Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 435 U.S. 662

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98 S.Ct. 988 Page 1
435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988, 11 ERC 1273, 1978 A.M.C. 527, 55 L.Ed.2d 179, 8 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,255
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
authority to conduct foreign affairs.
Supreme Court of the United States Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Dixy Lee RAY, Governor of Washington, et al.,
Appellants, Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Justice Bren-
v. nan and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined, filed opinion
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY and Seatrain concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Lines, Incorporated.
Mr. Justice Stevens, with whom Mr. Justice Powell
No. 76-930.
joined, filed opinion concurring in part and dissent-
Argued Oct. 31, 1977. ing in part.
Decided March 6, 1978.
West Headnotes
Action was brought challenging validity of State of
[1] Federal Courts 170B 272
Washington's Tanker Law which had been adopted
to regulate the design, size, and movement of oil 170B Federal Courts
tankers in Puget Sound. A three-judge United 170BIV Citizenship, Residence or Character of
States District Court for the Western District of Parties, Jurisdiction Dependent on
Washington ruled that all of the operative provi- 170BIV(A) In General
sions of the Tanker Law were preempted by federal 170Bk268 What Are Suits Against States
legislation, and enjoined enforcement thereof, and 170Bk272 k. Injunctive or Mandatory
appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Relief; Declaratory Judgments. Most Cited Cases
White, held that: (1) insofar as the Tanker Law re- Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit in federal
quires tankers “enrolled in the coastwise trade” to court against a state official for the purpose of ob-
have a local pilot on board, it was in direct conflict taining an injunction against his enforcement of a
with federal statute, and was invalid, but State was state law alleged to be unconstitutional.
free to require registered tankers in excess of U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 11.
50,000 DWT to take on state-licensed pilots upon
entering Puget Sound; (2) the matter of tanker [2] States 360 18.13
design standards has been preempted by federal
law, and the state's design provisions are unenforce- 360 States
able; (3) provision of the Tanker Law that requires 360I Political Status and Relations
tug escorts for tankers over 40,000 DWT that do 360I(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption
not satisfy the state's design provisions is not pree- 360k18.13 k. State Police Power. Most
mpted inasmuch as the Secretary of Transportation Cited Cases
has neither promulgated his own tug requirements (Formerly 360k4.13, 360k4.10)
for Puget Sound tanker navigation nor decided that In determining the validity of state's exercise of its
no such requirement should be imposed at all; (4) police power which is challenged under supremacy
the size limitation contained in the Tanker Law is clause, there is an assumption that the state's
invalid in light of provisions of the Ports and Wa- powers were not to be superseded by federal statute
terways Safety Act of 1972 and the Secretary's ac- unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
tions thereunder, and (5) the tug escort requirement Congress, and one of the legitimate inquiries is
is not invalid under the commerce clause or on the- whether the Congress has explicitly or implicitly
ory that it interferes with the federal government's declared that states are prohibited from regulating
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 2
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
the subject matter in question; even if Congress has vironmental protection measures imposed by a
not completely foreclosed state participation in the state, and mere fact that a vessel has been inspected
particular area, state statute is void to the extent and found to comply with federal vessel safety reg-
that it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute, ulations does not prevent a state or city from enfor-
and such conflict will be found where compliance cing local laws having other purposes, such as a
with both federal and state regulations is a physical local smoke abatement law.
impossibility. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 6, cl. 2.
[5] States 360 18.57
[3] Pilots 300 7
360 States
300 Pilots 360I Political Status and Relations
300k7 k. Obligation to Take Pilot. Most Cited 360I(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption
Cases 360k18.57 k. Maritime Matters. Most
Cited Cases
States 360 18.57 (Formerly 360k4.12)
Inasmuch as Title II of the federal Ports and Water-
360 States
ways Safety Act of 1972 aims at insuring vessel
360I Political Status and Relations
safety and protecting the marine environment, re-
360I(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption
quires the Secretary of Transportation to issue all
360k18.57 k. Maritime Matters. Most
design and construction regulations that he deems
Cited Cases
necessary for these ends, and contemplates a uni-
(Formerly 360k4.13)
form federal regime controlling design of oil
To extent State of Washington's Tanker Law re-
tankers, the supremacy clause of the Constitution
quired tankers “enrolled in the coastwise trade” to
dictates that the federal judgment that a vessel is
have a local pilot on board, it was in direct conflict
safe to navigate in United States waters prevail over
with federal statute and thus was invalid; but under
contrary state judgment, and thus tanker design pro-
federal statutes states are free to impose pilotage re-
visions of State of Washington's Tanker Law were
quirements on registered vessels entering and leav-
unenforceable, despite contention that reference in
ing their ports, and thus State of Washington was
the federal statute to comprehensive “minimum
free to require registered tankers in excess of
standards” required recognition of state authority to
50,000 DWT to take on a state-licensed pilot upon
impose higher standards than the Secretary had pre-
entering Puget Sound. RCWA 88.16.180; 46
scribed. RCWA 88.16.190(2); 46 U.S.C.A. §§
U.S.C.A. §§ 215, 364, 391a(2); Ports and Water-
391a, 391a(1, 3, 5, 6), (7)(A-D), (9).
ways Safety Act of 1972, § 101(5), 33 U.S.C.A. §
1221(5); U.S.C.A.Const. art. 6, cl. 2. [6] Shipping 354 15
[4] States 360 18.57 354 Shipping

354I Regulation in General
360 States
354k15 k. Port Authorities and Regulations.
Most Cited Cases
360k18.57 k. Maritime Matters. Most States 360 18.57
Cited Cases
(Formerly 360k4.12) 360 States
Enrolled and registered vessels must conform to 360I Political Status and Relations
reasonable, nondiscriminatory conservation and en- 360I(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 3
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
360k18.57 k. Maritime Matters. Most 360k18.57 k. Maritime Matters. Most

Cited Cases Cited Cases
(Formerly 360k4.10) (Formerly 360k4.12)
Inasmuch as the Secretary of Transportation has Given validity of a general state rule prescribing
neither promulgated his own tug requirements for tug escorts for all tankers in Puget Sound, state was
Puget Sound tanker navigation nor decided that no also privileged, insofar as the supremacy clause
such requirement should be imposed at all, State of was concerned, to waive the rule for tankers having
Washington's tug escort requirements in its Tanker design characteristics specified by the state legisla-
Law have not been preempted under the supremacy tion, even though, under the supremacy clause,
clause, and thus, so long as there was no such pree- such design requirements could not in themselves
mptive regulation, both enrolled and registered ves- be enforced in light of federal regulation of design.
sels could be required to comply with provision of RCWA 88.16.190(2); U.S.C.A.Const. art. 6, cl. 2.
the Tanker Law requiring tug escorts for tankers
over 40,000 DWT that did not satisfy design provi- [9] States 360 18.57
sions specified in the Washington statute. RCWA
360 States
88.16.190(2); Ports and Waterways Safety Act of
1972, §§ 101-107, 101(1-3, 5, 7, 8), 102(b, e), 104,
33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1221-1227, 1221(1-3, 5, 7, 8),
1222(b, e), 1224.
Cited Cases
[7] Shipping 354 15 (Formerly 360k4.12)
Section of State of Washington's Tanker Law ex-
354 Shipping cluding from Puget Sound under any circumstances
354I Regulation in General any tanker in excess of 125,000 DWT was invalid
354k15 k. Port Authorities and Regulations. under the Supremacy Clause in light of the author-
Most Cited Cases ity granted to Secretary of Transportation under the
A tug escort provision is a safety measure within Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 to estab-
the reach of the authority of the Secretary of Trans- lish vessel size and speed limitations and fact that
portation under Title I of the Ports and Waterways he had in fact done so with respect to Rosario
Safety Act of 1972, rather than a design require- Strait, and since Secretary's failure to promulgate a
ment under Title II, and under Title I, the Secretary ban on the operation of oil tankers in excess of
is merely authorized and not required to issue im- 125,000 DWT in Puget Sound amounted to a de-
plementing regulations, and assuming that state is termination that no such regulation was appropriate.
prevented from issuing higher safety equipment re- RCWA 88.16.190(1); Ports and Waterways Safety
quirements or safety standards than are required un- Act of 1972, §§ 101(3)(iii), 102(b, c, e), 33
der the federal legislation, this is so only with re- U.S.C.A. §§ 1221(3)(iii), 1222(b, c, e).
spect to those requirements or standards which may
be prescribed thereunder. Ports and Waterways [10] States 360 18.57
Safety Act of 1972, §§ 101(3)(iii, iv), 102(b), 33
360 States
U.S.C.A. §§ 1221(3)(iii, iv), 1222(b).
[8] States 360 18.57 360I(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption
360 States Cited Cases
360I Political Status and Relations (Formerly 360k4.12)
360I(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, by

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 4
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
FN*
permitting states to impose higher equipment or **991 Syllabus
safety standards “for structures only” impliedly for-
bids higher state standards for vessels, despite con- FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the
tention that the preclusive effect of such statute is opinion of the Court but has been prepared
restricted to vessel equipment requirements as op- by the Reporter of Decisions for the con-
posed to vessel safety standards. Ports and Water- venience of the reader. See United States v.
ways Safety Act of 1972, § 102(b), 33 U.S.C.A. § Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S.
1222(b). 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.
[11] Commerce 83 82.30 *151 Appellees challenge the constitutionality of

the Washington Tanker Law, which regulates the
83 Commerce design, size, and movement of oil tankers in Puget
83II Application to Particular Subjects and Sound, both enrolled (those engaged in domestic or
Methods of Regulation coastwise trade) and registered (those engaged in
83II(K) Miscellaneous Subjects and Regula- foreign trade). Three operative provisions are in-
tions volved: (1) a requirement ( § 88.16.180) that both
83k82.30 k. Navigation, Shipping, and enrolled and registered oil tankers of at least 50,000
Related Matters. Most Cited Cases deadweight tons (DWT) carry a Washington-li-
Section of State of Washington statute requiring tug censed pilot while navigating the Sound; (2) a re-
escorts for oil tankers in Puget Sound not satisfying quirement ( § 88.16.190(2)) that enrolled and re-
state design standards did not violate the commerce gistered oil tankers of from 40,000 to 125,000
clause on theory that it was an indirect attempt to DWT satisfy certain design or safety standards, or
regulate design and equipment of tankers, since tug else use tug escorts while operating in the Sound;
escort requirement for a particular body of water is and (3) a ban on the operation in the Sound of any
not the type of regulation that demands a uniform tanker exceeding 125,000 DWT (§ 88.16.190(1)). A
national rule and since the cost of the requirement three-judge District Court adjudged the statute void
was not such as to impede the free and efficient in its entirety, upholding appellees' contentions that
flow of interstate and foreign commerce. all the Tanker Law's operative provisions were pre-
U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; RCWA empted by federal law particularly the Ports and
88.16.190(2). Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA), which is
designed to insure vessel safety and the protection
[12] States 360 18.57 of navigable waters and adjacent shore areas from
tanker oil spillage. Title I of the PWSA empowers
360 States
the Secretary of Transportation to establish, oper-
ate, and require compliance with “vessel traffic ser-
vices and systems” for ports subject to congested
traffic and to control vessel traffic in especially
Cited Cases
hazardous areas by, among other things, establish-
(Formerly 360k4.12)
ing vessel size limitations. Pursuant to this Title,
Requirement of State of Washington's Tanker Law
the Secretary, through his delegate, has promul-
for tug escorts of oil tankers in Puget Sound not sat-
gated the Puget Sound Vessel Traffic System,
isfying state design standards was not invalid on
which contains general and communication rules,
theory that it interfered with the federal govern-
vessel movement reporting requirements, a traffic
ment's authority to conduct foreign affairs. RCWA
separation scheme, special ship movement rules ap-
88.16.190(2).
plying to Rosario Strait (where under a local Coast

