JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 15, 275-284 (1979)

Performance of an Unpleasant Task: Effects of Over- vs

Under-Payment on Perception of Adequacy of Rewards
and Task Attractiveness

DIETER FREY, MARTIN IRLE, AND GERHARD HOCHG~~RTEL

University of Mannheim

Received: September 10, 1978

Subjects who came to an experiment expecting to receive a moderate amount of

money for performing a task were then told, either before or after performing it,
that their pay would be higher than, equal to, or less than they had expected.
When the actual payment was announced after the task was performed, subjects
evaluations of the task increased with the amount they were paid; however, they
estimated a higher rate of pay to be appropriate if they received either more or less
than they expected than if they received what they expected. When the actual
payment was announced before the task was performed (and before subjects made
their decision to perform it), a different pattern emerged. Subjects rated the task
more attractive when they were offered either more or less than the expected
amount, while their judgments of the appropriateness of the pay offered increased
with the amount of the offer. Implications of the results for incentive and disso-
nance theories as well as self-perception and equity theories are discussed.

The manner in which payment for performing a task affects a persons

interest in the task is of considerable social psychological interest, not
only because of its practical implications, but because it falls within the
purview of a surprising number of social psychological theories, including
reinforcement theory (see Janis & Gilmore, 1965), dissonance theory (see
Festinger, 1957; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976), self-perception theory (see
Bern, 1972), and equity theory (see Berkowitz & Walster, 1976). Each of

This research was supported by a grant of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft to the

Sonderforschungsbereich 24 sozial- und wirtschaftspsychologische Entschei-
dungsforschung der Universitat Mannheim (Chairman: Martin Irle). We are grateful to Dr.
R. A. Wicklund for his suggestions on an earlier draft of the manuscript. Requests for
reprints should be sent to Dr. Dieter Frey, Universitat Mannheim, SFB 24, L 13, 15-17,
6800 Mannheim 1, Federal Republic of Germany.

275

0022-103 l/79/030275-10$02.00/O
Copyright @ 1979 by Academic Press, Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
276 FREY, IRLE, AND HOCHGijRTEL

these theoretical formulations postulates somewhat different factors to

govern the relation between payment and attitude towards the task, and
somewhat different processes to mediate this relation.
The two independent variables manipulated in the present study were
(1) the deviation of the payment received from prior expectancies
(higher, lower, or the same) and (2) the timing of the notification of the
actual payment (before or after subjects committed themselves to perform
the task). To assist further in isolating the effects of these variables on
subjects perceptions of the task, two dependent variables were assessed.
In addition to the basic ratings of task interest commonly used in experi-
ments of this kind, we asked the subjects how much money they thought
was appropriate payment for performing the task.
Considering first the subjects perceptions of the attractiveness of the
task, dissonance theory predicts that when a subject volunteers to per-
form a boring task, dissonance is aroused, the magnitude of which is
inversely related to the external incentive provided for engaging in the
task. This dissonance may be reduced in increasing the internal justihca-
tion for performing the task, and therefore increasing perceptions of task
attractiveness. Thus, this theory predicts an inverse relation between the
incentive provided for performing a task and liking for the task.
However, dissonance is less likely to be aroused if the payment is
announced after the subjects decision has been made than if it is known
beforehand, and thus the subjects decision to participate is made in full
knowledge of its consequences (see Freedman, 1963; Linder, Cooper, &
Jones, 1967; Helmreich, 1968; Sogin & Pallak, 1976). To this extent, the
negative effect of incentive on task attractiveness should be more pro-
nounced when payment is announced before the task is performed than
when it is announced afterwards.
Self-perception theory generates similar predictions. The smaller the
number of external factors that can account for a persons decision to
perform a task, the more likely it is that the person will interpret that his
decision is due to internal or dispositional factors (e.g., his liking for the
task), and therefore the more favorably the task should be evaluated.
When the subject is aware of the actual amount of reward he will receive
before making his decision to perform the task, he is more apt to infer that
he performed it for a high reward than for a low one, and therefore is less
apt to infer that he likes the task under the former conditions. When the
subject is not told the actual reward until after performing the task,
however, he should infer that he decided to perform it for the amount of
money he expected at the time he decided to perform the task, regardless
of how much he ultimately received. Under these conditions, therefore,
there should be no self-perception effect of reward on task attractive-
ness. The predictions of self-perception theory in the after-condition are
ambiguous, however, because it is not clear whether the decision or the
 EFFECTS OF OVER- VS UNDER-PAYMENT 277

