// Ateneo de Manila University

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

COURSE OUTLINE
IV-A and B
First Semester, SY 2016-2017
Dean Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo

To earn credits for this course, students are expected to have a detailed
knowledge of the topics set out below. The coverage consists of five parts:
PART I includes the Preliminary Title (Chapters 1 and 2), Book One, Titles I
(Chapters 1, 2 and 3) and II (excluding Citizenship), of the Civil Code of the
Philippines; PART II includes the entire of the Family Code (E.O. 209 as
amended by E.O. 227 and other legislations); PART III includes Titles X
(Funerals), XIII (Surname) and XIV (Absence) of the Civil Code of the
Philippines; PART IV includes the entire Book on Property; and PART V
includes the Modes of Acquiring Ownership, excluding Succession. Students
are expected to study and know not only the provisions of the above laws, but
also jurisprudence thereon, related legislation and cases listed herein, or in any
updated list as may be subsequently given.

PART I

A. Preliminary Title422

1. Chapter 1: Effect and Effectivity of Laws

(Arts. 1-18, Civil Code)

a. When laws become effective E.O. 200

Taada v. Tuvera GR 63915 Apr. 24, 1985
Garcillano v. House of Reps GR 170338/179275, Dec. 23, 2008
SEC v. GMA Network GR No. 164026, Dec. 23, 2008

b. Mandatory effect of laws

cf: Arts. 526, 2154 and 2155, Civil Code

c. Non-retroactivity of laws; Exceptions

COMELEC v. Conrado Cruz GR 186616 Nov. 20, 2009

d. Termination of effectivity of laws

Lledo v. Lledo AM-P-1167 Feb. 9, 2010

e. Waiver of Rights

f. Judicial decisions
De Roy c. C.A. GR 80718 Jan. 29, 1988

g. Computation of time
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 Quiqui v. Boncaros GR 51841 June 20, 1987
Co v. New Prosperity Products GR 183994 June 30, 2014

h. Nationality Principle
i) Conflicts rules
Llorente v. C.A. GR 124371 Nov. 23, 2000
Orion Savings Bank v. Suzuki GR 2015487 Nov. 12, 2014

2. Chapter 2: Human Relations (Arts. 19-36, Civil Code)

a. Application
De Tavera v. Phil. Tuberculosis Society GR 48928 Feb. 29, 1982
Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corp GR 141309, Dec. 23, 2008
Pantaleon v. American Express Intl Inc. GR 174269 Aug. 25, 2010

b. Duty to act with justice, observe honesty & good faith

c. Actions for breach of promise to marry

Bunag v. C.A. GR 101749 July 10, 1992
Baksh v. C.A. GR 97336 Feb. 19, 1993

d. Unjust enrichment at the expense of others

Garcia v. Philippine Airlines GR 164856, Jan. 20, 2009

e. Rights to personal dignity and privacy

f. Liability of Public Officers

Aberca v. Ver GR 69866 Apr. 15, 1988
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan GR 103501-503 & 103507
Feb. 17, 1997

g. Damages despite acquittal in criminal case

h. Independent Civil Actions and Prejudicial Questions

Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities GR 171435, July 30, 2008
Pimentel v. Pimentel GR 172060, Sept. 13, 2010

B. Persons

1. Chapter 1: General Provisions (Arts. 37-39, Civil Code)

a. Juridical Capacity v. Capacity to Act

b. Restrictions and Modifications on Capacity to Act

2. Chapter 2: Natural Persons (Arts. 40-43, Civil Code)

a. When personality begins and ends

b. Rules on survivorship (Art. 43, CC v. Rule 131 Sec. (jj)

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 3. Chapter 3: Juridical Persons (Arts. 44-47, Civil Code)

a. Who are juridical persons

b. When personality begins and ends
c. Rights of juridical persons

C. Domicile (Arts. 50-51, Civil Code)

Meaning of Domicile v. Residence
Macalintal v. COMELEC GR 157013 July 10, 2003
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC GR No. 22197/221698-700
Mar. 8, 2016
1. Kinds
2. Rules

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 PART II

A. Marriage (Arts. 1-54, Family Code)

1. Concept
In Re: Rufilo D. Bucana AC 1637 July 6, 1976
Rodolfo Espinosa v. Juliet Omana AC 9081 Oct. 12, 2011
Perfecto v. Esidera AM No. RTJ-15-2417
July 22, 2015

2. Essential and Formal Requirements

a. Legal Capacity

i) Gender
Silverio v. Republic GR 174689, Oct. 19, 2007
Republic v. Cagandahan GR No. 166676, Sept. 12, 2008

ii) Age

iii) Impediments by reason of:

aa) Incestuous relationship

bb) Public Policy
cc) Prior existing marriage
Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy GR 53703 Aug. 18, 1986
Cenon Teves v. People GR 188775 Aug. 24, 2011
Lasanas v. People GR 159031 June 23, 2014

b. Consent

c. Authority of Solemnizing Officer

Beso v. Daguman AM MTJ-99-1211 Jan. 28, 2000
Aranes v. Occiano AM MTJ-02-1390 Apr. 11, 2002
Punished judge for gross ignorance of law for solemnizing marriage
outside jurisdiction
Navarro v. Domagtoy AM MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
Acknowledges that if RTC-Makati can solemnize in Manila but
IRREGULAR!

d. Marriage License
Abbas v. Abbas GR 183896, Jan. 30, 2013
Ronulo v. People GR 182438 July 2, 2014
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 Castillo v. De Leon Castillo GR 189607 April 18, 2016
MEDOYO STRAY DECISION

Do not apply under Art. 40 if marriage celebrated under Old Civil Code.
Family Code has no retroactive application. Wish they could change this since
it does not make sense since in other cases where ml was absent even under
civil code ang celebration, it was invalid pa rin if no judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage.

--
if based on lack of marriage lciense, you can porcedd riectly to second
marriage. And 2nd marriage shall be valid. BT Here not criminal case for
bigamy. Question was won second marriage was considered valid. It did not
involve penal action of bigamy.

i) Procedure in obtaining Marriage Certificate

ii) Marriages exempt from marriage license

Ninal v. CA GR 133778 Mar. 14, 2000
Hubsnd killed wife. And married another woman without marriage license since
cohabited for five years na. 2 issues: won the children could bring an action to delcarenullit yof marriage
even after aprents death. 2. Validity of marriage since no marriage license based on 5 years cohab.

1. Can bring action? Yes. Collatteraly they can do it since they have interst in the marriage of their
parents. Here NOT REALLY COLLATERAL ACTTACK because the case was really about
declaration of nullity.
But here bawal na. CAN ONLY BE RAISED BY THE PARTY THEMSELVES> but now theyre
dead, bawal na. Since rules can only be brought by parties to amarriage, it does allow collateral
attack. So main prupose is not the declaration of nullity of marriage.

