G.R. No. 204894 March 10, 2014 who was armed with a .38 caliber revolver.
as armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The police found
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ y
FABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS y DELANTAR, and
ROGER JALANDONI y ARI, Appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Pias
charged appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas), Arnold
Gomez y Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando Santos y Delantar
(Santos), and Roger Jalandoni y Ari (Jalandoni) with murder
before the Las Pifias Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal
Case 06-0854.1
PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (P02 Gregorio) testified that at
around 10:30 in the evening of August 29, 2006, he and P02
Francisco Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling the
vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they
spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the
Aguila Auto Glass shop near the intersection of BF Almanza
and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The officers approached the taxi
and asked the driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for his
documents. The latter complied but, having entertained doubts
regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they asked
him to come with them to the police station in their mobile car
for further questioning.2
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and
left his taxi behind. On reaching the 7-11 convenience store on
the Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they stopped and PO2
Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he
approached the stores door, however, he came upon two
suspected robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan
shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to
escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his
death.
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at
an armed man whom he saw running towards Pilar Village. He
saw another man, who came from the Jollibbee outlet, run
towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2
Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men were able to take
a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an
ambulance. On returning to his mobile car, he realized that
accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with them had fled.
P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of Investigation
Division of the Las Pias Police, testified that he and PO2
Teoson Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito) immediately responded to
PO2 Gregorios urgent call. Suspecting that accused Enojas,
the taxi driver who fled, was involved in the attempted robbery,
they searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone
that Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed
PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its incoming
messages.3
The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2
Pangilinan had killed was someone named Reynaldo Mendoza
1|Page-JEC
spent 9 mm and M-16 rifle shells at the crime scene. Follow-up
operations at nearby provinces resulted in finding the dead
body of one of the suspects, Alex Angeles, at the Metro South
Medical Center along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.4
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the
messages in accused Enojas mobile phone and, posing as
Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police then
conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest
of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police
were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The
prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text
messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused.5
The victims father, Ricardo Pangilinan, testified that his son
was at the time of his death 28 years old, unmarried, and was
receiving police pay of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 per month.
Ricardo spent P99,999 for burial expense, P16,000.00 for the
interment services, and P50,000.00 for purchase of the
cemetery lot.6
Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any
evidence or testify in the case,7 the accused opted to instead
file a trial memorandum on March 10, 2008 for their defense.
They pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since
they were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the
text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly
identified.
On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment, 8 finding all the
accused guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation
and use of armed men with the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. It thus sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the
possibility of parole and to indemnify the heirs of PO2
Pangilinan with P165,999.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00
as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and P2,080,000.00 as compensation for loss of earning
capacity.
Upon review in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03377, on June 14, 2012 the
Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed in
toto the conviction of the accused.9 The CA, however, found
the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution
failed to prove that the several accused planned the crime
before committing it. The accused appealed from the CA to this
Court.10
The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present
direct evidence that the accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or
Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead. 11 This
may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by
circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is
more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.12
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution
presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all the
accused. Thus:
 1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas
as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously parked in
front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers were
bringing him with them to the police station because
of the questionable documents he showed upon
query. Subsequent inspection of the taxicab yielded
Enojas mobile phone that contained messages which
led to the entrapment and capture of the other
accused who were also taxicab drivers.
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than
remain in the cab to go to the police station where he
was about to be taken for questioning, tending to
show that he had something to hide. He certainly did
not go to the police afterwards to clear up the matter
and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez
as one of the men he saw running away from the
scene of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one of
those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout;
the messages also referred to "Kua Justin" as the one
who was hit in such shootout and later died in a
hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked
the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police
investigators succeeded in entrapping accused
Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all
named in the text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered
from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made
references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding
of "Kua Justin," one of the gunmen, and his
subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the
accused were members of an organized group of
taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in
possession of mobile phones with call numbers that
corresponded to the senders of the messages
received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas
left in his taxicab.13
The Court must, however, disagree with the CAs ruling that
the aggravating circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b)
use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2
Pangilinan to murder. In "aid of armed men," the men act as
accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission
of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused,
otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-
conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand,
is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among the
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code as qualifying a homicide to murder. 14Consequently, the
accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide,
aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance
alleged in the information.
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As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted
them in conformity with the Courts earlier Resolution applying
the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.15 Text
messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of
them.16 Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas,
exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to
identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages
sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3
Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was
competent to testify on them.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid
warrant of arrest.1wphi1 But, assuming that this was so, it
cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged
but for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from
them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an
unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a
crime had been committedthe killing of PO2 Pangilinanand
the investigating police officers had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had
committed it.17 The text messages to and from the mobile
phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong
leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed,
the police caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.
The award of damages by the courts below has to be modified
to conform to current jurisprudence.18
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of Appeals
Decision of June 14, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03377. The
Court instead FINDS accused-appellants Noel Enojas y
Hingpit, Arnold Gomez y Fabregas, Fernando Santos y
Delantar, and Roger Jalandoni y Ari GUILTY of the lesser
crime of HOMICIDE with the special aggravating circumstance
of use of unlicensed firearms. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the Court SENTENCES each of them to 12
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The Court also MODIFIES the award
of exemplary damages by increasing it to P30,000.00, with an
additional P50,000.00 for civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 170491 April 4, 2007
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC
of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and
WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00848, dated 9
November 2005, which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari
filed by the National Power Corporation seeking to set aside
the Order2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu,
Branch 19 dated 16 November 2004, denying admission and
excluding from the records plaintiffs (herein petitioner) Exhibits
"A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J", and its sub-
markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-
markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-
markings, "R" and "S" and its sub-markings.
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry
owned and operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping,
Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioners Power Barge
209 which was then moored at the Cebu International Port.
Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a
complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai
Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on petitioners
power barges.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint dated 8 July
1996 impleading herein private respondent Wallem Shipping,
Inc., as additional defendant, contending that the latter is a
ship agent of Bangpai Shipping Co. On 18 September 1996,
Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss which was
subsequently denied by public respondent Judge in an Order
dated 20 October 1998. Bangpai Shipping Co. likewise filed a
Motion to Dismiss which was also denied by public respondent
Judge in an Order issued on 24 January 2003.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case,
filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court on 2
February 2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with
the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private
respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc.
filed their respective objections to petitioners formal offer of
evidence.
On 16 November 2004, public respondent judge issued the
assailed order denying the admission and excluding from the
records petitioners Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-
markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its
sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-
markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its sub-
markings. According to the court a quo:
The Court finds merit in the objections raised and the motion to
strike out filed respectively by the defendants. The record
shows that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to
3|Page-JEC
present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the
documents it offered. It never produced the originals. The
plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies
by contending that "the photocopies offered are equivalent to
the original of the document" on the basis of the Electronic
Evidence (Comment to Defendant Wallem Philippines
Objections and Motion to Strike). But as rightly pointed out in
defendant Wallems Reply to the Comment of Plaintiff, the
Xerox copies do not constitute the electronic evidence defined
in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as
follows:
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
models of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed,
which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed
documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means
which accurately reflects the electronic data message or
electronic document. For the purpose of these Rules, the term
"electronic document" may be used interchangeably with
"electronic data message".
The information in those Xerox or photocopies was not
received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically.
Moreover, such electronic evidence must be authenticated
(Sections 1 and 2, Rule 5, Rules on Electronic Evidence),
which the plaintiff failed to do. Finally, the required Affidavit to
prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged
electronic evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Ibid) was not executed,
much less presented in evidence.
The Xerox or photocopies offered should, therefore, be
stricken off the record. Aside from their being not properly
identified by any competent witness, the loss of the principals
thereof was not established by any competent proof.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its
sub-markings, "I", "J", and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and
its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its
sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and "R" are hereby
DENIED admission and excluded from the records. However,
these excluded evidence should be attached to the records of
this case to enable the appellate court to pass upon them
should an appeal be taken from the decision on the merits to
be rendered upon the termination of the trial of this case.
Exhibits "S" and its sub-markings are also DENIED admission
for lack of proper identification since the witness who brought
these pictures expressly admitted that he was not present
when the photos were taken and had not knowledge when the
same where taken.3
Upon denial of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in an
Order dated 20 April 2005, petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
before the Court of Appeals maintaining that public respondent
Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in denying the admission of its Exhibits
"A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-
markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-
markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-
markings, "R", and "S" and its sub-markings.
On 9 November 2005, the appellate court issued a Decision
dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari, the pertinent
portions of which elucidate:
After a judicious scrutiny of the record of the case on hand,
together with the rules and jurisprudence which are applicable
in the premises, we have come up with a finding that the
petition for certiorari filed in this case is not meritorious.
It appears that there is no sufficient showing by the petitioner
that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the assailed orders in Civil Case No. CEB-18662. As
what our jurisprudence tells us, grave abuse of discretion is
meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
would be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction x x x.
In the case at bench, what has been shown to the contrary by
the totality of the record on hand is that the respondent judge
acted correctly and within the pale of his sound discretion in
issuing the assailed order, dated November 16, 2004, in Civil
Case No. CEB-18662.
Indeed, it appears that the pieces of petitioners documentary
evidence which were denied admission by the respondent
judge were not properly identified by any competent witness.
As pointed out by the respondent Bangpai Shipping Company
in its comment on the petition filed in this case which
reproduces some excerpts of the testimonies in the court a
quo of Atty. Marianito De Los Santos, Engr. Nestor Enriquez,
Jr. and Mr. Rodulfo I. Pagaling, the said witnesses did not have
personal knowledge of and participation in the preparation and
making of the pieces of documentary evidence denied
admission by respondent judge x x x. In other words, there was
lack of proper identification of said pieces of documentary
evidence. x x x.
Then another ground for denying admission of petitioners
Exhibits A, C, D, E, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, and S by the
respondent judge is that said pieces of documentary evidence
were merely photocopies of purported documents or papers.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the respondent judge acted
within the pale of his discretion when he denied admission of
said documentary evidence. Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court of the Philippines is very explicit in providing that,
when the subject of inquiry are the contents of documents, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original documents
themselves, except in certain cases specifically so enumerated
therein, and the petitioner has not shown that the non-
presentation or non-production of its original documentary
pieces of evidence falls under such exceptions. As aptly
pointed out by the respondent judge in the order issued by him
on November 16, 2004:
"x x x The record shows that the plaintiff (petitioner herein) has
been given every opportunity to present the originals of the
Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. It never
produced said originals."
So, the petitioner has only itself to blame for the respondent
judges denial of admission of its aforementioned documentary
evidence.
4|Page-JEC
Of course, the petitioner tries to contend that the photocopies
of documents offered by it are equivalent to the original
documents that it sought to offer in evidence, based on the
Rules on Electronic Evidence which were in force and effect
since August 1, 2001. However, such a contention is devoid of
merit. The pieces of documentary evidence offered by the
petitioner in Civil Case CEB-18662 which were denied
admission by the respondent judge do not actually constitute
as electronic evidence as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence. The informations therein were not received,
retrieved or produced electronically. The petitioner has not
adequately established that its documentary evidence were
electronic evidence. it has not properly authenticated such
evidence as electronic documents, assuming arguendo that
they are. Lastly, the petitioner has not properly established by
affidavit pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence
the admissibility and evidentiary weight of said documentary
evidence.
Thus, by any legal yardstick, it is manifest that the respondent
judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
admission of the aforementioned documentary evidence of
petitioner.
But even if it be granted just for the sake of argument that the
respondent judge committed an error in denying the
aforementioned documentary evidence of the petitioner, still
the petition for certiorari filed in this case must fail. Such error
would at most be only an error of law and not an error of
jurisdiction. In Lee vs. People, 393 SCRA 397, the Supreme
Court of the Philippines said that certiorari will not lie in case of
an error of law. x x x.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the petition filed in this
case and AFFIRMING the assailed orders issued by
respondent judge in Civil Case No. CEB-18662.4
Aggrieved by the aforequoted decision, petitioner filed the
instant petition.
The focal point of this entire controversy is petitioners
obstinate contention that the photocopies it offered as formal
evidence before the trial court are the functional equivalent of
their original based on its inimitable interpretation of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence.
Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial
court and the appellate court, the photocopies it presented as
documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence
based on its own premise that an "electronic document" as
defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is not limited to information that is received,
recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Rather,
petitioner maintains that an "electronic document" can also
refer to other modes of written expression that is produced
electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the sections
catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output, readable by sight or
other means".
We do not agree.
In order to shed light to the issue of whether or not the
photocopies are indeed electronic documents as contemplated
in Republic Act No. 8792 or the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, we shall enumerate the
following documents offered as evidence by the petitioner, to
wit:
1. Exhibit "A" is a photocopy of a letter manually
signed by a certain Jose C. Troyo, with "RECEIVED"
stamped thereon, together with a handwritten date;
2. Exhibit "C" is a photocopy of a list of estimated cost
of damages of petitioners power barges 207 and 209
prepared by Hopewell Mobile Power Systems
Corporation and manually signed by Messrs. Rex
Malaluan and Virgilio Asprer;
3. Exhibit "D" is a photocopy of a letter manually
signed by a certain Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with
"RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a
handwritten notation of the date it was received;
4. Exhibit "E" is a photocopy of a Standard Marine
Protest Form which was filled up and accomplished
by Rex Joel C. Malaluan in his own handwriting and
signed by him. Portions of the Jurat were handwritten,
and manually signed by the Notary Public;
5. Exhibit "H" is a photocopy of a letter manually
signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr. with
"RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a
handwritten notation of the date it was received;
6. Exhibit "I" is a photocopy of a computation of the
estimated energy loss allegedly suffered by petitioner
which was manually signed by Mr. Nestor G.
Enriquez, Jr.;
7. Exhibit "J" is a photocopy of a letter containing the
breakdown of the cost estimate, manually signed by
Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED"
stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation
of the date it was received, and other handwritten
notations;
8. Exhibit "K" is a photocopy of the Subpoena Duces
Tecum Ad Testificandum written using a manual
typewriter, signed manually by Atty. Ofelia Polo-De
Los Reyes, with a handwritten notation when it was
received by the party;
9. Exhibit "L" is a photocopy of a portion of the
electricity supply and operation and maintenance
agreement between petitioner and Hopewell,
containing handwritten notations and every page
containing three unidentified manually placed
signatures;
10. Exhibit "M" is a photocopy of the Notice of
Termination with attachments addressed to Rex Joel
C. Malaluan, manually signed by Jaime S. Patinio,
with a handwritten notation of the date it was
received. The sub-markings also contain manual
signatures and/or handwritten notations;
5|Page-JEC
11. Exhibit "N" is a photocopy of a letter of termination
with attachments addressed to VIrgilio Asprer and
manually signed by Jaime S. Patino. The sub-
markings contain manual signatures and/or
handwritten notations;
12. Exhibit "O" is the same photocopied document
marked as Annex C;
13. Exhibit "P" is a photocopy of an incident report
manually signed by Messrs. Malaluan and Bautista
and by the Notary Public, with other handwritten
notations;
14. Exhibit "Q" is a photocopy of a letter manually
signed by Virgilio Asprer and by a Notary Public,
together with other handwritten notations.
On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to
information or the representation of information, data, figures,
symbols or other models of written expression, described or
however represented, by which a right is established or an
obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and
affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. 5 It includes
digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight
or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document.6
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic
document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that
an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the
information contained therein, similar to any other document
which is presented in evidence as proof of its
contents.7 However, what differentiates an electronic document
from a paper-based document is the manner by which the
information is processed; clearly, the information contained in
an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies
submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents
therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly
signed the documents, may be recorded or produced
electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a persons
signature affixed manually be considered as information
electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of
petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced
through an electronic process, then these photocopies are
electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous,
interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered
photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is
consequential that the same may not be considered as the
functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in
denying admission and excluding from the records petitioners
Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and
its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its
sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-
markings, and "R". The trial court was correct in rejecting these
photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are
therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of
evidence. Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and
modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence rule
was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof
and the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of
the originals.8 But the modern justification for the rule has
expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that
writings occupy a central position in the law. 9 The importance
of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations,
the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of the
terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate
are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule. 10
Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions.
There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of which is
the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself,
except in the following cases:
Finally, it perplexes this Court why petitioner continued to
obdurately disregard the opportunities given by the trial court
for it to present the originals of the photocopies it presented yet
comes before us now praying that it be allowed to present the
originals of the exhibits that were denied admission or in case
the same are lost, to lay the predicate for the admission of
secondary evidence. Had petitioner presented the originals of
the documents to the court instead of the photocopies it
obstinately offered as evidence, or at the very least laid the
predicate for the admission of said photocopies, this
controversy would not have unnecessarily been brought before
the appellate court and finally to this Court for adjudication.
Had it not been for petitioners intransigence, the merits of
petitioners complaint for damages would have been decided
upon by the trial court long ago. As aptly articulated by the
Court of Appeals, petitioner has only itself to blame for the
respondent judges denial of admission of its aforementioned
documentary evidence and consequently, the denial of its
prayer to be given another opportunity to present the originals
of the documents that were denied admission nor to lay the
predicate for the admission of secondary evidence in case the
same has been lost.

