it seems to me that there really are troubling analogies between the philosophical attitudes
of antiquity and those of the Orient. These analogies cannot be explained by historical influ-
ences; nevertheless, they do perhaps give us a better understanding of all that can be involved
Introduction
Stoicism again exerted huge influence in the Italian and European re-
naissance, and in early modern neoStoics attempts to defend secular
foundations for ethical and social order despite the religious conflicts
of the era. (cf. Cassirer 1961, 166-170; Long 2003; Bouwsma 1990;
Brooke 2012; Oestreich, 2008; Sellars 2006, 135-159) When we teach
Stoic ethics today, however, this Western philosophy sets off a quite
different set of cultural and historical echoes in many students minds:
thats just like Buddhism!, that reminds me of Buddhism!, do you
know if there is any evidence of Buddhism influencing the Stoics?,
where can I read comparative accounts on Buddhism and Stoicism?
Yet as instructors, we can only reply that, at this time, there is little such
literature.
The last 100 years in the Western academy has seen a growing
literature challenging earlier occidental images of the supposedly par-
thenogenetic Greek miracle. McIvelleys magisterial Shape of Ancient
Thought shows in great detail the lines of cultural and philosophical in-
fluence passing in both directions between East and West, beginning
before Socrates and the Buddha, and continuing into the Roman era.
(McIvelley 2008) Ancient sources report the travels of wise men like
Democritus, Pythagoras and Plato to Egypt (Diogenes Laertius, IX 7.2).
We know that several philosophers, led by Pyrrho of Elis, accompanied
Alexanders imperial adventures in the late 4th century BCE, which
made it as far as Northern India. (Diogenes Laertius IX 11.2; Flintoff
1980, 88; Waligore, 2010) There are several excellent comparative
studies claiming the direct influence of Indian thought on Pyrrhos
scepticism, led by Flintoffs Pyrrho and India (Flintoff 1980), and
Kuzminskis studies on the remarkable parallels between Pyrrhos
strategies for suspending assertoric judgment with like practices in
Madhyamika (Kuzminski 2007,2008)). Giovanni Reale, in his Systems
of the Hellenistic Age, has claimed that, through Pyrrho, Indian thought
played a shaping, indirect role in reorienting Hellenistic ethics towards
3
2 See note 4 below on Coopers ways of life claim, and their relation to Hadot.
4
would live and comport themselves in distinct ways: ways still re-
flected in the lay use of the word Stoic to describe a manner in which
a person, for instance, takes bad news, and repeatedly parodied by the
ancient comic poets. (Caizzi, 1993 3) Hadot makes much of the passage
in Diogenes Laertius wherein we are told that the Greek Stoics distin-
guished between discourse concerning philosophy (ton kata philoso-
phian logon; ta tou philosophou theormata) and philosophy herself,
which they specified as akin to a living organism. (Hadot 2010, 220-
221; DL VII.39-40) Philosophy herself, the Stoics specified, amounted
to a techn (art, skill, craft) of living (tou biou): one which could only
be cultivated by bringing together, and applying, theoretical discourse
to our practical experiences. (Sellars 2009, 47-50, 55-58) In particular,
Hadot argues, there are large swathes of ancient philosophical writing,
notably amongst the Roman Stoics Rufus, Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus
Aurelius, that can only be understood as either recommending, or in-
volving (in Marcus case) the ongoing practice of cognitive, mnemic, im-
aginative, somatic and existential practices (Hadots spiritual exer-
cises) aiming at a transformation of our vision of the world, and a
metamorphosis of our personality. (Hadot 1996, 82 4) The price of
3 This very rupture between the philosopher and the conduct of everyday life is strongly
felt by non-philosophers. In the works of comic and satiric authors, philosophers were
portrayed as bizarre, if not dangerous characters. It is true, moreover, that throughout all
of antiquity the number of charlatans who passed themselves off as philosophers must
have been considerable, and Lucian, for example, freely exercised his wit at their ex-
pense. Jurists too considered philosophers a race apart. According to Ulpian, in the litiga-
tion between professors and their debtors the authorities did not need to concern them-
selves with philosophers, for these people professed to despise money. A regulation made
by the emperor Antoninus Pius on salaries and compensations notes that if a philosopher
haggles over his possessions, he shows he is no philosopher. Thus philosophers are
strange, a race apart. Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life trans. M. Chase (Lon-
don: Blackwell, 1996), 57.
