ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 2008

A Sociology of Scandal and Moral Transgression

The Swedish Nannygate Scandal

Kerstin Jacobsson
School of Social Sciences, Sdertrn University College, Sweden

Erik Lfmarck
Baltic and East European Graduate School (BEEGS), Sdertrn University College, Sweden

abstract: In this article, we use the case of a government scandal in Sweden to

develop a theoretical perspective by which to understand the moral nature of
political scandals. We draw on insights from Durkheims sociology of morality and
point, inter alia, to the ritual character of scandals. However, in contrast to most
Durkheimian readings, the perspective presented does not presume the existence
of a moral consensus. The scandal is understood as a confrontation between various
systems of norms. Rather than confirming a given moral order, scandals provoke
moral positioning and help in clarifying and dramatizing lines of difference or
conflict. The empirical case studied is a government scandal in Sweden in 2006
(Nannygate) that forced two government ministers to resign after less than 10 days
in office when it was revealed that they had not paid their TV licence and, moreover,
had bought black (untaxed) services. This transgression provoked a massive public
reaction at the time.

keywords: Durkheim moral transgression norms ritual scandal social

drama sociology of morality

Introduction
Political life is not merely a battlefield of interests or the play of power relationships, it is also
a moral world governed by values and norms of public morality. The moral substructure of
social relationships as well as statecitizen relationships is often taken for granted, except in
moments of moral upset when the collective conscience is offended and stirred.
This article presents a theoretical perspective by which to understand the moral nature of
political scandals. It draws on insights from Durkheims sociology of morality and points to
the moral basis as well as the ritual and emotional character of scandals. However, in contrast
to most Durkheimian readings, our perspective emphasizes moral heterogeneity and does not
presume a moral consensus. The political scandal is understood as a confrontation between
various systems of norms.
The theoretical perspective is developed in relation to a government scandal in Sweden
which forced the resignation of two government ministers after fewer than 10 days in office,
with revelations that they had neglected to pay their television licence fees and, moreover,
had bought black market household services. The scandal was referred to as the Swedish
Nannygate1 scandal when reported in foreign media, hinting at the relatively harmless

Acta Sociologica September 2008 Vol 51(3): 203216 DOI: 10.1177/0001699308094166

Copyright 2008 Nordic Sociological Association and SAGE (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore)
www.sagepublications.com
Acta Sociologica 51(3)

character of the transgressions compared to those at the heart of Watergate and other political
scandals. Nevertheless, Nannygate provoked a massive public reaction, unmatched by few
political events in recent collective memory (as measured by the amount of heated correspon-
dence from the general public received in the Correspondence Department of the Prime
Ministers office).2
We argue for a sociological understanding of scandals that takes the moral upset seriously.
If we look beyond party tactics, the entertainment aspects of scandals and the general dislike
of politicians, etc., we find the root of the scandal to be one or several norm transgressions.
Societal norms become more evident when they are violated, making outbursts of moral upset
sociologically interesting. Scandals are reactions to norm violations and therefore can serve as
detectors of norms (Jacobsson and Sandstedt, 2005; see also Neckel, 2005). The scandal-as-
ritual is an opportunity to validate and/or modify these norms. It is a time for clarifying lines
of conflict, i.e. for moral positioning and/or solidification. Herein lies the relevancy of scandals
when it comes to the sociology of morality, and it is the methodological point of departure for
this article. It enables us to explore what scandals can tell us about the systems of norms of
the society in which they unfold. We begin by briefly outlining the events of Nannygate.

