Political and International Law J. Bersamin Digest

2017 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
Executive Committee
Chairperson: Bandiola, Dawna Fya O.
Vice Chairperson for Academics: Najarro Jr., Violeta M.
Vice Chairperson for Academic Operations: Matibag, Kevin Christian S.
Vice Chairperson for Hotel Operations: Galvez, Ma. Johara G.
Executive Chairperson for Hotel Operations: Cancio, Ryan John C.
Vice Chairperson for Finance: Cuadra, Luis Alfonso L.
Vice Chairperson for Secretariat: Del Rosario, Janine Gabrielle A.
Vice Chairperson for Communications: Arriba, Edward Vange P.
Vice Chairperson for Recruitment and Membership: Santiago, Martin Kevin P.
Vice Chairperson for Electronic and Data Processing: Arbiol, Christian Adrianne M.
CONTENT AND LAY-OUT EDITORS
Christian Arbiol Franchezka Celis
Nikki Tuble Lois Suavillo
John Bitong
San Beda College Alabang School of Law Administration
ATTY. Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III

Dean and Adviser
ATTY. Anna Marie Melanie B. Trinidad

Vice Dean
ATTY. Carlo D. Busmente

Prefect of Student Affairs and Adviser
Centralized Bar Operations Advisers
ATTY. Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III
Dean and Adviser
ATTY. Carlo D. Busmente

Prefect of Student Affairs and Adviser
Centralized Bar Operations Core Group

Dawna Fya O. Bandiola Emmanuel Josef Javellanos
Kevin Christian S. Matibag Luis Alfonso L. Cuadra
Annabel F. Hernandez Edward Vange P. Arriba
Violeta M. Najarro Jr. Giulia Ingrid C. Calub
Ma. Terresa M. Marco Martin Kevin P. Santiago
Ma. Johara G. Galvez Rodel Jr. R. Cadorniga
Ryan John C. Cancio Janine Gabrielle A. del Rosario
Kristine C. Mirabueno Jemmarie Q. Pascua
Christian Adrianne M. Arbiol John Eli Zuriel d.V. Bitong
Nikki Angeli LB Tuble Mariane L. Hernandez
Marryl Ann G. Ragpala Juan Paolo N. Tamonte
Political Law Team
Subject Head: ABUNALES, Hanna Juvenil M.
Asst. Subject Head: SANTIAGO, Nemei S.
Members: BUSTAMANTE, Dulce S.
COMON, John Cedric M.
DELMO, Marx Nicholai C.
EVIDENTE, Fiel Aldous A.
FRIAS, Ma. Jia Denise M.
GARCIA-NATIVIDAD, Kris Dianne D.
LOPEZ, Catherine O.
PILLAR, Joshua Gericko A.
ROXAS, John Nikko E.

POLITICAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Laws and Decrees enacted before the 1987 Constitution still enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality. However, if its provisions go against due process and equal protection in
relation to the new constitution and subsequent laws, such provisions must be declared invalid.
(RAMA vs. HON. MOISES, G.R. No. 197146, December 6, 2016).
Locus standi, or legal standing, provides that the real party in interest must prosecute the
action, for he/she will be the one to stand benefited or injured by the judgment on the case.
However, if the matter is of transcendental importance, then the court may still exercise
jurisdiction on the case even if it the case was not filed for by a real party in interest (BIRAOGO
vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, G.R. No. 192935 and 193306, December 7, 2010).
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and
repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original,
sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The
grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative
body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. ... In fine, except as limited
by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and
extends to matters of general concern or common interest (LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056, February 15, 2011).
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation

made by law. A violation of this constitutional edict warrants the disallowance of the payment.
However, the refund of the disallowed payment of benefits granted by law to a covered person,
agency or office of the Government may be barred by the good faith of the approving official
and of the recipient (NAZARETH vs. COA, G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013).
Subject Head: ABUNALES, Hanna Juvenil M., Asst. Subject Head: SANTIAGO, Nemei S., Members: BUSTAMANTE,
Dulce S., COMON, John Cedric M., DELMO, Marx Nicholai C., EVIDENTE, Fiel Aldous A., FRIAS, Ma. Jia Denise M.,
GARCIA-NATIVIDAD, Kris Dianne D., LOPEZ, Catherine O., PILLAR, Joshua Gericko A., ROXAS, John Nikko E.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Under the Faithful Execution Clause of the Constitution, the President has the power to
take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law. The mandate is self-executory
by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the other
executive functions. It is best construed as an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power
(OCAMPO vs. ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 225973. November 8, 2016).
A case involving the validity of the termination of employment of an officer or employee

of the Civil Service is under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission not the RTC. (Buenaflor
vs. Ramirez, GR 201607, February 15, 2017)
The Constitutional Prohibition against appointments two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term or Midnight Appointments does not
apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the
Judiciary. (DE CASTRO vs. JBC & GMA, G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010).
Although executive discretion and flexibility are necessary in the execution of the
budget, any transfer of appropriated funds should conform to Section 25 (5), Article VI of the
Constitution:
1. There is a law authorizing the President. . . to transfer funds within their respective offices;
2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective
offices;
3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices. (ARAULLO vs. AQUINO, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014).
Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a
vote by the Senate or by Congress. (Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines vs.
Ochoa, G.R. No. 204605, July 19, 2016).
Determination of probable cause is an executive function which rests solely on the sound
discretion of the prosecutor. It may only be countered by the judiciary through appeal via Rule
65 on grounds of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not via
Rule 43. (CATERPILLAR vs.. SAMSON, G.R. No. 205972, November 9, 2016).
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
The exercise of the power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by
rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the
Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and
wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of
the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of
certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion (GMA vs. PEOPLE, G.R. Nos.
220598 & 220953, July 19, 2016).
2 San Beda College Alabang School of Law

2017 Centralized Bar Operations
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty
and responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which
are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law. The Court has accorded not only respect
but also finality to their findings especially when their decisions are not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion (TESDA vs. COA, G.R. No. 196418.
February 10, 2015).
The Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions are prohibited from holding
any other office or employment during their tenure, even in an ex officio capacity. (FUNA vs.
ALBERTO, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014).
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Assets or properties, to be considered as ill-gotten wealth, must be shown to have

originated from the Government itself, and should have been taken by former President Marcos,
the members of his immediate family, relatives, close subordinates and close associates by
illegal means. That one served as a government official or employee during the Marcos
administration did not immediately make her a close subordinate or close associate of former
President Marcos (REPUBLIC vs. BAKUNAWA, G.R. No. 180418, August 28, 2013).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
There can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of

the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is
made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owner (SPS.
YUSAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 156684. April 6, 2011).
If property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value, to be
computed from the time of taking up to the time when compensation is paid or deposited with
the court. However, interest is to be imposed on the just compensation only in case of delay in its
payment. (APO FRUITS CORPORATION vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 164195,
October 12, 2010).
In expropriation proceedings, the expropriator who has taken possession of the subject
property is obliged to pay reasonable compensation to the landowner for the period of such
possession although the proceedings had been discontinued. (NAPOCOR vs. HEIRS OF
SATURNINO, G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015).
The original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation under Republic Act
No. 6657 pertains to the RTC as a Special Agrarian Court (LANDBANK vs. SUNTAY, G.R. No.
188376, December 14, 2011).
When the property owner rejects the offer but hints for a better price, the government
should renegotiate by calling the property owner to a conference. The government must
exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain by agreement the land it desires. Its failure to comply will
warrant the dismissal of the complaint (CITY OF MANILA vs. ALEGAR CORPORATION, G.R. No.
187604, June 25, 2012).
Just compensation must be based on value of property prevailing at the time the parties
entered into a compromise agreement. (EPZA vs. PULIDO, G.R. No. 188995, August 2011).
The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs
from the action for damages. The prescriptive period under RA 6395 is applicable only to actions
for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation. (NAPOCOR vs.
HEIRS OF SANGKAY, G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011).
ARTICLE III: BILL OF RIGHTS
A judge who acted as the public prosecutor in the same case before he was appointed
to the bench may NOT hear and decide the same case for 'the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge' is the indispensable imperative of due process. (Lai vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
175999, July 1, 2015).
The delegation to LGUs of the legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations
reflected the desire of Congress to leave to the cities themselves the task of confronting the
problem of traffic congestions associated with development and progress because they were
directly familiar with the situations in their respective jurisdictions. (Legaspi vs. City Of Cebu, G.R.
No. 159110, December 10, 2013).
The constitutional right to equal protection does not require universal application of laws
to all persons or things without distinction. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another. (MOSQUEDA vs. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS, G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016).
The Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a persons poverty, a
condition that only a natural person can suffer. The Courts cannot grant the same exemption
from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants to foundations and associations, even if
the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people. (RE: GOOD SHEPHERD
FOUNDATION, INC, A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, August 19, 2009).
The constitutional guarantee to information does not open every door to any and all
information, but is rather confined to matters of public concern. It is subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. The State's policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions
involving public interest, and is tempered by reasonable conditions prescribed by law (Sereno
vs. Committee on Trade and Related Matters (CTRM) of NEDA, G.R. No. 175210, February 1,
2016).

The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended as a
restraint against the Government and its agents tasked with law enforcement. It does not
extend to acts committed by private individuals. (SESBRENO vs. CA, G.R. No. 160689. March 26,
2014).
A stop-and-frisk practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer
(ROMINES V. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 182010. August 25, 2010).
Government employees cannot expect privacy of information stored in government

issued computers which must be used for official business only. No right to privacy may arise
therefrom. A search thereof conducted in pursuance of administrative investigation is not
unreasonable and therefore not violative of the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures (APOLLO vs. CONSTANTINO- DAVID, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011).
The first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal. For even if the commission of the crime can be established, without competent proof
of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can be no conviction. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WAGAS, G.R. No. 157943, September 2013).
The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused's
propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of
bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial. Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III
of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution. (ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 213847, August 18,
2015).
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. (People of the
Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 188165. December 11, 2013).
ELECTION LAW
Every government agencys jurisdiction must always be exercised within the bounds and
limits stated for by its charter or law. Resolutions issued by such shall be invalidated if its cause is
outside the scope of the agreement entered into, or is not within the limits provided for by the
law (CAPALLA vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201112, June 30, 2012).

The Rules of Court yields to the substantive law in determining jurisdiction. The jurisdiction
over election contests involving elective municipal officials has been vested in the RTC by BP 881
or the Omnibus Election Code. On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC only spelled out the
manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction by specifying the proper
venue where such cases may be filed and heard. (GOMEZ-CASTILLO vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
187231, June 22, 2010).
Public works as used in Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code is construed to refer
to any building or structure on land or to structures (such as roads or dams) built by the
Government for public use and paid for by public funds. (GUZMAN vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
182380, August 28, 2009).
Once the term of office contested expires, the Election Protest becomes moot and
academic. (Roxas v. Binay, P.E.T. No. 004 (Resolution), August 16, 2017).
The COMELEC is given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that
would insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created to promote
free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of the means by the COMELEC should not be
interfered with, unless the means were clearly illegal or the choice constituted grave abuse of
discretion. (Tolentino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187958, April 7, 2010).
If the IRRs are shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were
authorized to be issued, they must be held to be invalid and should be struck down (CIBAC vs.
COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010).
The existence of a valid certificate of candidacy is a condition sine qua non for a valid
substitution. A declaration of disqualification renders a certificate of candidacy invalid; hence,
such candidate is not a valid candidate to be properly substituted. (Talaga vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 196804, October 9, 2012).
Petitions for pre-proclamation controversies fail in absence of any clear showing or proof
that election returns contain material defect; appears to be tampered with, falsified, or
prepared under duress; or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the
difference of which affects the result of the election (SUHURI vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181869,
October 2, 2009).
An appeal should be perfected within the brief span of 5 days from notice of the
decision of the trial court, together with the payment of appeal fees within such period
otherwise, his appeal risks dismissal. (DUCO vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 183366, August 19, 2009).
The court shall summarily dismiss an election protest if the petition is insufficient in form
and content. Failure to state thetotal number of precincts in the municipality warrants the
dismissal of the election protest. (Lloren vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196355, September 18, 2012).

A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an
election protest may not directly assail the order in the SC through a special civil action
for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the
decision of the Division in due course. (CAGAS vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012).
An electoral candidates continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of another country

through using his foreign passport after the renunciation of his foreign citizenship reverts him to his
earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion disqualifies him from being elected to public office
in the Philippines pursuant to Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code. (Agustin vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PUBLIC OFFICERS
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested

in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable
compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts (LIMKAICHONG vs. LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 158464, August 02, 2016).
Administrative agencies granted quasi-legislative functions may craft rules and

regulations, within the bounds of its mandate, in order to implement the purpose for which it was
created (PCSD vs. LIM, G.R. No. 183173, August 24, 2016).
The next-in-rank status of a government employee is not a guarantee to one's fitness to

the position aspired for, and the applicant must go through the rigors of a screening and
selection process as determined and conducted by a department or agency, subject only to
the standards and guidelines set by the Civil Service Commission. (Estrellado vs. David, G.R. No.
184288, February 16, 2016).
Administrative due process simply means the opportunity to be heard or to explain one's
side, or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In administrative
proceedings, formal hearing is not necessary. The right to counsel is not imperative because
administrative investigations are themselves inquiries conducted only to determine whether
there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees,
with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. (Mateo vs. Executive
Secretary Romulo, G.R. No. 177875, August 8, 2016; Decena vs. Judge Malanyaon, AM RTJ-10-
2217, April 2013; Rey Vivo vs. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 187854, November 2013).
An employee who is placed under preventive suspension pending investigation is not

entitled to compensation because such suspension is not a penalty but only a means of
enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. Backwages
corresponding to the period of suspension is proper only if he is found innocent of the charges
and the suspension is declared to be unjustified. (Garcia vs. Molina, G.R. No. 165223, January 11,
2016).

Proof showing that the subordinate officer or employee may unduly influence the
witnesses against her or may tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office is not
among the prerequisites before she may be preventively suspended. (TIDCORP vs. Manalang-
Demigillo, G.R. No. 176343. September 18, 2012).
The decision of the Office of the Ombudsman is immediately executory, and an appeal
therefrom does not stop the decision from being executory. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. De
Leon, G.R. No. 154083, February 27, 2013).
In cases of Ill-Gotten Wealth, it does not suffice that the respondent is or was a
government official or employee during the administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be
a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close
association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,
G.R. No. 166859, April 2012).
Failure to decide several cases within the reglementary period, without justifiable and
credible reasons, constitutes gross inefficiency. (RE: FAILURE OF FORMER JUDGE ANTONIO A.
CARBONELL TO DECIDE CASES, A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 9, 2013).
A compromise agreement does not necessarily warrant the dismissal of administrative

matters. (REAS vs. RELACION, A.M. No. P-05-2095, February 09, 2011).
Employees of the Judiciary should observe punctuality in reporting to work. Tardiness, if

habitual, prejudices the efficiency of the service being rendered by the Judiciary to the people,
and cannot be tolerated (RE: EMPLOYEES INCURRING HABITUAL TARDINESS IN THE SECOND
SEMESTER OF 2009, A.M. No. 2010-11-SC, March 15, 2011).
Gross dishonesty on the part of an employee of the Judiciary is a very serious offense that
must be severely punished. Even at the first offense, dismissal may be meted on the employee,
unless she had meanwhile ceased to be an employee, in which case a high fine shall be
imposed (Concerned Citizen vs. Catena, A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P, July 16, 2013).
To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected

with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. (Ganzon vs. Arlos,
G.R. No. 174321, October 22, 2013).
PUBLIC CORPORATION
The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency does not extend to Board of Directors where
some members sat ex officio, or by reason of their office or function. (ATTY. MANALANG-
DEMIGILLO vs. TIDCORP, G.R. No. 168613, March 5, 2013).

