G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997. Carlitos E. Silva, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Court of APPEALS and SUZANNE T. GONZALES, Respondents

9/5/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 275
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Silva vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997.
CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and SUZANNE T. GONZALES, respondents.
Parent and Child; Custody; Words and Phrases; Visitation

right is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his or her
child or children.The issue before us is not really a question of
child custody; instead, the case merely concerns the visitation
right of a parent over his children which the trial court has
adjudged in favor of petitioner by holding that he shall have
visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays,
but in no case (could) he take out the children without the written
consent of the mother
______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
605
VOL. 275, JULY 17, 1997 605
x x x. The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a

non-custodial parent to his or her child or children.
Same; Same; Illegitimate Children; There is nothing

conclusive to indicate that the constitutional and legal provisions
on the natural right and duty of parents are meant to solely
address themselves to legitimate relationships.There is, despite
a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on the
inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Article
150 of the Family Code expresses that (f)amily relations include
those x x x (2) (b)etween parents and children; x x x. Article 209,
in relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural
right and duty of parents and those exercising parental authority
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015e5135ffdf5e448f48003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/17
to, among other things, keep children in their company and to

give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship
and understanding. The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the
natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing of the
youth. There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these
provisions are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate
relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on
support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go
beyond the legitimate members of the family and so explicitly
encompass illegitimate relationships as well. Then, too, and most
importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation
that presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the
Family Code provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents
who are not given custody of their children.
Same; Same; In all cases involving a child, his interest and

welfare is always the paramount consideration.There is no
doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare
is always the paramount consideration. The Court shares the
view of the Solicitor General, who has recommended due course to
the petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with the
children, however, could not all be that detrimental to the
children.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Agcaoili Law Offices for petitioner.
German S. Gonzales, Sr. for private respondent.
606

VITUG, J.:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and

legal duty, to care for their children, see to their proper
upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare.
This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied
the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even
when the parents are estranged and their affection for each
other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings
invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the
courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any
real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the
child.
The petition bears upon this concern.
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne
T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress, cohabited without
the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two

children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long
after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began,
according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her
acting career over his vigorous objections. The assertion
was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in
fact, had never stopped working throughout their
relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986,
by the refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva, in apparent
contravention of a previous understanding, to have the
children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition
for custodial rights over the children before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The
petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva
often engaged in gambling and womanizing which she
feared could affect the moral and social values of the
children.
In an order, dated 07 April 1989, the trial court
adjudged:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered

directing respondent to allow herein petitioner visitorial rights to
his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case
should he
607
VOL. 275, JULY 17, 1997 607

take out the children without the written consent of

1
the mother or
respondent herein. No pronouncement as to costs.
Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for

only Gonzales interposed an appeal from the RTCs order to
the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch
national. The newlyweds emigrated to Holland with Ramon
Carlos and Rica Natalia.
On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in
favor of Gonzales; it held:
In all questions, regarding the care, custody, education and

property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
considerationnot the welfare of the parents (Art. 8, PD 603).
Under the predicament and/or status of both petitionerappellee
and respondent-appellant, We find it more wholesome morally
and emotionally for the children if we put a stop to the rotation of
custody of said children. Allowing these children to stay with their
mother on weekdays and then with their father and the latters
live-in partner on weekends may not be conducive to a normal up-
bringing of children of tender age. There is no telling how this

kind of set-up, no matter how temporary and/or remote, would
affect the moral and emotional conditions of the minor children.
Knowing that they are illegitimate is hard enough, but having to
live with it, witnessing their father living with a woman not their
mother may have a more damaging effect upon them.
Article 3 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, provides in part:
Art. 3. Rights of the Child.x x x
(1) x x x
(2) x x x
(3) x x x
(4) x x x
(5) Every child has the right to be brought up in an atmosphere of
morality and rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening of
his character.
______________
1 Rollo, p. 29.
608