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 5
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
Guard rule the passage of more than one 70,000 ing alone, are invalid under the Supremacy Clause.
DWT vessel-in bad weather, 40,000 DWT-in either Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S.
direction at a given time is prohibited), and other 440, 80 S.Ct. 813, 4 L.Ed.2d 852; Kelly v. Wash-
requirements. A State, though permitted to impose ington, 302 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 87, 82 L.Ed. 3, distin-
higher equipment or safety standards, may do so guished. Pp. 996-1000.
“for structures only.” Title II, whose goals are to
provide vessel safety and protect the marine envir- 3. The District Court erred in holding that the al-
onment, provides that the Secretary shall issue such ternative tug requirement of § 88.16.190(2) was in-
rules and regulations as may be necessary with re- valid as conflicting with the PWSA, for the Secret-
spect to the design, construction, and operation of ary has not as yet promulgated his own tug require-
oil tankers; provides for inspection of vessels for ment for Puget Sound tanker navigation or decided
*152 compliance with the Secretary's safety and en- that there should be no such requirement. Unless
vironmental regulations; and prohibits the carrying and until he issues such rules, the State's tug-escort
of specified cargoes absent issuance of a certificate requirement is not pre-empted by the federal
of inspection evidencing compliance with the regu- scheme. Pp. 1000-1002.
lations. Title 46 U.S.C. § 364 provides that every
4. The exclusion from Puget Sound of any tanker
coastwise seagoing steam vessel subject to **992
exceeding 125,000 DWT pursuant to §
federal navigation laws not sailing under register
88.16.190(1) is invalid under the Supremacy Clause
shall, when under way, be under the control and
in light of Title I and the Secretary's actions there-
direction of pilots licensed by the Coast Guard.
under, a conclusion confirmed by the legislative
Title 46 U.S.C. § 215 adds that no state government
history of Title I which shows that Congress inten-
shall impose upon steam vessel pilots any obliga-
ded that there be a single federal decisionmaker to
tion to procure a state license in addition to the fed-
promulgate limitations on tanker size. Pp.
eral license, though it is specified that the provision
1002-1005.
does not affect state requirements for carrying pi-
lots on other than coastwise vessels. Held : 5. The tug-escort requirement does not violate the
Commerce Clause. This requirement, like a local
1. To the extent that § 88.16.180 requires enrolled
pilotage requirement, is not the type of regulation
tankers to carry state-licensed pilots, the State is
demanding a uniform national rule, see *153Cooley
precluded by 46 U.S.C. §§ 215, 364 from imposing
v. Board of i Wardens, 12 How. 299, 13 L.Ed. 996,
its own pilotage requirements and to that extent the
nor does it impede the free flow of interstate and
state law is invalid. The District Court's judgment
foreign commerce, the tug-escort charges not being
was overly broad, however, in invalidating the pilot
large enough to interfere with the production of oil.
provision in its entirety, since under both 46 U.S.C.
Pp. 1005-1006.
§ 215 and the PWSA States are free to impose pi-
lotage requirements on registered vessels entering 6. Nor does the tug-escort provision, which does
and leaving their ports. Pp. 994-995. not interfere with the Government's attempt to
achieve international agreement on the regulation
2. Congress in Title II intended uniform national
of tanker design, interfere with the Government's
standards for design and construction of tankers
authority to conduct foreign affairs. P. 1006.
that would foreclose the imposition of different or
Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Olympia, Wash., for ap-
more stringent state requirements, and since the
pellants.
federal scheme aims at precisely the same ends as §
88.16.190(2) of the Tanker Law, the different and Richard E. Sherwood, Los Angeles, Cal., for ap-
higher design requirements of that provision, stand- pellees.

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 6
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
*154 Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of I

the Court.
Located adjacent to Puget Sound are six oil refiner-
Pursuant to the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of ies having a total combined processing capacity of
1972 (PWSA), 86 Stat. 424, 33 U.S.C. § 1221 et 359,500 barrels of oil per day. In 1971, appellee At-
seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V), and 46 U.S.C. § 391a lantic Richfield Co. (ARCO) began operating an oil
(1970 ed., Supp. V), navigation in Puget Sound, a refinery at Cherry Point, situated in the northern
body of inland water lying along the northwest part of the Sound. Since then, the crude oil pro-
FN1
coast of the State of Washington, is controlled cessed at that refinery has been delivered princip-
FN2
in **993 major respects by federal law. The PWSA ally by pipeline from Canada and by tankers
also subjects to federal rule the design and operat- from the Persian Gulf; tankers will also be used to
ing characteristics of oil tankers. transport oil there from the terminus of the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline at Valdez, Alaska. Of the 105
FN1. Puget Sound is an estuary consisting tanker deliveries of crude oil to the Cherry Point re-
of 2,500 square miles of inlets, bays, and finery from 1972 through 1975, 95 were by means
channels in the northwestern part of Wash- of tankers in excess of 40,000 deadweight tons
ington. More than 200 islands are located FN3
(DWT), and, prior to the effective date of the
within the Sound, and numerous marshes, Tanker Law, 15 of them were by means of tankers
tidal flats, wetlands, and beaches are found in excess of 125,000 DWT.
along the 2,000 miles of shoreline. The
Sound's waters and shorelines provide re- FN2. We were informed during oral argu-
creational, scientific, and educational op- ment by the Attorney General of Washing-
portunities, as well as navigational and ton that the pipeline from Canada to
commercial uses, for Washington citizens Cherry Point is no longer in service. Tr. of
and others. The Sound, which is connected Oral Arg. 6.
to the Pacific Ocean by the Strait of Juan
de Fuca, is constantly navigated by com- FN3. The term “deadweight tons” is
mercial and recreational vessels and is a defined for purposes of the Tanker Law as
water resource of great value to the State, the cargo-carrying capacity of a vessel, in-
as well as to the United States. cluding necessary fuel oils, stores, and pot-
able waters, as expressed in long tons
This case arose when ch. 125, 1975 Wash.Laws, 1st (2,240 pounds per long ton).
Extr. *155 Sess., Wash.Rev.Code § 88.16.170 et
seq. (Supp.1975) (Tanker Law), was adopted with Appellee Seatrain Lines, Inc. (Seatrain), owns or
the aim of regulating in particular respects the charters 12 tanker vessels in domestic and foreign
design, size, and movement of oil tankers in Puget commerce, of which *156 four exceed 125,000
Sound. In response to the constitutional challenge DWT. Seatrain also operates through a wholly
to the law brought by the appellees herein, the Dis- owned subsidiary corporation a shipbuilding facil-
trict Court held that under the Supremacy Clause, ity in New York City, where it has recently con-
Art. VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution, which declares structed or is constructing four tankers, each with a
that the federal law “shall be the supreme Law of 225,000 DWT capacity.
the Land,” the Tanker Law could not coexist with
On the day the Tanker Law became effective,
the PWSA and was totally invalid. Atlantic Rich-
ARCO brought suit in the United States District
field Co. v. Evans, No. C-75-648-M (WD Wash.
Court for the Western District of Washington, seek-
Sept. 24, 1976).
ing a judgment declaring the statute unconstitution-