The immunity of the State does not extend to a government agency engaged in the
enterprise that is far from being the prerogative of the State, which must be purely governmental
or sovereign in function. (AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE vs. SPS RAMOS, G.R. No. 159402, February
23, 2011).
A government-owned and controlled corporation may sue and be sued. However, no

court shall issue a writ of execution upon any monetary judgment rendered against the GOCC
unless such monetary judgment is submitted to and passed upon by the Commission on Audit
(NHA vs. ROXAS, G.R. No. 171953, October 21, 2015).
Trial judges should not immediately issue writs of execution or garnishment against the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities to enforce money
judgments. The primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all claims due from the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities pertains to the Commission
on Audit. (UP vs. DIZON, G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012).
The grant or denial of an application for Environmental Compliance Certificate/

Certificate of Non-Coverage is not an act that is purely ministerial in nature, but one that
involves the exercise of judgment and discretion by the Environmental Management Board
Director or Regional Director, who must determine whether the project or project area is
classified as critical to the environment based on the documents to be submitted by the
applicant. (Special People, Inc. Foundation vs. Nestor M. Canda, G.R. No. 160932, January 14,
2013).
The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other
advertising media applies only to public areas not to private properties. (MMDA vs. Trackworks
Rail Transit Advertising, Vending And Promotions, Inc., G.R. No. 179554, December 16, 2009).
For one to be considered an absentee structure owner, the following requisites must
concur: one, the person must own a structure or dwelling unit within the ZIP zone; and two, the
person has not occupied the structure or dwelling unit prior to the official closure of the census.
The status of censused renters or occupants could not automatically be changed by their
eventual judicial ejectment from the dwelling at the instance of the owner, considering that
their right to become lot beneficiaries of the ZIP was consistently recognized by the AAC, the
NHA, the OP and the CA (Blas vs. Spouses Galapon, G.R. No. 159710, September 30, 2009).
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Under the double criminality rule, the extraditable offense must be criminal under the
laws of both the requesting and the requested states. The requested state comes under no
obligation to surrender the person if its laws do not regard the conduct covered by the request
for extradition as criminal. (GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs.
MUOZ, G.R. No. 207342, August 16, 2016).

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
RAMA vs. HON. MOISES

G.R. No. 197146, December 6, 2016
DOCTRINE:
Laws and Decrees enacted before the 1987 Constitution still enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality. However, if its provisions go against due process and equal protection in
relation to the new constitution and subsequent laws, such provisions must be declared invalid.
FACTS:
By virtue of PD 198 enacted in 1973, Cebu City formed Metro Cebu Water District
(MCWD) which distributed and sold water to its citizens and neighboring municipalities. From
1973-2002, Cebu City Mayor appointed its Board of Directors whenever vacancy arose. In June
2002, however, Cebu Governor wrote to assert his right to appoint the Board of Directors in
accordance with PD 198.
PD 198 stated that the Mayor of the Municipality/City shall be the Appointing Authority
whenever more than 75% of the active water service connections are within the boundary of
any municipality/city, otherwise, the appointing authority shall be the Governor of the Province.
Cebu City only has 61.28%. Petitioners contend that the provision must be struck down as
unconstitutional because it impedes the local autonomy of Cebu City and goes against
substantive due process when it seeks to give appointive powers to another entity who do not
have any connection to the establishment and operation of the MCWD.
ISSUE:
Whether the Provincial Governor is entitled to appoint the Board of Directors of MCWCD
in accordance with PD 198
HELD:
NO. Provincial Governor is not entitled. PD 198s provision is unconstitutional for violating
substantive due process and equal protection clause.
Substantive due process requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which
the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just. It is unreasonable for a party who is not
connected in the creation and operation of the MCWD to be the one deciding who sits in its
BOD.
Equal Protection on the other hand only requires uniformity of treatment of members of
the same class. The classification, to be valid must: (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply
equally to all members of the same class. The intervening reclassification of the City of Cebu into
an HUC and the subsequent enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code rendered the
continued application of PD 198 in disregard of the reclassification unreasonable and unfair.
Note: Dissenting opinion gives a good argument that what is only granted to the Provincial Governor is the function of
being the appointing authority of the BOD of the MCWD and no supervisory function is given. MCWD is a GOCC and has
its own mandate separate from what is given to the City Government by the Local Government Code. Thus, there is no
violation of the Constitution

BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
G.R. No. 192935 and 193306, December 7, 2010
DOCTRINE:
Locus standi, or legal standing, provides that the real party in interest must prosecute the
action, for he/she will be the one to stand benefited or injured by the judgment on the case.
However, if the matter is of transcendental importance, then the court may still exercise
jurisdiction on the case even if it the case was not filed for by a real party in interest.
FACTS:
The petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, asserts the constitutionality of Executive Order
No.1 of (then) President Noynoy Aquino, establishing the Philippine Truth Commission, an ad hoc
body investigating reports of graft and corruption of third-level government officials, in related to
his winning slogan Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap. However, the OSG attacks the legal
standing of the petitioner for failure to demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the
case.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner has a legal standing to question the validity of the order
HELD:
Yes. Locus standi provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest, who stands benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.
However, as our system adopted the direct injury test, the rule on locus standi can be relaxed
when such is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or public
interest. In this case, the petitioner as a Filipino citizen, is undoubtedly interested to know the
status of the Presidents first effort about a promised change to the country.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056, February 15, 2011
DOCTRINE:
Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and
repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original,
sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The
grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative
body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. ... In fine, except as limited
by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and
extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
FACTS:
The League of Cities of the Philippines et al. filed petitions for prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of the 16 laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a
component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from conducting
plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. Petitioners argue that the Cityhood Laws are
unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause. The
Supreme Court twice changed its position on the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws. At
the first instance the Supreme Court ruled that the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional and
denied the first motion for reconsideration. The Court, however, sustained a motion for leave to
file and admit a second motion for reconsideration and later on ruled that the 16 Cityhood Laws
are constitutional. Hence, this final motion for reconsideration by the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether the 16 Cityhood Laws violate (1) Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, and (2)
Section 6, Article X and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
HELD:
1. NO. The exemption clauses in the Cityhood Laws are not unconstitutional even though
they are not written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), as amended
by R.A. No. 9009 since it is the intention of the legislators who enacted R.A. No. 9009 to exempt
the municipalities, which have pending cityhood bills in the 11 th Congress, from the P100Million
income requirement. Also, it cannot be denied that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting
respondent municipalities from complying with the higher income requirement imposed by the
amendatory R.A. No. 9009 since these municipalities have proven themselves viable and
capable to become component cities of their respective provinces.
2. NO. There was valid classification and the Cityhood Laws do not violate the equal
protection clause. The determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to
respondent municipalities does not simply lie on the mere pendency of their cityhood bills during
the 11th Congress. The existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent
municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A.
No. 9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Declaration of Policy. Indeed,
substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces.
NAZARETH vs. COA
G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013
DOCTRINE:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law. A violation of this constitutional edict warrants the disallowance of the payment.
However, the refund of the disallowed payment of benefits granted by law to a covered person,
agency or office of the Government may be barred by the good faith of the approving official
and of the recipient.
FACTS:
In 1997, the Congress passed RA 8439 which granted additional benefits to covered
officials of DOST. Commencing 1998, DOST Regional Office Zamboanga City released the
benefits granted by the law. No appropriation for the benefits was included in the GAA for 1998,
1999, 2000, and 2001. COA disallowed the benefits. In 2000, DOST Secretary requested the Office
of the President to grant the use of their savings to fund the benefits under RA 8439. It was
granted. COA ruled to allow the 1998- 2000 benefits but maintained the disallowance of the
2001 benefits.
ISSUE:
1. Was the disallowance of the 2001 benefits proper?
2. Must it be reimbursed to the government?
HELD:
1. YES. The disallowance was proper. The Constitution provides that No money shall be
paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. In this
case, no appropriation for the benefits was allocated for the said year. Unlike the other
years, there was also no augmentation by use of savings as allowed by each years GAA
for year 2001 because it was clearly not covered by the grant given by the OP in the
year 2000.
2. NO, it does not need to be reimbursed. The court, however, declares and holds that the
disallowed benefits received in good faith need not be reimbursed to the Government
consistent with Blaquera vs Alcala and Veloso vs COA. In this case, Petitioners received
the additional allowances and bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that LWUA
Board Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment. At the time petitioners received the
additional allowances and bonuses, the Court had not yet decided. Petitioners had no
knowledge that such payment was without legal basis. Thus, being in good faith,
petitioners need not refund the allowances and bonuses they received but disallowed
by the COA.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
OCAMPO vs. ENRIQUEZ

G.R. No. 225973. November 8, 2016
DOCTRINE:
Under the Faithful Execution Clause or second sentence of Sec. 17, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President has the power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into
execution the law. The mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in
nature and is intimately related to the other executive functions. It is best construed as an
imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power.
FACTS:
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R.
Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani . He won the May 9, 2016 Election and formally assumed
his office at noon of June 30, 2016. Following the Presidents verbal order, public respondent
Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to public respondent
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding
the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. In tum, General Visaya commanded Deputy Chief of Staff
of the APP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez to implement the Memorandum who transmitted his
own directive to the Commanding General of the Philippine Army to proceed with the interment
and to provide "all necessary military honors accorded for a President."
ISSUE:
Did the respondents commit grave abuse of discretion, when they issued the assailed
Memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to
implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB?
HELD:
NO. There is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a grave abuse of
discretion which would justify the Court to interpose its authority to check and override an act
entrusted to the judgment of another branch. Petitioners reliance on the provisions of the 1987
Constitution is misplaced. While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a
people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about
anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the instant controversy. The second
sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII pertaining to the duty of the President to "ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed, is likewise not violated by public respondents.
Being the Chief Executive, the President represents the government as a whole and sees
to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his or her department. Under
the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and proper steps"
to carry into execution the law. The mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently
executive in nature and is intimately related to the other executive functions. It is best construed
as an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power. The provision simply underscores the
rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is
obliged to obey and execute them.
DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL & GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010
DOCTRINE:
The Constitutional Prohibition against appointments two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term or Midnight Appointments does not
apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the
Judiciary.
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions arising from the controversy of the vacancy brought
about by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno 7 days after the presidential election.
Article VIII of the Constitution states that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within
90 days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least 3 nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy. The JBC submitted to then President Arroyo the list of
nominees of the candidates to fill the vacancy. Herein petitioners alleged that the practice has
been for the most senior Justice to act as Chief Justice whenever the incumbent is indisposed.
Thus, the appointment of the successor Chief Justice is not urgently necessary and in violation of
the 90-day constitutional ban on appointments as gleaned from Section 15, Article VII.
ISSUE:
Whether the prohibition under the Constitution against midnight appointments extend to
members of the Supreme Court
HELD:
NO. The presidential appointment is valid. There is nothing in Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution that provides the prohibition to the appointment extends to the Members of
the Supreme Court. Had the framers of the Constitution intended to extend the same to the
Judiciary, they could have explicitly done so. It only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within 2 months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.

ARAULLO V. AQUINO III (Resolution)
G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015
In their Motion for Reconsideration, Respondents contend that under Section 38 of the
Administrative Code, the President has the authority "to suspend or otherwise stop further
expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the
General Appropriations Act." Thus, they contend that withdrawn unobligated allotments and
unreleased appropriations under the DAP are savings that may be used for augmentation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations under the
DAP are considered savings that may be used for augmentation
2. Are the cross border transfers valid under the Administrative Code?
1. NO. When the President suspends or stops expenditure of funds, savings are not
automatically generated until it has been established that such funds or appropriations
are free from any obligation or encumbrance, and that the work, activity or purpose for
which the appropriation is authorized has been completed, discontinued or abandoned.
2. NO. Section 39 of the Administrative Code is in conflict with the plain text of Section 25
(5), Article VI of the Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of
any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and
projects of any department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the
regular appropriations. Section 25 (5) expressly limits the authority of the President to
augment an item in the GAA to only those in his own Department out of the savings in
other items of his own Department's appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot
serve as a valid authority to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP. Augmentations
under the DAP which are made by the Executive within its department shall, however,
remain valid so long as the requisites under Section 25 (5) are complied with.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OCHOA
G.R. No. 204605, July 19, 2016
DOCTRINE:
Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a
vote by the Senate or by Congress.
FACTS:
The Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks (Madrid System), is the
centralized system providing a one-stop solution for registering and managing marks worldwide.
It allows the trademark owner to file one application in one language, and to pay one set of
fees to protect his mark in the territories of up to 97 member-states. The Madrid System is
governed by the Madrid Agreement, and the Madrid Protocol.
The Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL), recommended to the
government the country's accession to the Madrid Protocol. After its own review, the DFA
endorsed to the President the country's accession thereto. Conformably, President Benigno C.
Aquino III ratified the Madrid Protocol through an instrument of accession which was later
deposited with the Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
The Madrid Protocol entered into force in the Philippines on July 25, 2012. Petitioner IPAP, an
association of more than 100 law firms and individual practitioners in Intellectual Property Law,
now challenged the validity of the President's accession to the Madrid Protocol without the
concurrence of the Senate.
ISSUE:
Whether the President's ratification of the Madrid Protocol is valid and constitutional
notwithstanding lack of concurrence of the Senate
HELD:
YES. The President's ratification of the Madrid Protocol is valid and constitutional. In the
Philippines, the DFA is given the power to determine whether an agreement is to be treated as a
treaty or as an executive agreement.
International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and
those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of
treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-
established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements.
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of 2/3 of the
Senate; whereas, executive agreements become binding through executive action without the
need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.
Based on the foregoing, the determination and treatment of the DFA Secretary of
the Madrid Protocol as an executive agreement, being in contemplation of the express state
policies on intellectual property as well as within his power under EO No.459, is valid. Therefore,
the registration of trademarks and copyrights have been a valid subject of executive
agreements entered into without the concurrence of the Senate.