The Nannygate scandal

After 12 years of Social Democratic rule, the Swedish general election of 2006 brought a centre
right coalition to power. Instead of the expected honeymoon period, the new government
quickly found itself knee-deep in scandal. On 7 October, the day after the Prime Minister intro-
duced his cabinet, the Minister of Culture and the Minister of Foreign Trade both revealed that
they had failed in the past to pay taxes and social security for their nannies. They were both
members of the Moderate (conservative) Party, chaired by the Prime Minister. The Minister of
Foreign Trade explained her actions by claiming she earned too little back then to afford a
fully taxed nanny. On 9 October, however, newspapers disclosed that her income at the time
was several times the national average. The scandal deepened on 11 October, when it was
revealed that the two ministers had also neglected to pay their television licence fees. Swedish
law states that the possessor of a television receiver has to pay a television fee for the receiver.
This charge finances public service, radio and television transmission. The transgression was
seen as especially grave in the case of the Minister of Culture, since she had neglected to pay
the fee for 16 years, and since her ministerial responsibilities would include overseeing the
Swedish public service corporations. Publicly, she blamed this neglect on simple carelessness.
Her situation went from bad to worse when a former colleague claimed to have heard her
making a point of dodging the licence fees for ideological reasons.
On the same day it was revealed that the Minister of Migration (a Moderate) had neglected
to pay the licence fees for the previous 10 years. He said that this had been done for ideologi-
cal reasons to begin with, but that he had grown wiser and expressed an ambition to repay
his debt with interest. The other two ministers shared the ambition, but on 12 October this
scandal exit was blocked by the agency tasked with collecting the licence fees. The agency
announced its intention to file criminal charges against all three ministers, and did so on 13
October. This same day, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority announced that the
Minister of Foreign Trade was now under investigation for financial irregularities concerning
the sale of shares in a company in which she was a member of the board. (Swedish law states
that such a transaction must be reported within five days.) A newspaper also reported that
her country cottage had been bought through a Jersey-based company. She resigned on 14
October, relinquishing her seat in the Swedish Parliament at the same time. The Minister of
Culture tendered her resignation to the Prime Minister on 16 October. The next day, tabloid
newspapers reported that during the 1990s the Minister of Finance (a Moderate) had paid both
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nannies and cleaners under the table. He admitted this was a serious mistake, but said he did
not believe any of them earned enough money during the year for him to have to declare it,
and that he had no intention of resigning. Successors to the resigned ministers were intro-
duced on 24 October, while the Finance Minister and the Minister of Migration remained in
office. The resigned Minister of Culture was sentenced to pay 80 day-fines for neglecting to pay
the licence fee. All other criminal charges raised during Nannygate were eventually dropped.
There are various ways of interpreting a scandal. Some might say that the moral indignation
is fabricated to serve a political agenda. In the aftermath of Nannygate, some commentators
indeed argued that the scandal was really about the disappointment of the Social Democratic
Party with the election result, channelled through equally disappointed journalists. Others
simply focused on the media, pointing to how fierce competition brings about scandal-driven
journalism, and to how these so-called scandals have no real connection with either politics
or moral standards. Others see little meaning in scandals, yet have their general dislike of poli-
ticians confirmed and updated. The term Nannygate has a somewhat belittling ring to it.
Compared to the transgressions at the heart of Watergate (a break-in and a presidential cover-
up), untaxed nannies and unpaid TV-licences may seem petty. Foreign commentators tried to
make sense of the scandal as it unfolded, often with a touch of irony. Some argued that noto-
riously high taxes always brought hypocrisy (Financial Times, 18 October 2006), others that the
Swedish Nanny State has a nanny crisis (The Times, 13 October 2006).
While there may be some truth in every interpretation, none of the above explanations could
account for the massive public response triggered by Nannygate and it was truly massive.
It is, of course, impossible to measure precisely how upset society is at any given time. However,
Swedens freedom of information laws make it possible to study variations. The volume of
letters from the general public to the Prime Minister varies over time and this variation is
not random. A regular month sees approximately 800 incoming letters registered in the
Correspondence Department of the Prime Ministers office (responsible for postal and e-mail
correspondence with the general public). When correspondence increases significantly, it is
always a reflection of a major event. For October 2006 there are 3061 letters registered, at least
1834 of which refer directly to the events of Nannygate (which still leaves a high number
generated by the many appreciative comments on an election result that brought to an end a
12-year-long period of Social Democratic rule in Sweden). This is the highest number for any
month thus far in the twenty-first century. In second place is January 2005 with 2763 letters
registered following the Tsunami in Southeast Asia affecting many Swedes and evoking public
criticism of the governments handling of this crisis and later forcing the Minister of Foreign
Affairs to resign. (Over time, however, the Tsunami yielded more letters than Nannygate,
because the governments handling was under heavy scrutiny for a very long time.) In third
place is September 2003, with 2015 letters reflecting the shock felt at the murder of the Swedish
Minister of Foreign Affairs. No lives were lost during Nannygate, and Swedes are quite accus-
tomed to political scandals. To understand why this one yielded so much heated correspon-
dence we draw on a Durkheimian sociology of morality.

