Judiciary Reviewer

Judiciary Aid Karminn Cheryl Dinney D.
Yangot
Judicial
Karminn Power
Cheryl Dinney D. Yangot
Art VII Sec 1, par 1: judicial power is vested in ONE SC and in lower courts
Art VIII Sec 1, par 2: expanded jurisdiction and certiorari power
The Supreme Court is the only constitutional court. The others are statutory creations.
Lower Courts under the Judiciary Reorganization Law: Court of Appeals, RTCs, Metropolitan TCs, MTC, and MTCCs. Not included: CTA and the
Sandiganbayan (special statutory court), Sharia courts.
Judicial Independence
Judicial Safeguards
a) The judiciary is b) Members of the judiciary c) Members of the d) The SC may not be e) The SCs f) SC has g) SC has
a constitutional are not subject to SC may not be deprived of its appellate administrative exclusive power
body. It cannot be confirmation of the removed except by minimum original jurisdiction may supervision over to discipline
changed by mere Commission on Appointments. impeachment. and appellate not be increased all courts and judges of the
legislation. jurisdiction. w/o its advice & personnel (new lower court.
concurrence. provision).
h) Members of the i) Members may not be j) During k) The Judiciary enjoys l) Only the SC may m) Only the SC may n) The SC
SC and lower designated to any agency continuance in fiscal autonomy initiate changes order temporary appoints all of
courts enjoy performing quasi-judicial or office, salaries may (automatic & regular in the Rules of detail of judges the employees
security of administrative functions not be decreased release of approp.). Court. (new provision). of the Judiciary
tenure. (new provision). (can be increased).
Grounds for impeachment
Art. XI, Section 2. The Pres., the VP, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the OMB may be removed from office on impeachment for, &conviction of (CuTOBBG) :
culpable violation of the Constitution
treason
other high crimes
bribery, betrayal of public trust
graft and corruption
xxxxx
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Judiciary Aid Karminn Cheryl Dinney D. Yangot
Karminn Cheryl Dinney D. Yangot
Qualifications
Qualifications of members of the SC cannot be reduced or increased by Congress through ordinary legislation, but those of the lower court judges
can be.
All collegiate courts: one must be a natural-born citizen to be a member; other lower courts: NBC not required.
Judicial and Bar Council

7 members:
Regular members shall sit for 4 years (subject to approval of the Commission on Appointments; staggered terms): IBP representative (4
yrs), professor of law (3 yrs), retired Justice (2), representative of the private sector (1 yr)
Ex officio members: CJ (Chairman), SOJ, rep of Congress (no limit on the number of terms they may serve)
Clerk of the SC = Secretary ex officio of the JBC
Regular members shall receive emoluments as may be determined by the SC
Principal function: recommend appointees to the Judiciary; may exercise other functions and duties as the SC may assign to it.
Congress may have only one representative in the JBC, and not two representatives, or one from each House with each having only one-
half vote. (Chavez v JBC, 2012)
Any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or HOR, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. (Chavez v JBC
Resolution on MR, 2013)
Judges may not be appointed in an acting or temporary capacity as this would undermine the independence of the judiciary.
Supreme Court en banc as PET

Macalintal v PET (2010 and 2011):
PET does not exercise non-judicial power; does not violate Art VIII Sec 12
when the SC, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-[residential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
the power wielded by the PET is a derivative of the plenary power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate from the judicial
department
Fiscal Autonomy
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Appropriations for the judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval,
shall be automatically and regularly released. (Art VII, Sec 3)
the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Office of the OMB contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to
levy, asses and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law (Bengzon v Drilon)
Any law which provides for an exemption from said fees (ex. in favor of GOCCs and LGUs) would be constitutionally infirm. (Re: Petition for
Exemption of the GSIS, 2010; In the Matter of Clarification and Exemption from Payment of All Court and Sherriffs Fees, 2012).
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciarys FA and its independence, the CJ and the Court EN Banc determine and decide the who, what,
where, when, and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of
the Courts granted power [] Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only
violates the FA and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privileged of the CJ and CEE to manage
the judiciarys own affairs. (Re: COA opinion on the computation of the appraised value of the properties, 2012)
This authority to exercise legislative power over the national purse is necessary to maintain judicial independence and is expressly provided
for by the Constitution Thus, it is not a violation of the separation of powers (ibid).
Composition of the Supreme Court

1935/ Commonwealth Constitution: 11 members; en banc/ in 2 divisions, unless otherwise provided by law
Congress did not want the SC to sit in divisions because it divided the SC into two.
1973 Constitution: 15; eliminated the phrase unless otherwise provided by law.
1987 Constitution: 15 sitting en banc or in 2/3/5 divisions
Number of members of the full Court and divisions may not be changes by statute
Vacancy: the President may provide for appointments in the judiciary even within two months immediately before the next presidential election
and up to the end of his term. Article VII Sec 15 (ban on midnight appointments) does not apply to all other appointments in the judiciary. (De
Castro v JBC).
En banc cases are to be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations.
Declaration of unconstitutionality: 2/3 of SC under the 1935 Constitution, 10 under the 1973C, majority of the members who actually
took part in the deliberations under the 1987C (at least 5 members can declare measures unconstitutional; 5 is the majority of the quorum of 8
of the 15-member court).
Division cases are to be decided with the concurrence of a majority of Members who actually took part in the deliberationsand in no
case, without the concurrence of at least 3 such Members.
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When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine/principle pf law laid down by
the courtmay be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
ALL issues on constitutionality must be heard en banc
Issues decided en banc:
(a) Constitutionality of laws (concurrence of majority who
participated in the deliberation)
(b) No 3 members reached a decision
(c) Changing a principle or doctrine of law
(d) Discipline of judges (concurrence of majority of members
who participated, for removal of a judge)
(e) Others stipulated in the Rules of Court)
By a vote of majority, may order dismissal of a judge.
REVIEW QUESTIONS
The SC cannot be abolished by ordinary legislation because it is a constitutional body,
Can the Supreme Court and the lower courts be abolished? BUT the lowers courts can be, provided that security of tenure is not undermined.
Duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
What does the expanded jurisdiction of the SC include? discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
When the SC sits in divisions, is there a violation of 1- No. The Supreme Court remains a unit notwithstanding it works in divisions. Although
sitting rule? Is the power of the SC diminished? it may have two decisions, it is but a single court.
The Philippine Legislature, by enacting that portion of section 138 of the

Administrative Code which authorizes divisions in the Supreme Court, has not
diminished the authority of the Supreme Court to hear and determine causes.
US v Limsiongco
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No. No temporary composition of the Supreme Court is authorized by the constitution.

This tribunal, as established under the organic law, is one of the permanent
Can the President appoint temporary members of the SC? institutions of the government.
Vargas v Rilloraza
No, but it is the concealment or lack of full disclosure (tantamount to

misrepresentation) that qualifies as a sufficient basis for DQ. A nominee must disclose
his or her record even if it was in the past, especially criminal charges.
The important consideration is that he had a duty to inform the appointing authority
Does a previous conviction or a pending criminal case and this Court of the pending criminal charges against him to enable them to
qualify as a sufficient basis to disqualify a nominee to the determine on the basis of his record, eligibility for the position he was seeking.
judiciary? OCA v Estacion Jr
He is not being chastened for having had a pending criminal case at the time of his
application for a judicial position but for his act of dishonesty and misrepresentation
in the process of seeking that office.
Guitierrez v Belan
What is jurisdiction? Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause. US v Limsiongco
In PS Bank v Senate Imp Court, was Corona correct in Majority Opinion: Yes, he was correct.
invoking the Foreign Deposit Act despite his non- Dissenting Opinions of Carpio and Sereno: No.
disclosure of foreign accounts in his SALN?
Should congress decide to enact a law increasing the Immediately upon passage and approval of the law.
salaries of all government employees, when shall a sitting
judge be entitled to enjoy the increase?
No. this is what Congress did after the SC declared in Perfecto v Meer that income tax was
a diminution of the salaries of the members of the judiciary. In Endencia v David, the SC
declared RA 590 unconstitutional. Both cases were decided under the 1935 Constitution.
1973C Art. XV, Sec 6. No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or
employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income
tax.
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When it disagrees with the judiciary, can the legislative Prevailing jurisprudence: Nitafan v CIR. Taxing the salaries of the members of the
department interpret the Constitution by enacting a law judiciary is not a decrease prohibited by the Constitution.
which declares that the imposition of income tax on
salaries of public officers is not a diminution of *NOTE:
compensation fixed by the constitution or by law? a. 1935 No diminution
b. 1973 Constitution No decrease & no exceptions clause by express provision
c. 1987 Constitution No decrease & no exceptions by implication
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional
provision in question until it was finally approved by the Constitutional Commission
disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it,
was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.
Can one file a disbarment case against a sitting Justice of

the SC on the grounds that said Justice when he was the No. Sitting Justices can only be removed through impeached and cannot be disbarred
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, influenced various while in office.
appointments to the judiciary, that he had a hand in the
ouster of an impeached president as well as in the Re: Complaint-Affidavit of Disbarment against SAJ Carpio filed by Lauro Vizconde
impeachment of a sitting CJ, that said Justice fails the
morality test as he bore a child out of wedlock, among
others?
No. (1) Such would undermine the fiscal autonomy of the judiciary, given that
payment of legal fees accrue to the JDF and SAJF; (2) The 1987 Constitution removed
Congress power to alter/supplement SC rules.
Can congress enact a law (GOCC charter) exempting a GOCC
from payment of legal fees? Any law which provides for the exemption from said fees would be constitutionally
infirm for it impairs the courts fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.
GSIS v Heirs of Caballero
In Re: Petition for Recognition of Exemption of the GSIS
*Note: Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitution, Congress was allowed to
alter/supplement SC rules.
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Can Congress amend the Rules of Court? No. Congress cannot.
Does the judiciary have a say in the enforcement of its

decisions, for instance on death row cases where the Yes. It is part of the power of the Court to control the execution or to suspend the
manner of carrying out the penalty was changed from enforcement of its decision.
electrocution to lethal injection? Echegaray v SOJ
Are the courts deprived of jurisdiction when a law No. Judicial power is not diminished by administrative procedure.
mandates an administrative body to decide on a matter PVIDC v Velezcheck notes below
first before aggrieved parties may seek recourse from
courts?
Can dissatisfied litigants charge a Justice before the No. Dissatisfied litigants cannot re-litigate in another forum. The decisions of the SC
Ombudsman? are beyond investigation of any agency of the government.
In Re: Laureta
No. Only the SC can.
In Republic v Garcia, the SC pronounced:

Worse, the Sandiganbayan transgressed the Constitution and arrogated upon itself a
power that it did not by law possess. All courts must take their bearings from the
Can the Sandiganbayan, a collegiate court, reverse legal decisions and rulings of this Court.
doctrine?
The Constitution mandates that only this Court sitting en banc may modify or
reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered
en banc or in division. Any court, the Sandiganbayan included, which renders a
decision in violation of this constitutional precept exceeds its jurisdiction
In Estrada v Desierto, did the court invoke the political In this case, the SC said that EDSA 1 was a political question that was beyond judicial
question doctrine in resolving ERAPs prayers in his review. EDSA 2, however, was different. Insofar as whether or not the SC may review
petition? and reverse the decision of both houses of Congress recognizing GMA as the de jure
president of the PH, it is a political question. BUT, the resignation of ERAP and the
succession of GMA is a justiciable question subject to judicial review.
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When one of the respondents in a criminal case (violation No. In Constantino v People, the SC took cognizance of the case despite the demise of
of RA 3019) dies during the pendency of appeal, does the Mayor Constantito (Sarangani) to prevent miscarriage of justice against the co-
issue involved in the case cease to be a justiciable accused.
controversy?
Can the SC review impeachment proceedings or decisions Yes, when constitutional provisions are violated.
of the impeachment court? No, when the matter to be reviewed refers to the Internal Rules of carrying out the
proceedings.
No. Congress cannot increase the Courts appellate jurisdiction.

Fabian v Desierto
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together
Can a law like the Ombudsman Act say that decisions can with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the
be appealed to the SC via certiorari? Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing
the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are
hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
No. In Felipe v Leuterio, the SC said:

Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. "Wrong" is the deprivation or violation
of a right. A contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared
winner by the board of referees or judges.
Can courts review results of national contests? In law there are instances of "damnum absque injuria" (loss and damage without
injury). This case is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a
different proposition
The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical
contest. For that matter it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and
similar competitions.
Can the SC review or modify decisions of lower courts or No. what can be reviewed by the higher court are only issues raised by parties-in-
quasi-judicial bodies when correctness of the decision is interest. If not obtained in the lower court, it cannot be obtained in the higher court
not raised by the party concerned? unless you appeal.
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Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question." Succinctly put, a partys standing is based on his own right to the relief
sought.
The Court has generally adopted the "direct injury" test that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result."
In Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court summarized the

What is standing? requirements before taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators can be
accorded a standing to sue, viz:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds
or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators
Advocates for Truth in Lending and Olaguer v BSP MB
Yes. In Kabataan Party-List et al v COMELEC, the Court said:

Recognizing that the petition is hinged on an important constitutional issue
Should the issue of standing be relaxed with regard to pertaining to the right of suffrage, the Court views the matter as one of
right of suffrage? transcendental public importance and of compelling significance.
Consequently, it deems it proper to brush aside the foregoing procedural barriers
and instead, resolve the case on its merits.
In Powers v. Ohio, the US SC wrote that:
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"We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties,
provided three important criteria are satisfied:
1. the litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact, thus giving him or her
a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute;
What are the 3 criteria of 3rd party standing? 2. the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and
3. there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his
or her own interests.
Cited in White Light Corp. v Manila
*NOTE: If the 2nd criterion is missing, is it okay?

In this case, the SC said that despite want of the 2nd criterion, petitioners may be
afforded standing because of the overbreadth doctrine.
[For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the
overbreadth doctrine are appropriate.]
No. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to
clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate
danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the laws enforcement.
Southern Hemisphere, et al. v Anti-Terrorism Council

Can one question the constitutionality of a penal
legislation (Human Security Act) and to have standing, *Nota Bene: Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being
invoke the doctrine of transcendental importance? suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas
individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine
and their status as citizens and taxpayers. Since a penal statute may only be assailed
for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition
of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge
against them.
Traditionally, pre-enforcement reviews are not allowed but the US Court allowed it
because of credible threat.
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In Atty.-Gen. Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, did the The SC held:

US SC allow the pre-enforcement review/challenge of a This pre-enforcement challenge to 2339B is a justiciable III case or controversy.
criminal statute (USA PATRIOT Act's prohibition on Plaintiffs face a credible threat of prosecution and should not be required to await
providing material support to foreign terrorist and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.
organizations)?
And that:
Plaintiffs [HLP] proposals to engage in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds and
Tamils, in turn, are phrased so generally that they cannot prevail in this
preenforcement challenge. The Court does not decide whether any future applications
of the material-support statute to speech or advocacy will survive First Amendment
scrutiny. It simply holds that 2339B does not violate the freedom of speech as applied
to the particular types of support these plaintiffs seek to provide
No. Only Professor Gemino Abad was clothed with locus standi. Nonetheless, the SC
took a liberal stance on standing.
The SC pronounced:
In this case, we find that the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right or
privilege to which they are entitled as members of the Order of National Artists as a
result of the conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Maosa and Moreno. In particular, they will be denied the privilege of exclusive
membership in the Order of National Artists.
In Almario, et al v Executive Secretary, were the petitioner-
National Artists afforded standing? Further:
While petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists, he is
entitled to be given an equal opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the
foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an
interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.
As regards the other concerned artists and academics as well as the CAP, their claim
of deep concern for the preservation of the countrys rich cultural and artistic
heritage, while laudable, falls short of the injury in fact requirement of standing. Their
assertion constitutes a generalized grievance shared in a substantially equal measure
by all or a large class of citizens. Nor can they take refuge in their status as taxpayers
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as the case does not involve any illegal appropriation or taxation. A taxpayers suit is
proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of the Congress.
Nonetheless, as a reading of the petition shows that it has advanced an issue which
deserves the attention of this Court in view of its seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedent, it behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue
presented before it. Moreover, this issue is of paramount interest, which further
justifies a liberal stance on standing.
In West Tower Condominium Corp. v FPIC, the SC declared:

Petitioners as Real Parties-in-Interest
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest
of its unit owners and residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the
There are limited powers of a Condominium Corporation instant petition. While a condominium corporation has limited powers under RA 4726,
otherwise known as The Condominium Act, it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf
under the Condominium Act. Does a Condominium of its members. In the instant case, the condominium corporation is the management
Corporation have the power to represent its body of West Tower and deals with everything that may affect some or all of the
residents/members in a suit? condominium unit owners or users.
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan
under Sec. 1, Rule 745 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not
require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule
clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with
violation.
No.
In Hontiveros-Baraquel v TRB, the SC said:

Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for,
Can legislators sue a corporation granted franchise by an or to authorize the operation of certain public utilities. With the growing complexity
executive agency (PNCC) for operation of a public utility? of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
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towards the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and towards the approval
of the practice by the courts. It is generally recognized that a franchise may be derived
indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency, and to this extent, the
power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other than
those of a legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges
conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a
legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature.
It is thus clear that Congress does not have the sole authority to grant franchises
for the operation of public utilities.
In this case, legislators have no standing to file the instant petition, for they are only
allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action when it infringes on their
prerogatives as members of Congress. Standing is accorded to them only if there is an
unmistakable showing that the challenged official act affects or impairs their rights
and prerogatives as legislators.
Final Note:
1. R.A. 8975 prohibits lower courts from issuing any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government
- or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private,
acting under the government's direction - to restrain, prohibit or compel acts related
to the implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects.
2. The rationale for the law is easily discernible. Injunctions and restraining orders tend
to derail the expeditious and efficient implementation and completion of government
infrastructure projects; increase construction, maintenance and repair costs; and
delay the enjoyment of the social and economic benefits therefrom. Thus, unless the
matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, judges of lower courts
who shall issue injunctive writs or restraining orders in violation of the law shall be
administratively liable.
3. It was therefore error on the part of petitioners to come directly before this Court for
the sole reason that the lower courts will not be able to grant the prayer for the
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issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order to

enjoin the assumption of toll operations by SOMCO. T
4. Parties must observe the hierarchy of courts before seeking relief from this Court.
Observance thereof minimizes the imposition on the already limited time of this Court
and prevents delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases. We do not
appreciate the litigants' practice of directly seeking recourse before this Court, relying
on the gravitas of a personality yet making serious claims without the proof to support
them.
No. No.
In Kabataan Party-List, et al v Comelec, the SC ruled:
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for
such right. This was echoed in AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC (AKBAYAN-Youth),
wherein the Court pronounced that the process of registration is a procedural
limitation on the right to vote. Albeit procedural, the right of a citizen to vote
nevertheless remains conditioned upon it.
Is the no bio, no boto rule (An Act Providing for Mandatory
Biometrics Voter Registration) an additional qualification to Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other
exercise the right to suffrage? Does it restrict or trample rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our
upon this right? Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. Thus, as to the substantive
aspect, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides:
xx xx
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned
upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of
registration.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the

standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest
brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used
today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race
as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal
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protection. As pointed out by petitioners, the United States Supreme Court has
expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage,
judicial access, and interstate travel.
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.
interest
There was no need for congress to resolve the matter because of judicial review. Only
In Francisco v HOR, why were the congressional remedies the Court can decide on the impropriety of the 2nd impeachment proceeding. It would
not exhausted before the SC? be a futility to let Congress decide on the matter.
In Dynamic Builders v Presbitero:

For local government infrastructure projects, Regional Trial Courts may issue
What is the principle of hierarchy of courts? provisional injunctive reliefs against government infrastructure projects only when
(1) there are compelling and substantial constitutional violations; (2) there clearly
HICordained sequence of recourse to court (to declog exists a right in esse; (3) there is a need to prevent grave and irreparable injuries; (4)
dockets of the SC); the SC will not entertain a direct resort there is a demonstrable urgency to the issuance of the injunctive relief; and (5) when
there are public interest at stake in restraining or enjoining the project while the
to it unless redress be obtained first from the lower courts.
action is pending that far outweighs (a) the inconvenience or costs to the party to
If there is concurrent jurisdiction, one must seek redress whom the project is awarded and (b) the public benefits that will result from the
first from the lower courts before going to the SC. completion of the project.
The Rules of Court provides for original concurrent jurisdiction by the RTC, the CA,
and this court in entertaining petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
However, parties must adhere to the principle of hierarchy of courts. This was
discussed in Dimson (Manila), Inc., et al. v. Local Water Utilities Administration:
A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue the
writ will be allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly
and specifically set out in the petition.
The hierarchy of courts must be respected. The doctrine with respect to hierarchy of
courts was designed so that this court will have more time to focus on its constitutional
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tasks without the need to deal with causes that also fall within the lower courts
competence.
However, direct resort to this court can prosper only when the requisites for direct
invocation of this courts original jurisdiction are present.
The acts sought to be enjoined in this case included the implementation of the
Construction Shoreline Protection Project awarded to private respondent HLJ
Construction and Enterprise. The project had already commenced and had been
ongoing at the time petitioner filed this case. Moreover, the issue of whether these
acts infringed on petitioners rights is a matter interrelated with the issues raised in
the Petition before the trial court, emphasizing the existence of the splitting of a cause
of action.
In any case, this court has stressed that extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus are "prerogative writs of equity[.]" It is within the courts sound
discretion whether these writs should be granted, and it will need to ensure that there
is a clear right to the relief.
[pet. Dismissed]
In Tanada v Cuenco:
The term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
What is a political question? parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
Is this an absolute rule in PH context? decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government."
Does the constitution provide a rule on political questions?
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
Is political question a doctrine in the PH? Yes, exception by
measure.
the constitution is the factual basis
It is not an absolute rule in the PH context.
Courts will not resolve political questions EXCEPT the determination of the factual basis
of Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus factual
issue which the courts can resolve.
16
When the executive branch confers diplomatic immunity on Yes. This matter is left to the determination of the executive (to confer immunity).
foreign corporation, is it okay? ICMC v Calleja
Case in point: Gutierrez v HOR Cmmm on Justice
These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives. The
argument that impeachment proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review was
debunked in this wise:
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that
of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly
granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the
Is the determination of what is an impeachable offense a Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution,
purely political question left to the legislative? Yes. is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the
power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality.
While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several
Does the Court have jurisdiction over what constitutes an limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article
impeachment offense? No. Pol Q. XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and
the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Judicial statesmanship: the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to
the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of
judicial wilfulness and pride."
Can a party seek recourse from the SC on alleged abuse of
impeachment proceedings? No, it is within the sound The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of congress to promulgate rules on impeachment discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the
proceedings. language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity
of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review
over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.
17
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded
certiorari jurisdiction of this Court reflects, includes the power to "determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance,
but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign
will.
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is

an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of
Representatives which committed such determinative function to public respondent. In
the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated
determinable standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint.
Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its
What does promulgation mean? duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the
minimum constitutional guidelines.
Francisco instructs that this issue would "require the Court to make a determination of
what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature.
Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x
As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, promulgation means "the

delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication."
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understoodthat

is, to make known.
Should impeachment rules be published? Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the
former should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the
discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules,
in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a
decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
18
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when
the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is
in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue
for Congress to make known its rules..
Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have
stated so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative
inquiries, per Neri. Other than "promulgate," there is no other single formal term in the
English language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published.
The discussion of the Constitutional Commission clearly rejects the notion that the
impeachment provisions are not self-executing. Section 3(8) does not, in any
circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment mechanism which the
Constitutional Commission took pains in designing even its details.
Are provisions on impeachment self-executing or not?
The prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-
self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated
to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
In other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is
within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the avowed purpose.
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution,

merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in
nature, they may be given retroactive application to pending actions. "It is axiomatic that
the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable.
19
Francisco states that the term "initiate" means to file the complaint and take initial action
on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied
with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. The initial
action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the
Committee on Justice.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two
former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate"
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial
action of said complaint.
1 yr ban rule; w/in 1 year from initiation of impeachment Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
proceedings endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the
filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the
What does initiation mean? Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may
Initial action refers to referral of complaint to committee not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
(usually Committee on Justice)
As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated "when the House
Is an impeachment proceeding a judicial proceeding? deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior
to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the
proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins,
when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow."
MR:
IN SUM, the Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing and referral
in the present case, with Francisco as the guiding light. Petitioner refuses to see the other
half of that light, however.
Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political

exercise. Petitioner thus cannot demand that the Court apply the stringent standards it
20
asks of justices and judges when it comes to inhibition from hearing cases. Incidentally,
the Impeachment Rules do not provide for any provision regarding the inhibition of the
Committee chairperson or any member from participating in an impeachment
proceeding. The Committee may thus direct any question of partiality towards the
concerned member only. And any decision on the matter of inhibition must be respected,
and it is not for this Court to interfere with that decision.
Except for the constitutionally mandated periods, the pacing or alleged precipitate haste
with which the impeachment proceeding against petitioner is conducted is beyond the
Courts control. Again, impeachment is a highly politicized intramural that gives the
House ample leg room to operate, subject only to the constitutionally imposed limits.
And beyond these, the Court is duty-bound to respect the discretion of a co-equal branch
of government on matters which would effectively carry out its constitutional mandate.
Does the SC have power of Judicial Review over Congress Yes, when there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion, the SC can use its expanded
respect to the correct processes with respect to powers.
impeachment?
Yes. Despite being independent, the SC may review the acts of the Ombudsman. It comes
within the purview of judicial reviewas a safety net.
In Carpio Morales v CA, the SC said that the CA can review the acts of the Ombudsman. In
this case, what was being questioned were the powers detailed in the OMB Act. Sec 14, par
1 which prohibits the courts to issue injunctions.
Section 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court

to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act,
unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Do the Ombudsmans acts come within the SCs power of No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision
Judicial Review? or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of
law.
21
If the Ombudsman investigates a government official, can courts issue an in junction?

Under the OMB act, No.
Did the SC reject this portion of law (par.1)? Yes. The SC struck it down without saying if
it was unconstitutional. The SC said instead that the section was ineffective.
The Court stated the 1st Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, which prohibits the issuance of an
injunction, is an encroachment of the SCs rule-making authority by Congress. An
injunction, after all, is merely a provisional and auxiliary relief to preserve rights in esse.
It declared the 1st Paragraph ineffective, until it is adopted as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor. Rules of procedure
can only be made by the SC and not Congress.
Did the SC agree with Sec 14 par 2 of the OMB Act (if there is a finding by the OMB no
remedy against the OMB except thru the SC via pure question of law)? No. the SC said the
provision is invalid and unconstitutional. One may go to other courts to question findings
of the OMB.
The SC ruled that the 2nd Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, is vague, unconstitutional and
invalid.
[*Nota bene: the SC relied on Fabian v. Desierto, where Par.4 Sec. 27, RA 6770, was
declared void bec it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC
without its advice and concurrence]
CHECK CASE.
The SC argued that when the constitution said the Omb is an independent body, it meant
independent of the executive department.
It stated:
Why did the SC vote unanimously to remove the powers of At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence of
the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as that of the foregoing independent bodies,
the OMB by declaring Sec 14 par 2 invalid and par 1
meant freedom from control or supervision of the Executive Department:
ineffective? [T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently
intended by the framers to be independent from executive control or
22
supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies

are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the "independence"
granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference
As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of
Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:
1. creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be
abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be
removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows,
or an amendment thereto is made;
2. fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed
from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to
[its] functions; hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by
officials of the political branches of government so as to impair said
functions; and
3. insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that
those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal
authority.
No. and no. The SC ruled:

Judicial Review of a Question of Executive Policy
Torrecampo asserts that "[t]he right of the eight million residents of Metro Manila to
clean and potable water is greatly put at risk x x x" and alleges that the MWSS and the
DPWH violate Section 16, Article II20 and Section 6, Article XII21 of the Constitution
should they choose to proceed with the C-5 Road Extension Project using MWSS
properties instead of the RIPADA area. These issues, however, are "dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."
In Torrecampo v MWSS (C5 project), was Brgy Capt
Torremoros resort to the SC proper? Can SC determine Despite the definition of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the
whether the Tandang Sora area is a better alternative to Constitution, an inquiry on issues raised by Torrecampo would delve into matters that
the RIPADA area for the C-5 Road Extension Project or not? are exclusively within the wisdom of the Executive branch. The possibility of judicial
interference, as well as the speculative nature of the present petition, was clearly
shown during the oral arguments.
23
The determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a road

extension is obviously not within the province of this Court. Such determination
belongs to the Executive branch. Moreover, in this case the DPWH still has to conduct
the proper study to determine whether a road can be safely constructed on land
beneath which runs the aqueducts. Without such study, the MWSS, which owns the
land, cannot decide whether to allow the DPWH to construct the road. Absent such
DPWH study and MWSS decision, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction can be alleged against or attributed to respondents warranting the
exercise of this Courts extraordinary certiorari power.
The Court pronounced:

In Sinaca v Mula (election substitution for mayor), how
was judicial restraint defined? A political party has the right to identify the people who constitute the association
and to select a standard bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and
preference. Political parties are generally free to conduct their internal affairs free
from judicial supervision; this common-law principle of judicial restraint, rooted
in the constitutionally protected right of free association, serves the public interest by
allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference.
When the penalty is reclusion perpetua, because there can be no greater penalty than
reclusion perpetua or death.
In criminal cases, when does the SC come in to review the
decision of the lower court? No judicial restraint because of automatic review.
When will the court take initiative in criminal cases?
*Note: Why is there no automatic review/ motu proprio review of other decisions? The
SC may impose a higher penalty.
What are the limitations of the SCs jurisdiction? Limitations on SCs jurisdiction are found in the constitution. Art VIII. Sec 5.
In Mantruste v CA, the SC said that courts are not allowed to issue injunctions/TROs against
assets/trusts of the government.
Is it constitutional to have a law prohibiting courts from
issuing injunction against corporations?
24
Is this constitutional? Yes. The SC said such provision does not infringe on any provision of
the Constitution. The SC upheld the Assets Privatization Trust and the Presidents
Proclamation.
*Nota Bene: Mantruste may have been rendered ineffective by Carpio-Morales v CA