In the inheritance of children, they can attack a marraige of marriage for purpsoes of legitimes.
BUT NOT for the purpose of declaring the marriage nll and void.

Second marriage was declared null and void under secondissue. Clear from facts that les than 2 years
from death of first wife to the death that they entere into marriage.

NO LEGAL IMPEDIMENT required that no impediment at ht etime of celebration of marriage.

Guilty of ilicit relationship are not prihbited from getting marriage as long as tt he time they get married,
they have no legal impediment. IPWEDE NAMAN they should have gotten a marriage license nalang
sana if they judt got a marriage license. But to get to the exception for exception, dapat lang yung 5 year
cohabitation.

Impediment no longer exists at time of marriage you can get married. But you get a mrriag elicense.
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Issue in case of nina was for exmeption of reqirement of marriage license controlling doctrine is ninal.
No diff between family code and civil code which was cited in ninal.

Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez AM MTJ-00-1329 Mar. 8, 2000

Judge celebrated marriage wihotu a liense merly on the satamtent that they were living for 5 years even if
judge knew na he was married to someone else but was just separated.

Republic v. Dayot GR Nos. 175581/179474,

Mar. 28, 2008

Marriage celebrated in 1986 without marriage license.so dapat may affidavit.

Republic says if you lie=irregular lang daw. BUT SC said na this will result in a void marriage talaga
since it will be as if ASBENT ANG MARRIAGE LICENSE.

If affidavit is false, basis of nulliyu of marriage is alck of marriage license. Shortening the process goes
into the defenct of formal reqt of marriage license.

e. Ceremony

3. Non-essential requirements

a. Marriage Certificate
Delgado v. Rustia GR 155733 Jan. 27, 2006
Anonuevo v. Int. Estate of Jalandoni GR 178221, Dec. 1, 2010

4. Marriages celebrated outside the Philippines

a. Validity and Exceptions

b. Foreign Divorce
Van Dorn v. Romillo GR 68470 Oct. 8, 1985
Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan-Lee GR 183622 Feb. 8, 2012
Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna GR 171914 July 23, 2014

Noveras v. Noveras GR 188289 Aug. 20, 2014

David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship.
xxx

6
pon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on
24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.6 The California court granted to
Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couples properties in the USA.7

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the
RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and Davids failure to
comply with his obligation under the same.

Xxx

he trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and
personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by
virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of California, County
of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties marriage had already been dissolved.
Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute
community of property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the
children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.

With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as absolute
community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the
solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled
that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because
the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their
national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the
law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute community properties cannot
beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to
prove abandonment and infidelity with preponderant evidence.

Perez v. Catindig AC No. 5816 March 10, 2015

Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the
Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree
was lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage.5 chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of
America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef
Frederic.6 chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce
decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by
Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez
that he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez
under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son.7
xxxclkgnrslkfi rtua llawlib ra ry
chan roble s v

xxxx

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Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens
at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless
his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be
void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty.
Catindigs sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our
laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA.
Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion
is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of
bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindigs claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew
that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in
order to render a faade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the
very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.

5. Void and Voidable Marriages

AM No. 02-11-10 SC Mar 4, 2003
Bolos v. Bolos GR 186400, Oct. 20, 2010
Dino v. Dino GR 178044, January 19, 2011
Requirement of distribution and liquidation will nto apply to marriage
declared null and void on thebasis of art 36 since liquidation wil have ot based on article
147. (but dean del does not get logic, because even if under 147, you still go thru process
of liquidation and distribution) Adding hta the requirement of distibutiona dn liquidation
of community assets will apply only if marriage declared void under 40 because therese
are for marriage declares under 148 or did she say 108? Check it!
Eric Yu v. Agnes Carpio GR 189207 June 15, 2011
Garcia-Quiason v. Belen GR 189121 July 31, 2013

a. Difference between void and voidable

i) Necessity of court declaration

Enrico v. Heirs of Medinaceli GR 173614, Sept. 28, 2007
Cenon Teves v. People GR 188775 Aug. 24, 2011
Iwasawa v. Gangan GR 204169 Sept. 11, 2013

ii) Effect on filiation of children

6. Void Marriages

a. Grounds

i) Lack of essential/formal requirements

Sevilla v. Cardenas GR 167684 July 31, 2006

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 ii) Bigamous/polygamous marriages

aa) Effect of absence

bb) Declaration of presumptive death

Republic v. Villanueva GR 210929 July 29, 2015

In this case, Edna claimed to have done the following to determine the whereabouts and the status of her
husband:

1. She took a vacation/leave of absence from her work and returned to the Philippines to look for
her husband.
2. She inquired from her parents-in-law in Iligan City and from their common friends in the same
city and in Valencia City.
3. She went as far as the birthplace of her husband in Escalante, Negros Oriental, so she could
inquire from her husband's relatives.

Despite her efforts, she averred that she received negative responses from them because none of them had
knowledge of the existence of her husband who had been missing for 15 years.

Applying the standard set forth by the Court in the previously cited cases, particularly Cantor, Edna's
efforts failed to satisfy the required well-founded belief of her absent husband's death.

Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it merely consisted of bare
assertions without any corroborative evidence on record. She also failed to present any person from whom
she inquired about the whereabouts of her husband. She did not even present her children from whom she
learned the disappearance of her husband. In fact, she was the lone witness. Following the basic rule that
mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof,21 the Court cannot give credence to her
claims that she indeed exerted diligent efforts to locate her husband.

Moreover, no document was submitted to corroborate the allegation that her husband had been missing
for at least fifteen (15) years already. As the OSG observed, there was not even any attempt to seek the
aid of the authorities at the time her husband disappeared. In Cantor, the present spouse claimed to have
sought the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, reported his absence to the police.22 Yet, the Court
denied her pleas.
Xxx

rom his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the

Republic v. Sarenogon GR 199194 Feb 10,2016

Resp Jose filed petition before RTC for declaration of presumptive death of his wife. Wife went to HK as
dh and for 3 months did not receive any comm from her. No idea about her whereabouts. It was testified
9
that Jose and netchie only lived together as hand w for 1 month prior to leaving the PH for sep
destinations abroad.

The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is complied with only upon a
showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to ascertain whether the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead

mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack of news that such
absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of the] general
presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the
premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the
additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief which can only be discharged upon
a due showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse''s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is already
dead.

xxxx

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of
each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to
comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already
dead.