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 7
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
al and enjoining its enforcement. Seatrain was later eventh Amendment. They recognized that
permitted to intervene as a plaintiff. Named as de- in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct.
fendants were the state and local officials respons- 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), the Court held
FN4
ible for the enforcement of the Tanker Law. that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
The complaint alleged that the statute was pre- suit in federal court against a state official
empted by federal law, in particular the PWSA, and for the purpose of obtaining an injunction
that it was thus invalid under the Supremacy against his enforcement of a state law al-
Clause. It was also alleged that the law imposed an leged to be unconstitutional, but urged the
undue burden on interstate commerce in violation District Court to overrule that decision or
of the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and that to restrict its application. The District
it interfered with the federal regulation of foreign Court declined to do so. The request is re-
affairs. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284, a peated here, and we reject it.
three-judge court was convened to determine the
case.
II
FN4. Four environmental groups-Coalition
[2] The Court's prior cases indicate that when a
Against Oil Pollution, National Wildlife
State's exercise of its police power is challenged
Federation, Sierra Club, and Environment-
under the Supremacy Clause, “we start with the as-
al Defense Fund, Inc.-and the prosecuting
sumption that the historic police powers of the
attorney for King County, Wash., inter-
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
vened as defendants.
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
[1] The case was briefed and argued before the Dis- Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
trict Court on the basis of a detailed stipulation of U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447
facts. Also before the court was the brief of the (1947); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,
United States as amicus curiae, which contended 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977).
that the Tanker Law was pre-empted in its entirety Under the relevant cases, one of the legitimate in-
**994 by the PWSA and other federal legislation. quiries is whether Congress has either explicitly or
FN5 implicitly declared that the States are prohibited
The three-judge court agreed with the
plaintiffs and the United States, ruling that all of from regulating the various aspects of oil-tanker
the operative provisions of the Tanker Law were operations and design with which the Tanker Law
pre-empted, and enjoining appellants and their suc- is concerned. As the Court noted in Rice, supra,
FN6 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. at 1152:
cessors from enforcing the chapter. We noted
probable jurisdiction of *157 the State's appeal, 430
“[The congressional] purpose may be evidenced in
U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 1172, 51 L.Ed.2d 580 (1977),
several ways. The scheme of federal regulation may
meanwhile having stayed the injunction. 429 U.S.
be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
1035, 97 S.Ct. 729, 50 L.Ed.2d 747 (1977).
that Congress left no room for the States to supple-
FN5. The United States has since modified ment it. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public Service
its views and no longer contends that the Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569, 40 S.Ct. 36, 37, 63
Tanker Law is in all respects pre-empted L.Ed. 1142; Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315
by federal law. U.S. 148, 786, 62 S.Ct. 491, 86 L.Ed. 754. Or the
Act of Congress may touch a field in which the fed-
FN6. The state defendants challenged the eral interest is so dominant that the federal system
District Court's jurisdiction over them, as- will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
serting sovereign immunity under the El- laws on the same subject. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 8
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581. Likewise, the Puget Sound. The District Court held that insofar as
object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the law required a tanker “enrolled in the coastwise
the character of obligations imposed by it may re- trade” to have a local pilot on board, it was in direct
veal the same purpose. *158Southern R. Co. v. conflict with 46 U.S.C. §§ 215, 364. We agree.
Railroad iCommission, 236 U.S. 439, 35 S.Ct. 304,
59 L.Ed. 661; Charleston & W. C. R. Co. v. Varn- FN7. Enrolled vessels are those “engaged
ville Co., 237 U.S. 597, 35 S.Ct. 715, 59 L.Ed. in domestic or coastwide trade or used for
1137, Ann.Cas.1916D, 333; New York Central R. fishing,” whereas registered vessels are
Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 37 S.Ct. 546, 61 those engaged in trade with foreign coun-
L.Ed. 1045, L.R.A.1918C, 439, Ann.Cas.1917D, tries. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.,
1139; Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. [272 431 U.S. 265, 272-273, 97 S.Ct. 1740,
U.S. 605, 611, 47 S.Ct. 207, 209, 71 L.Ed. 432], 1745, 52 L.Ed.2d 304 (1977).
supra.”
Section 364 provides that “every coastwise seago-
Accord, City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, ing steam vessel subject to the navigation laws of
Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633, 93 S.Ct. 1854, 1859, 36 the United States, . . . not sailing under register,
L.Ed.2d 547 (1973). shall, when under way, . . . be under *159 the con-
trol and direction of pilots licensed by the Coast
FN8
Even if Congress has not completely foreclosed Guard.” Section 215 adds that “[n]o State or
state legislation in a particular area, a state statute is municipal government shall impose upon pilots of
void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a steam vessels any obligation to procure a State or
valid federal statute. A conflict will be found other license in addition to that issued by the
“where compliance with both federal and state reg- United States . . ..” It goes on to explain that the
ulations is a physical impossibility . . .,” Florida statute shall not be construed to “affect any regula-
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. tion established by the laws of any State, requiring
132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 vessels entering or leaving a port of any such State,
(1963), or where the state “law stands as an other than coastwise steam vessels, to take a pilot
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of duly licensed or authorized by the laws of such
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” State . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The Court has long
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, held that these two statutes read together give the
404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941); Jones v. Rath Packing Federal Government exclusive authority to regulate
Co., supra, 430 U.S. at 526, 540-541, 97 S.Ct. at pilots on enrolled vessels and that they preclude a
1310, 1316-1317. Accord,**995 De Canas v. Bica State from imposing its own pilotage requirements
, 424 U.S. 351, 363, 96 S.Ct. 933, 940, 47 L.Ed.2d upon them. See Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co.,
43 (1976). 225 U.S. 187, 32 S.Ct. 626, 56 L.Ed. 1047 (1912);
Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U.S. 90, 6 S.Ct. 988, 30
L.Ed. 115 (1886). Thus, to the extent that the
III
Tanker Law requires enrolled tankers to take on
[3] With these principles in mind, we turn to an ex- state-licensed pilots, the District Court correctly
amination of each of the three operative provisions concluded, as the State now concedes, that it was in
of the Tanker Law. We address first conflict with federal law and was therefore invalid.
Wash.Rev.Code § 88.16.180 (Supp.1975), which
FN7 FN8. Included within the definition of
requires both enrolled and registered oil
steam vessels are “[a]ll vessels, regardless
tankers of at least 50,000 DWT to take on a pilot li-
of tonnage size, or manner of propulsion,
censed by the State of Washington while navigating
and whether self-propelled or not, and

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 9
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
whether carrying freight or passengers for “(b) Twin screws; and

hire or not, . . . that shall have on board li-
quid cargo in bulk which is-(A) inflam- “(c) Double bottoms, underneath all oil and liquid
mable or combustible, or (B) oil, of any cargo compartments; and
kind or in any form, . . . or (C) designated
“(d) Two radars in working order and operating,
as a hazardous polluting substance . . . .”
one of which must be collision avoidance radar;
46 U.S.C. § 391a(2) (1970 ed., Supp. V).
and
While the opinion of the court below indicated that
“(e) Such other navigational position location sys-
the pilot provision of the Tanker Law was void only
tems as may be prescribed from time to time by the
to the extent that it applied to tankers enrolled in
board of pilotage commissioners . . . .”
the coastwise trade, the judgment itself declared the
statute null and void in its entirety. No part of the This section contains a proviso, however, stating
statute was excepted from the scope of the injunct- that if the “tanker is in ballast or is under escort of a
ive relief. The judgment was overly broad, for just tug or tugs with an aggregate shaft horsepower
as it is clear that States may not regulate the pilots equivalent to five percent of the deadweight tons of
of enrolled vessels, it is equally clear that they are that tanker . . .,” the design requirements are not ap-
free to impose pilotage requirements on registered plicable. The District Court held invalid this altern-
vessels entering and leaving their *160 ports. Not ative design/tug requirement of the Tanker Law.
only does 46 U.S.C. § 215 so provide, as was noted We agree insofar as we hold that the foregoing
above, but so also does § 101(5) of the PWSA, 33 design requirements,*161 tanding alone, are invalid
U.S.C. § 1221(5) (1970 ed., Supp. V), which au- in the light of the PWSA and its regulatory imple-
thorizes the Secretary of Transportation to “require mentation.
pilots on self-propelled vessels engaged in the for-
eign trades in areas and under circumstances where The PWSA contains two Titles representing some-
a pilot is not otherwise required by State law to be what overlapping provisions designed to insure ves-
on board until the State having jurisdiction of an sel safety and the protection of the navigable wa-
area involved establishes a requirement for a pilot ters, their resources, and shore areas from tanker
in that area or under the circumstances involved . . . cargo spillage. The focus of Title I, 33 U.S.C. §§
.” Accordingly, as appellees now agree, the State 1221-1227 (1970 ed., Supp. V), is traffic control at
was free to require registered tankers in excess of local ports; Title II's principal concern is tanker
FN9
50,000 DWT to take on a state-licensed pilot upon design and construction. For present purposes
entering Puget Sound. the relevant part is Title II, 46 U.S.C. § 391a (1970
ed., Supp. V), which amended the Tank Vessel Act
of 1936, Rev.Stat. § 4417a, as added, 49 Stat. 1889.
IV
FN9. The Senate Report compares Title I
We next deal with § 88.16.190(2) of the Tanker
to “providing safer surface highways and
Law, which requires enrolled and **996 registered
traffic controls for automobiles,” while
oil tankers of from 40,000 to 125,000 DWT to pos-
Title II is likened to “providing safer auto-
sess all of the following “standard safety features”:
mobiles to transit those highways.” S.Rep.
“(a) Shaft horsepower in the ration of one No. 92-724, pp. 9-10 (1972) (Senate Re-
horsepower to each two and one-half deadweight port), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News
tons; and 1972, pp. 2766, 2769.
Title II begins by declaring that the protection of

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 10
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
life, property, and the marine environment from of certificates of inspection to covered ves-
harm requires the promulgation of “comprehensive sels complying with the applicable law and
minimum standards of design, construction, altera- regulations and for endorsement thereon
tion, repair, maintenance, and operation” for ves- showing approval for the carriage of the
sels carrying certain cargoes in bulk, primarily oil particular cargoes specified. The regulation
and fuel tankers. § 391a(1). To implement the twin provides that “such endorsement shall
goals of providing for vessel safety and protecting serve as a permit for such vessel to oper-
the marine environment, it is provided that the Sec- ate.”
retary of the Department in which the Coast Guard
FN10 Title II also directs the Secretary to inspect tank
is located “shall establish” such rules and
regulations as may be necessary with respect to the vessels for compliance with the regulations which
design, construction, and operation of the covered he is required to issue for the protection of the mar-
FN12
vessels and with respect to a variety of related mat- ine environment. § 391a(6). Compliance with
ters. § 391a(3). In issuing regulations, the Secretary these separate regulations, which must *163 satisfy
FN13
is to consider the kinds and grades of cargo permit- specified standards, and the consequent priv-
ted to be on board such vessels, to consult with oth- ilege of having on board the relevant cargo are
er federal agencies, and to identify separately the evidenced by certificates of compliance issued by
regulations established for vessel safety and those the Secretary or by appropriate endorsements on the
to protect marine environment. Ibid. vessels' certificates of inspection. Certificates are
valid for the period specified by the Secretary and
FN10. The Coast Guard is located in the are subject to revocation when it is found that the
Department of Transportation. Thus refer- vessel does not comply with the conditions upon
FN14
ences to the “Secretary” are to the Secret- which the certificate was issued. In lieu of a
ary of that Department. certificate of compliance with his own environ-
mental regulations relating to vessel design, con-
*162 Section 391a(5) provides for inspection of struction, alteration, and repair, the Secretary may,
vessels for compliance with the Secretary's safety but need not, accept valid certificates from foreign
FN11
regulations. No vessel subject to Title II may vessels evidencing compliance with rules and regu-
have on board any of the specified cargoes until a lations issued under a treaty, convention, or agree-
certificate of inspection has been issued to the ves- ment providing for reciprocity of recognition of
sel and a permit endorsed thereon “indicating that certificates or similar documents. § 391a(7)(D).
such vessel is in compliance with the provisions of
this section and the rules and regulations for vessel FN12. As directed by Title II, the Secret-
safety established hereunder, and showing the kinds ary, through his delegate, the Coast Guard,
and grades of **997 such cargo that such vessel see 49 C.F.R. § 1.46(n)(4) (1976), has is-
may have on board or transport.” It is provided that sued rules and regulations for protection of
in lieu of inspection under this section the Secretary the marine environment relating to United
is to accept from vessels of foreign nations valid States tank vessels carrying oil in domestic
certificates of inspection “recognized under law or trade. 33 CFR Part 157 (1977). These reg-
treaty by the United States.” ulations were initially designed to conform
to the standards specified in a 1973 inter-
FN11. The Secretary's current safety regu- national convention, but have since been
lations with respect to the design and supplemented by additional requirements
equipment of tank vessels appear at 46 for new vessels going beyond the conven-
CFR Parts 30-40 (1976). Section 31.05-1 tion. 41 Fed.Reg. 54177 (1976). They have
of the regulations provides for the issuance