4 It is here that Cooper decisively parts company with Hadot, although he does accept that
philosophy was a way of life, or rather involved the different schools promoting compet-
ing ways of living. But Cooper disputes the historical reality of Hadots exercises, in
claims it is not our task to consider here. (Cooper 2012, x, 20-22, 404 n. 4; cf. Sharpe
2014 for a critical assessment).
5
5 This is not to say that this has not, very often occurred, as contemporary academic phi-
losophers and historians of ideas have looked back at ancient thought, presupposing our
own understandings of what philosophy is and must be. See, for a striking instance, Ber-
nard Williams, Do Not Disturb, London Review of Books, 16:20, Oct. 20, 1994, 25-26.
We are acutely aware as we write that this paradigm for reading ancient philosophy,
while still evidently alive in early moderns like Montaigne or the neoStoics, is not the ac-
cepted one today in academic philosophy. This paper cannot wholly vindicate Hadots
claims (and nor is this our intention here), except by bringing forth the material it does
from the Hellenistic and Roman Stoics: materials which, we propose, can only plausibly
be read as intending to diagnose the causes of human misery (Part 1), what needs to be
addressed to end avoidable forms of mental suffering (Part 2), and the practices by which
one sets about doing this (Part 3).
6
The paper has three central parts, in which we will make this
case. Part I addresses the existential problems that Stoicism and Bud-
dhism address, to the extent that each can be conceived (as the evi-
dence we adduce aims to show each can) as therapeutic or soteriologi-
cal philosophies. We highlight the remarkable parallels between the
Stoics descriptions of unhappiness and its causes with the Buddhist
enumeration of the three kleas of attachment, aversion, and ignorance.
Part II examines the parallels between the Buddhist conception of what
it is we are working on when we undertake meditative practice in that
tradition (we call this, following Foucault, the ethical substance); and
the Stoic philosophy of mind undergirding their accounts of the path
as reflecting false evaluative assessments of self and world. Part III ex-
amines the way that, in Buddhist and Stoic texts, existential practices
(Buddhist meditation and the Stoic askseis and meltai) are clearly,
undoubtedly recommended (often in the imperative) and illustrated,
which aim at cultivating mindful attention to the present moment, the
transience of particular things, and non-attachment or reservation
(hypexairsis) concerning such indifferents (ta adiaphora), to use the
Stoic terms. (LS 58A-K, 356-359)
6But see Jiangxia Yus The Body in Spiritual Exercise: A Comparative Study between
Epictetan Asksis and early Buddhist Meditation 2014 for an example of recent compar-
ative work in this vein.
7
7 An important qualifying note on historical sources, and the scope of this analysis, is
needed before we proceed. Roman Stoicism is widely celebrated or reviled as more prac-
tical than what we can make of its Hellenistic sources, which we know only through the
doxographic tradition. While students of the school divide on this issue, we take there to
be a clear doctrinal continuity between Seneca, Epictetus and Aurelius and their sources
in Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, although the more practically-directed texts of the
Hellenistics, like Chrysippus Of Therapy, are lost. (see Gould 1970, 186-7; Tieleman
2006) Accordingly, we cite both the Hellenistics and the Romans in Parts I and II con-
cerning the passions and Stoic philosophical psychology, only drawing more exclusively
on the Romans concerning the practical philosophical exercises (Part III) For Buddhism,
given comparative difficulties, the primary focus of our comparative work here will be
the Pali Suttas although we will also draw on select contemporary Buddhist commenta-
tors to add scope and experiential texture to the discussion. Obviously, in future compar-
ative work of this kind, it would be intriguing to consider different specific strands of
Buddhist tradition in relation to the ancient philosophical schools of the West, sharing
their concern for philosophys informing practice and ways of life.