If anything, Jose''s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the
required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he
had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie''s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the
witness stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or
quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media, Nor did he show mat he undertook a thorough, determined and
unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were), and naming the
particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying
the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.

Republic v. Tampus GR 214243 Mar 16, 2016

In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries
with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know
where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her
husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information about her
husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding
him. Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo,
Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the said
mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore,
Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by
10
asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence
required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.

Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or neighbors as witnesses who could have
corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante. These resource persons were not even
named. In Republic v. Nolasco,24 it was held that the present spouse's bare assertion that he inquired from
his friends about his absent spouse's whereabouts was found insufficient as the names of said friends were
not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.25cralawred

Finally, other than Nilda's bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence had been offered to support
her allegation that she exerted efforts to find him but was unsuccessful. What appears from the facts as
established in this case was that Nilda simply allowed the passage of time without actively and diligently
searching for her husband, which the Court cannot accept as constituting a "well-founded belief that her
husband is dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and
after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by the present
spouse.26

In fine, having fallen short of the stringent standard and degree of due diligence required by jurisprudence
to support her claim of a "well-founded belief that her husband Dante is already dead, the instant petition
must be granted.

DENA DEL: Parang pinaka okay to sana. Good story. But even in this case, strict standard was not met
and the search conducted was passive sicne he just went ot realitves and relatives did not know about
whereabouts. For it to be active search, she should have gone ot the AFP-obtained certification, remains
never seen.

NOTES: Republic v Nolasco is the leading case.

CANTOR IS LEADING CASE. Just read this! And see the requisites!s

cc) Termination of subsequent marriage

Santos v. Santos GR 187061 Oct. 8, 2014
ACtionbased on court declaration of presumptive death. It was granted by the lower court but it turned out
after many ears, that spouse was still alive. Wife filed an action to annul the jdugmetn of court that she is
preumptively dead. Husband argued and said that isnt the roepr remedy since she could have just filed an
affidavit of reappearance with the civil register. But wife said Iwasm not willing to do that. Since I never
left the conjugal dweling. You knew I was alive and you gave wrong address so that summons will be
sent to somewhere else.

SC: if she emrely filed affidavit of repaarcne, it would have been an admission hat first marriage was
terminated (OBITER). But it was clear that this is NOT a valid judgment there is gorund to annul
judgment on the gorund of extrinsic fraud since husband deliberely misled the ocurt by giving wrong
11
address when all this time wife was in the conjugal dwelling.

Court erefused ot counsel her to just give affidavit of reappearance__> since this would mean that he
second marriage is valid, and therefore, chidre wil be legitime and he will have proper defense for
bigamy. Effect is that you have tow valid marriages. Moemt tehr eis affid of reaparence yu wil consider
the second terminated but you will recognize the validt yo fmarriage and as such time as the aff of
reapparnec ie filed.

SWRONS TATEMENT OF REAPPERANCE IN THE CIVIL REGISTRRY in the place where the place
of the seond spouses are residing =announce to the second marriage that it it stermiatned. NTOICE to be
given to the spouses of the seond marriage. And if disputed in court, civil registrar will have to await
decision of court with respect ot dispute of affidavit of reapparence.

If no affidavit of reaparence- interest erpsons can actually file affidavit of reapparence.

Dispute here disute to the affidavit of reapparence: what is disute won he is alive. If he fils affidavit of
reaparnce, he will say IM alie. What etterproff . you can dispute htat becase he might be an
IMPOSTER!!!!

For as lng a there is dispute, then the civil registar will not have ht epwe ot od aning and will wait until
dispute is finally judicially terminated.

In the mean tie, I tis iposible tha thepresent spouse can bring action for declaration of nullity of marriage
and if this has not been obtained int e manint iem, first marriage can be terminated for other causes.

NO PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD!

iii) Psychological Incapacity of parties

First case ever was SANTOS case. Talked about manifestations. BUT mamm does not like this. BUT
they gave three requirements:
a. gravity
b. juridical antecedence
c. incurable of the cause
Republic v. Molina GR 108763 Feb 13, 1997
Bible for psychological incapacity.

a. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff,
and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the existence of the marriage and
against its nullity.

b. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:

(1) medically or clinically identified;

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 - courts have accepted TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE ruling (marcos v
marcos) that it can be said that this req is not so strictly required
anymore

- Starting from the case of marcos v. marcos- the relevance of medical

experts and psychologist would be felt if there is no other evidence.
Hence, if you can porve with totality of evidence presented that there
is psych incapacity, the failure to present medical and expert
testimony is NOT fatal.

- NOT absolute necessity subject to show adequate evidence

(2) alleged in the complaint;

(3) sufficiently proven by experts; and

(4) clearly explained in the decision.

c. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, although the manifestation need not be perceivable at such time.

-still solid requirement. Since if it something after marriage, no cause for

declaration of nullity of marriage. MUST BE DEFECTIVE AT THE TIME OF
CELBRATION OF MARRIAGE.

-first two are soft req ofr DEAN DEL.

d. The incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clini- cally permanent or

incurable, although the incurability may be relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,
the incapacity must be relevant to the as- sumption of marriage obligations, not to
those not related to marriage like the exercise of a profession or employ- ment in a
job.

-SOLID requirement

-incurable: does this person have the right to enter into a subsequent marriage?
Then every marriage you will enter into is pscyh incap. BUT then again there is
epxiatio that PI is absolute or RELATIVE! Same way for legal speration
13
 absolute-whoever you marry you will be PI for whatever reason but then
you will have ot testify and researched by experts

relative-you are PI to marry this eprosn but capcitated to marry another

person. Can this happen?this is only reason given considering that PI person is
allowed to marry again.

e. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the dis- ability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.

-still SOLID

f. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Arts. 68-71 of the
Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Arts. 220-225, same Code, in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-compliance must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the text of the decision.

-still solid

g. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimo- nial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling, should be given great
respect by our courts.

-persuasive lang

-see Malilin case. This is wher ehte court looked into the interperation of the
NMTC of the catholic chirch. Court made distinction between two paragraphs of
CANON LAW. Court said that wwhat hwe have adopted as part of the family
code is par 3 of canon law-due to psh nature unable to assume atrial obligaitons.

What was used here was that there was previous chrc annulment was absed on
par3 of canon law shwihc talked about abuse of dsicreiton of jdugmetn concerning
the matrimony right s and oblgiations of marriage. Her eis theer eis absue of error
o judgment.

At any rate, it is fot even if there is this case. If base don par 3 since oNLY
PERSUAISVE in charger. Courts MA or AMY not accept finding of this tribunal.
14
 h. The trial court must order the fiscal and the Solicitor- General to appear as counsel
for the State. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating his reasons for
his agreement or opposition to the petition. The Solicitor General and the fiscal
shall submit such certification to the court within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is submitted for resolution.