(6) x x x
(7) x x x
(8) Every child has the right to protection against
exploitation, improper influences, hazards and other
conditions or circumstances prejudicial to his physical,
mental, emotional, social and moral development.
x x x
With Articles 3 and 8 of PD No. 603, in mind, We find it to the
best interest of the minor children, to deny visitorial and/or
temporary custodial rights to the father, even at the expense of
hurting said parent. After all, if indeed his love for the children is
genuine and more divine than the love for himself, a little self-
sacrifice and self-denial may bring more benefit to the children.
While petitioner-appellee, as father, may not intentionally
prejudice the children by improper influence, what the children
may witness and hear while in their fathers house may not be in
keeping with the atmosphere of morality and rectitude where
they should be brought up.
The children concerned are still in their early formative years
of life. The molding of the character of the child starts at home. A
home with only one parent is more normal than two separate
houses(one house where one parent lives and another house
where the other parent with another woman/man lives). After all,
under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children are
supposed to use the surname of and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother.
The child is one of the most important assets of the nation. It
is thus important we be careful in rearing the children especially
so if they are illegitimates, as in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered giving due course to the appeal. The Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated April 7, 1989 is hereby
reversed. Petitioner-appellees petition for visitorial rights is
hereby denied. 2
SO ORDERED.
Silva comes to this Court for relief.
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 22-23.
609
VOL. 275, JULY 17, 1997 609

The issue before us is not really a question of child custody;

instead, the case merely concerns the visitation right of a
parent over his children which the trial court has adjudged
in favor of petitioner by holding that he shall have
visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or
Sundays, but in no case (could) he take out the children
without the written consent of the mother x x x. The
visitation right referred to is the right of access 3
of a
noncustodial parent to his or her child or children.
There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions,
enough recognition on the inherent and natural right of
parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family Code
expresses that (f)amily relations include those x x x (2)
(b)etween parents and children; x x x. Article 209, in
relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the
natural right and duty of parents and those exercising
parental authority to, among other things, keep children in
their company and to give them love and affection, advice
and counsel, companionship and understanding. The
Constitution itself speaks in terms of the natural and4
primary rights of parents in the rearing of the youth.
There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these
provisions are meant to solely address themselves to
legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying
degrees, the laws on support and successional rights, by
way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members
of the family and so 5

explicitly encompass illegitimate
relationships as well. Then, too, and most importantly, in
the declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation that
presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the
Family Code provides for appropriate visitation rights to
parents who are not given custody of their children.
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his
interest and welfare is always the paramount
consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor
General, who has
______________
3 See Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth edition, p. 1572.

4 Art. II, Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution.
5 Arts. 176, 195 Family Code.
610

recommended due course to the petition, that a few hours

spent by petitioner with the children, however, could not
all be that detrimental to the children. Similarly, what the
trial court has observed is not entirely without merit; thus:
The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner,

even assuming as true, cannot be taken as sufficient basis to
render petitioner an unfit father. The fears expressed by
respondent to the effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt
and degrade their children once allowed to even temporarily
associate with petitioner is but the product of respondents
unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral
persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and
expense in instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing his
illegitimate children. It can just be imagined the deep6 sorrows of a
father who is deprived of his children of tender ages.
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private

respondent and their well-meant concern for the children;
nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have
ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parents
natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on
brief visits, his own children. The trial court, in any case,
has seen it fit to understandably provide this precautionary
measure, i.e., in no case (can petitioner) take out the
children without the written consent of the mother.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is
REINSTATED, reversing thereby the judgment of the
appellate court which is hereby SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ.,

concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., On leave.
Judgment reversed and set aside, that of the court a quo

reinstated.
______________
6 Rollo, p. 29.
611
VOL. 275, JULY 17, 1997 611

Pono vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Notes.A marriage though void still needs a judicial

declaration of such fact under the Family Code even for
purposes other than remarriage. (Domingo vs. Court of
Appeals, 226 SCRA 572 [1993])
An unrecognized spurious child has no rights from his
parents or to their estate. (Ilano vs. Court of Appeals, 230
SCRA 242 [1994])
Of the different categories of illegitimate children under
the old Civil Code, the natural child occupies the highest
position, she being the child of parents who, at the time of
her conception, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other. (Alberto vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA
745 [1994])
o0o
*
G.R. No. 118860. July 17, 1997.
ROLINDA B. PONO, petitioner vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION, RAFAELITO I. CASTILLO,
and SANDOZ PHILS., INC., respondents.
Labor Law; Illegal Dismissals; The issue of whether or not

there is a valid dismissal of an employee is a question of fact, the
determination of which is the statutory function of the NLRC.
Before proceeding any further, it must be borne in mind that the
issue of whether or not there is a valid dismissal of an employee is
a question of fact, the determination of which is the statutory
function of the NLRC. It is almost trite to state that factual
findings of the NLRC are generally accorded, not only respect but
also finality, provided that its decisions are supported by
substantial evidence and devoid of any unfairness or
arbitrariness.
Criminal Procedure; Prosecutors; An investigating fiscal is