(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CEB-SP No. 00848, dated 9 November 2005 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

(c) When the original is a record or other document in MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

the custody of a public officer; Associate Justice

(d) When the original has been recorded in an

existing record a certified copy of which is made
evidence by law;

(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts

or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to
be established from them is only the general result of
the whole."

When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or

cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or
by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. 11 The offeror
of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates
thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad
faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown
by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of
documents;12 (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference
of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be
shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search
has been made for the document in the proper place or
places.13 However, in the case at bar, though petitioner
insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence,
it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance
with the exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted
rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a
quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by
petitioner as documentary evidence.
6|Page-JEC
G.R. No. 210760 January 26, 2015
KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of
the July 15, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and
its January 8, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 34428,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Kyle Anthony Zabala.
The assailed CA Decision affirmed the July 7, 2011
Judgment in Crim. Case No. 1676-M-2008 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Malolos City, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
theft, punishable under Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised
Penal Code. The assailed Resolution, meanwhile, denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
An Information was filed against petitioner Kyle Anthony
Zabala (Zabala) before the RTC, Branch 22, Malolos City,
charging him with theft, the pertinent text of which states:
That on or about the 18th day of June 2007 in San Jose del
Monte City, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away with
him,one envelope containing cash amounting to SIXTY
EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (PhP68,000.00) belonging to
Randolph V. Alas, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner in the amount of PhP68,000.00. Contrary to law.1
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the
merits ensued. During the trial, the prosecution presented
the testimonies of the complaining witness, Randolph Alas
(Alas), and petitionersalleged former girlfriend, Marlyn
Pion (Pion). On the other hand, the defense presented
the testimonies of petitioner and of one Muriel John Ganas
(Ganas), his alleged companion on the day that the incident
took place.2
Version of the Prosecution
The evidence for the prosecution tends to establish that
Zabala is a jeepney driver who earns Two Hundred Pesos
(P200) to Four Hundred Pesos (P400) per day on an
alternate day basis. Complainant Alas, meanwhile, works at
the Manila City Hall. It is through this job that he was able to
save the Sixty-Eight Thousand Pesos (P68,000) stolen by
Zabala.3 Pion, on the other hand, had been the girlfriend
7|Page-JEC
of Zabalafor about five months when the incident pertinent
to this case occurred.
Alas testified that he and Zabalawere neighbors in San
Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan. As neighbors,he had treated
Zabala as his kumpare and would often invite the latter to
drinking sessions inside his house. At times, he would also
call Zabala to repair his vehicle, because Zabala is also a
mechanic. He would allow Zabala to follow him to his
bedroom to get cash whenever spare parts are to be
bought for the repair of his vehicle.4
Alas further testified that on June 18, 2007, at about 4:00 in
the morning, he left his house to go to work. When he
returned from work, at around 11:00 in the evening, he
discovered that his money amounting to Sixty Eight
Thousand Pesos (P68,000), which he kept in an envelope
inside his closet, was missing.5 During that time, there were
only five (5) persons living in their house: Alas, his parents,
his nine (9) year-old son, and his aunt. He asked his
parents and aunt if they knew where he kept his money, but
they did not know.6
Witness Pion, on the other hand, testified that in the early
morning of June 18, 2007, she and Zabala, her boyfriend at
the time, were together at a store owned by the latter, which
was six to seven steps away from the complainants house.
She then saw Zabala climb the fence and scale the tree in
front of the complainants house, and enter the house.
When he returned, she noticed that he had a bulge in his
pocket, which she later found to be a plentiful sum of
money. Zabala then brought her home, and agreed to meet
her again at about 10:00 in the morning. They then went to
Greenhills, where Zabala bought two Nokia mobile phones,
which cost about Eight Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P8,500).7
Version of the Defense
For his defense, Zabala testified that in the early morning of
June 17, 2007, he was driving his passenger jeepney,
together with his friend, witness Ganas. They parted ways
at around 6:00 in the morning of the following day. During
the whole time they were together, they did not drop by the
house of the private complainant. Neither did he have the
time to meet Marilyn Pion, of whom he regarded only as
an acquaintance and not his girlfriend.8
Witness Ganas corroborated the declaration of Zabala. He
testified that he was with petitioner, acting as the conductor,
while petitioner was plying the route of his driven jeepney.
He had known petitioner since his childhood, and was his
good friend.9
Ruling of the RTC
On July 7, 2011, the RTC rendered its Judgment convicting
petitioner of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of
the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal
Case No. 1676-M-2008 CONVICTING accused KYLE
ANTHONY ZABALA with the crime of theft defined and
penalized under the provisions of Article 308 and 309 of the
Revised Penal Code and is hereby [sentenced] to suffer
imprisonment of, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the MINIMUM penalty of prision correccional which is 6
years, to a MAXIMUM penalty of prision mayorin its
maximum period [of] 8 years.
Accused Zabala is likewise ordered to indemnify and pay
the amount of sixty eight thousand pesos (Php68,000.00) to
complaining witness Randolph V. Alas by way of reparation
of the damage caused on him.
Furnish both the public prosecutor and defense counsel of
this judgment including the accused.10
Aggrieved by the Judgment, petitioner appealed to the CA,
attributing to the lower court the following errors: (1) there
was a grave error in not giving credence to petitioners
version; (2) petitioner was convicted of the crime charged
despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) petitioner cannot be
convicted based on circumstantial evidence.
Ruling of the CA
In its presently assailed Decision promulgated on July 15,
2013, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the decision
of the trial court, but with modification as to the penalty to
be imposed upon petitioner. The CA ruled that the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of the appellant through circumstantial evidence.
Citing People v. Modesto,11 the CA said:
x x x [T]he doctrine on circumstantial evidence has been
recognized as part of the legal tradition when it was
declared that "a rule of ancient respectability somolded into
tradition is that circumstantial evidence suffices to convict
only if the following requisites concur: first, there is more
than one circumstance; second, the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and finally, the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.12
The CA then found that the series of circumstances present
in this case supports a conviction, and constitutes the basis
for a reasonable inference of the existence of the facts
thereby sought to be proved.13
Rejecting the defense of petitioner, the CA ruled that he
offered no evidence other than an alibi to exculpate him
from the crime charged. It then cited the rule that alibi is a
weakdefense, and cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of a truthful witness.14
The CA disposed of petitioners appeal as follows:
8|Page-JEC
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
DENIED. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, accused-appellant is
sentenced to six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum to twelve (12) years, eight (8) months and eight
(8) days of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accused Zabala is likewise [ordered to] indemnify and pay
the amount of Sixty Eight Thousand Pesos (Php68,000.00)
to complaining witness Randolph V. Alas by way of
reparation of the damage caused on him.15
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,but in its assailed
Resolution dated January 8, 2014,the CA denied it.
Thus, the present recourse before this Court. Petitioner now
argues that there is no sufficient evidence on record to
support his conviction for the charge of theft.
In its Comment, respondent People insists that the
prosecution was able to establish petitioners guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. It argues that the CA correctly ruled that
the series of circumstances presented before the trial court
is sufficient to support a conviction.16
The Issues
I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
PETITIONERS CONVICTION BY GIVING FULL
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES TESTIMONIES.
II.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD FAILED TO SUPPORT A
CONVICTION.17
In fine, petitioner alleges that the evidence presented
before the trial court is insufficient to convict him of the
offense charged.
The Courts Ruling
We reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA. We agree
with petitioner, and find that the evidence presented below
does not constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
sufficientto convict petitioner of theft. Thus, he must be
acquitted.
Discussion
Given that the case for the prosecution is largely based on
circumstantial evidence, a short discussion on the
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to convict an accused
is in order.
Circumstantial evidence asbasis for conviction
It is a settled rule that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
support a conviction, and that direct evidence isnot always
necessary. This is but a recognition of the reality that in
certain instances, due to the inherent attempt to conceal a
crime, it is not always possible to obtain direct evidence. In
Bacolod v. People, this Court had the occasion to say:
The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily
mean that the guilt of the accused cannot be proved by
evidence other than direct evidence. Direct evidence is not
the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, because circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can
supplant the absence of direct evidence. The crime charged
may also be proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes
referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence.
Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that which
"goes to prove a fact or series of facts other than the facts
in issue, which, if proved, may tend by inference to
establish a fact in issue."18
The Rules of Court itself recognizes that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction, under certain
circumstances:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven;
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Moreover, in Lozano v. People, this Court clarified the
application of the circumstantial evidence rule:
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it
is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must
constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The
circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that
some other person has committed the crime.19 (emphasis in
the original)
The prosecution failed to establish, by circumstantial
evidence, that petitioner is guilty of theft
9|Page-JEC
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, this Court finds that the
prosecution failed to present sufficient circumstantial
evidence to convict the petitioner of the offense charged.
We find that the pieces of evidence presented before the
trial court fail to provide a sufficient combination of
circumstances, as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
To recall, the evidence of the prosecution purports to
establish the following narrative: first, that the complaining
witness Alas hides P68,000 in cash in his closet inside their
house; second, that petitioner is aware that Alas hides
money in his bedroom closet; third, that on the night of the
incident, petitioner was with his then girlfriend, witness
Pion; fourth, that petitioner climbed through the fence of
Alass house, and was able to successfully gain entrance to
his house; fifth, that petitioner later went out of the house
with a bulge in his pockets; and sixth, that later that day,
petitioner and Pion went shopping for a cellphone.
The foregoing narrationbased on the testimonies of the
two witnesses of the prosecution, even if given full faith and
credit and considered as established factsfailsto
establish that petitioner committed the crime of theft. If at
all, it may possibly constitute evidence that petitioner
committed an offense, but not necessarily theft.
In the case before the Court,the evidence presented by the
prosecution fails to establish the corpus delicti of theft. In
Tan v. People, this Court said:
Corpus delicti means the "body or substance of the crime,
and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime
has been actually committed." The "essential elements of
theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property
belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with
intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the
consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is
accomplished without violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things." In theft, corpus delicti has
two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the
owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking.20
First, nobody saw Zabala enter the bedroom of Alas, where
the money amounting to P68,000 was allegedly kept and
hidden. It is interesting to note that while Alas testified that
there were other persons living in that house, i.e. his family
members, the prosecution failed to put any of them on the
witness stand, to testify that they saw or heard something
out of the ordinary at the time the incident allegedly took
place, or to explain why nobody else was able to notice that
the theft took place while Alas was absent. Witness Pion,
meanwhile, merely testified that she saw Zabala scale the
fence of Alas house and enter it. She did not actually see
Zabala enter the room of Alas, where the money was
hidden.
Second, the evidence presented below is insufficient to
determine without a reasonable doubt that the P68,000 in
cash was lost due to felonious taking, and,more importantly,
that it was petitioner who committed the felonious taking.
Even if believed in its entirety, the testimony of witness
Pion does not show that when petitioner left the house of
Alas, he was carrying the P68,000 incash which was
supposedly lost. All that Pion saw was the bulge in
petitioners pockets. Pions testimony can considered as
evidence to prove that when petitioner entered the house of
Alas, he did so because of his intent to commit asportation.