8
8Peter Harvey describes the truths as four realities and goes on to say that [they] are
not, as such, things to believe but to be open to, see and contemplate, and respond to ap-
propriately. (Harvey 2007)
9
and qualities of our existence, and wanting them to be other than they
are, as we will recall as we proceed.
9 The current Dalai Lama is often quoted as saying that all beings desire happiness but it
should be noted that, in keeping with the Buddhist virtue of non-attachment, happiness in
this context is not just subjective contentment but rather being in touch with the flow of
things as they are and things as they are in Buddhist terms are impermanent, inter-de-
pendent and empty. This idea of non-attached happiness is closer to the idea of flour-
ishing and can be fruitfully compared to eudemonia in Greek thought.
10
65G, 412) The unhappy man, as a result, spends much of his time wish-
ing that he, and the world, were other than they are, no matter where
he happens to find himself: a near-mirror image of the unenlightened
person in Buddhism, mired in forms of dukha.
10On this, see Foucault Hermeneutics of the Subject (New York: Picador, 2006), 130-135
11Here a further comparison with the Epicurean account of kenodoxia, empty opinions,
which fuel unnatural and unnecessary wishes incapable of satiation, might readily be un-
dertaken. Cf for instance Andr-Jean Voelke, Opinions Vides et Troubles de lme, in
Le Philosophie Comme Thrapie de lme: Etudes de Philosophie Hellnistique Prface
par Pierre Hadot (Fribourg: Academic Press), pp. 59-72.
11
overlay on selves and things and one of the most problematic obstacles
to be overcome in practice. (Sayutta Nikya 27.1; Loy 1983 )
12 To anticipate content to which we will return in Parts II and III, the notion of a lasting,
independently existing substantial self urges us to expend enormous effort in resisting the
inevitability of change, making sure that this self remains secure. When weve
achieved some condition that makes us feel whole and complete, we want everything to
stay exactly as it is: and this form of attachment is at the root of aversion (dvesha, dosa)
also. As Geshe Tashi Tsering explains the logic here: Aversion [dvesha; dosa] refers to
pushing away things that harm our sense of permanence... [It is] an exaggeration of an
object that arises from the fundamental ignorance of the way self and things exist. ...be-
cause the object harms the selfs notion of permanence, the mind exaggerates its negative
qualities. ...this mind of aversion can range from very gross to very subtle... (Tsering,
2006, 54)
12
as not understanding the full meaning and implications of the Four No-
ble Truths; or (what amounts to the same) as a crucial misunderstand-
ing of the nature of reality. At stake is a fundamental misperception of
the nature of self and phenomena. In many ways, indeed, in Buddhism
as we will see momentarily in Stoicism, it is ignorance that drives the
entire dynamism of human suffering. Ignorance isn't just an inability
to apprehend the truth. It is an active misapprehension of one's own
mind or body, other people, and more. It is the conception or assump-
tion that phenomena exist in ways that they actually do not. As Jeffery
Hopkins explains:
13Mark Epstein (2001) describes the kleas as powerful reactions to things being out of
our control that have the ability to drive our behaviour and take over our consciousness.
13
What is it, Passion, that you want? Tell me this? [What do] I
want, [O] Reason? To do everything I want. A royal wish, but
tell me again. Whatever I desire I want to happen. (Cleanthes
in Galen, loc cit., at LS 65I, 413)
14 Cf. All the Buddhas teachings come round to this one practical point: to find perma-
nent joy, we have to learn how not to yield to selfish desire. / This conclusion is so con-
trary to human nature that it is not surprising to hear even experts maintain that in preach-
ing the extinction of desire, the Buddha was denying everything that makes life worth liv-
ing. But trishna [tah] does not mean all desire; it means selfish desire, the conditioned
craving for self-aggrandizement ... He distinguishes raw, unregulated, self-directed
trishna from the unselfish and uplifting desire to dissolve ones egotism in selfless service
of all. The person who makes no effort to go against the base craving for personal satis-
faction is headed for more sorrow. (Stephen Ruppenthal, in Easwaran, Eknath trans.
(1985) The Dhammapada. Chapter introductions by Stephen Ruppenthal. Tomales, Cali-
fornia: Nilgiri Press), p. 179 emphasis and brackets added).