BUT we do not know whether or not, if the same issue in Mantruste will be brought
to the SC now, the SC will decide the same way it decided in 1989 because of Carpio-
Morales v CA.
*See notes below.
Can a person with grievances file before court even if an No, because by that time, the court could not have acquired jurisdiction unless period
administrative agency is given a period within which to lapsed. Applied Food v CIR, reiterating CIR v Roquesee notes below.
decide a case?
What should a court do if a case is not within its appellate It must dismiss the case (general rule) unless there is an error in raffling only (exception to
jurisdiction? the rulebecause court already has jurisdiction, but there was a wrong or incorrect raffling.)
In Mitsubishi v BOC, the SC said:

Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a
case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the
case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and
determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is
conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or
by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.
*Nota Bene:
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. An appeal under Rule
41 taken from the RTC to the CA raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues
purely of law not being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of
appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of a RTC shall be
dismissed.
25
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
When the Commission on Internal Revenue interprets a tax File a petition for review/ complaint before the Secretary of Finance, because of the Doctrine
provision in the exercise of its quasi-legislative function, if of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. CIR v CTA
you do not agree, what do you do?
What is subordinate legislation? It is the authority of administrative agencies to issue rules to carry out the general provisions
of the statute. Administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary
regulations. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Do administrative circulars also enjoy a presumption of Yes, always. They partake the nature of a stature, binding as if written in the law itself. Cawad
validity? v Abadsee notes below.
What is the difference between jurisdiction over subject The former is conferred by law, while the latter is a matter for courts to decide, being matters
matter and exercise of jurisdiction? of procedure.
What cases are within the original jurisdiction of the The Supreme Court has both original and appellate jurisdiction.
Supreme Court?
It exercises original jurisdiction (cases are directly filed with the SC in the first instance
Appellate? without passing through any of the lower courts) over:
1. cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. (Art. VIII, 5(1)).
2. writs of amparo, habeas data and the environmental writ of kalikasan.
It exercises appellate jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm final judgments,
and orders of the lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
26
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. (Art.VIII,5(1), (2))
(f) orders of Constitutional Commissions
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/aboutsc/SC%20Brief%20Overview.pdf
Can a Justice of the Supreme Court, who was investigated Yes, as was held in the case of Ret. Justice Ruben Reyes in In Re: Biraogo.
but never impeached, be disciplined by the SC?
In the case in point, why did the employees of court leak The leaking was intentional. They wanted to pre-empt the court.
the decision?
The SC penalized him and fined him P500k.
What did the court do? He was still a member of the bar, thus, the SC exercises supervision over him.
Even if the Justice was retired already, why was he
penalized?
What body has administrative supervision over judges and The Supreme Court. Thus, the SC cannot exercise administrative supervision over a
court personnel? Commissioner of Land Registration, even if the rank is the same as that of a judge. Noblejas v
Teehankee
Can administrative complaints be filed against court Yes. In Lorenzo v Lopez, the SC said:
employees even f the acts complained of are not work- We take this occasion to reiterate that judiciary personnel are held to the highest
related? standards of decorum and propriety. The conduct required of court personnel, from
the highest magistrate to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach. Any
transgression or deviation from the established norm of conduct, work-related or not,
amounts to misconduct. Employees of the judiciary should be living examples of
uprightness not only in the performance of their official duties, but also in their
personal and private dealings with other people, so as to preserve at all times the good
name and standing of courts in the community. Any act that falls short of the exacting
standards for public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the
image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced.
CAN the Civil Service Commission (CSC) properly assume No. Clearly, it is the SC that has jurisdiction to discipline members of the judiciary and
jurisdiction over administrative proceedings against a court personnel and employees regardless if the acts were committed before or after
judicial employee involving acts of dishonesty as a teacher, their employment in the judiciary. Ampong v CSC
committed prior to her appointment to the judiciary?
27
Yes. All government employees are required to present travel permits. Failure to
Can court personnel be required to obtain permit to travel secure a permit may cause one to be liable administratively. The right to travel is not
before they can go abroad? absolute.
Lest it be misunderstood, a judge or a member of the Judiciary, who is not being

restricted by a criminal court or any other agency pursuant to any statutory
limitation, can leave for abroad without permission but he or she must be prepared to
face the consequences for his or her violation of the Courts rules and regulations.
Stated otherwise, he or she should expect to be subjected to a disciplinary action. In
the past, the Court was not hesitant to impose the appropriate sanctions and penalties.
Leave Division v Heusdens
Can judges/ justices be assigned to temporary stations? Yes, as public interest may require, but the temporary assignment shall not exceed six
months without the consent of the judge concerned.
Yes. The Court held so in Pp v Pilotin

[Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a justification for
Can an accused request a change of venue? transfer of venue]
Can witnesses request a change of venue? And Pp v Sola
[Transfer or venue out of witnesses fear: It may be added that there may be cases
where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying,
but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify.]
In Pp v Judge Gacott, the SC declared:
only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be
decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious
evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary; it is only when the
penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of
P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in division.
How are members of the judiciary disqualified or dismissed
It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated
from service? Can a division of the SC dismiss a judge of Circular No. 2-89 which clarifies that:
the lower court? xxx xxx xxx A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred
in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence
28
of at least three of such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme

Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Can congress pass law exempting GOCCs from paying legal No. See GSIS cases, Supra.
fees?
Yes. Lim v CA
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution gives this Court the power to
"[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." It is within the inherent
power of the Court to suspend its own rules in particular cases in order to do
Can the SC suspend its rules in particular cases? justice.
When proper, no serious impediment bars the allowance of tardy appeals under the
Rules of Court, in recognition of this Court's inherent power to suspend adjective
rules. It is a different matter, however, when the period to appeal is provided by
statute, as in labor cases. For obvious reasons, this Court cannot ordinarily suspend
the statute's operation. x x x Nevertheless, if only to be able to dispense substantial
justice, strict observance of the period to appeal may not be exacted.
Can procedural laws diminish substantive rights? No.

In the criminal cases where the penalty is reclusion Yes.
perpetua or higher, can the SC add another step, such as Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
seeking recourse first from the CA before the SC? (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in
character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favour of the
accused.
Pp v Mateo
Can procedural laws be applied retroactively? No. Procedural rules cannot apply retroactively if it prejudices the State. Pp v Lacson
see notes below.
29
When legislative fixes computation for just compensation in Yes. Appropriations standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. Congress cannot
expropriation, is it an infringement on the rule-making legislate the manner of payment of just compensation and this is what RA 8974 (An Act to
power of the Supreme Court? Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government
Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes and its Implementing Rules and Regulations)
does.
Rep v Gingoyon
RA 8974 had amended Rule 67 in many respects.
There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act
No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate
payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of
possession, whereas in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with
an authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No.
8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the
property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or
structures using the replacement cost method.
Can we have special courts? Yes. Art VIII Sec 5(5) and Land Bank of the PH v de Leonsee notes below.
Can quasi-judicial bodies like COMELEC come up with rules No. The COMELEC rule is unconstitutional. There are rules for an appeal. Art VII Sec
that say the period of appeal to a its decision shall begin to 5(5) says that the SC has rule-making power to strike down and disapprove rules of
run after promulgation and can it declare that procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.
promulgation begins only when the extended opinions of Tan v Comelec
dissenting and/or concurring Justices are already in?
Yes. Courts have full, plenary authority to control their proceedings in order to
Can the SC regulate the conduct of demonstrations within effectuate a fair and impartial administration of justice.
the vicinity of the courts? Is there a repression of the right No repression.
to peaceably assemble for redress of grievances? In Re Valmonte
Can the Philippines alter rules of procedure to conform to Yes. Mere adjustments are not substantial. It is not an impairment of the rule-making
international treaty agreements? power of the SC.
Tanada v Angara
30
No. In Maceda v Vazquez, the SC held that such was an encroachment into the SCs power of
Can the Ombudsman investigate a judge for certifying administrative supervision over all courts.
falsely that he decided cases on time?
Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down
to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Yes. The Ombudsman is directed to refer all cases against judges and court personnel
filed before his office to the Supreme Court;
In Caoibes v OMB, the Court held that:

Regarding a fight between two judges over furniture, is the Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is
Ombudsman duty-bound to refer the matter to the SC? vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.
Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by
itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an
administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges
and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination
as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein.
xxxx
Can court personnel be disciplined for acts of immortality? Yes, as held in Adlawan v CSC.
Can judges be disciplined by divisions of the SC? Yes. In Pp v Gacott, Judge Gacott was found guilty of an administrative case. See above.
Can the COMELEC dismiss a petition for contempt against No. The COMELEC has no power to hold in contempt members of the SC.
members of the SC? Re Comelec 1st div
What are the 2 kinds of contempt? In Inonog v Judge Ibay, the SC said:
Under the Rules of Court, contempt is classified into direct and indirect. Direct
contempt, which is summary, is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward
the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer
31
as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so

(Section 1, Rule 71).
Indirect contempt, on the other hand, is not committed in the presence of the court
and can be punished only after notice and hearing (Zarate v. Balderian, 329 SCRA 558).
Undoubtedly, Judge Ibay cited the complainant for indirect contempt of court since
the subject incident transpired not in the courts presence.
No. In Garcia v Macaraig:
Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports of
Are judges allowed to engage in quasi-judicial or accomplishments and status of cases in his sala which are usually required of judges
administrative work? under existing laws as well as the corresponding circulars of the Department of Justice.
The reason is simple. He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None
of those laws and circulars apply to him for all of them contemplate judges who are
actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and others.
Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at
the practice of long standing to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of
Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of
exercising administrative authority over the courts
In Macalintal v PET, did the Court say that the SC No. The SC en banc acting as PET is not performing a nonjudicial function.
functioning as PET was a nonjudicial function?
Yes. Art VIII Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each
Does the SC have the duty to submit report to anyone? regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report
on the operations and activities of the Judiciary.
What cases are to be heard en banc? See above.