behavior is the most salient element from which subjects infer their
attitudes. If the behavior is the most salient element (instead of the
decision) one can expect an inverse relationship between attractiveness
and reward in the after condition also.
According to reinforcement or incentive theory, one can expect that
attractiveness of the task will increase as reward increases, independent
of the timing of the reward. According to a reinforcement formulation, a
task should acquire secondary reinforcement properties when it is as-
sociated with a high rate of pay; that is, the effect associated with the
payment generalizes to the task. In other words, people like things they
get paid to do better than things they dont get paid to do. If this is true,
estimates of the attractiveness of the task should increase with the amount
of reward, regardless of whether the reward is announced before or after
the task is performed.
Equity theory also has implications for attractiveness judgments. Ac-
cording to equity theory (Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973; Berkowitz
& Walster, 1976) inequity exists when there are unequal input-output
relationships, whether the inputs are higher or lower than the outputs. In
the present experiment inequity exists when a person receives more (or
less) pay than he expects. One of the ways to convince oneself that one
deserves high pay is to convince oneself that the task was particularly
aversive. Thus, equity theory would predict an inverse relation between
reward and task attractiveness which should occur in both before- and
after-conditions.
In regard to the second dependent variable, subjects judgments of the
amount of pay that is appropriate for performing the task, additional
factors may come into play. According to dissonance theory, dissonance
exists when a person discovers before undertaking a task that he will
receive more (or less) money than expected. To reduce dissonance the
subject justifies the payment he receives by increasing the belief that he
deserves it.
Thus, dissonance theory should predict in the before-condition a posi-
tive relationship between amount received and the amount perceived as
appropriate. As already mentioned in the discussion of the attractiveness
variable, dissonance theory makes no prediction in the after-conditions.
Likewise, self-perception theory should have some implications for per-
ceived adequacy of payment. A subject may reason I performed the task
of X Deutschmarks; therefore I must believe the pay to be adequate.
From a self-perception perspective, one can predict that under after-
conditions, there should be no relation between pay and amount per-
ceived as appropriate. Under before-conditions, subjects should judge
adequacy on the basis of the pay they volunteered for initially; thus, there
should be a positive relation between amount of pay and amount per-
ceived as appropriate. According to equity considerations a subject tends
 278 FREY, IRLE, AND HOCHGijRTEL

to justify the pay he receives by convincing himself that he deserved to

receive it, and to this extent, the subjects judgment of the appropriate pay
should increase with the pay received. Equity theory predicts these ef-
fects for both the before- and the after-conditions.
Although the different theories predict somewhat different results for
both dependent variables, the processes postulated by these theories are
not incompatible: each could contribute to the observed relation to a
greater or lesser extent, depending upon various mediating conditions that
may make the factors accounting for these processes more or less salient.
The empirical question, therefore, is not which of these various theoreti-
cal formulations is correct, but rather whether timing (or other mediating
conditions) affects the relative contribution of factors postulated by these
formulations to govern the effect of payment on task attractiveness.
The expectations for the task attractiveness variable can be sum-
marized as follows. Both dissonance and self-perception theories predict
an inverse relation between reward magnitude and judgments of task
attractiveness under before-conditions but not under after-conditions. On
the other hand, equity theory predicts such a relation under both before-
and after-conditions, whereas reinforcement theory predicts a positive
relation under both conditions. For the dependent variable adequacy of
payment dissonance theory predicts that the payment perceived as ap-
propriate increases with increased actual payment in the before-
condition, whereas equity theory predicts the same effect in both before-
and after-conditions. Self-perception theory, however, predicts a positive
relation between amount of payment and amount perceived as appro-
priate in the before-condition and no relation between the two in the
after-condition.
METHOD
Overview. The participants were 120 high-school students between the ages of 14 and 15.
In an announcement of the experiment approximately one week before it was scheduled, the
participants were promised two Deutschmarks (at the time of the experiment worth about 80
cents) for their participation. Then, in the experiment, they performed a task and received
either the amount promised in the announcement, more than this amount, or less than this
amount. Half of the subjects received the information about their actual pay before they
decided whether to participate (Before-condition): the other half received the information
after they had completed the task (After-condition). After subjects had completed the task,
they answered questions pertaining to their decision freedom, the attractiveness of the task,
and the appropriate payment for the task.
Procedure. Some days before the experiment, the experimenter announced that there
would be an experiment in the school and that participation in this experiment would be
voluntary. Subjects were promised two Deutschmarks, a typical payment for experimental
participation in such a setting. On the day of the actual experiment, the experimenter (who
remained ignorant of the hypotheses) introduced himself as a member of the staff of the
Social Psychological Institute of the University of Mannheim. The experiment was run in
three schools in Mannheim after school hours. Subjects were run in groups of five and were
told that their participation in the investigation was voluntary. The participants were then
 EFFECTS OF OVER- VS UNDER-PAYMENT 279

