DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil
Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on
January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable
laws to any and/or both parties.[3]

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on
March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian
Citizenship issued by the Australian government. [6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on
January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. [8]

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance
with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. [9]

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on
the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January
12, 1994.She claimed that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been
validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.

On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity
was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the
marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down. [13]

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.[15] The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties.[16] After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted
for resolution.[17]

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
 Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision
on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more marital union to nullify or annul.

Hence, this Petition.[18]

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the
petitioner.

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry
constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code
as the applicable provisions in this case.

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso
facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce
decree before our courts.[19]

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)
whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to
be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up
the rest.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign
judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law
allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to
establish these elements.
 Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized
abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the
Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine
law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. [21] A marriage between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 [22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 [25] of the Family Code allows the former to contract
a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.[26] A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.[27]

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van
Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. [28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.[29]Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:

ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

xxxxxxxxx

(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;

xxxxxxxxx

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to
furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the
deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of
nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.

ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a written
official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. [30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself.Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. [31] The decree purports to be a written act
or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. [32]

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested [33] by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
 The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court.[35] However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners
qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. [38]

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. [39] Naturalization is the
legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum
juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the
party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the
divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country
for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. [41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. [42] Since the divorce was a defense
raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. [43] Like any other
facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed
to know by reason of their judicial function. [44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated
to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful
union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage,
while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. [45] There is no showing in the case at bar which type
of divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of

divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after
the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. [46]

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce
which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a
remarriage only after proof of good behavior. [47]

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy. [48]

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did
not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the
ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no
proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not
submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent
did not have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the
legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima
facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. [50]

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. A
review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court:
(1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; [52] (c)
Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on
March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its
records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; [55] (2) for respondent: (a)
Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the
Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit
4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; [59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995.[60]

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioners contention that
the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to
remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his
status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct
result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court
to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated
March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
 WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the
court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, G.R. No. 155635

Petitioner,

- versus - Present:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,
CARPIO MORALES,
Respondents.
TINGA,
x-------------------------------------------x
VELASCO, JR., and
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT,
BRION, JJ.
Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 163979

VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

November 7, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

 The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning
certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and
seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution[2] of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2,
2002,[3] granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off
the trial courts grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45, [4] docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004
Decision[5] of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate[6] identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an
American citizen[7] born in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn
Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or
Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebeccas marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in
1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial
District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On
February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,[8] ordering the dissolution of the couples
marriage and leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements, but giving them joint custody and
guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,[9] settling the
couples property relations pursuant to an Agreement [10] they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement
specifically stated that the conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real
property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang,
Muntinlupa.[11]
 Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96,
Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition[12] dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of
nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved[13] and secured
approval[14] of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment [15] stating under oath that she is an
American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not
of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage[16] on the ground of Vicentes alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed
as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition
was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be
ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss[17] on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action
and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved
for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as
affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several
criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca.
Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[18] denying Vicentes motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094
and granting Rebeccas application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is

DENIED. Petitioners Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby
GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the
duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.
 SO ORDERED.[19]

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant
of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to
preclude her from receiving legal support

Following the denial[20] of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente
went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. [21] His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO. [22] On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via
a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from
implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November
20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of
an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[23]

Rebecca moved[24] but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the
meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ [25] was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration
of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in
Rebeccas petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed
Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the
presently assailed CA Decision reads:
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated
August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one entered DISMISSINGCivil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[26]

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicentes motion to dismiss on the basis of the following
premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule
applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action. [27] Applying said rule in the light of
the essential elements of a cause of action, [28] Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of
nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void,
the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally
secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce
restored Vicentes capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebeccas contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign
divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as
it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of
Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that nationality
status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her
marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured an American
passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for
nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
 (5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father
in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebeccas representation and assertion about being an American
citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity
of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was denied
in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.[29] Hence, Rebeccas Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of her
petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTCs
orders which would have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING
INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF
PETITIONERS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED
IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO

THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III
 THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER
HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND
CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE. [30]

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the success or
failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien
married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. [31] Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing
parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad.
And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction. [32]

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of
the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of:first, whether
petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic
on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal
effects?

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

 Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from
Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such
citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in
Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship
to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport. [33]

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as an
American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth
certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment [34] in which she stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID)
Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that
she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition
was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebeccas recognition pursuant to
the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph

and thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose
other particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953

Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown

Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

 was r e c o g n i z e d as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1,
Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice
Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila

dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1)
Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the
1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen was
issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC
9778 was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per
OR No. 5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau
on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No
explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the
1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of
Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the
certificate in question must be spurious.
 Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation
by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as
the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to
provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the
admission and stay of aliens. Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship
issued by the Bureau is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002[35] on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly
provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the
Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of
approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice
pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the
date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the
Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five
days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may
be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior
to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would
also imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No.
RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino
citizen through the 1 stIndorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the
eventual issuance of Rebeccas passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

