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Court of Appeal Case No.

C079524

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

JAROSLAW WASZCZUK,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants and Respondents,

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

On Appeal from a Judgment of the Superior Court,


County of Sacramento
The Honorable David I. Brown, Judge
Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 34201300155479CUWTGDC

JAROSLAW WASZCZUK
In Pro Per
2216 Katzakian Way
Lodi, CA 95242
Phone: (209) 663-2977
E-mail: jjw1980@live.com

1
TO BE FILED IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
APP-008
Court of App<l&I Caoo Number.
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD APPELL.ATE DISTRICT, DIVISION CIVIL
C079524
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY {N9me, Sta!e Bar number. Md sd1ress): Superior Court case Number.

-Jarosluw Waszczuk In Pro Ptlr 34-2013-00155479


2216 Katzakian Way FOR COURT USE ONLY
Lodi, CA 95242
TELEPHONE NO" 209.663.2977 FAX NO. (Optlon81): 2 09 .3 70. 82 8 I
E-MP.ILADDRESS (Op/jonal) _jjW J 90@liVe.COITI

mORNEY FOR !Natnt1): Jaroslaw Waszczuk (self respresented) ln Pro Per

APPELLANT/PETITIONER: Jaroslaw Waszczuk

RESPONDENT/REAL PARTY IN INTEREST: REGENTS OF THE UNIV. OF CA

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS


(Check one): 0 INITIAL CERTIFICATE 0 SUPPLEMENTAL CERTIFICATE
Notice: Please read rules 8.208 and 8.488 before completing this form. You may use this form for the initial
certificate In an appeal when you file your brief or a prebriefing motion, application, or opposition to such a
motion or application in the Court of Appeal, and when you file a petition for an extraordinary writ. You may
also use this form as a supplemental certificate when you learn of changed or additional information that must
be disclosed.

1. This form is being submitted on behalf of the following party (name): JAROSLAW WASZCZUK

2. a. 0 There are no interested entities or persons that must be listed in this certificate under rule 8.208.
b. D Interested entities or persons required to be listed under rule 8.208 are as follows:

Full name of Interested Nature of interest


entity or person (Explain):

( 1)

(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)

D Continued on attachment 2.
The undersigned certifies that the above-listed persons or entities (col'porations, partnerships, finns, or any other
association, but not including government entities or th air agencies) have either (1) an ownership interest of 10 perc,nt or
more in the party if it is an entity; or (2) a financial or other i nterest in the outcome of the proceeding that the justices
should consider in determining whether to disqualify themselves, as defined in rule 8.208(e)(2).

Date: October 25, 2017

JAROSALAW WASZCZUK
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)

Page 1 of 1
Form Approved for OptloMI Use C.I. Rul of Coo. rule& 8.208, 8.488
Judicia CouncJ of California
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS c:-.o.Jrl,nfa.ca.gav
APP-008 [Rov. January 1, 2009]

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 1

II. THE COURTS' BIAS, DISCRIMINATION, AND PREJUDICE TOWARD


WASZCZUK AND FAVORITISM GIVEN TO THE DEFENDANTS AND
DEFENDANTS' ATORNEYS... ............................... ............ ...........4

A. The Oral Argument...... ....................................... ... .............. ......... 4


B. The Court's Preliminary Statement in the Opinion...................................8
C. The old Defendants' demurrer filed as the Special Motion to Strike by the
Defendants' attorney Michael Pott on December 1, 2014 ............... ........ 10
D. Waszczuk's pleading in the Superior Court entitled "Plaintiffs Ex-Parte
Application for Postponement"
.......................................... ..............15
E. Waszczuk's Opposition to the Defendants' anti-SLAPP Motion and
Waszczuk's Motion for Reconsideration...... ..................... ................. 15
F. Waszczuk's Motion to Dismiss Defendants' anti-SLAPP motion because
of violation by the Defendants of Discovery Stay Code of Civ. Proc.
425.16(g)............................................................ ..................... 16
G. Appellant Mediation Statement.................................... ............ ........ 17

III. THE MERIT OF THE CASE.................................... ............ ..........18


A.Superior Court Judgment Affirmation by the Court of Appeal ......... ..........18
B.
Waszczuk's Proposed third Amended Complaint ........................ ......... 20
C.The Defense Michael Pott's August 19, 2014 confer letter and Douglas Stein's
response dated August 26, 2014 ...... ........................... ..................... .20
D. The Second Amended Complaint is not valid.............................. .........22
IV. ARGUMENTS..................... ............................. ............... ......... 27
A. First Cause of Action ............................................. ......................27
B. Second Cause of Action: Tortious Interference with Economic Advantage... 31
C. Third Cause Of Action [Harassment and Failure to Prevent Harassment,
Discrimination, Retaliation: Government Code 12940 (A)] ... .................32
D. The Fourth Cause of Action - Violation of California Government Code
Section 8547 .10(b), which allows people to sue University of California
employees who intentionally engage in acts of reprisal........................ .33
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TO THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE AND THE HONORABLE
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT:

PETITION FOR REHEARING


FOR ERROR IN LAW OR PROCEDURAL PROCESS

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to rule 8.268 of the California Rules of Court, appellant


Jaroslaw Jerry Waszczuk (hereafter Waszczuk) petitions this Court for a
rehearing in the above-entitled matter after the Court issued an unpublished
opinion, dated October 10, 2017. The Court of Appeal, by the issued
Opinion, affirmed the April 14, 2015, State of California, County of
Sacramento Court Judgment signed by the Honorable Judge David I. Brown
(AOB 2) (Vol.VI, CT 1554-1562).
With the Judgement granted to the five Defendants, MICHAEL
BOYD, STEPHEN CHILCOTT, DANESHA NICHOLS, CINDY
OROPEZA, and BRENT SEIFERT, the Special Motion to Strike entered
judgment in favor of the five individual Defendants pursuant to the Code of
Civil Procedure, Section 425.16. The Court Order also granted to the
Defendants the right to strike the first four Causes of Action (COA) from the
Second Amended Complaint (SAC), which was crafted and unlawfully filed
against Waszczuks will and instruction by Waszczuks former attorney
Douglas Stein on September 30, 2014 (Vol. I, CT 170-244). The SAC was
filed by Stein with a suspended attorneys license and with help or
collaboration from the Defendants attorney Michael Pott, and the defective
SAC was approved by the Superior Court Judge Hon. David Brown (Vol. I

8
CT 164-168). Waszczuk is submitting this Petition for rehearing because the
Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District (hereafter
Court or 3DCA) unpublished Court Opinion in the above captioned case was
issued by the Court with unbelievable blunt bias against Waszczuk and with
favoritism given to the Defendants. Waszczuk views the Court decision as
prejudicial and discriminatory against and a large part of the Opinion as
merely a redacted Defendants Respondent Brief (RB) and other documents
filed by the Defendants in the Superior Court.
In the biased Opinion, the Court did not even mention the Oral
Argument which took place on August 28, 2017. The Superior Court and the
Court of Appeal also completely failed to address in their ruling the breached
2009 Settlement Agreement by the Defendants in relation to the Code of
Civil Procedure section 425.16 and to Vergos v. McNeal (2007) 146
Cal.App.4th 1387, 1399 (Vergos) in the light of Navellier v. Sletten 29
Cal.4th 82, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703 (ARB 47). Regardless of the
fact that Waszczuk had nothing to do with the defective Second Amended
Complaint filed by his former attorney Douglas Stein with a suspended
attorney license, the Superior Court and the 3DCA completely failed to
properly address the law and establish whether Waszczuk had a probability
of prevailing in the first causes of action defectively pleaded by Waszczuks
attorney sufficient to meet the minimum requirement under 425.16, subd.
(b).
The Superior Court and the Court of Appeal failed to establish
whether the Defendants Special Motion to Strike pursuant to 425.16 had
anything to do with Waszczuks complaint in furtherance of his right of
petition or free speech under the United States and California Constitutions
in connection with a public issue ( 425.16, subd. (b)(1)), or whether it is a
form of abusive litigation to throw Waszczuk out of court and not let him

9
find out through litigation about the Defendants electric power laundering
from the UC Davis Medical Center 27 MW cogeneration facility in relation
to enormous tax fraud.
The Superior Court and the Court of Appeal completely failed to
establish that their speech and writings are constitutionally protected, and
both Courts decisions are fraudulent in light of information and evidence
that Waszczuk provided, which were ignored after citing Vergos v. McNeal
(Kim v. Regents of University of California (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 160, 165)
and repeating aspects of the Defendants Respondents Brief (RB 16) in a
redacted statement that Waszczuks disregard of the Rules of Court should
not be overlooked, citing Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Ca1.App.4th 1229, 1246-
1247 and other cases in the Court Opinion PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
on page 2. In this matter, Waszczuk agrees with the Superior Court and the
Court Appeal. However, both Courts should apply the same rules to both
parties and should not discriminate against Waszczuk and use Waszczuks
unintentional mistakes against him because of his lack of proper knowledge
in litigations while ignoring the Defense attorneys mistakes and violation of
court rules and conspiracy against Waszczuk regarding Waszczuks
dismissed attorney, Douglas Stein.
Instead, the Court should writ something about the age discrimination
law by the Defendants, Skelly Law (AOB 15) [Waszczuk Ex-Parte
Application] (Vol. II 493-494) [Brief for Skelly Reviewer] (Vol. IV CT 983-
1005) regarding two of Waszczuks employees performance reviews for
2010/2011 and 2011/2012. Additionally, by some statements written in the
Opinion, the Court implies that the 66-year-old Waszczuk is an obsessive
lunatic.
Waszczuk was unlawfully fired from his job at age 61 without the
possibility of obtaining new employment and lost his house. Waszczuks life

10
was entirely destroyed after 13 years of service to the University of California
with an outstanding employee record, provided in [SAC] (Vol. I CT 175).
Waszczuk is happy in having no need to be more aggrieved by the Court of
Appeal than already caused by the Superior Court Judges Hon. David Brown
and Hon. Shelleyanne Chang.

II. THE COURTS BIAS, DISCRIMINATION, AND PREJUDICE


TOWARD WASZCZUK AND FAVORITISM GIVEN TO THE
DEFENDANTS AND DEFENDANTS ATORNEYS

A. The Oral Argument


On June 19, 2017, Pursuant to Rule 8.256 (c)(1) of the California
Rules of Court, Waszczuk conditionally requested the Oral Argument due to
the procedural posture of this case.
In his June 19, 2017 Oral Argument request, Waszczuk wrote to the
Court:
JAROSLAW WASZCZUK, Plaintiff and Appellant (hereafter
Waszczuk),request respond to the June 9, 2017 (enclosed) inquiry by the
Court as to whether oral argument is sought by Appellant in the instant
matter. Due to the procedural posture of this case, Waszczuk conditionally
request oral argument.
The conditional request is a result of the new finding and discovery after
Waszczuk filed this appeal in June 11, 2015 and the new facts and
discovery basically changed the venue of the case and appeal. In June -July
2015, Waszczuk discover new facts and why Waszczuk was
unscrupulously hunted down since January 2007 by Respondents and
Defendants until his employment was terminated in December 2012 with
the University of California after 13 years of service.
After the discovery of new facts which are partly outlined in Waszczuks
Augmented Record on Appeal, Waszczuk intended to File Third Amended
11
Complaint) in the Sacramento County Superior Court but Waszczuk
intentionally was blocked by the Respondents Motion to Stay on September
25, 2015 before Waszczuk actually was able pursue his idea to file the
Third Amended Complaint.
The new evidentiary material and corresponding arguments with
Appellant's Reply Brief need some clarification from Waszczuk especially
some statements from the February 2009 Settlement -Agreement, the
Regents of the University of California signed with Waszczuk. The grossly
violated and breached by the Respondents the February 2009 Settlement -
Agreement is the written contract enforceable only by the State of
California Courts if breached or violated by either party.
For the above reasons Waszczuk reverently requests that oral argument is
permitted and scheduled by the Court to afford Waszczuk an opportunity to
present and discuss the matter. Waszczuk, also considerately requesting
from the Court, not to grant Respondents any Motion to Strike before the
scheduled oral argument date.
Waszczuk conditional request for oral argument is based on the
appeal records and files in this matter.
Waszczuk conditional request for oral argument is based on the
appeal records and files in this matter.
The above case was ordered on the calendar for a hearing on Monday,
August 28, 2017, at 9:30 a.m. Waszczuk argued for himself in Pro Per, and
the Defendants were represented by an attorney from the Porter Scott law
firm, David Burkett.
According to Waszczuks recollection, in his 15 minutes allotted time
to speak, he pointed out to the Court that this appeal never should and never
would take place if Waszczuks attorney Douglas Stein would file a motion
pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure 664.6 to enforce the Settlement

