British Policy in West Africa, The Ashanti Expedition of 1873-4

British Policy in West Africa: The Ashanti Expedition of 1873-4
Author(s): W. D. McIntyre
Source: The Historical Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1962), pp. 19-46
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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The Historical_Journal, v, I (I962), pp. I9-46
Printed in Great Britain
II. BRITISH POLICY IN WEST AFRICA:

THE ASHANTI EXPEDITION OF 1873-4
By W. D. MCINTYRE
University of Nottingham
THE Ashanti expedition of I873-4 provides a remarkable illustration of the

use of military power in colonial policy. At a moment when the whole basis
of Britain's West African policy was being questioned at home an Ashanti
invasion of the states on the Gold Coast in I873 brought about a calamitous
decline in British prestige in the region. The tiny neglected British settle-
ment on the Gold Coast, and the so-called 'protectorate', which even
experts did not understand, suddenly received unwelcome publicity,
which led finally to a reluctant exercise of military power. Sir Garnet
Wolseley's march to Kumasi was one of the military dramas of the Victorian
age.
Yet the remarkable thing about the Ashanti expedition was that the causes
of the incident were not understood, the expedition was launched without
consulting Parliament, and the nature of the attack was really decided without
Cabinet discussion. Gladstone, the Prime Minister, only asserted his author-
ity after two months of planning-when, in fact, it was too late to influence
the outcome. The general election of I874 took place when the result was
still undecided, which meant that political capital could not be made out of
the war, although Disraeli tried to turn it into a major election issue. Taking
office on the eve of victory in Africa, Disraeli's Government became re-
sponsible for the peace settlement, but there was no parliamentary inquiry
into the war as Disraeli promised in his manifesto. His Government made
very modest use of the prestige gained by the display of power.
The expedition was accompanied by famous reporters like H. M. Stanley
and the outlines of the campaign are well known,' but no detailed analysis
has yet been published of the debate among the ministers who decided to
send it. This paper, based on the Colonial and War Office files, the Gladstone,
Kimberley, Cardwell and Carnarvon papers, and the lesser known Glover and
Brabourne records, is an attempt to answer important historical questions
which arise over this debate. What was the nature of Britain's involvement in
West Africa and the cause of the Ashanti war? What part, in the broad sense,
did the expedition play in the evolution of British policy? Who, when it
I W. E. F. Ward, A History of the Gold Coast (I948), 26I-8I; W. W. Claridge, A History
of the Gold Coast and Ashanti (19I5), ii, chaps. I-ix; W. W. Reade, The Story of the Ashantee
Campaign (i 874); H. M. Stanley, Coomassie and Magdala: The Story of Two British Campaigns
in Africa (I874); J. F. Maurice, The Ashantee War. A Popular Narrative (I874); G. A. Henty,
The March to Coomassie (I874); H. Brackenbury, The Ashanti War, 2 vols. (I874).
2-2
20 W. D. McINTYRE
comes to the details of the expedition, really decided to launch it? Where,
both from the British and African viewpoint, does the importance of the
expedition lie?
There were three background causes for the Ashanti expedition. The Gold
Coast settlement was part of an expensive legacy from the past which hardly
anyone cherished. Britain's relations with Ashanti were ill-defined and there-
fore characterized by those misunderstandings of African states which made
frictions on the frontiers of empire inevitable. The principles guiding British
policy were contradictory.
First, the legacy from the past in West Africa was small and scattered.
Along two thousand miles of coast there were four tiny British settlements
and what has been called an 'informal dependency'2 in the Niger Delta;
these were the remnants of three centuries of intercourse. Every phase of
Britain's tortuous relationship with the Guinea coast had left its mark.
Elizabethan adventurers, seventeenth-century chartered companies and the
slave traders had built forts and occupied them intermittently in the River
Gambia and on the Gold Coast, philanthropists had colonized the Sierra
Leone coast in I787, the suppressors of the slave trade had demanded the
annexation of Lagos in i86i, and 'legitimate traders' backed by the Foreign
Office had worked to open up the Niger since the I830's. The West African
settlements were indeed a microcosm of colonial history. In I865, however,
they were costing about ?300,000 a year,3 and Disraeli suggested they should
be got rid of to help balance the budget.4
The great paradox of the West African empire was that the most expensive
footholds were the least rewarding. While in the Niger Delta, where there
was no actual British territory, a trade thought to be worth about a million
pounds a year flourished before the rise of Opobo in i870,5 in the region of
the greatest political influence, the Gold Coast, trade was worth only a
fraction of this.6 Moreover, Britain's connexion with the Gold Coast, al-
though longstanding, was somewhat tenuous. Here British sovereignty was
confined to the plots of land on which the forts were built and these were
interspersed with those of the Netherlands. Although Cape Coast Castle had
seen continuous British occupation since i672, only five forts were found
2 K. 0. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885 (Oxford, 1956), 203-4.
3 Select Committee's Report, 26 June i865. Parliamentary papers: Reportsfrom Committees
(i865), V, 12.
4 G. E. Buckle, Life of Benjamin iDisraeli, revised edn. (I929), II, 2IO.
5 Memorandum by Consul Charles Livingstone, 8 Dec. i87I. Foreign Office correspon-
dence: slave trade, F.O. 84/1I343.
6 In the six years before I872 the average annual value of trade in the Gold Coast was:
Imports about ?200,000, Exports about 3?00,000. Colonial Office Confidential Print: C.O.
806/3, P. 4.
BRITISH POLICY IN WEST AFRICA 2I
occupied in I864,7 and the exact implications of the protectorate baffled

everybody. It was said to extend inland for about 40 miles to the River Pra,
and to spread along the coast for about 2zo miles from Tano to the Volta, but
this area was broken by pieces of Dutch influence. In I865, after weeks of
debate, the parliamentary Select Committee found it to be 'not defined by
treaty, but only implied' and to be 'wholly indefinite and uncertain'.8
Secondly, relations with Ashanti had always been bedevilled by mis-
understanding. The successive trading companies which occupied the forts
before the nineteenth century had tried not to interfere in African politics,
indeed they usually lacked the power and were obliged to pay rent for the
land on which their forts were built. But with the subjugation of the coastal
states adjacent to the forts by the powerful inland Ashanti nation, which
reached its culmination just before the abolition of the British slave trade in
I807, tension was inevitable. When Ashanti became the 'suzerain' of the
coast states and captured many of the 'notes' by which the Europeans had
agreed to pay rent for the forts, peaceful relations were attempted and for a
short time a British consul was appointed to Kumasi. But there were mis-
understandings and after Ashanti was decisively defeated in i826 by the
coastal states in alliance with British and Danish forces, the British ceased
to pay rent for the forts, claiming back the 'notes' by conquest.9 At this
point the Government tried to abandon the legacy of the old empire on the
Gold Coast but merchant pressure prevented this.
Britain's real involvement in Gold Coast politics originated in the period
when the committee of London merchants administered the forts from I829 to
I843, through the efforts of Captain George Maclean. His tripartite agreement
of I83I provided the basis of relations between the forts, the coastal states
and Ashanti.10 The latter renounced her suzerainty over, and right to tribute
from, the coast states, and to rent from the British- forts, and the coast states
undertook not to molest Ashanti traders. Maclean, through his own personal
influence, was not only regarded as the guarantor of the agreement, but he
exercised a wide extra-legal civil and criminal jurisdiction in the coast states
by acquiescence and consent. Thus a sort of British paramountcy grew in the
Gold Coast, personified in Maclean, which came to imply that the Fante and
their neighbours would be supported against Ashanti. Hence the phrase
Gold Coast 'protectorate', which really originated as a personal sphere of
influence. Vague though this agreement was it provided the formal basis of
British relations with Ashanti until Wolseley's victory and the new treaty of
I874, and the system was endorsed by parliamentary committee in I842 after
I Ord to Cardwell, 9 Mar. I865. Parliamentary papers: Accounts and Papers (i865),
XXXVII, 302.
8 Reports (I865), V, IO.
9 Ward, op. cit. 115-i6, 130, I158-9, I78, and 240 for the question of the 'notes'.
10 Text in J. J. Crooks, Records relating to the Gold Coast and Settlements from 1750 to 1874
(Dublin, 1923), 262-4.
22 W. D. McINTYRE
which efforts were made to legalize it. In I843 the Crown resumed the
government of the forts and appointed a royal governor. Maclean continued
his work as 'Judicial Assessor to the Native Sovereigns' of the Gold Coast
and certain African rulers gave their consent in the Bond of i844.11 The
and protectorate became a separate Crown colony, detached from Sierra
Leone, in I850, when the Danish fort at Accra was also added.
Thus through Maclean's success the legacy of the old trading companies
on the Gold Coast reverted to the Crown and the protectorate now became
an experiment in British colonial government at a moment when the Colonial
Office under the third Earl Grey, was becoming interested in the question of
governing non-European populations elsewhere-in New Zealand and South
Africa.'2 Yet the experiment never seemed to work: successive Colonial
Secretaries always seemed to be on the verge of a decision which was never
made and for fifteen years the fate of the Gold Coast experiment hung in the
balance. Not until the fierce light of parliamentary disapproval was directed
upon it did a decision on policy emerge.
Thirdly, the contradictory principles, which guided British policy until
the eve of the I873-4 expedition, were laid down by parliamentary Select
Committee after Maclean's system broke down in I863. In his lifetime his
influence both with Ashanti and the coast states kept the peace on the Gold
Coast. But in subsequent years, while Ashanti smarted under the loss of
former tributaries like Assin, Akim and Denkyera and the loss of rent for
the forts, Britain increased this resentment by suppressing the slave trade by
sea and by harbouring runaways from Ashanti. At the same time the pro-
tectorate states ignored their undertakings by molesting Ashanti traders.
Finally, misunderstanding over two runaways sheltered by Governor Richard
Pine in i862 resulted in an Ashanti foray into the protectorate in I86313 and
a state of hostility which continued until after the expedition of I873-4.
The ineffectual British military effort against Ashanti in I863-4 involved a
great loss of life from disease and caused Palmerston's Government to be
bitterly criticized in Parliament, where he narrowly missed defeat in a motion
of censure brought by Vice-Admiral Sir John Hay, whose brother had died
on the coast.14 Thus the Ashanti attack had two results. Cardwell, the
11 See B. Cruikshank, Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast of Africa (I853), I, 170o
Sarbah, 'Maclean and the Gold Coast Judicial Assessors ',Journ. Africant Soc. 9, no. xxxvi (
19I0), 349; 'Civil and Judicial Constitution of the British West African Settlements',
(I854-5), XXXVII, 375-466; J. D. Fage, 'The Administration of George Maclean on the Gold
Coast I830-44', Trans. Gold Coast and Togoland Historical Soc. I (1952-5), II2; G. E.
Metcalfe, 'After Maclean', ibid. I83; A. N. Allott, 'Native Tribunals in the Gold Coast
I844-I929', J. African Law, i, no. 3 (I957), I63-8.
12 H. Grey (third Earl Grey), The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration
(I853), II, 269-87.
13 Ward argues (op. cit. 206) that if the Ashanti ruler swore to spare the runaways he would
have kept his word had Pine released them. See also Claridge, op. cit. I, 503-29; Fuller,
A Vanished Dynzasty-Ashanti (I92I), 63-7; A. B. Ellis, History of the Gold Coast of West
Africa (I893), 224-35. 14 3 Hansard, CLXXV, col. 545.
BRITISH POLICY IN WEST AFRICA 23
Colonial Secretary, gave instructions in i864 that English troops would never
again be used in the deadly climate; in future the protectorate states would
have to look after themselves.15 In view of the suggestions for a withdrawal
from the settlements, Sir Charles Adderley's Select Committee of I865
examined Britain's stake in West Africa. As Cardwell did not wish to close
the door to future development he ensured that the i865 report was a com-
promise. There should be no more extensions of territory or influence, no
interference in African politics, and Africans were to be trained in the
qualities necessary for self-government to facilitate a withdrawal from all but
Sierra Leone. But an escape clause was provided: there would be no
' absolute prohibition of measures which in peculiar cases may be necessary
for the more efficient and economical administration of the settlements we
already possess '.16 The decisions of I864-5 amounted to a negative realization
that there was a moral obligation not to abolish the protectorate, but there
was no legal obligation to protect it.
These principles were contradictory. Although the Colonial Office tried
hard to follow them for eight years17 the Earl of Kimberley, as Colonial
Secretary, came to realize their inconsistency. Therefore an agonizing re-
appraisal of British West African policy took place in I872-3, in which the
Ashanti war was merely the most painful, expensive and publicized element.
II
The immediate causes of the war may be found in the results of some of the
Government's attempts at economy and at reconciling the contradictory
principles after I865. The frontiers of British influence went far beyond the
frontiers of British sovereignty. The i865 committee, trying to halt this
expansion, called for a withdrawal from all but a minimum of territory. As
a preliminary step, Sierra Leone, regarded at this time as the hub of British
responsibility, became headquarters of a Governor-in-chief for all the settle-
ments with Administrators at Gambia, Gold Coast and Lagos. Yet when the
opportunity was presented in these outposts to follow the I865 policy, in
each case Kimberley rejected it.
When he entered the Colonial Office in July I870 negotiations were well
advanced for ceding Gambia to France in return for a partition of the
respective British and French spheres in West Africa. After merchant
opposition Kimberley was glad to use the Franco-Prussian war as an excuse
15 Cardwell to Gov. Pine, 23 June I864, A. & P. (I873), XLIX, 864-5.