-non-essential fo this point of time. THIS HAS BEEN TOTALLY REMOVED. While
they wsill represent state, they no longer have to oppose when there is c omplaint for
psychigca incapity.

Vinas v. Parel-Vinas GR 208790 Jan 21, 2015

Mallilin v. Jamesolamin GR 192718 Feb 18, 2015
Republic v. Romero II GR 209180/209253
Feb 24, 2016
FACTS: Reghis reoero was married to Olivia. Supposedly married at very young age and what is
interesting si that he had already filed a previous case for previously nltyi of marriage on account of PI of
wife. But this failed. Surprisingly,a fter ialin int aht action, he filed another case on account of his own PI.
There were issues raised that I was a cse of res judicata. Since court declared that case was already valid.

UBt sc made distinction that it was base don another cause since it was now him that was PI. But court
said there was nothing wrong with him. There is no suff evde ceot delare him as PI.

DEAN DEL: when person says I am PI- you just really wanna get away from marriage. You aint pI. haha
b. Declaration of Nullity
Ninal v. Bayadog GR 133778 Mar. 14, 2000
De Castro v. De Castro GR 160172, Feb. 13, 2008
Juliano-Llave v. Republic GR 169766 Mar. 30, 2011

c. Declaration of Nullity v. Bigamy

Montanez v. Cipriano GR 181089 Oct. 22, 2012
Lasanas v. People GR 159031 June 23, 2014
- for as long as no jud dec of first marriage, subseq. Marriage is considered null
and void.

-based on crim case.

-anyone who enteres into subsequent marriage while 1st is stil substiting, always
avoid marriage because it is a bigamous marriage. It is there mere celebreation of
marriage which gives rise to crime of marriage and not declaration.

15
RA 6995-made order brides. While action is unlawful, it does NOT provide as ground for nullity of
marriage. IT DOES NOT AFFECT NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
Vitangol v. People GR 207406 Jan 13, 2016

7. Voidable Marriages

a. Grounds
Almerol v. RTC of Las Pinas GR 179620, Aug. 26, 2008
Albios v. Republic GR 198780 Oct. 16, 2013

b. Who may bring action to annul; period

c. Ratification

8. Procedure and Effects of Termination of Marriage

Ancheta v. Ancheta GR 145370 Mar. 4, 2004
Yu v. Yu GR 164915 Mar. 10, 2006
Eric Yu v. Agnes Carpio GR 189207 June 15, 2011

9. Presumptive legitime

B. Legal Separation (Arts. 55-67, Family Code)

1. Grounds
2. Procedure
3. Defenses
4. Liquidation

a. Effect of death of one of the parties

Lapuz v. Eufemio GR 56772-84 July 9, 1981
Macadangdang v. C.A. GR 38287 Oct. 23, 1981

5. Effects of legal separation Pendente lite/After Finality

Lerma v. C.A. GR 33352 Dec. 20, 1974
Sabalones v. C.A. GR 106169 Feb. 14, 1994
Siochi v. Gozon GR Nos. 169900/169977,
Mar. 18, 2010

6. Reconciliation effects

C. Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife

(Arts. 68-73, Family Code)

1. To live together
16
 2. Observe mutual love, respect and fidelity of community
3. Expenses for support of family and payment of conjugal obligation
4. Management of Household
5. Exercise of profession

D. Property Relations Between Husband and Wife

(Arts. 74-146, Family Code)

1. How governed
2. Marriage Settlements (Arts. 75-81, FC)

a. Requirements
b. Capacity of Parties
c. Formalities

3. Donations by Reason of Marriage (Arts. 82-87, FC)

a. Requirements
b. Capacity of Parties
c. Formalities
d. Properties Covered; Limitations
e. Revocation

4. System of Absolute Community (Arts. 88-93, FC)

a. When applicable
b. Properties Covered
c. Separate Properties

5. Conjugal Partnership of Gains (Arts. 105-120, FC)

a. When applicable
b. Properties Covered
c. Exclusive Properties
Sarmiento v. IAC GR 75409 & 75410
Aug. 17, 1987

6. Charges upon and obligations of Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership

(Arts. 94-95; 121-123, FC)

Wong v. IAC GR 70082 Aug. 19, 1991

Ayala Investment & Dev Corp v. CA GR 118305 Feb. 12, 1998
Munoz v. Ramirez GR 156125, Aug. 25, 2010
Sps. Ros v. PNB GR 170166 Apr. 6, 2011
17
 Pana v. Heirs of Juanite GR 164201 Dec. 10, 2012

7. Ownership, Administration and Disposition of Absolute Community/Conjugal

Partnership Properties
(Arts. 96-98; 124-125, FC)

a. Presumption of Ownership/Effect of registration in name of one of the

spouses
De la Pena v. Avila GR 187490 Feb. 8, 2012
Salas Jr. v. Aguila GR 202370 Sept. 23, 2013
PNB v. Garcia GR 182839 June 2, 2014
Calalang-Parulan v. Calalang-Garcia GR 184148 June 9, 2014

b. Joint Administration

i) Disagreement
ii) Sole/Transfer of Administration
Sps. Uy v. C.A. GR 109557 Nov. 29, 2000

d. Dispositions/Donations
Fuentes v. Roca GR No. 178902 April 21, 2010
Nobleza v. Nuega GR 193038 Mar 11, 2015
Hapitan v. Spouses Lagradilla GR 170004 Jan 13, 2016

8. Ownership, Administration and Disposition of Separate/Exclusive Properties

9. Dissolution of Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership

(Arts. 99-101; 126-128, FC)

a. Grounds

b. Separation without dissolution - effects

Heirs of Protacio Go v. Servacio GR 157537 Sept. 7, 2011

10. Liquidation of Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership

Assets and Liabilities (Arts. 102-104; 129-132, FC)

a. Procedure
b. Two or more marriages
c. Order of payment
d. Net profits
Quiao v. Quiao GR 176556 July 4, 2012

11. Separation of Properties During Marriage

18
 a. Voluntary Dissolution
b. Grounds for Separation of Properties
c. Procedure
d. Revival of old property Regime

12. Regime of Separation of Property (Arts. 143-146, FC)

E. Property Relations of Union without Marriage (Arts. 147-148, FC)

1. When both capacitated to marry and living together exclusively

2. Either not capacitated to marry or not living together exclusively
San Luis v. San Luis GR 133743/134029,
Feb 6, 2007
Alain Dino v. Ma. Caridad Dino GR 178044 Jan. 19, 2011

