VAN DORN VS.

ROMILLO AND UPTON

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON

G.R. No. L-68470

October 8, 1985

FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard
Upton is a citizen of the USA. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and begot two children.
The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then re-married also in Nevada, this
time to Theodore Van Dorn.

In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alices business in Ermita,
Manila is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that Alice be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property.

Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had no community property as of June 11, 1982.

The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the mentioned case on the
ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property
in the Philippines?

HELD: Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between Alice and Richard, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community
property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in
this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner
who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained
jurisdiction over private respondent who authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree to
the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations.

As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD
LTD. to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf
and do all things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to
the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al

G.R. No. 80116

June 30, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a
German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in
Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling,
Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution
directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled PP
Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-
Somera.

A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed
this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the
annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery,
considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE and another
one entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case is
hereby made permanent.

NO

Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a
formal, requirement.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison
detre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased
to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.

Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a

criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the
latter.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale,
private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time
he filed suit.

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE,

respondents

November 23, 2000

FACTS:

Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo
was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through
naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she
was living with his brother and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the
name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on became
final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last
will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He filed a
petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before
the

proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over
Llorentes estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An
appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial
Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have
acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Law shall apply.

RULING:

Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the
situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law.
Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine
Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen.
Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of
Lorenzo Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law.

RP v Orbecido

2005

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus - CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

FACTS:

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

DECISION OF LOWER COURT:

(1) Regional Trial Court: declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to
remarry.
ISSUE:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

RULING:

Yes.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.

The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice.

A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long
as they come within its spirit or intent. The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife
was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

Facts:
On 25 March 1997, Respondent Crasus Iyoy filed a complaint in the RTC for the nullity of
marriage with his wife Fely, on the ground that after the celebration of their marriage, he found
his wife hot-tempered, nagger and extravagant.

Then in 1984, Fely left the PH for the US leaving all their five children to Crasus. After a year, she
sent a letter to respondent re seeking divorce but the latter disregarded the request.

In 1985, respondent learned that Fely got married to an American.

In 1987, Fely went back to the PH with her new husband; respondent did not bother to talk to
her because hes afraid that he might not bear the pain and sadness.

At the time the complaint was filed, it has been 13years since Fely left and abandoned
respondent and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them.

Respondent alleged that Fely has psychological incapacity to perform marital obligations set
forth in the FC.

In 1997, Fely refuted all the allegation about her, instead, argued that her hot temperance was
due to her husbands drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment,
hence, the reason why she left the country was for financial reasons.

She further invokes that although she left, she continued to give support to her children. She
also explained that after the divorce, she was naturalized as an American Citizen, hence, her
status re marriage is governed by her present nationality.

After both parties filed their respective pre-trial briefs, the RTC gave them opportunity to
present evidence.

On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent
and Fely null and void ab initio due to Felys psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
duties such as striving for unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. Crasus
also adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him; and that his wife
committed bigamous marriage.

Petitioner Republic assailed the RTCs decision saying that it was contrary to law and evidence,
hence, filed an appeal to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the earlier decision of the RTC
citing article 26 of the FC saying that to condemn plaintiff to remain shackle in a marriage
that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to
discharge essential marital covenants is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage
which this Court finds abhorrent.

With such, Petitioner Republic seek an appeal in the SC on the ground that abandonment by and
sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per se constitute psychological incapacity.

RULING:
What constitute a psychological incapacity?

Citing Santos v CA, the Court stated that psychological incapacity refers to no less than a mental
incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.

The only evidence presented by Crasus was his testimony which is put in question for being self-
serving. The evidence is not enough to convince the Court that Fely had such grave mental
illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Art 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take

cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent
and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent; her marriage to an Am citizen; and even her flaunting of her American family may
be indeed manifestations of her alleged incapacity, nonetheless, the root cause for such was not
identified. If the root cause f the incapacity was not identified, then, it cannot be satisfactorily
established as a psychological