ESCRA SYLLABUS

1. TAADA vs. TUVERA (G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986)

Statutes; Words and Phrases; The clause unless it is otherwise provided in Art 2 of the NCC refers to
the effectivity of laws and not to the requirement of publication After a careful study of this provision
and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come
to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on
any other date, without its previous publication.

Same; Same; The prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed
with - It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny
the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly
provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a
failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this
is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.

Same; Same; For purposes of the prior publication requirement for effectivity, the term laws
refer not only to those of general application, but also to laws of local application, private laws;
administrative rules enforcing a statute; city charters. Central Bank circulars to fill-in the
details of the Central Bank Act; but not mere interpretative rules regulating and providing
guidelines for purposes of internal operations only - The term "laws" should refer to all laws and
not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of
public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if
he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a
whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature
or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only
a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a
favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars
issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to
"fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

Same; Same; Local Governments; Internal instructions issued by an administrative agency are
not covered by the rule on prior publication. Also not covered are municipal ordinances which
are governed by the Local Government Code. - However, no publication is required of the
instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in
petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically,
municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

Same; Same; Publication of statutes must be in full or it is no publication at all - We agree that
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of
the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the
manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration.
The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Same; Same; Prior publication of statutes for purposes of effectivity must be made in full in the
Official Gazette and not elsewhere - At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That
function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived
and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil
Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different
period provided by the legislature.

Same; Same; Laws must be published as soon as possible - We also hold that the publication
must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the
said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law
could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to
cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at
this time.

2. IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased. MORA ADONG vs.
CHEONG SENG GEE (G.R. No. 18081, March 3, 1922)

MARRIAGE; PHILIPPINE MARRIAGE LAW; SECTION IV OF MARRIAGE LAW, CONSTRUED -

Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All marriages contracted
without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were
contracted, are valid in these Islands." To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this
comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the
foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by
convincing evidence.
ID.; ID.; ID. - A Philippine marriage, followed by twenty-three years of uninterrupted marital
life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband and administration of
his estate, though an alleged prior Chinese marriage, "save upon proof so clear, strong, and
unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment.

ID.; ID.; ID. A marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and proven mainly by a so-
called matrimonial letter, held not to be valid in the Philippines.

ID.; ID.; SECTION V OF THE MARRIAGE LAW, CONSTRUED; PRIEST, DEFINED. -

Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by either a judge of
any court inferior to the Supreme Court, justice of the peace, or priest or minister of the Gospel
of any denomination . . ." Counsel, failing to take account of the word "priest," and only
considering the phrase "minister of the Gospel of any denomination" would limit the meaning of
this clause to ministers of the Christian religion. We believe this is a strained interpretation.
"Priest," according to the lexicographers, means one especially consecrated to the service of a
divinity and considered as the medium through whom worship, prayer, sacrifice, or other service
is to be offered to the being worshipped, and pardon, blessing, deliverance, etc., obtained by the
worshipper, as a priest of Baal or of Jehovah; a Buddhist priest.

ID., ID.; SECTION VI OF THE MARRIAGE LAW, CONSTRUED. - Marriage Law, No. VI,
provides that "No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must
declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as
husband and wife." The law is quite correct in affirming that no precise ceremonial is
indispensable requisite for the creation of the marriage contract.

ID.; ID.; ID. - The two essentials of a valid marriage are capacity and consent. The latter element
may be inferred from the ceremony performed, the acts of the parties, and habit or repute.

ID., ID.; SECTION IX OF THE MARRIAGE LAW, CONSTRUED. Section IX of the

Marriage Law provides that "No marriage heretofore solemnized before any person professing to
have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority or on account of any
informality, irregularity, or omission, if it was celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either
of them, that he had authority and that they have been lawfully married." There is nothing in the
curative provisions of section IX of the Marriage Law which would restrict it to Christian
marriages. There is nothing in the curative provisions of section IX of the Marriage Law which
would restrict it to marriages performed under the Spanish law before the revolutionary
authorities. Section IX of the Marriage Law, analyzed and found to validate marriages performed
according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion.

ID.; ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENTAL POLICY - The purpose of the government toward the
Mohammedan population of the Philippines has, time and again, been announced by treaty,
organic law, statutory law, and executive proclamation. The purpose of the government is not to
interfere with the customs of the Moros, especially their religious customs.

ID.; ID.; ID.; MARRIAGE, DEFINED - Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but, it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested.

ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION AS TO MARRIAGE - Every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law.

ID.; ID.; ID.;RESTROSPECTIVE FORCE - Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a
curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. Public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate
marriages.
ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE Held: That a marriage performed according to the rites of the
Mohammedan religion is valid.

3. PEOPLE vs. PATALIN (G.R. No. 125539. July 27, 1999)

Constitutional Law; Death Penalty: There is no question that the abolition of the death penalty
benefits herein accused appellants. -Tthere is no question that the abolition of the death penalty
benefits herein accused-appellants. Perforce, the subsequent reimposition of the death penalty
will not affect them. The framers of the Constitution themselves state that the law to be passed
by Congress reimposing the death penalty (Republic Act 7659) can only have prospective
application (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary,
1996 ed., p. 508, citing I RECORD, p. 748; Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers,
1995 ed., p. 227, citing I Record, p. 747-748).

Same; Same; Statutes; A subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair a

right that accrued under the old law. - There is no question that a person has no vested right in
any rule of law which entitles him to insists that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit, nor
has he a vested right in the continued existence of a statute which precludes its change or repeal,
nor in any omission to legislate on a particular matter. However, a subsequent statute cannot be
so applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law (Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 1986 ed., p. 264, citing Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil 711
[1956]; Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil 372 [1946]). Courts have thus given statutes strict construction
to prevent their retroactive operation in order that the statutes would not impair or interfere with
vested or existing rights. Clearly, accused-appellants right to be benefited by the abolition of the
death penalty accrued or attached by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This benefit
cannot be taken away from them.

4. CUI vs. ARELLANO (G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961)

Contracts; Students and educational institutions; Scholarships; Stipulation whereby student

cannot transfer to another school without refunding scholarship cash null and void. The
stipulation in a contract, between a student and the school, that the students scholarship is good
only if he continues in the same school, and that he waives his right to transfer to another school
without refunding the equivalent of his scholarship in cash is contrary to public policy and,
hence, null and void because scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit and to help gifted
students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien, and not to keep outstanding
students in school in bolster its prestige and increase its business potential.

5. U.S. vs. SOLIMAN

6. U.S. vs. PALACIO

7. ANG PING vs. RTC

Courts; There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their
bearing; Court of Appeals has no power to reverse decision of the Supreme Court - Respondent
Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any other way
on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as
that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera (L-31589, July 31, 1970, 34
SCRA 98). "The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or
statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed
to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two
departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid
confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through
the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative,
binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to
submit." (ibid., 107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was
cited.) The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a
thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these
words: "Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition
and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is the final
arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all
other courts should take their bearings."

8. NACTOR vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Computation of periods; Petitioners contention that the motion for reconsideration was filed on
time is meritorious. - Petitioners contend that the motion for reconsideration was filed on time
with the Regional Trial Court on June 24, 1985 because the fifteenth day, June 23, 1985 is a
Sunday. There is merit in this contention.

Pertinent thereto, Section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, B.P. 129 provides:

The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award judgment or decision appealed from: ...

On the other hand, the rule on the computation of periods for filing of pleadings is now
embodied in Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:

Art. 13. ...

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

and also in the Revised Administrative Code which likewise provides:

Section 13. Computation of time in computing any fixed period-of time, with
reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done at a
certain time or within a certain limit of time, the day or date, or day from which
the time is reckoned, is to be excluded and the date of performance, included,
unless otherwise provided.

Same; Same; In case the last day is a Sunday or a legal holiday, the last day should really be the
next day provided said day is neither a Sunday nor a legal holiday. - However, in case the last
day is a Sunday or a legal holiday, it is understood that where the time refers to a period
prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by an order of the court, or by any other applicable
statute, the last day should really be the next day, provided said day is neither a Sunday nor a
legal holiday. The law cannot require compliance on a day when entities supposed to receive
pleadings or documents are closed in view of the holiday.

Same; Same; Period to appeal; In computing the period to appeal, the first day shall be excluded
and the last day to be included unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday - Thus, as authoritatively
formulated by this Court, the computation of the appeal periods is to the effect that the first day
shall be excluded but the last day of the period so computed is to be included unless it is a
Sunday or a legal holiday in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is
neither a Sunday nor a holiday (Kabigting v. Acting Director of Prisons, 6 SCRA 281 [1962]; De
las Alas v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 200 [1978]. Accordingly, in said cases, the period to
perfect an appeal is extended ipso jure to the first working day immediately following.