3. Co-ownership
Maxey v. C.A. GR 45870 May 11, 1984
Barrido v. Nonato GR 176492 Oct. 20, 2014
Ocampo v. Ocampo GR 198908 Aug 3, 2015
Uy v. Spouses Lacsamana GR 206220 Aug 19, 2015

F. The Family (Arts. 149-151, FC)

G. The Family Home (Arts. 152-162, FC)

a. Manner of Constitution
Modequillo v. Breva GR 86355 May 31, 1990
Manacop v. C.A. GR 104875 Nov. 13, 1992
Taneo v. CA GR 108532 May 9, 1999

b. Qualified Property

c. Exemption from execution

Josef v. Santos GR 165060, Nov. 27, 2008
Equitable PCIB v. OJ-Mark Trading GR 165950, Aug. 11, 2010

d. Sale

H. Paternity and Filiation (Arts. 163-

182, FC)

1. Kinds of Filiation
19
 2.
Children by Nature
a. Legitimate Children
Liyao v. Liyao GR 138961 Mar. 7, 2002
YOU CANNOT REFUSE LEGIMATICY. Becase yu are bornt hat way.
But you canr effuse recognition of legimtiacy if you are an illegiimate child.

Facts:

b. Illegitimate Children
c. Legitimated Children
BBB v. AAA GR 193225 Feb. 9, 2015
Facts:
Both [BBB] and [AAA] allege that they first met in 1991 but started to date seriously only in 1996.
[AAA] was then a medical student and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship, a
boy named [CCC], with the help of her parents.

During the relationship with [BBB], [AAA] bore two more children namely, [DDD] (born on December
11, 1997) and [EEE] (born on October 19, 2000).

To legalize their relationship, [BBB] and [AAA] married in civil rights on October 10, 2002 and
thereafter, the birth certificates of the children, including [CCCs], was amended to change their civil
status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage.

Marriage turned sour because of jealously and alleged claims of womanizing. And so AAA lef the
conjugal home with children and lived at friends home.

1. Compromise issue

It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly prohibits compromise on any
act constituting the crime of violence against women. Thus, in Garcia v. Drilon,21 the Court declared
that:chanRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the
issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. x x x.22 (Emphasis deleted)

AM No. 10-4-16-SC,23 on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of all issues under the
Family Code and other laws in relation to support, custody, visitation, property relations and
guardianship of minor children, excepting therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.

While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an independent action and not as an incidental
relief prayed for in a criminal suit, the instant petition cannot be taken outside the ambit of cases

20
falling under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. Perforce, the prohibition against subjecting the instant
petition to compromise applies.

2. Legitimatization issue

The deletion from the PPO of the

directive of the RTC and the CA relative
to the award of support is not warranted.

While CCC is not BBBs biological son,

he was legitimated under the latters name.
Like DDD and EEE, CCC is entitled to
receive support from BBB.

BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and custody, which allegedly renders moot
the provision in the PPO relative to support. BBB points out that CCC is not his biological son.
Impliedly then, BBB justifies why CCC is not entitled to receive support from him.

This Court is not persuaded.

Article 177 of the Family Code provides that [o]nly children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other may be legitimated. Article 178 states that [l]egitimation shall take place by a
subsequent valid marriage between parents.

In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCCs biological father. Such
being the case, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAAs
marriage. Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely
acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code pertinently provides: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of estoppel finds application and
it now bars BBB from making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He should not be
allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects
of the legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBBs son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the Family
Code, the former is entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of
his fathers support.

Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from raising before the proper
court the issue of CCCs status and filiation. However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant petition
before this Court now. In Tison v. CA,33 the Court held that the civil status [of a child] cannot be
attacked collaterally. The childs legitimacy cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral
issue in another action for a different purpose.34 The instant petition sprang out of AAAs application
for a PPO before the RTC. Hence, BBBs claim that CCC is not his biological son is a collateral issue,
which this Court has no authority to resolve now.

All told, the Court finds no merit in BBBs petition, but there exists a necessity to remand the case for

21
the RTC to resolve matters relative to who shall be granted custody over the three children, how the
spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of providing financial support.

The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did not commit reversible errors when they issued
the PPO against BBB. Events, which took place after the issuance of the PPO, do not erase the fact
that psychological, emotional and economic abuses were committed by BBB against AAA. Hence,
BBBs claim that he now has actual sole care of DDD and EEE does not necessarily call for this Courts
revocation of the PPO and the award to him of custody over the children.

This Court, thus, affirms the CAs order to remand the case for the RTC to resolve the question of
custody. Since the children are now all older than seven years of age, they can choose for
themselves whom they want to stay with. If all the three children would manifest to the RTC their
choice to stay with AAA, then the PPO issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its entiretyuy.
However, if any of the three children would choose to be under BBBs care, necessarily, the PPO
issued against BBB relative to them is to be modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would remain effective
only as to AAA and any of the children who opt to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may
accordingly alter the manner and amount of financial support BBB should give depending on who shall
finally be awarded custody over the children. Pursuant to Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code,
BBBs resources and means and the necessities of AAA and the children are the essential factors in
determining the amount of support, and the same can be reduced or increased proportionately. The
RTC is reminded to be circumspect in resolving the matter of support, which is a mutual responsibility
of the spouses. The parties do not dispute that AAA is now employed as well, thus, the RTC should
consider the same with the end in mind of promoting the best interests of the children.

A final note on the effectivity and

violation of a PPO

The Court reminds the parties that the application for the issuance of a PPO is not a process to be
trifled with. It is only granted after notice and hearing. Once issued, violation of its provisions shall be
punishable with a fine ranging from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months.35 cralawlaw lib rary

Section 16 of R.A. No. 9262, on the other hand, provides that [a] PPO shall be effective until revoked
by a court upon application of the person in whose favor the order was issued.

Pending the resolution of the instant petition, BBB claims that he and AAA had executed a MOA, upon
which basis a judgment by compromise is sought to be rendered. Atty. Uyboco, on her part, pointed
out AAAs vacillation anent the MOAs execution. With the foregoing circumstances, the parties,
wittingly or unwittingly, have imposed upon this Court the undue burden of speculating whether or not
AAAs half-hearted acquiescence to the MOA is tantamount to an application for the revocation of the
PPO. The Court, however, refuses to indulge the whims of either parties. The questions raised in the
instant petition for the Court to dispose of revolve around the propriety of the PPOs issuance. The
Court resolves that principal query in the affirmative. The PPO thus stands unless AAA, categorically
and without any equivocation, files an application for its revocation.