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 11
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
also been extended to vessels in the foreign barred by state law from operating in the navigable
trade, including foreign-flag vessels. Ibid. waters of the United States on the ground that its
It appears that the Coast Guard is now en- design characteristics constitute an undue hazard.
gaged in a rulemaking proceeding which
looks toward the imposition of still more [4] We do not question in the slightest the prior
stringent design and construction stand- cases holding that enrolled and registered vessels
ards. 42 Fed.Reg. 24868 (1977). must conform to “reasonable, nondiscriminatory
conservation and environmental protection meas-
FN13. Title II in relevant part, 46 U.S.C. § ures . . .” imposed by a State. Douglas v. Seacoast
391a(7)(A) (1970 ed., Supp. V), provides: Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 277, 97 S.Ct. 1740,
1748, 52 L.Ed.2d 304 (1977), citing Smith v. Mary-
“Such rules and regulations shall, to the land, 18 How. 71, 15 L.Ed. 269 (1855); Manchester
extent possible, include but not be limited v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 11 S.Ct. 559, 35
to standards to improve vessel maneuver- L.Ed. 159 (1891); and **998Huron Portland Ce-
ing and stopping ability and otherwise re- ment Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 80 S.Ct. 813, 4
duce the possibility of collision, ground- L.Ed.2d 852 (1960). Similarly, the mere fact that a
ing, or other accident, and to reduce dam- vessel has been inspected and found to comply with
age to the marine environment by normal the Secretary's vessel safety regulations does not
vessel operations such as ballasting and prevent a State or city from enforcing local laws
deballasting, cargo handling, and other having other purposes, such as a local smoke abate-
activities.” ment law. Ibid. But in none of the relevant cases
sustaining the application of state laws to federally
FN14. It should also be noted that the Sec-
licensed or inspected vessels did the federal licens-
retary has authority under Title II to insure
ing or inspection procedure implement a substant-
that adequately trained personnel are in
ive rule of federal law addressed to the object also
charge of tankers. He is authorized to certi-
sought to be achieved by the challenged state regu-
fy “tankermen” and to state the kinds of
lation. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, for
cargo that the holder of such certificate is,
example, made it plain that there was “no overlap
in the judgment of the Secretary, qualified
between the scope of the federal ship inspection
to handle aboard vessels with safety. 46
laws and that of the municipal ordinance . . .” there
U.S.C. § 391a(9) (1970 ed., Supp. V).
involved. Id., at 446, 80 S.Ct., at 817. The purpose
This statutory pattern shows that Congress, insofar of the “federal inspection statutes [was] to insure
as design characteristics are concerned, has entrus- the seagoing safety of vessels . . . to affor[d] protec-
ted to the Secretary the duty of determining which tion from the perils of maritime navigation,” while
oil tankers are sufficiently safe to be allowed to “[b]y contrast, the sole aim of the Detroit ordinance
proceed in the navigable waters of the United [was] the elimination of air pollution to protect the
States. This indicates to us that Congress intended health and enhance the cleanliness of the local com-
uniform national standards for design and construc- munity.” Id., at 445, 80 S.Ct., at 817.
tion of tankers that would foreclose the imposition
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 87, 82
of different or more stringent state requirements. In
L.Ed. 3 (1937), involved a similar situation. There,
particular, as we *164 see it, Congress did not anti-
the Court concluded that the Federal Motor *165
cipate that a vessel found to be in compliance with
Boat Act, although applicable to the vessels in
the Secretary's design and construction regulations
question, was of limited scope and did not include
and holding a Secretary's permit, or its equivalent,
provision for “the inspection of the hull and ma-
to carry the relevant cargo would nevertheless be

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 12
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
chinery of respondents' motor-driven tugs in order that insofar as tanker design is concerned, Congress
to insure safety or determine seaworthiness . . .,” as anticipated the enforcement of federal standards
long as the tugs did not carry passengers, freight, or that would pre-empt state efforts to mandate differ-
FN15
inflammable liquid cargo. Id., at 8, 58 S.Ct., at 91. ent or higher design requirements.
It followed that state inspection to insure safety was
not in conflict with federal law, the Court also hold- FN15. The Court has previously observed
ing that the limited federal regulations did not im- that ship design and construction standards
ply an intent to exclude state regulation of those are matters for national attention. In Kelly
matters not touched by the federal statute. v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 87, 82
L.Ed. 3 (1937), in the course of upholding
[5] Here, we have the very situation that Huron state inspection of the particular vessels
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit and Kelly v. Wash- there involved, the Court stated that the
ington put aside. Title II aims at insuring vessel state law was “a comprehensive code” and
safety and protecting the marine environment; and that
the Secretary must issue all design and construction
regulations that he deems necessary for these ends, “it has provisions which may be deemed to
after considering the specified statutory standards. fall within the class of regulations which
The federal scheme thus aims precisely at the same Congress alone can provide. For example,
ends as does § 88.16.190(2) of the Tanker Law. Congress may establish standards and
Furthermore, under the PWSA, after considering designs for the structure and equipment of
the statutory standards and issuing all design re- vessels, and may prescribe rules for their
quirements that in his judgment are necessary, the operation, which could not properly be left
Secretary inspects and certifies each vessel as suffi- to the diverse action of the States. The
ciently safe to protect the marine environment and State of Washington might prescribe stand-
issues a permit or its equivalent to carry tank-vessel ards, designs, equipment and rules of one
cargoes. Refusing to accept the federal judgment, sort, Oregon another, California another,
however, the State now seeks to exclude from Pu- and so on.” Id., at 14-15, 58 S.Ct., at 94.
get Sound vessels certified by the Secretary as hav-
Here, Congress has taken unto itself the
ing acceptable design characteristics, unless they
matter of tanker-design standards, and the
satisfy the different and higher design requirements
Tanker Law's design provisions are unen-
imposed by state law. The Supremacy Clause dic-
forceable.
tates that the federal judgment that a vessel is safe
to navigate United States waters prevail over the **999 That the Nation was to speak with one voice
contrary state judgment. with respect to tanker-design standards is supported
by the legislative history of Title II, particularly as
Enforcement of the state requirements would at
it reveals a decided congressional preference for ar-
least frustrate what seems to us to be the evident
riving at international standards for building tank
congressional intention to establish a uniform fed-
vessels. The Senate Report recognizes that vessel
eral regime controlling the design of oil tankers.
design “has traditionally been an area for interna-
The original Tank Vessel Act, amended *166 by
tional rather than national action,” and that
Title II, sought to effect a “reasonable and uniform
“international solutions in this area are preferable
set of rules and regulations concerning ship con-
since the problem of marine pollution is world-
struction . . .,” H.R.Rep.No.2962, 74th Cong., 2d FN16
wide.” Senate Report 23. Congress did
Sess., 2 (1936); and far from evincing a different
provide that the Secretary's safety regulations
purpose, the Title II amendments strongly indicate
would not *167 apply to foreign ships holding com-

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 13
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
pliance certificates under regulations arrived at by agreement. § 391a(7)(C). As noted by the Senate
international agreement; but, in the end, the envir- Report, this requirement demonstrated the
onmental protection regulations were made applic- “committee's strong intention that standards for the
able to foreign as well as to American vessels since protection of the marine environment be adopted,
it was thought to be necessary for the achievement multilaterally if possible, but adopted in any event.”
FN17
of the Act's purposes. Senate Report 28.
FN16. Elsewhere in the Senate Report it is FN18. The Department of State and the
stated: “The committee fully concurs that Department of Transportation, as well as
multilateral action with respect to compre- 12 foreign nations, expressed concern
hensive standards for the design, construc- about Title II's authorization of the unilat-
tion, maintenance and operation of tankers eral imposition of design standards on for-
for the protection of the marine environ- eign vessels. Id., at 23.
ment would be far preferable to unilateral
imposition of standards.” Senate Report Congress expressed a preference for international
23. action and *168 expressly anticipated that foreign
vessels would or could be considered sufficiently
FN17. The Senate Report notes that elim- safe for certification by the Secretary if they satis-
inating foreign vessels from Title II would fied the requirements arrived at by treaty or con-
be “ineffective, and possibly self-de- vention; it is therefore clear that Title II leaves no
feating,” because approximately 85% of room for the States to impose different or stricter
the vessels in the navigable waters of the design requirements than those which Congress has
United States are of foreign registry. Id., at enacted with the hope of having them internation-
22. The Report adds that making the Sec- ally adopted or has accepted as the result of interna-
retary's regulations applicable only to tional accord. A state law in this area, such as the
American ships would put them at a com- first part of § 88.16.190(2), would frustrate the con-
petitive disadvantage with foreign-flag gressional desire of achieving uniform, internation-
ships. Ibid. al standards and is thus at odds with “the object
sought to be obtained by [Title II] and the character
Although not acceding to the request of those who **1000 of obligations imposed by it . . . .” Rice v.
thought that foreign vessels should be completely Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S., at 230, 67 S.Ct.,
FN18
exempt from regulation under Title II, Con- at 1152. In this respect, the District Court was quite
gress did not abandon the effort to achieve interna- FN19
correct.
tional agreement on what the proper design stand-
ards should be. It wrote into Title II a deferral pro- FN19. We are unconvinced that because
cedure, requiring the Secretary at the outset to Title II speaks of the establishment of
transmit his proposed environmental protection comprehensive “minimum standards”
rules and regulations with respect to vessel design Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
to the appropriate international forums for consider- Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10
ation as international standards. § 391a(7)(B). In L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), requires recognition
order to facilitate the international consideration of of state authority to impose higher stand-
these design requirements, Title II specified that the ards than the Secretary has prescribed. In
rules and regulations governing foreign vessels and that case, we sustained the state regulation
United States vessels engaged in foreign trade against claims of pre-emption, but we did
could not become effective before January 1, 1974, not rely solely on the statutory reference to
unless they were consonant with an international “minimum standards” or indicate that it