17
While all the details of the Stoics accounts of the path need not
concern us here (cf. Graver 2007), two key ideas do need to be spelt out
to show the marked comparison with the Buddhist tradition. First is
the Stoics insistence that, in Epictetus concise formulation: Men are
disturbed (tarssei) not by things, but by their opinions (dgmata)
concerning things. (Epictetus, Encheiridion 5, start) The Stoics, like
the Buddhists, observe that people have a tendency to imagine, and
15 We note that this is one point of contention between Hadot and Foucault, in the recent
Western work on ancient Stoicism as a way of life. Hadot criticises Foucaults emphasis
on the pleasures, rather than forms of tranquility and eudemonia, as the key terms in Sen-
eca. Cf. Hadot, Reflections on the Idea of Cultivation of the Self in Philosophy as a
Way of Life, 206-214; esp. 206-7; and Un Dialogue Interruptu Avec Michel Foucault:
Convergences et Divergences, in Pierre Hadot, Exercises Spirituels et Philosohie An-
tique Prface par Arnold Davidson (Paris: ditions Albin Michel, 2002), 313-321.
18
very often to lament, that external things have a great deal more power
over us than in fact they do: what could I do?... It was his fault, not mine
, etc. However, secondly, as Epictetus continues in Encheiridion 5,
the actions and examples of virtuous individuals show that even the
apparently worst events need not trouble us as we usually accept:
16 Cf. Epictetus, Discourses III.8.4: So-and-so's son is dead. What happened? His son
is dead. Nothing else? Not a thing..So-and so's ship sank. What happened? His
19
Given this, we see that the path as the Stoics conceive them are not
simply somatic events. They are the psychophysiological corollaries18
of unnecessarily assenting to judgments that some external event com-
pellingly makes it appropriate (kathkon) for us to respond in some
way or the other. The fullest Stoic categorizations of the path thus
tabulate passions according to whether their subject interprets a pre-
sent or future, external happening as necessary for their own happiness
(hence good) or as harming them (thus bad, to be avoided):
ship sank. So-and-so was carted off to prison. What happened? He was carted off to
prison.- But if we now add to this He has had bad luck, then each of us is adding this
observation on his own account.
17 Viz. Say no more to yourself than what the initial impressions report (meden pleon
We have arrived then at the heart of our paper: the remarkable com-
parisons between Stoicism and Buddhism, conceived as lived philoso-
21
ness that there is a body is present to him just to the extent nec-
essary for knowledge and awareness. He abides independent,
not clinging to anything in the world. (Walshe, 1995, 336) 20
20 To take an example, with respect to the body one may serially attend to ones breathing
and to the position of ones body - whether it is upright, settled or prostrate. With respect
to feelings one identifies whether that feeling is pleasant, painful or neither pleasant nor
painful and so on.
24
also. When you know its not skillful or wholesome, you can let
go of it. 21
21 See II above concerning this distinction between skillful and unskillful responses to the
objects, impulses, and feelings which present themselves to us.
22 Aristotles famous remark is But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow
does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not
make a man blessed and happy. We note, contra the idea that Aristotle at least was
clearly interested in theory, as against kinds of living, that Aristotle NE I.7; NE I.5 is al-
ready concerned with contrasting different kinds of life, as against activities, in trying to
discern the ends of man. The Stoic would rejoin, to Aristotle, that a life is made of mo-
ments; so a life cannot be well lived unless it is compromised of moments well lived; but
there is unquestionably a tension here between the peripatetics and the Stoics which we
can only flag here. Aristotle accepts the popular Greek sense that a life can be harmed
post-humously, since a judgment on eudemonia includes a persons reputation, where the
Stoics are a good deal more sceptical about the importance of fame, dependent upon oth-
ers, as a constituent of happiness truly conceived.
23 Plutarch similarly reports to us in On Common Conceptions that for the Stoics, a good
is not increased by the addition of time, but even if someone becomes prudent for a mo-
ment, in respect of happiness he will in no way fall short of someone who employs virtue
for ever and lives his life blissfully in virtue. (Plutarch On Common Conceptions,
1061F; LS 631, 396)
25
do not imagine this, that you will recover it when you choose
For first, and what causes most trouble, a habit of not attend-
ing is formed in you; then a habit of deferring your attention.