Third, Pion' s testimony fails to establish that Alas' pocket

indeed contained the stolen money, as she never actually
saw what was inside the pocket of Zabala. While she
testified that later that day, they went to buy 2 cellphones
amounting to P8,500, she failed to testify whether the
money that Zabala used in paying for the cellphone was
retrieved from the very same bulging pocket which she saw
earlier in the day, which would have led to the conclusion
that Zabala's pocket contained money. Failing this, what is
left is the fact that Pifion saw a bulge in Zabala's pocket,
and there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that his
pocket in fact was used to hide the money that he allegedly
stole. The trial and appellate courts committed error in
accepting as fact that Zabala's pocket contained money,
when there is a dearth of evidence to support such
allegation.

And fourth, the rule in circumstantial evidence cases is that

the evidence must exclude the possibility that some other
person committed the crime.21 In the case here, however,
the prosecution failed to prove, or even allege, that it was
impossible for some other person to have committed the
crime of theft against Alas. The prosecution failed to
adduce evidence that at the time the theft was committed,
there was no other person inside the house of Alas, or that
no other person could have taken the money from the
closet of Alas. Alas himself admitted that there were other
residents in the house, but these persons were never
presented to prove their whereabouts at the time the
incident took place. This failure of the prosecution leads the
Court to no other conclusion but that they failed to establish
that culpability could only belong to Zabala, and not to
some other person.

Given the foregoing discussion, We find that petit10ner was

wrongfully convicted of theft.1wphi1 In the absence of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption of
innocence must be upheld, and thus, petitioner should be
acquitted.

WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the

July 15, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its
January 8, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 34428 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Kyle
Anthony Zabala is ACQUITTED of the offense of theft, on
account of reasonable doubt. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

10 | P a g e - J E C
G.R. No. 175021 June 15, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Chief of the Philippine National Police, Petitioner,
vs.
THI THU THUY T. DE GUZMAN, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Republic of
the Philippines, as represented by the Chief of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), of the September 27, 2006 Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80623, which affirmed
with modification the September 8, 2003 Decision 3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 222, of Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q99-37717.
Respondent is the proprietress of Montaguz General
Merchandise (MGM),4 a contractor accredited by the PNP for
the supply of office and construction materials and equipment,
and for the delivery of various services such as printing and
rental, repair of various equipment, and renovation of buildings,
facilities, vehicles, tires, and spare parts.5
On December 8, 1995, the PNP Engineering Services
(PNPES), released a Requisition and Issue Voucher 6 for the
acquisition of various building materials amounting to Two
Million Two Hundred Eighty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred
Sixty-Two Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P2,288,562.60) for the
construction of a four-storey condominium building with roof
deck at Camp Crame, Quezon City.7
Respondent averred that on December 11, 1995, MGM and
petitioner, represented by the PNP, through its chief, executed
a Contract of Agreement8 (the Contract) wherein MGM, for the
price of P2,288,562.60, undertook to procure and deliver to the
PNP the construction materials itemized in the purchase
order9 attached to the Contract. Respondent claimed that after
the PNP Chief approved the Contract and purchase
order,10 MGM, on March 1, 1996, proceeded with the delivery
of the construction materials, as evidenced by Delivery Receipt
Nos. 151-153,11 Sales Invoice Nos. 038 and 041,12 and the
"Report of Public Property Purchase"13 issued by the PNPs
Receiving and Accounting Officers to their Internal Auditor
Chief. Respondent asseverated that following the PNPs
inspection of the delivered materials on March 4, 1996, 14 the
PNP issued two Disbursement Vouchers; one in the amount
of P2,226,147.26 in favor of MGM,15 and the other, 16 in the
amount of P62,415.34, representing the three percent (3%)
withholding tax, in favor of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR).17
On November 5, 1997, the respondent, through counsel, sent
a letter dated October 20, 199718 to the PNP, demanding the
payment of P2,288,562.60 for the construction materials MGM
procured for the PNP under their December 1995 Contract.
On November 17, 1997, the PNP, through its Officer-in-
Charge, replied19 to respondents counsel, informing her of the
payment made to MGM via Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
Check No. 0000530631, 20 as evidenced by Receipt No.
11 | P a g e - J E C
001, 21 issued by the respondent to the PNP on April 23,
1996.22
On November 26, 1997, respondent, through counsel,
responded by reiterating her demand23 and denying having
ever received the LBP check, personally or through an
authorized person. She also claimed that Receipt No. 001, a
copy of which was attached to the PNPs November 17, 1997
letter, could not support the PNPs claim of payment as the
aforesaid receipt belonged to Montaguz Builders, her other
company, which was also doing business with the PNP, and
not to MGM, with which the contract was made.
On May 5, 1999, respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of
Money against the petitioner, represented by the Chief of the
PNP, before the RTC, Branch 222 of Quezon City. 24 This was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q99-37717.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss 25 on July 5, 1999, on
the ground that the claim or demand set forth in respondents
complaint had already been paid or extinguished, 26 as
evidenced by LBP Check No. 0000530631 dated April 18,
1996, issued by the PNP to MGM, and Receipt No. 001, which
the respondent correspondingly issued to the PNP. The
petitioner also argued that aside from the fact that the
respondent, in her October 20, 1997 letter, demanded the
incorrect amount since it included the withholding tax paid to
the BIR, her delay in making such demand "[did] not speak well
of the worthiness of the cause she espouse[d]."27
Respondent opposed petitioners motion to dismiss in her July
12, 1999 Opposition28and September 10, 1999 Supplemental
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.29 Respondent posited that
Receipt No. 001, which the petitioner claimed was issued by
MGM upon respondents receipt of the LBP check, was, first,
under the business name "Montaguz Builders," an entity
separate from MGM. Next, petitioners allegation that she
received the LBP check on April 19, 1996 was belied by the
fact that Receipt No. 001, which was supposedly issued for the
check, was dated four days later, or April 23, 1996. Moreover,
respondent averred, the PNPs own Checking Account Section
Logbook or the Warrant Register, showed that it was one
Edgardo Cruz (Cruz) who signed for the check due to
MGM, 30 contrary to her usual practice of personally receiving
and signing for checks payable to her companies.
After conducting hearings on the Motion to Dismiss, the RTC
issued an Order31 on May 4, 2001, denying the petitioners
motion for lack of merit. The petitioner thereafter filed its
Answer,32 wherein it restated the same allegations in its Motion
to Dismiss.
Trial on the merits followed the pre-trial conference, which was
terminated on June 25, 2002 when the parties failed to arrive
at an amicable settlement.33
On September 3, 2002, shortly after respondent was sworn in
as a witness, and after her counsel formally offered her
testimony in evidence, Atty. Norman Bueno, petitioners
counsel at that time, made the following stipulations in open
court:
Atty. Bueno (To Court)
Your Honor, in order to expedite the trial, we will admit that this
witness was contracted to deliver the construction supplies or
materials. We will admit that she complied, that she actually
delivered the materials. We will admit that Land Bank
Corporation check was issued although we will not admit that
the check was not released to her, as [a] matter of fact, we
have the copy of the check. We will admit that Warrant
Register indicated that the check was released although we
will not admit that the check was not received by the
[respondent].
Court (To Atty. Albano)
So, the issues here are whether or not the [respondent]
received the check for the payment of the construction
materials or supplies and who received the same. That is all.
Atty. Albano (To Court)
Yes, your Honor.
Court (To Atty. Albano)
I think we have an abbreviated testimony here.
Proceed.34 (Emphasis ours.)
The stipulations made by the petitioner through Atty. Bueno
were in consonance with the admissions it had previously
made, also through Atty. Bueno, in its Answer,35 and pre-trial
brief36:
Answer:
IX
It ADMITS the allegation in paragraph 9 of the Complaint that
[respondent] delivered to the PNP Engineering Service the
construction materials. It also ADMITS the existence of Receipt
Nos. 151, 152 and 153 alleged in the same paragraph, copies
of which are attached to the Complaint as Annexes "G," "G-1"
and "G-2."37 (Emphasis ours.)
Pre-trial Brief:
III
ADMISSIONS
3.1. Facts and/or documents admitted
For brevity, [petitioner] admit[s] only the allegations in
[respondents] Complaint and the annexes thereto that were
admitted in the Answer.38 (Emphases ours.)
With the issue then confined to whether respondent was paid
or not, the RTC proceeded with the trial.
Respondent, in her testimony, narrated that on April 18, 1996,
she went to the PNP Finance Center to claim a check due to
one of her companies, Montaguz Builders. As the PNP
12 | P a g e - J E C
required the issuance of an official receipt upon claiming its
checks, respondent, in preparation for the PNP check she
expected, already signed Montaguz Builders Official Receipt
No. 001, albeit the details were still blank. However, upon
arriving at the PNP Finance Center, respondent was told that
the check was still with the LBP, which could not yet release it.
Respondent then left for the Engineering Services Office to see
Captain Rama, along with Receipt No. 001, which she had not
yet issued.39 Respondent claimed that after some time, she left
her belongings, including her receipt booklet, at a bench in
Captain Ramas office when she went around the Engineering
Office to talk to some other people.40 She reasoned that since
she was already familiar and comfortable with the people in the
PNPES Office, she felt no need to ask anyone to look after her
belongings, as it was her "normal practice" 41 to leave her
belongings in one of the offices there. The next day,
respondent alleged that when she returned for the check due
to Montaguz Builders that she was not able to claim the day
before, she discovered for the first time that Receipt No. 001,
which was meant for that check, was missing. Since she would
not be able to claim her check without issuing a receipt, she
just informed the releaser of the missing receipt and issued
Receipt No. 002 in its place.42 After a few months, respondent
inquired with the PNP Finance Center about the payment due
to MGM under the Contract of December 1995 and was
surprised to find out that the check payable to MGM had
already been released. Upon making some inquiries,
respondent learned that the check, payable to MGM, in the
amount of P2,226,147.26, was received by Cruz, who signed
the PNPs Warrant Register. Respondent admitted to knowing
Cruz, as he was connected with Highland Enterprises, a fellow
PNP-accredited contractor. However, she denied ever having
authorized Cruz or Highland Enterprises to receive or claim
any of the checks due to MGM or Montaguz Builders. 43 When
asked why she had not filed a case against Cruz or Herminio
Reyes, the owner of Highland Enterprises, considering the
admitted fact that Cruz claimed the check due to her,
respondent declared that there was no reason for her to
confront them as it was the PNPs fault that the check was
released to the wrong person. Thus, it was the PNPs problem
to find out where the money had gone, while her course of
action was to go after the PNP, as the party involved in the
Contract.44
On April 29, 2003, petitioner presented Ms. Jesusa Magtira,
who was then the "check releaser"45 of the PNP, to prove that
the respondent received the LBP check due to MGM, and that
respondent herself gave the check to Cruz.46 Ms. Magtira
testified that on April 23, 1996, she released the LBP check
payable to the order of MGM, in the amount of P2,226,147.26,
to the respondent herein, whom she identified in open court.
She claimed that when she released the check to respondent,
she also handed her a voucher, and a logbook also known as
the Warrant Register, for signing.47 When asked why Cruz was
allowed to sign for the check, Ms. Magtira explained that this
was allowed since the respondent already gave her the official
receipt for the check, and it was respondent herself who gave
the logbook to Cruz for signing.48
The petitioner next presented Edgardo Cruz for the purpose of
proving that the payment respondent was claiming rightfully
belonged to Highland Enterprises. Cruz testified that Highland
Enterprises had been an accredited contractor of the PNP
since 1975. In 1995, Cruz claimed that the PNPES was tasked
to construct "by administration" a condominium building. This
meant that the PNPES had to do all the work, from the
canvassing of the materials to the construction of the building.
The PNPES allegedly lacked the funds to do this and so asked
for Highland Enterprisess help.49 In a meeting with its
accredited contractors, the PNPES asked if the other
contractors would agree to the use of their business name 50 for
a two percent (2%) commission of the purchase order price to
avoid the impression that Highland Enterprises was
monopolizing the supply of labor and materials to the
PNP.51 Cruz alleged that on April 23, 1996, he and the
respondent went to the PNP Finance Center to claim the LBP
check due to MGM. Cruz said that the respondent handed him
the already signed Receipt No. 001, which he filled up. He
claimed that the respondent knew that the LBP check was
really meant for Highland Enterprises as she had already been
paid her 2% commission for the use of her business name in
the concerned transaction.52
On September 8, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, the
dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of [respondent] and against [petitioner]
ordering the latter to pay [respondent] the following sums:
(1) P2,226,147.26 representing the principal sum plus
interest at 14% per annum from April 18, 1996 until
the same shall have been fully paid;
(2) 20% of the sum to be collected as attorneys fees;
and,
(3) Costs of suit.53
The RTC declared that while Cruzs testimony seemed to offer
a plausible explanation on how and why the LBP check ended
up with him, the petitioner, already admitted in its Answer, and
Pre-trial Brief, that MGM, did in fact deliver the construction
materials worth P2,288,562.60 to the PNP. The RTC also
pointed out the fact that the petitioner made the same
admissions in open court to expedite the trial, leaving only one
issue to be resolved: whether the respondent had been paid or
not. Since this was the only issue, the RTC said that it had no
choice but to go back to the documents and the "documentary
evidence clearly indicates that the check subject of this case
was never received by [respondent]." 54 In addition, the PNPs
own Warrant Register showed that it was Edgardo Cruz who
received the LBP check, and Receipt No. 001 submitted by the
petitioner to support its claim was not issued by MGM, but by
Montaguz Builders, a different entity. Finally, the RTC held that
Cruzs testimony, which appeared to be an afterthought to
cover up the PNPs blunder, were irreconcilable with the
petitioners earlier declarations and admissions, hence, not
credit-worthy.
The petitioner appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed with modification the RTCs ruling on
September 27, 2006:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the 14% interest per annum imposed
on the principal amount is ordered reduced to 12%, computed
from November 16, 1997 until fully paid. The order for the
payment of attorneys fees and costs of the suit is DELETED.55
13 | P a g e - J E C
The Court of Appeals, in deciding against the petitioner, held
that the petitioners admissions and declarations, made in
various stages of the proceedings are express admissions,
which cannot be overcome by allegations of respondents
implied admissions. Moreover, petitioner cannot controvert its
own admissions and it is estopped from denying that it had a
contract with MGM, which MGM duly complied with. The Court
of Appeals agreed with the RTC that the real issue for
determination was whether the petitioner was able to discharge
its contractual obligation with the respondent. The Court of
Appeals held that while the PNPs own Warrant Register
disclosed that the payment due to MGM was received by Cruz,
on behalf of Highland Enterprises, the PNPs contract was
clearly with MGM, and not with Highland Enterprises. Thus, in
order to extinguish its obligation, the petitioner should have
directed its payment to MGM unless MGM authorized a third
person to accept payment on its behalf.
The petitioner is now before this Court, praying for the reversal
of the lower courts decisions on the ground that "the Court of
Appeals committed a serious error in law by affirming the
decision of the trial court."56
THE COURTS RULING:
This case stemmed from a contract executed between the
respondent and the petitioner. While the petitioner, in
proclaiming that the respondents claim had already been
extinguished, initially insisted on having fulfilled its contractual
obligation, it now contends that the contract it executed with
the respondent is actually a fictitious contract to conceal the
fact that only one contractor will be supplying all the materials
and labor for the PNP condominium project.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of
the contract between the petitioner and the respondent on the
strength of the documentary evidence presented and offered in
Court and on petitioners own stipulations and admissions
during various stages of the proceedings.
It is worthy to note that while this petition was filed under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the assertions and arguments
advanced herein are those that will necessarily require this
Court to re-evaluate the evidence on record.
It is a well-settled rule that in a petition for review under Rule
45, only questions of law may be raised by the parties and
passed upon by this Court.57
This Court has, on many occasions, distinguished between a
question of law and a question of fact. We held that when there
is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, then it
is a question of law; but when the doubt arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts, then it is a question of
fact.58 "Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the
question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is
correct, is a question of law."59 To elucidate further, this Court,
in Hko Ah Pao v. Ting60 said:
One test to determine if there exists a question of fact or law in
a given case is whether the Court can resolve the issue that
was raised without having to review or evaluate the evidence,
in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it will be a
question of fact. Thus, the petition must not involve the
calibration of the probative value of the evidence presented. In
addition, the facts of the case must be undisputed, and the
only issue that should be left for the Court to decide is whether
or not the conclusion drawn by the CA from a certain set of
facts was appropriate.61 (Emphases ours.)
In this case, the circumstances surrounding the controversial
LBP check are central to the issue before us, the resolution of
which, will require a perusal of the entire records of the case
including the transcribed testimonies of the witnesses. Since
this is an appeal via certiorari, questions of fact are not
reviewable. As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are final and conclusive62 and this Court will only
review them under the following recognized exceptions: (1)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3)
when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties
and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.63
Although petitioners sole ground to support this petition was
stated in such a manner as to impress upon this Court that the
Court of Appeals committed an error in law, what the petitioner
actually wants us to do is to review and re-examine the factual
findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
Since the petitioner has not shown this Court that this case
falls under any of the enumerated exceptions to the rule, we
are constrained to uphold the facts as established by both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals, and, consequently, the
conclusions reached in the appealed decision.
Nonetheless, even if we were to exercise utmost liberality and
veer away from the rule, the records will show that the
petitioner had failed to establish its case by a preponderance
of evidence.64 Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides the guidelines in determining preponderance of
evidence:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In
determining where the preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all
the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying,
the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same
may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance
is not necessarily with the greater number.
14 | P a g e - J E C
Expounding on the concept of preponderance of evidence, this
Court in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc.,65held:
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of
the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of
the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which
is offered in opposition thereto.66
The petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals should not have
relied "heavily, if not solely"67 on the admissions made by
petitioners former counsel, thereby losing sight of the "secret
agreement" between the respondent and Highland Enterprises,
which explains why all the documentary evidence were in
respondents name.68
The petitioner relies mainly on Cruzs testimony to support its
allegations. Not only did it not present any other witness to
corroborate Cruz, but it also failed to present any
documentation to confirm its story. It is doubtful that the
petitioner or the contractors would enter into any "secret
agreement" involving millions of pesos based purely on verbal
affirmations. Meanwhile, the respondent not only presented all
the documentary evidence to prove her claims, even the
petitioner repeatedly admitted that respondent had fully
complied with her contractual obligations.
The petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals should have
appreciated the clear and adequate testimony of Cruz, and
should have given it utmost weight and credit especially since
his testimony was a "judicial admission against interest a
primary evidence which should have been accorded full
evidentiary value."69
The trial courts appreciation of the witnesses testimonies is
entitled to the highest respect since it was in a better position
to assess their credibility.70 The RTC held Cruzs testimony to
be "not credit worthy"71 for being irreconcilable with petitioners
earlier admissions. Contrary to petitioners contentions, Cruzs
testimony cannot be considered as a judicial admission against
his interest as he is neither a party to the case nor was his
admission against his own interest, but actually against either
the petitioners or the respondents interest. Petitioners
statements on the other hand, were deliberate, clear, and
unequivocal and were made in the course of judicial
proceedings; thus, they qualify as judicial admissions.72 In
Alfelor v. Halasan,73 this Court held that:
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that
fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of
evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes
an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently,
an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by
the party making such admission and are conclusive as to
such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent
therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by
the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions
contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader.
A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or
inconsistent with what was pleaded.74
The petitioner admitted to the existence and validity of the
Contract of Agreement executed between the PNP and MGM,
as represented by the respondent, on December 11, 1995. It
likewise admitted that respondent delivered the construction
materials subject of the Contract, not once, but several times
during the course of the proceedings. The only matter
petitioner assailed was respondents allegation that she had
not yet been paid. If Cruzs testimony were true, the petitioner
should have put respondent in her place the moment she sent
a letter to the PNP, demanding payment for the construction
materials she had allegedly delivered. Instead, the petitioner
replied that it had already paid respondent as evidenced by the
LBP check and the receipt she supposedly issued. This line of
defense continued on, with the petitioner assailing only the
respondents claim of nonpayment, and not the rest of
respondents claims, in its motion to dismiss, its answer, its
pre-trial brief, and even in open court during the respondents
testimony. Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 4. Judicial Admissions.An admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Petitioners admissions were proven to have been made in
various stages of the proceedings, and since the petitioner has
not shown us that they were made through palpable mistake,
they are conclusive as to the petitioner. Hence, the only
question to be resolved is whether the respondent was paid
under the December 1995 Contract of Agreement.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the
petitioners obligation has not been extinguished. The
petitioners obligation consists of payment of a sum of money.
In order for petitioners payment to be effective in extinguishing
its obligation, it must be made to the proper person. Article
1240 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor
the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in
interest, or any person authorized to receive it.
In Cembrano v. City of Butuan,75 this Court elucidated on how
payment will effectively extinguish an obligation, to wit:
Payment made by the debtor to the person of the creditor or to
one authorized by him or by the law to receive it extinguishes
the obligation. When payment is made to the wrong party,
however, the obligation is not extinguished as to the creditor
who is without fault or negligence even if the debtor acted in
utmost good faith and by mistake as to the person of the
creditor or through error induced by fraud of a third person.
In general, a payment in order to be effective to discharge an
obligation, must be made to the proper person. Thus, payment
must be made to the obligee himself or to an agent having
authority, express or implied, to receive the particular payment.
Payment made to one having apparent authority to receive the
money will, as a rule, be treated as though actual authority had
been given for its receipt. Likewise, if payment is made to one
who by law is authorized to act for the creditor, it will work a
discharge. The receipt of money due on a judgment by an
15 | P a g e - J E C
officer authorized by law to accept it will, therefore, satisfy the
debt.76
The respondent was able to establish that the LBP check was
not received by her or by her authorized personnel. The PNPs
own records show that it was claimed and signed for by Cruz,
who is openly known as being connected to Highland
Enterprises, another contractor. Hence, absent any showing
that the respondent agreed to the payment of the contract price
to another person, or that she authorized Cruz to claim the
check on her behalf, the payment, to be effective must be
made to her.77
The petitioner also challenged the RTCs findings, on the
ground that it "overlooked material fact and circumstance of
significant weight and substance."78 Invoking the doctrine of
adoptive admission, the petitioner pointed out that the
respondents inaction towards Cruz, whom she has known to
have claimed her check as early as 1996, should be taken
against her. Finally, the petitioner contends that Cruzs
testimony should be taken against respondent as well, under
Rule 130, Sec. 32 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since
she has not presented any "controverting evidence x x x
notwithstanding that she personally heard it."79
The respondent has explained her inaction towards Cruz and
Highland Enterprises. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
have found her explanation sufficient and this Court finds no
cogent reason to overturn the assessment by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals of the respondents testimony. It may
be recalled that the respondent argued that since it was the
PNP who owed her money, her actions should be directed
towards the PNP and not Cruz or Highland Enterprises,
against whom she has no adequate proof.80 Respondent has
also adequately explained her delay in filing an action against
the petitioner, particularly that she did not want to prejudice her
other pending transactions with the PNP.81
The petitioner claims that the RTC "overlooked material fact
and circumstance of significant weight and substance,"82 but it
ignores all the documentary evidence, and even its own
admissions, which are evidence of the greater weight and
substance, that support the conclusions reached by both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the RTC erred in the
interest rate and other monetary sums awarded to respondent
as baseless. However, we must further modify the interest rate
imposed by the Court of Appeals pursuant to the rule laid down
in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 83:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached,
the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions
under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in
determining the measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the
concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of
interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in
the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that
 which may have been stipulated in writing. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 80623
interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the dated September 27, 2006 is AFFIRMED with the
absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be MODIFICATION that the legal interest to be paid is SIX
12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., PERCENT (6%) per annum on the amount of P2,226,147.26,
from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and computed from the date of the last demand or on November
subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil 16, 1997. A TWELVE PERCENT (12%) per annum interest in
Code. lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%) shall be imposed on such amount
upon finality of this decision until the payment thereof.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the SO ORDERED.
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at
the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on Associate Justice
unliquidated claims or damages except when or until
the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest
shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but
when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have
been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on
the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of