16 The Committee's final report included significant amendments by Cardwell. Reports
(I865), V, 3.
17 Ward (op. cit. 227) says the i865 policy 'was never given a fair chance', bu
contrary, successive Colonial Secretaries-Buckingham, Granville and Kimberley-studied
the report, and Sir Frederick Elliott, the Assistant Under-Secretary, repeatedly reminded his
political chiefs of it.
24 W. D. McINTYRE
for suspending negotiations."8 When the expansionist administrator of Lagos,

Commander John Glover was recalled in I872,19 Edward Knatchbull-
Hugessen, the Parliamentary Under-secretary of the Colonial Office, attacked
the 'half and half policy of Great Britain-occupying territory as if she were
ashamed of it... coaxing one day and threatening the next'. Public opinion,
he said, would not permit withdrawal from Lagos, and Kimberley agreed.
He intended to define Britain's position around Lagos,20 but his attention
was diverted in i873 to more urgent affairs on the Gold Coast.
Here was the third region where the I865 policy was tested and found
inadequate. On the coast, a partition of the British and Dutch spheres in
I868 contributed to an incipient nationalist movement in the protectorate.
Inland, the resentments of Ashanti, never appeased after I863, caused
continual hostile pressure on the fringes of British influence. Both factors
were linked by the historic relationship of the Dutch with Ashanti, who in
the eighteenth century had captured the rent notes for Elmina. Thus the
Elmina inhabitants were allied with Ashanti and were hated by the Fante
and their neighbours, who feared Ashanti. The war grew out of this complex
situation.
When Britain and the Netherlands partitioned the coast at the Sweet River
in i868,21 the inhabitants of one of the former British forts resisted Dutch
rule, which caused an alliance of protectorate states to besiege the Dutch in
Elmina, and the Fante were urged at the same time to break with Britain.22
When Gladstone came to power in December i868 the position seemed so
precarious that Granville, the Colonial Secretary, seriously considered im-
plementing the I865 policy.23 He changed his mind because in April i872,
18 For the genesis of this idea in France see R. Catala, 'La Question de l'6change de la
Gambie Britannique contre les comptoirs fran9ais du Golfe de Guinee de I866 'a I876',
Revue d'Histoire des Colonies (I948), XXXV, II4-I8; see also J. D. Hargreaves, 'The French
Occupation of the Mellacourie I865-67', Sierra Leone Studies, no. 9 (Dec. I957), 3-I5;
Kimberley's refusals are in Minutes, i6 Aug. I870 (on Law Officers to C.O., I3 July I870,
Gambia correspondence: C.O. 87/98d.); io May I87I (on Kennedy to Kimberley, II April
I871, C.O. 87/99) and 3I May I873 (on F.O. to C.O. 23 May I873, C.O. 87/I06).
19 Glover governed Lagos (with some intervals) from I863 to I872. He had worked with
Baikie up the Niger in I857 and made expeditions up the Volta in i868, I870 and I873-4.
He planned to open up trade routes from Lagos overland to the Niger to by-pass the city
states of the Niger Delta, whose rivalries greatly reduced trade in the early I870's. He be-
came deeply entangled in Yorubaland politics in an effort to open routes to Ibadan, Oyo and
the Niger which would not be obstructed by the states in the immediate vicinity of Lagos,
who were antagonized by his efforts, notably the Egbas of Abeokuta. (See S. 0. Biobaku,
The Egba and their Neighbours 1842-1872 (Oxford, I957), 73-I00; Glover (who appears again
in the Ashanti war, see below, pp. 3 i-8) had the reputation of being the best British administra-
tor in West Africa in the i86o's. See Reade, Ashantee Campaign, 375, 389; Stanley, Coomassie,
93; W. F. Butler, Sir William Butler. An Autobiography (I9II), I55.)
20 Minute by Knatchbull-Hugessen, 23 Feb. I873, on Pope-Hennessy to Kimberley,
30 Dec. I872. Lagos correspondence: C.O. I47/24; Minute by Kimberley, 25 Feb. I873
and draft despatch for Gov. Keate, 5 April I873.
21 Text in A4. & P. (I867), LXXIV, 37I6.
22 Ussher to Blackall, 6 Mar. i868, C.O. 96/76.
28 Minute by Granville, 24 Dec. i868, on Treasury to C.O., I5 Dec. i868, C.O. 96/78.
the Dutch having decided to cut their losses, ceded their forts to Britain,24
who now had a free hand on the coast. But the twin problems of Ashanti
resentment and unrest in the protectorate soon coalesced to create a situation
in which Britain's foothold on the Gold Coast went through its most pre-
carious phase. Exponents of the I865 policy believed the position was ripe
for abandonment, but because of straits to which Britain was reduced a show
of force followed which signalized the end of the I865 policy.
Ashanti pressure on the protectorate resumed after Kofi Karikari was en-
stooled as Asantehene in I867. A small force under his uncle Akjampong
was sent to Elmina and a formidable army ravaged the Volta region, where
two German missionaries were captured who were not released until Wol-
seley's expedition.25 When Kofi Karikari heard of the cession of Elmina he
claimed that the town was his 'by right' of the captured rent notes, and he
assured the King of Elmina that he would come and remove the English
flag.26 The attack did not begin until December I872, but the Ashanti claim
to Elmina and the presence there of the Ashanti force served to convince the
Fante that an Ashanti invasion would follow the transfer of Elmina to Britain.
Their fears were quite justified, and already they had taken certain measures
of self-help to defend themselves.
The self-government clause of the i865 report was taken literally in the
Gold Coast where certain movements for self-government were attempted.27
One of these, the 'New Fanti Confederacy' movement of I87I is particularly
important because it attracted attention in Parliament, and gave rise to a
reappraisal of British policy similar to the discussion of the Lagos problem.
A Fante constitution was drawn up in October I87I, and elections were
staged. There was nothing illegal in the movement, but the Administrator
panicked and arrested the leaders.28 Although the excitement soon subsided
and the Fante leaders were released, the idea of the Confederacy was taken
up in London by the supporters of the I865 policy.
Alderman William McArthur, M.P., urged the recognition of the Con-
federacy in July i87229 and Governor Pope-Hennessy said the only alternative
to this was British annexation.30 Moreover, in the Colonial Office Knatchbull-
24 Text in A. & P. (I872), LXX, 80I -3.
25 The presence of the missionaries at Kumasi greatly complicated relations with Ashanti
before and during the I873-4 war, but by their presence they were able to provide valuable
evidence about events in the Ashanti capital (see F. A. Ramseyer and J. Kuhne, Four Years
in Ashantee, I875).
2' Thomas Lawson to Harley, 14 April I873, in Harley to Kimberley, I May 1873, C.O.
96/98.
27 For the view of an African graduate of Edinburgh University, see J. A. B. Horton, West
African Countries and Peoples (i868). Of the I865 report he wrote: 'This is indeed a grand
conception, which if developed in fact, will immortalize the name of Britain' (p. 69). He
suggested creating two African states under the self-government clause the Kingdom of
Fante and the Republic of Accra.
28 Salmon to Kennedy, 4 Dec. i87I, C.O. 96/89.
29 3 Hansard, ccxiii, col. 36.
30 Pope-Hennessy to Kimberley, 29 Oct. I872, CO. 96/94.
26 W. D. McINTYRE
Hugessen again attacked 'the absurd system of "Protectorate"' by which

the Government never knew how much authority it had and lacked the
power to enforce it. As in the case of Lagos, he blamed the I865 policy,
insisting that public opinion would not stand a withdrawal and demanding
that Britain's position be 'more accurately defined and more certainly
established '.31 Kimberley again agreed. Dismissing all thought of retiring
from the Gold Coast he said 'we must keep within the line of a Pro-
tectorate defining by agreement with the chiefs what are to be the powers
and obligations of the Protecting Power, and what on the other hand are to
be the obligations of the natives towards us'. He then drafted a scheme
involving something akin to what in a later period would have been called
Indirect Rule.32 But these instructions were never sent. The general re-
appraisal of British policy which had begun in the Colonial Office was
interrupted by the long heralded Ashanti invasion, and the development of
policy entered a new more urgent phase.
III
The reactions which the news of the Ashanti advance produced both in Cape
Coast Castle and London are of utmost importance in a discussion of the
question of who sent the Ashanti expedition. Starting their march on 9
December I87233 the Ashanti armies followed a familiar strategy. With small
flanking attacks to east and west the main force followed the primitive road
towards Cape Coast Castle. They reached the River Pra on 22 January I873;
a force estimated at I2,000 crossed, which by ii February had reached
Fante-Nyankumasi, only 24 hours march from the coast. A large Fante
army which moved forward to the attack was defeated on io March I873,
and after another stand at Dunkwa, a few miles to the south, it was over-
whelmed on I4 April-although this time the Fante inflicted great losses on
the invaders and armed Hausa police used rockets with effect.34 Yet, although
after Dunkwa the resistance of the protectorate collapsed and the forts were
prepared for defence, the Ashanti invasion appeared to have reached its peak.
As the invaders, now estimated at 30,000 to 40,000 settled at Dunkwa, they
were I 50 miles from Kumasi; they had been in the field for five months and
31 Minute by Knatchbull-Hugessen on Question by McArthur, i8 March i873, C.O.