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Agreement that the Regents of the University of California signed with
Waszczuk in February 2009 after Stein filed the First Amended Complaint
on June 16, 2014. Waszczuk visited Douglas Stein in El Dorado Hills just
before the Defendants filed the Special Motion to Strike with the hope that
Stein would cure the faulty pleading in the Second Amended Complaint.
Stein finally agreed to amend the complaint after Waszczuk gave him an
extra $500.00 in cash, thinking that the extra money would encourage Stein
to properly amend the complaint (AOB Page #14). Stein was very pleased to
have the $500.00 cash bonus from Waszczuk before Thanksgiving.
As Waszczuk pointed out to the Court, a few days later, instead of the
Third Amended Complaint to cure the defective SAC, Douglas Stein with
the Defense Attorney Michael Pott served Waszczuk the Special Motion to
Strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 (anti-SLAPP) in order
to teach Waszczuk a lesson about the First Amendment.
The last of Waszczuks issues during the oral argument was that he
attempted to amend the defective Second Amended Complaint and to dismiss
all individual Defendants after dismissing Douglas Stein on December 16,
2017. However, the Hon. Judge David Brown did not let Waszczuk do this.
In the October 10, 2017 Opinion, the Court did not mention by one
word that an Oral Argument took place nor that the Court Opinion
completely ignored Waszczuks argument and the information that his
attorney took Waszczuks money and did nothing for it.
The Court of Appeal shall not ignore Waszczuks Oral Argument
about the money that Waszczuk paid Stein for representation. The fact that
Stein purposely did not inform Waszczuk about the anti-SLAPP law and the
grave consequences of this law for Waszczuks wrongful termination lawsuit
is proof of the collusion between him and the Defense Attorney Michael Pott.
Hiding information from Waszczuk about the anti-SLAPP law and teaching

13
Waszczuk a lesson about the First Amendment in the form of a Special
Motion to Strike pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. 425.16 for the cost of a
$20,000 retainer to destroy Waszczuks lawsuit and devastate his life further
is too extreme, and the Court of Appeal should recognize this.
After just 15 minutes of oral argument, the Defendants legal counsel
David Burkett from the Sacramento-based law firm Porter Scott approached
Waszczuk in the Court Hall outside the courtroom and attempted to instigate
a confrontation. He made threats toward Waszczuk wife and tried to exploit
the emotional and financial suffering we have both experienced since UC
Regents terminated Waszczuk employment in December 2012 at age 61
without any possibility to find new employment . For the Court information
, Waszczuk spouse Irena Waszczuk is working in Nordstrom in Sacramento
as seamstress -fitter for almost 30 years and has nothing to do with the
University of California and Waszczuk lawsuit , Waszczuk spouse should
retire on September 21, 2017 at age of 66 but he cant due to devastation of
Waszczuks life and livelihood by UC Regents and their collaborators.
Burkett knew that Waszczuk was stressed due to financial hardship caused
by his clients criminal behavior; he thought that his attacks against my
spouse would easily provoke a confrontation. Sadly, this encounter was my
second time experiencing such shameful tactics in the court building. It is a
second time Waszczuk experienced such Defendants attorney behavior . It
happened before in 2015, prior to the court hearing with presiding Judge
Shelleyane Chang in the unemployment benefits Writ of Mandamus case
in which UC Regents is party as a Real Party In Interest( RPii.) UC legal
counsel and UC administrators must be very desperate if they resort to using
such tactics. Trying to provoke the opposing party into a physical
confrontation in an area heavily trafficked by sheriffs deputies and city
police is either very foolish or very underhanded.

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B. The Courts Preliminary Statement in the Opinion

On pages no. 1 & 2 of the Preliminary Statement, the Court stated:


We must reiterate what the trial court admonished plaintiff. At the
outset, the Court would note that a self-represented party is to be treated
like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater
consideration than other litigants and attorneys. (Williams v. Pacific
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 941, 944.) Thus, as is the
case with attorneys, self-represented litigants must follow correct rules
of procedure. Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247;
see also Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984. We add
that plaintiff has an equal responsibility to follow the California Rules
of Court applicable to appeals, no matter how sympathetic his claims
may seem to himself or us. It is a responsibility he has ignored to his
peril.Plaintiffs most glaring and consistent violation of the rules is his
failure to cite to the record. He makes grandiose accusations against the
University for illegally generating and selling electric power and for tax
evasion, but those allegations are not supported by citations to the
record and are not relevant to the special motion to strike. Plaintiff fails
to appreciate the limited scope of our review, which stands in stark
contrast to the wide-ranging allegations plaintiff lodges which are
untethered to the second amended complaint or the special motion to
strike. We are compelled to ignore any factual allegations that are not
supported by citations to the record.

Waszczuk sincerely apologizes to the Courts for his unintentional


mistakes in relation to the record on appeal. However, Waszczuk found the

15
Court statement discriminatory, biased, and prejudicial toward himself.
Regardless of what Waszczuks former attorney Douglas Stein and the
Defense attorney Michael Pott did to Waszczuk, forcing him to maintain his
lawsuit in Pro Per, the Court of law shall not use a double standard giving
preferential treatment to the Defendants.
The Court of Appeal record (Register of Action) shows that this
appeal was initially declared by the Court as fully briefed on August 23, 2016
after Waszczuk filed his Appellant Reply Brief. It appears that two and half
months later, after the case was fully briefed, the Court reviewed the case
and issued the following order on November 9, 2016:
On the court's own motion, the respondent's brief filed July 25, 2016,
is stricken for failure to [s]upport any reference to a matter in the
record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record
where the matter appears. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)((1)(c).)
A respondent's brief with proper citations to the record must be filed
on or before December 15, 2016. RAYE, P.J.
The Order was electronically filed on 11/9/2016 by Deputy Clerk
Anita Kenner.
In their July 25, 2016 RB, on pages 16 and 17 LEGAL
ARGUMENTS the Defendants cited Nwosu v. Uba (2004) (122
Ca1.App.4th) and complained about how Waszczuk disregarded the Rules
of Court by not citing the record and had their entire RB Brief stricken, which
had to be corrected and refiled. The incident with the RB in November 2016
indicates that the Court reviewed and screened all briefs to issue the Opinion.
If Waszczuks most glaring and consistent violation of the rules was his
failure to cite the record, then Waszczuk would appreciate if he would be
given the same chance as the Defendants attorney to correct his briefs and
resubmit. For the above reason alone, Waszczuks Petition for Rehearing

16
should be granted because Waszczuk sees many Court statements in the
issued Opinion that do not correspond with the facts. Waszczuk does not
understand why the Court placed Waszczuks appeal in abeyance for another
10 months after the Defendants attorney corrected their RB and refiled on
December 15, 2016. The Courts delay to resolve the appeal for almost a year
translated to Waszczuk being unemployed for another year and a $70,000
loss for Waszczuk, since he was dismissed by the Defendants in December
2012. Five years without a job translated to $350,000 lost since December
2012. The October 10, 2016 Court Opinion added more devastation to
Waszczuks life and health.

C. The old Defendants demurrer filed as the Special Motion to Strike


by the Defendants attorney Michael Pott on December 1, 2014

On September 1, 2017, just two days after Waszczuks Argument in the


Court of Appeal Third Appellate District (3DCA), the State Bar of California
suspended the attorney license for Waszczuks former attorney Douglas
Stein for matters supposedly unrelated to Waszczuks complaint violations:
the failure to pay the Bar members fees and Administrative Inactive/MCLE
noncompliance. The Case No. 15-O-10110, previously No. 14-31877,
against Douglas Stein, who defrauded Waszczuk of his $20,000 retainer, has
been pending in the State Bar since December 2014, as long as the Special
Motion to Strike that the Defendants filed against Waszczuk on December 1,
2014 [5/1/15 letter to State Bar Senior Trial Counsel Donald R. Steedman]
(AOB 18-19;27) (Vol. III 672-680). Waszczuk made multiple inquires with
the State Bar and asked California Senator Kathleen Galgiani to help resolve
the case against Douglas Stein in a timely manner. Apparently, the State Bar
was timing the resolution in Steins case with the 3DCA resolution in

17
Waszczuks Special Motion to Strike appeal, which is connected to Douglas
Stein.
On September 8, 2017, Waszczuk received a subpoena from the State
Bar to appear as a witness in the State Bar Court to testify against Douglas
Stein on October 12, 2017, just two days after the 3DCA issued the
Unpublished Opinion affirming the Superior Courts Judgement.
On September 9, 2017, a State Bar Notice of Disciplinary Charges
was filed against Douglas Stein in the State Bar Court in relation to
Waszczuks complaint.
On October 11, 2017, Waszczuk informed State Bar Investigator Ms.
Laura Sharek and Deputy Trial Counsel Ms. Laura Higgins that Waszczuk
was ill and asked for a trial continuance for one month.
On October 12, 2017, the California State Bar Deputy Trial Counsel
Ms. Laura Higgins informed Waszczuk that he had no need to appear on
the Bar Court Trial and that Douglas Stein had agreed to return the
advanced costs specified in the fee agreement ($14,500) in addition to the
costs Waszczuk incurred when closing Douglas Steins Wells Fargo
account.
During his preparation for the trial set for October 12, 2017 in the
disciplinary matter pending against Waszczuks former attorney Douglas
Stein, Waszczuk reviewed the Special Motion to Strike documents filed by
the Defendant on December 1, 2014. The anti-SLAPP motion was filed just
5 days after Waszczuk visited Douglas Steins residence in Eldorado Hills
on November 25, 2014 and paid him $500. 00 to fix the Second Amended
Complaint that was filed on September 30, 2014 with a suspended attorney
license in collaboration with the Defendants attorney Michael Pott. (Oral
Arguments on August 28, 2017)

18
While examining the documents, Waszczuk noticed that the Special
Motion to Strike all pleadings included five individual Defendant
Declarations and one Declaration that was not by a Defendant are the old,
altered Defendants Demurrer documents striking Waszczuks First
Amended Complaint or part of it with the pleading front pages, which instead
read Amended Complaint filed: September 30, 2014, whereas in the
Second Amended Complaint (SAC), all filed pleadings read Amended
Complaint filed June 16, 2014, referring to the First Amended Complaint
(FAC).
APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS (VOL. I , CT 255-256)
DECLARATION OF STEPHEN CHILCOTT HR EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR (Vol. II CT 338-343)
DECLARATION OF DANESHA NICHOLS (Vol. II, CT 386-388)
DECLARATION OF WENDI DELMENDO (Vol. II, CT 394-396)
DECLARATION OF CINDI G. OROPEZA (Vol. II, CT 404-406)
DECLARATION OF BRENT SEIFERT (Vol. II, CT 408-410)
MEMORANDUM OF POINT AND AUTHORITIES (Vol. II, CT
451-475)
DECLARATION OF MICHAEL BOYD (Vol. II, CT 440-442)
NOTICE OF DEFENDANTS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
(Vol. I, 251, CT 251-254)
DECLARATION OF MICHAEL W. POTT (Vol. I, CT 258-259)
Michael W. Pott is an expert in SLAPP law and public employment
law, and, as the Defendants attorney, he ad-hoc redacted and converted his
July 2014 Demurrer to anti-SLAPP motion against Waszczuks First
Amended Complaint and filed the defective pleading. The Proof of Service
attached to Michael Potts Declaration in Support of the Special Motion to
Strike states that:
19
On the date below, I served the following document:
DECLARATION OF MICHAEL W. POTT IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS AMENDED
COMPLAINT. Declaration was dated July 23, 2014 and was sent to
the Law office of Douglas E. Stein.

The fact is that the Special Motion to Strike was fabricated from the
old Demurrer in a rush manner during the long Thanksgiving weekend when
the University of California employees are off work for four days (ARB 26)
(Vol. V, CT 1479;1515). This shows that Defense Attorney Michael Pott was
tipped off by Stein that Waszczuk was demanding changes in SAC after Stein
agreed on November 25, 2014 to fix Waszczuks defective complaint
pleading for $500. The Defense attorney Michael Pott filed the old Demurrer
on December 1, 2014 as an anti-SLAPP motion, which never should have
been accepted by the Court . A special motion to strike is governed by section
Code of Civ. Proc. 425.16(f):

The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the
complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it
deems proper. The motion shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court
for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion
unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing.

The pleadings filed as a Special Motion to Strike fabricated during the


Thanksgiving weekend and filed by the Defense attorney Michael Pott on
December 1, 2014 are not the valid Special Motion to Strike court document,

20
but a fraudulent court document that should be rejected and dismissed by the
court.
Waszczuks attorney did not file an objection to the Defendants
Motion to Strike due on December 15, 2014, and he panicked when
Waszczuk told him on December 15, 2014 that he would report him to the
State Bar, then sent Waszczuk a text message saying that he had known the
Honorable Judge David Brown for more than 20 years and would get an
extension to file. The text message about the Hon. Judge Brown 1 was the
main reason that Waszczuk fired Stein. Waszczuk hates corruption and
corrupted lawyers.
Waszczuk is bringing up the issue of the old Defendants Demurrer
because it shows that the Special Motion of Strike was fabricated at the last
minute during the Thanksgiving weekend, which makes Waszczuk believe
that the Defendants attorney Michael Pott and Waszczuks attorney Douglas

21
Stein had something completely different on their minds to end Waszczuks
lawsuit.

D. Waszczuks pleading in the Superior Court entitled Plaintiffs


Ex-Parte Application for Postponement

On December 29, 2014, Waszczuk filed a pleading in the Superior


Court entitled Plaintiffs Ex-Parte Application for Postponement (Vol. II &
Vol. III CT 485-656).
In his Ex-Parte Application, Waszczuk requested from the Court
that the Court dismiss the pending anti-SLAPP motion "without
possibility to refile. (p. 14, II. 14-15); (2)
The Court declared Waszczuks Ex-Parte Application defective in the
Court Order dated December 30, 2014 (Vol. III CT 657-658) and denied
Waszczuks requests. However, the December 30, 2014 Court Order shows
that Waszczuks Ex-Parte Application first pleading document caught the
Courts attention.