money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from
such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period
being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.84

Since the obligation herein is for the payment of a sum of

money, the legal interest rate to be imposed, under Article
2209 of the Civil Code is six percent (6%) per annum:

Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of

money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for
damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be
the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum.

Following the guidelines above, the legal interest of 6% per

annum is to be imposed from November 16, 1997, the date of
the last demand, and 12% in lieu of 6% from the date this
decision becomes final until fully paid.lawphi1

Petitioners allegations of sham dealings involving our own

government agencies are potentially disturbing and alarming. If
Cruzs testimony were true, this should be a lesson to the PNP
not to dabble in spurious transactions. Obviously, if it can
afford to give a 2% commission to other contractors for the
mere use of their business names, then the petitioner is
disbursing more money than it normally would in a legitimate
transaction. It is recommended that the proper agency
investigate this matter and hold the involved personnel
accountable to avoid any similar occurrence in the future.

16 | P a g e - J E C
G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO @ PUKE, accused-
appellant.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, sentencing Gerrico Vallejo y
Samartino to death and ordering him to indemnify the heirs
of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the rape-
slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy Diolola, in Rosario,
Cavite on July 10, 1999.
The Information charging accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo
with the crime of Rape with Homicide alleged:
"That on or about the 10th day of July 1999, in
Barangay Ligtong I, Municipality of Rosario,
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Trial Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with DAISY DIOLOLA Y
DITALO, a nine-year old child against the latter's
will and while raping the said victim, said accused
strangled her to death."
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
Accused-appellant was arraigned on July 26, 1999 and,
with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged, whereupon trial ensued.
Ten (10) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely,
Ma. Nida Diolola, the victim's mother; Dr. Antonio S.
Vertido, medico-legal officer of the NBI; Atty. Lupo Leyva;
Mayor Renato Abutan of Rosario, Cavite; Atty. Sikat
Agbunag of the Public Attorney's Office; Pet Byron Buan,
NBI Forensic Biologist; Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, NBI Forensic
Chemist; SPO1 Arnel Cuevas of the Rosario, Cavite police
station; and Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-
Yepes, both neighbors of the victim.
The victim's mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at
around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, she
sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to their
neighbor's house in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite, so
that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant, could
help Daisy with her lessons. Aimee's house, where
accused-appellant was also staying, is about four to five
meters away from Daisy's house. Ma. Nida saw her
daughter go to the house of her tutor. She was wearing pink
short pants and a white sleeveless shirt. An hour later,
Daisy came back with accused-appellant. They were
looking for a book which accused-appellant could copy to
17 | P a g e - J E C
make a drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to her
teacher. After finding the book, Daisy and accused-
appellant went back to the latter's house. When Ma. Nida
woke up at about 5:30 o'clock after an afternoon nap, she
noticed that Daisy was not yet home. She started looking
for her daughter and proceeded to the house of Aimee,
Daisy's tutor. Aimee's mother told Ma. Nida that Daisy was
not there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with
her lessons because Aimee was not feeling well as she had
her menstrual period. Ma. Nida looked for Daisy in her
brother's and sister's houses, but she was not there, either.
At about 7:00 o'clock that evening, Ma. Nida went back to
her neighbor's house, and there saw accused-appellant,
who told her that Daisy had gone to her classmate's house
to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went there, she was
told that Daisy had not been there. Ma. Nida went to the
dike and was told that they saw Daisy playing at about 3:30
o'clock in the afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma.
Nida that Daisy was playing in front of her house that
afternoon and even watched television in her house, but
that Daisy later left with accused-appellant.
Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for Daisy the
whole evening of June 10, 1999, a Saturday, until the early
morning of the following day, June 11, 1999, a Sunday, but
their search proved fruitless. Then, at about 10:00 o'clock in
the morning of June 11, 1999, she was informed that the
dead body of her daughter was found tied to the root of an
aroma tree by the river after the "compuerta" by a certain
Freddie Quinto. The body was already in the barangay hall
when Ma. Nida saw her daughter. Daisy was wearing her
pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her
neck. Barangay Councilmen Raul Ricasa and Calring
Purihin reported the incident to the Rosario police. The
other barangay officers fetched accused-appellant from his
house and took him to the barangay hall. At the barangay
hall, Ma. Nida pointed to accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo
as the probable suspect since he was with the victim when
she was last seen alive.3
Another witness, Jessiemin Mataverde, testified that at
around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, she saw
Daisy playing with other children outside her house. She
asked Daisy and her playmates to stop playing as their
noise was keeping Jessiemin's one-year old baby awake.
Daisy relented and watched television instead from the door
of Jessiemin's house. About five minutes later, accused-
appellant came to the house and told Daisy something, as a
result of which she went with him and the two proceeded
towards the "compuerta."
Jessiemin testified that at around 5:00 o'clock that
afternoon, while she and her daughter were in front of a
store across the street from her house, accused-appellant
arrived to buy a stick of Marlboro cigarette. Accused-
appellant had only his basketball shorts on and was just
holding his shirt. They noticed both his shorts and his shirt
were wet. After lighting his cigarette, accused-appellant
left.4
Charito Yepes, another neighbor of Ma. Nida, also testified.
She said that at about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon of July
10, 1999, while she and her husband and children were
walking towards the "compuerta" near the seashore of
Ligtong, Rosario, Cavite, they met a fisherman named
Herminio who said that it was a good day for catching
milkfish (bangus). For this reason, according to this witness,
they decided to get some fishing implements. She said they
met accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo near the seashore
and noticed that he was uneasy and looked troubled.
Charito said that accused-appellant did not even greet
them, which was unusual. She also testified that accused-
appellant's shorts and shirt (sando) were wet, but his face
and hair were not.5
SPO1 Arnel Cuevas testified that upon receipt of the report,
Rosario Police Chief Ricardo B. de la Cruz, Jr. responded
to the call together with his men, PO2 Garcia, SPO1
Araracap and PO2 Lariza. When they arrived, Daisy's body
was already in the barangay hall. SPO1 Cuevas took
photographs of the body. At that time, Daisy was wearing
pink short pants and a dirty white panty with a dirty white
sleeveless shirt wrapped around her neck. The body was
afterwards taken to the Samson Funeral Parlor in Rosario,
Cavite. The inquiries conducted by the police showed that
one Freddie Quinto was fishing near the compuerta when
he accidentally hit the body of Daisy, which was in the mud
and tied to the root of an aroma tree.
Accused-appellant was invited by the policemen for
questioning. Two others, a certain Raymond and Esting,
were also taken into custody because they were seen with
accused-appellant in front of the store in the late afternoon
of July 10 1999. Later, however, the two were released.
Based on the statements of Jessiemin Mataverde and
Charito Paras-Yepes, the policemen went to the house of
accused-appellant at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
July 11, 1999 and recovered the white basketball shirt, with
the name Samartino and No. 13 printed at the back, and
the violet basketball shorts, with the number 9 printed on it,
worn by accused-appellant the day before. The shirt and
shorts, which were bloodstained, were turned over to the
NBI for laboratory examination.6
Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified
that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of July 11, 1999,
he conducted a physical examination of accused-appellant.
His findings7 showed the following:
"PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
"Abrasions: thigh, right, antero-lateral aspect, lower
3rd 5.0 x 0.1 cm., knee, left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm. legs,
right anterior aspect, 28.0 x 8.0 cms., left anterior
aspect, 24.0 x 10.0 cms., feet, plantar aspects;
right, 9.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 5.0 cms.
"Hematoma, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 1.0 x
0.5 cm.
"Lacerations, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 0.3
cm.
"(Living Case No. BMP-9902, p. 101, records)"
18 | P a g e - J E C
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Dr. Vertido went to
the Samson Funeral Parlor in Rosario, Cavite for an
autopsy on the cadaver of the victim Daisy Diolola. The
autopsy revealed the following postmortem findings:8
"Body in early stage of postmortem decomposition
characterized by foul odor, eyes and tongue
protruding, bloating of the face and blister
formation.
"Washerwoman's hands and feet.
"Contusion, (pinkish) face, right, 14.0 x 10.0 cms.
and left, 13.0 x 6.0 cms. Contused abrasions,
forehead, 13.0 x 5.0 cms. upper lip, 5.0 x 22.0
cms., lower lip, 3.0 x 2.0 cms., neck (nailmarks)
anterior aspect, 8.0 x 5.0 cms., arms, right antero-
medial aspect, middle 3rd 3.0 x 15.0 cms. posterior
aspect, upper 3rd, 1.5 x 1.0 cms., left posterior
aspect, 20.0 x 9.0 cms., forearm, left, posterior
aspect, 21.0 x 8.0 cms. left thumb, anterior aspect,
1.5 x 1.0 cms., left middle, ring and little fingers,
dorsal aspect, .50 x 4.0 cms. knees, right, 3.0 x 2.0
cms. and left, 8.0- x 5.0 cms., legs, right anterior
aspect, upper and middle 3rd 3.0 x 2.5 cms. foot
right, dorsal aspect.
"Hematoma, periorbital right, 5.0 x 3.0
cms. and left, 4.5 x 3.0 cms.
"Fracture, tracheal rings.
"Hemorrhages, interstitial, neck,
underneath, nailmarks. "Petechial
hemorrhages, subendocardial, subpleural.
"Brain and other visceral organs are
congested.
"Stomach, contains rice and other food
particles.
"CAUSE OF DEATH: -Asphyxia by Manual
Strangulation.
"GENITAL EXAMINATION: - Pubic hair, no growth.
Labia majora and minora, gaping and congested.
Hymen, moderately tall, thick with fresh
lacerations, complete at 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00
o'clock positions, edges with blood clots." [Autopsy
Report No. BTNO-99-152]
Renato Abutan, Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite,
testified that he was informed of the rape and murder at
past 10:00 o'clock in the evening of June 11, 1999. The
mayor said he immediately proceeded to the municipal jail,
where accused-appellant was detained, and talked to the
latter. Accused-appellant at first denied having anything to
do with the killing and rape of the child. The mayor said he
told accused-appellant that he could not help him if he did
not tell the truth. At that point, accused-appellant started
crying and told the mayor that he killed the victim by
strangling her. Accused-appellant claimed that he was
under the influence of drugs. The mayor asked accused-
appellant if he wanted to have the services of Atty. Lupo
Leyva, a resident of Rosario, as his lawyer. When accused-
appellant said he did, Mayor Abutan fetched Atty. Leyva
from his house and took him to the police station about
11:00 o'clock that evening.9
Atty. Lupo Leyva corroborated Mayor Abutan's testimony.
He said that upon arriving at the police station, he asked
accused-appellant if he wanted his services as counsel in
the investigation. After accused-appellant assented, Atty.
Leyva testified that he "sort of discouraged" the former from
making statements as anything he said could be used
against him. But, as accused-appellant was willing to be
investigated, Atty. Leyva said he advised him to tell the
truth. PO2 Garcia, the investigator, informed accused-
appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
be assisted by counsel and warned him that any answer he
gave could and might be used against him in a court of law.
PO2 Garcia asked questions from accused-appellant, who
gave his answers in the presence of Atty. Leyva. After the
statement was taken, Atty. Leyva and accused-appellant
read it and afterwards signed it. Atty. Leyva testified that he
did not see or notice any indication that accused-appellant
had been maltreated by the police. In his sworn statement
(Exh. M), accused-appellant confessed to killing the victim
by strangling her to death, but denied having molested
her.10
Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that
on July 12, 1999, he took blood samples from accused-
appellant in his office for laboratory examination to
determine his blood type. Likewise, the basketball shorts
and shirt worn by accused-appellant on the day the victim
was missing and the victim's clothing were turned over to
the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI by PO1
Amoranto of the Rosario, Cavite police for the purpose of
determining the presence of human blood and its groups.11
The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T.
Buan showed accused-appellant to belong to Group "O".
The following specimens: (1) one (1) white no. 13 athletic
basketball shirt, with patches "Grizzlies" in front and
"SAMARTINO" at the back; (2) one (1) violet no. 9 athletic
basketball short pants; (3) one (1) white small "Hello Kitty"
T-shirt with reddish brown stains; (4) one (1) "cut" pink short
pants with reddish brown stains; (5) one (1) "cut" dirty white
small panty with reddish brown stains, were all positive for
the presence of human blood showing the reactions of
Group "A".12
Pet Byron Buan also testified that before he took the blood
samples, he had a conversation with accused-appellant
during which the latter admitted that he had raped and later
killed the victim by strangulation and stated that he was
willing to accept the punishment that would be meted out on
him because of the grievous offense he had committed. Mr.
Buan observed that accused-appellant was remorseful and
19 | P a g e - J E C
was crying when he made the confession in the presence of
SPO1 Amoranto at the NBI laboratory.13
When accused-appellant was brought before Inquest
Prosecutor Elpidia J. Itoc at around noon of July 13, 1999 in
Cavite City, accused-appellant had with him a handwritten
confession which he had executed inside his cell at the
Municipal Jail of Rosario. In his confession, accused-
appellant admitted not only that he killed the victim but that
he had before that raped her. Accused-appellant said he
laid down the victim on a grassy area near the dike. He
claimed that she did not resist when he removed her
undergarments but that when he tried to insert his penis
into the victim's vagina, she struggled and resisted.
Accused-appellant said he panicked and killed the child. He
then dumped her body in the shallow river near the
"compuerta" and went home.14
Atty. Sikat Agbunag, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's
Office, testified that at noon of July 13, 1999, while she was
in their office in Cavite City, Prosecutor Itoc came together
with accused-appellant and some policemen. Prosecutor
Itoc asked Atty. Agbunag to assist accused-appellant about
his confession. Atty. Agbunag read the document, informed
accused-appellant of his constitutional rights, and warned
him that the document could be used against him and that
he could be convicted of the case against him, but,
according to her, accused-appellant said that he had freely
and voluntarily executed the document because he was
bothered by his conscience. Accused-appellant, assisted by