96/I04.
32 Ibid. Minute by Kimberley (after 20 March) and draft for Harley. This can be regarded
as Kimberley's Gold Coast policy had the Ashanti war not intervened. Its main points were:
(I) definition of responsibilities; (2) defence-Britain to defend the coast, Africans to defend
the interior; (3) revenue from customs, stipends for the Chiefs; (4) expenditure on vernacular
education, roads, and the development of administration with Africans in subordinate posts.
33 Ramseyer and Kuhne, op. cit. 205.
34 C.O. to W.O., 'a May i873, War Office files in the Public Record Office: W.O. 32/826,
file 076/224. Many items of the 076 series are missing, but they are summnarized in a Con-
fidential General Sketch, 'Measures taken at home', by the Intelligence Branch, I3 April I874.
Copy in the WVolseley Papers (by courtesy of the War Office Library), W. I3.
prisoners reported great suffering from casualties, disease and hunger.35

Early in May I873 they turned west into Denkyera, thus the immediate
threat to Cape Coast passed. By the end of May they encamped at Jukwa,
chief town of Denkyera, some I5 miles from Elmina, and the first phase of
the war was over.
When the news of the invasion reached Cape Coast Castle on 3I January
I873 and London on 26 February, the authorities were, at first, remarkably
complaisant. Col. Harley, the Administrator, would not believe the news at
first, Pope-Hennessy maintained that the attack was not an Ashanti invasion,
and his successor, Major R. W. Keate, decided not to reinforce the meagre
garrison of I7I West Indian troops with reserves from Sierra Leone as he
did not think the Ashantis would attack the British. Following Cardwell's
I864 policy he informed the Fante that 'they must depend on their own
exertions '.36 In the Colonial Office Knatchbull-Hugessen demanded that the
Ashantis should 'receive a severe lesson' in order to deter them from making
further attacks.37 But Kimberley ventured no opinion without more details;
he merely warned the War Office, and when questioned in the House of
Lords on 7 March I873 said he did not know the cause of the invasion.38
By the middle of March, however, the matter was viewed more seriously.
When Governor Keate died only a few days after setting foot on the Gold
Coast, Harley, who took his place, remained on the Gold Coast and took a
more active attitude. He banished the King of Elmina, who was the centre
of pro-Ashanti elements in the former Dutch possessions. He called up ioo
troops from Sierra Leone and ioo Hausa Police from Lagos. Feeling it was
unwise to let the Fante and their allies think they would receive no support
whatever, he sent fifty Hausas under a British officer to Dunkwa.39 In the
Colonial Office Kimberley agreed on io March that British officers should
rouse the Fante, and he arranged for Royal Navy support and for emergency
food supplies. Yet, although Knatchbull-Hugessen continued to demand that
the Ashantis should be 'severely dealt with ',40 the Colonial Office clung to the
idea of non-intervention. Within the department Knatchbull-Hugessen urged
Kimberley to take a strong line, but in the HLouse of Commons he had to
defend the official I864-5 policies. Answering questions by Sir John Hay
35 Report on Invasion. Capt. Brett, I9 April I873, W.O. 32/826, file 076/233. When
Kuhne was released from captivity in I874 he confirmed that Dunkwa was the peak of the
Ashanti attack. Shortly after the victory he met Kofi Karikari in the street and saw him
dance with joy. After the reports of sickness and defeats there was no more dancing (Reade,
Ashantee Campaign, I03).
36 Harley to Pope-Hennessy, 3I Jan. I873, in Pope-Hennessy to Kimberley, 8 Feb. I873;
Pope-Hennessy to Kimberley, 13 Feb. I873; Keate to Kimberley, I March i873, C.O. 96/96.
37 Ibid. Minute by Knatchbull-Hugessen, 27 Feb. i873, on Pope-Hennessy to Kimberley,
io Feb. i873.
38 3 Hansard, ccxiv, col. I5I5.
39 Harley to Kimberley, 20 and 2I March I873, CO. 96/97.
'4 Minute by Knatchbull-Hugessen, 2I March i873, on Keate to Kimberley, I March I873,
C.O. 96/96.
28 W. D. McINTYRE
and McArthur on 25 April I873 he said the Africans of the protectorate

would, on the whole, have to defend themselves. When Adderley reminded
the House of the I865 report Knatchbull-Hugessen pointed out that the
attempt to get rid of Gambia in I870 had been prevented because of the
public outcry.41
However, the news of the battle of Dunkwa, and growing public interest
in the war early in May I873, caused a change in the Colonial Office attitude,
and some reinforcements were sent to the forts. Dispatches received on 9
May indicated that the western-former Dutch-part of the protectorate was
likely to rise if the Ashantis appeared successful. The first clear indication of
the cause of the invasion was a copy of a letter from Kofi Karikari to Harley
stating that the Elmina cession was the reason for his attack. Moreover, after
Dunkwa Harley had ordered a general retreat,42 so the day after receiving the
news (io May I873) a conference was held in the War Office. Kimberley,
Cardwell (Secretary of State for War), Goschen (First Lord of the Ad-
miralty), Robert Herbert (Permanent Under-secretary of the Colonial Office),
and Sir Andrew Clarke, who had given evidence before the i865 committee,
decided to send ioo Royal Marines immediately to the Gold Coast and to
transfer four additional companies of the West India Regiment from
Barbados.43
Although a basic change of policy was not intended by this, the situation
at Cape Coast, and demands from the officers there for a more forceful policy,
were clearly making some new decision necessary. On i9 May i873 the War
Office learnt from the Commanding Officer at Cape Coast that it would be
impossible to defend just the forts because of the refugee swollen towns
around. Although he knew from captives that the Ashanti army was in a
wretched state through hunger and smallpox, the large hostile force was still
perilously close.44 Therefore he wanted some ruling on Cardwell's I864
instructions. The day after reading this Kimberley noted in his journal, 'The
Ashantee war begins to look very troublesome ,45 and he told Gladstone the
matter would have to be discussed in the Cabinet.46 On 22 May I873 a
proposal arrived from the War Office, which originated from a former Gold
Coast official, who suggested an invasion of Ashanti by way of the River
Volta. Here was another demand for a change in the policy of non-
intervention. Knatchbull-Hugessen said it could not be followed 'unless we
" The Times, I3 March I873.

42 Harley to Kimberley, Iz and 14 April I873, C.O. 96/98.
43 Minutes to conference, W.O. 32/826, file 076/2I9. Instructions to Lieut.-Col. Festing,
the Marine commander, in 076/255.
44 Ibid. Capt. Brett to W.O., zi April I873, 076/233.
45 E. Drus, 'A Journal of Events During Gladstone's Ministry I868-74 by John, First
Earl of Kimberley', Camden Miscellany, XXII (1958), 38.
46 Kimberley to Gladstone, zi May I873. Gladstone Papers, British Museum Add. MSS.
44225/38 and Cabinet Minute, 24 May I873. 44641/124 (by courtesy of the Cabinet Office,
Historical Section).
make up our minds to alter entirely that policy and the nature of our Pro-
tectorate '.47 Kimberley was still against a change of policy and wrote: 'If
we wish to weaken ourselves we cannot adopt a better course than to spend
a few millions in conquering Ashantee, and establishing a West African
Empire. It is to be hoped that no Govt. will be mad enough to embark on
so extravagant an enterprise. '48 Thus the commander at Cape Coast was told
that the I864 instructions would stand.
In June I873 the news was confirmed that the Ashanti effort appeared to
be spent. As the invaders moved west into Denkyera Harley tried to rouse
the Fante; his theory being that the Ashantis might make a final effort before
retiring. Thus, with Cape Coast no longer threatened and the Ashantis en-
camped at Jukwa,49 things were beginning to look quiet from London.
Possibly the Ashantis would soon retire and the policy of non-intervention
would be vindicated. But the calm was delusive; two mail ships had been
lost and a shock was in store.
It arrived on io July I873 in the shape of a report in The Times of a rout
of the Fante before Jukwa on 5 June, and a British bombardment of Elmina
on 13 June, when there was a skirmish with the Ashantis on the outskirts of
the town.50 'An end to all peace and quiet for the unlucky Colonial Office',
wrote Kimberley.51 On 13 June, while Colonel Festing, commander of the
recently arrived Royal Marine reinforcements, was bombarding a section of
the town of Elmina where Ashanti sympathizers had refused to surrender
their arms, an Ashanti force of 3000 had advanced on the town. The battle
had raged all day and Festing, with all the Hausa, naval and military help
he could get, only managed to drive the Ashantis three miles before they
retired at dusk.52 Kimberley was now alarmed by the news. At a meeting at
the War Office on i5 July I873 he pressed the military authorities, who he
said were 'very unwilling to move' to send 200 more marines, who were
standing by in England, and to alert a wing of infantry battalion.53 The
marines sailed on I6 July, while the Colonial Office studied its belated
dispatches describing these developments and reporting the Ashanti force at
47 Minute by Knatchbull-Hugessen, 27 May I873, on W.O. to C.O., 22 May I873, C.0.