 The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing
disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino
citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original
petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not
show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the
date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca
secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about
said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the
Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex B). If indeed ID Certificate No.
RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of
document be appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094,
like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were
attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Divorce Decree. It was
only through her Opposition (To Respondents Motion to Dismiss dated31 May 2001) [36] did Rebecca attach as
Annex C ID Certificate No. RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicentes motion to dismiss and
Rebeccas opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action,
which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.
 First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for
argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as
an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American
citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as
is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of
this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and
residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally
appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x
and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared
before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by
special power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public
Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the
acts concerning this case.[37] (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America,
a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated
through their Agreement [38] executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered
on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued onMarch 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be
recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien
spouse.[39] Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and
that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, [40] the presentation of a copy of foreign
divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
 It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both
parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its
proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the
opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this
Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so
on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a

foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the
title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a

right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in

order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our
Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the
claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. [41]

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente
was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the
foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both
Rebecca and Vicente.
 Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8,
2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not,
standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on
February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad
would come within the pale of the countrys policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of
the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.[42]

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect
in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculumbetween Rebecca and
Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and
Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: [T]hat the
marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x
x leaving them free to remarry after completing the legal requirements.[43]

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husbands obligation
under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to Rebecca.[44]

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code,
providing as follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As
amended by E.O. 227)
 In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph
of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.[45]

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and
Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed
on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement provided
that the ex-couples conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during
their marriage consists only of the real property and all the improvements and personal
properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT
No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila
registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x. [46](Emphasis
ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its
second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, THIRD: That the agreement
entered into between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this
Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply
with each and every provision of said agreement.[47]
 Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her
representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicentes conjugal property was not limited to
their family home in Ayala Alabang.[48]

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises,
cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action,
thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the
other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute
a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein.A cause of action
exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of
such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. [49]

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebeccas underlying petition before the RTC, Vicentes motion to
dismiss and Rebeccas opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a
cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief
does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.[50] With
the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no
more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
 The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs
of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that
the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982,
reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for
declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been
partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual
figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial
court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child
concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No.
155635, that is, Rebeccas right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on
the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of
Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for
support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.Accordingly,
the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 195432 August 27, 2014

EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of the Orders dated 14
January and 8 February 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (R TC), Third Judicial Region, Branch 45, 1 City of
San Fernando, Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 137, which dismissed the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed therein.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE

The pertinent facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner, are as follows:

3. On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in a civil wedding
solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. A copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex 'A'
and made an integral part hereof.

4. On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was validly granted under
Japaneselaws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with petitioner. A copy of the Divorce Certificate duly
issued by the Consulate-General of Japan and duly authenticated by the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Manila, is heretoas Annex B and made an integral part hereof. 5. Said Divorce Certificate was duly
registered with the Office of the Civil Registry of Manila. A copy of the Certification dated 28 October
2005 is hereto attached as Annex C and made an integral part hereof.

6. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by such she reverted to her
single status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando on 13 September 2005 in a civil wedding celebrated in
Sta. Ana, Pampanga. A copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex D and made an
integral part hereof.

7. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27 December 2005. A copy of the
JapaneseFamily Registry Record of Kobayashi showing the divorce he obtained and his remarriage with
Ryo Miken, duly authenticated by the Consulate-General of Japan and the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Manila, is hereto attached as Annex E and made an integral part hereof.

8. Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her surname withher
husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at the Department of Foreign Affairs that the same cannot be
issued to her until she can prove bycompetent court decision that her marriage with her said husband
Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.

xxxx

12. Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioners marriage with her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando
musttherefore be honored, considered and declared valid, until otherwise declared by a competent court.
Consequently, and until then, petitioner therefore is and must be declared entitled to the issuance of a
Philippine passport under the name Edelina Ando y Tungol. Hence, this petitioner pursuant to Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court.2
On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which was later raffled off to
Branch 46. She impleaded the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as respondent and prayed for the following
reliefs before the lower court:

WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that after proper proceedings, judgment
be rendered, as follows:

(a) declaring as valid and subsisting the marriage between petitioner Edelina T. Ando and her husband
Masatomi Y. Ando until otherwise declared by a competent court;

(b) declaring petitioner entitled to the issuance of a Philippine Passport under the name "Edelina Ando y
Tungol"; and

(c) directing the Department ofForeign Affairs to honor petitioners marriage to her husband Masatomi Y.
Ando and to issue a Philippine Passport to petitioner under the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol".

Petitioner prays for such other just and equitable reliefs. 3

On 15 November 2010, in an Order dismissing the Petition for want of cause and action, as well as jurisdiction, the
RTC held thus:

Records of the case would reveal that prior to petitioners marriage to Masatomi Y. Ando, herein petitioner was
married to Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in Candaba, Pampanga, on September 16, 2001, and that
though a divorce was obtained and granted in Japan, with respect to the their (sic) marriage, there is no showing that
petitioner herein complied with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code that is obtaining a judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of absolute divorce in our country.

It is therefore evident, under the foregoing circumstances, that herein petitioner does not have any causeof action
and/or is entitled to the reliefs prayed for under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. In the same vein, though there is other
adequate remedy available to the petitioner, such remedy is however beyond the authority and jurisdiction of this
court to act upon and grant, as it isonly the family court which is vested with such authority and jurisdiction. 4

On 3 December 2010, petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 15 November 2010.
In anOrder dated 14 December 2010, the RTC granted the motion in this wise:

WHEREFORE, considering that the allegations and reliefs prayed for by the petitioner in her petition and the instant
Motion for Reconsideration falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Family Court of this jurisdiction and for the
interest ofsubstantial justice, the Order of the Court dated November 15, 2010 is hereby reconsidered.