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 14
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
furnished a litmus-paper test for resolving might result from vessel or structure damage, Title
issues of pre-emption. Indeed, there were I authorizes the Secretary to establish and operate
other provisions in the Federal Act in ques- “vessel traffic services and systems” for ports sub-
FN20
tion that “militate[d] even more strongly ject to congested traffic, as well as to require
against federal displacement of [the] state ships to comply with the systems and to have the
regulations.” Id., at 148, 83 S.Ct., at 1220. equipment necessary to do so. §§ 1221(1) and (2).
Furthermore, the federal regulations The Secretary may “control vessel traffic” under
claimed to pre-empt state law were drafted various hazardous conditions by specifying the
and administered by local organizations times for vessel movement, by establishing size and
and were “designed to do no more than speed limitations and vessel operating conditions,
promote orderly competition among the and by restricting *170 vessel operation to those
South Florida [avocado] growers.” Id., at vessels having the particular operating characterist-
151, 83 S.Ct., at 1222. Here it is suffi- ics which he considers necessary for safe operation
ciently clear that Congress directed the under the circumstances. § 1221(3). In addition, the
promulgation of standards on the national Secretary may require vessels engaged in foreign
level, as well as national enforcement, with trade to carry pilots until the State having jurisdic-
vessels having design characteristics satis- tion establishes a pilot requirement, § 1221(5); he
fying federal law being privileged to carry may establish minimum safety equipment require-
tank-vessel cargoes in United States wa- ments for shore structures, § 1221(7); and he may
ters. establish waterfront safety zones or other measures
for limited, controlled, or conditional access when
necessary for the protection of vessels, structures,
V
waters, or shore areas, § 1221(8).
[6] Of course, that a tanker is certified under feder-
FN20. From 1950 until the PWSA was en-
al law as a safe vessel insofar as its design and con-
acted, the Coast Guard carried out its port
struction characteristics are concerned does not
safety program pursuant to a delegation
mean that it is free to ignore otherwise valid state
from the President of his authority under
or federal rules or regulations that do *169 not con-
the Magnuson Act, 50 U.S.C. § 191. That
stitute design or construction specifications. Re-
Act based the President's authority to pro-
gistered vessels, for example, as we have already
mulgate rules governing the operation and
indicated, must observe Washington's pilotage re-
inspection of vessels upon his determina-
quirement. In our view, both enrolled and registered
tion that the country's national security was
vessels must also comply with the provision of the
endangered. H.R.Rep.No.92-563, p. 2
Tanker Law that requires tug escorts for tankers
(1971) (House Report). The House Com-
over 40,000 DWT that do not satisfy the design
mittee that considered Title I of the PWSA
provisions specified in § 88.16.190(2). This conclu-
intended it to broaden the Coast Guard's
sion requires analysis of Title I of the PWSA, 33
authority to establish rules for port safety
U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (1970 ed., Supp. V).
and protection of the environment. The
Committee Report states:
A
“The enactment of H.R.8140 would serve
In order to prevent damage to vessels, structures, an important dual purpose. First, it would
and shore areas, as well as environmental harm to bolster the Coast Guard's authority and
navigable waters and the resources therein that capability to handle adequately the serious

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 15
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
problems of marine safety and water pollu- iting “the passage of more than one 70,000 DWT
tion that confront us today. Second, it vessel through Rosario Strait in either direction at
would remedy the long-standing problem any given time.” During the periods of bad weather,
concerning the statutory basis for the Coast the size limitation is reduced to approximately
Guard's port safety program.” Ibid. 40,000 DWT. App. 65.
**1001 In carrying out his responsibilities under FN21. Local Coast Guard authorities have
the Act, the Secretary may issue rules and regula- published an operating manual containing
tions. § 1224. In doing so, he is directed to consider the vessel traffic system for Puget Sound
a wide variety of interests that might affect the ex- and explanatory materials. App. 155.
ercise of his authority, such as possible environ-
mental impact, the scope and degree of the hazards
B
involved, and “vessel traffic characteristics includ-
ing minimum interference with the flow of com- [7] A tug-escort provision is not a design require-
mercial traffic, traffic volume, the sizes and types ment, such as is promulgated under Title II. It is
of vessels, the usual nature of local cargoes, and more akin to an operating rule arising from the pe-
similar factors.” § 1222(e). Section 1222(b) culiarities of local waters that call for special pre-
provides that nothing in Title I is to “prevent a cautionary measures, and, as such, is a safety meas-
State or political subdivision thereof from prescrib- ure clearly within the reach of the Secretary's au-
ing for structures only higher safety equipment re- thority under §§ 1221(3)(iii) and (iv) to establish
quirements or safety standards than those which “vessel size and speed limitations and vessel oper-
may be prescribed pursuant to this chapter.” ating conditions” and to restrict vessel operation to
those with “particular operating characteristics and
Exercising this authority, the Secretary, through his
capabilities . . . .” Title I, however, merely author-
delegate, the Coast Guard, has issued Navigation
izes and does not require the Secretary to issue reg-
Safety Regulations, 33 CFR Part 164 (adopted at 42
ulations to implement the provisions of the Title;
Fed.Reg. 5956 (1977)). Of particular importance to
and assuming that § 1222(b) prevents a State from
this case, he has promulgated the Puget Sound Ves-
issuing “higher safety equipment requirements or
sel Traffic System containing general rules, com-
safety standards,” see infra, at 1002, it does so only
munication rules, vessel movement reporting re-
with respect to those requirements or standards
quirements, a traffic separation scheme, special
“which may be prescribed pursuant to this chapter.”
rules for ship movement in Rosario Strait, descrip-
tions and geographic coordinates of the separation The relevant inquiry under Title I with respect to
zones and traffic lanes, and a specification for pre- the State's power to impose a tug-escort rule is thus
FN21
cautionary areas and reporting points. 33 whether the Secretary has either promulgated his
CFR Part 161, *171 Subpart B (1976), as amended, own tug requirement for Puget Sound tanker navig-
42 Fed.Reg. 29480 (1977). There is also delegated ation or has decided that no such *172 requirement
to Coast Guard district commanders and captains of should be imposed at all. It does not appear to us
ports the authority to exercise the Secretary's that he has yet taken either course. He has,
powers under § 1221(3) to direct the anchoring, however, issued an advance notice of proposed
mooring, and movements of vessels; temporarily to rulemaking, 41 Fed.Reg. 18770 (1976), to amend
establish traffic routing schemes; and to specify his Navigation Safety Regulations issued under
vessel size and speed limitations and operating con- Title I, 33 CFR Part 164 (1977), so as to require tug
ditions. 33 CFR § 160.35 (1976). Traffic in Rosario escorts for certain vessels operating in confined wa-
Strait is subject to a local Coast Guard rule prohib- FN22
ters. The notice says that these rules, **1002

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 16
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
if adopted, “are intended to provide uniform guid- referred to in the text.

ance for the maritime industry and Captains of the
Port.” 41 Fed.Reg. 18771 (1976). It may be that [8] Nor for constitutional purposes does it make
rules will be forthcoming that will pre-empt the substantial difference that under the Tanker Law
State's present tug-escort rule, but until that occurs, those vessels that satisfy the State's design require-
the State's requirement need not give way under the ments are in effect exempted from *173 the tug-
FN23 FN24
Supremacy Clause. escort requirement. Given the validity of a
general rule prescribing tug escorts for all tankers,
FN22. The advance notice of proposed Washington is also privileged, insofar as the Su-
rulemaking states: “The Coast Guard is premacy Clause is concerned, to waive the rule for
considering amending Part 164 of Title 33, tankers having specified design characteristics.
FN25
Code of Federal Regulations to require For this reason, we conclude that the District
minimum standards for tug assistance for Court erred in holding that the alternative tug re-
vessels operating in confined waters to requirement of § 88.16.190(2) was invalid because of
duce the potential for collisions, rammings, its conflict with the PWSA.
and groundings in these areas.” 41
Fed.Reg. 18770 (1976). It states that the FN24. In fact, at the time of trial all
following factors will be considered in de- tankers entering Puget Sound were re-
veloping the rules: size of vessel, displace- quired to have a tug escort, for no tanker
ment, propulsion, availability of multiple then afloat had all of the design features
screws or bow thrusters, controllability, required by the Tanker Law. App. 66.
type of cargo, availability of safety stand-
FN25. We do not agree with appellees' as-
ards, and actual or predicted adverse
sertion that the tug-escort provision, which
weather conditions. Id., at 18771.
is an alternative to the design requirements
FN23. Appellees insist that the Secretary of the Tanker Law, will exert pressure on
through his Coast Guard delegates has tanker owners to comply with the design
already exercised his authority to require standards and hence is an indirect method
tugs in Puget Sound to the extent he deems of achieving what they submit is beyond
necessary and that the State should there- state power under Title II. The cost of tug
fore not be permitted to impose stricter escorts for all of appellee ARCO's tankers
provisions. Appellees submit letters or oth- in Puget Sound is estimated at $277,500
er evidence indicating that the local Coast per year. While not a negligible amount, it
Guard authorities have required tug escorts is only a fraction of the estimated cost of
for carriers of liquefied petroleum gas and outfitting a single tanker with the safety
on one occasion for another type of vessel. features required by § 88.16.190(2). The
This evidence is not part of the record be- Office of Technology Assessment of Con-
fore us; but even accepting it, we cannot gress has estimated that constructing a new
say that federal authorities have settled tanker with a double bottom and twin
upon whether and in what circumstances screws, just two of the required features,
tug escorts for oil tankers in Puget Sound would add roughly $8.8 million to the cost
should be required. The entire subject of of a 150,000 DWT tanker. Thus, contrary
tug escorts has been placed on the Secret- to the appellees' contention, it is very
ary's agenda, seemingly for definitive ac- doubtful that the provision will pressure
tion, by the notice of proposed rulemaking tanker operators into complying with the
design standards specified in §

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 17
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
88.16.190(2). While the tug provision may ted to vessel equipment requirements. The statute,
be viewed as a penalty for noncompliance however, belies this argument, for it expressly
with the State's design requirements, it reaches vessel “safety standards” as well as equip-
does not “stan[d] as an obstacle to the ac- ment. A limitation on vessel size would seem to fall
complishment and execution of the full squarely within the category of safety standards,
purposes and objectives of Congress.” since the Secretary's authority to impose size limits
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 on vessels navigating Puget Sound is designed to
S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). The prevent damage to vessels and to the navigable wa-
overall effect of § 88.16.190(2) is to re- ters and is couched in terms of controlling vessel
quire tankers of over 40,000 DWT to have traffic in areas “which he determines to be espe-
a tug escort while they navigate Puget cially hazardous.”
Sound, a result in no way inconsistent with
the PWSA as it is currently being imple- The pertinent inquiry at this point thus becomes
mented. whether the Secretary, through his delegate, has ad-
dressed and acted upon the question of size limita-
tions. Appellees and the United States insist that he
VI has done so by his local navigation rule with re-
spect to Rosario Strait: The rule prohibits the pas-
[9] We cannot arrive at the same conclusion with
sage of more than one 70,000 DWT vessel through
respect to the remaining provision of the Tanker
Rosario Strait in either direction at any given time,
Law at issue here. Section 88.16.190(1) excludes
and in periods of *175 bad weather, the “size limit-
from Puget Sound under any circumstances any
ation” is reduced to approximately 40,000 DWT.
tanker in excess of 125,000 DWT. In our *174
On the record before us, it appears sufficiently clear
view, this provision is invalid in light of Title I and
that federal authorities have indeed dealt with the
the Secretary's actions taken thereunder.
issue of size and have determined whether and in
[10] We begin with the premise that the Secretary what circumstances tanker size is to limit naviga-
has the authority to establish “vessel size and speed tion in Puget Sound. The Tanker Law purports to
limitations,” § 1221(3)(iii), and that local Coast impose a general ban on large tankers, but the Sec-
Guard officers have been authorized to exercise this retary's response has been a much more limited one.
power on his behalf. Furthermore, § 1222(b), by Because under § 1222(b) the State may not impose
permitting the State to impose higher equipment or higher safety standards than those prescribed by the
safety standards “for structures only,” impliedly Secretary under Title I, the size limitation of §
forbids higher state standards for vessels. The im- 88.16.190(1) may not be enforced.
plication **1003 is strongly supported by the legis-
There is also force to the position of appellees and
lative history of the PWSA. The House Report ex-
the United States that the size regulation imposed
plains that the original wording of the bill did “not
by the Tanker Law, if not pre-empted under Title I,
make it absolutely clear that the Coast Guard regu-
is similar to or indistinguishable from a design re-
lation of vessels preempts state action in this field”
quirement which Title II reserves to the federal re-
and says that § 1222(b) was amended to provide “a
gime. This may be true if the size limit represents a
positive statement retaining State jurisdiction over
state judgment that, as a matter of safety and envir-
structures and making clear that State regulation of
onmental protection generally, tankers should not
vessels is not contemplated.” House Report 15.
exceed 125,000 DWT. In that event, the State
Relying on the legislative history, the appellants ar- should not be permitted to prevail over a contrary
gue that the preclusive effect of § 1222(b) is restric- design judgment made by federal authorities in pur-