E. Waszczuks Opposition to the Defendants anti-SLAPP Motion


and Waszczuks Motion for Reconsideration

On January 23, 2015, Waszczuk filed a Plaintiff Opposition to the


Defendants' anti-SLAPP Motion (Vol. III CT 00704-00740) with 42
exhibits totaling 443 pages (Vol. III & IV CT 741-1145) and the
Motion for Reconsideration (Vol. V; CT 1252-1275) with 10 exhibits
(Vol. V; CT 1276-1354) on February 20, 2015. Waszczuks Opposition
and Motion for Reconsideration were ignored as usual by the Court as
a formality with the words (Vol. VI; 1551-1553): 2

2 A self-represented party is to be treated like any other party and is entitled


to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.
22
The Hon. David Brown granted the anti-SLAPP Motion to the
Defendants, affirming the tentative decision after a court hearing that
took place on February 6, 2015 (Vol. V CT 1246-1251) (RT 0001-
00018), and the Court affirmed its own position against Waszczuk by
the Court Order (Vol. VI; CT 01551-01552) dated April 14, 2015,
granting the Defendants Special Motion to Strike. The Court Order
prepared by the Defendants attorney was signed on the same day, April
14, 2015 (Vol. VI, CT 1554-1562).
On March 16, 2015, Waszczuk filed the Notice of Objection to the
Proposed Court Order Granting Defendants anti-SLAPP Motion due to
violation by the Defendants of California Court Rule 3.1312(b) (Vol V. CT
1403-1461). Waszczuks Notice of Objection was ignored by the Court as
well.

F. Waszczuks Motion to Dismiss Defendants anti-SLAPP motion


because of violation by the Defendants of Discovery Stay Code of
Civ. Proc. 425.16(g)

On February 28, 2015, Waszczuks dismissed attorney, Douglas


Stein, forwarded an email to Waszczuk informing him that the Defendants
violated the Discovery Stay Code of Civ. Proc. 425.16(g) just six days after
the Defendants filed the Anti-SLAPP Motion in December. Somehow,
Waszczuk overlooked this and did not include it in his AOB or RB during
the pending appeal. The documents that Stein sent to Waszczuk contained a

(Williams v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1986) 186 Cal. App. 3d 941,
944) Thus, as is the case with attorneys, self-represented litigants must
follow correct rules of procedure. Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal. App. 4th
1229, 1246-1247; see also Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 975,
984

23
Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to obtain
Waszczuks record from the State of California Department of Fair
Employment and Housing. The subpoena was issued by the Defendants'
former Counsel, Michael Pott, on December 8, 2014, six days after the
Defendants filed the Anti-SLAPP Motion and violated Discovery Stay CCP
425.16 (g). The Defendants obtained the requested Plaintiff records without
the Plaintiff's knowledge on January 12, 2015, which was five days after the
Court issued an Order on January 7, 2015 stating that DISCOVERY
REMAINS STAYED PENDING RESOLUTION OF THIS MOTION.
On March 2, 2015, Waszczuk filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Defendants ant-SLAPP motion with prejudice for violation of Discovery
Stay by the Defendants during the time that the Defendants were pursuing
the anti-SLAPP motion they filed on December 1, 2014 (Vol. V CT 1376-
1402).
Waszczuks efforts to dismiss the Defendants motion for violation of
Discovery Stay were ignored as usual by the Court Order signed with bias
against Waszczuk by the Hon. David Brown on April 10, 2015 (Vol. VI, CT
1549-1550).
G. Appellant Mediation Statement

On July 9, 2015, Waszczuk filed the Appellant Mediation Statement


with detailed information, hoping that the Court of Appeals Third Appellate
District would consider his Appellant Statement. Instead, the resolve that was
oppressive to Waszczuk, the Defendants anti-SLAPP motion, occupied the
Court for another two years.
The eligibility for mediation was ignored and denied by the Court of
Appeals Order signed by the Honorable Justice Kathleen Butz on July 16,

24
2015 (Vol. VI, CT 01725-01800). Waszczuk covered this part in his
Appellant Reply Brief (ARB 13, 14).

III. THE MERIT OF THE CASE

A. Superior Court Judgment Affirmation by the Court of Appeal

In the first part of the Opinion, on pages 1 & 2, the Court, by affirming
the judgment which struck the Waszczuk four causes of action against the
Defendants, stated: 3
Waszczuk sincerely apologizes to the Court for offending the Court
by misunderstanding the burden on appeal and for unintentional ignorance
of the dispositive issue, of which Waszczuk still is not sure to what the Court
is referring. Furthermore, Waszczuk sincerely apologizes to the Court that he
brought to the appeal the issue of corruption, including collusion between his
then lawyer, the Defense counsel, and the trial judge. However, if the Court
felt offended and affirmed the judgment because Waszczuk insisted that the
judgment should be reversed due to systemic corruption, including collusion

3 Although Jaroslaw Waszczuk, a self-represented plaintiff, purports to


appeal the trial courts order granting five individual employees of the
University of Californias special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc.,
425.16) four causes of action arising from their involvement in his
termination, he does not argue the merits of the motion but insists the
judgment must be reversed because of systemic corruption including
collusion between his then lawyer, defense counsel, and the trial judge. He
misunderstands his burden on appeal, ignores the dispositive issues, provides
no evidence of corruption or untoward collusion, and fails to demonstrate
either relevance or prejudice from the shortcomings he cites. We need go no
further than to answer the contentions he raises, and in finding no merit in
those claims, we affirm.

25
between his then lawyer, the Defense counsel, and the trial judge, then
Waszczuk feels that it was unnecessary for the Court to write another 13
pages in legal opinion to further aggrieve a person who is already aggrieved
by the justice that he was served in the Sacramento County Superior Court
by two judicial officers, the Hon. Judge David Brown and the Hon.
Shelleyanne W.L. Chang. The Hon. Judge Chang is handling a cross-
connected case, Waszczuk v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeal
Board (CUIAB), Case No. C079254; Superior Court Case No: 34-2013-34-
00155479 No. 34-2013-80001699-CU-WM-GDS, which Waszczuk was
hoping would be resolved first by the Court of Appeal instant of slapping
Waszczuk with fraudulent anti-SLAPP Unpublished Opinion
However, even though Waszczuk disagrees with the Court Opinion,
which added more pain and suffering to his devastated life, Waszczuk was
somehow encouraged by the Court Opinion to look harder at where he made
unintentional mistakes and errors due to his lack of proper education and
experience in handling complex litigations, especially the appeals in the
Appellate Courts.
Waszczuks insufficient education and experiences in legal matters
does not mean that Waszczuk cannot recognize what is wrong and what is
right and who is wrong and who is right and who devastated Waszczuks and
his familys lives and livelihood at Waszczuks retirement age.
Based on facts and the clear and convincing evidence, Waszczuk has
little doubt and strongly believes that corruption, including collusion
between his dismissed attorney Douglas Stein, Defense counsel Michael
Pott, and the trial judge the Hon. David I. Brown took place, and, for this
reason, the Superior Court judgment should be reversed by the Court of
Appeal.

26
B. Waszczuks Proposed Third Amended Complaint

This case has merit, but not as the Court of Appeal presented in the
Opinion on pages 9-13. The merit of this case presented by the Court on
pages 9-13 is the fruit of former Defense attorney Michael Pott and
Waszczuks former attorney Douglas Stein unusual friendship and their
Second Amended Complaint, with which Waszczuk had nothing to do, with
the exception that his name is attached to it. Waszczuk wrote in September
2015 his 295-page detailed amended complaint without individual
defendants and with only two causes of action. Waszczuk provided the
proposed amended complaint to the Defendants attorneys David Burkett and
Douglas Ropel because they wanted to see it and they offered to help file it.
[See Waszczuks meet and confer letter Augmented Record on Appeal] (Vol.
I CAT 227-228) However, after Waszczuk sent his draft of the Third
Amended Complaint (TAC), it was blocked on September 25, 2015 by the
Defendants attorneys Motion to Stay pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc.
916(a) (Vol. I CAT 1-20). Waszczuk filed an objection (Vol. I CAT 126 -
203) to the Defendants Stay Motion on October 13, 2015, which did not do
Waszczuk any good, as the Hon. Judge Brown killed Waszczuks objection
as usual by the Court Order (Vol. I CAT 231) dated October 28, 2015 without
seeing the proposed TAC.

C. The Defense Michael Potts August 19, 2014 confer letter and
Douglas Steins response dated August 26, 2014

In the Opinion FACTS on page 5, the Court stated: 4

4 In a meet and confer letter dated August 19, 2014, Michael Pott,
representing the Regents and the employees sued in their individual
capacity, described a number of deficiencies in the first amended
27
Waszczuk understands the definitions of meet and confer and
demurrer and the new changes in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 430.41 & 472
regarding the demurred and complaint amendment. What the Court presented
in the Opinion is completely irrelevant to Waszczuks case, however.
The meet and confer letters exchanged between Stein and Pott
completely left the Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 out of the picture, since
the main goal of Pott and Stein was to avoid letting Waszczuk know about
the anti-SLAPP law. Waszczuk paid $20,000 to be advised about the anti-
SLAPP law and the consequences of this law, having nine individual
Defendants in the complaint. If Waszczuk had known that such a law existed,
then he would not be struggling today to write this Petition. This is why
Waszczuk does not care about the merit of this anti-SLAPP appeal. Stein and
Pott, by their corrupted behavior, caused Waszczuk enormous financial
losses of over $200,000 of his retirement funds through dealing with the anti-
SLAPP motion for three years.
Is the Court trying to imply in its own Opinion that Douglas Stein,
with 30 years of experience as an attorney at law, did not know the Code of

complaint that warrant the filing of a demurrer unless they can be


resolved by amendment. Stein spent 10 hours reviewing the first
amended complaint and researching the law in light of the alleged
deficiencies set forth in Potts letter. By letter dated August 26, 2014,
Stein agreed to amend the complaint in response to those deficiencies he
found legitimate and he explained why he rejected many others.
Stein prepared a second amended complaint with the same eight
causes of action. He signed the second amended complaint on September
8, 2014. Unbeknownst to him at the time, his license to practice law was
suspended on September 24, 2014, due to child support issues that he
resolved by October 7, 2014, but due to logistical aspects of the process,
the State Bar of California did not restore his license to an active status
until October 23, 2014. In the meantime, he filed the second amended
complaint on September 30, 2014.

28
Civil Procedure 425.16 and what SLAPP meant? Is it not a duty of
attorneys to protect their clients interests instead of exposing their clients to
harm by adverse parties?
Waszczuk is rather interested in whether the Court would explain in
the Opinion what would have happened if Stein had not filed a Second
Amended Complaint on September 30, 2014. Waszczuk has nothing to do
with the Second Amended Complaint.

D. The Second Amended Complaint is not valid.


The Court, in the DISCUSSION on pages No. 8 & 9, stated: 5

Douglas Stein, in collaboration with the Defense attorney Michael


Pott, by amending the First Amended Complaint, removed the University of
California, University of California Davis Health System, UC Davis Medical
Center, and UC Davis as Defendants, which Stein could just dismiss by the
Notice of Dismissal. Stein also removed some irrelevant material copied
from newspapers into the First Amended Complaint as a pretext to amend
the complaint and as the first stage of derailing Waszczuks lawsuit against
the University of California. As the Court noticed, Stein prepared a Second
Amended Complaint with the same eight causes of action, including the same
four causes of action that were sent by Defense Counsel Michael Potts

5 Yet plaintiff asserts that defense counsel colluded with Stein to file a second
amended complaint designed to rob him of meritorious claims. He also
contends that Stein bowed to defense counsels untoward pressure to amend
the complaint and subjected his pleadings to the anti-SLAPP motion. He adds
the naked allegation that the trial court acted improperly as well because the
trial judge had known defense counsel for a number of years. Plaintiffs
allegations are without evidentiary support.
Stein prepared a second amended complaint with the same eight causes of
action. He signed the second amended complaint on September 8, 2014.