96/Io7.
48 Ibid. Minute by Kimberley, 28 May I873.
49 Harley to Kimberley, 17 and 29 May I873, C.O. 96/99.
50 The Times, io July I873, I0. A correspondent's report dated Freetown, 29 May I873.
51 Drus, Kimberley's Journal, 39.
52 The Marines from England who arrived on 9 June, made Elmina their base, but they
found the part of the town occupied by the 'King's party' was pro-Ashanti. The Legislative
Council decided on I2 June to make this party surrender its arms and the operation was
planned for dawn on I 3 June. When no arms were forthcoming at the appointed hou
gave another half-hour, and then opened fire. At this point the Ashantis appeared (Festing
to W.O., I8 June I873, W.O. 32/826, file 076/320). Reade viewed this incident as the turning-
point of the war. The Ashantis failed to achieve their objective Elmina and after the battle
were only awaiting permission to return (Ashantee Campaign, 225).
53 Drus, Kimberley's Journal, 40; 3 Hansard, CCXVII, cols. 267-8, 308.
30 W. D. McINTYRE
Efutu, I2 miles from Elmina, and a state of 'alarm and panic' at Cape Coast.54
On the same day a writer suggested in The Times that Charles Gordon should
be sent to 'Finish with the Ashantees '.55
It was in the following two weeks that Cardwell, the chief author of the
x864-5 policies, and Kimberley, who had realized their limitations in Gambia,
Lagos and the Gold Coast, changed their minds about non-intervention, and
decided to send the much publicized Ashanti expedition. The main stages of
this crucial change of policy stand out clearly. Who was really responsible for
this decision is still obscure.
On 26 July I873, after reading of Harley's difficulties in rousing the Fante,
Kimberley decided Britain must assist them. Harley must tell the chiefs that
'while HMG expected them to do their best to defend themselves, they will
on their part give them cordial and active support to put an end to this
disastrous war '.56 The same day Kimberley sought Cardwell's advice. He
thought that the two of them, with Goschen, should discuss what to say to
Harley by the mail of 30 July. Kimberley was uncertain what course to take:
The question seems to be: can active measures be taken against the Ashantee during
the rainy season? If so, within what limits, and of what nature?
Of course if the Ashantee attack our forts, the course is simple, to repel them,
but if they do not attack what then? We cannot leave them quietly in occupation
of the Protectorate. Public opinion would not allow us to do so, if we ourselves
desired it: and all the trade of our settlements is practically destroyed by the
presence of the invading force, so that if things are left in their present position,
the settlements will be merely a heavy burden on the Imperial Treasury. Are we
to contemplate an attack on Coomassie and could we assemble a force sufficient
enough for the purpose?57
Kimberley asked to see Cardwell on Monday, 28 July I873. After their

conversation he evidently looked into various possible lines of action. He
called for all papers on Ashanti affairs since I864, for details of Glover's
expeditions up the Volta in i868 and I87o, and for the Foreign Office to get
particulars from The Hague about the navigability of the River Pra. The
Colonial Office material was prepared immediately, but when the dispatch
was sent to Harley on 30 July Kimberley had evidently not made up his
mind.58 He told Cardwell that it was really intended to stir Harley up, and
it committed 'no one to the Prah or to any other particular line of action'.59
54 Harley to Kimberley, io June I873, C.O. 96/99.

55 For other talk at a journalistic level of sending 'Chinese' Gordon to the Gold Coast,
see Lord Elton, General Gordon (0954), I44-5; Reade, Ashantee Campaign, 145.
56 Minute by Kimberley, 26 May I873, on Harley to Kimberley, 30 June i873, C.O.
96/100.
57 Kimberley to Cardwell, 26 July I873, Cardwell Papers, Public Record Office Gifts and
Deposits: P.R.O. 30/48/5/33, 48-51.
58 Minutes by Herbert and Kimberley, 28 July I873, on Harley to Kimberley, 30 June
I873 and Memorandum by Hales, 28 July I873, C.O. 96/I00.
59 Kimberley to Cardwell, 30 July I873, P.R.O. 30/48/5/33, 54.
BRITISH POLICY IN WEST AFRICA 3I
The same day Commander Glover, R.N., offered his services to the Colonial
Office. Herbert was inclined to accept, but Kimberley feared that after
the Lagos affair they could not use Glover again in West Africa.60 Neverthe-
less, Kimberley saw Glover on 4 August I873 and commissioned him to lead
a flanking expedition against Ashanti up the Volta.61 Kimberley gave the
clue to what happened in a note to Knatchbull-Hugessen on the 4th:
We mean to employ Glover to lead an expedition of natives and Hausas against

Ashantee up the Volta. I see him today at 3. We cannot mention this in the House,
as it would be dangerous to disclose prematurely our military plans.. .. The plan
was mentioned in the Cabinet on Saturday and approved.62
The Cabinet, then, had sanctioned the Glover expedition on z August.

Gladstone also noted that a frontal assault on Ashanti might have to be
considered later.63
But the plans for the frontal assault were actually being made without
consulting the Prime Minister. At a meeting in the War Office on I 3 Augu
1873 the forty year old Sir Garnet Wolseley was appointed Governor and
Commander-in-Chief of the Gold Coast.64 Kimberley simply reported to
Gladstone afterwards: 'whatever we do must be done quickly and if possible
in such a manner to deter the Ashantees from attacks upon our settlements
for a long time to come'. Glover, he said, was to be allowed to spend ? I 5,ooo
on his Volta expedition; the final decision about a possible attack on Kumasi
-the frontal assault-would depend on Wolseley's appreciation when he
arrived at Cape Coast. 'It is very provoking', wrote Kimberley, 'to have to
spend such large sums of money on these savages, but we cannot leave the
matter as it is. '65 Gladstone admitted that he was ignorant of Ashanti
relations, but he could not see why Ashanti need always be an enemy; he
only hoped that 'The miserable war... abates the disposition of rohn Bull to
put his head hereafter into a noose '.66 Very soon, however, Gladstone was
full of doubts and queries about the new policy. Well he might be, since the
main decision-Wolseley's frontal assault-appears to have been taken largely
behind his back. It is not easy to point to the responsibility for this, but it
seems to lie with Kimberley, Cardwell or Wolseley himself.
60 See above, p. 24, n. I9.

61 Kimberley said of Glover: 'he is one of those exceptional boasters who have prov
boasting and solid qualities sometimes go together'. Earlier in the year Glover had tried to
get the job of the Governor-in-Chief in West Africa (Glover to Kimberley, 15 April 1873,
Sierra Leone correspondence: C.O. 267/325).
62 E. Knatchbull-Hugessen, The Political Diary of Lord Brabourne 1858-1888 (by courtesy
of Lord and Lady Brabourne), (i870-73), iv, 634-5.
63 Cabinet Minute, 2 Aug. i873, Gladstone Papers, 4464X/X89. An attempt to get a debate
on the war before Parliament adjourned on 5 August failed (O Hansard, ccxviI, col. I526).
64 G. Wolseley, The Story of a Soldier's Life (1903), II, 267.
65 Kimberley to Gladstone, 13 Aug. i873, Gladstone Papers, 44225/79.
66 Gladstone to Kimberley, 14 Aug. 1873 and zi Aug. 1873, Kinmberley Papers (by courtesy
of the Earl of Kimberley), A/52.
32 W. D. McINTYRE
It was the news of the Jukwa-Elmina battles (received io July) which