CATERPILLAR vs. SAMSON
G.R. No. 205972, November 9, 2016
DOCTRINE:
Determination of probable cause is an executive function which rests solely on the sound
discretion of the prosecutor. It may only be countered by the judiciary through appeal via Rule
65 on grounds of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not via
Rule 43.
FACTS:
Caterpillar Inc. is a corporation engaged in footwear manufacture and distribution and is
the owner of several trademarks alleged to be internationally known (Core Marks). Manolo
Samson does business through several companies selling footwear, bags, clothing, and other
related items under registered trademark Caterpillar. Samson, on several occasions, through
the NBI, was found to be distributing items bearing Caterpillars Core Marks. Items were seized
and a civil case for unfair competition and trademark cancellation as well as criminal cases
were filed by Caterpillar against Samson.
The DOJ through the prosecutor found no probable cause and dismissed the case.
Caterpillar appealed to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43. The CA opined that
an appeal under Rule 43 to assail the resolution by the Secretary of Justice determining the
existence or non-existence of probable cause was an improper remedy. While the CA could
treat an appeal as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, it could not do so in this case
because the allegations of the petition did not sufficiently show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Secretary of Justice.
ISSUES:
Whether the judiciary (court) may review or counter the determination of existence or
non-existence of probable cause by the executive (DOJ)
HELD:
NO. The determination of probable cause rests solely on the prosecutor as an executive
function subject only to the review of the Secretary of Justice. The Judiciary cannot impede on
separation of powers. What the law allows for judicial review is when there exists grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The allegations in the petition were not
sufficient to be treated as an action for certiorari via Rule 65. Grave abuse of discretion means
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in
other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
GMA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 220598 & 220953, July 19, 2016
DOCTRINE:
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by
rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the
Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and
wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of
the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of
certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS:
Petitioners in this case are Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and former PCSO
Budget and Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas. The petitioners, along with other public officers, were
charged with plunder as defined by, and penalized under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659. The Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners and over most of the accused.
After the prosecution rested its case, the accused asserted that the Prosecution was not able to
establish a case for plunder against them, prompting them to file their separate demurrers to
evidence. The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence except that of the petitioners and
Valencia and ruled that sufficient evidence showing conspiracy to commit plunder was produced. A
special civil action for certiorari was filed by petitioners assailing the denial of their demurrers to
evidence on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether a special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to
evidence
HELD:
YES. Certiorari is proper since the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the
dermurrers to evidence. The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of
justice the duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic
exercise of discretion by expressly incorporating in Sec.1 of Art VIII the following provision: Section 1. The
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights, which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
Generally, a special civil action for certiorari will not lie in assailing an interlocutory order such as
that issued in this case because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law.
However, in the exercise of the superintending control over other courts, the judiciary is to be guided
by all the circumstances of each particular case as the ends of justice may require.
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
TESDA vs. COA

G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015
DOCTRINE:
COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty
and responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which
are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law. The Court has accorded not only respect
but also finality to their findings especially when their decisions are not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS:
In view of the inadequate policy on basic health and safety conditions of work
experienced by government personnel, then DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued
Administrative Order No. 430 authorizing the payment of healthcare maintenance allowance of
P5,000.00 to all officials and employees of the DOLE, including its bureaus and attached
agencies. Upon post-audit, the COA State Auditor issued AOM No. 04-005 which stated that the
payment of the allowance had no legal basis; hence the COA Legal and Adjudication Office
issued a Notice of Disallowance. TESDA filed an appeal before the COA Commission Proper
assailing said disallowance; however, the latter denied the appeal for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether COA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Notice of Disallowance
pursuant to AOM No. 04-005
HELD:
NO. COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional
duty and responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those
which are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law. The Court has accorded not only
respect but also finality to their findings especially when their decisions are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.

FUNA vs. ALBERTO
G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014
DOCTRINE:
The Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions are prohibited from holding
any other office or employment during their tenure, even in an ex officio capacity.
FACTS:
In 2010, former President Arroyo appointed Francisco Duque III as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, which was thereafter confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Subsequently, President Arroyo issued EO 864. Pursuant to it, Duque was designated as a
member of the Board of Directors or Trustees in an ex officio capacity of several GOCCs such as
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF.
Petitioner Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed a
petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864, as well as Section 14 of The Administrative
Code of 1987, and the designation of Duque as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees
of the aforesaid GOCCs for being clear violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of
the1987 Constitution.
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions
as "independent." Although their respective functions are essentially executive in nature, they
are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of such functions. To
safeguard the independence of these Commissions, the 1987 Constitution imposes under
Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution certain inhibitions and disqualifications upon the
Chairmen and members to strengthen their integrity, such as: (a) Holding any other office or
employment during their tenure.
ISSUE:
Whether the designation of Duque, in an ex officio capacity, as Director or Trustee of the
GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or
multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions
HELD:
YES. Duques designation is a violation of the Constitution. The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF are vested by their respective charters with various powers and functions to carry out the
purposes for which they were created. They are also tasked to perform other corporate powers
and functions that are not personnel-related. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member
of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these powers
and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman. Also, Duques
designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles
him to receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept
of an ex officio position. Moreover, Duques designation as member of the governing Boards of
the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC.

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUZ REYES-BAKUNAWA, ET.AL.

G.R. No. 180418, August 28, 2013
DOCTRINE:
Assets or properties, to be considered as ill-gotten wealth, must be shown to have
originated from the Government itself, and should have been taken by former President Marcos,
the members of his immediate family, relatives, close subordinates and close associates by
illegal means. That one served as a government official or employee during the Marcos
administration did not immediately make her a close subordinate or close associate of former
President Marcos.
FACTS:
Civil Case No. 0023 is an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages brought by the Republic against respondents for having allegedly acquired and
accumulated ill-gotten wealth with grave abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of
the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in their unjust enrichment. It
was alleged that respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa (Luz Bakunawa) had served as Imelda
Marcos Social Secretary during the Marcos administration and it was during that period that she
and her husband had acquired assets, funds and other property grossly and manifestly
disproportionate to her salaries and their other lawful income. The Sandiganbayan ruled in favor
of the respondents and rejected the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration
reiterating that the latter did not discharge its burden of proving the close links between the
Bakunawas and the Marcoses, and of proving how the Bakunawas had abused said links,
ISSUE:
Whether it was proven that the Baukanawas were able to amass ill-gotten wealth
because of their position in the government and/or close association and connection with the
Marcoses
HELD:
NO. Evidentiary substantiation of the allegations of how the wealth was illegally acquired
and by whom was necessary. For that purpose, the mere holding of a position in the Marcos
administration did not necessarily make the holder a close associate within the context of E.O.
No.1. A prima facie showing must be made to show that one unlawfully accumulated wealth by
virtue of a close association or relation with President Marcos and/or his wife. It would not suffice,
then, that one served during the administration of President Marcos as a government official or
employee.

SPS. YUSAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 156684. April 6, 2011
DOCTRINE:
There can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of
the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is
made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owner.
FACTS:
The petitioners owned a parcel of land.
The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series
of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for
the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost
housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. Notwithstanding that the
enactment of Resolution No. 552 was but the initial step in the Citys exercise of its power of
eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the
petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC,
praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory,
improper, and without force and effect. The RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. However, upon motion for consideration, the RTC ruled in favor of the
petition. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
Must a citizen await the takeover and possession of his property by the local
government before he can go to court to nullify an unjust expropriation?
HELD:
YES. There was no expropriation yet. The fact that there is no cause of action is evident
from the face of the Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The
absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. In view
of the absence of the proper expropriation ordinance authorizing and providing for the
expropriation, the petition for certiorari filed in the RTC was dismissible for lack of cause of action.
The remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution expressing the
desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners' property was issued. As of
then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for the power of
eminent domain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified complaint in
the proper court. Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified complaint, no
expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until then, the petitioners as the owners could
not also be deprived of their property under the power of eminent domain.

APO FRUITS CORPORATION AND HIJO PLANTATION, INC., vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164195, December 4, 2009
DOCTRINE:
If property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having
computed from the time of taking up to the time when compensation is paid or deposited with
the court. However, interest is to be imposed on the just compensation only in case of delay in its
payment.
FACTS:
AFC and HPI owned agricultural lands which they voluntarily offered to sell to the
government. Both received separate notices of land acquisition and valuation of their properties
from DAR. HPI and AFC rejected these valuations for being very low.
DAR requested the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to deposit the amounts to the
bank accounts of AFC and HPI, which amounts the petitioners then withdrew. The titles over the
properties were cancelled, and new ones were issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.
AFC and HPI filed separate petitions for determination of just compensation with the
DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). DARAB failed to act on these petitions for more than 3 years,
thus, AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for determination and payment of just
compensation with the RTC. The RTC fixed the just compensation for the petitioners land with
12% interest per annum from the time the complaint was filed until finality of the decision. Upon
MR, the RTC modified its decision by deleting the 12% interest due on the balance of the
awarded just compensation. It justified the deletion by the finding that the Land Bank did not
delay the payment of just compensation.
ISSUE:
Whether AFP and HPI are entitled to recover interest on just compensation
HELD:
NO. AFC and HPI are not entitled to recover interest on the just compensation.
Just compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the market value of the property,
described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of
legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who receives
and one who desires to sell. It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the State. Thus, if
property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having
computed from the time the property is taken up to the time when compensation is actually
paid or deposited with the court. But interest is to be imposed on the just compensation only in
case of delay in its payment, which fact must be sufficiently established.
In this case, Land Bank did not incur delay in the payment of the just compensation. After
the petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their lands, DAR referred their applications to Land Bank
for initial valuation. Land Bank initially fixed the just compensation but both rejected Land Bank's
initial valuation.

NOTE: In a Second Motion for Reconsideration, the 2009 case was reversed by the Supreme
Court in this 2010 Case penned by Justice Brion:
APO FRUITS CORPORATION AND HIJO PLANTATION, INC., vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010
HELD:
Apart from the requirement that compensation for expropriated land must be fair and
reasonable, compensation, to be just, compensation must also be made without delay.
While the Land Bank deposited the amount into the petitioners' bank accounts at the
time the landholdings were taken, these amounts were mere partial payments that only
amounted to 5% of the actual value of the expropriated properties. Thus, the initial payments
made by the LBP when the petitioners' landholdings were taken, although promptly withdrawn
by the petitioners, could not by any means be considered a fair exchange of values at the time
of taking.
The deposits might have been sufficient for purposes of the immediate taking of the
landholdings but cannot be claimed as amounts that would excuse the LBP from the payment
of interest on the unpaid balance of the compensation due. They were not enough to
compensate the petitioners for the potential income the landholdings could have earned for
them if no immediate taking had taken place. Under the circumstances, the State acted
oppressively and was far from "just" in their position to deny the petitioners of the potential
income that the immediate taking of their properties entail.
Deleting the award of 12% interest is not only patently and legally wrong, but is also
morally unconscionable for being grossly unfair and unjust. Thus, Land Bank of the Philippines was
ordered to pay Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. interest at the rate of 12% per
annum on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, computed from the date the
Government took the properties until the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines paid the
balance on the principal amount.

NAPOCOR vs. HEIRS OF SATURNINO
G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015
DOCTRINE:
In expropriation proceedings, the expropriator who has taken possession of the subject
property is obliged to pay reasonable compensation to the landowner for the period of such
possession although the proceedings had been discontinued.
FACTS:
NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation of a property owned by respondent heirs
of Saturnino Q. Borbon seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way for the 230 KV
Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission Project. In their answer, respondents sought
the payment of just compensation arguing that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them
before entering the property and that the entry was done without their consent in the process,
destroying some fruit trees without payment, and that the presence of the high tension
transmission line had rendered the entire property inutile for any future use and capabilities. The
lower court ruled in favor of respondents while the appellate court affirmed with modification.
During the pendency of the appeal before the SC, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings contending that the expropriation has become
without basis for lack of public purpose as a result of the retirement of the transmission lines.
ISSUE:
Whether the owner is still entitled to compensation if expropriation is discontinued
HELD:
YES, not the just compensation but reasonable compensation. It is essential that the
element of public use of the property be maintained throughout the proceedings for
expropriation since it is the fundamental basis for the action. The very moment that it appears at
any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must
necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at
all except when the expropriation is for some public use. Accordingly, there is no need to pay
just compensation to respondents. Instead, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents
for the disturbance of their property by paying to them actual or other compensatory damages
based on what they actually lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property
and of its use.
The SC now treats the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as producing the effect
of converting the case into an action for damages. For that purpose, the Court remands the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings, with instruction to the court of origin to enable
the parties to fully litigate the action for damages by giving them the opportunity to re-define
the factual and legal issues by the submission of the proper pleadings on the extent of the
taking, the value of the compensation to be paid to the respondents by NAPOCOR, and other
relevant matters as they deem fit.

LANDBANK vs. SUNTAY
G.R. No. 188376, December 14, 2011
DOCTRINE:
The original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation under Republic Act
No. 6657 pertains to the RTC as a Special Agrarian Court.
FACTS:
Respondent Suntay owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro
with a total area of 3,682.0285 hectares. In 1972, the DAR expropriated 948.1911 hectares of
Suntays land pursuant P.D. No. 27. Petitioner Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the
expropriated portion at P4,497.50/hectare, for a total valuation of P4,251,141.68. Rejecting the
valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition for determination of just compensation in the Office
of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD); his petition was assigned to RARAD
Mias. RARAD Mias rendered a decision fixing the total just compensation for the expropriated
portion at P157,541,951.30. Land Bank brought a petition for the judicial determination of just
compensation in the RTC in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro as a Special Agrarian Court,
impleading Suntay and RARAD Mias. The petition essentially prayed that the total just
compensation for the expropriated portion be fixed at only P4,251,141.67. Suntay filed a motion
to dismiss mainly on the ground that the petition had been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period as required by Section 11, Rule XIII of the Rules of Procedure of DARAB.
After the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, Land Bank appealed to the CA, which sustained
the dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Banks petition for the determination of just
compensation.
HELD:
YES. The RTC erred in dismissing the Land Banks petition. It bears stressing that the
petition is not an appeal from the RARADs final Decision but an original action for the
determination of the just compensation for respondents expropriated property, over which the
RTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction.