Scandal as disruption of moral order

From our perspective, scandals reveal the underlying societal norms that make up the moral
fabric of society; they reveal a moral order that is temporarily disrupted. A moral order builds
on the categorization of the world into the acceptable and the unacceptable, the permitted
and the forbidden, and, to use late Durkheimian vocabulary, the sacred versus the profane
(Durkheim, 1995). Every society, even modern ones, has ideals that are sacred in the sense of
being inviolable.3 Transgressions against the sacred tend to lead to strong reactions, strong
feelings the transgressions must be sanctioned against and the border between acceptable
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and unacceptable maintained or, in some cases, redrawn. Boli has argued that wherever we
find claims of transgression, we find a sacred element as the subject of concern (2006: 101). The
methodological device that follows is: in order to find sacredness, study transgression, or, in
our preferred vocabulary, in order to find norms, study the transgression of norms.
Durkheim saw morality as having two sides: an element of duty, i.e. rules of conduct or
norms, which are sanctioned, and an element of ideals, which are internalized and perceived
as desirable (2002: 96). Morality is both external and internal to us; it is both imposed on us
by social pressure and internalized as embraced ideals.4
Collective outbursts of moral upset can help detect collective norms. The moral order is
supra-individual, and some ideals (or values) are more important to the collective than others.
They are part of the self-identity of the group. The reaction is collective precisely because it is
the collective that is offended. Durkheim termed this the collective conscience. The key word here
is collective the property of being external to individuals and exerting pressure on us, even
though it operates through our individual consciences. It is a social fact, using Durkheims
vocabulary. A collective conscience is sometimes generally diffused in society, but the gener-
ality itself is not enough to make it collective in Durkheims sense. It must have the property
of being binding/imperative and external to the individual (Durkheim, 1982). It is that exter-
nality that social fact refers to. Often we are not aware of these social forces until we notice
the reactions when we choose to go against the stream (Durkheim, 1982: 536). Then we can
feel the resistance and the social forces operating; we can see it in our faces, we blush, etc. It
is the externality and objectivity of norms that make them sociologically interesting norms
can be socially effective whether or not a person has really internalized them.
Society, accordingly, has external mechanisms sanctions to protect ideals by securing norm
compliance. A transgression is upsetting because it is an offence to a collective we. However,
the collective conscience does not mean everybody.5 Social diversity means moral diversity, of
which Durkheim was well aware. Moreover, an individual is not embracing only one ideal,
since she belongs to many different social groups that all exert pressure on her. We even have
several collective consciences operating within us (Durkheim, 1984: 67). On an aggregate level,
the individual moral diversity corresponds to a diverse moral order to systems of norms
that is not the mere sum of individual moral preferences. We develop this point below. Yet
scandal interpretations along Durkheimian lines often underplay the social and moral diversity.
In Jeffrey Alexanders (1988) interpretation of the Watergate scandal, the reason it took almost
a year for the events to develop into a full-blown scandal was that America was experiencing
intense political polarization at the time of the Watergate break-in (June 1972). The presidential
candidates (Nixon and McGovern) had continued the battles of the 1960s during the election
campaign. This polarization between conservatism and leftism was reflected within several
social areas. Among other things, there was a lack of agreement regarding the rules about
political conduct. In Alexanders view, a societal sense of crisis following Watergate could first
be established when the intensively divisive election period had come to an end in November.
But by the time of the actual Watergate break-in, America was still experiencing intense political
polarization, and because there was continued polarization, there could be no movement upwards
toward shared social values; because there was no generalization, there could be no societal sense of crisis
(Alexander, 1988: 185, emphasis added).
The Swedish Nannygate scandal brings this interpretation into question. It immediately
developed into a full-blown scandal, even though Sweden was experiencing relatively strong
social polarization at the time. The preceding election was in effect limited to two different
alternatives Social Democraticleft or centreright. The winning centreright coalition success-
fully put the employment issue and the free-riding problem (such as benefit abusers) on the
agenda, arguably alluding to a tension between the productive and non-productive parts of
the population. To simplify, the centreright coalition aimed to attract healthy employed voters,
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with little to lose from benefit cuts. This particular polarization, alongside the traditional
leftright divide, did not disappear when the election was over. Still, there was an instant
movement upwards and a sense of social crisis when the transgressions of Nannygate became
public. The initial public reaction displayed overwhelming agreement that a minister who is
caught breaking the law is unsuitable for office. The early letters to the Prime Minister all
emphasize this point, from one angle or another. Centreright coalition voters (and Moderate
voters in particular) were disappointed with the ministerial recruitments and advised the
Prime Minister to be more careful in the future, dont feed the press with extra treats and
increased revenue by poor preparatory work (SB2006/8306). The ministers are conceived of
as a burden that hurts you at this early stage (SB2006/8441). Non-coalition voters expressed
their outrage with the transgressions in question: I find it scary that Ministers are allowed to
behave in this way [. . .] Its downright PITIFUL. However, my conscience is clear, since I
didnt vote for you (SB2006/8382). And several correspondents, Moderate or otherwise,
invoke being law-abiding as a fundamental social value: Your failure to act against ministers
who wont abide by the rules applicable to all of us is in itself scandalous (SB2006/8418).
While this level of agreement was enough to offset the scandal, Nannygate also became a
ritual clarification of disagreement. The transgressions, committed as they were in the private
realm, brought central aspects of the relationship between citizens and the (welfare) state to
the forefront of public debate: What may the state demand of its citizens, and vice versa?
What may citizens demand of each other? Here, there seems to be less of a consensus. The
movement upwards, then, was not just toward shared social values, but toward lines of
conflict within the moral order as well. Soon, nuances in the initially strong agreement on law-
abiding behaviour appeared as people began to question whether political representatives
need to be unblemished. A few quotes from a heated chat room debate may illustrate this:6
The bible says he that is without sin among you, let him cast the first stone. Im neither
religious, nor a moralist, yet I second that. Will they start checking for unpaid parking tickets
next? a debater asks, and is soon disaffirmed: Why is it so hard to understand that these
people have committed a crime, and the fact that they could afford the taxes makes it even
worse? Why is it so hard to understand that this behaviour is insulting to the vast majority of
the Swedish people? This particular debate was initially about the vertical dimensions of the
moral order, i.e. what citizens demand of their representatives. It soon shifted towards the
horizontal dimensions, i.e. about what citizens demand of each other. One debater asks us to
take a look around. In the construction business, for instance, it is commonplace to pay cash
under the table. Its not the least bit awkward to ask a carpenter if hes interested in a cash-
in-hand payment. Another debater is upset by this very description: What youre talking
about here is illegal. If youve witnessed something like it, it is your duty to report it.