Atty. Agbunag, then affixed his signature to the document
and swore to it before Prosecutor Itoc.15
At the instance of City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu of Cavite
City, NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan took buccal
swabs and hair samples from accused-appellant, as well as
buccal swabs and hair samples from the parents of the
victim, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and Arnulfo Diolola. The
samples were submitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI
for examination.
Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI,
conducted DNA tests on the specimens collected by Dr.
Vertido. She testified that the vaginal swabs of the victim
taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy contained the DNA
profiles of accused-appellant and the victim.16
The defense then presented as witnesses accused-
appellant Gerrico Vallejo and his sister Aimee Vallejo. Their
testimonies show that at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of July 10, 1999, accused-appellant, Aimee, and their sister
Abigail were in their house in Barangay Talisay, Ligtong I,
Rosario, Cavite when Daisy Diolola came to ask accused-
appellant to draw her school project. After making the
request, Daisy left.17 Accused-appellant did not immediately
make the drawing because he was watching television.
Accused-appellant said that he finished the drawing at
about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and gave it to the
victim's aunt, Glory. He then returned home to watch
television again. He claimed he did not go out of the house
until 7:00 o'clock in the evening when he saw Ma. Nida,
who was looking for her daughter. Accused-appellant said
he told her that he had not seen Daisy. After that, accused-
appellant said he went to the "pilapil" and talked with some
friends, and, at about 8:00 o'clock that evening, he went
home.
At 9:00 o'clock in the morning of July 11, 1999, barangay
officials fetched accused-appellant from his house and took
him to the barangay hall, where he was asked about the
disappearance of Daisy. He claimed that he did not know
anything about it. Accused-appellant was allowed to go
home, but, at 11:00 o'clock that morning, policemen came
and invited him to the police headquarters for questioning.
His mother went with him to the police station. There,
accused-appellant was asked whether he had something to
do with the rape and killing of Daisy. He denied knowledge
of the crime.
At 4:00 o'clock that afternoon, accused-appellant
accompanied the police to his house to get the basketball
shorts and shirt he was wearing the day before, which were
placed together with other dirty clothes at the back of their
house. According to accused-appellant, the police forced
him to admit that he had raped and killed Daisy and that he
admitted having committed the crime to stop them from
beating him up. Accused-appellant claimed the police even
burned his penis with a lighted cigarette and pricked it with
a needle.
Accused-appellant confirmed that Mayor Renato Abutan
and Atty. Lupo Leyva went to see him in the investigation
room of the police station and told him that they would help
him if he told the truth. Atty. Leyva asked him whether he
wanted him to be his counsel, and accused-appellant said
he answered in the affirmative. He said Atty. Leyva
informed him of his constitutional rights. Accused-appellant
claimed that, although he admitted to Mayor Abutan and
Atty. Leyva the commission of the crime, this was because
the police had maltreated him. Accused-appellant said he
did not tell the mayor or Atty. Leyva that he had been
tortured because the policemen were around and he was
afraid of them. It appears that the family of accused-
appellant transferred their residence to Laguna on July 12,
1999 because of fear of reprisal by residents of their
barangay.18 According to accused-appellant, Mayor Abutan
and Atty. Leyva were not present when he gave his
confession to the police and signed the same. Accused-
appellant claims that although Exhibit "N" was in his own
handwriting, he merely copied the contents thereof from a
pattern given to him by the police.19
On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding
accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged. The
dispositive portion of its decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
considerations, the Court finds the accused Gerrico
Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide, as
charged in the Information, accordingly hereby
sentences him to the supreme penalty of DEATH.
20 | P a g e - J E C
The accused is directed to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
"SO ORDERED."20
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:
"I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE
INSUFFICIENCY AND WEAKNESS OF THE
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION.
"II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE
ALLEGED ORAL CONFESSIONS OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE ITS BEING
HEARSAY IN NATURE.
"III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GIVING PROBATIVE
VALUE TO THE WRITTEN EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WAS
OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION AND THAT THE LAWYER WHO
ASSISTED HIM DURING HIS CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION DID NOT AND COULD NOT
POSSIBLY GIVE HIM EFFECTIVE LEGAL
ASSISTANCE."
We find accused-appellant's contentions to be without
merit.
First. An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness
is available, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence is
presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused committed the crime.21 In rape with
homicide, the evidence against an accused is more often
than not circumstantial. This is because the nature of the
crime, where only the victim and the rapist would have been
present at the time of its commission, makes the
prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the
victim could no longer testify against the perpetrator. Resort
to circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand
direct evidence proving the modality of the offense and the
identity of the perpetrator is unreasonable.22
Under Rule 133, section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a
conviction if:
"(a) there is more than one circumstance;
"(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and
 "(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as
to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt."23
In the case at bar, the following circumstantial evidence
establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-
appellant:
1. The victim went to Aimee Vallejo's house, where
accused-appellant was residing, at 1:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of July 10, 1999, for tutoring.
2. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
accused-appellant and Daisy went together to the
latter's house to get a book from which the former
could copy Daisy's school project. After getting the
book, they proceeded to accused-appellant's
residence.
3. From accused-appellant's house, Daisy then
went to the house of Jessiemin Mataverde where
she watched television. Accused-appellant
thereafter arrived and whispered something to
Daisy, and the latter went with him towards the
"compuerta."
4. At about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the
spouses Iluminado and Charito Yepes saw
accused-appellant coming out of the "compuerta,"
with his clothes, basketball shorts, and t-shirt wet,
although his face and hair were not. According to
these witnesses, he looked pale, uneasy, and
troubled (balisa). He kept looking around and did
not even greet them as was his custom to do so.
5. The fishing boat which accused-appellant used
as a bomber (a boat for catching fish with
dynamite) was docked by the seashore.
6. A little before 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
Jessiemin Mataverde also saw accused-appellant
buying a Marlboro cigarette from a store.
Jessiemen also noticed that accused-appellant's
clothes were wet but not his face nor his hair.
7. By 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, as Ma. Nida
Diolola looked for her daughter, she was told by
accused-appellant that Daisy had gone to her
classmate Rosario's house. The information
proved to be false.
8. Daisy's body was found tied to an aroma tree at
the part of the river near the "compuerta."
9. During the initial investigation, accused-
appellant had scratches on his feet similar to those
caused by the thorns of an aroma tree.
10. The clothes which accused-appellant wore the
day before were bloodstained. The bloodstains on
21 | P a g e - J E C
accused-appellant's clothes and on Daisy's clothes
were found positive of human blood type "A."
11. Accused-appellant has blood type "O."
12. The vaginal swabs from Daisy's body
contained her DNA profile as well as that of
accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant contends that the bloodstains found on
his garments were not proven to have been that of the
victim as the victim's blood type was not determined.
The contention has no merit. The examination conducted
by Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan of both accused-
appellant's and the victim's clothing yielded bloodstains of
the same blood type "A".24 Even if there was no direct
determination as to what blood type the victim had, it can
reasonably be inferred that the victim was blood type "A"
since she sustained contused abrasions all over her body
which would necessarily produce the bloodstains on her
clothing.25 That it was the victim's blood which
predominantly registered in the examination was explained
by Mr. Buan, thus:26
"ATTY. ESPIRITU
Q: But you will agree with me that more
probably than not, if a crime is being committed,
and it results in a bloody death, it is very possible
that the blood of the victim and the blood of the
assailant might mix in that particular item like the t-
shirt, shorts or pants?
A: It is possible when there is a huge amount
of blood coming from the victim and the suspect,
Sir. It is possible. It will mix. Whichever is the
dominant blood in it, it will be the one which will
register. For example, if there is more blood
coming from the victim, that blood will be the one to
register, on occasions when the two blood mix.
Q: But in these specimens number 1 to 5, it is
very clear now that only type A and no type O
blood was found?
A: Yes, sir."
Accused-appellant also questions the validity of the method
by which his bloodstained clothes were recovered.
According to accused-appellant, the policemen questioned
him as to the clothes he wore the day before. Thereafter,
they took him to his house and accused-appellant
accompanied them to the back of the house where dirty
clothes were kept.27 There is no showing, however, that
accused-appellant was coerced or forced into producing the
garments. Indeed, that the accused-appellant voluntarily
brought out the clothes sought by the police becomes more
convincing when considered together with his confessions.
A consented warrantless search is an exception to the
proscription in Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution. As
we have held, the consent of the owner of the house to the
search effectively removes any badge of illegality.28
The DNA analysis conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida
Viloria-Magsipoc is also questioned by accused-appellant.
He argues that the prosecution failed to show that all the
samples submitted for DNA testing were not contaminated,
considering that these specimens were already soaked in
smirchy waters before they were submitted to the
laboratory.
DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells
which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical
twins, each person's DNA profile is distinct and unique.29
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the
scene of the crime or from the victim's body for the
suspect's DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence
sample is then matched with the reference sample taken
from the suspect and the victim.30
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an
association exists between the evidence sample and the
reference sample.31 The samples collected are subjected to
various chemical processes to establish their profile. 32 The
test may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must
have originated from different sources (exclusion).
This conclusion is absolute and requires no further
analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results
of the test, whether the samples have similar DNA
types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety
of reasons including degradation, contamination, or
failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various
parts of the analysis might then be repeated with
the same or a different sample, to obtain a more
conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have
originated from the same source (inclusion).33 In
such a case, the samples are found to be similar,
the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical
significance of the Similarity.34
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
therefore, courts should consider, among others things, the
following data: how the samples were collected, how they
were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the
analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of
the victim and of accused-appellant, the smears taken from
the victim as well as the strands of hair and nails taken from
22 | P a g e - J E C
her tested negative for the presence of human
DNA,35 because, as Ms. Viloria-Magsipoc explained:
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: I noticed that specimens 1 to 5 consisting
of bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim
and of the accused gave negative results for the
presence of human DNA. Why is it so? What is the
reason for this when there are still bloodstains on
the clothing?
A: After this Honorable Court issued an Order
for DNA analysis, serological methods were
already conducted on the said specimens. And
upon inquiry from Mr. Buan and as far as he also
knew of this case, and we also interviewed the
mother who came over to the laboratory one time
on how was the state of the specimens when they
were found out. We found that these specimens
were soaked in smirchy water before they were
submitted to the laboratory. The state of the
specimens prior to the DNA analysis could have
hampered the preservation of any DNA that could
have been there before. So when serological
methods were done on these specimens, Mr.
Byron could have taken such portion or stains that
were only amenable for serological method and
were not enough for DNA analysis already. So
negative results were found on the clothings that
were submitted which were specimens no. 1 to 5 in
my report, Sir.
Q: I also noticed that specimen no. 6-B
consisting of the smears taken from the victim also
proved negative for human DNA, why is it so?
A: Because when we received the vaginal
smears submitted by Dr. Vertido, the smear on the
slide was very, very dry and could have chipped
off. I already informed Dr. Vertido about it and he
confirmed the state of the specimen. And I told him
that maybe it would be the swab that could help us
in this case, Sir. And so upon examination, the
smears geared negative results and the swabs
gave positive results, Sir.
Q: How about specimen no. 7, the hair and
nails taken from the victim, why did they show
negative results for DNA?
A: The hair samples were cut hair. This
means that the hair did not contain any root. So
any hair that is above the skin or the epidermis of
one's skin would give negative results as the hair
shaft is negative for DNA. And then the nails did
not contain any subcutaneous cells that would be
amenable for DNA analysis also, Sir.
Q: So it's the inadequacy of the specimens
that were the reason for this negative result, not
 the inadequacy of the examination or the "(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
instruments used? violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him."
A: Yes, Sir."
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions
Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for treated in this constitutional provision: (1) coerced
examination, and not the possibility that the samples had confessions, the product of third degree methods such as
been contaminated, which accounted for the negative torture, force, violence, threat, and intimidation, which are
results of their examination. But the vaginal swabs taken dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2)
from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human uncounselled statements, given without the benefit of
DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of
profile of accused-appellant:36 the same section.38