29
Demurrer to Stein on July 23, 2014. Stein did not prepare a second amended
complaint with the same eight causes of action and with the same nine
individual Defendants for Waszczuks benefit. The SAC was needed for
Michael Pott to include in the complaint a copy of the 2009 Settlement
Agreement that Douglas Stein declared in the FACs eight causes as void,
unlawful, and against public policy (AOB 10) (Vol. I, CT 81-82) (Vol. VI
CT 1706-1707) (Vol. VII CT 1852).
Nothing was held back, allowing Defense attorney Michael Pott to file
the anti-SLAPP motion of the FAC in July or August 2014. Michael Pott is
a skilled attorney in SLAPP lawsuits.
Furthermore, the Court, on the same page of the Opinion, stated: He
signed the second amended complaint on September 8, 2014. (Vol. I CT
151) Douglas Stein signed the SAC on September 8, 2014 and submitted it
to the Court to file by the Drop Box with the attached proposed SAC and a
copy of the 2009 Settlement Agreement that the Regents of the University of
California signed with Waszczuk after the Regents were defeated by
Waszczuk in the arbitration process in November 2008 (Vol. I 153-163).
On September 9, 2014, Douglas Stein submitted the SAC to the Court
to be filed via Drop Box without being required to do so by Cal. Rule of
Court 3.1324 Leave of Court (Vol. I CT 244). Douglas Stein, as a licensed
attorney who had practiced law for 27 years, knew perfectly well that he
could not file the SAC without Leave of Court. Also on September 9, 2014,
Douglas Stein knew that he did not pay his members dues and child alimony
that his attorneys license from the State Bar of California was about to be
suspended.
On the same day, September 9, 2014, a Clerk of the Court returned
the SAC to Stein, stating: Leave of Court is required for all subsequent
amended complaints after the first amended. (Vol. I, CT 85)

30
The filing without Leave of Court was a premeditated and well-
planned move by Stein and Defense Counsel Michael Pott to get the SAC to
be returned and to manipulate into their dirty game against Waszczuk the
Sacramento County Superior Court Judge Hon. David I. Brown, who
Douglas Stein had known for 20 years. Nothing was amended, and Stein and
Pott needed Judge Brown to approve Steins Ex-Parte Application for Leave
to File the SAC. The SAC did not meet the strict requirements of the Cal.
Rule of Court 3.1324, as was stipulated by Steins and Potts Ex-Parte
Application for Leave to File SAC on 9/19/2014 (AOB 25)(Vol. I, CT 164),
and the Order approving the Ex-Parte Application was signed on September
22, 2014 by the Hon. David I. Brown from the Department 53 Law and
Motion Department without appointment or the appearance of the parties
(Vol I. CT 166-167).
On July 15, 2015, Waszczuk filed a Plaintiffs Opposition to the
Defendants Motion for the Fees and Cost (AOB 22) (Vol. VI, CT 1698-
1717). From the Defendants Motion for Fees and Cost exhibits (filed on
May 11, 2015) (AOB 22) (Vol. VI CT 1695-1696), Waszczuk found that the
Special Motion to Strike (anti-SLAPP) was approved to be filed by the
Sedgwick Insurance Liability Company on September 24, 2014 (Vol. VI CT
1636). This took place two days after the Hon. David Brown approved the
SAC to be filed in the Court without checking what was different between
the FAC and SAC. The Sedgwick approved the anti-SLAPP motion six days
before Douglas Stein filed the SAC on September 30, 2014 with a suspended
attorneys license (Vol. VI, CT 1711-1712).
The Sedgwick Insurance Company is a company that is doing serious
business and conducting any lawsuit in which the University of California is
involved. Apparently, the financially insolvent Waszczuks attorney

31
provided 100% assurance for the Defense attorney Michael Pott and used his
long friendship with the Honorable David Brown to achieve the above.
Because of the listed and not listed in the lawsuit Defendants
conspiracy 6 Waszczuk life since January 2007 became a misery and since
2012 was entirely devastated by the University of California white collar
criminals and thereafter by corrupted state of California administrative
agencies and corrupted judicial officers who collaborated with Waszczuk
former employer attorneys to harm Waszczuk.
On pages No. 8 of the Opinion Court stated: 7

6 The civil conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two or more


people to participate in an unlawful act or a lawful act in an unlawful
manner. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C.Cir.1983);
Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 620-21 (7th Cir.1979), modified on
other grounds, 446 U.S. 754, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980). An
express agreement among all conspirators is not necessary. "A Plaintiff ...
need not prove that each participant in a conspiracy knew the `exact limits
of the illegal plan or the identity of all participants therein.'" Hampton, 600
F.2d at 621 (quoting Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Greenberg, 447 F.2d 872,
875 (7th Cir.1971)). The conspirators "must share the general conspiratorial
objective, but they need not know all the details of the plan ... or possess
the same motives." Id. Thus, to "demonstrate the existence of a
conspiratorial agreement, it simply must be shown that there was a single
plan, the essential nature and general scope of which [were] known to each
person who is to be held responsible for its consequences." Id. (quoting
Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Greenberg, 447 F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir.1971)).
To make the conspiracy actionable, there must also be an overt act in
furtherance of the object of the conspiracy that injures Plaintiff his or
deprives him of having or exercising any right or privilege of a legal
resident of the United States.
7 His license to practice was reinstated within about two weeks of his
discovery of the suspension. On these facts, there is not the slightest hint
of impropriety. To the contrary, Stein was diligent and transparent
making an ex parte application to assure the integrity of the document he
inadvertently filed during the briefest of suspensions for a minor
transgression unrelated to his professional performance. He should be
32
Douglas Steins diligence and transparency cost Waszczuk $20,000
of the retainer fee and 3 years of fighting the anti-SLAPP motion instead of
working in the UC Davis Medical Center HVAC shop. The breach of the
2009 Settlement Agreement that the UC Regents signed with Waszczuk in
December 2012 resulted in Waszczuk losing approximately $800,000 of
income and benefits.
Because of Steins personal problems and misconduct, Waszczuks
retainer of $20,000 was basically stolen by Stein. Then, Stein became
vulnerable to conspire with Defense attorneys and Judge of Superior Court
David Brown to end Waszczuk lawsuit in December 2014 by the anti-
SLAPP motion. The Sacramento County Superior Court and the Court of
Appeal does not have jurisdiction over the attorney Douglas Steins
professional misconduct, and judicial officers from both courts knew that.
8Waszczuk knows that the trial court has wide discretion in allowing the

commended, not chastised, for his fervent representation of plaintiffs


interests.

8 No one may practice law in California without being an active member of


the State Bar of California, admitted to practice by the California Supreme
Court. (Bus. & Prof. Code, 6064, 6125.) The California Supreme Court
controls both admissions and attorney discipline (including suspension and
disbarment). (Saleeby v. State Bar (1985) 39 Ca1.3d 547, 557-58 [216
Cal.Rptr. 367].) The Supreme Court's control over these issues is absolute.
(Ibid.)
The State Bar of California acts as the Supreme Court's administrative
arm for purposes of admission, discipline, and regulation of attorneys. (In
re Rose (2000) 22 Ca1.4th 430, 438-446 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 298]; In re
Attorney Discipline System (1998) 19 Ca1.4th 582, 599-600 [79
Cal.Rptr.2d 836].) Attorney discipline proceedings are prosecuted by the
State Bar's Office of Chief Trial Counsel ("OCTC") before the State Bar
Court. (Bus. & Prof. Code, 6079.5; Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule
5.4(16).)

33
amendment of any pleading, but, in this case, the Court allowed the
amendment in order to hurt Waszczuk.
After the Appeal is finally concluded, Waszczuk will ask the Court
for Court Order to let Waszczuk include the civil conspiracy cause of action
in the amended complaint pursuant to California Civil Code Section
1714.10(a).

IV. ARGUMENTS

A. First Cause of Action

On page 12 of the Opinion, the Court stated:

Plaintiffs first cause of action for the intentional infliction


of emotional distress fails because the tort requires a
showing of outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of
human decency.

Waszczuk is curious whether the Court of Appeal ever came across


any wrongful termination case involving the University of California where,
in any University of California campus, management reassigned a blue collar
worker from one shop to another shop and made him look like a KKK leader
or guard from a Nazi concentration camp in their letter of suspension and
reassignment, (Vol.III, CT 870-875) then, three months later, gave the
employee a normal performance review for the same evaluation period in
which the employees alleged gross misconduct took place. (Vol. III, 876-
878)After giving the employee a normal evaluation and acknowledging that
the employee did nothing wrong, the management continued to process the
employees Appeal-Complaint under the UC Policy PPSM 70 for another
year and half and lost to the employee in the arbitration process, after which
34
the UC Regents signed a Settlement Agreement with the employee giving
him an engineering title. It will not end until the Court issues a proper
decision.
Furthermore, Waszczuk is curious whether the Justices of the Court
of Appeal who issued the Opinion in this case had ever come across a
wrongful termination case where any University of California employee with
whom the Regents signed a Settlement Agreement to make him isolated from
other department shops removed the employee from the premises for over
one year without alleging one word in any witch hunt documents that UC
witch hunters generated as a cause of termination without stating
that the employee violated or breached the signed Settlement Agreement?
Furthermore, the UC witch hunters did not provide the employee with
evaluations for the final two years of his employment because they knew
that, once removed from the premises, the employee would appeal the bad
evaluation under UC Policy PPSM 70, and a complaint could take two years
to resolve, during which process the employee could not be fired.
This happened to Waszczuk in the period of time between January
2007 and December 2012 in order to hide an illegal power sale fraud of which
Waszczuk was still unaware. Waszczuk got angry at the Defendant Chilcott
and UC Davis Chief Counsel Steven Drown when Waszczuk, by looking into
US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission e-library documents, found out
why they persecuted him in 2007-2009 and again in 2011-2012. The Defense
attorney Douglas Ropel complained about Waszczuks correspondence in
the Defendants Motion for Automatic Stay filed on October 19, 2015 to
block Waszczuks TAC (Vol. I, CAT 204-228 page 7[17-28]; Vol. I, CAT
2014). Ropel also attached as the Exhibit B to his pleading Waszczuks
correspondence in this matter to US Senator Dianne Feinstein. Waszczuk
was exchanging correspondence with the Senator for quite some time, not

35
knowing that Senator Feinsteins husband ordered Waszczuks dismissal
from his job in January 2007 (Vol. I CAT 218-225).
University of California, Davis, administration subjected 60-year-old
Waszczuk to malicious psychological terror unthinkable for any normal
person and beyond the bounds of human decency from April 2011 to
December 2012 and prior to this, in 2006-2007, with involvement of four of
five listed defendants in the lawsuit, Michael Boyd, Cindy Oropeza,
Stephen Chilcott, and Charles Witcher.
The terror and witch hunt aimed at Waszczuk between 2006 and
2012 included unwarranted suspension and reassignment interrogations in a
style Waszczuk knew from his native country during the Communist era,
when Waszczuk was subjected to such interrogation by Communist secret
police for his political activities against communism in 1980-1981.
Furthermore, the psychological terror and which hunt aimed at Waszczuk
included and was not limited to stalking Waszczuk; maliciously sabotaging
Waszczuks job and the duty assigned to him to set Waszczuk up for
failure; falsely accusing Waszczuk of racism, bigotry, and antisemitism; not
providing Waszczuk with a mandatory annual Employee Performance
Review for the years 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 to let Waszczuk know that
he was a persona non grata and to let him know that he had been singled
out and that his employment days were numbered; an attempt to force
Waszczuk to file a fraudulent workers compensation claim and thus remove
Waszczuk from the premises; and reassignment of Waszczuks job, which
was guaranteed by a Settlement Agreement Waszczuk signed with the UC
Regents in 2009, to an individual who bringing on premises a twice-
convicted child pornography felon and who was then allowed to illegally
surf shop computers (Case: 2 :6 cr- 00418-LKK, The United States of
America v. Sean Christopher Robideaux, United States District Court,

36
Eastern District of California, Indictment Violation(S) 18 U.S.C 2252 ()
(4)(B) Possession of Visual Depiction of Minors in Sexually Explicit
Conduct ).
After Waszczuk and his coworker reported the above-mentioned
crime, Waszczuk and his coworker Kenneth Diede automatically became
subjects of a witch hunt by the Defendants in July 2011, and Waszczuk was
not allowed to come back to work on September 1, 2011, after one month
of sick leave for work-related stress.
In addition to the above-listed acts of terror against Waszczuk, the
Defendants denied Waszczuks disability income in an attempt to force him
to take UC retirement and quit; placed Waszczuk on investigatory-
administrative leave for over one year and did not let Waszczuk know when
the administrative leave would end; sent Waszczuk threatening letters, even
during the time when Waszczuk was placed on work-stress-related sick
leave and was under physician and psychologist care; denied Waszczuk
health care insurance in December 2011 and January 2012; changed
Waszczuks title from Associate Development Engineer, given to
Waszczuk by the Settlement Agreement that Waszczuk signed with UC
Regents in 2009, to Programmer I without Waszczuks knowledge or okay;
crafted false, defamatory, and defacing investigatory reports about
Waszczuk; and, in May 2012, attacked Waszczuk and Waszczuks two
coworkers, to whom Waszczuk was providing representation, with
unwarranted disciplinary action in the form of suspension and ill-crafted
letters of expectations to prime Waszczuk for heinous ill-orchestrated but
unsuccessful provocation on May 31, 2012, in order to end Waszczuks
employment in UC Davis Medical Center Nursing Trauma Unit No. 11. For
this purpose they bribed UC Davis Police Lt. James Barbour with a
$35,000.00 wage increase as the executor and assigned Trauma Unit

37
Supervisor Karen Kouretas to receive Waszczuk if provocation was
successful. [Barbour Pay raise](Vol V CT 1354);[ Danesha Nichols
Waszczuk Confidential Summary for Chancellor ]( Vol. V ; CT 1349) -
What the UC Chancellor wanted to know about an immigrant from Poland
.? [ UC Davis Med. Center Poster Boy ) (Vol IV ; CT 1057-1061)
The involvement of the Defendants in the criminally minded pseudo
investigation to terrorize the employee because of believing that the
employee would blow the whistle constitutes the type of outrageous conduct
beyond the bounds of human decency that should not be tolerated by the
Court, and the Plaintiffs First Cause of Action shall remain in Waszczuks
complaint.
Blocking Waszczuks Third Amended Complaint by the Court after
the Court was informed about electric power laundering from the UCDMC
27 MW cogeneration plant by the UC Regents violated Waszczuks rights
to petition the government for redress of grievances under the First
Amendment of the US Constitution and was akin to close participation in the
Civil conspiracy with the Defendants.