The scandal as ritual and social drama

A scandal typically takes a ritual form. By ritual we mean a standardized and therefore
predictable pattern of behaviour with a symbolic and expressive dimension. A ritual is a set
of performed acts, the wider meanings of which may not be entirely understood by the
performers (Couldry, 2003: 24). Its latent significance may also be wider than its manifest form.
A ritual communicates messages about social relationships (Wuthnow, 1987: 99 f.), in our case
about moral order. The scandal-as-ritual functions to remind us of social relationships and
the collective values and principles underlying them. Rituals invoke the collective. Following
Durkheim, a scandal can be viewed as a ritual to confront transgressors and to sanction
against transgressions. The legal system is an institutionalization of this procedure with legal
penalties as sanctions. With a scandal, the transgression is sanctioned by outrage. Durkheim
regarded public opinion as a social sanction (1993: 86). He also regarded social currents, such
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as waves of indignation, as social facts, even though they are not crystallized or institutional-
ized by organizational means as other types of social facts, such as legal sanctions (Durkheim,
1982: 52 f.).
Just as crime in Durkheims analysis (1982, 1984; Cotterrell, 1999: 65 ff.), a scandalous beha-
viour is an attack on a collective conscience. For Durkheim, the social sanction fills the function
of preserving a groups belief in, and support of, a rule of action. The norm violation serves
to confirm the norm, not so much for the norm-breaker as for others who are reminded of
what is valid and acceptable, and they can, at least temporarily, step away from the issue. The
public reaction against the transgression fulfils the function of collective purification and abso-
lution. While we agree with this analysis, we also argue that members of a public can react
very differently to norm transgressions and, moreover, that a ritual may evoke conflict rather
than consensus among a collective.7
Participation in rituals evokes emotional energy among the participants, as pointed out
strongly by Collins (2005, drawing on Durkheim, 1995 and Goffman, 1967). While these authors
point to face-to-face interaction rituals, in our view the ritual responses to scandal, such as
angry letters to the Prime Minister or heated website debates, also give emotional kicks to
those participating. However, the emotional energy that responses to scandals and trans-
gression of sacred norms are loaded with fade away quite quickly and soon a phase of more
reflexive attitudes follows at the collective as well as the individual level. We may even feel
embarrassed over our reaction. As put by Durkheim:
[Once] these social influences have ceased to act upon us, and we are once more on our own, the
emotions we have felt seem an alien phenomenon, one in which we no longer recognize ourselves. It
is then we perceive that we have undergone the emotions much more than generated them. (1982: 53)

As ritual, then, the scandal undergoes certain phases. Like the celebration of Christmas in a
Swedish home, the scandal has its heightened expectation and its culmination followed by a
saturation point. Afterwards, the calm returns, yet society has been reminded of the under-
lying system of values and norms.
The scandal-as-ritual can also be understood as a social drama (Turner, 1981), with key
actors, an audience, a scene, a corresponding script, etc. It dramatizes the roles and obligations
of the actors in question. The norm-breakers become figures symbolizing these boundaries,
i.e. they represent ways of violating or transgressing collective values (Wuthnow, 1987: 116).
These figures and their transgressions are often well known in the collective memory; rituals
and social dramas generate narratives (Turner, 1981: 153). Wsterfors has pointed out that
scandals help construct familiarity past scandals become our scandals (2005: 165). Examples
from Sweden include the former government ministers Jan O. Karlsson, who invited private
guests to a crayfish party paid for by the public purse, and Mona Sahlin, who bought chocolate
using a ministerial credit card (several letters to the Prime Minister refer to this: please dont
let this become another Toblerone scandal (SB2006/8207). Both evoked massive public reaction,
despite the small amount of money at issue, which shows that it is offensive to the collective
conscience in Sweden to let taxpayers pay for private expenses.8 Examining the scandal as
social drama explains why scandal-management requires the right postures and script, such
as humbleness rather than stubbornness, apologies rather than defence or explanations.
A ritual is often a response to a sense of crisis or uncertainty as regards the moral order, and
rituals then reduce uncertainty about, for instance, commitment to shared values or behav-
ioural options (Wuthnow, 1987: 120, 132). The ritual helps to clarify how a social group draws
the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable, but, since there are many groups, it can
also reveal clashing norms. Furthermore, symbolic or moral boundaries can be subject to
conflicts of interpretation and negotiation. In a pluralistic society there is no reason to assume
that the ritual dramatizes the same values, or communicates the same message, to everyone
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(Wuthnow, 1987: 132). The ritual can lead to conflict rather than consensus. Rather than merely
confirming values, the scandal-as-ritual provokes a discussion of values; it demands that a
stand be taken. That is, the ritual is important for moral positioning.
Victor Turner (1981: 145) argued that social dramas can result in either reintegration or recog-
nition of schism. To view the scandal as simply a process towards consensus and reintegra-
tion is to underestimate the level of moral complexity in modern societies. A contemporary
sociology of morality must incorporate the contemporaneous homo- and heterogeneity that
characterize the moral order.
There are scholars who claim that modern societies are too pluralistic and individualized to
allow for any collective morality to exist (e.g. Bauman, 1993). However, we only need to travel
abroad to realize that some of the norms we live by are more valid back home. There is
obviously plenty of moral consensus, as well as plenty of moral diversity in modern society.
We cannot go deeply into why this is so here; suffice a few comments to clarify our under-
standing. Some norms are spread throughout vast geographical and social areas (they are
generalized social facts). Other norms operate more locally (as localized social facts). We
believe that this diversity is linked to the institutional and organizational structure of society.
With modernization, some institutions are indeed being weakened, expanding the room for
individual choice. Yet modern society is an organized society where the paramount insti-
tutions of life are embedded in the organizational structure. Institutions such as health care
and education take the shape of relatively homogeneous organizations that most citizens
encounter sooner or later. A distinguishing feature of any organization is that it continues to
exist, even when all of its original members have been replaced (Ahrne and Papakostas, 2002:
15). This durability, achieved through rules and statutes, makes organizations truly effective
in preserving institutions and in diffusing norms across time and space. In this way, organiz-
ations may help explain the persistence of generalized norms in otherwise pluralistic societies.
Still, our individual journeys through the various institutions and organizations of society
differ greatly partly by chance or choice, partly by structuring factors, such as class or
gender. As moral individuals we come to live in the intersections of the different norms diffused
by the various institutions and organizations we encounter. It is no surprise, then, that our
individual morality often proves contradictory and inconsistent.