under no obligation to file a criminal information where he is not
con-
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
612
vinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the

averments.Pono contends that the NLRC erred when it
deliberately disregarded her complaint for sexual harassment
against Castillo. The Court takes cognizance of the fact that a
criminal complaint for attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness
filed by Pono against Castillo before the Prosecutors Office in
Makati was eventually dismissed due to lack of merit, which
dismissal was affirmed by the Department of Justice.
Indisputably, an investigating fiscal is under no obligation to file
a criminal information where he is not convinced that he has the
quantum of evidence at hand to support the averments.
Same; Same; The determination of the persons to be

prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is vested with
quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of this function.Thus,
the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily
with the prosecutor who is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in
the discharge of this function. The courts should give credence, in
the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, to the findings
and determination of probable cause by prosecutors in a
preliminary investigation.
Labor Law; Illegal Dismissals; To validate a dismissal, the

employer must show that (1) there was sufficient or just cause
therefor and that (2) due process was observed.With respect to
the legality of Ponos dismissal, we have consistently held that, to
validate a dismissal, the employer must show that (1) there was
sufficient or just cause therefor and that (2) due process was
observed.
Same; Same; Due Process; The twin requirements of notice

and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process in the
dismissal of employees.Well-settled is the dictum that the twin
requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential
elements of due process in the dismissal of employees. It is a

cardinal rule in our jurisdiction that the employer must furnish
the employee with two written notices before the termination of
employment can be effected: (a) the first apprises the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought;
and (b) the second informs the employee of the employers decision
to dismiss him.
Same; Same; Same; The requirement of a hearing is complied

with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and not
necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.The
requirement of a
613
VOL. 275, JULY 17, 1997 613
hearing, on the other hand, is complied with as long as there was

an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that an actual
hearing was conducted.
Same; Same; Same; A meeting merely for the purpose of

informing an employee about her questionable work report, and
to serve her a written notice detailing her infractions in her work
sheet is not the hearing contemplated by law.An examination of
the records, however, reveals that no hearing was ever conducted
by Sandoz before Pono was dismissed. The meeting called by Ruiz
on October 5, 1992, is not the hearing contemplated by law since
it was merely for the purpose of informing Pono about her
questionable work report, and to serve Pono a written notice
detailing her infractions in her work sheet. In fact, barely two
weeks later, she was summarily dismissed. While it may be true
that Pono was allowed to explain her side at this meeting, it is
undisputed that no hearing was actually conducted before her
employment was terminated.
Same; Same; Same; Consultations or conferences may not be a

substitute for the actual holding of a hearing.Consultations or
conferences may not be a substitute for the actual holding of a
hearing. Every opportunity and assistance must be accorded to
the employee by the management to enable him to prepare
adequately for his defense, including legal representation.
Considering that Pono denied the accusation that she forged a
doctors signature in her work report, these denials should at least
have warranted a separate hearing to enable her to fully ventilate
her side. Absent such a hearing, Ponos constitutional right to due
process was clearly violated.
Same; Same; Serious Misconduct; The habit of reporting

visits or calls to several doctors when no such visits or calls were
actually made constitutes serious misconduct.We cannot
countenance Ponos incompetence and lack of diligence in the
performance of her duties. In fact, from June to October 1992, she
received no less than five written notices calling her attention to
her negligence in discharging her duties, not to mention the
documented delinquencies she incurred prior to the alleged May
18, 1992 incident. Moreover, the habit of reporting visits or calls
to several doctors when no such visits or calls were actually made
constitutes serious misconduct. We, therefore, hold that Ponos
dismissal was for a just cause.
614
Same; Same; Due Process; Where the dismissal of an employee

is, in fact, for a proven just and valid cause, but he is not accorded
due process, the dismissal shall be upheld, but the employer must
be held liable for the violation of his right to due process.In a
growing number of cases, this Court has consistently held that
where the dismissal of an employee is, in fact, for a proven just
and valid cause, but he is not accorded due process, the dismissal
shall be upheld, but the employer must be held liable for the
violation of his right to due process. The identical situation
obtains in the case at bar.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Dario F. Pedrasa for petitioner.
Soo, Gutierrez, Leogardo & Lee for private
respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner Rolinda B. Pono seeks the annulment of the

decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated
August 31, 1994, affirming the August 27, 1993 decision of
Labor Arbiter Benigno C. Villarente, Jr. which, in turn,
dismissed petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal, as
well as the NLRCs resolution of November 9, 1994,
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
This case arose from a complaint filed by Pono against
herein private respondents Sandoz Phils., Inc. (Sandoz)
and Rafaelito I. Castillo for illegal dismissal, unfair labor

practices, separation pay and damages.
Pono averred that she was employed by Sandoz as
medical representative, with the primary task of conferring
with doctors to update them about Sandoz various medical
products. Sometime in May 18, 1992, she was asked by
Castillo, her immediate supervisor, to report to his office
and explain her alleged incompetence in the performance of
her work. At said meeting, Castillo confronted Pono
concerning her alleged infraction of company policies. It
was then that Castillo started to physically take advantage
of Pono by touching dif-
615
VOL. 275, JULY 17, 1997 615

ferent parts of her body. Aghast at her supervisors action,

Pono resisted his advances.
Unable to consummate his prurient desires, Castillo
warned Pono not to inform anybody about the incident;
otherwise, her continued employment in the company
would be placed in jeopardy.
Fearful lest she should lose her job which she apparently
valued more than her dignity, Pono decided to remain
silent and maintained a facade of normalcy for the next five
months. On October 5, 1992, however, she was again asked
by Castillo to report to his office ostensibly to discuss
company matters and policies.
Apprehensive that the so-called conference was another
ploy of Castillo for sexually harassing her, Pono decided to
divulge the May 18, 1992 incident to her closest co-workers.
Thereafter, along with two co-workers, she informed
Sandoz National Sales Manager Godofredo Ruiz of the
incident.
Subsequently, Mr. Ruiz called a meeting on October 6,
1992 to give a chance to Castillo to explain his side on the
matter. As expected, Castillo denied the incident of May 18,
1992. Ruiz then asked Pono not to resign until after she
has completely paid the amortizations on the company car
assigned to her. Undecided, Pono asked for a reasonable
time to consider the same. Two days later, however, Ruiz
withdrew the offer; whereupon, Castillo asked Pono to
explain her inefficiencies in her work, which the latter did
through a handwritten statement dated October 14, 1992.
After five days, her services were formally terminated.
With no recourse left, Pono filed the instant labor case, as
well as the necessary criminal charges before the
Prosecutors Office of Makati.
Private respondents reconstruction of the events was

expectedly at variance with Ponos. They claimed that she
was one of seven medical representatives under Castillos
supervision. Castillos version is as follows. Having
observed that Pono had been violating several company
policies, she was asked to comment on her alleged
infractions, such as absences in certain itineraries,
discrepancies in her work report and
616

non-liquidation of cash advances. During the meeting, she

admitted that her failure to comply with her duties was
due to personal problems and asked for some
understanding so she could put her life in order.
Castillo advised Pono to clean her backyard and follow
company policies. Notwithstanding the advise, Ponos
work still fell short of company standards. Hence, on
October 5, 1992, he requested her to personally report to
him so they could discuss matters concerning her work
performance. Aware that she could no longer offer a
reasonable justification of her continued inefficiency, Pono
decided to fabricate her attempted rape story.
To add credence to her story, Pono went to Godofredo
Ruiz to narrate the attempted rape allegedly committed by
Castillo, and at the same time offered to resign from her job
effective April 1993, at which time she would already be
entitled to purchase the company car she was then using at
50% of its appraised value. Unfortunately, her request was
denied by the company.
Pono, on the other hand, offered no plausible
explanation as to her shortcomings. Instead, she accused
Castillo of harassing her and threatened to take legal
action against him to stave off her dismissal. Making good
her threat, she filed charges for unfair labor practice and
sexual harassment against private respondents.
After considering the evidence and arguments of the
parties, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit. As stated at the outset, this decision was affirmed
by the NLRC on appeal. It found that the infractions of
company policies committed by Pono warranted the penalty
of dismissal.
Pono is now before this Court contending that the NLRC
acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction in affirming the decision of the
Labor Arbiter.
Before proceeding any further, it must be borne in mind
that the issue of whether or not there is a valid dismissal of
617
VOL. 275, JULY 17, 1997 617