CITY OF MANILA vs. ALEGAR CORPORATION
G.R. No. 187604, June 25, 2012
DOCTRINE:
When the property owner rejects the offer but hints for a better price, the government
should renegotiate by calling the property owner to a conference. The government must
exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain by agreement the land it desires. Its failure to comply will
warrant the dismissal of the complaint.
FACTS:
The City Council of Manila passed Ordinance 8012 that authorized the City Mayor to
acquire certain lots belonging to respondents Alegar Corporation, Terocel Realty Corporation,
and Filomena Vda. De Legarda, for use in the socialized housing project
of petitioner City of Manila. The City offered to buy the lots at P1,500.00 per sqm but the owners
rejected this as too low with the result that the City filed a complaint for expropriation against
them before the RTC of Manila. The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the City did
not comply with Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) 7279 (Urban Development Housing Act) which
set the order of priority in the acquisition of properties for socialized housing. Private properties
ranked last in the order of priorities for such acquisition and the City failed to show that no other
properties were available for the project. The City also failed to comply with Section 10 which
authorized expropriation only when resort to other modes (such as community mortgage, land
swapping, and negotiated purchase) had been exhausted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Did the City of Manila complied with the requirements of RA 7279
HELD:
NO. The CA correctly ruled that the City failed to show that it complied with the
requirements of Section 9 of R.A. 7279. The intent of the law is for the State or the local
government to make a reasonable offer in good faith, not merely a pro forma offer to acquire
the property. These requirements are strict limitations on the local governments exercise of the
power of eminent domain. They are the only safeguards of property owners against the
exercise of that power.

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY vs. PULIDO
G.R. No. 188995, August 2011
DOCTRINE:
Just compensation must be based on value of property prevailing at the time the parties
entered into a compromise agreement.
FACTS:
EPZA filed an action for the expropriation of 3 parcels of irrigated Riceland. During the
pendency of the case, Lot 1406 which was owned by Salud Jimenez, was subdivided
into Lot 1406-A and 1406-B. The RTC sustained the right of EPZA to expropriate the 3 parcels of
rice lands, but later released Lot 1406-A from expropriation. EPZA appealed to the CA. Pending
appeal, the EPZA and the Estate of Salud Jimenez entered into a compromise agreement and
agreed that the Estate of Salud Jimenez would transfer Lot 1406-B to the petitioner in exchange
for Lot 434. The swap arrangement recognizes the fact that the lot 1406-B is considered
expropriated in favor of the government and the payment for which being Lot 434. The RTC
approved the Compromise Agreement.
EPZA failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to the Estate of Salud Jimenez because the
registered owner was Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. As a result, the Estate of Salud Jimenez filed
a Motion to Partially Annul the Order of the RTC. RTC annulled the Compromise Agreement and
directed the petitioner to peacefully return Lot 1406-B to the Estate of Salud Jimenez. The
petitioner went to the CA by petition for certiorari and prohibition and set aside the order of the
RTC to return Lot 1406-B. Instead, it ordered RTC to determine the just compensation for Lot 1406-
B.
ISSUE:
Should just compensation be based on the value of Lot 1406-B prevailing at the time
when EPZA commenced the expropriation proceedings or when RTC approved the
Compromise Agreement?
HELD:
Just compensation for Lot 1406-B must be based on value of property prevailing when
RTC approved the compromise agreement. The Court upheld the annulment of
the Compromise Agreement and recognized that the agreed upon mode of payment of the
just compensation for Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 was cancelled.
When the parties signed the compromise agreement and the same was approved, they
had in fact settled between themselves the question of what is just compensation and that both
of them had intended that defendant would be compensated on the basis of prevailing values
at the time of the agreement. By agreeing to a land swap in 1993 in the ill-fated compromise
agreement, EPZA had impliedly agreed to paying just compensation using the market values in
1993.

NAPOCOR vs. HEIRS OF SANGKAY
G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011
DOCTRINE:
The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs
from the action for damages. The prescriptive period under RA 6395 is applicable only to actions
for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation.
FACTS:
Petitioner, NPC, undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s
to generate electricity in Mindanao. The project included the construction of several
underground tunnels. Respondents sued NPC in the RTC for payment of just compensation.
Respondents (Heirs of Sangkay) alleged that the underground tunnel had been constructed
without their knowledge and consent and deprived them of beneficial value of their land. NPC
countered that the respondent entitlement to compensation has prescribed already. After trial,
the RTC ruled in favor of respondents. NPC appealed to CA but the affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the right to claim just compensation prescribes within 5 years in accordance to
RA 6395
HELD:
NO. The prescriptive period under RA 6395 is applicable only to actions for damages,
and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. The NPC cannot
bar the rights of the respondents to just compensation. The action to recover just compensation
from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. The former, also
known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in
fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain has been attempted by the taking agency.
The action to recover just compensation is based on the Constitution. It is not based on
tort, but on constitutional prohibition against taking of property without just compensation. It
would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just
compensation for private property taken for public use solely on the basis of statutory
prescription.

ARTICLE III: BILL OF RIGHTS
LAI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 175999, July 1, 2015
DOCTRINE:
A judge who acted as the public prosecutor in the same case before he was appointed
to the bench may NOT hear and decide the same case for 'the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge' is the indispensable imperative of due process.
FACTS:
The accused Nelson Lai was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide by Judge Fernando Elumba of the RTC. On appeal before the CA, accused averred
that he was deprived of due process because his case was decided by the judge who acted as
the public prosecutor in the same case before he was appointed to the bench. The CA,
however, affirmed the decision in toto ruling that when the judge, who was then a public
prosecutor, entered his appearance, the prosecution had already long rested its case, thus, it
cannot be said that the presiding judge personally prosecuted the instant case and that a
petition to disqualify a judge must be filed before rendition of judgment by the judge.
ISSUE:
Whether a judge who acted as the public prosecutor in the same case before he was
appointed to the bench may hear and decide the same case
HELD:
NO. An essential part of the constitutional right to due process of law is to be afforded a
just and fair trial before his conviction for any crime. Any violation of the right cannot be
condoned, for 'the cold neutrality of an impartial judge' is the indispensable imperative of due
process.
The CA's justifications directly contravened the letter and spirit of Section 1 of Rule 137 of
the Rules of Court and Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary. The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case rests on
the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision
and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his
integrity. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.

LEGASPI vs. CITY OF CEBU
G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013
DOCTRINE:
The delegation to LGUs of the legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations
directly familiar with the situations in their respective jurisdictions.
FACTS:
Valentino Legaspi and Bienvenido Jaban Sr. assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance
No. 1664 enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu which authorized the
traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize by clamping any motor vehicle violating the parking
restrictions and prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City).
ISSUE:
Was the Ordinance No. 1664 enacted outside the ambit of the legislative powers of the
City of Cebu?
HELD:
NO. Ordinance No. 1664 complied with substantive and procedural due process. With
regard to substantive due process, the Court held that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with
the legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations was proper by virtue of Section 458 of
the LGC, and the General Welfare Clause in Section 16 of the LGC. The delegation to LGUs
directly familiar with the situations in their respective jurisdictions. With the broad latitude in this
regard allowed to the LGUs of the cities, their traffic regulations must be held valid and effective
unless they infringed the constitutional limitations and statutory safeguards. With regard to
procedural due process, the Court held that the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by
clamping the tires was necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of
apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous. Nor should
the lack of a trial-type hearing prior to the clamping constitute a breach of procedural due
process, for giving the transgressors the chance to reverse the apprehensions through a timely
protest could equally satisfy the need for a hearing. In other words, the prior intervention of a
court of law was not indispensable to ensure a compliance with the guaranty of due process.

MOSQUEDA vs. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS
G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016
DOCTRINE:
The constitutional right to equal protection does not require universal application of laws
to all persons or things without distinction. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another.
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted an Ordinance imposing a ban
against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. challenged the constitutionality of
such ordinance, alleging that the ordinance violates the due process clause and the equal
protection clause. The RTC declared the ordinance valid and constitutional. It held that the City
of Davao had validly exercised police power under the General Welfare Clause of the Local
Government Code and that the ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was consistent
with the Equal Protection Clause. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the judgment and declared
the ordinance as void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether the Ordinance is constitutional - NO
HELD:
Violative of Due Process Clause

A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local
government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also be not
oppressive. The respondents challenge the ordinance for being unreasonable and oppressive in
that it sets the effectivity of the ban at 3 months after publication of the ordinance. They allege
that 3 months will be inadequate time to shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying. The
conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of 3 months. Requiring the
respondents to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-month period under
pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would
definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
Violative of Equal Protection Clause

According to the respondents, the ordinance transgresses this constitutional guaranty:
1. By prohibiting aerial spraying per se, regardless of the substance or the level of
concentration of the chemicals to be applied;
2. By imposing the 30-meter buffer zone in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of
the sizes of the landholding

The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Equal
treatment does not require universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction. The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals determined
according to a valid classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.
In this case, was there substantial distinction? NO. The occurrence of pesticide drift is not
limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any mode of pesticide application.
Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the
same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and to the
environment. The ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the classification does
not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. As such,
the decision of prohibiting only aerial spraying is tainted with arbitrariness. Also, the imposition of
the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the substance to be aerially
applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted.
RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING FEES
OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC
A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, August 19, 2009
DOCTRINE:
The Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a persons poverty, a
condition that only a natural person can suffer. The Courts cannot grant the same exemption
from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants to foundations and associations, even if
the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people.
FACTS:
Mr. Roger Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., sent a letter
to the Chief Justice. He queried if the Courts also grant exemption from payment of legal fees to
foundations such as Good Shepherd Foundation, like the grant of exemption for indigent and
underprivileged people.
ISSUE:
Whether Foundations may also be granted exemption from legal and filing fees
HELD:
NO. The Courts cannot grant the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to
indigent litigants to foundations and associations, even if the foundations are working for
indigent and underprivileged people. The provisions under the Rules of Court indicate that only
a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation,
Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct
from that of its members, is a juridical person. As a juridical person, it cannot be accorded the
exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.

SERENO vs. COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND RELATED MATTERS (CTRM) OF NEDA
G.R. No. 175210, February 1, 2016
DOCTRINE
The constitutional guarantee to information does not open every door to all information,
but is rather confined to matters of public concern. It is subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. The State's policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving
public interest, and is tempered by reasonable conditions prescribed by law.
FACTS
In his capacity as a citizen and as a stakeholder in the Philippine petrochemical industry,
herein petitioner, filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent Committee on Tariff and
Related Matters (CTRM) to provide him a copy of the minutes of its May 23, 2005 meeting in
which it resolved to recommend to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo the lifting of the
suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and certain plastic products,
thereby reducing the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) rates from 7% or 10% to 5%; as
well as to provide copies of all official records, documents, papers and government research
data used as basis for the issuance of Executive Order No. 486 which orders the lifting of the
suspension of the tariff reduction on petrochemical resins and other plastic products under the
ASEAN Free Trade Area.
ISSUE
Whether the CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the petitioner with a
copy of the minutes of the May 23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to information
on matters of public concern and the State's policy of full public disclosure
RULING
NO. 2 requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ
of mandamus:
1. The information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public interest
2. It must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee
The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern in

Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State's policy of full public
disclosure in all transactions involving public interest in Section 28 of Article II thereof. These
provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in policy-making as well as in the operations of
the Government, and at safeguarding the exercise by the people of the freedom of expression.
In a democratic society like ours, the free exchange of information is necessary, and can be
possible only if the people are provided the proper information on matters that affect them. But
the people's right to information is not absolute. The constitutional guarantee to information
"does not open every door to any and all information." It is limited to matters of public concern,
and is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Likewise, the State's policy of full
public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest, and is further subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law.

SESBREO vs. CA
G.R. No. 160689, March 26, 2014
DOCTRINE:
The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended as a
restraint against the Government and its agents tasked with law enforcement. It does not
extend to acts committed by private individuals.
FACTS:
Petitioner Raul Sesbreo accused the Violation of Contract Inspection Team dispatched
by the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) to check his electric meter with conducting an
unreasonable search in his residential premises. He filed for damages founded on abuse of rights
alleging that their entry to his house and the surrounding premises was effected without his
permission or a search warrant and over the objections of his maids; that they threatened,
forced or coerced their way into his house; they unscrewed the electric meter, turned it upside
down and took photographs thereof; they forced a visitor to sign two documents, making her
appear to be his representative or agent; that he found that some of his personal effects were
missing, apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they searched the house. The RTC dismissed
the claim. The CA affirmed the dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether the inspection of residence by the VOC team was an unreasonable search for
being carried out without a warrant
HELD:
NO. Sesbreo, as the consumer of VECO, gave the VOC team the authority to enter his
premises at all reasonable hours to conduct an inspection of the meter without being liable for
trespass to dwelling pursuant to paragraph 9 of the metered service contract entered into
between VECO and each of its consumers.
The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures, on which petitioner
relied, is intended as a restraint against the Government and its agents tasked with law
enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of State power. The Court has made this clear in its pronouncements that the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Not
being agents of the State, the VOC inspectors did not have to first obtain a search warrant to do
so.

ROMINES V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 182010. August 25, 2010
DOCTRINE:
A stop-and-frisk practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
FACTS:
Romines was caught in possession of 0.1224 grams of shabu when Cruzin, a police officer
in a surveillance operation for a snatcher named Ryan saw her place a sachet of white
substance in a cigarette case. She ran from the police after being questioned and was
subsequently caught in a stop-and frisk operation after the law enforcer asked her about the
sachet contents. She and the contents were tested for drug presence. The latter was confirmed
to be shabu. Her alibi was that the evidence was used to frame her when the police dangled a
wallet containing shabu near her in the detention facility. In court, she admitted to the truth of
the toxicology report on the substance and the presence of shabu in her body. The trial court
convicted her under RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous drugs Act. In
the Appellate court, she contended that the arrest without a warrant was illegal.
The appellate court found her arrest valid in People v Chua where the stop-and-frisk operation
was established as an exception to warrantless arrests. In the Supreme Court, she contended
that Cruzin failed to justify the hunch that there was a criminal act in the placement of
something in a case. The OSG contended for a penalty modification.
ISSUE:
Whether the arrest without the warrant was valid
HELD:
YES. A stop-and-frisk practice serves a dual purpose:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, and
(2) safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers
constituted a valid stop-and-frisk operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially
noticed in petitioners possession - later voluntarily exhibited] to the police operative - was
undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after
PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of her arrest,
petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the police
officer had identified himself.