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 18
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
suit of uniform national and international goals. On FN27. During the hearings in the House,
the other hand, if Washington's exclusion of large for example, Representative Keith ex-
tankers from Puget Sound is in reality based on wa- pressed concern that States might on their
ter depth in Puget Sound or on other local peculiar- own enact regulations restricting the size
ities, the Tanker Law in this respect would appear of vessels, noting that Delaware had
to be within the scope of Title I, in which event also already done so. He stated that “[w]e do
state and federal law would represent contrary judg- not want the States to resort to individual
ments, and the state limitation would have to give actions that adversely affect our national
FN26
way. interest.” Hearings on H.R.867, H.R.3635,
H.R.8140 before the Subcommittee on
FN26. It appears that the minimum water Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey,
depth in Rosario Strait is 60 feet, App. 65, and Navigation of the House Committee
which according to the design standards on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d
used by the United States at the 1973 Inter- Cong., 1st Sess., 30 (1971). The Com-
national Conference on Marine Pollution mandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral
would accommodate vessels well in excess Bender, responded that the Coast Guard
of 120,000 DWT. Id., at 80. “believe[s] it is preferable for the approach
to the problem of the giant tankers in par-
Our conclusion as to the State's ban on large
ticular to be resolved on an international
tankers is consistent with the legislative history of
basis.” Ibid.
Title I. In exercising his authority under the Title,
the Secretary is directed *176 to consult with other A representative of the Sierra Club testi-
agencies in order “to assure consistency of regula- fied before the Senate committee consider-
tions . . .,” § 1222(c), and also to “consider fully the ing the PWSA and suggested the advisabil-
wide variety of interests which may be affected . . ity of regulations limiting the size of ves-
..” § 1222(e). These twin themes-consistency of sels. Hearings on S. 2074 before the Senate
regulation and thoroughness of consideration-re- Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st
flect the substance of the Committee Reports. The Sess., 78 (1971). In response to this sug-
House Report indicates that a good number of the gestion, Senator Inouye questioned wheth-
witnesses who testified before the House subcom- er the necessary result of such a regulation
mittee stated that one of the strong points of Title I would not be an increase in the number of
was “the imposition of federal control in the areas tankers, so as to meet the Nation's require-
envisioned by the bill which will insure regulatory ments for oil. The Sierra Club witness ac-
**1004 and enforcement uniformity throughout all knowledged that there was “some contro-
FN27
the covered areas.” House Report 8. Such a versy even among the oil company people
view was expressed by the Commandant of the as to which would be the most hazardous,
*177 Coast Guard, Admiral Bender, who pointed more smaller ships or fewer bigger ships.”
out that with a federally operated traffic system, the Id., at 81. This statement is consistent with
necessary research and development could be car- the stipulation of facts, App. 84, which
ried out by a single authority and then utilized states:
around the country “with differences APPLIED . . .
TO THE PARTICULAR PORTS . . ..” ibid. he ad- “Experts differ and there is good faith dis-
ded that the same agency of the Federal Govern- pute as to whether the movement of oil by
ment that developed the traffic systems should then a smaller number of tankers in excess of
be responsible for enforcing them. Ibid. 125,000 DWT in Puget Sound poses an in-

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 19
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
creased risk of oil spillage compared to the affirmatively to exercise their full authority takes
risk from movement of a similar amount of on the character of a ruling that no such regulation
oil by a larger number of smaller tankers in is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of
Puget Sound.” the statute,” States are not **1005 permitted to use
their police power to enact such a regulation. Beth-
While the House Report notes the importance of lehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations
uniformity of regulation and enforcement, the Sen- Board, 330 U.S. 767, 774, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 91
ate Report stresses the careful consideration that the L.Ed. 1234 (1947); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Secretary must give to various factors before exer- Co., 272 U.S. 605, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432
cising his authority under Title I. It states that the (1926). We think that in this case the Secretary's
Secretary “is required to balance a number of con- failure to promulgate a ban on the operations of oil
siderations including the scope and degree of haz- tankers in excess of 125,000 DWT in Puget Sound
ard, vessel traffic characteristics, conditions peculi- takes on such a character. As noted above, a clear
ar to a particular port or waterway, environmental policy of the statute is that the Secretary shall care-
factors, economic impact, and so forth.” Senate Re- fully consider “the wide variety of interests which
port 34. It was also “anticipated that the exercise of may be affected by the exercise of his authority,” §
the authority provided . . . regarding the establish- 1222(e), and that he shall restrict the application of
ment of vessels size and speed limitations [would] vessel size limitations to those areas where they are
not be imposed universally, but rather [would] be particularly necessary. In the case of Puget Sound,
exercised with due consideration to the factors” set the Secretary has exercised his authority in accord-
forth above and with due regard for “such matters ance with the statutory directives and has promul-
as combinations of horsepower, drafts of vessels, gated a vessel-traffic-control system which contains
rivers, depth and width of channels, design types of only a narrow limitation on the operation of super-
vessels involved, and other relevant circum- tankers. This being the case, we conclude that
stances.” Id., at 33. Washington is precluded from enforcing the size
FN28
limitation contained in the Tanker Law.
We read these statements by Congress as indicating
that it desired someone with an overview of all the FN28. We find no support for the appel-
possible ramifications of the regulation of oil lants' position in the other federal environ-
tankers to promulgate limitations on tanker size and mental legislation they cite, i. e., the Fed-
that he should act only after balancing all of the eral Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
competing interests. While it was not anticipated ments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. §
that the final product of this deliberation would be 1251 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V); the
the promulgation of traffic safety systems applic- Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 86
able across the board to all United States ports, it Stat. 1280, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (1976
was anticipated that there would be a single de- ed.); and the Deepwater Port Act of 1974,
cisionmaker, rather than a different one in each 88 Stat. 2126, 33 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq.
State. (1970 ed., Supp. V). While those statutes
contemplate cooperative state-federal regu-
Against this background, we think the pre-emptive
latory efforts, they expressly state that in-
impact *178 of § 1222(b) is an understandable ex-
tent, in contrast to the PWSA. Further-
pression of congressional intent. Furthermore, even
more, none of them concerns the regula-
without § 1222(b), we would be reluctant to sustain
tion of the design or size of oil tankers, an
the Tanker Law's absolute ban on tankers larger
area in which there is a compelling need
than 125,000 DWT. The Court has previously re-
for uniformity of decisionmaking.
cognized that “where failure of . . . federal officials

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 20
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
Appellees and the United States as amicus merce, for the cost of the tug escort for a 120,000
curiae urge that the Tanker Law's size lim- DWT tanker is less than one cent per barrel of oil
it also conflicts with the policy of the Mer- and the amount of oil processed at Puget Sound re-
chant Marine Act, 1936, 49 Stat. 1985, as fineries has not declined as a result of the provi-
amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1970 sion's enforcement. App. 68. Accordingly, we hold
ed. and Supp. V), and the tanker construc- that § 88.16.190(2) of the Tanker Law is not invalid
tion program established thereunder by the under the Commerce Clause.
Maritime Administration in implementa-
tion of its duty under the Act to develop an FN29. Although the District Court did not
adequate and well-balanced merchant fleet. reach these additional grounds, the issues
Under this program the construction of involved are legal questions, and the re-
tankers of various sizes is subsidized, in- cord seems sufficiently complete to war-
cluding tankers far in excess of 125,000 rant their resolution here without a remand
DWT. The Maritime Administration has to the District Court.
rejected suggestions that no subsidies be
[12] Similarly, we cannot agree with the additional
offered for the building of the larger
claim that the tug-escort provision**1006 interferes
tankers. There is some force to the argu-
with the Federal Government's authority to conduct
ment, but we need not rely on it.
foreign affairs. Again, appellees' argument is based
on the contention that the overall effect of §
*179 VII 88.16.190(2) is to coerce tanker owners into outfit-
ting their vessels with the specified design require-
[11] We also reject appellees' additional constitu- ments. Were that so, we might agree that the provi-
tional challenges to the State's tug-escort require- sion constituted an invalid interference with the
ment for vessels not satisfying its design standards. Federal Government's attempt to achieve interna-
FN29
Appellees contend that this provision, even if tional agreement on the regulation of tanker design.
not pre-empted by the PWSA, violates the Com- The provision as we view it, however, does no
merce Clause because it is an indirect attempt to more than require the use of tug escorts within Pu-
regulate the design and equipment of tankers, an get Sound, a requirement with insignificant interna-
area of regulation that appellees contend necessit- tional consequences. We, therefore, decline to de-
ates a uniform national rule. We have previously re- clare § 88.16.190(2) invalid for either of the addi-
jected this claim, concluding that the provision may tional reasons urged by appellees.
be viewed as simply a tug-escort requirement since
it does not have the effect of forcing compliance Accordingly, the judgment of the three-judge Dis-
with the design specifications set forth in the provi- trict Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part,
sion. See n. 25, supra. So viewed, it becomes ap- and the case is remanded for further proceedings
parent that the Commerce Clause does not prevent a consistent with this opinion.
State from enacting a regulation of this type. Simil-
ar in its nature to a local pilotage requirement, a re- It is so ordered.
quirement that a vessel take on a tug escort when Mr. Justice MARSHALL, with whom Mr. Justice
entering a particular body of water is not the type of BRENNAN and Mr. Justice REHNQUIST join,
regulation that demands a uniform national rule. concurring in part and dissenting in part.
See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 13 The Washington Tanker Law at issue here has three
L.Ed. 996 (1852). Nor does it appear from the re- operative provisions: (1) a requirement that every
cord that the requirement impedes the free and oil tanker of 50,000 deadweight tons (DWT) or lar-
*180 efficient flow of interstate and foreign com- ger employ a pilot licensed by the State of Wash-