really stirred the responsible authorities in London. It was after his con-
versation with Cardwell on z8 July I873 that Kimberley reviewed the
Ashanti papers and asked for information about Glover's former exploits up
the Volta. It is fairly certain that Cardwell had told Kimberley about some
of the discussions which had already been taking place in the Admiralty and
the War Office. A few days after the Jukwa-Elmina news Goschen had
called Glover to the Admiralty to discuss the possibility of getting stores up
the Pra in the event of a campaign. A few days later (according to Glover's
own account) he was sent for by Cardwell to repeat what he had said. Thus
on 29 July I873, at a meeting in the War Office, Glover suggested raising
an African force in the Accra and Volta regions to attack the Ashantis in
the flank and rear, and to threaten Kumasi from Akim. Sir Andrew Clarke 67
supported the Glover plan, suggesting operations far up in the Volta. He
advised that Glover should be given a free hand to deal with the whole
situation.68 The day after this interview Glover offered his services to the
Colonial Office, no doubt on Cardwell's and Clarke's advice. Somewhat
surprisingly Gladstone approved the plan in the Cabinet of z August, and
Glover's offer was accepted the same day.69 Gladstone later said he thought
the Glover plan was a good one.70
Yet from the start Glover's was aflanzk operation.71 The really important
appointment was Wolseley's, which paved the way for the march to Kumasi
in I874. Sometime, between May and July I873, Wolseley drew up a
memorandum outlining a plan of campaign against Ashanti 72 He proposed
that he should assume the government of the Gold Coast and should take a
67 Clarke had been grateful to Glover in i864, when, by making sure that he got to sea in
a bout of fever, Glover probably saved Clarke's life. R. H. Vetch, Life of Sir Lieut.-General
Andrew Clarke ( 905), 82, and Lady E. Glover, Life of Sir John Hawley Glover (i 897), I I 8-20,
disagree as to whether this took place on the Gold Coast or at Lagos.
68 Lady Glover, Life of Glover, 149-52. This is based on an autobiographical fragment
now in the library of the Royal Commonwealth Society, and consulted with the librarian's
permission.
69 Herbert to Glover, 2 Aug. I873, Letter-book of Glover Papers (by the courtesy of the
Royal Commonwealth Society).
70 Gladstone to Kimberley, I4 Aug. I873, Kimberley Papers, A/52.
71 Glover was appointed 'Special Commissioner to the Native Chiefs of the Eastern
District', and was instructed to raise an African force in the Accra and Volta region, to create
a diversion in the flank and rear of Ashanti, and so to force them to retire from the
Protectorate.
72 This memorandum has not been found and therefore can only be roughly dated. In
May I873, when there was growing publicity in Britain, Lieut.-Col. Evelyn Wood found
Wolseley poring over Dutch maps of Ashanti and was told 'there was a king there who
required a lesson to bring him to a sense of the power of England' (E. Wood, From Mid-
shipman to Field Marshal (I906), I, 254-5). Wolseley's biographers say 'As soon as difficulties
arose on the Gold Coast, Sir Garnet prepared for Mr Cardwell a memo. on the situation'
(F. Maurice and G. Arthur, The Life of Lord Wolseley, 6I-2). Wolseley himself wrote: 'Mr
Cardwell had in confidence already informed me that he would like me to go there should
it be determined to undertake active operations against the invading Ashanti.... I submitted
privately to Mr Cardwell a rough outline of a military scheme. . . ' (A Soldier's Life, II, 262).
staff of officers who would raise an African force which would attempt to
drive the Ashantis beyond the Pra. He indicated frankly that he would
probably need two battalions of British regulars, who would be rushed to
the Pra along a road on which staging camps would be prepared.73 Cardwell
evidently favoured this plan by the successful leader of the Red River expedi-
tion in Canada in i 870, who was also his ally in the battle 'against purchase'.
He sent the plan to Kimberley before the Cabinet meeting of z August,
saying Wolseley was 'now ready to capture Coomassie . Thus Cardwell's
support for the Wolseley plan makes him a fair candidate for shouldering the
responsibility for the attack on Kumasi, although he was quick to deny this
to Gladstone: 'You will observe that I have said nothing about any expedition
to Coomassie, or anywhere else.'75 If Cardwell wanted a forceful policy on
the Gold Coast he was not strictly honest with Gladstone about it.
Kimberley has a big share of the responsibility. A remarkably conscientious
Colonial Secretary, he had already rejected the I865 policy in three settle-
ments and early in i873 was planning stronger more defined rule in the Gold
Coast. If his word in his journal is to be trusted he had to persuade un-
willing authorities to send the reinforcements on I5 July and he called fo
part of an English battalion to be alerted, so he was prepared to use English
troops again; after the war he said he never doubted for a moment they would
have to use them.76 When he wrote to Cardwell before the Cabinet decision
about using Glover he had mentioned the possibility of an attack on Kumasi.
Thus the Wolseley-Cardwell plan found a ready supporter in Kimberley.
Wolseley records that at one of the meetings subsequent to his appointment,
Kimberley answered 'in a somewhat sharp tone of voice' questions put by
Goschen. Kimberley became so nettled at the cross-examination by some of
his colleagues that finally, says Wolseley, he banged his fist on the table
saying 'either this expedition comes off or I cease to be Colonial Minister '.7
And in some ways Kimberley's change of mind was greater than Cardwell's.
The latter appears as the advocate of the ambitious Wolseley plan, which
itself can be seen as part of the new spirit stirring among the younger profes-
sional officers in this period, who were quick to volunteer for the expedition.
But Kimberley only accepted this plan after first considering a milder
alternative proposed by Sir Andrew Clarke.
In his journal Kimberley says he first offered the new Gold Coast command
to Clarke,78 who was then Director of Works at the Admiralty, but who had
accepted the governorship of the Straits Settlements on 30 May I873.
I3 lbid. 262-3. This plan was carried out.
74 Cardwell to Kimberley, i Aug. I873 (copy), Cardwell Papers, P.R.O. 30/48/5/33, p. 6o.
75 Cardwell to Gladstone, 3 Sept. I 873, Gladstone Papers, 44 I 20/ I I 9.
76 Drus, Kimberley's Yournal, 42.
7 Wolseley, A Soldier's Life, II, 268. Woiseley does not mention Goschen, but says 'A
minister'. .. 'but I fancied that the question reflected Naval sentiment at the Admiralty'.
78 Drus, Kimberley's Youirnal, 42. The Duke of Cambridge also favoured Clarke (H.R.H.
to Cardwell, i9 Aug. I873, Cardwell Papers, P.R.O. 30/48/4/I7).
3 HJV
34 WV. D. McINTYRE
Clarke's I864 report on West Africa was regarded highly in the War Office,79
and he was called into the various conferences in I873. Like Wolseley Clarke
drew up a plan of campaign and an itinerary to Kumasi.80 He was against
the use of English troops and asked for a free hand to make a settlement with
Kofi Karikari. Although his precise plans have not been found he told a
fellow officer in Malaya in I875 that he had 'stipulated that the country
should be handed back to the native Government after the war',81 and after
Wolseley's appointment Clarke suggested that an autographed letter from
Queen Victoria to the Asantehene and to the protectorate chiefs would be
much better than an expedition to Kumasi.2 One suspects that Gladstone
would have preferred Clarke's scheme, and three years later, after Sir Arthur
Gordon's successful 'little war' against the mountain tribes of the new Crown
colony of Fiji, one M.P. suggested that some such limited effort-which
Clarke obviously preferred-should have been used against Ashanti.83 Kim-
berley evidently favoured this at one stage in the discussion, but in I864
Clarke had favoured the policy of withdrawal from the coast, and as
Wolseley said, 'peace loving as Lord Kimberley undoubtedly was, he took
no such church-warden's view of our Imperial responsibilities '.84 So
Kimberley definitely accepted the more forceful Wolseley plan and had the
onerous task of persuading Gladstone.85
Yet if Kimberley and Cardwell were firm in their support for Wolseley,
the Cabinet, which dispersed at the end of the parliamentary session early
in August, had not yet been fully drawn into the matter. They were not
unanimous and Gladstone was by no means happy when he discovered the
scale of the preparations. Thus, although the decision to undertake active
operations was made between 26 July and 2 August, the final decision, which
made possible the march to Kumasi, was not made until 7 November 1873
when Wolseley's request for the British battalions was sanctioned.
" Vetch, Life of Clarke, 82. Clarke's memorandum on British West African Settlements,
June x864, in War Office Prints: W.O. 33/I3, I387.
80 Information from Vetch, Life of Clarke, II 5. Like Wolseley's memorandum Clarke's
cannot be found. However, there is in the Glover Papers (Royal Commonwealth Soc.) a
memorandum written on Singapore Government note-paper signed by Clarke dated, I I Aug.
i873, initialled by Cardwell: 'written by Sir A. Clarke at my request'. In this Clarke says
if an attack upon Kumasi is decided on regular troops would be needed, but he is convinced
that sufficient forces could be raised in the protectorate.
81 A. E. H. Anson, About Myself and Others (I920), 324.
82 Clarke to Kimberley, I9 Aug. i873, Kimberley Papers, A/69.
83 G. Shaw-Lefevre to Gordon, I Feb. i877. A. H. Gordon, Fiji. Records of Private and
Public Life 1875-1880 (Edinburgh, I897-19I2), III, I 17.
84 Wolseley, Soldier's Life, II, 27I.
85 Ironically the one person who seems to have been 'out' of the decision was Knatchbull-
Hugessen, the very man who had insistently criticized the I865 policy and urged a strong line
with Ashanti. But he was going through a period of disillusion over his prospects of Cabinet
office under Gladstone and had hinted at resignation (see Brabourne Diary, iv (I870-3),
639 for a letter from Kimberley dated io Aug. I873: 'I trust you are not serious in talking
of making your bow. You would not I am sure turn your "backside".. . .to Coffee
Calicalli ').
Now it seems fairly clear that from Wolseley's point of view a British
expedition to Kumasi was part of the plan from the start. Both Cardwell
and Kimberley realized this, although probably both of them hoped that a
peace might be achieved without one.86 The plan as presented to Gladstone,
however, was that Wolseley would use the forces already available, and those
he could recruit in West Africa, to strike a blow at Ashanti, and he would
request the British troops only if it should prove necessary. Kimberley,
rather franker than Cardwell, told Gladstone that they should be prepared
for this eventuality. 'It is a hateful affair, but I feel sure that the only safe
policy is to deal with it quickly and thoroughly.'87
A minor wrangle took place early in September 1873 over Wolseley's
instructions. On the peace treaty, Gladstone said that human sacrifices
practised by the Asantehene were 'not crimes under the moral law as recog-
nized in Africa', but as the Queen regarded the Asantehene 'with horror' in
this matter, Kimberley suggested Wolseley should urge him to end 'atroci-
ties '.88 Kofi Karikari was to be warned that the expedition was in preparation
in case he did not quit the protectorate. Wolseley's aim was to get a new
Ashanti treaty, possibly like that of I83I. Kimberley also suggested that a
Resident or Consul might be appointed to Kumasi.89 Cardwell had trouble
with Gladstone over the military instructions as the Prime Minister thought
the general was given too wide a discretion. But Cardwell insisted, some-
what disingenuously, that the question of the British expedition would rest
with the Cabinet. Beyond that limitation Wolseley should have the widest
latitude in dealing a blow at Ashanti with what he found at Cape Coast.90
Soon Goschen, faced with the need for providing a hospital ship, confessed
to 'very great qualms' and a feeling 'so uncomfortable about the expedition
and now so doubtful as to its necessity'.91 But Cardwell, the main author of
the i864-5 policies replied: 'you cannot be more opposed to an ambitious
policy on the Gold Coast than I am... but .., could Kimberley have a state
of things in existence, under which his revenue is destroyed by a Barbarian
86 See Kimberley to Goschen, I2 Sept. I873, in A. D. Elliot, Life of George Joachim

Goschen. 1st Viscount Goschen. 1831-1907 (191 ), 122: 'we should be delighted if we could
finish the business in a decently creditable manner without sending more European troops
and without an expedition to Coomassee'.
87 Kimberley to Gladstone, i8 Aug. I873, Gladstone Papers, 44225/79.
88 Gladstone to Kimberley, 4 Sept. I873, Kimberley Papers, A/52: Kimberley to Ponso
9 Sept. I873 (copy), ibid. A/46; Kimberley to Gladstone, 9 Sept. I873, Gladstone Papers,
44225/99.
89 Kimberley to Wolseley, io Sept. I873 (draft), C.O. 96/I08. This draft has the same date
as the draft of Kimberley's famous instruction to Sir Andrew Clarke suggesting the appoint-
ment of Residents in the Malay States.
90 Cardwell to Kimberley, 3 Sept. I873, Kimberley Papers, A/52; Cardwell to Gladstone,
3 Sept. I873, Gladstone Papers, 44I20/II9; Gladstone to Cardwell, 5 Sept. 1873 (COpy),
ibid. I23; military instructions: Cardwell to Wolseley, 8 Sept. I873 (copy), W.O. 32/826,
file 076/594.
91 Goschen to Kimberley, 8 Sept. I873, Kimberley Papers, A/52; Goschen to Cardwell,
io Sept. I873, Cardwell Papers, P.R.O. 30/48/5/27, p. II5.
3-2
36 W. D. McINTYRE
invader and the people whom he assumes to govern are butchered or en-
slaved? Is he to eat humble pie, and withdraw?'92 So the first wave of
opposition was overcome. Wolseley sailed from Liverpool on I2 September
I873. Gladstone thought Kimberley had judged wisely over the instructions
-although he was soon 'aghast' at the expense.93
The preparations were indeed 'assuming large proportions ',9 and since
Gladstone had also become Chancellor of the Exchequer on i August after
Robert Lowe's transference to the Home Office, he was full of detailed
inquiries about expense. He discovered that the hospital ship was being
prepared and that equipment for i5 miles of railway was being shipped to
Cape Coast. He began to suspect that an expedition to Kumasi was being
prepared in earnest, and his guess was, of course, correct; the War Office
would know of Wolseley's plans. Cardwell did his best to ease the Premier's
conscience:
We have not (as Northcote argues) involved the country in a war without calling
Parliament together. We are in a war forced upon us.. . and existing long before
Parliament broke up. I believe the steps we have taken have averted a storm of
indignation, which would have burst forth if these ill-tidings had arrived and no
such steps had already been taken. As regards the tramway.... I do not regard it
as pledging us to an expedition into Ashanti territory.95
But Kimberley and Cardwell sensed that the atmosphere among Cabinet
colleagues was getting rather 'hot' for them, and at a meeting at the War
Office on 22 September I873, which finally decided on the hospital ship and
the railway, they agreed that the circle of responsibility would have to be
enlarged to include the Cabinet as a whole.96
The Cabinet finally discussed the matter on 4 October I873, just two
months after agreeing to the Glover expedition and taking note of the pos-
sibility of a frontal assault. In a meeting which lasted from noon to 5 p.m.,
John Bright, attending for the first time as Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster, was one of those who opposed the Kimberley-Cardwell policy.
'Ashantee policy to be pacific: no invasion of Ashantee & no assault on
Coomassie', is the note in his diary.97 This must be Bright's wishful thinking,
but certainly as a result of this Cabinet a dispatch was sent to Wolseley on
6 October 1873 (drafted in the main by Gladstone) which represents the
first real attempt by the Prime Minister to assert any authority in the direction
92 Cardwell to Goschen, 12 Sept. I 873 (copy), Cardwell Papers, p. II 3.