Publicity as a defining feature of scandal

Even though we are the moral products of our experiences, there is room for moral choice at
the individual level. In private, we may choose to suppress some norms and let others guide
our actions. Durkheim argued that, with modernization, each collective conscience gets more
open to individual varieties. Each person has her own particular way of thinking about the
rules of common morality. Yet collective ideals command us and impose respect and restric-
tions on us: even while they are being individualized and thus becoming elements of our
personalities collective ideals preserve their characteristic property: the prestige with which
they are clothed (Durkheim, 1973: 161).
For a transgression to evolve into any type of scandal, publicity is necessary. Adut (2005)
defines scandal as the disruptive publicity of transgression. Transgression of norms can take
place in private, unnoticed, but transgression does not evolve into scandal unless transgression
is publicized to a norm audience, which is in fact offended. A norm audience is a public
united by some level of identification with the norm that has apparently been violated, and it
is in some capacity attentive and negatively responsive to the publicized transgression (Adut,
2005: 218, drawing on Ellickson, 2001). While the concept of norm audience is fully compati-
ble with collective conscience as we have used the term, it has the advantage of signalling
that, as there are many different norms, many norm audiences co-exist in society. If we are to
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counter the popular claim that scandals are media-driven events that lack any bearing on
collective morality, the concept of norm audience is useful. First, without the media there
would be no major scandals in modern society. Transgressions would not become known to
a large enough norm audience. Second, media scandal coverage needs to appeal to a norm
audience, and successful editors know which norm transgressions have this potential. This is
a delicate task, because misjudging the norm audience may backfire. As Gluckman notes: the
battle of scandals has its own rules, and woe to him who breaks these rules. By the act of
carrying his scandalizing too far, he himself oversteps the values of the group and his scandal
will turn against him (1963: 313). This is probably why the media sometimes, towards the end
of a scandal, post questions like has the media gone too far? on their electronic chat rooms.9