No. Such reorganization is purely an internal matter of the Court to which petitioner
certainly has no business at all.
Can a party to a case question the reorganization of the SC, Limketkai v CA
where the SC decision reversed a previous unanimous
decision after its reorganization? Melo, J.s dissent:
Because of the peculiar circumstances of the voting herein brought about by the
change in the membership of the Division, I believe that referring the case to the Court
En Banc would be most appropriate so that the other members would be consulted and
32
in order that those who had taken part in the previous deliberation thereof would not
in effect be disenfranchised.
When the SC decides in division, is the SC en ban an No. Check Firestone Ceramics below.
appellate court vis--vis the divisions?
Rule 56, Sec. 7, Rules of Court
Sec. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided.
Where the Court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be
had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is
If the opinion of the court is equally divided, how is the reached, the original action commenced in the Court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the
judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the
matter resolved?
petition or motion shall be denied.
Rule 125, Sec. 3, Rules of Court
Sec. 3. Decision if opinion is equally divided.
When the court en banc is equally divided in opinion or the necessary majority cannot be had,
the case shall be reheard, and if in rehearing no decision is reached, the judgment of
conviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the accused acquitted.
Art VII Sec 13it means that it is a collegial decision.
As held in Consing v CA:

What does the requirement under the 1987 Constitution The certification requirement, however, is a new provision introduced by the framers
that decisions must be reached in consultation mean? of the 1987 Constitution. Its purpose is to ensure the implementation of the
constitutional requirement that decisions of the Supreme Court and lower
collegiate courts, such as the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax
Appeals, are reached after consultation with the members of the court sitting en banc
or in a division before the case is assigned to a member thereof for decision-writing.
No. In Consing v CA:

The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily mean that the
case submitted for decision had not been reached in consultation before being
If the decision is decided without the certification, is the assigned to one member for the writing of the opinion of the Court since the regular
decision null and void? performance of official duty is presumed [Sec. 5 (m) of Rule 131, Rules of Court]. The
lack of certification at the end of the decision would only serve as evidence of failure
33
to observe the certification requirement and may be basis for holding the official
responsible for the omission to account therefor. Such absence of certification would
not have the effect of invalidating the decision.
In a full court, what is the minimum number of votes Majority of quorum. In a full court, there are 15 members, the quorum is 8. Thus, the
needed to decide a case? minimum number is 5.
Is abstention a vote? Yes.

If a Justice is present but silent, is that a vote? Yes, counted.
If a justice inhibits, is that a vote? Not counted.
Must the SC always have quorum for a valid decision to be Yes.
made?
To declare a law unconstitutional, how many votes are Prior to the 1987 Constitution, 2/3 of members.
needed?
Now, only a majority of those who participated in the deliberation.
In a division of 7 members, how many votes are needed to At least 4. 3 is not a quorum, not a valid decision.
make the decision valid?
In a division of 5 members, how many votes are needed to AL 3 member.
In a division of 3 members, how many votes are needed to AL 3 members. Vote must be unanimous to be a valid decision.
If the number of needed votes is not obtained, how shall be It must be referred en banc.
the case be decided?
Yes. In Oil and Natural Gas v CA, the SC said:
Memorandum decisions are those which adopt by reference the findings of facts
What are memorandum decisions? Are they allowed under and conclusions of law of inferior tribunals. In this jurisdiction, it has been held
the 1987 constitution? that memorandum decisions do not transgress the constitutional requirement in
Article VIII, Section 14, on clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the law on which
the decision is based.
Francisco v Permskul
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and
the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference. For the
34
incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the

What are the requirements for a valid memorandum facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement
decision? attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized
under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an
indispensable part of the decision.
When a court decision merely paraphrases the testimonies Yes. Pp v. Ordono

of witnesses, does it comply with section 14?
No. there must be a discussion of legal basis and evidence presented.
If the decision states that evidence is completely in Nicos v CA
accordance with law, is this a compliance with the The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and
constitutional requirement in section 14? just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party
is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should
he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark
as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable
to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
In a conviction for murder, can the court just say that the No. Without facts and law, it would be unfair to party-litigants.
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong? Is it a Pp v Viernes
compliance to Sec 14?
Under the 1987 Constitution, are minute resolutions valid? Yes. Borromeo v CA; Tayamura v IAC; Komatsu
Should all court decisions be signed by justices? No. Borromeo v CA; Tayamura v IAC
If there is a resolution of court and the resolution Yes. Resolutions comply with the constitutional requirement San Luis v CA
reiterated the previous decision, is this a compliance with
the constitutional requirement?
Can the SC dismiss cases with the reason lack of merit? Yes. Lack of merit is a legal basis. Prudential Bank v Castro
Aside from the ponencia, is it required that those who Before the 1987 Constitution, it was okay not to state the reason thereof. Now, it is
dissent/abstain must state reason for such? mandatory in the Constitution.
Under the 1987 Constitution, is the period for deciding Yes. Art VIII Sec 15.
cases mandatory? Failure to decide within the prescribed period does not divest the court of
jurisdicrtion.
35
In so far as the Sandiganbayan is concerned, what is the 3 months. In re delays in SB decisions

legal period within which it must render a decision?
De Leon, J. Dissent: The SB is a collegiate court, thus the 12-month rule should apply.
If you exceed period of constitution, should the case be No.
dismissed?
Before the 1987 constitution, was the period mandatory? No. it was merely directory. Marcelino v Cruz.
Under the 1973 constitution, was there an automatic Yes. Malacora v CA and Flora v Pajarillaga 1973 Constitution
affirmance of decision upon lapse of prescribed period to
decide? But under the 1987 C, there is no automatic affirmance anymore. Sesbreno v CA.
Can the JBC add qualifications of judged of lower courts? Yes. The JBC may determine the qualifications more than those in the constitution, those
identified in the constitution are minimum requirements. VIllanueva v JBC
In this case, the SC said:

The assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication
requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under
the Executive branch of the government. Since the JBC is a body under the supervision
of the Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication requirements of the
Administrative Code.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-
level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have
been published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all
statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement
existing laws, attain binding force and effect.
Nonetheless, the JBCs failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced the
petitioners private interest
Does the CA sit en banc? No, except when settling administrative matters.
1. Judicial Privilege, or the right of the Judiciary to confidentiality of certain information,
is implied from Judicial Power.
What is judicial privilege?
2. The rationale for Judicial Privilege, Executive Privilege, as well as Legislative Privilege, as
follows:
36
[I]nformation x x x like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts,
or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of
information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of
exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by
interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those
tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. x x x1 (Emphasis supplied)
3. Judicial Privilege refers only to matters that are part of the internal deliberations and
actions of the Court in the exercise of the(ir) adjudicatory functions and duties of
Justices. The Resolution further states that the matter must refer to the performance of
the(ir) official functions of adjudication of Justices.
4. To qualify for protection under the deliberative process privilege, the agency must show
that the document is both (1) predecisional and (2) deliberative.
5. Additionally, two other grounds may be cited for denying access to court records, as well
as preventing members of the bench, from being subjected to compulsory process: (1) the
disqualification by reason of privileged communication and (2) the pendency of an
action or matter.
In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents
None.
But in Francisco v HOR, the SC said:
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following
instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Is there a doctrinal definition of transcendental Feliciano are instructive:
importance? (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case;
(2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and
(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions being raised.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
37
people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. Such liberality
does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the
matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such
interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice
38
Case Doctrines
A nominee to the judiciary must disclose record of pending criminal charges (reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries). Concealment of the fact is tantamount to misrepresentation and erodes the candidates
competence, integrity, probity, and independence. It is not the criminal charge that is a ground for disqualification,
but the concealment of such.
The fact alone of his concealment of the two criminal cases against him (Belan) is clear proof of his lack of the said
Gutierrez v Judge Belan
qualifications and renders him unworthy to sit as a judge. The fact that respondent Judge has been acquitted
ultimately in the criminal case against him is of no moment. He is not being chastened for having had a pending
criminal case at the time of his application for a judicial position but for his act of dishonesty and misrepresentation
in the process of seeking that office.
De Castro v JBC Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or
to other appointments to the Judiciary.
In re del Castillo 1. Did the SC say there was plagiarism ? No. There was no intent to plagiarize
2. Did the SC say J. Del Castillo twisted the works of the authors? No. He made his own conclusion.
3. Did the SC find him guilty of misconduct or gross inexcusable negligence? No. It was an error/defect in MS
Word.
4. Serenos Dissent
- Tams Enforcing Erga Omnes [Lifted verbatim with no quotations]
- Criddle - Descent A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens [17 instances of copying without quotations nor footnote]
- Ellis Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime [18 paraphrased sentences without quotations]
- Motive not Required in Plagiarism
- Proof of plagiarism is text itself
- No word processor detects naman talaga.
5. Carpios Dissent
- A criminal case against Del Castillo cannot prosper because SC justices may only be removed thru impeachment
39
6. Brions Reply to Carpio

- Can only impeach when the reason is culpable violation, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, etc. etc.
- If it is just a complaint for plagiarism no need for impeachment
The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal points:

1. There was a misapplication of the "unanimity rule" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as to Jardelezas
legal strategy in handling a case for the government.
2. While Jardelezas alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading fall within the contemplation
of a "question on integrity" and would have warranted the application of the "unanimity rule," he was
not afforded due process in its application
3. The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate applications for judicial posts, exercises full discretion
on its power to recommend nominees to the President. The sui generischaracter of JBC proceedings,
however, is not a blanket authority to disregard the due process.
4. Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the JBC rules, he was neither
Jardeleza v Sereno formally informed of the questions on his integrity nor was provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare
his defense.
This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from the
violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process.
Primarily, the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity is effectively a veto power over the collective will of
a majority. This should be clarified. Any assertion by a member after voting seems to be unfair because it effectively
gives him or her a veto
The unanimity rule only comes into operation when the moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds
no application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicants moral uprightness.
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), as a body, is not required by law to hold hearings on the qualifications of the
nominees.
Unanimity of all members of the JBC is required if there is a question as to the integrity of the nominee
40
Kilosbayan v Ermita To be a Supreme Court Judge, one must be a natural-born citizen. No exceptions.
PS Bank v Senate Impeachment Court The SC held that Foreign Deposits have absolute confidentiality, except when the depositor signs a waiver/written
permission to the effect that s/he allows her/his account to be subject to inquiry.
Dissents:
Sereno: Coronas SALN did not include his Foreign Currency Deposits (FCDs). How can he claim
secrecy/confidentiality when by not including it, he denied his ownership of same. Why should the SC respect
the confidentiality if Corona does not admit ownership of the FCDs?
Carpios Dissent: FCD Act was intended only for non-resident depositors of the PH. Its purpose is to encourage
non-residents to deposit in the country. It does not apply to Filipino depositors.
MR Resolution:
Indeed, the main issue of whether the Impeachment Court acted arbitrarily when it issued the assailed subpoena
to obtain information concerning the subject foreign currency deposits notwithstanding the confidentiality of such
deposits under RA 6426 has been overtaken by events. The supervening conviction of CJ Corona on May 29, 2012,
and his execution of a waiver against the confidentiality of all his bank accounts, whether in peso or foreign
currency, has rendered the present petition moot and academic.
Nitafan v CIR (abandoning the ruling in It is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices
Perfecto v Meer and Endencia v David and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower,
that "the imposition of income tax upon it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval.
the salary of judges is a diminution
thereof, and so violates the Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of
their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the
Constitution")
government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
41
Karminn Cheryl Dinney D. Yangot The legislative power to abolish courts can be validly exercised as long as the abolition is done in good faith. There
is no violation of the security of tenure.
Removal from office should be distinguished from termination by abolition of an office. There can be no tenure to
a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant. In this sense, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. But, for the incumbents
of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal
and the abolition of the office.
Incumbents need not fear that they will not be appointed anew. In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts
De la Llana v Alba affected continue functioning as before, until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as
declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the
incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office.
Teehankee, J., dissent

The express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of judges must prevail over the implied authority to
abolish courts.
Abolition of courts a mere indirect manner of removing judges. There was no reductionthere was increase
in the number of judges, nor in the number of courts. The positions of Judges-at-Large and Cadastral Judges
were eliminated; but they were in fact substituted or replaced by other positions of judges; there was a mere
change of designation from Cadastral Judge or Judge-at-Large to district judge. Their positions had not been
abolished de facto, but actually retained with another name.
In Re 1st Indorsement of Raul Gonzales A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification
for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with
disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. During his incumbency, he cannot be charged
criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of
removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.
Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to
answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that
may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
42
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. The
rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of
the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties
who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.
PVIDC v Judge Velez A law can mandate an administrative body to decide on a certain matter first.
It does not diminish the jurisdiction of courts but only prescribes an administrative procedure for the
settlement of certain types of disputes between or among departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the National Government, including GOCCs, so that they need not always repair to the
courts for the settlement of controversies arising from the interpretation and applications of statutes,
contracts or agreements. The procedure is not much different, and no less desirable, than the arbitration
procedures.
It is an alternative to, or a substitute for, traditional litigation in court with the added advantage of avoiding
the delays, vexations and expense of court proceedings. Purpose: "the elimination of needless clogging of court
dockets to prevent the waste of time and energies not only of the government lawyers but also of the courts,
and eliminates expenses incurred in the filing and prosecution of judicial actions."
Mantruste v CA There can be a law which prohibits the issuance of injunctions against government agencies.
Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT (administrative agency), nor block, by an
injunction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the
acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.
There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency, except
when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or
without jurisdiction.
Francisco v HOR See above.

Suplico v NEDA Under the rules, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official acts
of the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further provided
in the above-quoted rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without introduction of
43
evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN
Project during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as an official act of the
executive department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without need of evidence
Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. In the absence of actual
justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where
there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make
any pronouncement.
The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or
controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is
no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts do not
sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.
Tichangco v Ennriquez Unless contrary substantial evidence is presented in the proper proceedings by the proper party, a Torrens
certificate of title cannot be overturned. The Torrens system rests on stability -- on the assurance that once
ownership is recorded in the proper registry, owners can rest easy on their properties.
Legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is
affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question
involved." Since the parcels they claim are properties of the public domain, only the government can bring an
action to nullify the TCTs.
Matibag v Benipayo See below.
TELEBAP v COMELEC Nor indeed as a corporate entity does TELEBAP have standing to assert the rights of radio and television
broadcasting companies.
Standing jus tertii will be recognized only if it can be shown that the party suing
(1) has some substantial relation to the third party, or
(2) that the third party cannot assert his constitutional right, or
(3) that the right of the third party will be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third
party's constitutional claim.
44
None of these circumstances is here present. The mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the
broadcast industry does not entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of the affected
companies.
La Bugal Blaan v Ramos Please refer to your notes.
Moldex Realty v HLURB When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or invalid, a party may raise its
unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that the regulation is being enforced. For the Court to
exercise its power of judicial review, the party assailing the regulation must show that the question of
constitutionality has been raised at the earliest opportunity. This requisite should not be taken to mean that
the question of constitutionality must be raised immediately after the execution of the state action complained
of. That the question of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow
it to be raised later. A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional, would lapse into
constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the same.
It must be emphasized that this Court does not have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions assailing the
constitutionality of a law or an administrative regulation. In Drilon v. Lim, it was clearly stated that the lower
courts also have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality at the first instance.
The general rule is that this Court shall exercise only appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation, except in circumstances where the Court believes that
resolving the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance is of paramount importance
and immediately affects the social, economic and moral well being of the people.
It is also a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law,
or an administrative regulation as in the instant case, to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the
court may raise its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until such question will be unavoidable.
In other words, the Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota of the
case.
An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and
who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The
presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to
hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case."
45
Gutierrez v HOR Comm on Justice See above

In Re: Biraogo A retired justice can be investigated because after retirement, he is still a lawyer.
Ampong v CSC Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the SC regardless of whether the offense was
committed before/after employment in the judiciary.
It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under the Constitution
and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality
of the government, and GOCCs.
However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative supervision
over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee
the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, rules and regulations.
Indeed, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the OCA.
But in this case, the SC was constrained to uphold the ruling of the CSC based on the principle of estoppel. The
previous actions of petitioner have estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC.
Baguio Market Vendors v Judge Cabato- A credit cooperative organized under the Cooperative Code cannot claim exemption from payment of legal
Cortes fees, as stated in said Code.
Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vested on the SC the "power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." However, these constitutions
also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to "repeal, alter or supplement" such rules.
The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by deleting in
Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective power. The Court to observed in Echegaray v.
SOJ that this Courts power to promulgate judicial rules "is no longer shared by this Court with Congress."
[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the
46
safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules is now the Courts
exclusive domain.
Echegaray v SOJ "the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the
judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has
become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.lxviii There is a difference between the
jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former
continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter
terminates when the judgment becomes final.lxviii x x x For after the judgment has become final facts and
circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.
Ret Judge Garcia v OMB Miro Rules do not preclude the OMB from taking cognizance of criminal cases against judges even if the
(Caoibes and Fuentes not applicable: administrative aspect has been duly endorsed to the SC.
the two cases involve the performance of
administrative and professional duties of the Supervision over all inferior courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA to the lowest
judges that were involved. Caoibes concerns the ranked court employee, is vested by the Constitution in the SC. However, that prerogative only extends to
judges dealings with his fellow member of the administrative supervision. As such, the OMB cannot encroach upon this Courts task to oversee judges and
Bench, while Fuentes touches on the acts of a court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the
judge in the exercise of his official functions, laws of the land.
particularly the issuance of a writ of execution.)
To reiterate, the case filed against petitioner before the MCTC is a criminal case under its own jurisdiction as
prescribed by law and not an administrative case. To be sure, trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal
aspect of offenses committed by judges of the lower courts.
Tayamura v IAC The SC clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts
and law on which it is based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the
constitutional provision which states that, No petition for review shall be refused due course without stating
the legal basis therefor.
When the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or
motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no
reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the
resolution, there is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
47
Nunal v COA In this case, the assailed "Resolution" was not a "Decision" within the meaning of the Constitutional requirement.
This mandate (Art VII Sec 14) is applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after
the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be. It is not applicable to an Order or
Resolution refusing due course to a Petition for Certiorari. In the second place, the assailed Resolution does state
the legal basis for the dismissal of the Petition and thus complies with the Constitutional provision.
Marcelino v Judge Cruz (+), 1983 The period to resolve a case from date of submission is not mandatory.
(reiterated in De Roma v CA) To date, no authoritative interpretation of the above-quoted provision has been rendered by this Court. The
established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory, unless by express
Section 11 [1], Article X of the New provision or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest."
Constitution provides in full, to wit:
o SEC. 11 [1]. Upon the effectivity of this The phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls within the exception rather than the general
Constitution, the maximum period rule. By the phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme Court," it is evident that the period prescribed therein is
within which a case or matter shall be subject to modification by this Court in accordance with its prerogative under Section 5[5] of Article X of the
decided or resolved from the date of its New Constitution."
submission, shall be eighteen months for Constitutional provisions are directory, and not mandatory, where they refer to matters merely procedural.
the Supreme court, and, unless reduced
by the Supreme Court, twelve months The Court had at various times, upon proper application and for meritorious reasons, allowed judges of inferior
for all inferior collegiate courts, and courts additional time beyond the three-month period within which to decide cases submitted to them. The
three months for all other inferior
reason is that a departure from said provision would result in less injury to the general public than would its
courts.
strict application. To hold that non-compliance by the courts with the aforesaid provision would result in loss
of jurisdiction, would make the courts, through which conflicts are resolved, the very instruments to foster
unresolved causes by reason merely of having failed to render a decision within the allotted term. Such an
Not the prevailing jurisprudence, absurd situation could not have been intended by the framers of our fundamental law.
overturned by the 1987 Constitution
Courts are not divested of their jurisdiction for failure to decide a case within the ninety-day period, BUT, for
the guidance of the judges manning our courts, that cases pending before their salas must be decided within
the aforementioned period. Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction
against the defaulting judge.
Malacora v CA, 1982 De Castro, J. Ponencia
The provision of Article X, Section 11 of the Constitution, is mandatory and should have been complied with
Article X of the 1973 Constitution immediately after the effectivity of the New Constitution. This has always been my position, basically, on the
Section 11. (1) XX XXX XXX XX legal principle that all provisions of the Constitution which direct specific acts to be done, or prohibit certain
(2) With respect to the Supreme Court and acts to be done, should be construed as mandatory. To construe them as merely directory would be to thwart
other collegiate appellate courts, when the the intention of the Constitution.
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applicable maximum period shall have