"PROSECUTOR LU: Accused-appellant argues that the oral confessions given to

Mayor Abutan of Rosario, Cavite and to NBI Forensic
Biologist should be deemed inadmissible for being violative
Q: So based on your findings, can we say
of his constitutional rights as these were made by one
conclusively that the DNA profile of the accused in
already under custodial investigation to persons in authority
this case was found in the vaginal swabs taken
without the presence of counsel. With respect to the oral
from the victim?
confessions, Atty. Leyva testified:39

A: Yes, Sir.
"PROSECUTOR LU:

Q: That is very definite and conclusive?

Q: Upon meeting this Gerrico Vallejo at the
police station were you able to confer with him?
A: Yes, Sir."
A: Yes, Sir.
In conclusion, we hold that the totality of the evidence
points to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant is
Q: Did you ask him whether he really wants
guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is weighed not
you to represent or assist him as a lawyer during
counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved that investigation?
are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also
inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight
and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its A: I did, as a matter of fact, I asked him
effect upon the court.37 This is how it is in this case. whether he would like me to represent him in that
investigation, Sir.
Second. Accused-appellant challenges the validity of the
oral and written confessions presented as evidence against Q: And what was his answer?
him. He alleges that the oral confessions were inadmissible
in evidence for being hearsay, while the extrajudicial A: He said "yes".
confessions were obtained through force and intimidation.
Q: After agreeing to retain you as his counsel,
The claim is untenable. Section 12 of Art. III of the what else did you talk about?
Constitution provides in pertinent parts:
A: I told him that in the investigation, whatever
"(1) Any person under investigation for the he will state may be used against him, so it's a sort
commission of an offense shall have the right to be of discouraging him from making any statement to
informed of his right to remain silent and to have the police, Sir."
competent and independent counsel, preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the Upon cross-examination, Atty. Leyva testified as follows:40
services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel. Q: You stated that you personally read this
recital of the constitutional rights of the accused?
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation
A: Yes, Sir.
or any other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of Q: But it will appear in this recital of
detention are prohibited. constitutional rights that you did not inform the
accused that the statement that he will be giving
might be used against him in a court of justice?
23 | P a g e - J E C
 A: I did that, Sir.
Q: But it does not appear in this statement?
PROSECUTOR LU
The best evidence will be the statement,
your Honor.
ATTY ESPIRITU
The only thing that is stated here is that
"Maaaring gamitin pabor o laban sa iyo."
COURT
Let the witness answer.
A: I told him that, as a matter of fact, and I
also told him to tell the truth and nothing but the
truth."
The testimony of Atty. Leyva is not only corroborated by the
testimony of Mayor Renato Abutan,41 it is also confirmed by
accused-appellant who testified as follows:42
"ATTY. ESPIRITU:
Q: Did Atty. Leyva explain to you the meaning
and significance of that document which you are
supposed to have executed and signed?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What did Atty. Leyva tell you?
A: That they are allowing me to exercise my
constitutional right to reveal or narrate all what I
know about this case, Sir.
Q: Did Atty. Leyva tell you that if you do not
want, nobody can force you to give that statement?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And did he tell you that what you would be
giving is an extra-judicial confession?
A: Yes, Sir."
Clearly, accused-appellant cannot now claim that he was
not apprised of the consequences of the statements he was
to make as well as the written confessions he was to
execute. Neither can he question the qualifications of Atty.
Lupo Leyva who acted as his counsel during the
investigation. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not
challenge all the questions being propounded to his client.
24 | P a g e - J E C
The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an
accused from saying anything which might incriminate him
but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude
the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. Indeed, counsel should not prevent an
accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.43
Indeed, accused-appellant admitted that he was first asked
whether he wanted the services of Atty. Leyva before the
latter acted as his defense counsel.44 And counsel who is
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the
accused where the latter never raised any objection against
the former's appointment during the course of the
investigation but, on the contrary, thereafter subscribed to
the veracity of his statement before the swearing
officer.45 Contrary to the assertions of accused-appellant,
Atty. Leyva was not the municipal attorney of Rosario,
Cavite but only a legal adviser of Mayor Renato Abutan.46
Accused-appellant contends that the rulings in People vs.
Andan47 and People vs. Mantung48 do not apply to this
case. We disagree. The facts of these cases and that of the
case at bar are similar. In all these cases, the accused
made extrajudicial confessions to the municipal mayor
freely and voluntarily. In all of them, the extrajudicial
confessions were held admissible in evidence, being the
spontaneous, free, and voluntary admissions of the guilt of
the accused. We note further that the testimony of Mayor
Abutan was never objected to by the defense.
Indeed, the mayor's questions to accused-appellant were
not in the nature of an interrogation, but rather an act of
benevolence by a leader seeking to help one of his
constituents. Thus, Mayor Abutan testified:49
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: And during the conversation you had with
Accused Gerrico Vallejo, what exactly did he tell
you?
A: At first he said that he did not do that. That
was the first thing he told me. Then I told him that I
will not be able to help him if he will not tell me the
truth.
Q: And what was the reply of the accused?
A: He had been silent for a minute. Then we
talked about the incident, Sir.
Q: And what exactly did he tell you about the
incident?
A: I asked him, "Were you under the influence
of drugs at that time"?
Q: What else did he tell you?
 A: I told him, "What reason pushed you to do
that thing?" x x x
Q: Please tell us in tagalog, the exact words
that the accused used in telling you what
happened.
A: He told me that he saw the child as if she
was headless at that time. That is why he strangled
the child, Sir. ("Ang sabi niya po sa 'kin, nakita niya
raw 'yung bata na parang walang ulo na
naglalakad. Kaya po sinakal niya.")
COURT:
Q: When you told the accused that you will
help him, what kind of help were you thinking at
that time?
A: I told him that if he will tell the truth, I could
help give him legal counsel.
Q: And what was the answer of the accused?
A: Yes, he will tell me the truth, Your Honor."
In People vs. Mantung,50 this Court said:
"Never was it raised during the trial that Mantung's
admission during the press conference was
coerced or made under duress. As the records
show, accused-appellant voluntarily made the
statements in response to Mayor Marquez'
question as to whether he killed the pawnshop
employees. Mantung answered in the affirmative
and even proceeded to explain that he killed the
victims because they made him eat pork. These
circumstances hardly indicate that Mantung felt
compelled to own up to the crime. Besides, he
could have chosen to remain silent or to do deny
altogether any participation in the robbery and
killings but he did not; thus accused-appellant
sealed his own fate. As held in People v. Montiero,
a confession constitutes evidence of high order
since it is supported by the strong presumption that
no person of normal mind would deliberately and
knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by
truth and his conscience."
And in People vs. Andan, it was explained:
"Thus, it has been held that the constitutional
procedures on custodial investigation do not apply
to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted
having committed the crime. What the Constitution
bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating
facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12
are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of
25 | P a g e - J E C
coercion by the state as would lead the accused to
admit something false, not prevent him from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth."51
For the same reason, the oral confession made by
accused-appellant to NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron
Buan is admissible. Accused-appellant would have this
Court exclude this confession on the ground that it was
uncounselled and that Mr. Buan, who initiated the
conversation with accused-appellant, was part of the NBI.
The issue concerning the sufficiency of the assistance
given by Atty. Leyva has already been discussed. On the
other hand, the questions put by Mr. Buan to accused-
appellant were asked out of mere personal curiosity and
clearly not as part of his tasks. As Buan testified:52
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: What was the subject of your conversation
with him?
A: It is customary when we examine the
accused. During the examination, we talk to them
for me to add knowledge on the case, Sir.
Q: What did you talk about during your
conversation?
A: I asked him if he was the one who did the
killing on this victim, Daisy Diolola, Sir.
Q: And what was the reply of the accused?
A: He said yes, Sir.
Q: What else did you ask the accused?
A: I remember that while asking him, he was
crying as if feeling remorse on the killing, Sir.
....
Q: And it was you who initiated the
conversation?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Do you usually do that?
A: Yes, Sir. We usually do that.
Q: Is that part of your procedure?
A: It is not SOP. But for me alone, I want to
know more about the case, Sir. And any
information either on the victim or from the suspect
will help me personally. It's not an SOP, Sir."
The confession, thus, can be likened to one freely and Q: Between 10:30 in the morning up to 11:00
voluntarily given to an ordinary individual and is, therefore, o'clock in the evening, what did you do there?
admissible as evidence.
A: They were interrogating and forcing me to
Third. The admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of admit something, Sir.
accused-appellant is also attacked on the ground that these
were extracted from him by means of torture, beatings, and Q: In what way did they force you to admit
threats to his life. The bare assertions of maltreatment by something?
the police authorities in extracting confessions from the
accused are not sufficient. The standing rule is that "where
A: They were mauling me, Sir.
the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or
duress nor violence on their person; where they failed to
complain to the officer who administered their oaths; where Q: The 5 of them?
they did not institute any criminal or administrative action
against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where A: Yes, Sir.
there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies;
and where they did not have themselves examined by a Q: The 5 of them remained inside that room
reputable physician to buttress their claim," all these will be with you throughout the questioning?
considered as indicating voluntariness.53 Indeed,
extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary,
and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that A: Yes, Sir.
the declarant's consent in executing the same has been
vitiated, the confession will be sustained.54 Q: In what way did they hurt you?