93 Drus, Ki7nberley's Jouirnal, 42.
94 Cardwell to Kimberley, I8 Sept. I873, Kimberley Papers, A/52.
95 Cardwell to Gladstone, 20 Sept. I873, Gladstone Papers, 44120/140.
96 Cardwell to Gladstone, 22 Sept. I873, ibid. I44. Robert Lowe, who had not been
consulted, 'did not know what his colleagues were about' and he prophesied failure. Derby
to Disraeli, 9 Sept. I873, Disraeli Papers, Hughenden Manor (by courtesy of the National
Trust), bundle xii; Disraeli to Northcote, I I Sept. 2873. Buckle, Life of Disraeli, II, 598-9.
9 P. Bright, edition of The Diary of John Bright, 357.
of the Ashanti war.98 He warned Wolseley against conducting desultory

operations and told him the Government would be most reluctant to sanction
the expedition of English battalions. They would be satisfied now with an
honourable peace or, failing that, an effective chastisement of the invaders.
Apart from this the main object was to clear the Ashantis from the
protectorate.
Gladstone's intervention came a month too late. Wolseley arrived at Cape
Coast on 2 October I87399 and after only a week had passed he said he would
need I500 British troops.100 A sober military appreciation of the situation
must have told him that he might be cheated out of the carefully planned
march to Kumasi. The Ashantis were definitely about to retreat and there
had been no further alarms like the Elmina affair on I3 June, which had
really caused Kimberley and Cardwell to consider sending Wolseley. Since
May the Ashantis had suffered considerably in their camps and early in
October they began to retire. By 29 November I873 the main body had
returned across the Pra. Yet although the threat to Cape Coast and Elmina
was removed and the protectorate had been evacuated by the invaders,
British prestige had suffered a severe blow and throughout most of the Gold
Coast British influence had collapsed under the impact of the invasion. In
the west the Government was reduced to holding the forts at Secondi, Dixcove
and Axim with the help of the navy; a projected drive up the Pra to cut the
Ashantis in two came to nothing; in the Volta region Glover was delayed
because his flank was threatened by hostile tribes on the east bank. Moreover,
relations between the civil government and the military were strained. The
protectorate, then, was in a bad way, but the real danger from Ashanti was
passed.
Two days after arriving WVolseley met the chiefs from the Cape Coast
region and offered inducements for the building of African levies; he also
sent recruiting officers to the other settlements.101 Yet only a week after
landing, before he could have made any systematic effort to train and assess
the Fante force, he asked Kimberley for the British battalions. In his
memoirs he wrote that he never thought he would finish the war without
them. In fact it is abundantly clear that he had made up his mind beforehand
that the Africans would be useless. He wrote to his wife from Sierra Leone
that 'the Africans are like so many monkeys; they are a good-for-nothing race '.10
98 Gladstone's rough drafts in Cabinet Minutes, 3 and 4 Oct. I873, Gladstone Papers,
4464I/I93-6. Kimberley's draft (based on Gladstone) in C.O. 96/I08.
99 Wolseley to Kimberley, 8 Oct. I873, Colonial Office Confidential Print: Gold Coast
no. 36, 2o8.
100 Wolseley to Kimberley, 9 Oct. I873, ibid. p. 269.
101 Wolseley to Kimberley, 5 Oct. I873, ibid. p. 209; Wolseley to War Office, 7 O
W.O. 32/826, file 076/I235. At this 'palaver' Wolseley and his staff wore full dress (Henty,
March to Coomnassie, 62).
102 Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, 27 Sept. I873. G. Arthur, The Letters of Lord and Lady
Wolseley, 1870-1911 (I923), 10.
38 W. D. McINTYRE
Before the Cape Coast chiefs had even replied to his offers, he told his
wife he would see 'these wretched kings and chiefs' but he would have
to ask for British troops.103 This belief was confirmed by the first operations
he witnessed on I4 October I873-some punitive attacks on hostile villages
near Elmina, where a survey party had been attacked. Yet his official applica-
tion to the War Office for the English battalions was dated the day before
this.104 It is safe to judge that Wolseley had decided on the British expedition
from the start; that he did not consider seriously any other alternative when
he got to Africa.
The request reached London on I7 November I873. The Cabinet had
already authorized Cardwell to ship stores for I500 men,105 and on the I 7th
it sanctioned the sailing of not two, but three, battalions of regulars, which
left on I9th-2Ist. Gladstone reiterated his desire that Wolseley should make
peace as soon as he could and should strike a blow as far short of the Pra or
Kumasi as possible.106 When the Cabinet considered the instructions on the
use of the battalions on 2i November, Bright made a final effort to prevent
the expedition, but he failed and contemplated resigning.107 Gladstone
warned the general that if Ashanti was crushed completely he might reach
Kumasi and find no one there to negotiate108-which is precisely what
happened-but the Queen hoped Gladstone was not fettering Wolseley's
movements.109
Gladstone's caution was really the last interference the Liberal Government
made in the expedition, which culminated with Wolseley's entry of Kumasi
on 4 February 1874. Since the news did not reach London until after
Gladstone's resignation, it was Glover's activities in the Volta which caused
the most trouble at the end of 1873. As Glover prepared first to subdue the
east bank of the river Kimberley wondered if the 'flank' expedition had not
been a mistake and even Glover's admirers agreed.110 Of one thing Kimberley
103 Ibid. loc. cit. In A Soldier's Life, II, 276, he wrote: 'The term "slave" jars upon the
ear, and yet the more one sees the negro the more one realises that he was intended to be
the white man's servant.' Wolseley also told Reade on the voyage that he was sure he would
want English troops (Ashantee Campaign, I63).
104 'Measures taken at home', Wolseley Papers, W. 13, p. I 4. Maurice, who quotes the dispa
to the War Office (Ashantee War, 90-I05), specially notes that it was dated the day before
Wolseley's first operations. The dispatch was apparently delayed in the mail office until 27
Oct. (C. H. Melville, Life of General the Right Hon. Sir Redvers Buller (I923), I, 6i).
105 Cabinet Minute dated Nov. I873, Gladstone Papers, 44641/209. The third battalion
had been requested by Wolseley, who specified he wanted volunteers commanded by Col.
Colley.
106 Cabinet Minute, I7 Nov. I873, 4464I1/2I8; Gladstone to Kimberley, i9 Nov. I873,
Kimberley Papers, A/8 b.
107 Bright, Diary of John Bright, 358.
108 Cabinet Minute, 2I Nov. I873, 4464I/223.
109 Ponsonby to Kimberley, 23 Nov. I873, Kimberley Papers, A/40.
110 Minute by Kimberley, 25 Dec. I873, on Wolseley to Cardwell, z Nov. I873, C.O.
96/107. Herbert said, however, 'The truth is that Capt. Glover has succeeded in a business
with which he is familiar and the officers who had no African experience have naturally been
less successful'. Wolseley complained that Glover's recruiting jeopardized his own. Gladstone
was certain: 'how utterly without authority we are in the " Protectorate " and
that we are defending little more than a shadow. '"1 He seemed now to
have no constructive ideas about what to do with the Gold Coast after the
war, but he did not rule out the possibility of withdrawal.112 He realized great
changes were necessary, yet he doubted if the settlements could ever be
governed satisfactorily. In such a mood he once told Wolseley he would
bother him on 'this futile subject'.113 It was, perhaps, extremely appropriate
that the hard-working, but now quite weary, Kimberley should remain in
office until the eve of victory, but that the younger, more imaginative,
Carnarvon should be left with the peace settlement.
IV
If, from the British point of view, the interest of the Ashanti expedition lies
in the maturing of the Wolseley-Cardwell-Kimberley plan, from the African
point of view interest centres in the use Britain made of her belated display
of power. Gladstone's Government had reluctantly decided to wage war in
earnest; what would Disraeli's ministry make of the peace? As an election
issue in February I874 the war was quietly dropped after Disraeli blundered
in accusing Gladstone of causing the war by receiving Elmina in I872 as an
equivalent for allowing the Dutch to attack Atjeh in northern Sumatra, thus
relinquishing the command of the Straits of Malacca, Britain's trade route to
Singapore and the Far East. This is not the place for a detailed refutation of
this story, but Disraeli's charge was inaccurate.114 Camarvon, who bore the
brunt of the peace settlement in the Gold Coast, took over the Colonial
Office five days before the arrival of the news of Wolseley's entry of Kumasi.
Well acquainted with Gold Coast problems, from his previous experience in
the Colonial Office, he decided immediately not to make political capital out
of the expedition. Although Disraeli wanted to do this, Carnarvon, who
privately produced an impressive list of Liberal mistakes,115 said 'I should
... prefer to accept the fact of the war and... treat it as a transaction for
which we are not responsible, but which ... we are determined to make the
intervened when he heard Glover was purchasing Hausa slaves for ?s each for his force
(Gladstone to Kimberley, i6 Dec. I873, Kimberlev Papers, A/52). The journalists, who usually
admired Glover, were all agreed that the flank expedition was a mistake: Reade, Ashantee
Campaign, 378-8I; Maurice, Ashantee War, 390; Henty, March to Coomassie, 2I8.
1"' Minute by Kimberley, 25 Dec. I873, C.O. 96/I07.
112 Kimberley to Granville, I7 Dec. I873, Granville Papers, Public Record Office, Gifts
and Deposits: P.R.O. 30/29/55, 333.
113 Kimberley to Wolseley, 9 Jan. I874 (copy), Kimberley Papers, A/22.
114 See my article on 'Disraeli's Election Blunder: The Straits of Malacca Issue in the
I874 Election', Renaissance and Modern Studies, v (I96I).
115 Undated Memorandum in Carnarvon Papers, Public Record Office, Gifts and Deposits:
P.R.O. 30/6/85. Reade was also very critical of Wolseley (Ashantee Campaign, I87-8, 229,
231, 289, 29I, 338, 353), and Stanley criticized Wolseley's conduct in Kumasi (Coomassie and
Magdala, 229).
40 W. D. McINTYRE
best of'.116 Of the conduct of the expedition he found 'more to praise than
to blame'.
Militarily it had appeared neat, effective, and a fitting exercise for Card-
well's reorganized War Office. Wolseley's officers, many of them famous in
later years as the 'Wolseley gang' or 'Ashanti ring ',117 helped to lay the bogey
of I864 by proving the English troops could fight in tropical Africa. Admini-
stratively (especially in medical services) the expedition seemed a model, and
a field telegraph operated from the front. The British troops stayed at sea
until i January I874, when the Black Watch, the 2nd Battalion The Rifle
Brigade, part of the 2nd Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and naval units
began their march to the Pra, sleeping overnight in well-prepared camps so
they were still fresh when they crossed into Ashanti territory on I5 Januar
Flanking movements were made to east and west by African forces each
with a British officer. From the Volta, Glover disentangled himself from
his trans-Volta war, crossed the Pra on 15 January and headed for Juaben,
second town of Ashanti, to the north-east of Kumasi. Wolseley reached
Kumasi on 4 February and began the return march two days later after firing
the town. Glover passed through the ruins from the north-east on 12
February and followed Wolseley to the coast. By 23 February the last of the
British troops had sailed for home. Wolseley became a popular hero; even
Glover got his knighthood.
As the first troopships anchored at Spithead on I9 March, members of
both Houses heard them welcomed home in the Address from the throne.
Little did they realize, as they listened to hints of glory, that the expedition
had been a continual conflict between the instructions and the inclinations of
the commanding general. Wolseley was ordered to clear the Ashanti forces
from the protectorate and make a new treaty with the Asantehene; the
methods were left to his discretion. His inclination was to march to Kumasi,
and to dictate a new treaty to Kofi Karikari in his own capital, leaving the
Ashanti nation intact, but submissive.118 Since the Ashanti army had left
the protectorate even before the British battalions arrived, the first aim was
achieved painlessly. But as the Asantehene did not reply to Wolseley's
proposals for a treaty the expedition preparations continued. Wolseley
imagined that a few battles inside Ashanti territory would soon bring Kofi
Karikari suing for peace.119 In fact, just as Wolseley's forces were about to
116 Carnarvon to Disraeli, 6 Mar. I874 (copy), Carnarvon Papers, P.R.O. 30/6/II, 3.
117 The 'ring' included such notable figures in the late nineteenth-century British Army
as Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, Gen. Sir Redvers Buller, Maj.-Gen. Sir George Colley,
Gen. Sir John McNeil, Gen. Sir George Greaves, Gen. Sir Baker Russell, Gen. Sir Thomas
Baker, Maj.-Gen. Sir Frederick Maurice, Lieut.-Gen. Sir William Butler, Gen. Sir Henry
Brackenbury.
118 Wolseley to Gen. Biddulph, 26 Oct. I873, extract in Kimberley Papers, A/22. Reade's
theory was that Wolseley hoped he would not have to fight for Kumasi and wanted to build
up a reputation as a diplomatist (Ashantee Campaign, 288).
119 Wolseley to Cardwell, I I Dec. I873, copy in Kimberley Papers, A/22.
cross the Pra, his terms were accepted and the Asantehene begged him to
stop.120 Thus it appeared that the second aim would also be achieved with the
general's inclination unfulfilled, so he pressed on and demanded impossible
terms. This caused the Ashantis to make a stand and forced the British to
fight for Kumasi.121
The battle of Amoaful on 3' January I874 dashed all illusions of 'child's
play', and five days of fighting followed before Kumasi was occupied. But
although he had satisfied his inclination, Wolseley had still not achieved his
aim. The Asantehene had already agreed to accept his terms but had fled
from the capital when it was obvious that Wolseley would not be cheated out
of his objective. Thus Kumasi was deserted, no one came forward to sign
a treaty, and Wolseley set off back to the coast with his aim not accomplished.
Ashanti envoys did not reach him until I3 February when the draft of the
Treaty of Fomana was handed to them,122 and Wolseley had left for home
when the treaty was signed by the Administrator at Cape Coast on I4 March
I874. The new treaty replaced the I83I treaty as the basis of British relations
with Ashanti, but it included little which was new. The Asantehene renounced
all allegiance from Denkyera, Assin, Akim and Adansi, he renounced his
claim of Elmina or for rent from the British forts. Both sides pledged them-
selves to keep open trade routes and to maintain the track to Kumasi, and
Kofi Karikari promised he would try to stop human sacrifice in his dominions.
Thus Elmina was finally secured and doubts about Denkyera, Assin and
Akim were removed. The only really new departure was Ashanti's renuncia-
tion of Adansi, which had requested to join the protectorate.123 But as this
provided a precedent for the secession of other Ashanti states, Wolseley had
deliberately hastened from the scene to avoid political complications which
might detract from his success. It was no part of British policy to destroy
Ashanti; what was wanted, as Gladstone had said in his Greenwich manifesto,
was peaceful relations.124
Ashanti had been humiliated, but what was to come of the protectorate?
Here, ironically, Carnarvon faced precisely the same dilemma as Kimberley
had just before the Ashanti invasion at the end of I872. Should Britain leave
the coast (the solution Kimberley had rejected in I873) or, remaining, should
she strengthen the basis of her position? Some saw 'complete annexation or
120 Wolseley to Kofi Karikari, 2 Jan. I874, C.O. 806/2, p. I03. His terms were: the return of
all captives; an indemnity of 50,000 oz. of gold dust; and a new treaty to be signed by
Wolseley in Kumasi.
121 Kofi Karikari to Wolseley, 9 Jan. I 874, C.0. 806/4, p. 6, and Wolseley to Kofi Karikari,
24 Jan. i874, ibid. pp. I2-I3. The new terms required as hostages the king's heir, the Queen
Mother, and the heirs of the four leading Ashanti kings. Ward, History of the Gold Coast,
273, says it was impossible for the Asantehene to accept such humiliating terms. Reade,
Ashantee Campaign, 290-2, considered that Kofi Karikari outwitted Wolseley in diplomacy
and forced the general to fight for Kumasi in order to save his reputation at home.
122 C.O. 8o6/6, p. I2.
123 Text in Crooks, Records of the Gold Coast, 52I-3.
124 The Times, 24 Jan. I874, 8.
42 W. D. McINTYRE
total abandonment' as the only alternatives,125 but Carnarvon, as he was