B. Second Cause of Action: Tortious Interference with Economic


Advantage

The Second Cause of Action will be part of the Breach of the


Settlement Agreement Cause of Action in the new Third Amended
Complaint, with already calculated financial damages caused by the
Defendants in the approximate amount of $800,000 due to Waszczuks
unlawful termination.

C. Third Cause Of Action [Harassment and Failure to Prevent


Harassment, Discrimination, Retaliation: Government Code
12940 (A)]
38
The significant change in the whistleblower statute in California went into
effect on January 1, 2014. The statute, Cal, Lab. Code section 1102.5, has
been substantially expanded beyond its prior form to now protect employees
from retaliation for making internal complaints or even potential complaints
about suspected violations of federal, state or local law.
Under the revised provisions of Labor Code section 1102.5, it is unlawful
for any person acting on behalf of the employer to retaliate against the
employee based on a belief "the employee disclosed or may disclose" the
information, either internally or to a government agency. In effect, the
revamped law protects employees who have not yet even complained against
"anticipatory retaliation."
[ See the October 14, 2014 Waszczuk letter to UCOP Senior Vice President
and Locally Designated Officer in regard to his decision in Waszczuks
Whistle Blower Retaliation Complaint ]( Vol. IV , CT 1073-1082 page 5)
The Defendants, and especially five individual Defendants, knew and were
aware that Waszczuk is over 60 years old and has had open heart surgery and
life experiences that they have never had and that Waszczuk does not wish
for them to have. What the Defendants have done to Waszczuk and his
family is beyond Government Code 12940. The Defendants violated
Waszczuks human rights and denied him and his family the right to work
and live their normal lives. Even in the Court of Appeal, Hall, their attorney,
did not hesitate to make threats toward Waszczuks 66-year-old spouse, who
has nothing to do with the University of California.

39
D. The Fourth Cause of Action Violation of California
Government Code Section 8547.10(b), which allows people to sue
University of California employees who intentionally engage in
` acts of reprisal

On page 2 in the Opinion Preliminary Statement, the Court stated:

A brief excerpt from a letter he sent to the general counsel for the
University reflects his bitterness as well as his belief that there is much
more at stake than his mere wrongful termination lawsuit. He wrote: The
stake in this lawsuit must be a lot bigger and more important than the life of
a 63-year-old Polish refugee who escaped communist oppression and was
promised protection from oppression in his new country by the US
government. Instead of protection from oppression, the Polish refugee
received treatment from the University of California that has been a lot
worse than the treatment he received in the Polish communist prison, where
the communists prison guard was more respectful to the political prisoners
than UC management to its own employees. His experience has left him
emotionally distraught. At the end of a hearing in the trial court, he
announced he was done and was going to go outside of the courtroom and
shoot himself.

Actually, this is not what Waszczuk said at the Court hearing on


Friday April 10, 2014. Waszczuk asked the Hon. Judge Brown if he had to
go outside the Court building and shoot himself to make the judge look for
truth after a heated and lengthy discussion with Judge Brown about his over
20-year relationship with Waszczuks dismissed attorney, who stole
Waszczuks $20,000 retainer (CRT page 21). The Court hearing was about
the $500.00 that Waszczuk gave to Stein on November 25, 2014 to amend a
40
faulty complaint that he filed with a suspended attorneys license on
September 30, 2014 in conspiracy with Defense Attorney Michael Pott
(CRT page 20,19-28). Furthermore, Waszczuk disputed two conflicting
statutes: the Code of Civ. Proc 425.16 and Government Code 8547.10(b).
Waszczuk disputed these with the Hon. Judge Brown in his 443-page
opposition to the Defendants Anti-SLAPP motion (CRT page 20). In
addition, Waszczuk disputed the Judge Order dated December 17, 2014 that
approved the Second Amended Complaint, which was filed by Stein
against Waszczuks will and instruction and with a suspended attorneys
license, because nothing was amended in the complaint. Waszczuk pointed
out to the Judge that, by Court Order on January 7, 2014, he nullified all
documents filed after December 16, 2014 by Waszczuks attorney Douglas
Stein and the Defendants attorney Michael Pott, but let the anti-SLAPP
motion continue (CRT page 22). This was total abuse of discretion by the
Court. It seemed that what was most important to the Court of Appeal was
to twist Waszczuks statement about shooting himself within the Opinion to
make Waszczuk look mentally unstable. Waszczuk is stable and will
continue to fight in the Courts of Law against white collar criminals from
the University of California and their collaborators.
Furthermore, on page 3 in the Opinions Preliminary Statement,
the Court stated:

He makes grandiose accusations against the University for


illegally generating and selling electric power and for tax
evasion, but those allegations are not supported by citations
to the record and are not relevant to the special motion to
strike.

Waszczuk dont believe that it would proper to have thousands of


documents from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in in anti-
41
SLAPP On top of this Waszczuk found out about the regents and their
collaborators white collar crime during the pending Waszczuks
appeals. Hon. Sheleyanne Chang and her friend from California
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board Marylin Tays are two major
to uncover the UC Al Capones shady businesses UC Davis Medical Center
. The generation , sale and resale illegally power in tens of millions of dollars
from the UCDMC 27 MW cogeneration plant in time period of 1999-2003
and resumed in 2012-2013 was closely akin to the crimes committed by
like alcohol is a commodity( Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1985)
166 Ca1.App.3d 68) and sale of commodities is regulated by the
international law( Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court (1962)
208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 81) that the sale of a commodity is regulated by
international law and profit from sale is taxable .
Waszczuk is not sure how the Court determined that Waszczuks
allegation about the University generating and selling illegal power and
defrauding taxpayers is not relevant to the special motion to strike which
cause of action with the Government Code 8547.11
Waszczuks grandiose accusations are real. The Court was
properly informed about the Regents fraud in Waszczuks Augmented
Record on Appeal. In addition, Waszczuk informed the Court about the
Regents white collar crime in his Notice of Objection to the Defendant and
Respondents' Application for Extension of Time to File Respondents Brief,
which was due on 7/5/2016, when Waszczuk was being represented by the
Baum, Hedlund, Aristei, and Goldman Professional Law Corporation from
Los Angeles as well as in his complaint against the UC Regents to the US
Treasury Inspector General. This law firm specializes in such fraud cases.
On March 23, 2016, Waszczuk filed a 47-page detailed whistleblower
complaint with 35 exhibits. IRS Whistleblower Office Case No. 2016-007-

42
481 followed with a similar 53-page complaint with the State Board of
Equalization and the Tax Recovery and Criminal Enforcement as well as a
213-page complaint with the State Bar of California against 23 university
and state agency attorneys involved in covering up the fraud, including three
listed defendants in the ant-SLAPP lawsuit and 47 detailed complaints
against Superior Court Judge Hon. Shelleyanne Chang with the Commission
on Judicial Performance.
Keeping Waszczuk out of UCDMC premises for over one year and
persecuting him with pseudo investigations in order to fire him because of an
unlawful contract power sale between the UC Regents and the Sacramento
Municipal Utility District was underway and was signed on May 31, 2012.
Not providing Waszczuk with employee evaluations for the last two years of
his employment is a classic example of a despicable and outrageous violation
of the Government Code 8547.11 by all five individual Defendants: Boyd,
Chilcott, Nichols, Seifert, and Oropeza. Four of these Defendants are UC
Davis Medical Center Human Resources officers. Three of them have law
JD degrees. All of them knew how to harass Waszczuk with interrogations
and pseudo investigation reports for almost two years, but they did not
provide Waszczuk with employee evaluations for two years under UC Davis
Policy 23, making Waszczuk persona non grata
Government Code 8547.11 states: 9

9 (a) A University of California employee, including an officer or faculty


member, may not directly or indirectly use or attempt to use the official authority
or influence of the employee for the purpose of intimidating, threatening,
coercing, commanding, or attempting to intimidate, threaten, coerce, or
command any person for the purpose of interfering with the right of that person
to disclose to a University of California official, designated for that purpose by
the regents, or the State Auditor matters within the scope of this article.
(b) For the purpose of subdivision (a), use of official authority or influence
includes promising to confer, or conferring, any benefit; effecting, or threatening
43
In the Discussion on page 13, the Court stated: 10
These five individuals Defendants did not want see Waszczuk death for filing a
whistleblower complaint. Regents and their friends wanted to see Waszczuk W
death because UCDMC 27 MW cogeneration plant was plant was not selling
power since Grey Davis was recalled from office in 2003 . Waszczuk estimates
no matter who spent $ 65,000,000 in 1998 to build the 27 MW cogeneration
facility in UC David Medial Center lost approximate $ 250, 000,000 from 2003
to 2012. It is a lot of cash free of tax .
The power illegal power sale was briefly resumed on June 1,2012 but was
ceased eight days after Waszczuk filed his wrongful termination lawsuit in
December 2013. [Power purchase Agreement ] (Vol I , ACT ; Vol 156-180)
[Corespondence with US Senator Dianne Feinstein dated 9/26/2015] (Vol I ,
ACT , 195-203)

The five individual defendants were ordered by the Regents to hunt


Waszczuk down and fire him in 2007-2009 and 2011-2012 because

to effect, any reprisal; or taking or directing others to take, or recommending,


processing, or approving, any personnel action, including, but not limited to,
appointment, promotion, transfer, assignment, performance evaluation,
suspension, or other disciplinary action.

10 Finally, the trial court found that plaintiff did not establish that the
individual defendants conduct was in retaliation for his whistleblowing. The
court explained: The mere fact that Nichols, Oropeza and Seifert conducted
investigations and reached conclusions with which Plaintiff does not agree
with does not establish their investigatory findings are an act of retaliation.
Nor can Boyds decision to deny Plaintiffs grievance at the Step II level of
PPSM 70 review be deemed to be a retaliatory action. Finally, there is no
allegation that Chilcott took any particular action against Plaintiff that could
be deemed to be a retaliatory action. In the absence of any evidence or
analysis provided by plaintiff, we have no basis for reaching a finding at odds
with the trial court. Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of prevailing on a
whistleblower retaliation cause of action. (Gov. Code, 8547.10.)

44
whoever invested $65,000,000 into the UCDMC 27 cogeneration facility
in 1998 lost millions of dollars after the illegal power sale was ceased in
2003 due to Governor Grey Daviss recall from office. Waszczuk was
viewed as an obstruction who could find out about the laundered power
from the UCDMC 27 MW plant because of his involvement in the similar
$100,000,000 fraud in 1990-1998 committed by Waszczuks previous
employer, Dynegy, against Pacific Gas and Electric ratepayers and
California taxpayers. Waszczuk learned the real reason for his termination
in June 2015 thanks to an August 2012 interview of the UC Davis
Assistant Vice Chancellor, Dr. Shelton Dur uisseau, which Waszczuk
described in the letter to the University of California Office of
the President (UCOP) Principal Investigator J udith Rosenberg
in the Plaintiffs Opposition to the anti-SL APP motion (Vol.
III CT 794-802 page 3). Dr. Duruisseau disclosed in the
interview that the plant was built for a 50-year capacity and
that it was currently o nly us ing 9%. [Letter to UCOP Princ ipal
Investigator J udith Rosenberg ](Vol III, CT 793-8 01)
Waszczuk suspected that the UCDMC 27 MW plant was not in
complia nce with the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(PURPA) or the requirements set in 18 C.F.R.
292.203(b) and 292.205 for operation, efficiency, and use of energy
output and being certified as a Qualified Facility (QF) pursuant to 18
C.F.R. 292.20 requirements, the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
824d(a), California Public Utilities Code Section 218.5, State of
California Unfair Business Competition law, and Business and
Professions Code 17200. The prosecutors eye was closed to the tax
evasion and fraud that violated Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 and the State of California Revenue and Taxation Code in