asked to perform an intentionally boring task, which involved copying a Russian text onto a
different sheet of paper. This task was performed for 20 min.
Subjects scheduled to learn about the payment before performing the task (Before-
conditions) were told one of three things. Under Same Pay conditions, subjects were told
they would receive the announced amount of 2 DM. Under the Increased-Pay conditions,
the experimenter informed the subjects that the University payroll offtce had decided to give
an amount of 5 DM instead of the announced 2 DM because they had more money than
expected. Under Decreased Pay conditions, the experimenter said that he was just informed
that the University payroll office would not support this research financially because they
had less money than expected and that he was not able to pay the promised 2 DM. So in both
conditions the change in payment was beyond the experimenters control. In the case of
subjects scheduled to learn about the payment after performing the task (After-conditions).
no mention of payment was made at this point. Before beginning the task, all subjects were
explicitly reminded that they had complete choice and that they did not have to do the tasks.
(In fact, none of the subjects refused.)
After completing the task. the subjects in the After-conditions were told of the change in
the payment they would receive in a manner analogous to that under Before-conditions. To
make the belated presentation of this information seem plausible, the experimenter was
called from the room about 15 min after the task was started. This was intended to convey
the impression that the experimenter himself had just been informed of the pay change, and
therefore had not been intentionally withholding information.
Dependent variables. After completion of the task the participants were given a question-
naire containing three questions. First, subjects estimated how interesting they found the
task along a scale from 1 (very dull) to 1 I (very interesting). Second, they estimated how
much money they felt was adequate payment on a scale from 0 DM to 7 DM. Finally, they
indicated how much freedom of choice they had about participating along a scale from 0 (no
choice) to I1 (completely free choice). To give the impression that subjects would not be
indentified personally with their responses, they were told that after completing the ques-
tionnaire, they should place it in an envelope.

RESULTS
Since subjects were run in groups, and it is conceivable that their overt
reactions to the pay information may have influenced other group mem-
bers, groups rather than individuals was used as the unit of analysis. None
of the subjects was dropped from the analysis.
Perceived freedom. Subjects perceptions of their freedom to refuse to
participate ranged from 9.70 to 10.95 over the six combinations of pay
and timing of information. However, analyses of these judgments as a
function of experimental variables yielded no significant effects. Thus,
one can conclude that subjects perceived themselves to have high choice
in all conditions.
Attractiveness of the task. Mean judgments of attractiveness of the task
are shown in Table 1. Analysis of data yield an interaction between
payment and timing of information [F(2,18) = 9.64: p < .OOl]. The
interaction is attributable to the fact that when payment information was
given after task performance, task attractiveness increased with the
amount of payment received. However, when payment information was
Pretest data indicated that most subjects perceived the task as very dull.
280 FREY, IRLE, AND HOCHGijRTEL

TABLE 1
MEAN RATINGS OF ADEQUACY OF REWARDS AND ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE TASK

Timing of information
Before performance After performance

Task attractiveness
Increased pay 6.50 7.65
Same pay 5.25 6.55
Decreased pay 7.00 5.25
Perceived appropriate payment
Increased pay 2.70 2.65
Same pay I .60 1.30
Decreased pay I.15 2.45

Scale ranges from 1 to 11 with higher numbers indicating greater attractiveness; n = 4

groups.
* Scale ranges from 0 to 7 Deutschmarks ($0-$2.80) perceived as adequate pay; n = 4
groups.