Systems of norms and the public sphere

In the private sphere, the level of publicity is limited, and there is room for moral choice. The
opposite is true for the public sphere. But what determines the moral order of the public sphere?
As argued above, we are the moral products of our experiences. Through the combined result
of structuring factors such as class, gender, ethnicity, geography, etc., individuals will cluster
in adjacent moral intersections. They have similar experiences and carry similar sets of norms.
On an aggregate level, they form societal systems of norms. Ontologically, these systems are of
the same fabric as political trends, i.e. they only exist on an aggregate level. But, on this level,
systems of norms determine what behaviour is acceptable in the public sphere. Some norms
overlap and are present in almost every system of norms (generalized social facts), simply
because most people internalize these norms through their institutional and organizational
experiences. In Sweden, the norm demanding that individuals show moderation in public is
genuinely overlapping,10 as is the norm stating that public office-holders should be honest (Jacobsson
and Sandstedt, 2005). In Sweden, the honesty norm provides the scandal object with a possible
scandal exit strategy. Several politicians have remained in office by admitting their transgres-
sions and apologizing. This manuvre is known as the full poodle in Sweden, referring to
the way dogs signal their submission by lying on their backs and exposing the throat.
Another generalized norm states that public office-holders should set a good example. For instance,
in 2007, 73 per cent of Swedes agreed to the statement those in power and politicians should
have higher morals than private persons, while only 17 per cent disagreed (study by FSI
reported in Dagens Nyheter on 18 June 2007). However, as shown above, Nannygate revealed
vast disagreement on whether questionable actions taken in the past should disqualify people
from taking public office or not. Hence, the norm stating that those who take public office should
have an unblemished record is a localized social fact. But when the two scandal-evoking ministers
failed to reveal the full circumstances of their past transgressions, this failure was itself a trans-
gression of the overlapping honesty norm. This is evident from the letters to the Prime Minister:
Matters are made worse by the implicated ministers lame excuses for their failure to pay
taxes and license fees. Its COWARDLY and PATHETIC (SB2006/9651). Or: Our trust in the
ministers was permanently undermined by their failure to fully disclose all circumstances
(SB2006/8897). In the case of the Minister of Foreign Trade, the economic circumstances that
surfaced were also a transgression of the moderation norm. It is the overlaps the general-
ized social facts that ultimately drive norm transgressors from office.
While violations of these overlapping social facts may trigger a great deal of moral upset,
the real stir occurs where the different systems of norms collide, i.e. where more localized
norms/social facts confront each other. The norms concerning black market labour purchase
(one of the transgressions at the heart of Nannygate) may serve as an example. In a study
conducted by the Swedish Tax Agency on the attitudes towards black market labour, and
the actual behaviour of Swedes, four different groups appear (Skatteverket, 2006: 23 ff.): The
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largest comprises people who have not purchased black labour during the previous year and
who have a moral objection to such services. They are called social carriers in the report, and
they amount to 39 per cent of the population. The second largest group comprises people who
have not purchased black labour during the previous year, but do not have a moral objection
to such services (potential purchasers, 29 per cent). Then there are the people who have
purchased black labour during the previous year and do not have a moral objection to such
services (black purchasing core, 21 per cent). The fourth and smallest group comprises people
who have purchased black labour during the previous year, but who have a moral objection
to such services (conscience purchasers, 11 per cent). Again, there is room for moral choice
within the private sphere, and it is the moral objection rather than the actual purchase that
is of interest here. One-half of the population has a moral objection to buying untaxed services,
while the other half does not.
Nannygate made transparent this moral divide. Two systems of norms collided, the collision
itself yielding immense moral upset among the population. The collision meant that the
scandal shifted focus from individual norm transgressions to more fundamental questions of
how to organize societal coexistence. As Wuthnow remarked: [a ritual] permits persons or
groups with very different claims on the larger collective order to articulate their own position
in relation to the moral order (1987: 136). In this way, scandals offset moral positioning and
conversations about morality. Different systems of norms are confronted, and the weaker one
may have to give in (temporarily). The effect of a particular scandal on the moral order is
difficult to measure. Over time, we may find that the norms regarding black market labour
have been slightly modified through Nannygate. It is noticeable that in January 2007 the STA
put forward a list of suggestions intended to make the tax system appear more legitimate
and reasonable in the eyes of citizens (Skatteverket, 2007). These suggestions were indeed
grounded in various studies conducted by the STA, but Nannygate helped pave the way.
What about other effects? In a comparative study of Watergate and Sewergate,11 Szasz (1986)
finds that scandals have few consequences on substantive policy and mass political attitudes.
His explanation is that resolution of a scandal facilitates forgetting: The threatened pollution
of the body politic has been fiercely, and successfully, confronted. The matter is resolved [and]
the audience is reassured and encouraged to return to chronic inattentiveness (Szasz, 1986:
215). He is partly right. Moments of emotional stir are short-lived and, moreover, mostly we
do not relate to moral issues in a reflexive manner. The moral substructure of social relation-
ships takes on an assumptive character, except when the collective conscience is offended and
stirred. Scandal resolution means that the moral substructure slips back into this character,
into being precisely a substructure. The emotional energy that brought it to the forefront
vanishes when the scandal has passed. Nevertheless, the emotional energy that scandals
mobilize can have momentous consequences: Scandals in effect trigger a great deal of the
normative solidification and transformation in society (Adut, 2005: 213).
In line with many cynical scandal commentators, Szasz argues:
[S]candals may serve to stabilize the political system not primarily because they drive from office
those who refuse to play by the rules, but because they periodically help repress the gnawing pre-
conscious sense of impotence and restlessness that plagues nominally empowered but chronically
passive, uninvolved citizens. (Szasz, 1986: 215)

Here we disagree. While the inattentiveness of the general public is a democratic problem,
scandals are not about redeeming this through episodes of spectator participation. Scandals
have direct and apparent consequences; they can drive representatives from office. Further-
more, they often bring the political process to a standstill until the scandal is resolved. In this
way, morality can be a powerful resource in the hands of the citizens, and the scandal-as-ritual
is an effective application of this resource.
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Why is it that we often find political representatives in the leading roles of this social drama?
The most obvious answer is that politicians are vested with regulatory power over peoples
lives, and, consequently, their own behaviour becomes heavily scrutinized. Most politicians
are aware of this, and yet they seem somehow to attract scandal. Unless we believe politicians
to be a particular immoral and careless breed, as popular commentators often lament, we need
to look more deeply.
In our view, in addition to their regulatory power there are two major reasons why political
representatives are scandal prone. First, because politicians are public; publicity, as argued
earlier, is a defining feature of a scandal. In theory, anyone could be caught in a scandal, but
most of us are just not public enough; our transgressions are of little general interest. Second,
because politicians are moral representatives in multiple ways; a government minister, for
example, is the moral representative of the public office she holds, the cabinet she is a member
of, her political party, a political agenda, the political system, etc. She may also, unwillingly
and in the eyes of the public, become a moral representative of her social class (as in the case
of the Minister of Foreign Trade) and of her gender (the male ministers implicated in Nanny-
gate have all remained in office). Accordingly, ministerial transgressions threaten to pollute
several areas at one and the same time. Gamson (2001) notes how scandals:
. . . move far past the narrative of the individual sinner, whose normative violation is painted as
atypical and underlines what must not be breached; here, it is the institutions moral universe, as
much or more so than the individuals character, that is revealed to be rotten. (2001: 199)