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 21
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
ington while navigating Puget Sound and adjacent being constructed by Seatrain will not meet
waters, Wash. Rev. Code § 88.16.180 (Supp.1975); the majority of the design requirements,
(2) a requirement that every oil tanker of from and, as the Court convincingly demon-
40,000 to 125,000 DWT either possess certain strates, ante, at 1002, n. 25, the Tanker
safety features or *181 utilize tug escorts while op- Law is not likely to induce tanker owners
erating in Puget Sound, § 88.16.190(2); and (3) a to incorporate the specified design features
size limitation, barring tankers in excess of 125,000 into new tankers.
DWT from the Sound, § 88.16.190(1).
I also cannot agree with the Court's conclusion in
I agree with the Court that the pilotage requirement Part VI of its opinion that the size limitation con-
is pre-empted only with respect to enrolled vessels. tained in the Tanker Law *182 is invalid under the
I also agree that the tug-escort requirement is fully Supremacy Clause. To reach this conclusion, the
valid, at least until such time as the Secretary of Court relies primarily on an analysis of Title I of
Transportation or his delegate promulgates a feder- the PWSA and the Secretary of Transportation's ac-
al tug-escort rule or decides, after full considera- tions thereunder. I agree with the Court that the
tion, that no such rule is necessary. I therefore join Secretary has authority to establish vessel size lim-
Parts I, II, III, V, and VII of the Court's opinion. itations based on the characteristics of particular
FN2
waters, and **1007 that a State is not free to
In the current posture of this case, however, I see impose more stringent requirements once the Sec-
no need to speculate, as the Court does, on the retary has exercised that authority or has decided,
validity of the safety features alternative to the tug after balancing all of the relevant factors, that a size
requirement. Since the effective date of the Tanker limitation would not be appropriate. On the other
Law, all tankers-including those owned or chartered hand, Title I does not by its own force pre-empt all
by appellees-have employed tug escorts rather than state regulation of vessel size, since it “merely au-
attempting to satisfy the alternative safety require- thorizes and does not require the Secretary to issue
ments. The relative expense of compliance, regulations to implement the provisions of the
moreover, makes it extremely unlikely, at least for Title.” Ante, at 1001. Thus, as the Court notes,
the foreseeable future, that any tankers will be con- “[t]he pertinent inquiry at this point . . . [is] wheth-
structed or redesigned to meet the law's require- er the Secretary, through his delegate, has ad-
FN1
ments. Indeed, the Court itself concludes that § dressed and acted upon the question of size limita-
88.16.190(2) “may be viewed as simply a tug-es- tions.” Ante, at 1003.
cort requirement since it does not have the effect of
forcing compliance with the design specifications FN2. The relevant provision of Title I
set forth in the provision.” Ante, at 1005; see ante, states:
at 1002 n. 25, and 1007. Accordingly, I cannot join
Part IV of the Court's opinion. “In order to prevent damage to, or the de-
struction or loss of any vessel, bridge, or
FN1. According to the record, no tanker other structure on or in the navigable wa-
currently afloat has all the design features ters of the United States, or any land struc-
prescribed by the Tanker Law. Neither At- ture or shore area immediately adjacent to
lantic Richfield nor Seatrain has plans to those waters; and to protect the navigable
modify any tankers currently in operation waters and the resources therein from en-
to satisfy the design standards, “because vironmental harms resulting from vessel or
such retrofit is not economically feasible structure damage, destruction, or loss, the
under current and anticipated market con- Secretary of the department in which the
ditions.” App. 67. Moreover, the vessels Coast Guard is operating may-

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 22
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
the Coast Guard considered the need for promulgat-

“(3) control vessel traffic in areas which he FN3
ing size limitations for the entire Sound.
determines to be especially hazardous, or Second, even assuming that the Rosario Strait rule
under conditions of reduced visibility, ad- resulted from consideration of the size issue with
verse weather, vessel congestion, or other respect to the entire area, appellees have not
hazardous circumstances by- demonstrated*184 that the rule evinces a judgment
contrary to the provisions of the Tanker Law. Un-
“(iii) establishing vessel size and speed der the express terms of the PWSA, the existence of
limitations and vessel operating conditions local vessel-traffic-control schemes must be
. . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1221(3)(iii) (1970 ed., weighed in the balance in determining whether, and
Supp. V). to **1008 what extent, federal size limitations
FN4
should be imposed. There is no evidence in the
The Court concludes that the Secretary's delegate, record that the Rosario Strait “size limitation” was
the Coast Guard, has in fact considered the issue of in existence or even under consideration prior to
FN5
size limitations for Puget Sound and reached a passage of the Tanker Law. Thus appellees
judgment contrary to the one embodied in the have left unrebutted the inference that the Coast
Tanker Law. Under well-established principles, Guard's own limited rule was built upon, and is
however, state law should be displaced “ ‘only to therefore entirely consistent with, the framework
the extent necessary to protect the achievement of already created by the Tanker Law's restrictions.
the aims of’ ” *183 federal law; whenever possible,
we should “reconcile ‘the operation of both stat- FN3. The Rosario Strait “size limitation” is
utory schemes with one another rather than holding not contained in any written rule or regula-
[the state scheme] completely ousted.’ ” Merrill tion, and the record does not indicate how
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 it came into existence. The only reference
U.S. 117, 127, 94 S.Ct. 383, 390, 38 L.Ed.2d 348 in the record is the following statement in
(1973), quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, the stipulation of facts:
373 U.S. 341, 357, 361, 83 S.Ct. 1246, 1257-1259,
“The Coast Guard prohibits the passage of
10 L.Ed.2d 389 (1963); accord, De Canas v. Bica,
more than one 70,000 DWT vessel through
424 U.S. 351, 357-358, n. 5, 96 S.Ct. 933, 937, 47
Rosario Strait in either direction at any
L.Ed.2d 43 (1976). Viewed in light of these prin-
given time. During periods of bad weather,
ciples, the record simply does not support the
the size limitation is reduced to approxim-
Court's finding of conflict between state and federal
ately 40,000 DWT.” App. 65.
law.
The Puget Sound Vessel Traffic System,
The Coast Guard's unwritten “local navigation
33 CFR Part 161, Subpart B (1976), as
rule,” which prohibits passage of more than one
amended, 42 Fed.Reg. 29480 (1977), does
70,000 DWT vessel through Rosario Strait at any
not contain any size limitation, and the ne-
given time, is the sole evidence cited by the Court
cessity for such a limitation apparently was
to show that size limitations for Puget Sound have
never considered during the rulemaking
been considered by federal authorities. Ante, at
process. See 38 Fed.Reg. 21228 (1973)
1003. On this record, however, the rule cannot be
(notice of proposed rulemaking); 39
said to reflect a determination that the size limita-
Fed.Reg. 25430 (1974) (summary of com-
tions set forth in the Tanker Law are inappropriate
ments received during rulemaking).
or unnecessary. First, there is no indication that in
establishing the vessel traffic rule for Rosario Strait FN4. Title I provides in relevant part:

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 23
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
“In determining the need for, and the sub- portant natural resources of the state and to
stance of, any rule or regulation or the ex- jobs and incomes dependent on these re-
ercise of other authority hereunder the Sec- sources.
retary shall, among other things, consider-
“The legislature also recognizes Puget
Sound and adjacent waters are a relatively
“(6) existing vessel traffic control systems, confined salt water environment with ir-
services, and schemes; and regular shorelines and therefore there is a
greater than usual likelihood of long-term
“(7) local practices and customs . . . .” 33
damage from any large oil spill.
U.S.C. § 1222(e) (1970 ed., Supp. V).
“The legislature further recognizes that
FN5. The stipulation of facts does not spe-
certain areas of Puget Sound and adjacent
cify when the size rule for Rosario Strait
waters have limited space for maneuvering
was established. The rule apparently was
a large oil tanker and that these waters
in force at the time the stipulation was
contain many natural navigational
entered, see n. 3, supra, but the Tanker
obstacles as well as a high density of com-
Law had gone into effect prior to that time.
mercial and pleasure boat traffic.” Wash.
Perhaps in recognition of the tenuousness of its Rev. Code § 88.16.170 (Supp.1975).
finding of conflict with federal regulation under
The natural navigational hazards in the
Title I, the Court suggests that the size limitation
Sound are compounded by fog, tidal cur-
imposed by the Tanker Law might also be pre-
rents, and wind conditions, in addition to
empted under Title II of the PWSA. Ante, at 1003.
the high density of vehicle traffic. App. 69.
In particular, the Court theorizes that the state rule
might be pre-empted if it “represents a state judg- Among the “areas . . . [with] limited space
ment that, as a matter of safety and environmental for maneuvering a large oil tanker,” re-
protection generally, tankers should not exceed ferred to by the Washington Legislature, is
125,000 DWT.” Ibid. (emphasis added). It is clear, undoubtedly Rosario Strait. The Strait is
however, that the Tanker Law was not merely a re- less than one-half mile wide at its narrow-
action to the problems arising out of tanker opera- est point, Exh. G, and portions of the ship-
tions in general, but instead was a measure tailored ping route through the Strait have a depth
to respond to unique local conditions-in particular, of only 60 feet. App. 65. (A 190,000-DWT
the unusual *185 susceptibility of Puget Sound to tanker has a draft of approximately 61 feet,
damage from large oil spills and the peculiar navig- and a 120,000-DWT tanker has a draft of
ational problems associated with tanker operations approximately 52 feet. Id., at 80.)
FN6
in the Sound. Thus, there is no basis for pre-
FN7
emption under Title II. FN7. In addition to finding the Tanker
Law's size limit to be inconsistent with the
FN6. The Tanker Law contains the follow- PWSA and federal actions thereunder, the
ing statement of intent and purpose: Court suggests that “[t]here is some force
to the argument” that the size limit con-
“Because of the danger of spills, the legis-
flicts with the tanker construction program
lature finds that the transportation of crude
established by the Maritime Administra-
oil and refined petroleum products by
tion pursuant to the Merchant Marine Act,
tankers on Puget Sound and adjacent wa-
1936. Ante, at 1005 n. 28. The Court does
ters creates a great potential hazard to im-