NOTE: woman already had child. There was alte registration of children, including CCC (na before
marriage)

CONCLUSION: TO impugn legitimacy of child must bebrought in direct proceding. Canot be borught as
collateral acctack.
22
 3. Actions regarding filiation

a. To claim filiation (legitimate/illetigimate)

i) Proof of filiation
Heirs of Basbas v. Basbas GR 188773 Sept. 10, 2014

Hindi anak kasi before oyu can be an heir, you hav eot prove filiation. But you cannot do that since apray
na ang alleged dad.

Aguilar v. Siasat GR 200169 Jan 28, 2015

ON filiation: similar as Geronimo. For purposes of preicirptive period to ipugn legitimatcy 12,3- if
alleged that child was neer child of couple, do not use 1,2,3 period. This is something that will not follow
preoscirptive period. And foolow GENERAL prosriove period of brinig action

A person claims tha the is only son of cpuple who already died. Action was to receover certiciate of tilte
wthat waswere hy daughter rof sister of wife(Niece of couple deid). Pet said that the niece reposndent of
the wife in tis case had ilelglally kep titles from him and was stolen. Niece said that youar enot really son
since you are stranger and you were just borugh tinto family. Legal reasoning was tha tpsouse died in
succession. So first person who died was husband. And since hcildlless, all proeprties in the acp were all
inherited by the wife isnc eno heri but her. Awhen wife die,d I touwl dog to isntatea heirs of wife since
she was widown and now hcilren. And she as niece, was intestate heir of wife.

As proof of his filiation , pet shouwed several: school records weher ename f couple was listed as
aprent,marriage ceriticate where paretns were named as paapents, SSS form E-1, where beneficiaries were
listed down. Form E-1 is public document signed by SSS employee, an igne dby tfather.

SC: A rpiamry piece o vicen has bene repsentat and that is a public document signed by father. Against
this, youa vhe to rpesent proof that the contents of public ocuments are not true. So court concluded that
leg siya. Others were usellss since not sgned.

Since sss was notarized and even signed by father, and so, int eh absence of any contradiciotn, he had
filation with father.

Was not able to present brith certiciate, but he only presented certicate that records were urend. Court said
e was leg in theabence of contrary proof, but he admonsiehd that for fialing to fo civil reigsterg eneral
office in manila . but that did not change the deicisons.

BUT HERE: in the absne ceof contrary proof, public oducment should statn dint eh absnce of contar
yproof in the absence of contrary eveidence.
23
Facts: Sps aguildar died intestate nd without debts. Incuded in estate are 2 parcels of land.

Rodolfo aguilar is the only son of sps agailar. He filed mandatory injuction with damages against Siasat.
He suspected that siasat clan sotle the same. m Heirs of Arado v. Alcoran
GR 163362 July 8, 2015

ii) Admissibility of Scientific Testing

Ong v. Diaz GR 171713, Dec 17, 2007
Lucas v. Lucas GR 190710 June 6, 2011

b. To impugn filiation
Geronimo v. Santos GR 197099 Sept 28, 2015

*if case involves a person who is not alleged to be child of

hsband or wife, then do not apply period of 1,2 3 for impugning
legitimacy You only use that provision if in fact the child was born to the
wife and it is not fathered by husbad.

Here there was preorty dispute. Who is entitled to certina oreproty. Petitioners claim that theyreborhter of
huband versus person who says she is legitimate child of husband and wife. Birth certiiaate was
tampered.brhters provide that wife she was enver pregnant and there was no maternity benefits nga eh.
This child was chid of wifes sister, and then registered as own. So borht certiicte was tampered. But child
said that its too late to question now. Period expired since father is dead. So cannot question na. on the
issue of won there should hve been action within 1,2,3 year period?

SC: you only apply that provision if that child is really a child of the wife and it is contested who the
father is.

Theat s why right ot bring action can only be by hsband. No question as w to wife since wife gave brith.
So husband alone and heir in orper cases must be bourght in DIRECT proceeding and not n collateral
where this is a property dispute.

HERE, heirs are saying na NOT child of the WOMAN. Do noy apply 1,2,3 if you impugn legitimacy of
child when child is note ven child of the sps. ONLY use 1,2,3 if child is that of wifes, but iba ang father.

4. Rights of Legitimate/Legitimated/Illegitimate Children

Cf. R.A. 9255 (Surname of Illegitimate Children)
R.A. 9225 (Effect of Dual Citizenship on Derivative Citizenship of Minor
Children)
Salientes v. Abanilla GR 162734, Aug. 29, 2006
De la Cruz v. Gracia GR 1770728 July 31, 2009
24
There was autobiography.

92250 allows acknow.edging legitimacy by administrative case.

Grande v. Antonio GR 206248 Feb 8, 2014

I. Adoption (Arts. 183-193, FC)

Inter-country Adoption Law (RA 8043)
Domestic Adoption Law (RA 8552)

1. Construction
Landingin v. Republic GR 164948, June 26, 2006

2. Qualifications/Disqualifications of Adopter
In re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lee GR Nos. 168992-3,
May 21, 2009
Castro v. Gregorio GR 18880, Oct 14, 2014

3. Qualifications/Disqualifications of Adopted

4. Rights Granted by Adoption

Republic v. Hernandez GR 117209 Feb. 9, 1996

5. Rules on Succession
Sayson v. C.A. GR 89224-25 Jan. 23, 1992

6. Rescission/Termination of Adoption
Lahom v. Sibulo GR 143989 July 14, 2003
Bartolome v. SSS GR 192531 Nov. 12, 2014

J. Support (Arts. 194-208, FC)

1. What constitutes support/basis

Del Socorro v. Van Wielsen GR 193707 Dec. 10, 2014

2. Persons Obliged to Support each other

a. Spouses

b. Ascendants & Descendants

Lim v. Lim GR 163209, Oct. 30, 2009

25
 c. Parents and Legitimate/Illegitimate Children/Descendants
Lam v. Chua GR 131286 Mar. 18, 2004
Gotardo v. Buling GR 165166 Aug. 15, 2012

d. Legitimate/Illegitimate Brothers and Sisters

2. Contractual Support

3. Basis of Support

4. Options of Giver

5. Support Pendente Lite

Lim-Lua v. Lua GR 175279-80 June 5, 2013

K. Parental Authority (Arts. 209-233, FC)

1. Concept

2. Over Person
Bondagjy v. Bondagjy GR 170406 Aug. 11, 2008
Dacasin v. Dacasin GR 168785, Feb. 5, 2010
Beckett v. Sarmiento AM-RTJ-12-2326 Jan. 30, 2013
Caram v. Segui GR 193652 Aug. 5, 2014