According to Adut, norm enforcement can only be understood if we take into account the
externalities on third parties that may be unleashed when transgressions are publicized (2005:
215). A scandal has a disruptive effect not only on the public and its collective conscience, but
also on associates of the transgressor, such as authorities (Adut, 2005: 219). Popularly elected
policy-makers represent their voters and, moreover, their values, institutions and ultimately
law itself, which makes their transgressions more appalling. The fact that they exert power
over others and set the rules for others just adds to this. Political representatives are subject
to moral obligation because they represent the principle of obligation itself (Neckel, 2005: 105).
The transgression, even if made in the private sphere, defiles the office as such.
At such a moral intersection, it would seem almost impossible to avoid norm transgressions.
Yet, most politicians manage to stay clear of scandals. To understand how, we draw on Goffman
(1959) and distinguish between the backstage and frontstage norms of an organization. The
backstage norms regulate behaviour among insiders, while the frontstage norms regulate what
behaviour is acceptable to make visible to outsiders. There is no reason to assume that front-
stage and backstage norms always differ, but sometimes they do. It may be that it is accept-
able, even laudable, to avoid paying taxes and the TV-licence fee within a liberal wing of the
Moderate Party.12 If so, this is an example of a backstage norm. The frontstage norm states
that avoiding taxes is wrong. The transgressions committed by the ministers implicated in
Nannygate threatened to pollute the Moderate Party, because it made visible a set of backstage
norms. Backstage norms are localized social facts, while frontstage norms are overlapping,
generalized, social facts. The individual exposed to scandal has somehow failed to uphold this
distinction. One correspondent asks the Prime Minister to pass the following message on to
the Minister of Culture: Give the communist bastards what they want, say youre sorry, and
repay your debt with interest. That ought to silence the commies (SB2006/8699).
Not only does the scandal risk polluting the associates of the transgressor, it also risks normal-
izing the norm break and legitimizing the transgressions of others. In the letters to the Prime
Minister, many threatened to follow the examples set by the ministers: Unless you fire these
ministers, who obviously feel that withholding tax is OK, I will seriously consider this cheap
option myself (SB2006/8182). Often with a humorous touch: Where do I apply for exemption
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from taxes due to lacking funds? (SB2006/8401).13 Consequently, the norm break, publicized
as scandal, provokes a disassociation from the transgression as well as the transgressor, regard-
less of whether those people in question really agree about the offensiveness of the act or not.
It was increasingly impossible for the Prime Minister to defend the two ministers in face of the
public reaction, which illustrates the social factual nature of outrage. The transgressors all
four government ministers, even those who remained in office had to confess their sins and
apologize in public. In this sense, we can understand Wuthnows statement that in ritual a bond
is established between the person and the moral community on which she depends, and that
ritual in this sense can reinforce moral order (1987: 123). The transgressors were dragged back
to the community of taxpayers and TV-licence payers and, moreover, the agency tasked with
collecting the licence fees received thousands of new notifications of television possessions. Of
course, this has little to do with conversion to ideals and more to do with reminders of obli-
gations and the costs of sanctions. The community of tax-payers or TV-licence payers is a
community, not of values, but of social obligations.14 As social facts, these are consequential
also for those who do not embrace the values. Put differently: Rituals do not as much express
order, as naturalize it (Couldry, 2003: 27); hence the role of ritual in normative solidification.

Conclusions
This article has presented a theoretical perspective through which to understand the moral
nature of political scandals. By scandal we have understood a collective outburst of outrage
caused by a norm transgression that is made public and that is experienced as an offence by
a norm audience (or, if we so wish, by a collective conscience). The public reaction is a sanction
against the transgression.
Our sociology of morality is one that does not presume the existence of a moral consensus
but a co-existence of consensus and conflict at various levels. We have tried to account for this
complexity by using the concept of systems of norms containing localized and generalized
norms (or social facts). The case of Nannygate shows how a scandal often entails the confronta-
tion of various systems of norms. This is why scandals may occur during periods of relatively
sharp polarization and disintegration, a point often underplayed by other scandal scholars
(cf. Alexander, 1988). Nannygate also shows that the nature of transgressions at the heart of a
scandal need not be of a very dramatic variety (such as the Watergate break-in). Instead, they
may relate to the everyday life of individuals and dramatize some aspect of coexistence in
modern society.
A scandal typically takes ritual form and it dramatizes social and moral roles and relation-
ships. Rather than confirming a given moral order, scandals provoke moral positioning and
help clarify and dramatize lines of difference or conflict. However, because of the exter-
nalities involved in a scandal, i.e. scandals risk polluting their environment, the confrontation
of norms often leads to one system of norms appearing as stronger than the others, which then
has (temporarily) to give in. The scandal-as-ritual is important for maintaining moral order
not by reaffirming collective values and maintaining a consensus, but by provoking a moral
position-taking which forces the (temporary) settling of moral order.
The scandal is loaded with emotional energies. In our understanding, collective outrage is
a form of collective effervescence. Durkheim saw collective effervescence as moments when
ideals can be transformed, i.e. a creative time. It is consequently also a time for renewal of a
moral order. The emotional energies soon disappear, and afterwards it is easier to discuss what
changes may be necessary to maintain moral order (in this case the proposed changes
regarding taxation of services in private homes). The scandal is incorporated into the collec-
tive memory along with previous trespasses. We have all been reminded of our societal obli-
gations and the costs of deviation.
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Acta Sociologica 51(3)

Notes
We gratefully acknowledge helpful suggestions from colleagues and conference participants and financial
support from the Swedish Research Council.