APOLLO vs. CONSTANTINO- DAVID
G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011
DOCTRINE
Government employees cannot expect privacy of information stored in government
issued computers which must be used for official business only. No right to privacy may arise
therefrom. A search thereof conducted in pursuance of administrative investigation is not
unreasonable and therefore not violative of the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
FACTS
Pollo works as a ranking official at the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The Chairman
received an anonymous complaint that Pollo was lawyering for accused government
employees having pending cases at the CSC. The Chairman formed an investigating team and
ordered that all computers in the office be backed up. They were able to get a hold of
documents appearing as legal pleadings. Administrative case was filed and Pollo was dismissed
from service. Pollo argues that the government action was violative of his constitutional right to
privacy and his right against unreasonable searches and seizures and that any evidence
obtained is not admissible in court for being a fruit of a poisonous tree.
ISSUE
Was his right to the government action violative of the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizure?
HELD
NO. Pollo cannot claim privacy over the documents as they were inside a government
issued computer coupled with an office policy stating that they shall not expect any privacy in
anything they store in the computers. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures is likewise not violated. The search was reasonable for it was in pursuance
of the investigation of work related misconduct.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WAGAS
G.R. No. 157943, September 2013
DOCTRINE:
The first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal. For even if the commission of the crime can be established, without competent proof
of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can be no conviction.
FACTS:
Wagas was charged with estafa. At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant
Alberto Ligaray as its lone witness. Ligaray testified that Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of
rice over the telephone. Wagas then issued BPI Check for P200K but the check was dishonored
due to insufficiency of funds. On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally
meet Wagas because they transacted only through the telephone. The RTC convicted Wagas
of estafa. On Appeal, Wagas argued that the Prosecution did not establish that it was he who
had transacted with Ligaray; that the records showed that Ligaray did not meet him at any
time; and that Ligarays testimony on their alleged telephone conversation was not reliable
because it was not shown that Ligaray had been familiar with his voice.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the existence
of all the elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator of
the crime
HELD:
NO. The Prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who
had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. Ligarays declaration that it was Wagas who had
transacted with him over the telephone was not reliable because he did not explain how he
determined that the person with whom he had the telephone conversation was really Wagas,
whom he had not yet met or known before then. Since the accused is presumed innocent, the
first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For
even if the commission of the crime can be established, without competent proof of the identity
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can be no conviction. Since the accuseds
constitutional right of presumption of innocence was not overcome, he is entitled to an
acquittal.
The State has the burden of proof to show: (1) The correct identification of the author of
a crime, and (2) The actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of the
accused. All these facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength
of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense. That the defense the
accused puts up may be weak is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to
discharge the onus of his identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates that it
is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 188165, December 11, 2013
DOCTRINE:
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.
FACTS:
On November 12, 2002, Congressman Villarama of Bulacan delivered a privilege speech
in the House of Representatives denouncing acts of bribery allegedly committed by a high-
ranking government official whom he then called the "2 Million Dollar Man." In reaction, the
Office of the President directed the Presidential Anti-Graft and Commission (PAGC) to conduct
an inquiry on the expos of Cong. Villarama. PAGC sent written communications to the
concerned parties inviting them to provide information and documents on the alleged bribery
subject of the expos. On his part, Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo requested PAGC to submit
documents relevant to the same. After a series of fact-finding and preliminary investigations and
motions, the Special Panel issued a joint resolution finding probable cause and recommending
that criminal Informations be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the respondents. The
Resolutions were approved by Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez who replaced the
resigned Ombudsman Marcelo. The Informations were ultimately filed on April 15, 2008.
The Sandiganbayan ordered the quashing of the Information there being a clear
violation of the constitutional right of the accused to the speedy disposition of cases.
ISSUE:
Whether the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases of the respondents was
violated due to the inordinate delay of the Office of the Ombudsman in bringing the criminal
action
HELD:
YES. The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused
in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. While the concept
of speedy disposition is relative or flexible, such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient, the right to the speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy
trial, is deemed violated when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or
when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. The fact-finding investigation and preliminary investigation by the
Office of the Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and five months. Such long delay was
inordinate and oppressive, and constituted under the peculiar circumstances of the case an
outright violation of the respondents' right under the Constitution to the speedy disposition of
their cases.
ELECTION LAW
CAPALLA vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 201112, June 30, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Every government agencys jurisdiction must always be exercised within the bounds and
limits stated for by its charter or law. Resolutions issued by such shall be invalidated if its cause is
outside the scope of the agreement entered into, or is not within the limits provided for by the
law.
FACTS:
(This is a consolidated case) In GR 201112, Archbishop Capalla questions the vailidity of
the resolutions issued by the COMELEC relative to the extension of the Option to Purchase (OTP),
and purchase of PCOS machines; as well as a prayer that a TRO be issued enjoining the
COMELEC from purchasing the PCOS Machines until after the final judgment of the current case.
The petitioners are contending that the PCOS machines do not meet the rigorous requirements
of RA 9369, such as public bidding, and that it must have demonstrated capability and must
have been successfully used in prior electoral exercise here or abroad.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the COMELEC on issuing their assailed resolutions
HELD:
NO. An Option to Purchase is only a preparatory contract and continuing offer to enter
into a principal contract. Under such, the owner (Smartmatic) gives the optionee (COMELEC)
the right to accept the offer to purchase goods enlisted in the contract for a specified amount,
and within a specified period. In this case, the provider of the PCOS machines (Smartmatic) was
not given any preferential right not available to other providers, as the resolutions issued were of
the same amount involved in their original contract; hence, the extension to the OTP is a
favorable matter for the COMELEC and not for the provider.

GOMEZ-CASTILLO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 187231, June 22, 2010
DOCTRINE:
The Rules of Court yields to the substantive law in determining jurisdiction. The jurisdiction
over election contests involving elective municipal officials has been vested in the RTC by BP 881
or the Omnibus Election Code. On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC only spelled out the
manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction by specifying the proper
venue where such cases may be filed and heard.
FACTS:
Castillo and respondent Revilla ran for Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite during the
May 14, 2007 local elections. After the proclamation of Revilla as the elected Municipal Mayor,
Castillo filed an Election Protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite, which was eventually raffled to
Branch 19. Revilla sought the dismissal of the election protest, alleging that it was filed in the
wrong Branch of the RTC. He pointed out that Supreme Court Administrative Order (SCAO) No.
54-2007 designated Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite and Branch 88 of the RTC in Cavite City
to hear, try and decide election contests involving municipal officials in Cavite. Branch 19
dismissed Castillos election protest.
ISSUE:
Does Section 13 of Rule 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC designate the RTC Branch that has
jurisdiction over an election contest, or does it merely designate the proper venue for filing?
HELD:
It is well settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. As such, jurisdiction cannot be fixed
by the will of the parties; nor be acquired through waiver nor enlarged by the omission of the
parties; nor conferred by any acquiescence of the court.
The allocation of jurisdiction is vested in Congress, and cannot be delegated to another

office or agency of the Government. The Rules of Court does not define jurisdictional
boundaries of the courts. In promulgating the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court is circumscribed
by the zone properly denominated as the promulgation of rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts; consequently, the Rules of Court can only determine the means,
ways or manner in which said jurisdiction, as fixed by the Constitution and acts of Congress, shall
be exercised. The Rules of Court yields to the substantive law in determining jurisdiction.

GUZMAN vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 182380, August 28, 2009
DOCTRINE:
Public works as used in Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code is construed to refer
to any building or structure on land or to structures (such as roads or dams) built by the
Government for public use and paid for by public funds.
FACTS:
Thirty-nine (39) days prior to the May 9, 2004 election, City Mayor Ting purchased the two
parcels of land for use as a public cemetery. As payment, City Treasurer Garcia issued and
released a treasury warrant.
Based on the transaction, petitioner Guzman filed a complaint in the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor against City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia, charging them
with violation of Section 261, paragraphs (v) and (w), of the Omnibus Election Code, for having
undertaken to construct a public cemetery and for having released, disbursed and expended
public funds within 45 days prior to the May 9, 2004 election. The Acting Provincial Election
Supervisor of Cagayan recommended the dismissal of the complaint. The COMELEC en banc
adopted such recommendation in its own resolution and dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit, holding that the acquisition of the two parcels of land for a public cemetery was not
considered as within the term public works and that the issuance of the treasury warrant was not
for public works and was thus not in violation of Section 261 (w) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Not satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil action under Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65, Rules of Court, claiming that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in thereby
dismissing his criminal complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the acquisition of the lots during the period of the election ban are in violation
of the Omnibus Election Code
HELD:
NO. The acquisition of the subject lots for use as a public cemetery cannot be
considered a disbursement of the public funds for public works in violation of Section 261(v) of
the Omnibus Election Code. Absent an indication of any contrary legislative intention, the
term public works as used in Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code is properly construed
to refer to any building or structure on land or to structures (such as roads or dams) built by the
Government for public use and paid for by public funds. Public works are clearly works, whether
of construction or adaptation undertaken and carried out by the national, state, or municipal
authorities, designed to subserve some purpose of public necessity, use or convenience, such as
public buildings, roads, aqueducts, parks, etc.; or, in other words, all fixed works constructed for
public use.

ROXAS vs. BINAY (Resolution)
P.E.T. No. 004, August 16, 2016
DOCTRINE:
Once the term of office contested expires, the Election Protest becomes moot and
academic.
FACTS:
The Congress proclaimed Jejomar Binay as the Vice President duly elected in the May
10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Protestant Roxas initiated a protest, praying to conduct a
proper, independent and transparent Random Manual Audit of votes cast for Vice-President by
comparing the votes contained in the official ballots with the votes as recorded by the compact
flash cards; and, ultimately to annul and set aside the proclamation of Binay and to proclaim
protestant Roxas as the duly elected Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines. Binay, in
his Answer, posited that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction over the protest because the protest was
seeking to invalidate not only his election as the Vice President, but also the May 10, 2012
National and Local Elections "as a whole."
Come 2016, both parties filed their certificates of candidacy for Presidency in the 2016
National and Local Elections. The Tribunal directed them to express their interest in pursuing the
case but neither of the parties has complied with the directive. After the holding of the 2016
National and Local Elections, the NBOC officially proclaimed Rodrigo R. Duterte as the newly
elected President of the Philippines, and Ma. Leonor G. Robredo as the newly elected Vice
President of the Philippines. Both took their respective oaths of office and assumed office at
noon of June 30, 2016.
ISSUE:
Whether the case is already moot and academic
HELD:
YES. The Tribunal dismissed the protest on the ground of mootness.
When the NBOC officially proclaimed Rodrigo R. Duterte as the newly elected President
of the Philippines, and Ma. Leonor G. Robredo as the newly elected Vice President of the
Philippines, and when both took their respective oaths of office and assumed office at noon of
June 30, 2016, term of the office of Vice President being contested by the parties had expired.
Vice President Robredo has assumed the office thereby contested. Clearly, the protest and the
counter-protest that are the subject matter of this case have become moot and academic.

TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 187958, April 7, 2010
DOCTRINE:
The COMELEC is given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that
would insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created to promote
free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of the means by the COMELEC should not be
interfered with, unless the means were clearly illegal or the choice constituted grave abuse of
discretion.
FACTS:
Abraham Tolentino and Celso De Castro were proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor
and Vice-Mayor, respectively, in the May 2007 elections in Tagaytay City. The private
respondents contested the election results in 116 ballot boxes by filing 3 separate election
protests against the proclaimed winning candidates. The protests were raffled to the Second
Division of the COMELEC. Tolentino and De Castro took turns to suspend the transmittal of the
ballot boxes. Further delay occurred because 44 of the 116 contested ballot boxes became
involved in the election protest of Aquilino L. Pimentel III against Senator Juan Miguel F. Zubiri
pending in the SET. The Division then directed the Election Officer of Tagaytay City to deliver the
affected ballot boxes to the SET, with the remainder of the ballot boxes to be deposited in the
COMELEC Ballot Box Storage Area in Manila. In his Compliance Report, the Election Officer
certified that 40 ballot boxes out of the 116 protested ones were set aside due to apparent
sealing defects or irregularities. The Division, despite objections from petitioners, ordered the
constitution of the four Revision Committees and the commencement of the revision of the 44
ballot boxes. Tolentino and De Castro assailed said orders.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders despite unresolved pending issues on the
irregularity of the ballot boxes, the absence of guidelines or procedure for the conduct of the
revision proceedings, and the fact of simultaneous revision for the three protest cases
HELD:
NO. The COMELEC should not and must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in
resolving election disputes. The COMELEC, in its performance of its duties, must be given a
considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that would insure the accomplishment of
the great objective for which it was created to promote free, orderly, and honest elections.
The choice of the means by the COMELEC should not be interfered with, unless the means were
clearly illegal or the choice constituted grave abuse of discretion. To require a more stringent
rule would unduly handicap the COMELEC in the achievement of its mandate to expeditiously
dispose of election contests. Hence, a liberal construction of its rules should be conceded to the
COMELEC.

CIBAC vs. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
DOCTRINE:
If the IRRs are shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were
authorized to be issued, they must be held to be invalid and should be struck down.
FACTS:
Prior to the elections, CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC), through its
president, Emmanuel Joel Villanueva filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and
amendment of the list of nominees, whereby it withdrew the nominations of Luis K. Lokin, Jr.,
Sherwin Tugna and Emil L. Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees.
With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos,
purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of
the House of Representatives, requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de
Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied, however, that the request of
Delos Santos could not be granted because of the pendency of E.M. 07-054. Thereafter,
COMELEC en banc approved the substitution of nominees in E.M. 07-054 based on the right of
CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 which adds another
ground for substitution, xx (4) he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination xx
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 (IRR of Party List System Act) is
unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act;
HELD:
YES. The insertion of the new ground was invalid. There are only three grounds provided
for in Section 8 of the Party-List System Act before a valid substitution to take place. An axiom in
administrative law postulates that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly
adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs are shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, they must be held to be invalid and
should be struck down. Resultantly, the COMELECs approval of CIBACs petition of withdrawal
of the nominations and its recognition of CIBACs substitution should be struck down for lack of
legal basis.