Let the record of this case be therefore referred back to the Office of the Clerk of Court for proper endorsement to
the Family Court of this jurisdiction for appropriateaction and/or disposition. 5 Thereafter, the case was raffled to
Branch 45 of the RTC. On 14 January 2011, the trial court dismissed the Petition anew on the ground that petitioner
had no cause of action. The Order reads thus:

The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to be declared as valid is already her second marriage, a
bigamous marriage under Article 35(4) of the Family Codeconsidering that the first one, though allegedly
terminated by virtue of the divorce obtained by Kobayashi, was never recognized by a Philippine court, hence,
petitioner is considered as still married to Kobayashi. Accordingly, the second marriage with Ando cannot be
honored and considered asvalid at this time.

Petitioners allegation of Sec. 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is misplaced. The fact that no judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Ando was rendered does not make the same valid because such declaration under
Article 40 ofthe Family Code is applicable onlyin case of re-marriage. More importantly, the absence of a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage is not even a requisite to make a marriage valid.

In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of this case is imperative.6

On 1 February 2011,petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 14 January 2011. The
motion was denied by the RTC in open court on 8 February2011, considering that neither the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) nor respondent was furnished with copies of the motion.

On 24 March 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, raising the sole issue of whether or not the RTC
erred in ruling that she had no cause of action.

Petitioner argues that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, it is solely the wife or the husband who can file a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage. Thus, as the state is not even allowed to filea direct petition for
the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage,with even more reason can it not collaterally attack the
validity of a marriage, as in a petition for declaratory relief. Further, petitioner alleges that under the law, a marriage
even one that is void or voidable shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

Petitioner also argues that assuming a court judgment recognizing a judicial decree of divorce is required under
Article 13 of the Family Code, noncompliance therewith is a mere irregularity in the issuance of a marriage license.
Any irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage, such as with respect to the marriage license, shall notaffect the
legality of the marriage. Petitioner further claims that all the requisites for a petition for declaratory relief have been
complied with.

With respect to the failure to furnish a copy of the Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration to the OSG and the DFA,
petitioner avers that at the time of the filing, the RTC had yet to issue a summons to respondent; thus, it had yet to
acquire jurisdiction over them.

Thereafter, the DFA, through the OSG, filed a Comment on the Petition. The latter raised the following arguments:
(1) the Petition was improperly verified, as the juratin the Verification thereof only stated that the affiant had
exhibited "her currentand valid proof of identity," which proof was not properly indicated, however; (2) prior
judicial recognition by a Philippine court of a divorce decree obtained by the alien spouse is required before a
Filipino spouse can remarry and be entitled to the legal effects of remarriage; (3) petitioner failed to show that she
had first exhausted all available administrative remedies, such as appealing to the Secretary of the DFA under
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8239, or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, before resorting to the special civil action of
declaratory relief; and (4) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC was a mere scrap of paper and did
not toll the running of the period to appeal. Hence, the RTC Order dated 14 January 2011 is now final.

On 29 November 2011, petitioner filed her Reply to the Comment, addressing the issues raised therein.

THE COURTS RULING

The Court finds the Petition to be without merit.

First, with respect to her prayer tocompel the DFA to issue her passport, petitioner incorrectly filed a petition for
declaratory relief before the RTC. She should have first appealed before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her
ultimate entreaty was toquestion the DFAs refusal to issue a passport to her under her second husbands name.

Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which was adopted on 25 February 1997, the
following are the additional documentary requirements before a married woman may obtain a passport under the
name of her spouse:

SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed women shall be made inaccordance with
the following provisions:

a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt the surname of her husband pursuant to
Art. 370 of Republic Act No. 386, she must present the original or certifiedtrue copy of her marriage
contract, and one photocopy thereof.

In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in the Philippines to a foreigner, shall be required to
present a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counselling Seminar conducted by the CFO when
applying for a passport for the first time.
 b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified true copy of her annotated
Marriage Contract or Certificate of Registration and the Court Order effecting the annulment.

c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she must present a certified true copy of the
Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post which has jurisdiction over
the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the
Philippines.

When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree or a certified
true copy of the Certificate of Divorce from the Shariah Court or the OCRG. d) In the event that marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband, the applicant must present the original or certified true copy of the Death
Certificate of the husband or the Declaration of Presumptive Death by a Civil or Shariah Court, in which case the
applicant may choose to continue to use her husbands surname or resume the use of her maiden surname. From the
above provisions, it is clear that for petitioner to obtain a copy of her passport under her married name, all she
needed to present were the following: (1) the original or certified true copyof her marriage contract and one
photocopy thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if applicable; and (3) a
certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post that has
jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission
in the Philippines.

In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a Philippine passport under her second
husbands name.1wphi1 Should her application for a passport be denied, the remedies available to her are provided
in Section 9 of R.A. 8239, which reads thus:

Sec. 9. Appeal. Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the application of this Act of the implementing
rules and regulations issued by the Secretary shall have the right to appeal to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs from
whose decision judicial review may be had to the Courts in due course.