an employee is a question of fact, the determination

1
of
which is the statutory function of the NLRC. It is almost
trite to state that factual findings of the NLRC are
generally accorded, not only respect but also finality,
provided that its decisions are supported by substantial2
evidence and devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness.
Pono contends that the NLRC erred when it deliberately
disregarded her complaint for sexual harassment against
Castillo. The Court takes cognizance of the fact that a
criminal complaint for attempted rape or acts of
lasciviousness filed by Pono against Castillo before the
Prosecutors Office in Makati was eventually dismissed due
to lack of merit, which3 dismissal was affirmed by the
Department of Justice. Indisputably, an investigating
fiscal is under no obligation to file a criminal information
where he is not convinced that he has the 4
quantum of
evidence at hand to support the averments.
Thus, the determination of the persons to be prosecuted
rests primarily with the prosecutor who is vested with5
quasijudicial discretion in the discharge of this function.
The courts should give credence, in the absence of a clear
showing of arbitrariness, to the findings and determination
of probable 6 cause by prosecutors in a preliminary
investigation.
With respect to the legality of Ponos dismissal, we have
consistently held that, to validate a dismissal, the employer
must show that (1) there was sufficient or7 just cause
therefor and that (2) due process was observed.
_______________
1 Cardona v. NLRC, 195 SCRA 92 (1991).

2 Artex Development Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 187 SCRA 611 (1990); Loapstar
Shipping Co. v. NLRC, 229 SCRA 654 (1993); Morales v. NLRC, 241 SCRA
103 (1994); Radio Communication of the Philippines v. NLRC (1996).
3 Rollo, pp. 144-146.
4 People v. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748 (1967).
5 Ogburn v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 483 (1992); People v. Devaras,
228 SCRA 482 (1993).
6 Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 280 (1996).
7 Shoppers Gain Supermarket, et al., v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110731, July
26, 1996.
618

Bearing these standards in mind, we find that while Pono

was dismissed for cause, the same disregarded the
requirements of due process.
Well-settled is the dictum that the twin requirements of
notice and hearing constitute the essential
8
elements of due
process in the dismissal of employees. It is a cardinal rule
in our jurisdiction that the employer must furnish the
employee with two written notices before the termination
of employment can be effected: (a) the first apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought; and (b) the second informs 9
the
employee of the employers decision to dismiss him.
The requirement of a hearing, on the other hand, is
complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be
heard, and10 not necessarily that an actual hearing was
conducted.
In the case at bar, Pono was duly notified of the charges
against her. The records reveal that on October 5, 1992, she
was asked to explain why there were some discrepancies in
her reported calls11and the actual signatures
12
of the doctors
in the call cards. In another notice dated October 12,
1992, she was apprised of an apparent forgery in the
signatures of a certain Dra. Melissa Bilgera, and was asked
to explain her side within 72 hours from receipt thereof.
An examination of the records, however, reveals that no
hearing was ever conducted by Sandoz before Pono was
dismissed. The meeting called by Ruiz on October 5, 1992,
is not the hearing contemplated by law since it was merely
for the purpose of informing Pono about her questionable
work re-
_______________
8 Corral v. NLRC, 221 SCRA 693 (1993); Marcelo v. NLRC, 240 SCRA
782 (1995).
9 Amor Conti & Leopoldo Cruz v. NLRC, Corfarm Holding Corporation,
Carlito J. Rabang & Cipriano Bayarang, G.R. No. 119253, April 10, 1997.
10 Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. CSC, 241 SCRA 506 (1995).
11 Rollo, pp. 102-103.
12 Ibid., p. 106.
619
VOL. 275, JULY 17, 1997 619

port, and to serve Pono a written notice detailing her

infractions in her work sheet. In fact, barely two weeks
later, she was summarily dismissed. While it may be true
that Pono was allowed to explain her side at this meeting,

it is undisputed that no hearing was actually conducted
before her employment was terminated.
Consultations or conferences may13
not be a substitute for
the actual holding of a hearing. Every opportunity and
assistance must be accorded to the employee by the
management to enable him to prepare 14adequately for his
defense, including legal representation. Considering that
Pono denied the accusation that she forged a doctors
signature in her work report, these denials should at least
have warranted a separate hearing to enable her to fully
ventilate her side. Absent such a hearing, Ponos
constitutional right to due process was clearly violated.
This conclusion, notwithstanding, we uphold the
findings of the NLRC that Ponos dismissal was for a just
cause.
Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the just causes for
dismissal are the following:
Article 282. Termination by employer.An employer may

terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(1) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the

employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(2) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(3) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(4) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against
the person of his employer or any immediate member of
his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(5) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
_______________
13 Pepsi Cola v. NLRC, 210 SCRA 277 (1992).