TALAGA vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012
DOCTRINE:
The existence of a valid certificate of candidacy is a condition sine qua non for a valid
substitution. A declaration of disqualification renders a certificate of candidacy invalid; hence,
such candidate is not a valid candidate to be properly substituted.
FACTS:
Ramon Talaga and Philip Castillo filed their certificates of candidacy for the position of
Mayor of Lucena City for the 2010 elections. Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-
CMD, declared in his COC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected
to. Days later, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Talaga as Mayor for having already served for 3
consecutive terms.
Ramon filed a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, expressing his recognition of his
disqualification; however he did not withdraw his COC. Acting on said Manifestation, the
COMELEC First Division declared Ramon disqualified to run for Mayor. Ramon filed a
Manifestation for withdrawal. That same day, Barbara Ruby filed her own COC for Mayor in
substitution of Ramon.
The COMELEC En Banc declared the COMELEC First Division's Resolution final and
executory. On the day of the election, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but
the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate,
resulting in Barbara Ruby winning said election over Castillo. Consequently, Barbara Ruby was
proclaimed as the newly-elected Mayor of Lucena City.
ISSUE:
Whether the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of
Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband, was valid
HELD:
NO. A cancelled COC does not give rise to a valid candidacy. Thus, there can be no
valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be
clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid COC may not be validly substituted,
because a person without a valid COC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as
any person who has not filed a COC is not at all a candidate. Likewise, a candidate who has
not withdrawn his COC in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code may not
be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a substitution if the substitute
candidate submits prior to the election a sworn COC as required by Section 73 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

SUHURI vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 181869, October 2, 2009
DOCTRINE:
Petitions for pre-proclamation controversies fail in absence of any clear showing or proof
that election returns contain material defect; appears to be tampered with, falsified, or
difference of which affects the result of the election.
FACTS:
Suhuri ran for Mayor of Patikul, Sulu in 2007. During the canvassing of votes, he moved to
exclude 25 election returns on ground that they were obviously manufactured; tampered with
or falsified; prepared under duress; and characterized with statistical improbability. Municipal
Board of Canvassers (MBC) ruled against him and proclaimed Hayudini as Mayor. Suhuri insisted
on the invalidity of the proclamation because of the existing pre-proclamation controversy.
ISSUE:
Should the petition for pre-proclamation controversy prosper?
HELD:
NO. Petitions for pre proclamation controversies fail in absence of any clear showing or
proof that election returns contain material defect; appears to be tampered with, falsified, or
difference of which affects the result of the election. In this case, the defects cited by Suhuri
were mere formal defects which did not warrant exclusion (lacking BEI Signatures and thumb
marks which were later on corrected); statistical improbability did not occur as there were
neither uniformity of tallies nor systematic blanking of the candidates of one party (he received
zero votes in some precincts but the same is not true with his partymates); no manufacture of
election returns or duress in its preparation was presented in the affidavits (only irregularities
during voting which are proper grounds in election protest, not pre-proclamation controversy)

DUCO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 183366, August 19, 2009
DOCTRINE:
An appeal should be perfected within the brief span of 5 days from notice of the
decision of the trial court, together with the payment of appeal fees within such period
otherwise, his appeal risks dismissal.
FACTS:
Herein petitioner was proclaimed as the elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Ibabao,
Loay, Bohol in the October 2007 simultaneous barangay and SK elections. His opponent,
respondent Avelino, initiated an election protest in the MCTC, seeking a recount of the ballots in
four precincts on the ground that that the election results for the position of Punong
Barangay were spurious and fraudulent and did not reflect the true will of the electorate. The
MCTC ruled in favor of respondent Avelino; hence, Duco filed his notice of appeal and paid the
required appeal fees. The COMELEC, however dismissed Ducos appeal on the ground of his
failure to pay the correct appeal fee as prescribed under the its Rules of Procedure. His Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise denied for nonpayment of necessary motion fees.
ISSUE:
Whether the failure to pay the necessary fees constitute a valid ground for dismissal of
action
HELD:
YES. The dismissal of the appeal was in accordance with Sec. 9 (a), Rule 22 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which pertinently states: The appeal may be dismissed upon
motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission on any of the following grounds:
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee; xxx
The payment of the deficiency beyond the five-day reglementary period did not cure the
defect, because the date of the payment of the appeal fee is deemed the actual date of the
filing of the notice of appeal. Accordingly, his appeal, filed already beyond the five-day
reglementary period, rendered the decision of the MCTC final and immutable.

LLOREN vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 196355, September 18, 2012
DOCTRINE:
The court shall summarily dismiss an election protest if the petition is insufficient in form
and content. Failure to state thetotal number of precincts in the municipality warrants the
dismissal of the election protest.
FACTS:
Bienvenido Lloren and respondent Rogelio Pua, Jr. were the candidates for Vice-Mayor
of the Municipality of Inopacan, Leyte in the May 10, 2010 elections. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Pua as the winning candidate. Alleging massive vote-buying,
intimidation, defective PCOS machines in all the clustered precincts, election fraud, and other
election-related manipulations, Lloren commenced an election protest case in the RTC of Leyte.
On November 12, 2010, the RTC dismissed the election protest for insufficiency in form and
substance and for failure to pay the required cash deposit. On November 17, 2010, Lloren filed a
notice of appeal in the RTC, and paid the appeal fee of P1,000.00 to the same court. The RTC
granted due course to the appeal on November 24, 2010. On December 2, 2010, the fifteenth
day from the filing of the notice of appeal, Lloren remitted the appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the
COMELEC Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) by postal money order. Through
the first assailed order of January 31, 2011, however, the COMELEC First Division dismissed the
appeal on the ground of petitioner's failure to pay the appeal fee within the period set under
Section 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Lloren moved for the reconsideration of
the dismissal on February 14, 2011, and later sent a notice dated March 3, 2011, stating that he
paid the motion fee of P300.00 by postal money order. On March 16, 2011, the COMELEC En
Banc denied Llorens motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners election protest should be given merit
HELD:
NO. Petitioners election protest lacks merit. Under A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC, an election protest
shall state ii) The total number of precincts in the municipality. In this case, petitioner did not
indicate the total number of precincts in the municipality in his election protest. The omission
rendered the election protest insufficient in form and content and warranted its summary
dismissal. The RTC likewise found that the cash deposit made by petitioner was insufficient.

CAGAS vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012
DOCTRINE
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an
election protest may not directly assail the order in the SC through a special civil action
for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the
decision of the Division in due course.
FACTS:
Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules
and resolutions, for the position of Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010
automated national and local elections, Claude P. Bautista filed an electoral protest on May 24,
2010. The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division. On August 13, 2010, the COMELEC
First Division issued the first assailed order denying the special affirmative defenses of the
petitioner. The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not discuss
whether the protest specified the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the elections and
prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC en banc. In his opposition, Bautista
countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the
COMELEC en banc. On October 7, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed
order, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first order
was contrary to law. Not satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil action directly to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the petition for certiorari
HELD:
NO. The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, although it
confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits
such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to
an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no
power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division
of the COMELEC. The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc may
be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1964 Revised Rules of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be
no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion
for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this
procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition. In like manner, a
decision, order or resolution of a division of the COMELEC must be reviewed by the COMELEC en
banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory

AGUSTIN vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015
DOCTRINE:
An electoral candidates continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of another country
through using his foreign passport after the renunciation of his foreign citizenship reverts him to his
earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion disqualifies him from being elected to public office
in the Philippines pursuant to Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code.
FACTS:
In 1997, Arsenio Agustin was naturalized as a citizen of the U.S.A. He filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. Respondent
Salvador Pillos, a rival mayoralty candidate, filed in the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course
and/or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin, alleging that the petitioner
had made a material misrepresentation in his COC by stating that he had been a resident of the
Municipality of Marcos for 25 years despite having registered as a voter therein only on May 31,
2012. The COMELEC Second Division issued its omnibus resolution in favor of Agustin. Pillos moved
for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, underscoring that the certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration reflected that Agustin had voluntarily declared in his travel documents
that he was a citizen of the USA; that when he travelled to Hawaii, USA on October 6, 2012, he
still used his USA passport despite his renunciation of his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012 and
after filing his COC on October 5, 2012, in which he declared that he was a resident of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte; and that the petitioner's declaration of his eligibility in his
COC constituted material misrepresentation because of his failure to meet the citizenship and
residency requirements.
ISSUE:
Whether an electoral candidate who continues to use his foreign passport is qualified to
run for public office
HELD:
NO. The petitioner's continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA through using
his USA passport after the renunciation of his USA citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as
a dual citizen. Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to public office in the
Philippines pursuant to Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code. It is not disputed that
on October 6, 2012, after having renounced his USA citizenship and having already filed his
Certificate of Candidacy, Agustin travelled abroad using his USA passport, thereby representing
himself as a citizen of the USA. He continued using his USA passport in his subsequent travels
abroad despite having been already issued his Philippine passport on August 23, 2012. He
thereby effectively repudiated his oath of renunciation on October 6, 2012, the first time he used
his USA passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012. Consequently, he could
be considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days from October 2, 2012 until
October 6, 2012.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PUBLIC OFFICERS
LIMKAICHONG vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 158464, August 02, 2016
DOCTRINE:
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested
in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable
compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.
FACTS:
Limkaichong was the owner of agricultural lands in Negros Oriental. For purposes of
placing those lands within the coverage of CARP, the DARAB in Dumaguete City sent her
several Notices of Land Valuation and Acquisition, which she rejected. The DARAB conducted
summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation issued its order
affirming the valuation of the lands. Petitioner then filed in the RTC, as special agrarian court
(SAC), a complaint for the fixing of just compensation for her lands. The RTC granted the
respondents' motion to dismiss ruling that the petitioner's complaint should have been filed within
15 days from notice of the assailed order. The petitioner brought her petition for certiorari in the
CA but the CA rendered its decision affirming the dismissal of the civil case.
ISSUE:
Whether he dismissal of petitioner's action was fair and proper
HELD:
NO. The dismissal of petitioner's action was unfair and improper. The ruling in Republic v.
Court of Appeals, which was principally relied upon by the petitioner herein and which is the
prevailing rule at the time she filed her complaint, reiterated that the determination of just
compensation for the taking of lands under the CARL was a power vested in the courts and not
in administrative agencies, clarifying that the jurisdiction of the SAC was not appellate but
original and exclusive. In accordance with it, the private respondent's case was properly
brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the
terminology of 57, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." It would
subvert this "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in
compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the
review of administrative decisions.
However, in the light of the conflict in the rulings of the Court, the Supreme Court, in this
case, upheld that the better rule is that while a petition for the fixing of just compensation with
the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicator's decision but an original action,
the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the
adjudicator's decision will attain finality.

PCSD vs. LIM
G.R. No. 183173, August 24, 2016
DOCTRINE:
Administrative agencies granted quasi- legislative functions may craft rules and
regulations, within the bounds of its mandate, in order to implement the purpose for which it was
created.
FACTS:
Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) is an administrative agency
tasked to implement RA 7611 on the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan.
Lim operated a nonscheduled air taxi which transports fish and other cargo from
Palawan. PCSD issued Administrative Orders to the effect that only PCSD accredited carriers
shall be allowed to transport fish in Palawan. Air Transportation Office (ATO) then sent a notice to
PCSD stating that ATO-authorized carriers (including Lims) are common carriers which should be
exempted from PCSD accreditation. Lim continued operation despite several Notices of
Violation. He then sought the help of the CA which issued a TRO finding that PCSD overreached
its authority.
ISSUE:
Were the Administrative Orders, Resolutions, Notices of Violation, and Show Cause Orders
given by PCSD null and void for having been issued in excess its authority?
HELD:
NO. They are well within the powers of PCSD. PCSD was established to implement RA
7611s adoption of the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan consistent with the policy
of the state to protect, develop, and conserve its natural resources. Section 19 of RA 7611 state
the following as one of the powers and functions of the Council:
Adopt, amend and rescind such rules and regulations and impose penalties therefor for the effective
implementation of the SEP and the other provisions of this Act.
Accordingly, the PCSD had the explicit authority to fill in the details as to how to carry out
the objectives of R.A. No. 7611 in protecting and enhancing Palawan's natural resources
consistent with the SEP. In that task, the PCSD could establish a methodology for the effective
implementation of the SEP. Moreover, the PCSD was expressly given the authority to impose
penalties and sanctions in relation to the implementation of the SEP and the other provisions of
R.A. No. 7611. As such, the PCSD's issuance of A.O. No. 00-95 and Resolution No. 03-211 was well
within its statutory authority. The assailed Administrative Orders, Resolutions, Notices of Violations,
and Show Cause Orders are valid.

ESTRELLADO vs. DAVID
G.R. No. 184288, February 16, 2016
DOCTRINE:
The next-in-rank status of a government employee is not a guarantee to one's fitness to
the position aspired for, and the applicant must go through the rigors of a screening and
selection process as determined and conducted by a department or agency, subject only to
the standards and guidelines set by the Civil Service Commission.
FACTS:
After conducting screenings, the appointment of Hipoilto R. Garboni and Roberto S. Se
were recommended to the LTO for the vacant positions of TRO II and AO IV within the LTO Law
Enforcement Service. Thereafter, petitioners Eric Estrellado, TRO 1, and Jossie Borja, Records
Officer III, who were also applicants for the aforementioned positions and in their alleged
capacities as next-in-rank employees, filed with the Civil Service Commission, a petition to
declare the LTO-CO-SPB selection procedure null and void, alleging among others, that Garboni
and Se did not meet the requirements for the positions of TRO II and AO IV.
ISSUE:
Whether the appointments of Garboni and Se violated pertinent laws, including Republic
Act No. 7041 (An Act Requiring Regular Publication)
HELD:
NO. The screening process is that which each department or agency formulates and
administers in accordance with the law, rules, regulations, and standards set by the CSC. If
neither the law nor the IRR define the specific criteria of the screening process, each agency or
department is empowered to formulate its own screening processes subject to the standards
and guidelines set by the CSC.
In this case, the appointing authority exercised the right of choice, freely exercising its
best judgment, in determining the best-qualified applicants from those who had the necessary
qualifications and eligibilities. The CSC did not violate the rule on the three-salary grade
promotion because Se's promotion, six steps upwards, came under one of the exceptions
specified in CSC Resolution No. 03-0106. The CSC also declared that the appointments had
resulted from a deep selection process that considered the appointees' superior qualities on
educational achievements, highly specialised trainings, relevant work experience, and
consistent high-performance rating/ranking.

MATEO vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROMULO
G.R. No. 177875, August 8, 2016
DOCTRINE:
Administrative due process simply means the opportunity to be heard or to explain one's
side, or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In administrative
proceedings, formal hearing is not necessary.
FACTS:
Rodolfo Mateo was first employed by the National Water Resources Board as Attorney IV.
He was later appointed as Executive Director.
38 NWRB employees lodged a complaint affidavit with the Presidential Anti-Graft

Commission (PAGC) charging petitioner Mateo with dishonesty, usurpation of authority and
conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. The complaint alleged that he had not
disclosed the existence of a prior criminal conviction for homicide. The PAGC found the
petitioner administratively liable as charged.
The petitioner sought for reconsideration, claiming that the absolute pardon granted by
Pres. Aquino completely erased his criminal conviction, thereby eliminating the need for him to
disclose his previous criminal liability in his PDS. The petitioner contends that the right to due
process in administrative proceedings should include the right to confront his accusers. He
invoked his right to confrontation and sought a formal hearing through his motion for
reconsideration in the OP.
ISSUE:
Whether a formal hearing is necessary in administrative proceedings
HELD:
NO. Administrative due process simply means the opportunity to be heard or to explain
one's side, or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Petitioner had
been duly notified of the complaint against him and of the formal hearings conducted by the
PAGC. The requirements of administrative due process are satisfied once the parties are
afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides. The administrative
agency could resolve the issues based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary
evidence submitted by the parties.

DECENA vs. JUDGE MALANYAON
AM RTJ-10-2217, April 2013
DOCTRINE:
In administrative cases, the requirement of due process is satisfied whenever the parties
are afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy, either
through oral arguments or through pleadings.
FACTS:
A complaint was filed against Judge Malanyaon for violations of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippines Judiciary, when he sat beside his daughter, Atty. Kristina
Malanyaon, the counsel and coached her on what to do during the hearing in another
administrative case against the Judges wife, Dr. Amelita Malanyaon. The Judge contends that
it was his duty as husband and father.
The Court required the parties in this case to manifest within 10 days of they were willing
to submit the case for resolution. However, Judge Malanyaon did not submit any compliance
because according to his counsel, the Judge suffered a massive stroke that impaired his mental
faculty, which was certified by a medical certificate. Dr. Amelita, wife of the complained judge,
submitted a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that because of the stroke, the judge
cannot properly avail himself of his rights in an adversarial administrative investigation.
ISSUES:
Whether Judge Malanyaon would be denied of due process if the administrative case
was not dismissed
HELD:
NO. Respondents right to due process is not violated. Prior to his suffering the massive
stroke that impaired his mental faculty, Judge Malanyaon already submitted his comment
containing his explanations and refutations of the charge against him. Under the
circumstances, Judge Malanyaon was accorded due process. In administrative cases, the
requirement of due process is satisfied whenever the parties are afforded the fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy, either through oral arguments or
through pleadings.