Accused-appellant's claim that he was tortured and A: They burned my private part with a lighted
subjected to beatings by policemen in order to extract the cigarette butt and pierced me with a needle, Sir.
said confession from him is unsupported by any proof:55
Q: Who did these things to you?
"ATTY. ESPIRITU:
A: Mercado, Sir.
Q: Did they further interrogate you?
Q: Who is this Mercado?
A: Yes, sir.
A: EPZA policemen, Sir.
Q: What else did they ask you?
Q: Did the other policemen help in doing
A: They were asking me the project, Sir. these things to you?

Q: What else? A: No, Sir.

A: That is the only thing, Sir. Q: Were you asked to undress or you were
forced to do that?
Q: Who was doing the questioning?
A: They forced me to remove my clothes, Sir.
A: The investigator, Sir.
Q: In what way did they force you to remove
Q: How many were they inside that room? your clothes?

A: Five, Sir. A: They were asking me to take off the pants

which I was wearing at the time, Sir.
Q: They are all policemen?
Q: Did they do anything to you to force you to
remove your pants?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Until what time did they keep you inside
that room?
Q: What?
A: Up to 11:00 in the evening, Sir.

26 | P a g e - J E C
 A: They boxed me, Sir.
Q: What else, if any?
A: They hit me with a piece of wood, Sir.
Q: What did you feel when your private part
was burned with a cigarette butt?
A: It was painful, Sir.
Q: In what part of your body were you pricked
by a needle?
A: At my private part, Sir."
These bare assertions cannot be given weight. Accused-
appellant testified that he was made to stay in the municipal
hall from 10:00 o'clock in the morning until 11:00 o'clock
that night of July 10, 1999, during which time he was boxed,
tortured, and hit with a piece of wood by policemen to make
him admit to the crime. However, accused-appellant was
physically examined by Dr. Antonio Vertido at about 9:00
o'clock in the evening of the same day. While the results
show that accused-appellant did sustain injuries, the same
are incompatible with his claim of torture. As Dr. Vertido
testified:56
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: What were your findings when you
conducted the physical examination of the
suspect?
A: I found abrasions, your Honor, abrasions
on the thigh, knees, legs and feet of the suspect,
and I also found hematoma on the left ring finger,
posterior aspect and at the same time, a laceration
on the left ring finger.
Q: In your findings, it appears that the
accused in this case suffered certain physical
injuries on his person like this abrasion on the
thigh, right anterior lateral aspect lower third of the
knee, what could have caused this injury?
A: Abrasions are usually caused when the
skin comes in contact with a rough surface, Sir.
Hematoma are usually caused by a blunt
instrument or object and laceration is the forcible
contact of the skin from that blunt object.
Q: I am particularly interested in your findings
hematoma on the left ring finger, posterior aspect
and laceration left ring finger posterior aspect, what
could have caused those injuries on the accused?
27 | P a g e - J E C
A: My opinion to these hematoma and
laceration found on the said left ring finger was that
it was caused by a bite, Sir."
If the account of accused-appellant that he was beaten up
is true, Dr. Antonio Vertido would have found more than
mere abrasions and hematoma on his left finger. Dr.
Vertido's findings are more consistent with the theory that
accused-appellant sustained physical injuries as a result of
the struggle made by the victim during the commission of
the rape in the "compuerta."
At all events, even if accused-appellant was truthful and his
assailed confessions are inadmissible, the circumstantial
evidence, as already shown, is sufficient to establish his
guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. The prosecution
witnesses presented a mosaic of circumstances showing
accused-appellant's guilt. Their testimonies rule out the
possibility that the crime was the handiwork of some other
evil mind. These witnesses have not been shown to have
been motivated by ill will against accused-appellant.
On the other hand, no other witness not related to accused-
appellant was ever called to corroborate his claim. The
defense presented only accused-appellant's sister, Aimee
Vallejo, to corroborate his story. We have held time and
again that alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by
the accused and his relatives, and not by credible
persons.57 It is well settled that alibi is the weakest of all
defenses as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.
For this reason, this Court looks with caution upon the
defense of alibi, especially when, as in this case, it is
corroborated only by relatives or friends of the accused.58
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide
is committed, the penalty shall be death."59 Therefore, no
other penalty can be imposed on accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations,
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite
City, finding accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of
DEATH and directing him to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages, is hereby AFFIRMED.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art.
83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this
decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded
to the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise
of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona,
JJ., concur.
De Leon, Jr., J., abroad, on official business.
G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R
TIJING, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and
ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39056, reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas
corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of
petitioners.
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children.
The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April
27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse
Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida
served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita
Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to
her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since
Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she
asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her
four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita
as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while
Bienvenida was doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and
Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to
Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them
there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer
went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later.
She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to
discover that Angelita had moved to another place.
Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and
also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for
assistance.
Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could
not imagine how her spouse would react to the
disappearance of their youngest child and this made her
problem even more serious. As fate would have it,
Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, this
time, they looked for their missing son in other places.
Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of
his whereabouts.
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a
tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the
common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were
lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan,
where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first
time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was
pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late
28 | P a g e - J E C
Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas
Lopez.1 She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the
boy despite her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas
corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. To
substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two
witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez.
The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the
delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her
clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with
her clinical records.2 The second witness, Benjamin Lopez,
declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not
have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter
was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and
bumped his private part against the edge of a banca
causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-
bearing capacity. Benjamin further declared that Tomas
admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an
adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with
children.3
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother
of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to
John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of
midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She
added, though, that she has two other children with her real
husband, Angel Sanchez.4 She said the birth of John
Thomas was registered by her common-law husband,
Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on
August 4, 1989.
On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since
Angelita and her common-law husband could not have
children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an
impossibility.5 The trial court also held that the minor and
Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it
ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are
one and the same person who is the natural child of
petitioners. The trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED,
judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition for Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent
Angelita Diamante is ordered to immediately
release from her personal custody minor John
Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over and/or
surrender his person to petitioners, Spouses
Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing,
immediately upon receipt hereof.
Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby
commanded to implement the decision of this
Court by assisting herein petitioners in the recovery
of the person of their minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr.,
the same person as John Thomas D. Lopez.
SO ORDERED.6
Angelita seasonably filed her notice of
appeal.7 Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff
implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of
the minor. In his report, the sheriff stated that Angelita
peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned over the
custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing.8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court
expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.
In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not
sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor.
It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same
person,9 and disposed of the case, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of
the lower court dated March 10, 1995 is hereby
REVERSED, and a new one entered dismissing
the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 94-71606, and
directing the custody of the minor John Thomas
Lopez to be returned to respondent Angelita
Diamante, said minor having been under the care
of said respondent at the time of the filing of the
petition herein.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted
decision which was denied. Hence, the instant petition
alleging:
I
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS' ACTION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS MERELY
SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF FILIATION
THAT THE PETITIONERS HAD LIKEWISE
PROVEN.
II
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR "HABEAS CORPUS" AND
DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE
MINOR JOHN THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS
PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO
R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.11
In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the
following:
(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper
remedy?
29 | P a g e - J E C
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John
Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and
is the son of petitioners?
We shall discuss the two issues together since they are
closely related.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto.12 Thus, it is the
proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody
of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. It may even be said that in
custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale
for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of
custody over a child.13 It must be stressed too that
in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is
relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions
including those as to identity of the person.
In this case, the minor's identity is crucial in determining the
propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it must be resolved first
whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to
be her son, is the same minor named John Thomas Lopez,
whom Angelita insists to be her offspring. We must first
determine who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the
minor's biological mother. Evidence must necessarily be
adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be
distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and
the same.14 Petitioners must convincingly establish that the
minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is
the person upon whom they have rightful custody. If there is
doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the
application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke
with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.
True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and
evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to
the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its
impugned decision, resolution or order.15 But since the
conclusions of the Court of Appeals contradict those of the
trial court, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on the
record to determine which findings should be preferred as
more conformable to the evidentiary facts.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the
evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish
that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son,
Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear
children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth
of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez
Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez
without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had
that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered
no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988
or for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly
delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were test as evidence is still open to challenge.21 Eventually, as
ever submitted. the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to
rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said,
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that that courts should apply the results of science when
Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to
Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile reject said result is to deny progress.22 Though it is not
because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it
that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of
Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan parentage and identity issues.
Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together.
Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
fourteen years, they also bore no offspring. assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of Costs against the private respondent.
John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of
the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the SO ORDERED.
alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the attending
physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.
registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or
midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The
certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within
thirty days after the birth.16 Significantly, the birth certificate
of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent
were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy,
Bulacan, which is false because even private respondent
had admitted she is a "common-law wife".17 This false entry
puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.

Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the
child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong
similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish
parentage.18 Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion
should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity
to observe the physical appearances of the minor and
petitioner concerned.

Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in

Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic.
Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records
consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures
of petitioners.