1. The original Nannygate scandal was linked to the Clinton administration. Zoe Baird was President
Clintons first nominee for attorney general in 1993, but she had to withdraw her candidature when
it became known that she had employed illegal aliens as household help.
2. Out of the 1834 letters referring to the Nannygate scandal that were registered during October 2006,
we have selected every tenth letter for further analysis (using their chronological post room numbers).
We sorted out the main themes of the resulting 183 letters and used illustrative quotes from a few
of them in this article. The translation into English is ours. In addition, we draw on 50 qualitative
interviews conducted with Swedes of various social classes during 200607, where the recent scandal
was one of the themes covered.
3. When Durkheim spoke of society, he meant a social group. Society or the group has properties
that make it irreducible to a number of individuals. It develops social forces and dynamics that
cannot be explained merely by reference to its individual members; it is a synthesis sui generis.
Durkheim was well aware that we are members of many different groups, such as the family, the
profession, the company, the political party, the nation and even humanity (2002).
4. Our reading of Durkheim draws mainly on his later works on morality (1993, 2002; Bellah, 1973; see
Jacobsson, 2006). His definition of morality as a combination of ideals and duties (norms in our
vocabulary) is more dynamic than the more structuralist conceptions in Durkheim (1984), for instance.
5. Collins also emphasizes this point: Collective conscience can exist in little pockets rather than as
one huge sky covering everybody (2005: 15). This is why Collins is able to read Durkheim as a contri-
bution to conflict theory.
6. Postings taken from Dagens Nyheter on 18 October 2006. Online readers were asked whether or not
the media had carried the scandal coverage too far. The chat room debate that ensued was in essence
about the normative aspects of black market labour purchase.
7. Durkheims views on rituals are often met by two standard critiques: first, a critique of functional-
ism in general, and second, a critique against an overemphasis on consensus, i.e. that rituals reinforce
consensus. The critics of functionalism (e.g. Couldry, 2003: 9; Thompson, 2000: 235 ff.) tend to forget
that Durkheim (1982) was careful to distinguish between causal and functional explanations and did
not confuse the two. As to the critique of consensus, Durkheims writings on morality are less suscep-
tible to that criticism than his sociology of religion. Anyway, this article aims to develop a perspec-
tive that points to the co-existence of conflict and consensus, and which understands scandals in terms
of confrontations of norms.
8. A study of scandals arising in Sweden during one year showed that out of the 10 scandals causing
most media reactions, only one was not about private use of public money (Johansson, 2004). What
is scandalous differs across time and space. Thompson (2000: 116) speaks of distinctive political
cultures of scandals, and notes that in Britain and the United States the sex life of politicians is very
sensitive and offensive, while sex is not particularly upsetting in Italy or France, where scandals tend
to be about corruption or misuse of power. On Norway, see Midtb (2007).
9. As did Dagens Nyheter during Nannygate (18 October 2006).
10. Flagrant displays of wealth, for example, are frowned upon. Wealth always appears at the bottom
in Swedish value ranking surveys conducted by the SOM institute (Oscarsson, 2005). The moderation
norm is expressed in the Swedish word lagom. It is also popularly known throughout Scandinavia
as the Jante Law, the essence of which reads: Dont think youre anyone special or that youre better than
us, following Sandemose (1934).
11. Sewergate was a political scandal at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in the spring of 1983,
concerning political favouritism and misappropriation of funds.
12. We draw here on media reports speculating that such a culture of tax avoidance out of ideological
reasons exists within the neo-liberal wing of the Moderate Party (Financial Times, 18 October 2006;
Sveriges Radio (Ekot), 14 October 2006). In autumn 2007, when a new heated debate over black
purchases arose, it was revealed that 10 out of 15 Moderate Secretaries of State had bought black
services (Svenska Dagbladet, 6 November 2007).

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13. See Wsterfors (2005) for an analysis of the variety of rhetorical styles used in scandal responses.
14. Parsons (1968), in his interpretation of Durkheims sociology of morality, emphasized common value
systems. However, Durkheim himself spoke not of common values but of common obligations.

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Biographical Note: Kerstin Jacobsson is Associate Professor of Sociology and a Senior Lecturer at
Sdertrn University College.
Address: School of Social Sciences, Sdertrn University College, SE-141 89 Huddinge, Sweden. [email:
kerstin.jacobsson@sh.se]

Biographical Note: Erik Lfmarck is a Doctoral Student of Sociology at the Baltic and East European
Graduate School at Sdertrn University College, in collaboration with Uppsala University.
Address: Baltic and East European Graduate School (BEEGS), Sdertrn University College, SE-141 89
Huddinge, Sweden. [email: erik.lofmarck@sh.se]

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