part, would not have given his permission without being informed
of the fact of the summons and the writ of replevin issued by the lower court, which permission includes
the authority to receive the summons and the writ of replevin.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated July 25, 2007, as well as its Resolution dated August 28, 2008, in CA-G.R. CV No. 70666 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated December 15, 2000 is declared
NULL and VOID. The Regional Trial Court is hereby ORDERED to validly serve summons upon Sixto N. Chu
and, thereafter, proceed with the trial of the main action with dispatch.
SPS. LIM v. MA. CHERYL LIM
G.R. No. 163209 October 30, 2009
CARPIO, J.:

RULE 61 SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

FACTS
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners.
Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl,
Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with
Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edwards family
business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl
had no steady source of income.

On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her
(then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife
of Chua Giak in what the trial court described a very compromising situation. Cheryl, for herself and her
children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly
support of P6,000 pendente lite.

RTC rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to jointly provide P40,000 monthly
support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject
to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability. CA affirmed the trial court.

ISSUE
WON petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

HELD
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to
their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition to the
narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions found in
Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is
activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension
during the childrens minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward
exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the
latters offspring ends with them.

Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient
legal support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support
Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents basic needs.
This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their
obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines,
following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to
sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of
parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to
fill the void.

However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word
is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by
blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed,
Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from
their marital bond. Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the amount of monthly support the trial court
awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the
trial court for this limited purpose.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 28
April 2003, and its Resolution dated 12 April 2004 with the MODIFICATION that petitioners Prudencio and
Filomena Lim are liable to provide support only to respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano
III, all surnamed Lim. We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140, for
further proceedings consistent with this ruling.