All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject

minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of habeas
corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using

conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the
facility and expertise in using DNA test19 for identification
and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The
analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other
from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged
father and child are analyzed to establish parentage.20 Of

30 | P a g e - J E C
G.R. L-No. 5110 August 19, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FABIANA LEGASPI and PAULINO
PULONGBARET, defendants-appellants.
Leocadio Joaquin for appellants.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The appellants were charged with the crime of adultery in
an information couched in the following language:
The undersigned accuses Fabiana Legaspi and
Paulino Pulongbaret with the crime of adultery
committed as follows:
That on or about the 23d day of March, 1908, in
the city of Manila, P. I., the accused Fabiana
Legaspi was at the said time and place a married
woman in that she was united in wedlock to a
certain Sotero Cruz; that the accused Paulino
Pulongbaret, at the said time and place, had
knowledge that the said Fabiana Legaspi was
legally married to the said Sotero Cruz; that the
said accused Paulino Pulongbaret and Fabiana
Legaspi did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lie
together and have sexual intercourse. All contrary
to law.
Counsel for appellants contends that the information as
insufficient, and does not charge the dfendants or either of
them with any crime; and further that the evidence of record
does not established beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of illicit relations or carnal access between the
defendants, and fails to sustain a finding of their guilt of any
crime.
It will be seen from an examination of the above set out
information that it clearly and succinctly sets out: First, the
names of the defendants; second, the designation of the
crime charged; third, the acts complained of as constituting
the crime, in ordinary and concise language, and in such
form as to enable a person of common understanding to
know what is intended and the court to pronounce judgment
according to right; fourth, that the offense was committed
within the jurisdiction of the coourt; and fifth, the name of
the offended party. It is, therefore, under the provisions of
section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, a sufficient
information.
The husband, who was the complaining witness, testified
that at about 10 o'clock on the evening of the day set out in
the complaint, he found that his wife had left his house; that
his suspicions of her fidelity having been previously
aroused he went in search of her; that he found her in the
house of her aunt, and without entering watched the house
until the shutters of the window through which he could see
31 | P a g e - J E C
her from the street were closed; that he then crept up to the
window and was able to observe what went on inside
through a crack in the shutter; that he there and then
discovered the two accused flagrante delicto; that he then
without giving them any warning called upon the policeman
upon duty in that neighborhood to arrest them; that the
policemen at first refused to take any action, and only did
so when the witness procured a written order from the
sergeant at the local police station; that the policeman then
joined the witness, and creeping up to the shutter through
which the witness had previously observed the movements
of the accused, discovered them in bed together, and
forthwith arrested them.
The testimony of the husband is satisfactory corroborated
by the testimony of the policemen, who appears to have
been wholly disinterested witness, and to have been called
upon for assistance by the complaining witness for that sole
reason that he happened to be on duty on his beat at the
time when and near the place where the crime was
committed.
The defendant, Fabiana Legaspi, did not testify in her own
behalf, but her codefendant admitted that at the time when
the arrest was made he was lone in the room with his
codefendant; he also admitted that she was at that time in
bed, but he denied that he was in bed with her, or had had
any criminal relations with her.
We do not think that the statement of this accused is
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the truth of the
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, which fully
establishes the guilt of both the accused as charged in the
complaint ; and, as pointed out by the trial judge, the
admissions of his accused would in themselves appear to
be sufficient to established the commission of the crime; for
the unexplained fact that a man is found at a late hour of
the night, alone in a room with another man's wife, she
being in bed, and absent from her husband's home without
his consent, and as far as she knew without his knowledge,
would seem to be sufficient to sustain a conviction of the
crime of adultery. Proof of the commission of the crime of
adultery, like proof of he commission of most other crimes,
may safely be rested on circumstantial evidence when that
evidence is such that it leaves no room for reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused, and, indeed, contrary to
the contention of counsel for appellants, convictions for this
crime have frequently been had without direct evidence as
to the specific acts constituting the offense, as will appear
from the following citations from decisions of the Tribunal
Supremo de Espaa:
The finding in the possession of a married woman
of several love letters signed by her paramour;
their having been seen together in different places,
and finally, the fact that they were surprised in a
well-known assignation house which the accused
woman admitted having visited six times in
company with the former, are data and indications
sufficient to convict them both of the crime of
adultery; because, as the supreme court of Spain
says, "it shows without doubt not only thier illicit
 relations but also such acts as constitute
adultery and are the consequence of said
relations." (Decision of the 23d of June, 1874.)

First. It having reached the knowledge of . . . that

his wife was living in intimacy with . . . known by
the name of . . . instead of remaining in the house
of . . . where she was placed, he asked for and
obtained from the court a warrant to enter and
search the residence of the keeper . . ., at any time
of the night and when this was done by the proper
authorities, on the morning of January 5, at last,
they found . . . and . . . in the only bedroom that
there was in the house, and in which there was but
one bed, partially disrobed, the bed with evident
signs having been used, while the clothes of both
were mixed together.

The trial court, in imposing the penalty, gave the accused

the benefit of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code,
and sentenced them to two years, four months, and one
day of prision correccional, that being the minimum penalty
prescribed for the crime of adultery: there is nothing in the
record which discloses that the defendants are members of
uncivilized or semicivilized tribes or persons of notably low
order of intelligence, nor does it appear that the commission
of the crime of adultery, of which they were convicted, was
marked by such exceptional circumstances as to suggest a
holding that they are entitled to the benefit of the provisions
of this article, and this court has in general declined to
affirm the extension of the benefits of its provisions to
persons convicted of the crime of adultery. (U. S. vs. Borjal
et al., 9 Phil. Rep., 140; U.S. vs. Mercado et al .,1 decided
August 3, 1909.)

We therefore reverse so much of the sentence of the trial

court as imposes upon the defendants the penalty of two
years, four months, and one day of prision correccional,
and instead thereof we impose upon them and each of
them the penalty of three years, six months, and twenty-one
days of prision correccional, and thus the sentence of the
trial court is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the appellants.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.

32 | P a g e - J E C
G.R. No. 112229 March 18, 1997
RAYMOND PE LIM, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOANNA ROSE C. PE LIM, Minor
represented by her Natural Mother and Guardian,
MARIBEL CRUZ y TAYAG, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
All too often, immature men who allow their emotions to
hold sway over their rational minds come to grief when their
passions cool off, but not before inflicting irreparable
psychic and spiritual damage on their victims and the fruits
of their wanton acts. As they sow the proverbial "wild oats,"
they are heedless of the dire consequences they heap on
their heads. When the inevitable confrontation explodes
and they are helpless to extricate themselves from the
messy situation arising from their wrongdoing, eventually
they invoke the help of the courts as their final arbiter.
Before us is one of those cases where a man woos a maid,
succeeds in seducing and impregnating her, only to
disclaim the paternity of the child when made to account for
his misdeeds.
DNA, 1 being a relatively new science, it has not as yet
been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity
will still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence
as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the
putative father.
This petition for review on certiorari sprang from a
complaint filed by Maribel Cruz for child support on behalf
of her daughter, private respondent Joanna Rose C. Pe
Lim, against petitioner Raymond Pe Lim who, Maribel
claims, is Joanna's father.
Maribel's story unfolds, thus:
Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-time
student. She also worked as a receptionist at Tonight's
Club and Resthouse along Roxas Blvd., Manila. She met
petitioner during her first night on the job. Petitioner wooed
her and Maribel reciprocated his love. They soon lived
together, with petitioner paying the rentals in a succession
of apartments in Cubao, Quezon City, Tambo, Paranaque
and Makati, Metro Manila. Maribel left for Japan in July
1981, already pregnant, and returned to Manila in October
of the same year.
The couple never married because petitioner claimed that
he was not financially stable. On January 17, 1982, Maribel
gave birth to their daughter at the Cardinal Santos Memorial
Hospital. The bills for Maribel's three-day confinement at
the hospital were paid for by Raymond and he also caused
the registration of the name Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim on the
child's birth certificate. After Joanna Rose's birth, the love
affair between Maribel and petitioner continued.
33 | P a g e - J E C
Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noted that
petitioner's feelings toward her started to wane. He
subsequently abandoned her and Joanna Rose. Maribel
tried to support herself by accepting various jobs and with
occasional help from relatives, but it was never enough.
She asked petitioner for support but, despite promises to do
so, it was never given. Maribel then filed a complaint
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
for support.
Petitioner, on the other hand, has a different version: He
claims that in 1978, he went to Tonight's Club and
Resthouse along Roxas Boulevard, Manila to relax after a
hard day's work. There he met Maribel, a pretty and
aggressive hospitality girl. Raymond observed that while
she had a pleasing personality, she seemed to be quite
experienced because she started to kiss him on the cheeks
and neck, whispering to him that they could go anywhere
and rest. Raymond declined to take Maribel up on her offer
saying that he only wanted someone to talk to. They
became friends after that first meeting, and while he often
saw her, there was no intimacy between them. He did admit
giving Maribel sizeable tips because she confided in him
that she needed money.
Raymond alleged that he was not Maribel's only customer
at the club. In 1980, she left for Japan to work as an
entertainer.
In 1981, she returned to Manila pregnant, and appealed to
Raymond for help because she claimed that she could not
face her relatives in her condition. Raymond got her an
apartment and paid its rentals until she gave birth to a baby
girl on January 17, 1982. Raymond admits paying the
hospital bills but claims that Maribel was supposed to pay
him back for it. When she failed to do so, Raymond stopped
seeing her.
Raymond denies being the father of Maribel's child,
claiming that they were only friends and nothing more.
The trial court rendered a decision on June 10, 1971, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant ordering herein
defendant, Raymond Pe Lim to give
support to his natural daughter, minor
Joanna Rose Pe Lim in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Philippine
Currency, per month for the support,
maintenance, education and well-being of
said child, the same to be paid on or
before the 5th day of each month and
monthly thereafter starting June, 1991,
until the said minor Joanna Rose Pe Lim,
shall have reached the age of majority.
The defendant is further ordered to pay
the plaintiff the sum of Seven Thousand
 Five Hundred (P7,500.00) Pesos, financial stability. Sooner or later they will
Philippine Currency, for attorney's fees come to know of it and I am sure that they
and other litigation expenses. will not consent it. I have no alternative but
to leave them & to stick it up with you. This
No costs. is where the financial side comes in. I can't
allow myself walking away from my family
making them think that I can stand on my
SO ORDERED.
own two feet but the truth of the matter is
not and seeing both of you suffer for only
Petitioner then elevated his case to the Court of Appeals one stupid mistake which is I was not yet
which affirmed the trial court's findings. financially ready to face the consequence.

Petitioner now argues before the Court that there is no clear
and convincing evidence on record to show that there was
actual cohabitation between him and Maribel. In fact,
petitioner infers that Maribel became pregnant only when
she went to Japan. In short, he denies that he is the father
of Joanna Rose. He further questions the awarded support
of P10,000.00 per month, saying that the same is beyond
his means, considering that he has a family to support.
My plan is that if you could only stick it out
with me until I am ready to face whatever
consequence that might occur during our
life or relation as husband and wife. You
have already tried it before, why can't you
stress it a little longer. In return, I promise
to be a loving & caring husband & father to
both of you.

We find no merit in this petition.
In Alberto v. Court of Appeals, 2 we said:
When a putative father manifests openly
through words and deeds his recognition
of a child, the courts can do no less than
confirm said acknowledgment. As the
immortal bard Shakespeare
perspicaciously said: "Let your own
discretion be your tutor; suit the action to
the word, the word to the action."
The evidence in the instant case shows that petitioner
considered himself to be the father of Joanna Rose as
shown by the hand-written letter he wrote to Maribel:
Hi Love,
Love, I really don't want you to be taken
away from me by anyone, whether he be
single or married. This is the reason why I
am still trying to convince you. But if you
really have decided things up and really
determined to push through with it. I guess
I just have to respect your decision. Just
remember I wish you the best of luck and
take extra-care of yourself & Joanna.
Remember, if the time comes when things
get rough for you and you have no one to
turn to, don't hesitate to call on me. I am
very much willing to be at your side to help
you.
I love you very much!

I wrote you this letter because I would like

to erase from your mind the thought of
why I can not ever [sic] you marriage right
now is because I have no longer love or
care for both Joanna & you.

Last night when we talked things over, I

was in a stage wherein everything was
happening so fast that I was running out of
time & works (sic) to make you understand
me through this letter I would like to
explain my side in a more detailed way
and I hope you could understand.

You know love, the main root of the

problem of why marriage is impossible for
us right now is not what my parents or my
family circle will say about you, but
the financial side of it. Okay, let say I did
marry you right now disregarding my

34 | P a g e - J E C
 Love, in your letter
s you seem so much
concern (sic) about my situation once
here. I really appreciate
s it, but please don't
give too much thought
u about it because
I'm physically o.k.p here. The important
thing is that don'tpthink too much and have
a lot of restl during your spare
time especially ini the situation you're in
now. If you are e feeling homesick just go
out with your friends
d and try to enjoy
yourself to the fullest while you are there.
b
Love, you said yin your letter that you
regret very much your going there &
wishes (sic) that R you have not left
a
anymore. I understand your feelings to
what had happened y after you told me
m
about it in the telephone.
o
n
Love, I miss you so much that I always re-
d
read those letters you had send me very
often. At night I always think of you and
h
the times we're together before going to
i
sleep.
m
s
It was only after petitioner separated
e from Maribel that he
started to deny paternity of Joanna l Rose. Until he got
married to another woman, he fdid not object to being
identified as Joanna Rose's father ) as disclosed in the
Certificate of Live Birth. The evidence on record reveals
that he even got a copy of the said Certificate when Joanna
From the tenor of the letter and the statements petitioner
Rose started schooling, as shown by a receipt in his name
made therein it is clear that, contrary to his vehement
from the San Juan Municipal Office. His belated denial
assertion that he and Maribel were just friends, they were
actually lovers. cannot outweigh the totality of the cogent evidence which
establishes beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is
indeed the father of Joanna Rose. 3
In an earlier letter, this time sent to Maribel while she was in
Japan, petitioner lovingly told her to take care of herself
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation
because of her "situation," obviously referring to the state of
pregnancy of Maribel: may be established in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
A
Article 172 of the Family Code states:
u
g
The filiation of legitimate children . is
established by any of the following:
1
(1) The record of birth appearing 1 in the
civil register or a final judgment; or,

1
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
9
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the8 parent
concerned. 1

Hi Love, In the absence of the foregoing evidence,

Do you know how glad I was to receive a
letter from you yesterday? At least now I'm
a little bit at ease to know that everything
is fine with you.
the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child; or

35 | P a g e - J E C
 (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a,
267a).

This article adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code
that filiation may be proven by "any evidence or proof that
the defendant is his father." 4

Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record.

His love letters to Maribel vowing to be a good father to
Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on various occasions
cuddling Joanna Rose and the Certificate of Live Birth say it
all. Accordingly, his suit must fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision

of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Mendoza, J., took no part.

36 | P a g e - J E C