And continually from time to time you drive away, by deferring
it, the happiness of life, proper behavior, the being and living
conformably to nature. To-day I choose to play. Well then,
ought you not to play with attention? I choose to sing. What,
then, hinders you from doing so with attention? Is there any part
of life excepted, to which attention does not extend? (Epictetus
Discourses IV.12)
to those matters we can affect. (cf. Sorabji 2000, 228-242) This is why
Seneca directs us:
Two things must be cut short: the fear of the future and the
memory of past discomfort; the one does not concern me any
more, and the other does not concern me yet. (Seneca, Letter 78,
14; at Hadot 1996, 228)
24 Cf. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations III.11: To the aids (parastmata) which have been
mentioned let this one still be added:Make for thyself a definition (poieisthai horon) or
description of the thing which is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a
thing it is in its substance, in its nudity (gymnon), in its complete entirety (holon), and tell
thyself its proper name (onoma), and the names of the things of which it has been com-
pounded, and into which it will be resolved. On this naming exercise in the Roman Sto-
ics, see Foucault 2006, 294-299.
27
ii. impermanence
25 The promise of being able to cultivate such attentiveness, Marcus tells us, is very
greatindeed, very close to the ethical goal of Stoicism more widely, as a eudemonistic
philosophy: if you separate from yourself the future and the past, and apply yourself
exclusively to living the life that you are living - that is to say, the present - you can live
all the time that remains to you until your death, in calm, benevolence, and serenity.
(Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, XII.3.3-4) Or again: All the happiness you are seeking
by such long, roundabout ways you can have right now I mean, if you leave all of the
past behind you, if you leave the future to providence, and if you arrange the present ac-
cording to piety and justice. (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations XII.1.1-2)
28
remind yourself that you love a mortal, something not your own; it
has been given to you for the present, not inseparably nor forever, but
like a fig, or a bunch of grapes, at a fixed season of the year, and that if
you yearn for it in the winter, you are a fool. If in this way you long for
your son, or your friend, at a time when he has not been given to you,
rest assured that you are yearning for a fig in winter ... (Epictetus, Dis-
courses III. 24. 84-7; cf. Encheiridion 3)
Just in the same way ought we to act all through life, and where
there are things which appear most worthy of our approbation,
we ought to lay them bare (apogymnoun) and cleanse them
(katharon) of the account (historian) by which they are exalted.
For outward show is very seductive (paralogists), and when
you are most sure that you are employed about things worth
your pains, it is then that it cheats you most. (Marcus Aurelius
Meditations VI.13)
Like the Buddhists, the Stoics in the West have consistently been
chided by critics for their allegedly unfeeling, fatalistic, indifference to-
wards the wider world, coupled with their allegedly proud, self-inter-
ested attention to their own ethical perfection. (Brooke 2012, 1-12)28
Yet the Stoics, unlike their more extreme Cynic cousins, never advo-
cated a principled rejection of all external things or of the world. A
sizable part of the ancient Stoic literature on ethics deals instead with
the issue of how the Stoic should select or not select these indifferents:
many of which, like food, shelter, water, and so on, are natural necessi-
ties for creatures like us and necessary for cultivating virtue; and many
others, like political responsibility, which may be necessary instru-
ments for performing virtuous actions. (Stobaeus Anthology 7e, at In-
wood & Gerson 2008, 135;Reydams-Schils 2005, 59-69) Nevertheless,
what the Stoic should cultivate is a kind of inner reservation towards
all externals he either selects or opts to avoid, so that he acts with re-
serve and encounters no obstacles which are not anticipated. (Sto-
baeus Anthology 2.155.5-17; LS 63W1, 419; Epictetus Encheridion 12,
27 For the deconstructive aspects of Buddhist practice see Davis, Leesa S. 2010 Advaita
Vednta and Zen Buddhism: Deconstructive Modes of Spiritual Inquiry. (London and
New York: Continuum).