GARCIA vs. MOLINA
G.R. No. 165223, January 11, 2016
DOCTRINE:
An employee who is placed under preventive suspension pending investigation is not
entitled to compensation because such suspension is not a penalty but only a means of
enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. Backwages
corresponding to the period of suspension is proper only if he is found innocent of the charges
and the suspension is declared to be unjustified.
FACTS:
Elino Caretero stated that it was respondent Mario Molina who handed to him a letter
containing "scurrilous and libellous statements" against petitioner Winston Garcia, the President
and GM of GSIS. The finger of suspicion came to point at Molina. Consequently, Molina was
administratively investigated for grave misconduct. He was required to explain the circulation
and publication of the letter, and to show cause why no administrative sanction should be
imposed on him for doing so. In response, he denied the imputed act.
Garcia issued a Memorandum to formally charge Molina with grave misconduct, and to
preventively suspend him for 60 days effective upon receipt. Molina also instituted in a special
civil action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to challenge the legality of the Memorandum.
Upon review, the CA nullified the assailed Memorandum and decreed that Molina is entitled to
his backwages during the period of his preventive suspension. Garcia appealed by petition for
review on certiorari, contending that the CA gravely erred in awarding backwages to Molina.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent who was preventively suspended is entitled to backwages
HELD:
NO. Respondent Molina is not entitled to backwages during the time that he was under
preventive suspension. There are 2 types of preventive suspension of civil service employees
charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension:
(1) Preventive suspension pending investigation;
(2) Preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is
suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated.
(3)
An employee placed under preventive suspension pending investigation is not entitled to
compensation because such suspension is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the
disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. In this case, Molinas preventive
suspension was done pending investigation. The fact that the charge against the him was
subsequently declared to lack factual and legal bases did not, ipso facto, render the preventive
suspension without legal basis.
The formal charge against Molina was for grave misconduct, an administrative offense
that justifies the imposition of the preventive suspension of the respondent. Backwages
corresponding to the period of suspension of a civil service employee who is reinstated is proper
only if he is found innocent of the charges and the suspension is declared to be unjustified.
Considering that the respondent's preventive suspension had legal basis, he was not entitled to
backwages.

PUBLIC CORPORATION
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

MANALANG-DEMIGILLO
G.R. No. 176343, September 18, 2012
DOCTRINE:
among the prerequisites before she may be preventively suspended.
FACTS:
TIDCORP formally charged its Senior Vice-President Maria Rosario Manalang-Demigillo
with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, insubordination,
and gross discourtesy in the course of official duties for several incidents of verbal tussles with its
President and CEO, Mr. Joel Valdes. Pending investigation, TIDCORP placed Demigillo under
preventive suspension for 90 days. Demigillo assailed her preventive suspension in the Civil
Service Commission which issued a resolution declaring her preventive suspension to be "not in
order." The CSC stated that under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
a civil service officer like Demigillo might be preventively suspended by the disciplining authority
only if said authority can prove Demigillo's possibility of influencing potential witnesses against
her or tampering with documentary evidence on file in her office.
ISSUE:
Whether it is necessary to prove that the officer or employee has the possibility of
influencing potential witnesses against her or tampering with documentary evidence on file in
her office before he/she can be preventively suspended
HELD:
NO. It is clear from the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service that
before an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation may validly issue, only two
prerequisites need be shown
(1) that the proper disciplining authority has served a formal charge to the affected
officer or employee; and
(2) that the charge involves either dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in
the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of the
charges which would warrant her removal from the service.
among the prerequisites. Preventing the subordinate officer or employee from influencing the
witnesses and tampering the documentary evidence under her custody are mere purposes for
which an order of preventive suspension may issue.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. SAMSON DE LEON
G.R. No. 154083, February 27, 2013
DOCTRINE:
The decision of the Office of the Ombudsman is immediately executory, and an appeal
therefrom does not stop the decision from being executory.
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman found Samson De Leon liable for Gross Neglect of Duty in
relation to his positions as Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) and
Chairman of the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board after conducting an investigation regarding
illegal quarrying committed in the Municipality of Baras, Rizal. De Leon was penalized with 1 year
suspension without pay. On petition for review, De Leon averred that the Office of the
Ombudsman erred and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
finding him liable for gross neglect of duty and for effecting the immediate execution of the
suspension pending appeal. The Court of Appeals reduced the suspension to 3 months without
pay for Simple Neglect of Duty and held that the decision of the Ombudsman is not immediately
executory.
ISSUE:
Whether the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman is immediately executory
HELD:
YES. An appeal shall not stop the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman from being
executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal,
he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary
and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.

REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 166859, April 2012
DOCTRINE:
In cases of Ill-Gotten Wealth, it does not suffice that the respondent is or was a
association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
FACTS:
The Republic commenced a civil case in the Sandiganbayan impleading as defendants
respondent Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and 59 individual defendants. Cojuangco allegedly
purchased a block of 33,000,000 shares of San Miguel Corporation stock through the 14 holding
companies owned by the CIIF Oil Mills. It was alleged that Cojuangco, the "coconut king" with
unlimited powers to deal with the coconut levy funds, took undue advantage of his association,
influence and connection, acting in unlawful concert with defendants Ferdinand Marcos, and
misused the coconut levy funds to buy out majority of the outstanding shares of stock of San
Miguel Corporation.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff to prove by preponderance
of evidence its causes of action against defendants with respect to the 20% outstanding shares
of stock of San Miguel Corporation registered in defendants names. Republic of the Philippines
appealed the case to the Supreme Court invoking that coconut levy funds are public funds. The
SMC shares, which were acquired by respondents Cojuangco, Jr. and the Cojuangco
companies with the use of coconut levy funds in violation of respondent Cojuangco, Jr.s
fiduciary obligation are, necessarily, public in character and should be reconveyed to the
government.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case
HELD:
NO. In cases of Ill-Gotten Wealth, it does not suffice that the respondent is or was a
association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
In this case, it is the Republics burden to establish that respondents SMC shares had
been illegally acquired with coconut-levy funds. This burden was not discharged.
Although the trust relationship supposedly arose from Cojuangcos being an officer and
member of the Board of Directors of the UCPB, the link between this alleged fact and the
borrowings or advances was not established. Nor was there evidence on the loans or
borrowings, their amounts, the approving authority, etc. As trial court, the Sandiganbayan could
not presume his breach of fiduciary duties without evidence showing so, for fraud or breach of
trust is never presumed, but must be alleged and proved. Absent any special facts and
circumstances proving a higher degree of responsibility, any dealings between a lender and
borrower are not fiduciary in nature.
RE: FAILURE OF FORMER JUDGE ANTONIO A. CARBONELL TO DECIDE CASES SUBMITTED
FOR DECISION AND TO RESOLVE PENDING MOTIONS IN THE RTC, BR 27, SF, LA UNION
A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 9, 2013
DOCTRINE:
Failure to decide several cases within the reglementary period, without justifiable and
credible reasons, constitutes gross inefficiency.
FACTS:
In view of the disability retirement of Presiding Judge Antonio Carbonell, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit on Branch 27, RTC of San Fernando, La
Union. According to the audit report, Judge Carbonell failed to decide 41 criminal cases and 22
civil cases, and failed to resolve pending motions in 4 criminal and 12 civil cases. A fine was
recommended for gross inefficiency for failing to promptly decide the cases and to resolve
pending motions and incidents.
Judge Carbonell contended that some of the undecided cases were inherited, and
some have no transcripts of stenographic notes; hence he ordered a submission of memoranda
by the parties.
The OCA found that the failure to resolve the motions within the 90-day reglementary
period was caused by the inefficiency of Judge Carbonell, as in some of the cases, he just gave
ample time to file their memo to the parties involved, without any specific deadline indicated.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Carbonell is grossly inefficient on his obligations as Presiding Judge
HELD:
YES. It was held that as a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should at all times
act with efficiency and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to
maintain professional competence.
Judge Carbonells failure to decide several cases within the reglementary period,
without justifiable and credible reasons, constituted gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition
of administrative sanctions, like fines. The fines imposed have varied in each case, depending
chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other factors,
including the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances like the damage suffered by
the parties from the delay, the health condition and age of the judge, etc.

REAS vs. RELACION
A.M. No. P-05-2095, February 09, 2011
DOCTRINE:
A compromise agreement does not necessarily warrant the dismissal of administrative
matters.
FACTS:
Benigno Reas is the Sheriff IV of RTC Cebu. He charged a complaint against Carlos
Relacion, Clerk III of the RTC. He alleged in his complaint, that by prior arrangement, the Clerk of
Court of the RTC delivered to the Cebu CFI Community Cooperative the salary checks of court
personnel with outstanding obligations with the Cooperative to pay for their loans.
According to Reas, his salary check was delivered by the COC to the Cooperative for
that purpose; that when he asked for the receipt corresponding to his payment, the
Cooperative informed him that his salary check had been "inadvertently surrendered" to
Relacion after the latter had harassed the Cooperative "to a point of violence" to release his
(Relacion) own check for that period; that Relacion did not return the salary check to the
Cooperative despite repeated demands; that when he confronted Relacion, the latter
admitted taking his salary check; that Relacion mauled him when he refused Relacion's offer to
pay his salary check with Relacion's JDF check; and that it was only after the Cooperative
confronted Relacion that the latter paid his salary check.
The parties entered into a compromise agreement. Relacion through a letter-request,

implored the Court to approve the compromise agreement and to dismiss the administrative
matter.
ISSUE:
Whether a compromise agreement necessarily warrant the dismissal of administrative
matters
HELD:
NO. Three reasons justify the continuation of the administrative matter despite the
compromise agreement or the forgiveness. One, the Court's disciplinary authority is not
dependent on or cannot be frustrated by the private arrangements entered into by the parties.
Two, public interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of the officials and employees of
the Judiciary. Accordingly, the efforts of the Court in improving the delivery of justice to the
people should not be frustrated and put to naught by any private arrangements between the
parties. And, three, the Court's interest in the affairs of the Judiciary is a paramount concern that
bows to no limits.

RE: EMPLOYEES INCURRING HABITUAL TARDINESS IN THE SECOND SEMESTER OF 2009
A.M. No. 2010-11-SC, March 15, 2011
DOCTRINE:
Employees of the Judiciary should observe punctuality in reporting to work. Tardiness, if
habitual, prejudices the efficiency of the service being rendered by the Judiciary to the people,
and cannot be tolerated.
FACTS:
On July 5, 2010, the OAS directed the concerned employees to explain in writing why no
administrative disciplinary action should be taken against them for their habitual tardiness during
the covered period, which habitual tardiness was in violation of Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1991, viz: An employee shall be considered habitually
tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten (10) times a month for at
least two (2) months in a semester or at least two (2) consecutive months during the year. The
OAS concluded that the concerned employees had incurred habitual tardiness and that their
justifications were unacceptable.
ISSUE:
Whether habitual tardiness is a ground for administrative liability
HELD:
YES. Public office is a public trust. This canon includes the mandate for the observance of
prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every moment of such hours for the public
service, because only thereby may the public servants recompense the Government and the
people for shouldering the costs of maintaining the Judiciary. Accordingly, court officials and
employees must at all times strictly observe official hours to inspire the publics respect for the
justice system. There is no question that all the concerned employees incurred habitual tardiness
within the context of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1991. Thereby, they fell short of
the standard of conduct demanded from everyone connected with the administration of
justice.
The nature and functions of the employment of the officials and employees of the
Judiciary require them to be role models in the faithful observance of the constitutional canon
that public office is a public trust. They are always accountable to the people, whom they must
serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. Absenteeism and tardiness are,
therefore, impermissible. The respective justifications of the concerned employees are not
unacceptable. If at all, such justifications may only mitigate liability.

CONCERNED CITIZEN vs. CATENA
A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P, July 16, 2013
DOCTRINE:
Gross dishonesty on the part of an employee of the Judiciary is a very serious offense that
must be severely punished. Even at the first offense, dismissal may be meted on the employee,
unless she had meanwhile ceased to be an employee, in which case a high fine shall be
imposed.
FACTS:
An administrative case was filed following an undated anonymous letter-complaint
charging respondent Nonita Catena, a Court Stenographer of the RTC Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan, with gross dishonesty for allegedly causing another person to take the 1998 Civil
Service Eligibility Examination in her stead. In January 2002, the complaint was forwarded to the
Office of the Court Administrator. The investigation revealed discrepancies between the
pictures, signatures and other details contained in the Career Service Examination permit
submitted to the Civil Service Commission. The Court Administrator repeatedly directed Catena
to comment on the anonymous complaint but the latter failed to do so. Catena resigned from
her position in January 2003.
ISSUE:
Whether a finding of dishonesty against a Civil Service Employee carries with it the
penalty of dismissal even at the first offense
HELD:
YES. Considering that Catena's misrepresentation of her eligibility concerned a material
fact that enabled her to secure her appointment equated to her deliberate fabrication of the
truth concerning her eligibility, she was guilty of gross dishonesty. A finding of dishonesty against
an employee in the Civil Service carries with it the penalty of dismissal. Under the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Rules (Revised Uniform Rules), dishonesty is
classified as a grave offense that is already punishable by dismissal from the service even at the
first offense.

GANZON vs. ARLOS
G.R. No. 174321, October 22, 2013
DOCTRINE:
To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected
with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.
FACTS:
Fernando Arlos filed an administrative charge for grave misconduct against Rolando
Ganzon on the ground that the latter aimed his loaded firearm at and menaced the former
during their Christmas party at the DILG Regional Office in Iloilo City. The Civil Service
Commission found Ganzon guilty of grave misconduct and meted out the penalty of dismissal
from the service with all its accessory penalties. On appeal, Ganzon argued that his acts did not
constitute grave misconduct in the contemplation of the law because they were not committed
in relation to his performance of duty; and that the Christmas party was not an official function
as to render any untoward incident committed on the occasion thereof a misconduct.
ISSUE:
Whether Ganzons acts constitute grave misconduct
HELD:
YES. Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should be related or
be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In
grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.
In this case, Ganzon resented the poor performance rating he had received, and his
resentment caused his aggressive confrontation of Arlos. Thus, Ganzon's offense could not be
separated from his performance of duty.