bombarded with advice, decided there were five possibilities: withdrawal,
leaving a consul on the coast and a resident at Kumasi; rule by a company;
recognition of the Fante confederacy; direct rule, on 'Anglo-Indian plan';
or annexation.126 One certain fact emerged; the small body of opinion
interested in West Africa would not support a withdrawal.
In March I874 Augustus Hemming and Edward Fairfield of the African
department examined the whole basis of Britain's position on the Gold
Coast and reached four conclusions. The I865 policy was finally condemned
as 'vague and inconclusive '.127 Cardwell's military policy of I864 was
rejected and the duty of protection reaffirmed. As Fairfield said: 'the duty
arises from the fact that our presence renders the protectorate tribes less able
to defend themselves, whilst our peculiar policy has exposed them to the
undying hatred of their most powerful enemies',128 The system of a single
Governor at Freetown was found defective, as the protectorate rendered the
Gold Coast potentially the most dangerous settlement, yet its administrator
was not the real authority.129 Finally, domestic slavery was seen as the chief
bar to better government. Its existence was the real reason why British
sovereignty was not extended; yet unless this happened effective British rule
could not be developed. Therefore, Fairfield suggested gradual abolition.'30
Carnarvon announced his new policy in the House of Lords on I2 May
I874. There would be no withdrawal; if there were no written obligations
on the Gold Coast, there were moral ones.
A great nation like ours must be sometimes prepared to discharge disagreeable

duties; she must consent to bear burdens which are inseparable from her great-
ness.. . it is certainly not a desire of selfish interest or the ambition of larger
empire which bids us remain on the West Coast of Africa; it is simply and solely
a sense of obligations to be redeemed and of duties to be performed."3'
The Gold Coast forts were to be added to Lagos to form a new Crown
colony on the model of the Straits Settlements, and certain other changes,
including a new capital at Elmina or Accra, were to be made to improve the
administration. Although the local government would investigate the matter
of domestic slavery Carnarvon promised no sudden emancipation. Therefore
there was no dramatic new policy after the Ashanti expedition. The protec-
125 Minute by James Lowther (Parliamentary Under-secretary), 2o April I874, on Fitz-