lapsed without the rendition of the The manifest purpose of the provision is to avoid delay in the disposition of cases, which always is a cause of
corresponding decision or resolution injustice, under the familiar aphorism that "justice delayed is justice denied." Paragraph 2 of Section 11
because the necessary vote cannot be had, requires for the appealed decision to be deemed affirmed and original special civil actions, dismissed, is that
the judgment, order, or resolution appealed the applicable maximum period has lapsed without the decision of the merits being rendered, because of failure
from shall be deemed affirmed except in to act on the case and put it to a vote, not that it was put to a vote, but "the necessary vote could not be had."
those cases where a qualified majority is
This phrase would thus appear to be either a mere surplusage or as merely descriptive of how a decision is
required and in appeals from judgment of
conviction in criminal cases, and in original reached in the Supreme Court, where alone that phrase has application. It cannot apply to the Court of Appeals,
special civil action and proceedings for because there the necessary votes can always be had for a decision to be reached, just like in the one-man Court
habeas corpus, the petition in such cases of First Instance, as long as the Court acts.
shall be deemed dismissed; and a
certification to this effect signed by the Chief The automatic affirmance of the appealed provision in case of failure to decide or resolve within the time limit
Magistrate of the Court shall be issued and a is precisely the alternative prescription, believed to better serve the cause of justice than waiting for a decision
copy thereof attached to the record of the on the merit.
case
Under Section 2 of Article X , eight (8) votes are required for a decision of the Court en banc, five (5) votes, for
Not the prevailing jurisprudence, a decision of a Division. If the necessary vote is not obtained, the petition is dismissed, and the appealed
overturned by the 1987 Constitution decision, order or resolution is then deemed affirmed. This is what happens when this Court acts on the case
within the period fixed in Section 11 of Article X, but fails to obtain the necessary vote.
From this observation, it becomes apparent that to hold the provision of Section 11 of Article X of the
Constitution as only directory would make said provision serve no purpose at all, because notwithstanding the
lapse of the applicable maximum period without a decision or resolution having been rendered, the case may
nevertheless still be decided on the merit, as if the provision did not exist. Only by holding that Section 11 is of
mandatory character would such an absurdity be avoided.
Aquino, J. Separate Concurring Opinion:

In my opinion, it is impossible for this Court to comply with the eighteen-month period because of the thousand
of judicial, administrative and disbarment cases pending decision. Since the Constitution took effect on January
17, 1973, this Court has never complied with the eighteen-month period.
Some Justices consider that provision directory. There is an opinion that the judgment or order' under appeal
is deemed affirmed after the expiration of the 18-month period only when there is a showing that "the
necessary note cannot be had". In the absence of such a showing, the automatic affirmance of the judgment or
order under appeal not take place.
49
Flora v Judge Pajarillaga Because this was a labor case that has been pending for more than fifteen years, the SC held that any doubt as to
the tenability of counsels contention should be resolved in favor of the appellee-laborer.
The SC considered it to be within the spirit of Section 11(2) of Article X of the Constitution of the Philippines that
should there be any uncertainty in the mind of the court for more than eighteen months after an appeal is
submitted to it for decision, regarding the merits thereof, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed, without
even the need of reasoning out such affirmance, as an exception to the general requirement of Section 9 of the
same Article that every decision of a court of record should state the facts and the law on which it is based.
Javellana v DILG Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No.
90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent.
Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on
the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules
of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the
private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.
On discrimination
Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all
provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides
that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools expect
during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the
professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.
LBP v de Leon A petition for review is the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
In accordance with the SCs constitutional power to review rules of procedure of special courts, the Decision in
the instant case actually lays down a rule of procedure, specifically, a rule on the proper mode of appeal from
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, rules
of procedure shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. In determining whether a rule of
procedure affects substantive rights, the test is laid down in Fabian vs. Desierto,16 which provides that:
[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts,
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is,
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule
50
creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. (italics supplied)
This decision declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal from judgments of Special Agrarian
Courts, is a rule of procedure which affects substantive rights.
Lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to
perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs
the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]).
White Light Corp v Manilaoverbreadth Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth
and 3rd-party standing doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of
transcendental importance. (citing Domingo v Carague and Macasiano v NHA).
Montesclaros v Comelec A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes
no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or
duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be
in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot
be exercised in vacuo.
Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.
Del Mar v PAGCOR A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation. In essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of
illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or where
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.
Be that as it may, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of
overarching significance to our society, we find and so hold that as members of the House of Representatives,
petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions at bar
Philconsa v Enriquez Members of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, have the legal standing to question
the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
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Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the President by the
Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises.
Cruz v DENR Mendoza, J. Separate Opinion, for Dismissal

This suit was instituted to determine the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No. 8371/IPRA. Petitioners
do not complain of any injury as a result of the application of the statute to them. They assert a right to seek an
adjudication of constitutional questions as citizens and taxpayers, upon the plea that the questions raised are of
"transcendental importance."
Judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or controversies without upsetting
the balance of power among the three branches of the government and erecting the judiciary with power not only
to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them. Yet that is exactly what we would be permitting in this case were
we to assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of the IPRA contrary to the established
rule that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional.
Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face. The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is
allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine
permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is not unconstitutional but it
might be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.
Invalidation of the statute "on its face" rather than "as applied" is permitted in the interest of preventing a
"chilling" effect on freedom of expression. But in other cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is
unconstitutional, courts will decree only partial invalidity unless the invalid portion is so far inseparable from the
rest of the statute that a declaration of partial invalidity is not possible
Vitug, J. Separate Opinion, to Grant

A cardinal requirement, is that one who invokes the Courts adjudication must have a personal and substantial
interest in the dispute; indeed, the developing trend would require a logical nexus between the status asserted
and the claim sought to be adjudicated in order to ensure that one is the proper and appropriate party to
invoke judicial power.
The rule requires a party to aptly show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that
can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant his invocation of the Courts jurisdiction and to render
legally feasible the exercise of the Courts remedial powers in his behalf.
52
Where a most compelling reason exits, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance and
paramount interest to the nation, the Court must take the liberal approach that recognizes the legal standing
of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as citizens and taxpayers, to raise constitutional issues that affect them.
Kapunan, J. Separate Opinion, to Grant

Petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, have the requisite standing to raise the constitutional questions herein.
In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, he has sustained, or will sustain, a direct injury
as a result of its enforcement.

Evidently, the rights asserted by petitioners as citizens and taxpayers are held in common by all the citizens,
the violation of which may result only in a "generalized grievance".
This Court has recognized that a "public right," or that which belongs to the people at large, may also be the
subject of an actual case or controversy. In Severino, we ruled that a private citizen may enforce a "public
right" in behalf of other citizens.
Petitioners, as citizens, possess the "public right" to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated and
diminished in violation of the Constitution.T he preservation of the integrity and inviolability of the national
patrimony is a proper subject of a citizens suit.
The taxpayer has paid his taxes and contributed to the public coffers and, thus, may inquire into the manner
by which the proceeds of his taxes are spent. The IPRA appropriates funds as indicated in its title: "An Act to
Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes." Thus, the IPRA is a valid subject of a taxpayers suit.
Estarija v Ranada Unequivocally, the law requires that the question of constitutionality of a statute must be raised at the earliest
opportunity. In Matibag v. Benipayo, we held that the earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to
The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, if it was not raised in
recommendatory. His office was given teeth to the pleadings before a competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered in the trial,
render this constitutional body not merely it cannot be considered on appeal.
functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that
under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman has the In this case, petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 in his motion for the
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans decision. Verily, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain
53
constitutional power to directly remove from questions on the constitutionality of a law. Thus, when petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep.
government service an erring public official Act No. 6770 before the Court of Appeals, which is the competent court, the constitutional question was raised
other than a member of Congress and the at the earliest opportune time. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the
Judiciary. time when a constitutional issue may be passed upon.
Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual controversy directly involving petitioner who is personally
aggrieved that the labor tribunals and the CA computed his monetary award based on the salary period of three
months only as provided under the subject clause.
Serrano v Gallant Maritime Svc The requirement that a constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity entails the interposition of
constitutionality of last sentence of sec 10 the issue in the pleadings before a competent court, such that, if the issue is not raised in the pleadings before
RA 8042,raised for the 1st time in the nlrc; that competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be
considered on appeal.
nlrc not a quasi-judicial body and has no
jurisdiction to rule on the
The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely performs a quasi-judicial function .
constitutionality of the law.
The CA, on the other hand, is vested with the power of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional
a law or a provision thereof, such as the subject clause.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality,
recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would
be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of
prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be
more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Courts solemn duty to strike
down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor
committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities.
Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor.
Pp v Lacson The Issue as to the Application of the Time-bar under Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Whether Prospective or Retroactive
54
The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused.
It must be noted that the new rule was approved by the Court not only to reinforce the constitutional right of
the accused to a speedy disposition of the case. The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to
excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State
and the accused; not for the accused only.
The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or
insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice.
Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a statute.
The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the
Constitution. This constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter alia, to determine
whether to give the said rules prospective or retroactive effect.
It would be a denial of the States right to due process and a travesty of justice for the Court to apply the new
rule retroactively in the present case as the respondent insists.
Ynares-Santiago, Dissenting Opinion