The IRR further provides in detail:

ARTICLE 10
Appeal

In the event that an application for a passport is denied, or an existing one cancelled or restricted, the applicant or
holder thereof shall have the right to appeal in writing to the Secretary within fifteen (15) days from notice of denial,
cancellation or restriction.

Clearly, she should have filed anappeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the event of the denial of her application
for a passport, after having complied with the provisions of R.A. 8239. Petitioners argument that her application
"cannot be said to havebeen either denied, cancelled or restricted by [the DFA ], so as to make her an aggrieved
party entitled to appeal",7 as instead she "was merely told"8 that her passport cannot be issued, does not persuade.
The law provides a direct recourse for petitioner in the event of the denial of her application.

Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed,
instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband.

In Garcia v. Recio,9 we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like
any other fact.10

While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court actually constitutes a
petition for declaratory relief,11 we are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there
appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the national law of her first husband,
Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under that national law. 12 Hence, any declaration as to the
validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and
the national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's recourse to the proper remedies
available.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who
created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No.
42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its
decision are as follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros
Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to
enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on
one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them
during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first
week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle,
his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio
City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the
defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair
located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988
until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
[S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
 Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist
at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of
her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her,
the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was
given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of
his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain
his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he
loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable;
and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it
can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was
that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to
have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and
these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2)
that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is
still a chance to overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza,
Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his
Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"),
and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and
he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection
which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft
erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated." 2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the
plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of
 this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties
without making any findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of
proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-
coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner;
that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them;
that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in
the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment
of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment
on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged
in the complaint shall always be proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment
of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence
was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on
May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that
no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment
(Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that
there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have
never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant
portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial
lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The
issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation
was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it
appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this
Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
112019, January 4, 1995). 4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and
the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as
error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an
in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders"
because there might have been other reasons, i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts,
why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a
short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner
and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never
been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e.,
even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason
for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is
ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did.
At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his
wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but
perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar,
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same
 bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having
asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil
Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that
defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted
by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her
private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her
life in order and put to rest her marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and
who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless
situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the
basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless
it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not
have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared feeling
which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at
a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not
for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29,
1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO, G.R. No. 184063

Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

- versus - NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and PATRICIO E. Promulgated:

YAMBAO,

Respondents.
January 24, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
 Before this Court is yet another tale of marital woe.

Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao (petitioner) is assailing the Decision[1] dated April 16, 2008 and the
Resolution[2] dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262. The CA affirmed the
decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which denied petitioners Petition[4] for the annulment
of her marriage to respondent Patricio E. Yambao (respondent) on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at the Philamlife Church in Quezon
[5]
City. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage, petitioner filed a Petition[6] before the RTC,Makati City,
praying that the marriage be declared null and void by reason of respondents psychological incapacity, pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.[7]

In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her and respondents married
life had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latters inability to comply with the essential
obligations of married life.[8]

Petitioner averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the only one who earned a living
and took care of the children. Respondent, she alleged, did nothing but eat and sleep all day, and spend time with
friends. When respondent would find a job, he would not be able to stay in it for long. Likewise, respondent went
into several business ventures, which all failed. In addition, respondent loved to gamble and would gamble away
whatever money would come his way.

Petitioner also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not even help to change their
diapers or feed them, even while petitioner was recovering from her caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that
he knew nothing about children.[9] Later, respondent became insecure and jealous and would get mad every time he
would see petitioner talking to other people, even to her relatives. When respondent started threatening to kill
petitioner, she decided to leave the conjugal abode and live separately from him. [10] She then consulted a psychiatrist
who concluded that respondent was indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.[11]
 In his Answer, respondent denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a
decent job, but was always unable to because of his old age and lack of qualifications. He also claimed that he did
not stay long in the jobs he had because the same could not support the needs of his family, and yielded benefits that
were not commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He had ventured into small businesses but they failed due to
various economic crises. Respondent further claimed that he was not, in fact, contented with living with petitioners
relatives since his every move was being watched with eagle eyes. [12]

Respondent denied that he gambled, positing that since he had no income, he would not have the funds for
such activity. He alleged that even without a steady source of income, he still shared in the payment of the
amortization of their house in BF Homes, Paraaque City.

As to the care of their children, respondent countered that no fault should be attributed to him because that
is the duty of the household help.[13]

Respondent also denied that he threatened to kill petitioner, considering that there was never any evidence
that he had ever harmed or inflicted physical injury on petitioner to justify the latter having a nervous breakdown. [14]

He further alleged that he never consulted any psychiatrist, and denied that he was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.[15]

On February 9, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision[16] dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The RTC
held that petitioners evidence failed to support her argument that respondent was totally unaware of and
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations such that the marriage was void from the beginning. The court said
that, even as petitioner claimed to be unhappy in the marriage, it is incontrovertible that the union lasted for over
thirty years and the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without suffering any major parenting
problems. The court also noted that respondent was faithful to petitioner and never physically abused her. Likewise,
when the parties lived with petitioners parents, respondent got along well enough with her family. [17]
 The RTC recognized that respondent did indeed have many faults, such as his indolence and utter
irresponsibility. However, the RTC said, respondents failure to find decent work was due to his not having obtained
a college degree and his lack of other qualifications. Likewise, respondents failure in business could not be entirely
attributed to him, since petitioner was a business partner in some of these ventures. [18]