gerald to Carnarvon, I3 April I874, C.O. 96/II4.
126 Undated Memorandum in Carnarvon Papers, P.R.O. 30/6/85.
127 A. W. L. Hemming, Gold Coast. Enquiry of 1865 (March I874), Confid. Pri
Coast no. 50, C.O. 806/I2, p. i6.
128 E. Fairfield, The Origin and Extent of the British Obligation towards the Na
on the Gold Coast (24 March I874), Gold Coast no. 49, C.O. 8o6/iI, p. i8.
129 Hemming, C.O. 8o6/I2, pp. 9-I0.
130 Fairfield, Domestic Slavery, the 3urisdiction of the 3udicial Assessor and the Le
CharacterandLimitationof British Powerupon the Gold Coast(I9 March 1874), CO. 8o6/9,p. 22.
131 3 Hansard, Ccxix, cols. I57-68.
torate was retained very much as it had existed before the expedition.
Influence rather than edict would still be Britain's method of advancing
'Commerce, Christianity and Civilization'.
Two additions, however, were made to this modest programme later in
I874, which, in the long run, profoundly influenced the future of the Gold
Coast. They have also misled more than one historian into saying that
Britain 'annexed' the protectorate.'32 First, while no new territory was in
fact annexed, the Legislative Council of the colony (i.e. Lagos and the Gold
Coast forts) was empowered to legislate for the protectorate and the Queen
was proclaimed the sole authority on the Gold Coast.'33 The Government
instead of confining itself to police and judicial functions would also com-
prehend health, education, roads, economic and social regulation. It could
be said, then, that in theory the protectorate was 'annexed administratively'
to the colony. Secondly, after the Hon. Evelyn Ashley (son of the factory
reformer) secured a promise from Disraeli, in a debate on 29 June i874, that
the Prime Minister hoped personally that slavery would soon be abolished,
it is evident that the Cabinet forced Carnarvon to attempt this reform. Thus
Governor Strahan was secretly told to make an agreement with the protec-
torate chiefs for the gradual abolition of domestic slavery. It transpired that
Strahan had already opened such discussions on his own initiative, and
largely through his efforts and courage domestic slavery was formally
abolished,'34 although it still remained for many years. Beyond these two,
rather nebulous changes Carnarvon refused to move.
While it may be true, as Gallacher and Robinson have argued,'35 that to
concentrate on areas of British sovereignty is to distort the history of British
expansion, writers like Ward have interpreted Carnarvon's policy wrongly by
suggesting that he annexed the protectorate. Ward says that there were only
two alternatives for Britain on the Gold Coast in I874-annexation, or
withdrawal-and he suggests that Carnarvon came down firmly in favour of
the former.'36 The policy actually followed, however, shows that Carnarvon
sought some middle course, which would save him from facing such clear-cut
alternatives. He felt an obligation to hold a sort of 'balance of power'; he
wanted a legal basis for the exertion of influence; but he did not want the
sovereignty of the region. In short, he still clung to some notion of 'informal
empire'.
132 J. D. Fage, An Introductioni to the History of West Africa (Cambridge, I955), I40-
Ward, History of the Gold Coast, 257-60; F. M. Bourret, Ghana. Road to Independence 1919-
57 (Oxford, I960), 20; C. D. Cowan, Nineteenth Centzry Malaya (Oxford, i96i), 172-3, 200.
133 Order in Council, 6 Aug. i874, C.O. 806/I9, p. 6. Ward, p. 257, questions whether
this was ever published on the coast.
134 3 Hansard, ccxx, cols. 607-4I; Carnarvon to Strahan, 2i Aug. I874 (secret), C.O.
806/i9, p. 8; Strahan to Carnarvon, I9 Sept. I874 (secret), C.O. 806/23 and 20 Sept. I874
(private), P.R.O. 3o/6/24, p. 25.
135 Economic History Rev. vi, I (I953).
136 Ward, History of the Gold Coast, 256-7.
44 W. D. McINTYRE
The Ashanti expedition was a display of British power in nineteenth-century

Africa. After the abolition of the slave trade in 1807 Britain had been reluc-
tant to remain in West Africa, but on the Gold Coast British intervention
weakened the ability of the coastal states to withstand Ashanti attacks, while
the Government never accepted the logic of Maclean's system and did not
pledge itself permanently to defend the protectorate. Disillusion with West
Africa reached its height in the mid- i 86o's, yet by the early I 870's it appeared
that Britain was certain to remain in West Africa. In this significant, and
comparatively rapid, change, the Gold Coast, which was certainly not the
most valuable region of contact, was perhaps the most dramatic. Events
there were the cause of the I865 committee, and they provided the most
noticeable examples of the I865 policy's weakness. When the Ashanti
invasion, for which British intervention was partly responsible, took place
in i 872 the Government was most reluctant to move, and when it did intervene
it did so with unnecessary force. Prompt measures to defeat the Ashantis in
battle early in I873 with limited reinforcements might have avoided the
expense and publicity of the somewhat fruitless march to Kumasi.
That intervention, when it came, should take the form of Wolseley's
expedition is a vivid example of how a plan once made gains a certain momen-
tum of its own. Cardwell, evidently on his own initiative, asked Wolseley
to make his plan. There were certainly other alternatives available, such as
immediate reinforcement, Clarke's plan for rousing the Fante, and the various
ideas about using the Volta. But although the Wolseley plan was something
of a last resort-certainly as presented to Gladstone-it was followed through
even though the Ashantis had left the protectorate before the invasion
actually began. One is left with the impression, then, that Wolseley decided
to enter Kumasi with British troops and would not be deterred. Wolseley's
large influence over British policy may partly be explained by the Prime
Minister's preoccupation with domestic affairs in the dying months of the
ministry, the fact that Parliament was prorogued on 5 August I873, and that
the Cabinet was dispersed during the vital days of the general's appointment.
Thus the main burden of the decision fell on Kimberley and Cardwell,137 and
one senses that they, realizing Gladstone's reluctance to use force, presented
the plan in such a way as to emphasize the alternatives to the actual march to
Kumasi. Whether Cardwell and Kimberley were sincere in wanting action
as far short of an invasion of Ashanti territory as possible-as Gladstone
surely was-is not clear. It is certain, though, that Gladstone's distaste, or
137 Parliamentary criticism of the preparations for sending equipment for a railway to
the Gold Coast caused Cardwell to complain to Gladstone about 'our form of government,
which seldom very clearly defines responsibilities. . . ' (Cardwell to Gladstone, i9 Sept. I873,
Gladstone Papers, 44I20/1I35).
simply his preoccupation, prevented him from making his views clear
until it was too late. His warning to Wolseley of 6 October I873 was
written only one week before Wolseley made his application for the British
troops; it was then too late to question the general's wisdom from
London.
However, although it can be argued that the expedition to Kumasi was
unnecessary and was only fulfilled because the 'plan' once started was not
stopped, the display of power produced certain advantages-even if they
were not very effectively used. Having seen that British force could gain
quick success in Africa, interested opinion now refused to support withdrawal
from the Gold Coast. Moreover, the Colonial Office now believed there
was a moral obligation to protect the protectorate; and the chiefs who had
just been rescued from Ashanti subjugation were informed that the Queen
was 'entitled to require of them a greater degree of deference and conformity
to the known desires of herself and her people than formerly'.138 Thus the
tangible result of the display of force was the beginning of the abolition of
domestic slavery and the proclamation of the Queen's supremacy in the
protectorate. Colony and protectorate were, after I874, to be treated as one,
thus the impression was given at first that Britain had 'taken over' in the
protectorate, and it is often wrongly said that the latter was annexed. There
was an air of optimism among the missionaries at first,139 and Hemming of
the Colonial Office wrote: 'We are now, particularly on the Gold Coast,
committed to a policy of development and improvement, a policy of real and
earnest efforts to raise the natives of our settlements from the slough of
ignorance and barbarism... ..The agents of this policy must be among other
things roads and schools. '140 Yet in spite of this idealism, the moral advantage
secured by Wolseley's expedition was soon lost. Colony and protectorate
were not defined, the local government still confined itself largely to police
and jurisdiction and building a few roads; administration spread into the
interior of the protectorate very slowly and Ashanti policy remained contra-
dictory.141 The protectorate was not annexed until I90I after another Ashanti
war, when Ashanti was also annexed. Domestic slavery remained into the
twentieth century.142 In fact, apart from the slavery issue, and in spite of
138 Carnarvon to Strahan, 2 July I874 (secret), C.O. 806/I9, p. 8.

139 Rev. Penrose to General Secretaries, 26 April I875, Methodist Missionary Society,
Gold Coast incoming letters, file for I875-6; 'already the more decisive measures of British
rule are making themselves felt'.
140 Minute by Hemming, I4 Oct. I875, on Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Carnar-
von, I3 Oct. I875, C.O. 87/I08.
141 Ward, History of the Gold Coast, 282-3: 'The policy.. towards Ashanti from I874
to I890 was utterly timorous and vacillating, and the fruits of the campaign of I874 were
completely lost in an incredibly short time.... The Government... wanted the Asantehene
to be strong enough to keep all Ashanti in order, but to be weak enough not to be a danger
to the Colony. Two contradictory aims naturally led to chaos.'
142 It still existed in I9I5, when Claridge wrote. See Gold Coast and Ashanti ii, I 83-4, for
his view of the effect of the I874 policy.
46 W. D. McINTYRE
the display of power, Disraeli's Government did less than Gladstone's was
contemplating on the eve of the Ashanti attack in I872.
Britain saved the Gold Coast from Ashanti slavery in 1873-4 and demon-
strated that when she wished she had the power to dictate in Africa. Carnar-
von felt a moral responsibility not to abandon the protectorate, and the
younger men in the Colonial Office even talked of 'development and welfare',
but on the whole there was no inclination in Britain to do anything about it.
Disraeli was no more interested in this than Gladstone. Policy making re-
mained in the hands of enthusiasts, departmental clerks, and the men on the
spot. British power was not, in I874, used to transform the Gold Coast.
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O, s m, T O

British Policy in West Africa, The Ashanti Expedition of 1873-4

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British Policy in West Africa, The Ashanti Expedition of 1873-4

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British Policy in West Africa: The Ashanti Expedition of 1873-4

II. BRITISH POLICY IN WEST AFRICA:

THE Ashanti expedition of I873-4 provides a remarkable illustration of the

occupied in I864,7 and the exact implications of the protectorate baffled

15 Cardwell to Gov. Pine, 23 June I864, A. & P. (I873), XLIX, 864-5.

for suspending negotiations."8 When the expansionist administrator of Lagos,

Hugessen again attacked 'the absurd system of "Protectorate"' by which

31 Minute by Knatchbull-Hugessen on Question by McArthur, i8 March i873, C.O.

prisoners reported great suffering from casualties, disease and hunger.35

and McArthur on 25 April I873 he said the Africans of the protectorate

" The Times, I3 March I873.

47 Minute by Knatchbull-Hugessen, 27 May I873, on W.O. to C.O., 22 May I873, C.0.

Kimberley asked to see Cardwell on Monday, 28 July I873. After their

54 Harley to Kimberley, io June I873, C.O. 96/99.

We mean to employ Glover to lead an expedition of natives and Hausas against

The Cabinet, then, had sanctioned the Glover expedition on z August.

60 See above, p. 24, n. I9.

It was the news of the Jukwa-Elmina battles (received io July) which

86 See Kimberley to Goschen, I2 Sept. I873, in A. D. Elliot, Life of George Joachim

92 Cardwell to Goschen, 12 Sept. I 873 (copy), Cardwell Papers, p. II 3.

of the Ashanti war.98 He warned Wolseley against conducting desultory

total abandonment' as the only alternatives,125 but Carnarvon, as he was

A great nation like ours must be sometimes prepared to discharge disagreeable

125 Minute by James Lowther (Parliamentary Under-secretary), 2o April I874, on Fitz-

The Ashanti expedition was a display of British power in nineteenth-century

138 Carnarvon to Strahan, 2 July I874 (secret), C.O. 806/I9, p. 8.

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