45
relation to the illegal power sale from the UCDMC 27 MW cogeneration
plant.
E. February 2009 Settlement Agreement
Since February 2009 Waszczuk was employed by the Defendants per
2009 by written Settlement -Agreement agreement thus Vergos v. McNeal
(2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1399 (Vergos)) has no weight in Waszczuk
case . Defendants did not provided any evidence that they investigation
Waszczuk because breach of settlement agreement . The Settlement
agreement was result of the Defendnts January -March 2007 witch hunt
aimed at Waszczuk and which was orchestrated and supervised by the
Defendant Stephen Chillcott Witch who assigned to this task by the UC
Davis Chancellor Larry Vanderhoef and UC Davis Chief Counsel Steven
Drown in 2006. See the UCDM HR assigned witch hunters report dated
March 8, 2007 (Vol .III ;CT 858-868) and the Suspension and
reassignment letter dated March 23, 2007 portraying Waszczuk as a a
bigot , Jew heater etc. (Vol.III, CT 870-875) . The Annual Employee
Performance Review (Evaluation ) dated July 25, 2007 for the evaluation
period which Waszczuk included suspension and reassignment was signed
by the same manager Charles who suspend and reassign Waszczuk to
HVAC shop . (Vol. III, 876-878) . The evaluation for 2006/2007 is the best
proof that everything was orchestrated to fire Waszczuk but the plants
two managers basically refused to participate in the witch hunt and the
Chilcotts maliciously planned attempt to destroy Waszczuk failed . In
January 2009 Defendant Chilcott solicited Settlement -Agreement with
Waszczuk . See the Waszczuks meet and confer negotiation letter
addressed to Defendant Chilcott and dated January 19, 2009 (Vol. III 881-
883) following by February 2009 Settlement -Agreement Waszczuk signed
with UC Regents (Vol. III, CT 884-899) The peace did not last long and

46
Chilcott promoted from the investigator position to the UC Davis Health
System HR Executive Director position with $ 300, 000 annual salary and
lot of given power employed forces which almost ended Waszczuk
employment with UCDMC in the UCDMC Trauma Unit # 11 on May 31,
2011. See March 7, 2003 Waszczuk Whistle Blowing Retaliation
Complaint ( Vol IV , CT 1015-1057 page 15-23) . On September 26, 2012
Defendant Chilcott in collaboration with new UC Davis Police Chief
distributed Police Poster with Waszczuk photo and description on and did
not inform Waszczuk about (Vol. IV , CT 1057-1061) In October 2011
Waszczuk complained against Defendants Chilcott and Danesha Nichols to
the UC Davis Police Department not knowing why Waszczuk being
attacked so viciously and removed from the premises on September 1, 2011
for over one year until Waszczuks employment was terminated on
December 7, 2012. See Waszczuk inquiry to UCDPD Captain Joyce Souza
( Vol IV , CT 1131-1141) In this letter on page 6, Waszczuk provided
information to Captain Souza that Waszczuk complained to State Bar
against Defendands Chillcott and Danesha Nichols.

After February 2009, Waszczuk was employed by the Defendants by


written Settlement Agreement. Thus, Vergos v. McNeal (2007) 146
Cal.App.4th 1387, 1399 (Vergos)) has no weight in Waszczuks case. The
Defendants did not provide any evidence that they investigated Waszczuk
because Waszczuk breached or violated the signed with Regents February
2009 Settlement -Agreement. In Vergos Plaintiff was not employed by
settlement agreement . If five Defendants did not provide Waszczuk with
evaluation for 2 years than Court must decide what polices were applied to
Waszczuk to judge Waszczuk performance as an employee .

47
V. THE DEFENDANTS GROSSLY VIOLATED WASZCZUKS
RIGHT OF PETITION OR FREE SPEECH UNDER THE
UNITED STATES AND CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONS IN
CONNECTION WITH A PUBLIC ISSUE C.C.P 425.16.

The five Defendants filed the anti-SLAPP motion against Waszczuks


wrongful termination under Code of Civ. Proc. 425.16, claiming that they
had investigated, represented, and reviewed Waszczuks complaints and
were protected from the lawsuit under the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution or State of California SLAPP law, which Waszczuk heard
of for the first time on December 1, 2014.
Waszczuk did not know anything about SLAPP law in December
2014, but he knew that the Defendants lied in their declarations attached to
the anti-SLAPP motion because they did harass and discriminate against
Waszczuk.
Waszczuk does not deny the Defendants their right to free speech, but
their free speech should not have been used to violate Waszczuks and other
UC employees civil and human rights.
Besides defending himself, Waszczuk was also defending others from
the orchestrated witch hunts that were carried out by other HR employees
and department managers and supervisors under the guidance of Stephen
Chilcott, Bren Seifert, Danesha Nichols, and Cindy Oropeza. The Defendants
were doing everything possible to prevent access to his job site and contact
with employees who Waszczuk represented under the UC Davis Compliant
Resolution Policy PPSM 70 or UC Whistle Blowing Policy. They also
attacked the employees that Waszczuk represented in order to isolate
Waszczuk from them.
On October 23, 2012 after Waszczuk was kept out of the UC Davis
Medical Center premises for more than one year by criminally and ill
minded Defendants HR Consultant Gina Harwood sent a letter to

48
Waszczuk informing him that he is permitted to serve as the representative
in complaint meeting for Kenneth Diede , William Buckans and Dereck
Cole. Gina Harwood forgot mention to Waszczuk that the UC Police
Most Unwanted poster with Waszczuk photo and description is still
hanging araound UC Davis Campuses and Ms. Harwood did not say
what is going to happen to Waszczuk if show up in UC Davis Medical
Center . (Vol IV , CT 1106 [letter] and 1057 [Most Unwanted Poster ]
[10/20/2013 Waszczuk s sent inquiry sent to Defendant Boyd in Re :
Request to Schedule a Hearing for the Step II Appeal -Dereck Coles
2011/2012 Evaluation UC Davis PPSM 70 . Defendants Boyd and
others did not give a same chance to Waszczuk with his evaluations for
2010/2011 and 2011/2012. ] (Vol VI , CT 1517 -1526) to defend his
employees rights under the UC Davis Policy PPSM 70. No one of the
listed Defendants should be dismisses by the court from the lawsuit
because of their notorious violations of UC Policies they were
supposedly to enforce for the employees and university protection and
rights So far no one Judge or Justice had a courage to ask Defendant
attorneys why Defendants did not provide Waszczuk with the
evaluations he was entitle to have as any other UC Davis Medical
Center employees including the Waszczuk represented during the course
of his employment with the UCDMC The Compliance Resolution
Officer (CRO) and listed Defendant Michael Boyd and other highly
skilled professionals were aware that denying Waszczuk administrative
remedies to resolve dispute under the UC Davis Complaint Resolution
Policy PPSM 70 . The California Supreme Court in the quite clear about
the administrative remedies to UC employees under the PPSM 70 These
administrative remedies which are the main subject in Palmer v.
Regents of the University of California, 107 Cal.App.4th 899, 132

49
Ca1.Rptr.2d 567 (Cal.App. Dist.2 04/08/2003) and Janet Campbell v.
Regents of the University of California (Supra S113275.) However, as
Court noticed on the Page No. 4
The first amended complaint did not, however, contain a cause of action
for violation of PPSM 23.
However Court anyway affirmed the Superior Judgment having full
knowledge how much effort Waszczuk put to force his crooked lawyer to
amend properly the First Amended Complaint and restore the violation of
PPSM 23 by the five listed Defendants . Four of them are highly skilled
UCDM Human Resources Department including Defendant , HR
Executive Director Steven Chilcott . The Court completely ignored
Waszczuk Oral Argument in this matter during the Court hearing on
August 28, 2017.
Waszczuk was attacked by Defendants in 2007 and again in 2011-2012
Waszczuk because :
On January 5, 2007, respondents in the filed in August 2000 with
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) complaint San Diego Gas
& Electric Company v. Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Service Into
Markets Operated by the California Independent System Operator
Corporation and the California Power Exchange, Re: Investigation of
Practices of the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the
California Power Exchange (CalPX), Docket Nos. EL00-95-000 and EL00-
98-000, submitted a Joint Offer of Settlement and Motion for Expedited
Consideration, with accompanying Joint Explanatory Statement and APX
Settlement and Release of Claims Agreement (Settlement Agreement), in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 602 of the Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 18 C.F.R. 385.602 (2007) of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.

50
The APX and APX participants in the January 2007 Settlement and Release
of Claims Agreement 5.2 entitled Non-Monetary Consideration stated:

UC Davis Medical Center. The UC Davis Medical center represents that


the generation unit at the University of California Davis Medical Center
only sold ancillary services to the ISO during the Refund Period. APX
submitted unit-specific bids and schedules on behalf of the Regents of the
University of California (Regents) to the ISO and APX received unit-
specific dispatch instructions and ancillary service awards from the ISO.
Settlement statements from the ISO clearly identify all UC Davis Medical
Center schedules and transactions by unit designation for instructed energy,
deviations and ancillary service award. If the Regents and the California
Parties reach a settlement of refund issues related to APX Transactions
prior to the Settlement Effective Date, the Regents shall be excluded from
this Agreement. The APX Participants will not impede the Regents from
settling issues directly related to the APX Transactions with the California
Parties.

A. The Court Hearing on February 6, 2015 Defendants anti-SLAPP


Motion Code of Civ. Proc, 425.16 with Presiding Hon. David I. Brown

Waszczuk does not know why he was not given the same rights as
the Defendants under Code of Civ. Proc. 425.16. Quite a few times,
Waszczuk represented UC Davis Medical Center employees during
pending witch hunt action orchestrated and conducted by the Defendants
listed in the lawsuit. Waszczuk was denied access to UCDMC premises for
over one year.
The Defendant Chilcott ordered the employees complaint to be
placed in abeyance, and the employees that Waszczuk represented were
harassed, wrongfully accused, and disciplined.
51
This occurred on February 6, 2015 during the discussion with Hon.
David Brown on the issue of Waszczuks representation of others (CRT page
8, 25-28) (CRT page 9, 1-28) (CRT 10, 1-5):
THE COURT: Let's talk about the five guys that are implicated by this
motion. After paragraph 70 of your papers, you said, and I believe this was
in your complaint, your first amended complaint, and this is not just the
only paragraph, you said the investigation was flawed, corrupt and biased.
The five people that you're addressing in this particular motion that you're
opposing, this motion, these five you've alleged were involved in the
investigation and proceeding that you alleged are corrupt, fraudulent, and
bad.
MR. WASZCZUK: Exactly, Your Honor.
THE COURT: But it all arises out of the investigation. Their actions all
arise out of the investigation.
MR. WASZCZUK: Your Honor, I cannot be treated differently than other
employees.
THE COURT: Agreed.
MR. WASZCZUK: This is the whole point here. You know, if other
employees are getting an evaluation, then I have to get an evaluation. If
other employees get the same acquisition letter of expectation, then I should
get a letter of expectation, and everything is there in this big pile.
THE COURT: And unfortunately I read all of it; every bit.
MR. WASZCZUK: It's necessary to understand I understand perfectly UC
policies because I represent people, Your Honor, many people. I don't
violate policies. I am representing people who were accused of violating
policies.
THE COURT: What do you mean, you're representing?

52
MR. WASZCZUK: I am representing I was representing people, my
coworkers, policies PPM 70.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. WASZCZUK: I'm still one guy who I still represent. I moved this to
the EEOC. Represent in the EEOC for discrimination.

The above conversation with the Hon. David Brown shows that
Waszczuks representation caught the Courts attention, and Waszczuk
believes that the Court did not read the exhibit, subsequently ignoring
Waszczuk and his representation of others.
After the Court granted the anti-SLAPP Motion for the Defendants,
Waszczuk, in his Motion for Reconsideration filed on February 20, 2015
(Vol. V, CT 1252-1270), on page 2, reminded the Court about his
representation of others and how, at the same time as Waszczuk was denied
access to the employees represented by him, he was attacked by letters of
suspensions, causing him to be absent for eight months from the UC Davis
Medical Center HVAC shop [Suspension Letter absent in shop 8 months]
(Vol. V CT 1316-1354).
If Waszczuk had known anything about SLAPP and the anti-SLAPP
law in December 2014, then Waszczuk would have filed a cross-complaint
against the Defendants anti-SLAPP. This should have been done by

Waszczuk representation for Frank Gonzales: Letter of Expectation (Vol


V, CT 1311-1313) ;Frank Gonzaless Declaration (Vol.III, CT 767-770);
September 30, 2014 Waszczuk letter to Defendant Mike Boy Re: Frank
Gonzaless letter of Expectation (Vol. IV , CT 1092-1096); November
Waszczuks representation for Dereck Cole :-Letter of Expectation (Vol. V,
CT 1319-1335); [Waszczuks inquiry to Gina Harwood ; HR SPHR Re:

53
Dereck Coles latter of Expectation with copy of the complaint under UC
Davis Policy PPSM 70 ] (Vol IV , CT 1107-1114 ) [10/20/2013 Waszczuk s
inquiry sent to Defendant Boyd in Re : Request to Schedule a Hearing for the
Step II Appeal -Dereck Coles 2011/2012 Evaluation UC Davis PPSM 70 .
Defendant Boyd did not give a same chance to Waszczuk with his
evaluations for 2010/2011 and 2011/2012. ] (Vol VI , CT 1517 -1526)
.Waszczuk presented in details how differently Waszczuk was treated by
Defndannt s Boyd in Plaintiffs Appeal Meditation Statement using Dereck
Cole case in which Waszczuk represented Cole
Waszczuks represention for Kenneth Diede: [ Kenneth Diedes Declaration]
(Vol. III, CT 759-765) ;
Waszczuks representation for William Buckans: [William Buckans;
Declaration ](Vol. III, CT 745-757);
[Waszczuks July 12, 2007 Public Record Act Request In Re: Unlawful
machine oil discharge from UCDMC 27 MW cogeneration plant to
Sacramento River for 7 years] (Vol .III , CT 774-792);[Waszczuk
correspondence with UCOP Principal Investigator dated March 11, 2014] (Vol
III , CT 793 -802) ; [Waszczuk correspondence with US Senator Dianne
Feinstein ](Vol. III, CT 804-814); October 2000 [Eduardo Espinosa
correspondence with UCOP Vice President Judith Boyette ](Vol III. CT 815-
830); [Waszczuk April 2001 letter to CAL/OSHA District Manager and in
regards to unsafe working condition in the UCDMC 27 MW cogeneration
plant plus the issued copies of citations by CAL/OSHA] (Vol III, CT 835-
845) [May 24, 2012 Waszczuk inquiry entitled REVANGE ISNT WISE in
re of Waszczuk two cowerkers and Waszczuk friends , Kenny Diede and
William Buckans who were viciously attacked by their supervisors at the
order of Defendant Stephen Chilcott ]

54
Waszczuks attorney, who wasted Waszczuks $20,000 retainer and
conspired with the Defense attorney Michael Pott.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Waszczuk Petition for Rehearing in the above shall be granted
to Waszczuk by the Court for the captioned reasons:

1. The Superior Court abused its own discretion by accepting the Second
Amended Complaint filed on September 30, 2014 against Waszczuks
will and instructions. The Second Amended Complaint did not amend
anything relevant that should have been amended. The Second
Amended Complaint was filed with an evil motive by Waszczuks
attorney Douglas Stein in conspiracy with the Defendants Attorney
Michael Pott in order to harm Waszczuk. The Second Amended
Complaint was filed by Ex Parte Application stipulated between Stein
and Pott to bypass the filing Drop Box and avoid a Court Clerk
detecting that the Second Amended Complaint was the same as the First
Amended Complaint and grossly violated the Cal. Rule of Court 3.1324.
The Superior Court abused its own discretion and jurisdiction in
accepting the Second Amended Complaint and deeming it valid by
Court Order dated December 17, 2014, which was extorted from the
Superior Court Hon. Judge Brown by Waszczuks dismissed attorney
Douglas Stein and his partner Michael Pott by Ex Parte stipulated
application for an extension of time to oppose the old, defective
Defendants Demurrer, which was filed as an anti-SLAPP motion.

2. The Defendants Special Motion to Strike, filed on December 1, 2014,


shall be dismissed by the Court. The motion is actually the old July

55
2014 Defendants Demurrer and was filed with a defective pleading as
the anti-SLAPP motion of Waszczuks First Amended Complaint.
The Second Amended Complaint, filed on September 30, 2014 by
Waszczuks former attorney Douglas Stein with a suspended attorneys
license, should be declared null and void. Douglas Stein is currently
suspended to practice law and is being prosecuted by the State Bar due
to misrepresenting Waszczuk and defrauding Waszczuk of a $20,000
retainer fee. The Superior Court and the Court of Appeal have no
jurisdiction to permit attorneys to practice law with suspended licenses.
The Defendants anti-SLAPP motion is the old demurrer crafted by
Defense attorney Michael Pott in July 2014 and was filed as the
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint instead of the Second Amended
Complaint. The Plaintiff would never be permitted by the Court to file
such defective documents, and the documents would be stricken by the
Defendants motion. Additionally, the individual Defendants
Declarations are most likely forged.
3. The Superior Court Hon. Judge Brown was biased and prejudiced
against Waszczuk in every Court Order issued and signed since
September 22, 2014 [Ex Parte Application] (Vol. I, 166-167), with the
exception of the Stay Order for the Defendants to attempt to extort legal
fees from Waszczuk in the amount of $32,738 (Vol. VI, CT 1694-
1695).
4. The Court of Appeal Third Appellate District Opinion in the above
captioned case is discriminatory, prejudicial, demeaning, and degrading
toward Waszczuk, using twisted facts and statements. The Opinion
praised Waszczuks dismissed attorney, who is an ordinary thief who
stole Waszczuks retainer in the amount of $20,000 and caused
Waszczuk enormous damage. Rather than being transparent and

56
diligent, this attorney has had his license suspended for not paying child
alimony and being prosecuted by the State Bar.
The Courts prejudicial and discriminatory Opinion reminded
Waszczuk of his employment at UC Davis Medical Center and how
differently the five individual Defendants treated other employees in
comparison to Waszczuk. By giving the opportunity to the Defendants
to correct the Reply Brief while denying Waszczuk the ability to correct
his briefs, the Court acted in a similar manner to how the five
Defendants acted in providing evaluations to other employees to give
them a chance to correct their performance but denying this chance to
Waszczuk. The Court used Waszczuks mistakes against him in the
discriminatory and outrageously biased Opinion.
For this reason alone, the Petition for Rehearing should be granted to
Waszczuk.
In conclusion of this Petition for Rehearing , Waszczuk respectfully asks the
Court of Appeals to reverse the Superior Court Judgment dated April 14,
2015, and allow Waszczuk to correct and refile the SAC or file the TAC.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California
that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 25 day of October 25,
2017, in Lodi, California.

___________________________________
Jaroslaw Waszczuk Plaintiff and Appellant

57
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.360(b)(1), I certify that

this Petition for Rehearing contains 14257 words, based on the word-
count feature of my word-processing program.

DATED: October 25, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

______________________________
Jaroslaw Waszczuk
Plaintiff and Appellant In Pro Per

58
DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY ELECTRONIC MAIL
TRUEFILING

Re: Jaroslaw Waszczuk v. The Regents of the University of California


Case No.: C079524
I, IRENA WASZCZUK the undersigned, declare that 1 am over 18 years of age
and not a party to the within cause; my address is 2216 Katzakian Way, Lodi,
CA . On October 25 ,2017 served a true copy of the attached PETITION FOR
REHEARING on each of the following, by ELECTRONIC MAIL
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District
914 Capitol Mall
Sacramento, CA 95814

CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA


County of Sacramento
720 Ninth Street, Department 53, Honorable David I. Brown
Sacramento, CA 95814-1380
California Supreme Court
350 McAllister St,
San Francisco, CA 94102

David P.E. Burkett Esq.


PORTER/SCOTT LAW FIRM
350 University Avenue, Suite 200
Sacramento, CA 95825
Each said envelope was then sealed and deposited in the United States Mail at San
Joaquin County, California, the county in which I am residing, with the postage
thereon fully prepaid.
I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of California that

the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on October 25, 2017 , at Lodi CA
______________________
IRENA WASZCZUK

59
Filed 10/10/17 Waszczuk v. Regents of the University of California CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA


THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

JAROSLAW WASZCZUK, C079524

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No.


34201300155479CUWTGDS)
v.

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF


CALIFORNIA et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

Although Jaroslaw Waszczuk, a self-represented plaintiff, purports to appeal the


trial courts order granting five individual employees of the University of Californias
special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16) four causes of action arising from
their involvement in his termination, he does not argue the merits of the motion but
insists the judgment must be reversed because of systemic corruption including collusion
between his then lawyer, defense counsel, and the trial judge. He misunderstands his
burden on appeal, ignores the dispositive issues, provides no evidence of corruption or
untoward collusion, and fails to demonstrate either relevance or prejudice from the

1
shortcomings he cites. We need go no further than to answer the contentions he raises,
and in finding no merit in those claims, we affirm.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff, a Polish immigrant, feels deeply aggrieved by the University of
California (the University), his lawyer, the defense lawyer, and the trial judge. A brief
excerpt from a letter he sent to the general counsel for the University reflects his
bitterness as well as his belief that there is much more at stake than his mere wrongful
termination lawsuit. He wrote: The stake in this lawsuit must be a lot bigger and more
important than the life of a 63-year-old Polish refugee who escaped communist
oppression and was promised protection from oppression in his new country by the US
government. Instead of protection from oppression, the Polish refugee received treatment
from the University of California that has been a lot worse than the treatment he received
in the Polish communist prison, where the communists prison guard was more respectful
to the political prisoners than UC management to its own employees. His experience
has left him emotionally distraught. At the end of a hearing in the trial court, he
announced he was done and was going to go outside of the courtroom and shoot himself.
While plaintiffs pain is clear, his legal analysis is not. We have carefully
scrutinized his briefs and the record in a diligent attempt to decipher his legal theories.
Much remains a mystery. We must reiterate what the trial court admonished plaintiff.
At the outset, the Court would note that a self-represented party is to be treated like any
other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants
and attorneys. (Williams v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 941,
944.) Thus, as is the case with attorneys, self-represented litigants must follow correct
rules of procedure. Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247; see also
Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984. We add that plaintiff has an equal
responsibility to follow the California Rules of Court applicable to appeals, no matter

2
how sympathetic his claims may seem to himself or us. It is a responsibility he has
ignored to his peril.
Plaintiffs most glaring and consistent violation of the rules is his failure to cite to
the record. 1 He makes grandiose accusations against the University for illegally
generating and selling electric power and for tax evasion, but those allegations are not
supported by citations to the record and are not relevant to the special motion to strike.
Plaintiff fails to appreciate the limited scope of our review, which stands in stark contrast
to the wide-ranging allegations plaintiff lodges which are untethered to the second
amended complaint or the special motion to strike. We are compelled to ignore any
factual allegations that are not supported by citations to the record.
Plaintiff loses this appeal, but it is not the end of his lawsuit for wrongful
termination. The trial court reminded plaintiff at the hearing on the special motion to
strike that the Regents of the University of California (the Regents) were not protected if
they discriminated or retaliated against him and, therefore, [i]ndependent of the five
individuals who are before the Court on this motion, [plaintiff] still retains his right to sue
the Regents because they are still in the lawsuit and hes still the plaintiff. In this
context, we recite the brief facts relevant to the issues plaintiff raises on appeal.

1 An appellant must support all statements of fact in his briefs with citations to the
record [citation] and must confine his statement to matters in the record on appeal.
[Citation.] (Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 29.) [I]t is counsel's duty to
point out portions of the record that support the position taken on appeal. (Del Real v.
City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) The Court of Appeal must not search
the record on behalf of an appellant or serve as backup appellate counsel. (Mansell v.
Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545-546.)

3
FACTS
Plaintiff worked in the University of California Davis Medical Centers Plant
Operations and Maintenance Department for 13 years. He received many years of
favorable performance reviews. In 2007, however, he was given a disciplinary transfer
from the central plant to the HVAC/plumbing shop. He filed a grievance and ultimately
entered into a settlement agreement with the University whereby he agreed to the transfer
in exchange for a promotion to an exempt position with a more prestigious job title.
In 2011 the University again initiated an investigation of plaintiff based on
complaints that he had violated University policies by engaging in acts of ethnic
discrimination constituting hate incidents in the workplace. He was terminated in 2012.
He appealed the termination and ultimately filed a whistleblower retaliation complaint.
In this court, he fixates on his belief the Universitys suspension, investigation, and
termination were nothing more than a witch hunt designed to remove him, preferably
by getting him to quit, and thereby enable the University to resume its alleged tax-free
illegal power sales. He asserts, again without citation to the record, the University
attempted to assassinate him.
Plaintiff filed his first complaint, in pro. per., in December 2013. The complaint
included six causes of action: wrongful termination; retaliation; the intentional infliction
of emotional distress; failure to prevent harassment, discrimination, or retaliation; breach
of the settlement agreement; and violation of the Universitys Personnel Polices for Staff
Members (PPSM) 23. Plaintiff thereafter hired a lawyer, Douglas Stein, who filed a first
amended complaint on his behalf in June 2014. The first amended complaint set forth
eight causes of action, including a cause of action entitled Breach of Written Contract.
The written contract referred to the settlement agreement plaintiff reached with the
University to resolve his first grievance. The first amended complaint did not, however,
contain a cause of action for violation of PPSM 23.