14 Segismundo v. NLRC, 239 SCRA 167 (1994); Abiera v. NLRC, 215
SCRA 476 (1992).
620

We cannot countenance Ponos incompetence and lack of

diligence in the performance of her duties. In fact, from
June to October 1992, she received no less than five written
notices calling her attention to her negligence in
discharging her duties, not to mention the documented
delinquencies she incurred prior to the alleged May 18,
1992 incident. Moreover, the habit of reporting visits or

calls to several doctors when no such visits or calls were
actually made constitutes serious misconduct. We,
therefore, hold that Ponos dismissal was for a just cause.
In a growing number of cases, this Court has
consistently held that where the dismissal of an employee
is, in fact, for a proven just and valid cause, but he is not
accorded due process, the dismissal shall be upheld, but the
employer must 15
be held liable for the violation of his right to
due process. The identical situation obtains in the case at
bar.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The August 31, 1994
decision of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
private respondent shall pay to the petitioner P1,000.00, in
keeping with the Courts policy regarding the same, as
damages for its failure 16to observe procedural due process in
effecting the dismissal.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Puno and Mendoza, JJ.,

concur.
Torres, Jr., J., On leave.
Petition dismissed. Judgment affirmed with

modification.
______________
15 Seahorse Maritime Corp. v. NLRC, 173 SCRA 390 (1989);

Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 421 (1990); Aurelio v.
NLRC, 221 SCRA 432 (1993); Anambra Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, 238
SCRA 232 (1994).
16 MGG Marine Services, Inc. and/or Doroteo C. Garlan and Ceasar
Rotilo v. NLRC and Elizabeth A. Molina, G.R. No. 114313, July 29, 1996.
621
VOL. 275, JULY 17, 1997 621

Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Note.While it is true that the essence of due process is

simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied in
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side, meetings in the nature of consultation and
conferences, however, may not be valid substitutes for the
proper observance of notice and hearing. (Equitable
Banking Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 273 SCRA 352 [1997])
o0o
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G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997. Carlitos E. Silva, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Court of APPEALS and SUZANNE T. GONZALES, Respondents

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G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997. Carlitos E. Silva, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Court of APPEALS and SUZANNE T. GONZALES, Respondents

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9/5/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 275

604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

Parent and Child; Custody; Words and Phrases; Visitation

VOL. 275, JULY 17, 1997 605

Silva vs. Court of Appeals

x x x. The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a

Same; Same; Illegitimate Children; There is nothing

to, among other things, keep children in their company and to

Same; Same; In all cases involving a child, his interest and

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and

the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered

VOL. 275, JULY 17, 1997 607

take out the children without the written consent of

Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for

In all questions, regarding the care, custody, education and

bringing of children of tender age. There is no telling how this

Art. 3. Rights of the Child.x x x

608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Silva comes to this Court for relief.

2 Rollo, pp. 22-23.

VOL. 275, JULY 17, 1997 609

The issue before us is not really a question of child custody;

of the family and so 5

3 See Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth edition, p. 1572.

610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

recommended due course to the petition, that a few hours

The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner,

The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private

Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ.,

Judgment reversed and set aside, that of the court a quo

VOL. 275, JULY 17, 1997 611

Notes.A marriage though void still needs a judicial

ROLINDA B. PONO, petitioner vs. NATIONAL LABOR

Labor Law; Illegal Dismissals; The issue of whether or not

Criminal Procedure; Prosecutors; An investigating fiscal is

612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pono vs. National Labor Relations Commission

vinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the

Same; Same; The determination of the persons to be

Labor Law; Illegal Dismissals; To validate a dismissal, the

Same; Same; Due Process; The twin requirements of notice

elements of due process in the dismissal of employees. It is a

Same; Same; Same; The requirement of a hearing is complied

VOL. 275, JULY 17, 1997 613

Pono vs. National Labor Relations Commission

hearing, on the other hand, is complied with as long as there was

Same; Same; Same; A meeting merely for the purpose of

Same; Same; Same; Consultations or conferences may not be a

Same; Same; Serious Misconduct; The habit of reporting

614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pono vs. National Labor Relations Commission

Same; Same; Due Process; Where the dismissal of an employee

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Rolinda B. Pono seeks the annulment of the

and Rafaelito I. Castillo for illegal dismissal, unfair labor

VOL. 275, JULY 17, 1997 615

ferent parts of her body. Aghast at her supervisors action,