3. Over Property
Badillo v. Ferrer GR 51369 July 29, 1987

4. Substitute and Special Parental Authority

St. Josephs College v. Miranda GR 182353, June 29, 2010
People v. Bayabos GR 171222/174786
Feb. 18, 2015

5. Suspension/Termination of Parental Authority

6. Liability of Parents for Acts of Children

Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court GR 70890 Sept. 18, 1992
Tamargo v. C.A. GR 85044 June 3, 1992

L. Emancipation (Arts. 234-237, FC)

1. Age of Majority
26
 R.A. 6809

M. Retroactivity of Family Code

Exception: Vested Rights
Aruego v. C.A. GR 112193 Mar. 13, 1996
Rep. v. Miller GR 125932 Apr. 21, 1999

PART III

A. Funerals (Arts. 305-310, CC)

Valino v. Adriano GR 182894 April 22, 2014

B. Surname (Arts. 364-380, Civil Code)

Tolentino v. C.A. GR 41427 June 10, 1988
Republic v. Capote GR 157043, Feb 2, 2007
Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs GR 169202, Mar. 5, 2010
Grande v. Antonio GR 206248 Feb. 18, 2014

C. Absence (Arts. 381-396, CC)

1. Provisional Absence
2. Declaration of Absence
Reyes v. Alejandro GR 32026 Jan. 16, 1986

3. Presumption of Death

a. Art. 41, 2nd par., FC

b. Ordinary & Extraordinary Absence

D. Civil Register (Arts. 407-413, CC)

Cf. RA 9048

Silverio v. Republic GR 174689, Oct. 10, 2007

Republic v. Cagandahan GR 166676, Sept. 12, 2008

HERE, NOT AHCHNGE OF GENDER. HERE CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL

REG .BASIS OF GRANT IN CGANHDAHN WAS
Republic v. Mercadera GR 186027, Dec. 8, 2010
Onde v. Office of Civil Registrar of Las Pinas GR 197174 Sept. 20, 2014
Republic v. Olaybar GR 189538 Feb. 10, 2014
- obtain cenomar (certificate of no marriage). Woman went to civ reg and asked
for one and found out that she as already married to Chinese citizen. Many
27
 Chinese faked marriage by putting name of Filipina to be permanent resident.
Signature in marriage cert was forged. So she institution action for correction
of entry in civil registry to delete name of spouse as married person. Court
corrected entry and legally declared she was not married for purposes of
marrying someother person.
- Judicial declaration of nullity of marriage (court said no marriage to declare
void in the first place) versus correction of entry in civil registry.
o If in the absence of marriage license, there was actually a marriage and
you appeared but no license.

PART IV
PROPERTY

A. Classification of Property (Arts. 414-418, CC)

1. Immovable Property

Makati Leasing & Finance

Corp. v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. GR 58469 May 16, 1983
Yap v. Taada GR 32917 July 18, 1988
Victoria v. Pidlaoran GR 1964770 April 20, 2016

2. Movable Property
Laurel v. Abrogar GR 155076, Jan. 13, 2009

3. According to Ownership

a. Public Dominion
Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Dev GR 186961 Feb. 20, 2012

b. Private Ownership
Director of Lands v. MERALCO GR 57461 Sept. 11, 1987

B. Ownership (Arts. 427-439, CC)

1. Rights of Ownership/Limitations
2. Doctrines of Incomplete Privilege/Self-Help
3. Presumption of Ownership
4. Rule on Hidden Treasure

28
C. Accession (Arts. 440-475, CC)

1. Accession Discreta

a. Natural Fruits
b. Industrial Fruits
c. Civil Fruits

2. Accession Continua

a. On Real Property

a.1 Accession Industrial

i) Builder/Planter/Sower in Good Faith

Depra v. Dumlao GR 57348 May 16, 1985
Sarmiento v. Agana GR 57288 April 30, 1984
Sulo ng Nayon v. Nayong
Filipino GR 170923 Jan. 20, 2009
Automat Realty v. Sps DL Cruz GR 192016 Oct 1, 2014
Dept of Edu v. Casibang GR 192268, Jan 27, 2016

ii) Builder/Planter/Sower in Bad Faith

Metropolitan Waterworks v C.A.GR 54526 Aug. 25, 1986
Mirallosa v. Carmen Dev GR 194538 Nov. 27, 2013
BPI v. Sanchez GR 179518/179835/179954
Nov. 19, 2014
Sps. Aquino v. Sps. Aguilar GR 182754 June 29, 2015

iii) No claim of ownership

Mores v. Yu-go GR 172292, July 23, 2010

a.2 Accession Natural

Bagaipo v. C.A. GR 116290 Dec. 8, 2000
Republic v. Arcadio GR 160453, Nov. 12, 2012

D. Quieting of Title (Art. 476-481, CC)

E. Co-Ownership

1. Elements
Robles v. C.A. GR 123509 Mar. 14, 2000

2. How created

3. Rights of Co-owners

a. Ownership over whole property

b. Sale/Alienation

i) of undivided interest

ii) of entire property

Del Campo v. C.A. GR 108228 Feb. 1, 2001
Torres v. Lapinid GR 187987 Nov. 26, 2014

iii) redemption by other co-owners

(cf. Art. 1620, 1623 CC)
Adille v. C.A. GR 44546 Jan. 29, 1888
Cabales v. C.A. GR 162421 Aug. 31, 2007

29
 iv) prescription
Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla GR 151334 Feb. 13, 2013

c. Benefits, fruits, interest, income

d. Use/possession
Estreller v. Ysmael GR 170264 Mar. 13, 2009

e. Management/administration

i) distinguished from alteration

4. Partition

a. Demandable anytime
Pada-Kilario v. C.A. GR 134329 Jan. 19, 2000
Maestrado v. C.A. GR 133345 & 133324
Mar. 9, 2000
Pilapil v. Briones GR 150175 Feb. 5, 2007

b. Not a Transfer of Ownership

Heirs of Ureta v. Ureta GR 16748/165930,
Sept. 14, 2011
d. Form
Notarte v. Notarte GR 180614, Aug. 29, 2012

e. Prohibition for indivision

5. Obligations of Co-Owner

a. Necessary Expenses for preservation

b. Useful & luxurious expenses

6. Termination

F. Condominium Act (RA 4726)

G. Waters (P.D. 1067)

H. Possession

1. Elements
Yu v. Pacleb GR 130316 Jan. 24, 2007

2. Kinds

3. Requirements - to ripen into ownership

SMPSM v. BCDA GR 142255, Jan 26, 2007
Julita Imuan v. Juanito Cereno GR 167995 Sept. 11, 2009
Jaime Abalos v. Heirs of Torio GR 167995 Dec. 14, 2011