The RTC also rejected the supposed negative effect of respondents Dependent Personality Disorder. The
RTC said that, although the evidence tended to show that respondent would unduly rely upon petitioner to earn a
living for the family, there was no evidence to show that the latter resented such imposition or suffered with the
additional financial burdens passed to her by her husband. On the contrary, the RTC averred that, despite a
supposedly horrible married life, petitioner was able to rise in the ranks in her company and buy properties with
hardly any help from respondent.[19]

The RTC concluded that while respondent might have been deficient in providing financial support, his
presence, companionship, and love allowed petitioner to accomplish many things. Thus, respondent could be relied
on for love, fidelity, and moral support, which are obligations expected of a spouse under Article 68 of the Family
Code.[20]

Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioners claim that she suffered through respondents overbearing jealousy. It
found that respondent only became jealous when he thought that petitioner was cheating on him. The RTC
determined that jealousy was not a character trait that contributed to respondents psychological dysfunction; much
less did it amount to psychological or mental torture on petitioner. [21] Thus, the RTC concluded that the parties might
have indeed entered into a bad marriage, but this did not in itself prove that the marriage did not exist, given the 30
years they remained together through the various ups and downs of their volatile relationship. [22]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on May 21, 2007. [23] Petitioner subsequently filed a
Notice of Appeal,[24] which was given due course by the RTC in an Order dated June 8, 2007. [25]She then appealed
to the CA.

In a Decision[26] dated April 16, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA held that petitioner
failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. It pointed out that respondent exerted efforts to find a source of income to support his family. However,
his failure to find a suitable job and the failure of his business ventures were not mental but physical defects and,
hence, could not be considered psychological incapacity as contemplated under the law.

The CA also found that petitioners claims that she lived in misery during the marriage and that respondent
failed to keep his promises to her were not duly established. The CA held that the fact that the parties lived together
for 35 years and raised three children well, and the fact that respondent never physically abused petitioner belied the
formers psychological incapacity. The CA also held that respondents refusal to care for the children was not
psychological incapacity but merely constituted refusal to perform the task, which is not equivalent to an incapacity
or inability.[27]

The appellate court also rejected petitioners allegation of respondents unbearable jealousy. It said that the
same must be shown as a manifestation of a disordered personality which would make respondent completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. [28] The CA averred that a jealous attitude simply
evinced respondents love for his wife, whom he could not bear to lose to another man. Meanwhile, the CA construed
the purported threats to kill petitioner as emotional immaturity and not psychological incapacity.[29]

Lastly, the CA found the report of expert witness Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino) to be
unsupported by sufficient evidence since the findings therein were not corroborated by any other witness. Moreover,
the CA said, neither the report nor petitioners testimony established that respondents psychological condition was
grave enough to bring about the inability of the latter to assume the essential obligations of marriage, so that the
same was medically permanent or incurable. [30]

Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated August 4, 2008. [31]

Petitioner is now before this Court in a last ditch effort to gain freedom from her marriage to respondent. In
her petition for review, petitioner submits the following assignment of errors:

I
 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW THAT RESPONDENT WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

RESPONDENT WAS MERELY REFUSING TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE AND NOT DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITATED OR UNABLE

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

RESPONDENTS UNBEARABLE JEALOUSY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A CHARACTER
TRAIT CONTRIBUTING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE

WAS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
CONDITION OF RESPONDENT WAS GRAVE ENOUGH, INCURABLE AND HAD NO
ANTECEDENCE (sic)[32]

Petitioner argues that respondents Dependent Personality Disorder was sufficiently established by her
testimony and that of her sister, which testimonies were both credible considering that they have personal
knowledge of the circumstances prior to and during the parties marriage. On the other hand, respondents evidence
consisted merely of his sole testimony, which were self-serving and full of inconsistencies.[33] Petitioner points out
that what the CA characterized as respondents efforts in finding jobs were merely the result of short-lived bursts of
industry, failing to note that the jobs were few and very far between. [34] The rest of the time, respondent did nothing
but eat, sleep, and party with his friends. [35] Petitioner also alleges that respondent was given the opportunity to
finish his studies, first by his parents, and then by petitioner herself, but he never took up these offers. [36]

Petitioner also highlighted respondents failure to earn his keep, participate in household chores, or take care
of their children. She argues that respondent had the obligation to help and contribute to all the needs of the family,
whether the same be in the form of material or physical support.[37]

Petitioner also refutes the CAs conclusion that respondent was merely refusing to attend to his familys
needs. She insists that respondents inability is due to a psychological affliction, i.e., Dependent Personality Disorder,
as attested to by the expert witness she presented during trial. [38] Part of this same disorder, according to petitioner, is
respondents jealous tendencies, which the CA belittled and attributed to emotional immaturity. [39]

Finally, petitioner argues against the CAs finding that respondents laziness and dependence could not be
characterized as inability but just plain refusal. Petitioner contends that she has complied with the guidelines laid
down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. She further contends that the framers of the Family
Code never intended to give such a suppressed definition of psychological incapacity, and, in fact, declared that a
restrictive definition would limit the applicability of the provision. [40] Moreover, she asserts that she has proven that
respondents unbearable jealousy and Dependent Personality Disorder manifested themselves even before the
marriage of the parties, although not in the same degree as when they were already married. [41]

The petition has no merit and, perforce, must be denied.