given before the task was performed, subjects judged the task more
attractive when they had been paid either more or less than expected than
when they had been paid according to expectations. Within the Decreased
Pay condition, higher attractiveness of the task was found in the before-
than in the after-condition [F(l,l8) = 4.19; p < .0.5], consistent with
dissonance theory predictions. If the Increased Pay and Same Pay condi-
tions are combined, a significant before- vs after-difference is obtained
[F(l,l8) = 6.22: p < .05]. This effect is contrary to expectation, in that
attractiveness was higher in the after-condition. This effect may be ex-
plained by the following reasoning. First one can assume that there is no
dissonance in the Same Pay and Increased Pay conditions, which means
that the primary effect of pay will be an incentive effect. Further, it seems
likely that the incentive effect would be stronger when the incentive is
recent or salient (i.e., in the after condition).
Adequacy of payment. Subjects judgments of the payment they be-
lieved to be appropriate are also shown in Table 1. Analysis of these data
yielded a significant main effect of payment [F(2,18) = 3.60; p < .051,
indicating that the amount of payment believed to be adequate was greater
under Increased Pay conditions (M = 2.68), than under either Same Pay
(M = 1.45) or Decreased Pay conditions (M = 1.80). The interaction of
the amount of pay and the timing of the pay information was not sig-
nificant [F(2,18) = 1.67; p = .22]. However, the means in Table 1 suggest
that the amount of pay believed adequate increased directly with the
amount of pay received under before-conditions, whereas under after-
conditions, the amount of pay believed adequate was much greater under
both Increased Pay and Decreased Pay conditions than under Same Pay
conditions.
 EFFECTS OF OVER- VS UNDER-PAYMENT 281

It should be added that the overall correlation between the two depen-
dent variables was nearly zero (r = .03) and that within the experimental
conditions the correlations were also insignificant.
DISCUSSION
The results suggest that more than one factor must be considered in
predicting the effects of payment on task attractiveness. When payment
information was presented after performing the task, attraction increased
with the amount of payment received. It seems reasonable to suppose that
in these conditions, little dissonance existed, and therefore that rein-
forcement effects predominated; that is, that greater rewards produced
greater attraction to the task.
When payment information was presented before performing the task,
there was a curvilinear relationship between payment and task attractive-
ness. Subjects who were told before performing the task that they would
receive lower pay than they expected and yet still agreed to participate
rated the task as more attractive than those who had participated for the
pay they initially expected. This finding is consistent with the predictions
of dissonance theory.
Relative deprivation before leads to an underestimation of the appro-
priate amount of payment and more positive task evaluation. In the
After-conditions both effects are reversed. In this condition subjects
feeling unjustly treated by the relative deprivation manipulation say
that they should be getting more money and derogate the task relative to
control subjects. The latter is not a dissonance effect, as subjects are
obviously making external attributions of causality for the relative depri-
vation (cf. Pallak, Sogin, & van Zante, 1974).
The intriguing results are those in the Increased Pay condition, where
the pattern relative to control suggests a quite distinct set of processes
taking place. Subjects rated the task as more attractive when they re-
ceived more pay than they had anticipated. From self-perception theory
and dissonance theory one might have expected, a priori, a difference
between the Same Pay and Increased Pay (Before) conditions, such that
Increased Pay subjects would have shown a relative derogation of the
task. This pattern would correspond to an oversufficient justification
phenomenon (cf. Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973). However, the fact
that the opposite occurred suggests that neither self-perception nor disso-
nance processes were operating in the Same Pay or Increased Pay condi-
tions, and that instead, incentive effects predominated. If this interpreta-
tion is correct, the question arises as to why positive effects of incentive
were not found in previous forced compliance studies. Usually in these
studies subjects either agreed to participate for a high or low amount of
money with no prior expectancy. Thus the original decision was for
different amounts of pay. In the present study, all subjects agreed to
 FREY, IRLE, AND HOCHGORTEL

participate for 2 DM initially, and thus in high pay conditions are told they
will get more than expected. These subjects do not make a new decision,
and thus there is no need to alter their liking of the task on the basis of
dissonance considerations. Thus, the incentive effect predominates: these
subjects are no different than subjects run in after-conditions.
In contrast, subjects who are told they will get less than expected do
reevaluate their decision to participate, and in the process, convince
themselves that the task is attractive in order to justify their new decision.
In summary, if subjects had simply been asked to participate for high,
moderate, or low pay, without inducing a prior expectancy, the results
might more closely parallel those of other forced compliance experiments.
That is, there might have been a consistent inverse effect of pay on
attractiveness judgments.
As mentioned before, self-perception theory is not explicit regarding
whether people infer their attitudes from their behavior or from their
decisions; thus from this theory two possible effects could be expected.
When subjects infer their attitudes from their actual behaviors (perform-
ing the task) one might have expected an increase of attractiveness with
decreasing reward for both the Before- and After-conditions. When sub-
jects infer their attitudes from their decisions to perform the task, one
should have expected such a relationship only in the Before-condition but
no relationship between reward and attractiveness in the After-condition.
The assumption that subjects infer their attitudes from their decisions is
most (although not entirely) consistent with the data. However, while
self-perception could account for the increase in attractiveness ratings
under Before-conditions when payment was low, this reasoning would
also predict a decrease in attractiveness ratings under Before-conditions
when payment was high. There is no obvious reason why self-perception
should not be as strong in one condition as in the other. Thus, it seems
most parsimonious to conclude that self-perception processes were gen-
erally minimal under the conditions of this study, and thus that dissonance
and reinforcement effects predominated.
Also from the overjustification discussions and experiments (e.g., Lep-
per, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973) one might have expected a negative rela-
tionship between reward and attractiveness of the task in both the Before-
and After-conditions. As the results show this is the case in neither
condition. However, most overjustification studies (see Ford & Foster,
1976) have studied neutral or attitude-congruent behavior. Maybe over-
justification occurs only when the task is rewarding in and of itself.
The data for adequacy of reward are easily explainable. In general,
subjects infer the level of pay that is appropriate from the level of pay they
receive except under conditions in which they are told after the fact that
they will get less than was promised them. Here, their reporting that a
high rate of pay is appropriate could be an indirect protest against being
 EFFECTS OF OVER- VS UNDER-PAYMENT 283