ATTY. MANALANG-DEMIGILLO vs. TIDCORP
G.R. No. 168613, March 5, 2013
DOCTRINE:
The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency does not extend to Board of Directors where
some members sat ex officio, or by reason of their office or function.
FACTS:
Atty. Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo) was appointed as Senior Vice President
with permanent status, and was assigned to the Legal and Corporate Services Department
(LCSD) of TIDCORP.
The Board of Directors of TIDCORP passed a Resolution approving a so-called

Organizational Refinement/Restructuring Plan to implement a new organizational structure. The
LCSD was abolished. Demigillo, albeit retaining her position as a Senior VP, was assigned to head
the Remedial and Credit Management Support Sector. Atty. Demigillo sent a letter to TIDCORP
Chairman Jose Camacho and challenged the validity her assignment to the RCMSS. She
averred that she had been illegally removed from her position of Senior Vice President in the
LCSD. She insisted that the Board of Directors had not been authorized to undertake the
reorganization and corporate restructuring.
TIDCORP argues for the application of the doctrine of qualified political agency,
contending that the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP, an attached agency of the
Department of Finance whose head, the Secretary of Finance, was an alter ego of the
President, were also the acts of the President.
ISSUE:
Whether the Board of Directors of TIDCORP is authorized to undertake the reorganization
and corporate restructuring, applying the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
HELD:
The reorganization was valid BUT the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency does not
apply in this case.
The doctrine of qualified political agency states that the heads of the various executive
departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in
the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the President
himself should disapprove such acts. However, in this case, the doctrine of qualified political
agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP. This is because,
although some of the Board Members are appointees of the President, some members sat ex
officio, or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the
Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board.
The reorganization is valid for being done in accordance with the exclusive and final
authority expressly granted under Republic Act No. 8494, further amending Presidential Decree
No. 1080, the law creating TIDCORP itself, stating: Section 7. The Board of Directors shall provide
for an organizational structure. . .

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE vs. SPOUSES DAVID AND ELISEA RAMOS
G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011
DOCTRINE
The immunity of the State does not extend to a government agency engaged in the
enterprise that is far from being the prerogative of the State, which must be purely governmental
or sovereign in function.
FACTS:
Spouses Ramos discovered that a portion of their land was being used as part of the
runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport operated by Air Transportation Office. The
spouses agreed to sell the land to ATO but the latter failed to pay the consideration. The spouse
filed for collection against ATO. The ATO, in its affirmative defense, contended that they cannot
be sued without the States consent since the deed of sale was originally entered into in the
performance of governmental functions.
ISSUE:
Whether the Doctrine of State Immunity may be invoked by ATO, a government agency
performing propriety functions
HELD:
NO. The doctrine of state immunity does not extend to government agencies not
performing a purely governmental or sovereign function.
In this case, ATO is an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental
or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the
Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign
capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit.
Further, the Doctrine of State Immunity it cannot be applied if such will defeat a valid
claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the
proper expropriation proceedings.

NHA vs. ROXAS
G.R. No. 171953, October 21, 2015
DOCTRINE:
A government-owned and controlled corporation may sue and be sued. However, no
court shall issue a writ of execution upon any monetary judgment rendered against the GOCC
unless such monetary judgment is submitted to and passed upon by the Commission on Audit.
FACTS:
The National Housing Authority (NHA) is charged with the Dagat-Dagatan Development
Project in Navotas.
Ernesto Roxas applied for commercial lots for his gravel, sand, and cement business, with
an area of 176 square meters. , and sold at P1,500/sq.m. However, upon final subdivision project
survey, Roxas area was increased from 176 to 320 square meters. The respondent has been
informed and it was agreed that the additional area will be sold for at P3,500/sq.m. The
respondent appealed for a reduction of the price, as making it the same with the original
contract price, since it was a matter only of technicalities which resulted to the increase. Upon
rejection by the NHA, Roxas appealed to the RTC where his appeal was granted, with additional
indemnification for Attorneys Fees. The CA upheld the decision of the RTC.
Roxas filed a writ of execution, which was granted by RTC. The NHA countered that the
RTC gravely abused their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because the writ
should not be granted. The CA dismissed the certiorari by the NHA and held that since NHA is a
government-owned and -controlled corporation whose funds were not exempt from
garnishment or execution, Roxas need to first file his claim in the COA.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent, in order to execute the judgment of the RTC against NHA,
needed to file his claim to the Commission on Audit first before filing a Writ of Execution to the
RTC
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court partially considered the issue. The SC held that the NHA is not
immune from suit, as stated under its Charter. As to the implementation of the writ of execution,
the specific performance of the reduction of the price shall be immediately executed, it being
under their management and disposition for the development of the Dagat-Dagatan.
However, as to the payment of Attorneys Fees, it must first be submitted to the

Commission on Audit being a monetary obligation and thus, considered as all debts and claims
of any sort, which falls under the powers vested to the COA.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DIZON
G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Trial judges should not immediately issue writs of execution or garnishment against the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities to enforce money
judgments. The primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all claims due from the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities pertains to the Commission
on Audit.
FACTS:
The University of the Philippines entered into a General Construction Agreement with
Stern Builders for the construction of CAS Building in UPLB. Only 2 out of 3 billings were paid
because the third one was disallowed. The disallowance was lifted, but still, no payment has
been made. Stern Builders sued the UP and its officials to collect the unpaid billings which the
RTC granted. Several motions have been raised, and this case revolves with the issuance of the
RTC of a Writ of Execution with the sheriffs serving of notices of garnishment on UPs depository
banks. UP challenges the jurisdiction of the RTC in issuing the writ involving the garnishment of its
funds.
ISSUE:
Whether the funds of the UP were proper subject of garnishment
HELD:
NO. UPs funds, being government funds, are not subject of proper garnishment. UP
remains to be a chartered institution performing a legitimate government function. All the funds
going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such
funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which
should always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to
auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character.
Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTCs writ of
execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it
had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP,
because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability. It was of no moment that a
final and executory decision already validated the claim against the UP.
The settlement of the monetary claim was still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the
COA despite the final decision of the RTC having already validated the claim. As such, Stern
Builders as one of the claimants had no alternative except to first seek the approval of the COA
of their monetary claim.

SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION vs. CANDA, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 160932, January 14, 2013
DOCTRINE:
The grant or denial of an application for Environmental Compliance Certificate/
Certificate of Non-Coverage is not an act that is purely ministerial in nature, but one that
involves the exercise of judgment and discretion by the Environmental Management Board
applicant.
FACTS:
Special People, Inc. Foundation applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with
the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, seeking to be exempt from the
requirement of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for its water-resource
development and utilization project in Loboc, Bohol. Upon evaluating the nature and
magnitude of the environmental impact of the project, respondent Nestor Canda, then Chief of
EMB in Bohol, rendered his findings stating that the project is located within a critical area;
hence, Initial Environmental Examination is required. Petitioner appealed Canda's findings to
respondent EMB Region 7 Director Bienvenido Lipayon, who notified the petitioner that its
documents substantially complied with the procedural aspects of the EMB's review, and that the
application was assigned a control number for easy reference. Lipayon required the petitioner
to submit several certifications to enable the EMB to determine whether the project was within
an environmentally critical area or not. Petitioner sought and obtained the required
certifications; however, the PHIVOLCS certification did not state the required statement that the
project area was within a critical slope. Given the tenor of the certification from PHIVOLCS,
Lipayon's letter declared that the petitioner was not entitled to the CNC. Petitioner filed a
petition for mandamus and damages in the RTC, alleging that Lipayon already exercised his
discretion in its case when he made his finding that the application substantially complied with
the procedural requirements for review. As such, he was then obliged to issue the CNC once the
petitioner had submitted the required certifications.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of the Certificate of Non-Coverage is ministerial after the
procedural requirements have been complied with
HELD:
NO. The grant or denial of an application for ECC/CNC is not an act that is purely
ministerial in nature, but one that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion by the EMB
applicant. Regional Director Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his discretion since his finding
referred to the "procedural requirements for review" only. He had still to decide on the
substantive aspect of the application, that is, whether the project and the project area were
considered critical to the environment.

MMDA vs. TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT ADVERTISING, VENDING AND PROMOTIONS, INC.
G.R. No. 179554, December 16, 2009
DOCTRINE:
The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other
advertising media applies only to public areas not to private properties.
FACTS:
The Government, through the DOTC, entered into a Build-Lease-Transfer agreement with
Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Ltd. (MRTC) pursuant to RA 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer
Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own
MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the
Government. The BLT agreement stipulated that MRTC could build and develop commercial
premises in the MRT3 structures, or obtain advertising income therefrom.
Trackworks, Inc. entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks
thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertizing media in the different
parts of the MRT3. However, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle said installations pursuant
to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA
proceeded to dismantle the former's billboards and similar forms of advertisement.
Trackworks filed an injunction suit against MMDA. The RTC rendered its decision
permanently enjoining MMDA from dismantling, removing or destroying the billboards, signages
and other advertizing media installed by Trackworks. On appeal, MMDA claimed that its
mandate under its charter of formulating, coordinating and monitoring of policies, standards,
progress and projects for the use of thoroughfares and the promotion of safe and convenient
movement of persons and goods prompted its issuance of MMDA Regulation No. 96-009.
ISSUE:
Whether the MMDA could unilaterally dismantle installations in the structures of the MRT3
despite it being a private property
HELD:
NO. Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time
material to this case, MRTC's entering into the contract for advertising services with Trackworks
was a valid exercise of ownership by the former. The Supreme Court agrees with the CA's ruling
that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 did not apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages and other
advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages
and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property
pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas
as to which the prohibition applied.

BLAS vs. SPOUSES GALAPON
G.R. No. 159710, September 30, 2009
DOCTRINE:
For one to be considered an absentee structure owner, the following requisites must
concur: one, the person must own a structure or dwelling unit within the ZIP zone; and two, the
person has not occupied the structure or dwelling unit prior to the official closure of the census.
The status of censused renters or occupants could not automatically be changed by
their eventual judicial ejectment from the dwelling at the instance of the owner, considering
that their right to become lot beneficiaries of the ZIP was consistently recognized by the AAC,
the NHA, the OP and the CA.
FACTS:
The National Housing Authority conducted in 1987 the Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP)
census and tagging of structures as pre-qualifying requisites for determining the potential lot
beneficiaries in the Peafrancia ZIP zone in Paco, Manila pursuant to NHA Circular No. 13. In the
census, Carmen Blas was determined to be an absentee structure owner of the dwelling unit
tagged as Structure No. 86-313, while respondent Spouses Galapon were censused to be the
renters of the petitioner in the structure. The petitioner had been renting Structure No. 86-313 out
as a source of income. Alarmed that she might be disqualified as beneficiary, Blas filed a
petition for change of status from absentee structure owner to residing structure owner with the
Awards and Arbitration Committee (AAC) of NHA. The AAC recommended the approval of the
petition. Aggrieved, respondent Spouses appealed and was later awarded the 50-sqm lot. In
the meantime, the petitioner filed for and succeeded in the ejectment of the spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NHA Circular No. 13 disqualifies an absentee structure owner from owning
a lot within the ZIP zones and whether or not a judicially evicted occupant is still qualified to
become a homelot beneficiary
HELD:
YES. The following requisites must concur for one to be considered an absentee structure
owner:
1. The person must own a structure or dwelling unit within the ZIP zone;
2. The person has not occupied the structure or dwelling unit prior to the official closure of
the census
In this case, the petitioner did not meet the second requisite because it was the respondents,
not her, who were living in or occupying the structure at the time of the official ZIP census and
until they vacated the premises. It is undisputed that the respondents were the censused renters
or occupants of Structure No. 86-313. Such status could not automatically be changed by their
judicial ejectment at the petitioner's instance, considering that their right to become lot
beneficiaries of the ZIP was consistently recognized by the AAC, the NHA, the OP and the CA.
An ejected censused renter may only lose his status as a potential ZIP beneficiary if he does not
inform the NHA or the local government unit of his address.

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs. MUOZ
G.R. No. 207342, August 16, 2016
DOCTRINE:
Under the double criminality rule, the extraditable offense must be criminal under the
laws of both the requesting and the requested states. The requested state comes under no
obligation to surrender the person if its laws do not regard the conduct covered by the request
for extradition as criminal.
FACTS:
Muoz was the Head of the Treasury Department of the Central Bank of the Philippines.
Ho Chi was the Chief Executive of Standard Chartered Bank The Mocatta Group (Hongkong)
(MHK).
There were series of gold swaps and gold blacked loans between CBP and Mocatta
London through MHK. Funds from this account were subsequently disbursed to the benefit of Chi
and Muoz personally. None of the payments were known to and ever reached Central Bank.
The transactions are now the subject of 10 criminal cases filed against MHK. The Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region is now invoking the Agreement between the Government of
PH and the Government of HK for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons. A Note was
sent by HK to the PH Consulate General in HK to inquire on which agency should handle a
request for extradition under the RP-HK agreement. The DOJ received the request for the
provisional arrest of Muoz.
The DOJ, representing HKSAR, filed a petition for the surrender of Muoz to the HKSAR to
face the criminal charges against him in HK. The RTC granted the request for the extradition of
Muoz. It ruled that the extradition request sufficiently complied with the RP-HK Agreement.
However, upon MR, the Court of Appeals held that the crime of accepting an advantage as an
agent should be excluded from the charges for which he could be tried in Hong Kong due to
non-compliance with the double criminality rule.
ISSUE:
Whether the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent complies with the double
criminality rule
HELD:
NO. The crime of accepting an advantage as an agent does not have an equivalent in
this jurisdiction. The unauthorized giving and receiving of benefits in the private sector is not a
crime because there is no law that defines and punishes such act as criminal in this jurisdiction.
Although the crime of conspiracy to defraud was included among the offenses covered by
the RP-Hong Kong Agreement, and the RTC and the CA have agreed that the crime was
analogous to the felony of estafa through false pretense as defined and penalized under Art.
315 of the RPC, the other crime of accepting an advantage as an agent was not punished as a
crime in the Philippines.
NOTE: Double criminality rule is a requirement in the extradition law that states that the accused can be extradited from
one country to stand trial for breaking a second country's laws only if a similar law exists in the extraditing country.


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No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation

A case involving the validity of the termination of employment of an officer or employee

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NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Assets or properties, to be considered as ill-gotten wealth, must be shown to have

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

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ARTICLE III: BILL OF RIGHTS

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Government employees cannot expect privacy of information stored in government

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An electoral candidates continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of another country

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PUBLIC OFFICERS

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested

Administrative agencies granted quasi-legislative functions may craft rules and

The next-in-rank status of a government employee is not a guarantee to one's fitness to

An employee who is placed under preventive suspension pending investigation is not

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A compromise agreement does not necessarily warrant the dismissal of administrative

Employees of the Judiciary should observe punctuality in reporting to work. Tardiness, if

To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected

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A government-owned and controlled corporation may sue and be sued. However, no

The grant or denial of an application for Environmental Compliance Certificate/

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

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RAMA vs. HON. MOISES

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OCAMPO vs. ENRIQUEZ

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