Article 36 of the Family Code states:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
 Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case for declaration of nullity under
the foregoing provision must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations,
but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.[42] Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards,
taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and
experience.[43]

While the Court has not abandoned the standard set in Molina,[44] the Court has reiterated the tenet that the
factual milieu of each case must be treated as distinct and, as such, each case must be decided based on its own set
of facts.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[45] the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. These guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically
identified.[46] What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological
condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.[47]

Hence, the issue in this case can be summed up, thus: Does the totality of petitioners evidence establish
respondents psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage?

The Court holds that it does not.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.[48] Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically
incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. [49] It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. [50]
 In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so severe
that he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary, respondents efforts, though few and
far between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with
much success. Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other
external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his family,
even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity.

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.[51] This
incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this
inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of
life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. [52] It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness.[53]

That respondent, according to petitioner, lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility[54] does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to help care for the
children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional
turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount to a psychological abnormality.

Moreover, even assuming that respondents faults amount to psychological incapacity, it has not been established that
the same existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

In his psychological report, [55] Dr. Tolentino merely said, [b]ecause ones personality or character is formed
early in life, it has a clear ANTECEDENT and it has an enduring pattern of inner experience that deviates from the
expectations of the individuals culture,[56] without explaining this antecedent. Even petitioner, in her allegations,
never explained how the alleged psychological incapacity manifested itself prior to or at the time of the celebration
of their marriage.
Likewise militating against petitioners cause is the finding of the trial court, and the same was affirmed by the CA,
that respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused petitioner or their children. In fact, considering that
the children lived with both parents, it is safe to assume that both made an impact in the childrens upbringing. And
still, as found by the RTC and the CA, the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without any major
parenting problems.[57] Such fact could hardly support a proposition that the parties marriage is a nullity.

Respondent may not have turned out to be the ideal husband, or may have failed to meet petitioners
exacting standards. Yet this Court finds it impossible to believe that, as petitioner alleges, there was nothing but
heartache and strife in their over 35 years (prior to filing the petition for declaration of nullity) of marriage.

To be sure, respondent, perhaps with a little more effort on his part, could have been more helpful and
could have made life that much easier for his wife. The fact that he did not, however, does not mean that he is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge his marital obligations, as to give the Court a reason to declare the
marriage null and void.

Certainly, the marriage was beset by difficulties, or as petitioner puts it, marred by bickerings, quarrels, and
recrimination. It is a fact, however, that all marriages suffer through the same trials at one point or another, with
some going through more rough patches than others. The Court concedes that petitioner and respondents marriage,
as characterized by the former, may indeed be problematic, even tumultuous. However, that they had gone through
35 years together as husband and wife is an indication that the parties can, should they choose to do so, work
through their problems.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 16,
2008 and the Resolution dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the
Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's
effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this
ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case
of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in
specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals,
the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the
present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1of the
Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son,
Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends
on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in
February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which
their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to
live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had
since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to
have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together
as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1)
Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2)
Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run
the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on
July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie
Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-
Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents
marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-
trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner
was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and
made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to
establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings
"that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities."
Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It
concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range

of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she
regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as
his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage.
If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the
spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings
and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage
of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of
is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your

findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically
unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove
that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's
part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor
indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the
faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-
visexisting law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty
experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae,
namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of
the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for
their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they
followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation
of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling
becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

 FIRST DIVISION

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, G.R. No. 162368

Petitioner,

Present:

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),

- versus - Ynares-Santiago,

Austria-Martinez,

Callejo, Sr., and

Chico-Nazario, JJ.

BRIX FERRARIS,

Respondent. Promulgated:

July 17, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the

Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of

the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to

sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.
 On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a

Decision[1] denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial

court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the

Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioners motion for

reconsideration was denied in an Order[2] dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there was no

evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the

obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed [3] in toto the judgment of the trial court. It

held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from

psychological incapacity or that his defects were incurable and already present at the inception of the

marriage.[4] The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayans testimony failed to establish the substance of

respondents psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the

respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or

supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondents character that effectively

incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations. [5]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied[6] for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for

review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for failure of

petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error.

Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.[7] The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to

file comment[8] but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file

comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioners

motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.

 After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny

petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of

marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. [9] Such factual issue,

however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh

all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. [10] It is a well-established

principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this

Court,[11] save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go

beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain

relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a

misappreciation of facts,[12] which are unavailing in the instant case.

The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. [13] As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [14] It is
for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must
be fully explained,[15] which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.

As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:

Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases
is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondents psychological
condition. Here, appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the
evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
 psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at
the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.

Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioners evidence showed that respondents
alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some
deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couples
relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was
not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with
her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioners own reckoning, respondent was a
responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner started doubting
respondents fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that
respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital
obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioners lack of trust in him and her constant
naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper
and jealousy. x x x.

xxxx

At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent
has a mixed personality disorder called schizoid, and why he is the dependent and avoidant
type. In fact, Dr. Dayans statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is
dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of
theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayans information that respondent had extramarital affairs was
supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondents alleged
psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayans answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied
that such disorder can be part of his family upbringing x x x. She stated that there was a history of
respondents parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the supposed
problematic history of respondents parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly
demonstrate that there was really a natal or supervening disabling factor on the part of respondent,
or an adverse integral element in respondents character that effectively incapacitated him from
accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner
likewise failed to prove that respondents supposed psychological or mental malady existed even
before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that
upon her devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum. [16]

We find respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the leaving-the-house attitude whenever they

quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of

support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some

debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of

marriage.
 In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[17] where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends
than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was
dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more of
a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing
of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.

Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[18] that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity.

While petitioners marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliat ion, the
remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An
unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. [19] No less than the Constitution recognizes the
sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legallyinviolable and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.[20]

Thus, in determining the import of psychological incapacity under Article 36, it must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, [21] 37,[22] 38,[23] and 41[24] that would likewise,
but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45[25] that would make the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.[26] Article 36 should
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves.[27] Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. [28]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June

9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the

Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, G.R. No. 161793

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, CHICO-NAZARIO,

Respondent, NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.

REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Oppositor. Promulgated:

February 13, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has
become a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it
having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological
incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid of
any definition.

For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
August 5, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the
January 19, 2004 Resolution[2] denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to
Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was
in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman. [3]

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain
degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena
asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money
and she, purchasing the boat ticket.[4]

However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily
sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back toManila. Rowena
proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles
place.[5]
 On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and
she, 20.[6] The two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not
allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave
Rowena.[7] At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at
their parents home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get
his inheritance so that they could live on their own.Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad,
told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home. [8]

After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family
then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him. [9]

In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with
his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.[10]

After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters
psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.[11]

As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties. [12] In the
meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the
OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings. [13]

On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there
was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits. [14]

The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and
made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born
Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994
and is currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-
TE. He presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now
residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.

Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his
parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and
patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally
considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting
people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay
long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or
a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he only
loves to read the Bible and hear its message.

Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient
wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments
with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.

In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation
of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he
is having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family
and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted
to petitioner that they should elope and live together.Petitioner hesitated because he is not
prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow
manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought
the idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly
agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a
friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an
apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was suggested by
respondent that they should go back and seek help from petitioners parents. When the parties
arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent
decided to go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their
home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted
to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent
confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even
threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call
by phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to
do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his
family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this
point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,]
agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought the parties to
Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract
before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many
guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission
their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that
if he should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[ ]and relatives[]
houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his
parents about his predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military
escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with
respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after
the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home
of petitioners parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that
she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away from his
parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he would
inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing
[that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When respondent refused
to live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop
harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also
does not have a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not
have any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that
they should live separate lives.

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and
weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their
young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still
egocentrically involved with herself.

TESTS ADMINISTERED:

Revised Beta Examination

Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test

Draw A Person Test

Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test

Sachs Sentence Completion Test

MMPI

TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:

 Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive
upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to
commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is
absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social
interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that
he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of
respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and
timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.

ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-

rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of
wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with
petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her
dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-
willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out
of the relationship.

REMARKS:

Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself
before submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly
a serious institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and
respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for
granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of
weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is
extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in
her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable
presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only
manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a
big mistake for them to take.[15]

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision[16] declaring the marriage of the parties null and
void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.[17] The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal. [18]

On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision[19] in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867,
reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling. [20] It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of
respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information
provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina[21] needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.[22] The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of the OSG
briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the
petition.[23] The CA later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004
Resolution.[24]

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15,
2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[25]

In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondents psychological
incapacity, but rather due to both parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no
requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the
actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the
pleadings, the trial court orders and notices. [27]

For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum, [28] that the annulment petition filed before the RTC
contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with.The root cause of the
psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified.
The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And
the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements
in Molina[29] were not satisfied.[30]

The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage
between the parties is null and void.[31]

I.
 We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence
interpreting it.

Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code,
Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her
separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[33]

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add
some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in
behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family
Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of
including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book
I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to
prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault
divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de
facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds:
(a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a
judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would
have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a
proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice
Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and

Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the
draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of
marriage as
 a special contract of permanent partnership between a
man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by law.

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional

concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable,
indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded,
and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our
citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees
in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead,
opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would
not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the
nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized
by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare
a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage.
Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in
the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the
two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New
Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages
with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional
kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil
Code, to wit:

(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at

the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use
of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

as well as the following implementing provisions:

Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be

invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision
of Article 34.
 Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.

xxxxxxxxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be
dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as
well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact,
during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another
meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was
informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on
the ground of lack of due discretion for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds
for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some
personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a
spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with
her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they
have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their
sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.[34]

In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage
or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following
revised provision even before the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage
and to mentally incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases refer to defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation. There being a defect in consent, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . .
Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage.

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity
is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term psychological or mental impotence,
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a
weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or
mental incapacity to discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase
and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question
of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more
problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes
manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special cases and special situations,
hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or
annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
 Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage,
the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: 3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the
Family Code: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of
marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a
marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first
place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal
hearing.

Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for
nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former
being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from
the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages
or enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the
Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Codeand classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages
void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not
provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: Canon #1081 required persons to be capable according to law in
 order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the
major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of
due competence. Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid
consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence
means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made
during the wedding ceremony.

Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a
broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.
The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at
the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly
after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was
paved for what came after 1970.Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.[36]

Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so
doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee
desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon
Law.[37] The law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application. [38]

Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible cases
of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as expressed by Article 68[40] of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most
serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.[41] This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:

3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made
between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of
discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a
rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell
a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter
such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a
different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire
unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the
canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of giving consent because
it has been established a priori that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know
well the object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the
object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its
formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological
act, however, is directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes
this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with positing the
object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not
capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.

Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic
incapacity with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an
increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume
the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual
anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this
rubric.

The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case
imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect,
discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they arise
from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual
condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free
human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies
of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either
with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself
[sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether
possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an
adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can
choose marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can assume those
responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In this latter
hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the
incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.

Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial
steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the
conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at
the moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable
conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary
freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible
impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true
that the intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem
entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which one
who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what
marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason
that he cannot posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal
way and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be
free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot
deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.

3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more
clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the
inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the
other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they
are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free
and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and
free consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne,
another rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act
of positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with
nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and
understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the delivering of the
goods.

3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal
jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that
the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of
consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent
judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decisioncoram
Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only
with regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in
facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the
conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the
obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.

Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this
ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific
incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact
the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to
distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by
C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid
matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the
essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology:
nemo ad impossibile tenetur.

xxxx

3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are
not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases
where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even
know how to begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a
relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of
beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of
matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of
himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum
conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other
party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting
marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the
economic good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum
conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained and
individual description.

A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns
a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the
respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of
marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of his constitutional immorality.

Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of
responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
moment of execution of decision.And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it
means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent
consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to
assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party
to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and
especially atmatrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated
the incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic
constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his
apathy as regards the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are
invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to
recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable
expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal
exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to achieve ones ends.

Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of
them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do
not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or
even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is
impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage
include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.

Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality
was understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because
of the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its
obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to
assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity,
homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said
to be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object
of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium
totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex
phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except
in very few exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the
 spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a
grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical,
volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the
responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial
contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of
the object of consent.

3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity
specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the
clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference
to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic
constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is
incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in
this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic
constitution which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in
ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The
difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the development of the
habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law insists
that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom. [42]

Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a
party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment
in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,[43] ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate
courts.[44]

Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the
pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,[45] explained that when private respondent testified under oath
before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a
set of strict standards in Molina,[46] thus:
 From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as
legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I
do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage,
like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
 words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and apart from each othershall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[47]

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the ponencia of
then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result and another
threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice
Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.[48]

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,[49] the Court has applied the aforesaid standards,
without too much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one
in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the
deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as
the most liberal divorce procedure in the world. [50] The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its
toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which,
like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what
was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.[51]

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are
ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public
prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. [52] The Court should rather
be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous
rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to
allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of
a sociopathic personality anomaly.[53] Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first
place, as the same is void from the very beginning. [54] To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article
36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the
Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of
psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have
become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse
of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare
that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,[55] there is need to emphasize other perspectives
as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of
being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis,
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

II.

We now examine the instant case.

The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in
March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony
found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of
dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. [56]
 By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.[57]

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert

became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and
after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to
the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide
the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could
necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations
of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial
consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, not
only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is
not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but
is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or
psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality;
as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as
a distinct person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the obligations of marriage are
rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining
of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal
sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but
in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
 Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature
marital relationship:

The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital

commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner;
(2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion

even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly
giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following:
(1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense
of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses
consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits
very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting

a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability
to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or
carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is
that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the
family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was entered into. [58]

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish
the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos[60] asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. [61] Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.[62] Parenthetically, the Court, at this
point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed
psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will
assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination
of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.

Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced
the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of
Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows

A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a persons recent and
long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated
episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the
individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal
functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue
through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more
than one personality disorder at a time.

The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety
of character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as
overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their
behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as
difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other
individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be
lonely, isolated or dependent.Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem
and dissatisfaction with life.
 Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of
causes of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories
and brain wave activity.

Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to
certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character
types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to
derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional
aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was
thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate relationships. However, later
researchers have found little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of
development lead to specific personality patterns.

Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in
the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance
of other personality disorders.Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal
personality may be related to genetic factors.

Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have

found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated
with measures of aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has
been associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth
pursuit eye movement.

Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in

antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study
of borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared
with 19 percent in a control group.

Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are
categorized into three major clusters:

Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.

Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.

Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality

disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.

The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not otherwise specified, that can
be used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any
of the specific personality disorders.
 Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and
thus therapy may be long-term.[64]

Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner

A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such

individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism
and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others
through a quest for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this
disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others,
may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree
with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing
things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other
people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.[65]and antisocial personality disorder described, as follow

Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional

behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent
physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to
blame others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of
remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals
who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the
rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.

During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The
term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.

According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four dramatic
personality disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic. [66]

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive
the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and
void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-
hand view of the witnesses deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as
where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. [67] As clearly shown in this case,
petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no
sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her
disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to
blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society. [68] Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her
threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage
which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5,
2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.