mistreated: a way of letting the experimenter know they feel unjustly

treated. While this interpretation is straightforward, it is worth pointing
out that none of the various theories predict this effect.
In general, the effect of reward received on judgments of the appro-
priate pay level is consistent with equity theory and dissonance theory.
That is, one attempts to justify the payment one receives by increasing the
belief that one deserves it. The judgment of the appropriate pay level may
reflect this. But equity theory also predicts an inverse relation between
pay received and task attractiveness. (Presumably the reason the subject
thinks he deserves high pay is because the task is unattractive, and the
reason he thinks he does not deserve high pay is because the task is
attractive). This effect did not occur. Moreover, equity theory predicts a
negative correlation between magnitude of payment considered appro-
priate and task attractiveness, and this did not occur either. Thus, it
seems that the data raise questions about the role of equity theory in this
study. An equity principle may account for only some of the effects.
Also the two interpretations of self-perception theory (involving either the
decision or the behavior as the critical basis for self-inferences) fail in
explaining the effects of the amount of payment considered as adequate in
the After-condition.
In summary, the results of both dependent variables indicate that more
than one factor must be considered in predicting the effects of payment on
task attractiveness and perception of adequacy of reward. While the
results for task attractiveness in the After-condition could be perfectly
explained by incentive theory, in the Before-condition the results are
produced by a combination of dissonance and incentive processes. Equity
theory can explain most of the results of the adequacy of reward variable
but fails in explaining the perceptions of task attractiveness.

REFERENCES
Bern, D. J. Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.) Advances in experimenta/ social
psychology (Vol. 6). New York: Academic Press, 1972.
Berkowitz, L., & Walster, E. Equity theory: Toward a general theory of social interaction.
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 9). New York: Academic Press,
1976.
Festinger, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1957.
Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1959, St?, 203-210.
Ford, I. D., & Foster, S. L. Extrinsic incentives and tokenbased programs. American
Psychologist, 1976, 31, 87-90.
Freedman, J. L. Attitudinal effects of inadequate justification. Journal ofPersonality. 1963,
31, 371-385.
Helmreich, R. L. Attitudinal effects of stress and justification: A replication and extension.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1968, 4, 153-161.
Janis, I. L., & Gilmore, J. B. The influence of incentive condition on the success of role
playing in modifying attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 1,
17-27.
284 FREY, IRLE, AND HOCHGURTEL

Lepper, M. R., Greene, D., & Nisbett, R. E. Undermining childrens intrinsic interest with
extrinsic reward: A test of the overjustification hypothesis. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 1973, 28, 129-137.
Linder, D. E., Cooper, J., & Jones, E. E. Decision freedom as a determinant of the role of
incentive magnitude in attitude change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
1967, 6, 245-254.
Pallak, M. S., Sogin, S. R., & Van Zante, A. Bad decisions: Effect of volition, locus of
causality, and negative consequences on attitude change. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 1974, 30, 217-227.
Sogin, S. R., & Pallak, M. S. Bad decisions, responsibility and attitude change: Effects of
volition, foreseeability, and locus of causality of negative consequences. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 1976, 33, 300-306.
Walster, E. H., Berscheid, E., & Walster, G. W. New directions in equity research. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 25, 151-176.
Wicklund, R. A., & Brehm, J. W. Perspectives on cognitive dissonance. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Earlbaum Associates, 1976.