I submit that the new rule should be made retroactive. This interpretation is in line with simple justice.
Procedural laws, by definition, prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress.
They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to criminal law, procedural law as
distinguished from substantive law is that which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a
crime is to be punished.
No vested right may attach to nor arise from procedural laws. This is a principle that we have enunciated in a
long line of cases. A person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to insist that it shall remain
unchanged for his benefit.
Firestone Ceramics v CA The SC en banc is not an appellate court vis--vis its divisions.
Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989, as amended by the Resolution of November 18,
1993: xxx, the following are considered en banc cases:
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1.....Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive

agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question;
2.....Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;
3.....Cases raising novel questions of law;
4.....Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
5.....Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission, Commission
on Elections, and Commission on Audit;
6.....Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the
judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than
one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;
7.....Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed;
8.....Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit
the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the
court en banc; and
9.....All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of
sufficient importance to merit its attention.
The Supreme Court by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is.
It is the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other
courts should take their bearings. Consequently, we cannot and should not review a case already passed upon by
the Highest Tribunal. It is only proper to allow the case to take its rest.
Komatsu v CA Minute resolutions are valid. Resolutions are not decisions within the above constitutional requirements; they
merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so
understood it; and the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Courts denial since, for one thing, the facts and the
law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals decision.
This was reiterated in Que vs. People, et al.,vi and further clarified in Munal vs. Commission on Audit, et al.vii that
the constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course and after the
filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due course, with the
resolution therefore stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and
subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or
56
there is no reversible error in the respondent courts decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.
Sinsuat v Judge HidalgoTROs on There are three ways by which administrative proceedings against judges may be instituted:
national government infra (1) motu proprio by the Supreme Court;
(2) upon verified complaint with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged
therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or
(3) upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
Daabay v Coca-Cola A party who has not appealed from a decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court
other than what he had obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal.
A party who did not appeal cannot assign such errors as are designed to have the judgment modified. All that
he can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors or to argue on issues raised below only for the purpose of
sustaining the judgment in his favor.
Due process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did not appeal.
Granting that such motion to reconsider was filed with the NLRC, the labor tribunal shall first be given the
opportunity to review its findings and rulings on the issue of the legality of Daabays dismissal, and then correct
them should it find that it erred in its disposition. The Court cannot, by this petition, pre-empt the action
which the NLRC, and the CA in case of an appeal, may take on the matter.
Agribiotech v Greenpeace BT Talong MR:

There was no permissible benefit.
There was no reason act of the petition for a writ of kalikasan on the merits. Paramount interest to
the public should not have been applied in the first place.
2 factors to consider if the case is capable of repetition yet evading review:
1. The challenged action was in duration too short to be litigated prior to cessation/ expiration.
2. Reasonable expectation that same projects be subjected to the same action.
These two factors were not present.
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Was the duration too short? No. The biosafety permits were issued in 2010, and were questioned only
after two years.
Because of the change in regulation, the situation complained of is no longer susceptible to repetition.
What is the difference of this case to the Pork Barrel Case? Thus case no frequent and routinary nature
whereas the PB Case has.
Applied food v CIRfiling of tax credit Well-settled is the rule that the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter may, at any time, be raised by the
parties or considered by the Court motu proprio. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the CTA over petitioners appeal
may still be considered and determined by this Court.
Without a decision of the CIR, the CTA, as a court of special jurisdiction, has no jurisdiction to entertain claims for
the refund or credit of creditable input tax. "The charter of the CTA also expressly provides that if the
Commissioner fails to decide within "a specific period" required by law, such "inaction shall be deemed a denial"
of the application for tax refund or credit. It is the Commissioners decision, or inaction "deemed a denial," that
the taxpayer can take to the CTA for review. Without a decision or an "inaction x x x deemed a denial" of the
Commissioner, the CTA has no jurisdiction over a petition for review."
Marina v COA The judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, and the Office of the
Ombudsman are granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution. The fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the
Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy Group is an aspect of the members independence guaranteed by the
Constitution. Their independence is a necessary component for their existence and survival in our form of
government.
As this court held in Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased
by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, real fiscal autonomy covers the grant to the
Judiciary of the authority to use and dispose of its funds and properties at will, free from any outside
control or interference. This includes the judgment to use its funds to provide additional allowances and
benefits to its officials and employees deemed to be necessary and relevant in the performance of their
functions in the office. Due to the nature of the functions of the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy Group and
the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy, an issuance by the Department of Budget and Management or any
other agency of the government is not necessary to exclude an allowance or benefit from the standardized
salary.
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Re COA..Retired Justices The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction, as
enumerated in Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution, or from passing a law that undermines the security of
tenure of the members of the judiciary. The Constitution also mandates that the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy, and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel.
While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is
unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy
amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its
primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that purpose.
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the
Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they
extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Courts granted
power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
In Re Save the Supreme Court One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial review is the existence of an actual
controversy. This means that there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.
For this court to rule on constitutional issues, there must first be a justiciable controversy. Pleadings before
this court must show a violation of an existing legal right or a controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination.
In the concurring opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa:

Basic in litigation raising constitutional issues is the requirement that there must be an actual case or
controversy. This Court cannot render an advisory opinion. We assume that the Constitution binds all other
constitutional departments, instrumentalities, and organs.
This court is not empowered to review proposed bills because a bill is not a law.
This court has explained that the filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is not subject
to judicial restraint[.] A proposed bill produces no legal effects until it is passed into law. Under the
Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the constitutionality or
59
unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or issues
that are not ripe for judicial determination.
The judiciary is the weakest branch of government. It is true that courts have power to declare what law is
given a set of facts, but it does not have an army to enforce its writs. Courts do not have the power of the purse.
Except for a constitutional provision that requires that the budget of the judiciary should not go below the
appropriation for the previous year, it is beholden to the Congress depending on how low the budget is.
ICMC v Calleja It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by
the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and
affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to
accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . . .
or other officer acting under his direction.
Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to
embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in
such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not
embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international
character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the
host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these
instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international
organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country
to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their
functions.
ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights, which
are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, 14 Article III, Section 8, 15 and Article XIII, Section 3 (supra), of the
1987 Constitution; and implemented by Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code, 16 relied on by the BLR
Director and by Kapisanan.
60
Cawad v Abad The issuance and enforcement by the Secretaries of the DBM, CSC and DOH of the questioned joint circulars
were done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative and administrative functions. It was in the nature of
subordinate legislation, promulgated by them in their exercise of delegated power.
Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and
regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of powers from the
separation of the branches of the government.
Indeed, publication, as a basic postulate of procedural due process, is required by law in order for
administrative rules and regulations to be effective.
These regulations need not be published for they add nothing to the law and do not affect substantial rights of
any person.
On the other hand, Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 cannot be considered as administrative regulations because
they do not: (a) implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or
explain existing statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain the existence of
certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends.
Administrative regulations, such as the DBM-DOH Joint Circular herein, enacted by administrative agencies to
implement and interpret the law they are entrusted to enforce are entitled to great respect. They partake of
the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such,
administrative regulations have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of legality. Unless and
until they are overcome by sufficient evidence showing that they exceeded the bounds of the law, their validity
and legality must be upheld.
Re Clearance Pendency CSC Section 6,2 Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) exclusively vests in the Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. As such, it oversees the court personnels
compliance with all laws and takes the proper administrative action against them for any violation thereof. As
an adjunct thereto, it keeps in its custody records pertaining to the administrative cases of retiring court
personnel.
In view of the foregoing, the Court rules that the subject provision which requires retiring government
employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from, among
others, the CSC should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary.
61
To deem it otherwise would disregard the Courts constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative

supervision over its personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior
clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which makes the CSC
clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154.
It must, however, be noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary administrative supervision
over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance requirement obtains with respect to criminal
cases. As such, a clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate
government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the
ambit of the Judiciarys power of administrative supervision.
62

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Judiciary Aid Karminn Cheryl Dinney D.

Grounds for impeachment

Judicial and Bar Council

Supreme Court en banc as PET

Composition of the Supreme Court

The Philippine Legislature, by enacting that portion of section 138 of the

No. No temporary composition of the Supreme Court is authorized by the constitution.

No, but it is the concealment or lack of full disclosure (tantamount to

Can one file a disbarment case against a sitting Justice of

Can Congress amend the Rules of Court? No. Congress cannot.

Does the judiciary have a say in the enforcement of its

No. Only the SC can.

In Republic v Garcia, the SC pronounced:

No. Congress cannot increase the Courts appellate jurisdiction.

No. In Felipe v Leuterio, the SC said:

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

In Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court summarized the

Advocates for Truth in Lending and Olaguer v BSP MB

Yes. In Kabataan Party-List et al v COMELEC, the Court said:

In Powers v. Ohio, the US SC wrote that:

*NOTE: If the 2nd criterion is missing, is it okay?

Southern Hemisphere, et al. v Anti-Terrorism Council

In Atty.-Gen. Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, did the The SC held:

In West Tower Condominium Corp. v FPIC, the SC declared:

In Hontiveros-Baraquel v TRB, the SC said:

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order to

In Kabataan Party-List, et al v Comelec, the SC ruled:

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the

In Dynamic Builders v Presbitero:

Case in point: Gutierrez v HOR Cmmm on Justice

The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is

As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, promulgation means "the

Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understoodthat

Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution,

Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political

Section 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court

If the Ombudsman investigates a government official, can courts issue an in junction?

supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies

No. and no. The SC ruled:

The determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a road

The Court pronounced:

*Nota Bene: Mantruste may have been rendered ineffective by Carpio-Morales v CA

*See notes below.

In Mitsubishi v BOC, the SC said:

Lest it be misunderstood, a judge or a member of the Judiciary, who is not being

Yes. The Court held so in Pp v Pilotin

of at least three of such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme

Can procedural laws diminish substantive rights? No.

In Caoibes v OMB, the Court held that:

as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so

What cases are to be heard en banc? See above.

Art VII Sec 13it means that it is a collegial decision.

As held in Consing v CA:

No. In Consing v CA:

Is abstention a vote? Yes.

incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the

When a court decision merely paraphrases the testimonies Yes. Pp v. Ordono

In so far as the Sandiganbayan is concerned, what is the 3 months. In re delays in SB decisions

In this case, the SC said:

6. Brions Reply to Carpio

The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal points:

Teehankee, J., dissent

Francisco v HOR See above.

Gutierrez v HOR Comm on Justice See above