4
In a meet and confer letter dated August 19, 2014, Michael Pott, representing the
Regents and the employees sued in their individual capacity, described a number of
deficiencies in the first amended complaint that warrant the filing of a demurrer unless
they can be resolved by amendment. Stein spent 10 hours reviewing the first amended
complaint and researching the law in light of the alleged deficiencies set forth in Potts
letter. By letter dated August 26, 2014, Stein agreed to amend the complaint in response
to those deficiencies he found legitimate and he explained why he rejected many others.
Stein prepared a second amended complaint with the same eight causes of action.
He signed the second amended complaint on September 8, 2014. Unbeknownst to him at
the time, his license to practice law was suspended on September 24, 2014, due to child
support issues that he resolved by October 7, 2014, but due to logistical aspects of the
process, the State Bar of California did not restore his license to an active status until
October 23, 2014. In the meantime, he filed the second amended complaint on
September 30, 2014.
On December 1, 2014, five defendants, Michael Boyd, Stephen Chilcott, Danesha
Nichols, Cindy Oropeza, and Brent Seifert (the individual defendants) filed a special
motion to strike the first four causes of action in the second amended complaint as a
strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) suit (hereafter referred to as the
anti-SLAPP motion). (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16.) Stein, then unaware that plaintiff had
fired him, filed an opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion on plaintiffs behalf. Plaintiff
did fire Stein, proceeded in pro. per., and requested an extension of time to file his own
opposition. Plaintiff filed his opposition late and exceeded the page limit. Nevertheless,
the trial court considered the entirety of plaintiffs opposition and granted his request to
disregard the opposition filed by Stein.
On December 17, 2014, Stein filed an ex parte application for relief from the
potential defective filing of the second amended complaint. Stein explained to the court
that his license had been temporarily suspended because he had mistakenly paid the

5
wrong amount of child support for two or three months, a mistake that was quickly
rectified once he learned of it. The trial court granted Steins application and ruled that
the second amended complaint filed on September 30, 2014, is deemed validly filed.
In ruling on the individual defendants anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court
followed the requisite two-step process. First, the court examined the individual
defendants showing whether their acts were taken in furtherance of their constitutional
rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. The court found the
individual defendants made a prima facie showing. The individual defendants speech,
the court ruled, was made in connection with the processing, investigation, hearing and
deciding the workplace complaints filed by Plaintiff and others pursuant to University
policies. Second, the court found that plaintiff did not sustain his burden of showing a
likelihood of prevailing on each of the elements of the four causes of action as well as
defeating the individual defendants affirmative defenses. The court, therefore, granted
the individual defendants anti-SLAPP motion.
Plaintiff appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
The Allegations
Plaintiff believes that his employer, defense counsel, the trial judge, and even his
own lawyer, are corrupt and colluded to destroy his life. These allegations, not the merits
of the anti-SLAPP motion, are at the heart of plaintiffs appeal. He writes: There is no
need for Waszczuk to base this appeal on the merit of the case which is important and
Clerk Transcript is speaking for itself, if the whole legal process in this case was
corrupted by the Defendants attorney, Michael Pott, and Waszczuks attorney, Douglas
Stein misconduct, and their actions against Waszczuk were approved by the Court on
September 22, 2014, and December 17, 2014.

6
There is nothing we can decide in this appeal or write in this opinion that will
disabuse plaintiff of this fiercely held belief. He fails to understand that these very
serious allegations are not before us on appeal of the anti-SLAPP motion. We will
explain for his benefit what the record discloses to usthe utter absence of any evidence
to support even a colorable claim of misconduct by any of the lawyers or judicial officers
in this case. We will also briefly describe the procedural context in which the allegations
are made and the futility of pursuing his corruption theory against these individual
defendants. Despite the ferocity of plaintiffs feelings to the contrary, the fact that the
second amended complaint did not contain what he hoped it would does not translate into
reversible error and the fact that his lawyer and defense counsel engaged in an interactive
process to avoid an unnecessary demurrer does not translate into corruption.
Let us begin with plaintiffs focus on the second amended complaint. As best we
can decipher, his objection is twofold: (1) He is troubled that Stein did not pursue his
theories that the University breached the settlement agreement and failed to follow
internal policies by not providing him annual performance reviews for two years, and (2)
he accuses the trial court of improperly validating the filing when Steins license had
been temporarily suspended.
Both objections are irrelevant to the individual defendants anti-SLAPP motion,
which sought to strike only four of the eight causes of action stated in the second
amended complaint. Whether or not Stein would have expanded the second amended
complaint to include additional causes of action has no bearing on whether the four
causes of action were properly stricken. In any event, we are baffled by plaintiffs
insistence that Stein refused to include a cause of action for breach of the settlement
agreement is belied by the language of the sixth cause of action for breach of a written
contract which appears to embody that very claim.
Plaintiff fails to cite any authority to support his claim that the trial court
improperly validated the filing of the second amended complaint. The claim lacks both

7
legal authority and evidentiary support in the record. Rather, Stein was forthright in his
disclosure to the court. When he filed the second amended complaint he was unaware
that his status with the State Bar had changed. The reason for his very brief suspension
was unrelated to his competency or ethics in the practice of law. Rather, as Stein
explained, he made an inadvertent error on the amount he paid in child support for two or
three months. His license to practice was reinstated within about two weeks of his
discovery of the suspension. On these facts, there is not the slightest hint of impropriety.
To the contrary, Stein was diligent and transparentmaking an ex parte application to
assure the integrity of the document he inadvertently filed during the briefest of
suspensions for a minor transgression unrelated to his professional performance. He
should be commended, not chastised, for his fervent representation of plaintiffs interests.
Yet plaintiff asserts that defense counsel colluded with Stein to file a second
amended complaint designed to rob him of meritorious claims. He also contends that
Stein bowed to defense counsels untoward pressure to amend the complaint and
subjected his pleadings to the anti-SLAPP motion. He adds the naked allegation that the
trial court acted improperly as well because the trial judge had known defense counsel for
a number of years. Plaintiffs allegations are without evidentiary support.
The record discloses a cordial, thorough, and appropriate exchange between two
lawyers engaged in a meet and confer process designed to avoid an unnecessary
demurrer. The thoughtful letters exchanged by counsel described the legal issues
presented by the first amended complaint and the authorities upon which they relied to
support their positions. Stein relented on a few minor issues, but held steadfast as to the
viability of his theories. Plaintiffs sheer speculation about the lawyers motives is totally
unsubstantiated; indeed, the record belies his accusations.
In summary, we conclude plaintiffs accusations of misconduct, corruption, and
collusion between the lawyers and the trial court are unsubstantiated and unfounded. But
even more importantly, they are irrelevant to the sole issue properly before us on

8
appealwhether the trial court erred by granting the five individual defendants anti-
SLAPP motion to strike four of the causes of action alleged against them. We turn,
therefore, to the only relevant issue presented.
II
The Merits
The anti-SLAPP statute provides: A cause of action against a person arising
from any act of that person in furtherance of the persons right of petition or free speech
under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that
the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim. (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) We review an order granting an anti-
SLAPP motion de novo. (Daniel v. Wayans (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 367, 379.)
As explained above, the trial court engages in a two-step process in determining
whether to grant an anti-SLAPP motion. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) In this case, the trial court found the individual
defendants made a prima facie showing to satisfy the first prong and plaintiff did not
challenge this finding in his opening brief. Belatedly in reply, he contends that the
defendants did not show any record or evidence that the Defendants Nichols, Chilcott,
Boyd, Seifert, and Oropeza, who brought the anti-SLAPP motion to strike Waszczuks
first four causes of action, were made in connection with the processing, investigation,
hearing, and deciding of the workplace complaints filed by Waszczuk.
In short, the court acknowledged that University policies and procedures have the
force and effect of a state statute (Kim v. Regents of University of California (2000)
80 Cal.App.4th 160, 165); statutory procedures qualify as official proceedings authorized
by law as contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (Vergos v. McNeal
(2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1399 (Vergos)); the constitutional right to petition includes
the act of seeking administrative action (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity

9
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115); and investigations and investigatory reports prepared in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by an official body, such as a
public entitys internal investigations, are protected activities under the anti-SLAPP
statute (Miller v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1383). Because the
speech of the individual defendants who were subject to the anti-SLAPP motion was
made in connection with the processing, investigation, hearing and deciding the
workplace complaints filed by Plaintiff and others pursuant to University policies, the
court concluded the individual defendants satisfied their burden and shifted it to the
plaintiff to demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits.
Plaintiff insists that Vergos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 1387, cited by the trial court,
does not support the granting of the anti-SLAPP motion. We disagree. In Vergos, an
employee of the University named the manager who denied his administrative grievance
as a defendant in his sexual harassment lawsuit in her individual capacity. (Id. at
p. 1390.) The manager filed a special motion to strike contending that her statements and
communicative conduct in handling the employees grievances were protected by Code
of Civil Procedure section 425.16 because they (1) were connected with an issue under
review by an official proceeding authorized by law, and (2) furthered the right to petition
of the plaintiff and similarly situated employees. (Vergos, at p. 1394.) We agreed and
affirmed the judgment.
We pointed out that the managers only conduct targeted in the complaint involved
her hearing, processing, and deciding the employees grievances. (Vergos, supra,
146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396.) Similarly, here the trial courts finding parroted our
conclusion in Vergos. And the court reviewed the allegations against each of the five
individual defendants and reported their involvement as follows:
The allegations of the SAC [second amended complaint] against Nichols attack
her protected participation in the official investigations. The SAC specifically alleges
Nichols communications regarding the investigation and her investigative conclusions.

10
Nichols was appointed to investigate Plaintiffs whistleblower complaints, and was also
appointed to conduct an investigation into complaints of workplace violence filed by
Putney and Daniliuc. All were protected petitioning activities.
The allegations against Boyd and Chilcott are limited to their receipt of emails
from Nichols relating to the investigations, and Chilcotts sending of an email relating to
the investigation of Plaintiff. The emails are protected speech in connection with an
investigation process.
The allegations against Oropeza and Seifert are based upon their investigation
into the emails plaintiff sent to Nichols in April 2012. Oropeza and Seifert conducted
their investigation pursuant to the Universitys grievance protocol and reached
conclusions documented in a report.
Boyd acted as Complaint Resolution Officer (CRO) at Step II of the
Universitys PPSM 70 process, hearing and deciding Plaintiffs appeal of his
termination.
In sum, each of the individual defendants, like the manager in Vergos, were
involved in the investigation, hearing, processing, and/or deciding plaintiffs and his co-
workers grievances. We conclude, as in Vergos, their conduct was within the protective
ambit of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Thus we must review the trial courts
resolution of the second step in the analysiswhether plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood
of success on the merits.
Without citation to specific pages in the record or argument about the likelihood of
success of each element of the four causes of action or even a response to the trial courts
thorough analysis, plaintiff invites us to review his 443-page opposition to the anti-
SLAPP motion and insists, again without analysis, that the evidence is overwhelming.
He falls miserably short of his duty on appeal to cite to the record, to present cogent
argument, and to support his argument with applicable legal authority. In this vacuum,
we turn to the trial courts statement of decision wherein the court provides a brief and

11
apt rationale for finding plaintiff did not sustain his burden of showing a likelihood of
prevailing.
Plaintiffs first cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress
fails because the tort requires a showing of outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of
human decency. The court found [w]hat plaintiff has alleged, and what his evidence in
opposition appears to support, are complaints concerning personnel management by
defendants. Pleading of personnel management activity is insufficient to support a claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged.
(Janken v. [GM Hughes Electronic (1996)] 46 Cal.App.4th [55,] 80.) We agree with the
trial court that none of the allegations against these individual defendants involved in the
investigation and resolution of the grievances constitutes the type of outrageous conduct
beyond the bounds of human decency necessary to prevail on a claim of the intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff is unable to surmount the basic principle of law that an employee or
former employee cannot sue a current or former supervisor or employee for interfering
with his or her prospective economic advantage by inducing the employer to terminate
the plaintiffs employment. (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 24; Shepperd v.
Freeman (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 339, 347.) On this basis, the trial court properly
concluded plaintiff failed to provide any countervailing authority or analysis as to why
the facts before the court show the likelihood of prevailing on his interference with
prospective economic advantage cause of action.
Plaintiffs discrimination claim meets another definitive legal obstacle. Individual
defendants cannot be sued for discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing
Act (FEHA), nor can they be sued for failing to prevent discrimination, retaliation, and

12
harassment. (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 663-664; 2 Janken v. GM Hughes
Electronic, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 63.) Plaintiff has not shown any likelihood of
surmounting this obstacle.
Finally, the trial court found that plaintiff did not establish that the individual
defendants conduct was in retaliation for his whistleblowing. The court explained: The
mere fact that Nichols, Oropeza and Seifert conducted investigations and reached
conclusions with which Plaintiff does not agree with does not establish their investigatory
findings are an act of retaliation. Nor can Boyds decision to deny Plaintiffs grievance at
the Step II level of PPSM 70 review be deemed to be a retaliatory action. Finally, there is
no allegation that Chilcott took any particular action against Plaintiff that could be
deemed to be a retaliatory action. In the absence of any evidence or analysis provided
by plaintiff, we have no basis for reaching a finding at odds with the trial court. Plaintiff
has not shown a likelihood of prevailing on a whistleblower retaliation cause of action.
(Gov. Code, 8547.10.)
III
Plaintiff maintains he should have been allowed to amend his complaint for the
third time. As support he cites cases involving demurrers, not special motions to strike a
SLAPP. His authorities, therefore, are inapposite. The anti-SLAPP statute makes no
provision for amending the complaint once the court finds the targeted conduct is
protected speech. (Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073.)

2 After Reno v. Baird, supra, 18 Cal.4th 640 was decided the California Legislature
amended FEHA's harassment provision expressly holding individual employees liable for
their harassment. (Scott v. Solano County Health & Soc. Orders Servs. Dep't (E.D. Cal.
2006) 459 F.Supp.2d 959, 966, citing Gov. Code, 12940, subd. (j).) There is no
harassment claim targeted by the individual defendants anti-SLAPP motion.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment striking the four causes of action against defendants Nichols,
Oropeza, Seifert, Boyd, and Chilcott is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs
on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

RAYE , P. J.

We concur:

NICHOLSON , J.

ROBIE , J.

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