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 24
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
not rely on this argument, however, and it measures otherwise within their police
is totally lacking in factual basis. While it power.” Douglas v. Seacoast Products,
is true that construction of tankers larger Inc., supra, 431 U.S. at 277, 97 S.Ct. at
than 125,000 DWT has been subsidized 1747; see, e. g., Huron Portland Cement
under the program, almost two-thirds of Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 80 S.Ct. 813,
the tankers that have been or are being 4 L.Ed.2d 852 (1960); Manchester v. Mas-
constructed have been smaller than sachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 11 S.Ct. 559, 35
125,000 DWT, App. 60; of the remainder, L.Ed. 159 (1891); Smith v. Maryland, 18
the smallest are 225,000 DWT vessels with How. 71, 15 L.Ed. 269 (1855). The Tanker
drafts well in excess of 60 feet-too large to Law's size limitation appears to be a reas-
pass through Rosario Strait, see n. 6, supra onable environmental protection measure,
, or dock at any of the refineries on Puget see n. 8, infra, and it is imposed evenhan-
Sound (Atlantic Richfield's refinery at dedly against both residents and nonresid-
Cherry Point has a dockside depth of 55 ents of the State.
feet; none of the other five refineries on
Puget Sound has sufficient dockside depth *186 **1009 For similar reasons, I would hold that
even to accommodate tankers as large as Washington's size regulation does not violate the
125,000 DWT. App. 47-48, 80). Commerce Clause. Since water depth and other
navigational conditions vary from port to port, local
Appellees advance one final argument for regulation of tanker access-like pilotage and tug re-
invalidating the 125,000 DWT size limit quirements, and other harbor and river regulation-is
under the Supremacy Clause. Relying on certainly appropriate, and perhaps even necessary,
the well-established proposition that feder- in the absence of determinative federal action. See,
al enrollment and licensing of a vessel give e. g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299,
it authority to engage in coastwise trade 319, 13 L.Ed. 996 (1852); Packet Co. v. Catletts-
and to navigate in state waters, Douglas v. burg, 105 U.S. 559, 562-563, 26 L.Ed. 1169 (1882).
Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, Appellees have not demonstrated that the Tanker
276, 280-281, 97 S.Ct. 1740, 1747, Law's size limit is an irrational or ineffective means
1749-1750 (1977); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 of promoting safety and environmental protec-
FN8
Wheat. 1, 212-214, 5 L.Ed. 302 (1824), ap- tion,388 *187 # or have they shown that the
pellees assert that Washington may not ex- provision imposes any substantial burden on inter-
FN9
clude from any of its waters tankers that state or foreign commerce. Consequently, it is
have been enrolled and licensed, or re- clear that appellees have not carried their burden of
gistered, pursuant to the federal vessel re- showing that the provision's impact on interstate or
gistration, enrollment, and licensing laws, foreign commerce “is clearly excessive in relation
46 U.S.C. §§ 221, 251, 263. Even assum- to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce
ing that registration of a vessel carries with Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 847,
it the same privileges as enrollment and li- 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970).
censing, this argument ignores a proposi-
tion as well established as the one relied on FN8. The stipulation quoted by the Court,
by appellees: Notwithstanding the priv- ante, at 1004 n. 27, merely establishes that
ileges conferred by the federal vessel li- there is good-faith dispute as to whether
cense, “States may impose upon federal li- exclusion of large tankers will in fact re-
censees reasonable, nondiscriminatory duce the risk of oil spillage in Puget
conservation and environmental protection Sound. A showing that there is conflicting

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 25
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
evidence is not sufficient to undercut the statute imposing those design requirements is inval-
presumption that a State's police power has id. It follows, I believe, that the State may not im-
been exercised in a rational manner. See, e. pose any special restrictions on vessels which do
g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & not satisfy these invalid criteria.
Enginemen v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.,
393 U.S. 129, 138-139, 89 S.Ct. 323, FN1. Washington Rev.Code §
327-328, 21 L.Ed.2d 289 (1968). 88.16.190(2) (Supp.1975) reads as follows:
FN9. Exclusion of tankers larger than “(2) An oil tanker, whether enrolled or re-
125,000 DWT has not resulted in any registered, of forty to one hundred and
duction in the amount of oil processed at twenty-five thousand deadweight tons may
the Puget Sound refineries. App. 68. proceed beyond the points enumerated in
Moreover, according to the record, use of a subsection (1) if such tanker possesses all
120,000 DWT tanker rather than a 150,000 of the following standard safety features:
DWT tanker increases the cost of shipping
“(a) Shaft horsepower in the ration of one
oil from Valdez, Alaska, to Cherry Point
horsepower to each two and one-half dead-
by a mere $.02 to $.04 per barrel, id., at
weight tons; and
64; and the record does not specify the rel-
evant cost data for the Persian Gulf-Cherry “(b) Twin screws; and
Point route. Finally, appellees offered no
concrete evidence of any significant dis- “(c) Double bottoms, underneath all oil
ruption in their tanker operations, or of any and liquid cargo compartments; and
decrease in the market value of the tankers
that they own, as a result of the Tanker “(d) Two radars in working order and op-
Law's provisions. erating, one of which must be collision
avoidance radar; and
I do not find any of appellees' other arguments per-
suasive. I would therefore sustain the size limitation “(e) Such other navigational position loca-
imposed by the Tanker Law. tion systems as may be prescribed from
Mr. Justice STEVENS, with whom Mr. Justice time to time by the board of pilotage com-
POWELL joins, concurring in part and dissenting missioners:
in part.
“PROVIDED, That, if such forty to one
The federal interest in uniform regulation of com-
hundred and twenty-five thousand dead-
merce on the high seas, reinforced by the Suprem-
weight ton tanker is in ballast or is under
acy Clause, “dictates that the federal judgment that
escort of a tug or tugs with an aggregate
a vessel is safe to navigate United States waters
shaft horsepower equivalent to five percent
prevail over the contrary state judgment.” Ante, at
of the deadweight tons of that tanker, sub-
998. For that reason, as the Court explains in Part
section (2) of this section shall not apply:
IV of its opinion, we must reject the judgment ex-
pressed by the Legislature of the State of Washing- PROVIDED further, That additional tug
ton that *188 an oil tanker of 40,000 to 125,000 shaft horsepower equivalencies may be re-
deadweight tons cannot safely navigate in Puget quired under certain conditions as estab-
Sound unless it possesses the “standard safety fea- lished by rule and regulation of the Wash-
tures” prescribed by § 88.16.190(2) of the **1010 ington utilities and transportation commis-
FN1
Washington Code. As the Court holds, the state sion pursuant to chapter 34.04 RCW:

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 26
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
PROVIDED further, That a tanker of less quiring payment of a “risk charge” by ves-
than forty thousand deadweight tons is not sels that do not conform to state design re-
subject to the provisions of [this Act].” quirements, Alaska Stat.Ann. § 30.20.010
et seq. (Sept. 1977), and California is con-
The Court correctly holds that the State may not ex- sidering comparable legislation. See Brief
clude vessels in that category from Puget Sound but for State of California et al. as Amici Curi-
it inconsistently allows the State to impose a costly ae, 3 n. 2.
tug-escort requirement on those vessels and no oth-
ers. This tug-escort requirement is not, by its terms, FN4. No matter how small the cost in the
a general safety rule from which tankers are exempt individual case, the State's effort here to
FN2
if they possess the invalid design features. enforce its general determinations on ves-
Quite the *189 contrary, the tug-escort requirement sel safety must be viewed as an “obstacle”
is merely a proviso in § 88.16.190(2)-the section of to the attainment of Congress' objective of
the Washington Tanker Law that prescribes the providing comprehensive standards for
design requirements; it is imposed only on tankers vessel design. See Hines v. Davidowitz,
that do not comply with those requirements. The 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85
federal interest that prohibits state enforcement of L.Ed. 581. This does not mean that the
those requirements should also prohibit state en- State cannot adopt any general rules im-
forcement of a special penalty for failure to comply posing tug-escort requirements, but it does
with them. mean that it cannot condition those re-
quirements on safety determinations that
FN2. The Court, ante, at 1002, seems to are pre-empted by federal law, thus “impos
characterize the tug-escort requirement as [ing] additional burdens not contemplated
such a “general rule.” by Congress.” De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S.
351, 358 n. 6, 96 S.Ct. 933, 938, 47
If the federal interest in uniformity is to be vindic-
L.Ed.2d 43.
ated, the magnitude of the special burden imposed
by any one State's attempt to penalize noncompli- *190 Since I am persuaded that the tug-escort re-
ance with its invalid rules is of no consequence. quirement is an inseparable appendage to **1011
The tug-escort penalty imposed by Washington will the invalid design requirements, the invalidity of
cost appellee ARCO approximately $277,500 per one necessarily infects the other. I therefore re-
year. The significance of that cost cannot be de- spectfully dissent from Parts V and VII of the
termined simply by comparison with the capital in- FN5
Court's opinion.
vestment which would be involved in complying
with Washington's invalid design specifications. FN5. The validity of Washington's tug-
Rather, it should be recognized that this initial bur- escort provision may be short lived, des-
den is subject to addition and multiplication by sim- pite today's opinion. The Secretary is now
FN3
ilar action in other States. Moreover, whether contemplating regulations in this area, and
or not so multiplied, the imposition of any special even the majority concedes that they may
restriction impairs the congressional determination pre-empt the State's regulation. Ante, at
to provide uniform standards for vessel design and 1002. While this lessens the impact of the
FN4
construction. State's regulation and the threat it poses to
the federal scheme, the legal issue is not
FN3. The possibility of States' enacting le- affected by the imminence of agency ac-
gislation similar to Washington's is not re- tion.
mote. Alaska has enacted legislation re-

98 S.Ct. 988 Page 27
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988)
U.S.Wash.,1978.
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988, 11 ERC 1273, 1978
A.M.C. 527, 55 L.Ed.2d 179, 8 Envtl. L. Rep.
20,255
END OF DOCUMENT

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Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 435 U.S. 662

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Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for PATRON ACCESS,-

Date/Time of Request: Monday, August 23, 2010 13:25 Eastern

business law 2 http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=508&invol=520

authority to conduct foreign affairs.

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[4] States 360 18.57 354 Shipping

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360k18.57 k. Maritime Matters. Most 360k18.57 k. Maritime Matters. Most

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[11] Commerce 83 82.30 *151 Appellees challenge the constitutionality of

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*154 Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of I

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whether carrying freight or passengers for “(b) Twin screws; and

Title II begins by declaring that the protection of

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if adopted, “are intended to provide uniform guid- referred to in the text.

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the Coast Guard considered the need for promulgat-

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