28 Part of the arguable misunderstanding involved here no doubt comes from the term ad-
iaphora which the Hellenistic Stoics used to describe all things which fall beyond virtue
and vice, and the subjects volitional choice (impulses, actions, judgments). Literally
meaning something like undifferentiated things, the force of the term is to highlight the
Stoic observation that, despite the illusory hopes we are often encouraged to invest in ex-
ternal things (especially power, money, beauty), their possession by itself cannot make a
person happy, absent a kind of practical wisdom about how to select and use or enjoy
these things. (cf. Long 1996, 23-32) These things are for the Stoics beneath good and
evil in this sense. Just as gaining one or other of them can never bring with it instant
eudemonia, neither does losing any of them necessitate unhappiness. We recall again
Epictetus: Men are disturbed not by things, but by their judgments concerning things.
(Epictetus, Ench. 5, start; cf. II above).
33
The wise man sets about every action with reservation: if noth-
ing happens which might stop him. For this reason, we say that
he always succeeds and that nothing unexpected happens to
him: because within himself he considers the possibility that
something will get in the way and prevent what he is proposing
to do. (Seneca, On Benefits 4.34.4, at Donini & Inwood 1999,
737)[ ]
Concluding Remarks
Pierre Hadot nearly always kept his trained philologists caution con-
cerning comparative analysis of the Western schools that were his ob-
ject of scholarship, and Eastern traditions. Nevertheless, late in What
is Ancient Philosophy?, Hadot confessed that continuing research and
29 In the Zen Buddhist tradition there is a form of walking meditation that enables practi-
tioners a break from the long hours of seated meditation. Known as kinhin (literally
sutra walk) this is another way of mindfully focusing on the present moment of each
step to practice walking meditation is to practice walking in mindfulness (Hanh, 1985)
35
discussions with scholars of Eastern thought later in his life had con-
firmed exactly the kind of point we have been contending for here:
30 In another late interview, Hadot felt licensed to comment that what he calls spiritual
exercises were practiced in every age, in the most widely diverse milieus, and in widely
different latitudes: China, Japan, India; among the Christians, Muslims, and Jews.
(Hadot 1996, 282, cf. 279)
36
Buddhist Suttas in three, very practical ways. First, the Roman Stoics
urge themselves and us to cultivate attention to the present moment.
Second, they call themselves and us to philosophically recall the transi-
ence of all things, including our own mortality. 31 Thirdly, we showed
how Marcus, Epictetus and Seneca all recommend that people practice
cultivating a sage reservation or detachment concerning everything,
except (for the Stoics) the pursuit of virtue and harmony with the world
as it is in itselfagain, a spiritual attitude students today are generally
more familiar with through the widespread currency of Buddhism in
Western culture.
We close now with some qualifications and honest avowals of the limits
of this analysis. Firstly, while we have tried to show that there are sig-
nificant, hitherto-too-little remarked comparison between the soterio-
logical concerns and practical prescriptions of Stoicism and Buddhism,
this work stands as a necessary preliminary to further studies, more
adequately specifying the differences between these two philosophical
and spiritual traditions. In Part II, we remarked Buddhisms stress on
the lack of any stable Self, which is not a Stoic teaching. The Stoics, it is
true, do stress the impermanence of experience, and Marcus and Epic-
tetus enjoin themselves and us to repeatedly call this universal flux, and
our own transient mortality, to mind as we saw in Part III. But the Sto-
ics sense of the providential ordering of the physical Whole, and their
31 Considerations of space prevented us from pursuing this famous exercise of the me-
mento mori, for which the Stoics have been widely attacked as morbid. To take exam-
ples of this practices from only one of the classical texts, in Marcus Aurelius Meditations,
see II.12; IV.5; VII.32; VI.4; VI.10; IV.14 [on death as natural, as natural indeed as
birth]; II.2; II.4; II.6; II.11; II.17; III.1; III,14 [on death as imminent, given the passage of
time, a recollection which recommends attentiveness to the present moment (see Part
III)].
37
32 This is the very mundane observation Cooper (2012) completely misses, as Sharpe
(2014) has argued.
39
aiming to see things as they are, both as a theoretical end in itself, and
as a practical means for individuals to live better, wiser lives.
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