4. Acquisitive prescription

a. in good faith
b. in bad faith
Mercado v. Espinocilla GR 184109 Feb. 1, 2012
c. tacking of possession
Nenita Quality Foods v. Galabo GR 174191, Jan. 30, 2013

5. Rights of Legal Processor

30
 a. Peaceful and uninterrupted possession

i) Co-possession
Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot GR 132518 Mar. 28, 2000

- effect of partition
- effect of interruption

iv) Actions in case of deprivation of possession

b. Presumption of Ownership
Heirs of Lopez v. Querubin GR 1554059/164092
March 18, 2015

c. Fruits

i) Civil Fruits
ii) Natural/Industrial Fruits
iii) Pending Fruits

c. Indemnity for Expenses/Improvements

i) Necessary
ii) Useful
iii) Luxurious
iv) Possession by Lessee

6. Presumption of Just Title

a. when applicable
b. meaning of just title

7. Possession of Movables
a. when lost
b. unlawful deprivation (c.f. Arts. 1132, 1505, CC)

8. Loss of Possession

I. Usufruct

1. Nature/Elements
NHA v. CA GR 148830 April 13, 2005

2. Application to Personal & Real Properties

2. How constituted

4. Rights of Usufructuary
a. Fruits
b. Possession & enjoyment
c. Lease of property
c. Sale/Alienation of Usufructuary rights

5. Obligations of the Usufructuary

a. Before the Usufruct commences

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 b. During the Usufruct
i) Alteration of form & substance
ii) Exercise of Diligence
iii) Repairs
iv) Charges & Taxes
v) Insurance

6. Termination of Usufruct
Moralidad v. Pernes GR 152809 Aug. 3, 2006

J. Easements
La Vista v. CA GR 95252 Sept. 5, 1997
Villanueva v. Velasco GR 130845 Nov. 27, 2000
Castro v. Monsod GR 183719, Feb. 2, 2011

PART V

A. Modes of Acquiring Ownership

1. Mode v. Title
3. Original/Derivative Modes

B. Occupation

C. Intellectual Creation

C. Donation

1. Essential Elements
Republic v. Guzman GR 132964 Feb. 18, 2000
Reyes v. Asuncion GR 196083 Nov 11, 2015

2. Kinds

3. Conditional Donations
a. Effect of Impossible/Illegal Conditions
Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila v. C.A. GR 77425 & 77450
June 19, 1991

4. Inter Vivos/Mortis Causa Donations

Aluad v. Aluad GR 176943 Oct. 17, 2008
Villanueva v. Sps. Branoco GR 172804 January 24, 2011

5. Form
a. Onerous Donations
Danguilan v. IAC GR 69970 Nov. 28, 1988

6. Capacity
a. Of Donor

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 b. Of Donee

7. Revocation
a. Birth, Survival or Adoption
b. Ingratitude
c. Non-fulfillment of Condition
d. Innoficiousness

SC Rules on declaration of nullity of marriage:

1. Requirement that only the parties to the marriage can bring action to the declaration of
nullity. (as seen in the case of Ninal. Note NInal was decided under Civil Code and no
rules yet kaya pwede pa children niya to file. But note the present rule that only the
parties can bring an action to delare a nullity of marriage
-enrique v memanche(?) first case that sc said that only parties can bring action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Heirs in this case argued that the rule aplie donly if
parents are still alive. They argued that if dead, heirs should be permitted to bring action.
But SC said rules do not make discitinction. Hence, even if dead, heirs CANNOT
BRING action.

But SC also said that if it is a collateral acttack where nullity of marriage is questioned
i.e. property case. So pwede i.duscuss ang nullity. But in this case, what was brought was
declaration of nullity of marriage. BUT if only succesionalrights or shares in the estate,
they could have calidly done a COLLATERAL attack on the nullity of the marriage.
Hecne, for as long As DIRECt caciton on declaration of nullity of marriage, only aprties
can bring. But for collateral attack, heirs can do it.

Bolos case: Restatement of Enrique v Minicheli(?)

2. Final Decree of Nullity (same for annulment) courts even after decision has been
rendered, even after it has become final, procedurally, it will be that when case decided
there is period of appeal. If no appeal, it becomes final. Then there is a entry of judgment.
For all itnetns and purpsses, when case is decided, thats it.

BUT HERE there is a DECREE required. This is what you present to the Civil Rgistrar.
You cannot tell CR that decision has already become final. They have ministerial power
so you must present DECREE first. So even it becomes final or even after etry of
judgment, still comply with procedural requirements before you can get DECREE of
Nullity. Here are the procedural (not substantial hence oyu can get married but
PROBLEM IS THAT YOU CANNOT GET A MARRIAGE LICENSE- otherwise
marriage is void not because of essential requirement of capacity since you can get
married na. the problem witill bef ormla requiremtn of the marriage license!) Once oyu
have final entry of judgment, the case final:
a. entry of judgment must be entere din local civl reg where (1) FIRST marriage
recorded and (2) where court that issued final judgment sits so two registrations
b. Parittion and liquidation of properites. As a a ncesary consequence of declaration
and annulment, must proceed with dissolution of property regimes. Must register
that LIQUIDATION AND DISSOLUTION of ACP or CP in the palce wehreh
assets are located. But this only refers to real proeprties. No personal property
since no registrar for personal proeprties!
c. The delivery of presumptive legitime of children affected by dec and annulment.
Show court that rendered final jdugemnt that you have already distributed

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 properties to children their cash whether in cash or property or in sound securities
(bonds, shares of stock). Show proof that you gave these. One of the criticsms
when FC came itno effect, none of the parties actually delivered presumptive
legitie and foreget about children. So this provision is for the protection of
children. So demonstrate to court that you complied wit this requirement.
t

(NOTE the SC RULES not apply when termination of marriage is on account of the death of the
other spouse)

If you do not have legal declaration of nullity of marriage, subsqueent marriage is void

What happens if you dont have decree and you enter into subsuqnet marriage?
a. if oyu did not obtain NL on account of the fact that you dont have decree? Marriage is
declared as void but because of lack of formal requirement.
b. But if reason you did not get decree because you did not deliver preusmtpove legitiem,
but you were ablet o get marriage license for some werid reaons, will your second
marriage be void? YES because of article 53 since you failed to delivery art 53.
c.
Does it make a difference? Yes because if failure is ebacuse of 53, effect son marriage is that the
children will be cosdiered as legitime. BUT if it is bigamous marriage, the chidlrne will be
cosndiered illegitimate.

But if failure of subseq marriage bec of article 53, marriage will be considered legitime.

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